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COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS díospóireacht -
Thursday, 22 May 2003

Vol. 1 No. 19

2001 Annual Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General and Appropriation Accounts.

Vote 33 - Department of Health and Children.

VFM Report No. 42 - Car parking at Beaumont Hospital.

Mr. John Lamont (Chief Executive, Beaumont Hospital) and Mr. Michael Kelly (Secretary General, Department of Health and Children) called and examined.

We are dealing with the annual report of the Comptroller and Auditor General. I welcome everybody to the meeting. The first item with which we will deal is the car park at Beaumont Hospital, followed by chapters 9.1 and 9.2 of Vote 33.

Witnesses should be made aware that they do not enjoy absolute privilege and should be appraised as follows. Members' and witnesses' attention is drawn to the fact that, as and from 2 August 1998, section 10 of the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997 grants certain rights to persons who are identified in the course of the committee's proceedings. These rights include the right to give evidence, the right to produce or send documents to the committee, the right to appear before the committee either in person or through a representative, the right to make a written or oral submission, the right to request the committee to direct the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and the right to cross-examine witnesses. For the most part, these rights may only be exercised with the consent of the committee. Persons being invited before the committee are made aware of these rights and any person identified in the course of proceedings who is not present may have to be made aware of these rights and provided with a transcript of the relevant part of the committee's proceedings if the committee considers it appropriate in the interests of justice.

Notwithstanding this provision in legislation, I remind members of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that members should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House, or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. Members are also reminded of the provisions in Standing Order 156 that the committee shall also refrain from inquiring into the merits of a policy or policies of the Government, or a Minister of the Government, or the merits of the objectives of such policies.

I ask Mr. Lamont, chief executive of Beaumont Hospital, to introduce his officials.

Mr. John Lamont

Thank you, Chairman. I would like to introduce James Rogan, who is the internal auditor of Beaumont Hospital.

I ask Mr. Michael Kelly, the Secretary General of the Department of Health and Children, to introduce his officials.

I am accompanied by Helen Minogue, assistant principal and Dermot Smyth, Assistant Secretary, both of whom are in the finance unit; Bernard Carey, a director on the personnel side of the Department; and Mr. Colm Desmond, a principal in the primary care area of the Department.

Thank you, Mr. Kelly. Will the Department of Finance officials introduce themselves?

Mr. Michael Errity

I am in the organisation and management division. I am accompanied by Mr. Joe Mooney from the public expenditure division and Mr. Liam Murphy from the budget and economic division.

Will Mr. Purcell introduce the value for money report on the car park at Beaumont Hospital?

Mr. John Purcell

The subject matter of this report has its origins in the audit of the 1999 accounts of Beaumont Hospital when we were finding it difficult to establish the full circumstances surrounding the development and operation of the multi-storey car park at the hospital.

The project involved a complex public private partnership type arrangement whereby a developer, using a partnership of investors, financed the construction of the car park and in return was effectively granted a lease to operate it. It provided for the charging of parking fees, the payment of a rent to the hospital and the reversion of the car park to the hospital after 13 years.

The car park was built by way of a fixed cost contract and came in at about €8.6 million. As is the norm in these matters, the governing framework for the arrangement was highly structured in order to avail of the tax breaks on offer. The diagram on page 19 of the report will give members some idea of the nature of the relationships between the parties. The particular tax incentives applicable in this case were capital allowances on the construction costs and double rent relief on operational costs.

The proposal for a tax financed project to procure the car park was floated in late 1997 by the project co-ordinator of a similar scheme for Tallaght Hospital. It was approved by the board of Beaumont Hospital and then by the Department of Health at the end of June 1998. On the face of it the proposal was attractive to the hospital. It was getting a new multi-storey car park built on the site of its main ground car park, giving a net 230 additional parking spaces while maintaining the same level of income it was getting from the existing car park but, as is often the case, somebody loses in these so-called win-win situations.

A financial model of the relative costs of the tax based deal and the alternative cost of direct provision of the facility shows that the big loser in this case was the Exchequer. We calculated that the State was between €8.9 million and €13 million worse off in net present value terms as a result of going for this deal. Most of the difference is accounted for by the amount of income tax foregone from investors in the project. The potential loss to the State was not considered by either the hospital or the sanctioning authority, the Department. I believe at the time its view was that the tax incentive approach was the only game in town as no public capital funding was available for car parking facilities at hospitals.

The other major point of the report is the way mismanagement of the agreement led to a situation where only €120,000 was received in rent from the operating company for the period June 1999 to March 2002 as against the €1.8 million envisaged under the terms of the lease. What happened was that financial penalties were being imposed by the operating company for alleged illegal parking in the grounds of the hospital and deducted from the rent due.

In my view the basis for the scale of the penalties imposed was questionable in some respects and should have been challenged but the way the agreement was panning out had not rung any alarm bells in the hospital. The consequences of the failure to properly control public parking, together with the implications of the way the operator was calculating the penalties, did not come to the attention of the board, or top management of the hospital, until about early 2002. Belatedly, the hospital took up the matter with the operator and negotiations have been ongoing to try to resolve the historic issue and also the position going forward. I will let the chief executives update the committee on developments on that score.

Other aspects of the handling of the project were not altogether satisfactory. The financial analysis of the development proposals was not as thorough as I would have expected. However, since the choice of the successful developer was partly based on deliverability grounds, it may not rank as a critical issue. Another point worth mentioning is that the hospital's continued use of a subsidiary company to receive the rent may have taxation repercussions, depending on the view which Revenue may ultimately take.

Thank you, Mr. Purcell. I invite Mr. Lamont to make his opening statement.

Mr. Lamont

Thank you, Chairman. I welcome the opportunity of appearing before the committee to explain exactly what has happened under my regime since I took office in October 2001 in relation to the multi-storey car park project. In setting out my statement regarding this matter, it is not my intention to repeat the facts as set out in the value for money report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, which has just been summarised. Accordingly, in this opening statement, I will concentrate on the events that may not be specifically referred to in the report but which may indicate to members of the committee the ongoing work being undertaken by me on behalf of the hospital arising from the problems identified early in 2002 relating to car parking at Beaumont Hospital, which is the subject of the value for money report.

The work undertaken at the hospital includes the following: (i) to establish the facts leading to the losses incurred in the period from 1998 to 2002, as detailed in the VFM report, that were the result of a failure to properly control public parking as set out in the legal agreement with the multi-storey car park operators, Winston Properties; (ii) to negotiate a settlement with Howard Holdings, the parent company of Winston Properties, that would allow the two parties to resolve any dispute that had arisen with respect to the imposition of fines leading to a significant loss of income to the hospital; (iii) to prepare accounts for the subsidiary company known as Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of Beaumont Hospital board, and then to arrange for the winding up of this company as had been intended to take place once the multi-storey car park was established but which, due to an apparent oversight, did not in fact take place; and (iv) to undertake the measures necessary for the transfer of the land on which the car park is built back into the beneficial ownership of Beaumont Hospital, thus allowing the hospital to benefit from any settlement reached between the two parties in dispute.

I wish to restate at this point that Beaumont Hospital welcomes the publication of the VFM report on car parking at Beaumont Hospital. The hospital management has co-operated with the preparation of the report at all stages. I understand that the internal audit report, referred to later in my statement, which was prepared by the hospital's internal auditor and issued in March 2002, has assisted the investigation undertaken by the Comptroller and Auditor General.

By way of background, on 6 December 2001 I received a letter from the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, dated 4 December 2001, relating to outstanding issues arising from the hospital's annual accounts for the year ended 31 December 1999. As I had only taken up my post as chief executive eight weeks earlier, I was unaware of the issues referred to in that letter. On the day I received the letter, I gave a copy to the hospital's financial controller, asking that I receive a report on the matters in the letter without delay. On 13 December 2001, the day before my response was due, I contacted the Office of the C&AG in order to assure the C&AG that I was personally involved in following up on the issues raised in the letter of 4 December.

During the weeks that followed, I continued to make internal inquiries in the hospital while maintaining regular contact with the Office of the C&AG in order to keep it apprised of my progress in answering the queries raised by him in respect of the hospital's accounts for 1999. From the time of receipt of the December 2001 letter, there followed a two month period during which I made a significant effort to gather the information required to prepare a satisfactory response to the questions raised by the C&AG. By the middle of January 2002, however, it was clear the hospital was not in a position to respond to the queries raised by the C&AG, primarily due to a lack of records and information relating to Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited and the accounts of that company.

On 14 January 2002, the Office of the C&AG issued a formal audit query regarding the matter. Towards the end of that period, information was brought to my attention indicating that rental income due to the hospital from the multi-storey car park had not been received for 2000 or 2001. On the basis of this information, on 4 February 2002 I requested the internal auditor to investigate the matter, in particular the financial position of Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited and its financial records and to prepare a report. At this point, I should explain that the internal auditor who is with me today is not the person who was in that post at the time to which I refer in this statement. The occupant of the post at that time was Ms Mary Keaney. In the course of her investigation, the then internal auditor established evidence of significant deficiencies in the manner of operation of car parking on site that led to the imposition of fines and, furthermore, that documented evidence of the subsequent losses incurred by the hospital was not readily available.

On 22 February 2002 I issued a formal response to the audit query raised by the Comptroller and Auditor General. On 26 March 2002, I received an internal audit report relating to the development and operation of the multi-storey car park at Beaumont Hospital. The report confirmed that Beaumont Hospital had suffered a considerable loss or reduction of projected income relating to the operation of the car park. A copy of this internal audit report was furnished to the Office of the C&AG for information. On 17 April 2002, approximately three weeks later, I met with the Comptroller and Auditor General, Mr. John Purcell, and two of his senior staff, Mr. Gerry Smyth and Mr. Michael Buckley and briefed them on the updated position with respect to the multi-storey car park, Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited and other related matters.

Throughout the period referred to above, I informed Beaumont Hospital board of the problems as they had been identified at that time. I subsequently updated the hospital board at successive board meetings on the progress of the investigations and subsequent negotiations and continue to do so to this day. At an early stage, I briefed officials of the Department of Health and Children and the Eastern Regional Health Authority who are responsible for funding the hospital.

In May 2002 I wrote to Howard Holdings, the parent company of Winston Properties, indicating that the hospital disputed the level of fines for so-called illegal parking on the hospital site and the manner in which the fines had been applied. In the 15 month period from March 2002, the legal and financial experts engaged by me on behalf of the hospital have sought to collect and collate all the relevant documentation relating to the car park. It has taken many months for these records and documentation to be gathered.

In March 2002 the Beaumont Hospital board agreed that I be appointed as a director of Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited, along with the then chairman of Beaumont Hospital board, Mr. Peter Webster. Mr. Pat Lyons, former chief executive of Beaumont Hospital, remained on as a director. At a board meeting on 20 November 2002, the board of Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited accepted the resignation of Ms Evelyn Hempenstall, former financial controller of Beaumont Hospital, as a director of the company.

I will now bring the committee up to date on what has happened in the course of the last number of months in relation to negotiations and arrangements. The outstanding concerns in relation to matters identified in the value for money report which have yet to be resolved are twofold. These matters, which have been referred to by the Comptroller and Auditor General in his introduction, are the arrangements for car parking at Beaumont Hospital that will eliminate the imposition of fines on the hospital for so-called illegal parking and the transfer of the car park land back to the hospital and the winding up of Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited, the subsidiary company of Beaumont Hospital board.

In relation to the first of these matters, I met with Howard Holdings in December 2002, in the first of a series of meetings over a period of four months during which we agreed draft heads of terms that have subsequently been agreed in principle by Beaumont Hospital board at a meeting held last Tuesday, 20 May 2003. These heads of terms are intended to form the basis of future arrangements with respect to car parking on the hospital campus with a view to eliminating the imposition of fines by the multi-storey car park operators on Beaumont Hospital.

There are a number of actions yet to be taken as part of the process of resolving the problems relating to the control of car parking on the hospital campus. The hospital has introduced a new access ID system that allows for more strict control of parking in staff car parks, as well as access to the hospital in general. In addition, the hospital is in the process of installing bollards on footpaths and verges around the site to prevent cars being parked inappropriately in such areas. It is intended that all cars belonging to the public will be parked in the multi-storey car park, as agreed by the hospital in 1998.

A number of actions need to be taken in sequence in relation to the transfer back to the hospital of the land on which the multi-storey car park is built and this process is under way. One of the actions relates to establishing the position of the hospital with respect to VAT on the land transfer. I received a response in February 2003 in this regard from the hospital's financial advisors at the time of the development to questions raised by the internal auditor relating to the payment of VAT on car park transactions and other issues. On foot of this response, the hospital's current financial advisors wrote to the Revenue Commissioners on 4 March about VAT matters relating to the transfer of the freehold of the car park site back to the board of Beaumont Hospital. In a letter dated 16 May, the Revenue Commissioners confirmed that the transfer of the freehold by Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited to the board of Beaumont Hospital will not give rise to a VAT liability in the circumstances outlined.

As indicated in the value for money report, we may intend approaching the Revenue Commissioners about other outstanding matters after the accounts for Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited for 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 have been prepared. This action is under way. The hospital is addressing the issues referred to in paragraph 4.30, views of the chief executive, and paragraph 4.31, further risks to the hospital. We have made considerable progress in this regard.

As the chief executive of Beaumont Hospital, I have given an undertaking to the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, which is the hospital's auditor, that I will take all actions within my power to ensure the outstanding issues relating to the matters raised in the value for money report are resolved as soon as possible. I have also given an undertaking to the hospital board that I will prepare regular reports for it, detailing the progress on each of the actions identified as being necessary to resolve the outstanding issues referred to above. I would be glad, similarly, to assure the Committee of Public Accounts that the outstanding issues will be resolved as soon as possible, taking into account the hospital's statutory and regulatory obligations. I am happy to answer any questions that may arise from the information I have given or to deal with any other matters relating to my statement about which the members require further clarification or information.

It is not surprising that the State will lose €13 million on this project, given that the hospital paid €13 per hour for visitors' cars parked outside the car park. It is staggering. How did the hospital end up in this mess?

Mr. Lamont

The terms of the lease that the hospital agreed in 1998 allowed for the car park operators to fine the hospital for cars that were deemed to be parked illegally. The definition at that time was that the hospital would incur fines in respect of cars which should be parked in the multi-storey car park but were not. Under the terms of the lease, the fine was meant to be the daily rate that applied in the car park at the time, which I believe was £5. Following the initial lease agreement, the car park operators and the hospital agreed that a multiplier factor should be introduced which, in effect, would be equivalent to the number of times a parking space was used in the multi-storey car park. This is a little complex. One can accept that every space in the car park is used more than once each day - it was calculated that each space was used on an average of 1.8 or 1.9 occasions each day. The hospital agreed at the time that the operators of the car park could fine the hospital for cars illegally parked outside the multi-storey car park, and that the daily rate could be multiplied by the factor of 1.9. This agreement was reached with the hospital at the time.

Does Mr. Lamont agree that the deal was extraordinary, especially given that fines have averaged €600,000 per year since the car park opened?

Mr. Lamont

I cannot deny that it was not beneficial to the hospital to have agreed to the deal. That is the reason why we are here today and why I have taken such strong action to try to retrieve the situation. I assure the committee that the previous arrangements are no longer in place. When the heads of terms are agreed with the car park operators, illegal fines will disappear from the campus and we will begin a new phase.

Are fines still being paid at present?

Mr. Lamont

Fines are not being paid at present. The operators of the multi-storey car park are continuing to monitor car parking on site. The number of cars parked inappropriately on site has diminished from 300 per week to less than 50 as a result of the introduction of the new access ID control system last February. We have taken significant measures to control car parking on site. We need to enter into an agreement with the operators to address the situation and to redress the losses. They will control car parking outside the staff car parks and ensure that all cars are parked appropriately on the campus.

Can we publish the full report?

Mr. Lamont

Yes, absolutely.

I thank Mr. Lamont for his report. Looking at the dates in the report, I can appreciate that it is very up to date. Confirmation of the VAT liability was received from the Revenue Commissioners on 16 May and terms were being agreed as of 20 May, which is two days ago. I welcome the fact that it is up to date. Mr. Lamont inherited this mess - there is no other way of describing it - and had to pick up the pieces. I do not want to refer to it as a public private partnership because if those who read about what happened here see it as a PPP, further PPPs will not be considered in this country. The costs were horrendous. Those who thought they were going to get something out of it did not do so, but the private element did very well.

Before we talk about the car parking itself, I would like to examine the early days of the project. The first point made in Mr. Purcell's report was that there was a cost to the State of anything up to €13 million. It was a tax driven system, in effect, from that point of view. I understand that Beaumont Hospital informed the Department of Health and Children of what was going on. Am I right in saying that?

Mr. Lamont

Yes, in the early stages.

I would like to know the cost of this, specifically, in light of the magnitude of potential liability or loss of tax. Did the Department of Health and Children keep the Department of Finance involved in what was going on?

Mr. Lamont

That is not an issue with which I would be familiar.

In response to Deputy Curran, any significant involvement in this matter on the part of the Department of Finance may have related to its funding aspects, if it was to be funded from the Exchequer. The way in which the arrangement between the hospital and the private developer was presented suggested that it did not put public funds at risk. In our view, there was no necessity to consult the Department of Finance. As the particular mechanism that was being used in this arrangement was provided for in tax legislation, it was perfectly legal and above board. This was a time when complementarity between the public and private sectors was an aspect of public policy, generally speaking.

Mr. Purcell

To amplify, I implied, if I did not say directly, in my opening remarks that the Department of Health and Children, as the sanctioning authority in this case, should have taken into account the amount of tax expenditure which the scheme involved.

I was not suggesting - and I do not mean to imply - that there was anything improper about this scheme. However, I echo the point that this scheme by its nature would have a cost to the State. There might have been a question as to which Department would pay, but there was a cost. It would have been prudent to refer the scheme to the Department of Finance when it was being established to evaluate the most efficient way of providing the extra 230 car spaces. While it is easy to sit here with hindsight, the approach adopted was not the most efficient. Quite clearly, the Department of Finance knew nothing about this at the time.

What I have said is that the Department of Health and Children did not approach the Department of Finance to seek approval as the Department of Health and Children was the approving authority in relation to the proposal from Beaumont Hospital.

Going back to Beaumont Hospital, what criteria were used to decide that this was the best way to advance this project? Why was a public private arrangement adopted rather than to borrow the money to directly finance the project which would be run by the hospital?

Mr. Lamont

I am not certain that detail was gone into in the sense that a similar car park was built at the Adelaide and Meath Hospital, Dublin, incorporating the National Children's Hospital at Tallaght. The manager of that project approached Beaumont Hospital at the time to seek information as to whether it was interested in something similar. By the late 1990s, parking on site had become difficult for staff, visitors and patients and there were problems caused by people parking on footpaths. The hospital identified a need for additional parking spaces and the alternatives were to surface as a car park some of the land around the hospital which might be described as wasteland - though we have plans to develop it - or to go down the route of this tax-based scheme. The difficulty with choosing the latter scheme was that there would be tight deadlines to be met.

As Deputy Curran said, it is easy in hindsight to say if we knew then what we know now, we would not have adopted the approach we did. To qualify for the tax breaks, a certain amount of money had to be expended on the project before 30 June 1998. There was only a six-month window in which to make decisions and the proposal was put to the board in March 1998. The project was agreed in April, May and June. If everything had gone according to plan and the management of parking had been stricter and better controlled, the hospital would not have incurred the loss it did. From my reading of the matter, it would not have made any difference to the tax loss to the State. While, hopefully, under my management the hospital will adopt a broader perspective, it was not looking at value for money for the State at the time, rather it was seeking value for money for the hospital itself. As a result of this mess, my colleagues in other hospitals and I are far more aware of the need to look at the broader picture and to make decisions without focusing specifically on our own needs.

I wish to quickly clarify one or two specific points. Mr. Lamont said that Beaumont Hospital was approached on foot of the scheme at the hospital in Tallaght. Who made the approach?

Mr. Lamont

I understand the project manager for the Tallaght project approached Beaumont Hospital.

Was he the operator of the car park at Tallaght?

Mr. Lamont

No. He was the project manager employed on the Tallaght site.

Who employed him?

Mr. Lamont

I believe he was employed by the board of the hospital. My colleagues at the Department of Health and Children might be able to confirm that the hospital at Tallaght had yet to open at the time the car park project there was completed.

Mr. Purcell's report referred to three proposals which were offered at the tendering stage. Mr. Purcell's report indicates that the two unsuccessful proposals were assessed as inferior in terms of deliverability, however, the rejected proposals appear to have offered better rental income. In simple terms, the hospital seems to have turned down the better offers. What aspect of deliverability was the problem?

Mr. Lamont

My understanding at the time was that there were two issues in relation to the other proposals. In the case of one, another stakeholder in the company involved had to be consulted to seek permission to go ahead. In other words, having been offered the contract, the company would have to seek permission to go ahead with it. That would have caused a delay. The other issue related to the income which would have accrued to the hospital. My understanding was that the time constraints of the project ruled out one of the companies and the second company was rejected on the basis of the financial deal it put together.

I have to accept your answer, but reading the report gives rise to great concerns. It seems the two proposals which constituted better financial deals were rejected. I presume the companies submitting proposals would have been aware the scheme was based on tax breaks and that they would have expected to deliver within the time scale.

Mr. Lamont

Again, my understanding is that one of the companies indicated there would be a delay in getting agreement from its stakeholder to go ahead with the proposal. Winning the contract would not have meant a commitment to go ahead. From the documentation I have seen since, I understand that was deemed to be an unacceptable delay. I believe that may have been proposal No. 2, as listed on figure 3.1, page 25. The proposal would have guaranteed a rental income of €9.61 million. That company had to ask a third party for permission whereas the company making proposal No. 3, which guaranteed a rental income of €8.75 million, was ruled out on the basis of its profitability to the hospital.

I know colleagues will have questions on the rental income. During the period covered by the report, the rental income the hospital anticipated was €1.8 million. A little over €100,000 was received in the period and the rest of the money was lost in fines. Those figures jump out a mile. The operator had the whole show to itself and the hospital received virtually nothing. Mr. Lamont referred to the short time scale imposed by the tax-breaks scheme. Was it the case that the short time available meant there was a failure to go into enough detail?

Obviously, based on the deal which was put in place, the operator has been able to levy these fines. In terms of the internal operations of the hospital, which is the landlord, €120,000 is a very small amount. The hospital must have realised at an early stage that there was a huge problem with fines, but it seems to have taken a long time to address the issue. Was there an accounting system in place? At what point did the hospital become aware of the issue? Was the issue addressed purely as a result of Mr. Purcell's report?

Mr. Lamont

A significant amount of detail was gone into at the time. The records show that a number of different advisers were involved, including a project manager, a quantity surveyor, a financial adviser and a legal adviser, all of whom seem to have had a significant input. The difference between this project and the one in Tallaght is that this project was on the site of an already up-and-running hospital. Therefore, there were significant pressures on the management team to run the hospital and basic services as a result of which a great deal of dependency was invested in the advisers to the project. With hindsight, perhaps hospital management should have been more familiar with the detail of the advice.

Is that what happened?

Mr. Lamont

The detail was there, but it may not have received the attention it deserved because the management team was also involved with operating a service in the hospital.

The report makes it clear that there was a breakdown in the Government's arrangements in relation to the internal operation. That is also borne out by my inquiries and the internal audit report, as well as anything else I have seen. There was a breakdown in communication within the management of the hospital at the time. I do not wish to give the committee a sense that I am trying to make excuses. It was badly managed and there is no getting away from that. However, it was badly managed in the context of trying to run a very busy acute hospital. Car parking did not receive the attention it should have, because it is not the core business of an acute hospital. Nonetheless I take the line that everything we do at the hospital, whether that is cleaning services, car parking or operating services, is relevant to the core business of the hospital. It is a business rather than just a hospital.

I am relieved to hear those comments.

Mr. Lamont

We are in the business of providing health care, but it is a business and we have to run it as such. In 1997, car parking was a facility provided for staff to get to work, no more - no less. Now car parking is a potential source of income, which we can use to benefit the services the hospital provides. Therefore, we see it as part of the business of running the organisation.

Is it not the case that the board of Beaumont Hospital and the Department of Health and Children were not too concerned about costs because it was not affecting their budgets since those costs were being funded by the taxpayer? In this case, the direct cost would not be attached to the hospital or the Department.

Mr. Lamont

As I have said, achieving best value for the State was not considered to be an imperative of the hospital at the time. The hospital was more concerned with achieving best value for the hospital. In that regard, it has ended up with a car park on site which, in the next ten years, will come back into the ownership of the hospital. It did not cost any capital outlay at the time. I am not a tax expert, but it would appear that best value was not achieved for the State.

The choice in relation to this project was to leave car parking as it was at Beaumont Hospital or have it developed by means of the option taken up by the hospital. I will not comment on the process which was employed because, as Mr. Lamont said, there were weaknesses in the management of the project. Where tax-based financing is part of the legislative framework, specifically designed to incentivise private developers to put car parks in place, a public authority availing of those economies should not be precluded from doing so. While we would now argue that all other options should be evaluated as part of the option appraisal in looking at a project like this, at the time the options the hospital was faced with were to get direct capital investment from the Department's capital allocation, forget about it or avail of a scheme put in place by the Minister for Finance in tax legislation, specifically designed for the purpose. The original decision is defensible.

Would the Department of Finance like to make a comment on that? Is it in agreement?

As the Comptroller and Auditor General said, we would have preferred to see a more thorough appraisal of the potential options for funding this project. Clearly, the option that was chosen turns out to have been a bad deal as far as the Exchequer is concerned. However, I agree with the Secretary General that, in terms of getting money directly through the public capital programme, the car park would have been a low priority when one considers all the other demands. However, the tax-based option was not the only option. For example, there was the possibility of borrowing. I am not saying that, had the hospital approached the Department of Finance and said they wanted to borrow money for a car park, they would have been pushing an open door. Nevertheless, if the material provided in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, specifically in C2 which sets out the estimated public sector cash flow of direct provision, had been submitted to the Department of Finance in relation to how it was proposed to remunerate borrowing, we would have paid particularly close attention to it. I am not saying it was a choice between going the tax-based route, doing nothing or borrowing. There were a number of options and we would have preferred if they had all been exploited more fully, while accepting that there was a time constraint in terms of the availability of tax breaks.

Do double rent relief tax-based schemes enable people to negotiate soft deals? Is the Department happy with soft deals which turn a net profit into a net loss?

No. However, I will ask my colleague, who deals with tax, to talk about the scheme. The Department of Finance is not in the game of supporting soft options.

Does Mr. Mooney agree that this was a total soft option, given the opportunities to the developer and the zero gain to Beaumont Hospital?

I have already said that the Department of Finance would have preferred a more thorough appraisal of the project to have been taken, particularly in relation to the funding options. The comparisons the Comptroller and Auditor General has revealed in his report are particularly stark. We would have been concerned that there were serious deficiencies in the management and operation of the car park. The hospital did not do enough to protect its interests in relation to the subsequent operation of the car park.

I will only comment of the tax scheme. The car parking scheme started in 1981 and is still in place. Successive Governments felt there was a need to give a tax break for the construction of multi-storey car parks. Perhaps that is because of the huge increase in traffic and because there had to be space for the cars and it is better to utilise space by going up or going down in a multi-storey building.

The double rent allowance element came into effect in the 1984 urban renewal scheme and continued until 1999. There is no double rent element in any new car parking project, although existing contracts were honoured and will continue for ten years for projects, like this one, which got in before the shutters came down in 1999. In the budget, the Minister announced that a number of tax-based schemes would cease at the end of the year. Seven are mentioned, one of which is the multi-storey car park scheme. Perhaps the tax incentive has done its work. I understand that between 60 and 70 multi-storey car parks have been constructed in the State with the aid of tax relief, although only some with double rent allowance. The Chairman identified double rent allowance as a particular avenue to be exploited in this scheme, however that relief has ceased. A review of the urban renewal scheme was carried out in 1996 by the then Minister of State at the Department of the Environment and Local Government, which looked at the car park schemes and which we welcomed. Page 68 of the review pointed out that:

The importance of car park development in the whole urban renewal process could easily be overlooked. The development and operation of multi-storey car parks has added immeasurably to the appeal of many of the shopping centres and businesses in the designated areas. They are essential to the future viability of commercial developments in the designated areas, helping them attract as wide as possible a customer base. The tax incentives are critical in the development and operation of these. Without the double rent allowance, the start up of these would not have been financially feasible. The initial capital costs involved in developing multi-storey car parks is very high.

The Department of Finance concurred with that report at the time. However, times have changed, the double rent allowance is gone and the Minister has announced that the scheme itself will cease at the end of next year.

That report is from 1996. Has any report been published since?

Yes. We are carrying out reviews of tax reliefs which were mentioned in the budget. They are internal reviews.

Is Mr. Murphy aware of any other sweet deals in other similar developments apart from this one?

We are not aware of that level of detail since we only look at the matter in a general sense. It is a good study and we are grateful it was carried out.

Is Mr. Murphy not concerned at what he has heard today? Obviously the double tax allowance was an encouragement for developers, but there should have been a tighter framework within the system for negotiating a deal that would benefit everybody and not solely the developer.

We are making proposals. These were Government decisions. The Government decided there would be double rent relief and the detail would be on the ground in terms of what happened with an individual project. We cannot get into the level of examining individual projects from a tax point of view. We are concerned with making proposals to Government in the context of what is in the Finance Bill.

Is it not like winning the lottery for the developer?

It depends. I do not know what happened with particular cases.

I am surprised to hear Mr. Kelly talk about the defence of these tax allowances, given the situation. I am grateful to Mr. Murphy for explaining the context. This committee is precluded from talking about policy issues. We are only meant to refer to the effects public expenditure has and whether or not it has been correctly spent. We have an indication that the allowances are being phased out for car parks. However, in the tax code there are allowances for other aspects such as the provision of health care services. I fear we could have a report, subsequent to this, not about a car park but about a private hospital. It is only right and proper to put this issue on the record because, if the lessons are not learned, the potential exists.

The median figure from the range which the Comptroller and Auditor General's report outlines as to the cost to the State of every additional car park space provided through this scheme is €50,000. That is more than the value of any car likely to park in a space. I do not get a sense of anything other than embarrassment that the scheme has turned out like this. The type and amount of expenditure is wrong. Have lessons really been learned? There is still a potential for other costs to be incurred by the health board, the taxpayer or the hospital in trying to retrieve this situation. A scheme has been available, through the co-operation of the hospital, that has allowed a private developer to have zero risk and guaranteed profits. I do not believe this Committee can stand over that policy.

I query the fact that Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited has yet to file annual accounts. How often has the board met? It appears its only purpose is as a shelf company or conduit to allow the private company that developed the car park to avail of the tax incentives. While that might be technically and legally correct, there are ethical and moral questions to be asked about the type of approach that has been followed. To what extent has the Companies Office dealt with the Beaumont Hospital board and this company that they have established? It appears they have been allowed to operate for five years and not produce one set of accounts. We have been informed that the Companies Office is becoming more stringent in asking companies to provide up to date accounts. In terms of the State agencies from which we require accounts, this committee has been more disciplined in ensuring that such accounts are provided within a short time period. However, in this case, not only has the taxpayers' money been mis-spent, the accountability for that money in legislation does not seem to have been lived up to.

I am interested in exploring a point Deputy Curran raised in relation to the procurement procedures, which have been rightly criticised in the Comptroller and Auditor General's value for money report. It seems that not only was there a question about which tender was chosen and why, but there also seems to have been a total lack of strategic reasoning as to why the car park was built in the first instance. If I hear what Mr. Lamont is saying correctly, and I appreciate that it pre-dates his time, it seems that the idea of a car park and the approach to it were utterly informal. If this is the way we plan infrastructure at our prime health service centres, we should be more worried than we already are about their condition.

Does Deputy Boyle wish to hold the answers to those questions until after the vote?

I may have some short questions afterwards.

Mr. Lamont

I fully understand Deputy Boyle's concerns about the existence of Beaumont Hospital Car Park Limited, of which I am a director. The reason the company still exists is complex. It was the intention that the company would be set up specifically for the purpose of expending a certain amount of money on the project before a certain date. The intention was that the land would transfer into the name of the car park company in return for a loan note to the value of £1.3 million. When the multi-storey car park was developed and built, the land was to transfer back to the hospital. It did not transfer back to the hospital when it should and, subsequently, the transfer of the land back to the hospital was impeded because, in February 2000, Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited initiated the sink-in fund, which was only meant to kick-in in year four and was brought into being in year two, through which the hospital was to buy back the car park itself. Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited allowed the bank a charge on that account in favour of the operators. The reason for the charge is not clear. However, that charge still exists on the sink-in fund, which means that Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited, in whose name the sink-in fund exists, does not have 100% ownership of that account - there is a charge held by the bank in favour of Howard Holdings. Howard Holdings has agreed, as part of our negotiations, that it is happy that charge be lifted and we are about to go to the bank and seek the lifting of that charge. Once it is lifted, it will allow Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited to have a meeting of its board of directors, which will make a decision in relation to its interests in that account. We have an account in the name of the company, over which the company does not have total control. This means we cannot say we want the account to be in the name of the hospital because a third party has a charge on it. Once that charge is lifted our advice is that the car park company can then deem that the account should be held in the beneficial ownership of Beaumont Hospital not the car park company. Accounts were filed in 1998 but Deputy Boyle is correct in saying they have not been submitted since. I put on record that the Companies Office successfully prosecuted Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited in January 2002 for late filing of returns. That prosecution only came to my attention some months later. The reality is that there are very poor records in relation to Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited with the exception of the sinking fund account. The absence of records is primarily due to the fact that Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited does not do anything. It does not make any decisions. The only purpose of its existence originally was for the transfer of the land in order to expend a certain percentage of the total project and thus to gain the tax breaks that would accrue.

Is it not a requirement in law to have an annual meeting and to sign accounts?

Mr. Lamont

It is and since I became a director that has been happening and we have been actively progressing the preparation of accounts. Our financial advisers whom I have engaged in the last year to help improve this mess are in the process of preparing accounts for 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002. We hope to have those accounts available very shortly when they will go to an annual general meeting of Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited. Beaumont Hospital board has asked the Comptroller and Auditor General to be the auditor for Beaumont Hospital Car Park Company Limited. Once the accounts have been prepared we will submit them to the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General for audit.

May I add one or two brief comments? In particular, what I want to correct is any impression that I was commenting in any way on a policy matter; absolutely not and I am precluded from doing so. The point I was making is that, in a context where there is a policy position which is well articulated in legislation and so on around tax incentives to developers, the initial decision was defensible given that a public authority was faced with the option of having no investment and no car park. Obviously I had serious concern about the management of this project subsequently. That is a matter of record and is reflected in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report on the project. As Accounting Officer in the Department I am accountable for all expenditure within the Health Vote. As presented this project did not involve a draw on the Health Vote. In fact, it was intended, had it gone as planned, to enhance the income flow to the hospital so that it would have relieved public expenditure in regard to the Health Vote. It is a long-term project following though on the remedial work being done by Mr. Lamont in relation to the whole arrangement. My view is that in the long-term it will enhance income flow to the hospital and it needs to be viewed in that context.

I take absolutely the point made by the Comptroller and Auditor General about the cost to the Exchequer being part of the broader analysis around these projects. We have developed, in light of the experience with this project, a set of guidelines for general application which have now been issued to all health boards and hospitals and which were cleared in advance with Mr. Purcell's office. They reflect the very rigorous approach in terms of analysis that the spokespersons on behalf of the Department of Finance referred to earlier. In terms of the general application of principles, we have followed up on this in a way that presents rigorous guidelines to the system in general.

This is not the only project in terms of a car park that has been mounted by a hospital. There are several examples of successful projects which have been undertaken in co-operation with developers which have worked, both in the interests of the developer and of the hospital, so that it is a particular case which has not gone well.

Why is it that nobody noticed the €165,000 was not paid into the account every quarter and that the hospital did not discover it was receiving less than 10% of the anticipated rental income from the development? I am concerned that the signs did not become apparent to the financial controller within the hospital at an earlier stage.

Mr. Lamont

There is no easy answer to that question. There is no doubt it should have been spotted far more quickly. It would appear that the reporting mechanisms broke down within the hospital and, therefore, it was not discovered until a late stage that the income had not been flowing. There is no easy answer to the question, with respect, except to say that accountability and reporting mechanisms broke down in a way that one could say in hindsight they should not have broken down and in a way that I hope would not happen again in my time as chief executive. We have introduced significantly more stringent reporting within the hospital as a result of our experience. Our new board which has recently been confirmed in office has established a governance committee and a finance committee which did not exist previously. Many lessons have been learned from this experience. No system can guarantee 100% that these things will not happen again but certainly we have reduced the risk of it ever happening again by measures we have taken since.

I have been a member of a local authority that built a car park on the same basis with, I believe, the same company. Having learned what I have learned from this report, it is a matter I feel inclined to revisit. The parent company is listed as Howard Holdings and is UK based. Howard Holdings ran several car parks in the Cork City region and I believe the directors of that company are Cork based. Is it the same company?

Mr. Lamont

I believe so.

Thank you. The second point, following on from Mr. Kelly, is the potential income for the hospital in years to come. Income has also been lost in recent years in the initial operation. To what extent does that affect other services within the hospital? Have you had to make cutbacks in your core health care services and, if so, in what way or have you gone to the Department of Health and Children to cover the losses incurred through this project?

Mr. Lamont

We have not actually approached the Department of Health and Children specifically for compensation arising from the losses we have incurred. With respect to services, the loss to the hospital in the last 12 months, once we get the agreement in place, has been of the order of €250,000. We have an expenditure in excess of €200 million on an annual basis. We have a number of different income streams in terms of in-patient income, out-patient income, income from accident and emergency, income from retail sales and so on. The amount of €250,000 is not an insignificant sum in its own right but in the overall context of the income of the hospital would represent about 1%. It would not have a tremendous negative effect on the provision of services. I would not be aware of any specific services that have suffered as a result of our losses. That is not say the losses are defensible, they are not defensible. Having said that, I could not say services have suffered as a result of those losses.

Mr. Lamont, thank you for your report. You say you received a letter shortly after your arrival in your new job on 6 December 2001. Later in your report, the first reference to you having a meeting with Howard Holdings, the developers in this issue, was December 2002. Perhaps you had other meetings with the company in the interim, but in your presentation to the committee, this is the first reference to a meeting. In view of the gravity of the situation, which must have been obvious to you after a short period of time, why did it take you 12 months to have a meeting with Howard Holdings in December 2002 when you first became aware of this problem in December 2001, or did you have meetings in the meantime?

Turning to the officials from the Department of Health and Children, page nine of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report produced in December 2002 states, "As a result, the Department has established a group to examine the lessons to be learned and prepare guidelines for the proper management of such initiatives in the future." What guidelines have you issued? Perhaps you will provide the committee with a copy of them by way of correspondence after the meeting. The correspondence should contain a summary of the lessons to be learned and the circulars you have issued to everybody under your remit. I would be surprised if the lessons have not been taken on board and I look forward to the documentary evidence for this.

Turning to the officials from the Department of Finance, I too would be very dissatisfied with Beaumont Hospital in terms of its mismanagement of the parking issue and how it got caught for fines. However, the overall tax incentive schemes and regimes were not of the hospital's making and it operated a system that was provided for by legislation.

The biggest flaw in what has been put before the committee is that nobody considered they had a responsibility to assess the overall cost of this development to the taxpayer. Beaumont Hospital was happy to get its parking problem resolved, possibly secure some income and, at the end of 13 years, acquire ownership of the car park. The Department of Health and Children did not consider that there were any problems with the development in that it did not require funding from capital budgets and was being undertaken within the parameters of a legitimate tax scheme. The Department Finance would have welcomed a more thorough examination of the issues.

I ask the Department of Finance officials to send to the committee a copy of the guidelines it sent to the various Departments and State bodies dealing with how they should carry out similar examinations. Beaumont Hospital, health boards and other such bodies are not tax experts or advisers. They cannot be reasonably expected to have the competence within their organisations to undertake that level of assessment. They should be administering the health services, not urban tax renewal schemes and tax incentives. That can only be done on the basis of detailed memoranda from the Department of Finance in the first instance.

I would not term this development a public private partnership but a joint venture. Given the availability of tax incentives, the public body was able to accept a proposal from the private sector to provide a service it could not provide from its own budgets on the basis that the private sector would avail of tax incentives. However, nobody within the system undertook an assessment of the development in terms of the overall benefit to the Exchequer. I am confident that similar projects and developments are happening in many other State bodies, be they health or local authorities. Even from reading newspapers, I am aware the local authorities are entering similar schemes under urban renewal arrangements. In view of this I am anxious to see the guidelines issued by the Department of Finance to all relevant bodies in the country to enable them make proper assessments. Over the coming years there could be dozens of reports similar to the one under consideration because the tax regimes are still in place and there is no obligations on those benefiting from these joint ventures to undertake an assessment of their value.

If deals of this type continue, the country is again in danger of becoming an economic basket case.

My main concern is that taxpayers be appraised of the cost of schemes undertaken under the parameters of tax incentives.

I am very concerned.

I understand the Department of Finance has said it does not become involved in the detail of each scheme, while those involved in the detail do not get involved in the tax implications because they are not competent to do so. It would appear, therefore, that there is a vacuum in terms of assessing these kinds of projects. I have directed questions at the three groups present and I await their comments, including the provision of documentation after the meeting.

Mr. Lamont

I assure Deputy Fleming that I did not wait 12 months to seek clarification on this matter. The purpose of the meeting of December 2002 was to renegotiate the arrangements dealing with the imposition of illegal parking fines.

When you were first made aware of the revenue loss to the hospital, you should have immediately turned off the tap. While you had to address what happened before you took up your position, it took you 12 months to hold a meeting on the ongoing position. I would have hoped you would have arranged a much more prompt meeting to deal with the fines issue.

Mr. Lamont

The confirmation of the problem was made at the end of March 2002, when the internal auditor finalised her report. In April 2002, I briefed the Comptroller and Auditor General. I had already briefed the Department of Health and Children on the position as I saw it. As I explained in my opening statement, I wrote to Howard Holdings in May 2002 indicating that the hospital disputed the level of fines. In other words, in May 2002, approximately six weeks after receipt of the internal audit report, I wrote saying this had to stop and that on behalf of Beaumont Hospital I no longer accepted the imposition of fines.

It could be argued that fines are continuing to be imposed. Part of the deal I have negotiated with Howard Holdings is that we will receive rental as a hospital for the period March 2002, when the internal audit report was issued, to March 2003. For that year we will receive the year's rental, less the fines we have agreed, which are illegal parking fines, less the multiplier, less 40% for staff parking, as I explained earlier. In the interim, as part of our ongoing discussions with Howard Holdings, in June 2002 it paid one quarter's rent. That was the first time rent had been paid in three years. Shortly after I wrote to the company, we received one quarter's rent. I do not wish to give the impression that I delayed for a long time but rather that as soon as it was legally practicable to do so, I wrote to the company and explained that the arrangement was no longer allowed and that we would have to work out a resolution.

My first meeting with Howard Holdings was in July 2002. The record shows there was a discussion centred on how we would together monitor illegal parking. However, I was unhappy with that because it meant that fines would continue to be accrued. I wanted to get back to the original agreement by negotiation. I believe that what I have achieved to date through our negotiations, and what has been passed by the board, is an arrangement whereby Howard Holdings controls parking outside the staff car park, so the footpath parking will stop. The hospital in its turn will put down bollards and make sure cars cannot park on footpaths as heretofore. We will manage this system together over the next ten years to the benefit of both sides. When I say that, part of the deal is to allow the hospital recover some of its losses incurred to date in a way that Mr. Kelly referred to earlier. At the end of a ten year period we will have a deal that I hope will meet the approval of anyone who looks at it so they will say we did a reasonably good job in getting back some of the losses incurred to date.

Some of my questions have already been asked. This deal was the subject of an agreement between unequal partners. I have no idea who negotiated this on behalf of the developer, but he or she knew more than Beaumont Hospital, the Department of Health and Children and the Department of Finance. There was only one winner, namely the developer.

If the conduit by which that company was developed is examined, it will be seen from the diagram we have been given that there are eight levels between the board of Beaumont Hospital and the Beaumont Hospital car park operating partnership. A person would need to be Sherlock Holmes to identify who had responsibility. It is the most intricate cobweb work I have seen for a long time. I am not trained in corporate matters, but I certainly see this as a cobweb work in terms of people's responsibilities and lack of action.

Mr. Lamont got the poisoned chalice and, from what I see, is certainly dealing with it. While Beaumont is an excellent medical hospital and we are delighted to have it in the State, it is clear from the actions of whoever on the hospital board was dealing with this matter that the expertise was on the medical side. My understanding is that the board paid the developer in such a way that, the more cars parked outside his complex, the better off he was. That is what it amounted to.

Mr. Lamont said the number of cars would be reduced from 300 to 50. On a practical level, everyone working in the hospital would have to travel there every day. It is remarkable that 300 cars could be parked around a building and that no one would know why they were there or whether they should have been there or not. Surely it must have been known on day one that something was terribly wrong. Whoever signed this contract knew that every car outside the hospital that should not have been there was gold dust for the developer. I cannot see why it should have taken so long for someone to say that this was costing the hospital a fortune.

On a practical note, I can see from the Dublin and many other hospitals, even small ones, which charge to park that it is a reasonably good income source for them. If my information is correct, the hospital began with one car park of about 350 to 370 spaces. Is my understanding correct and is it right to say that it earned €500,000 from it? Did the hospital earn anything from the old car park?

Mr. Lamont

We were getting approximately €500,000 per annum.

If that is the case then the hospital's position is ten times worse than we believed to be the case. Under the new system, it had understood that it would receive €1.8 million over two years at €900,000 a year. It received €60,000 but before that it received €500,000 for the existing car park. The hospital lost hand over fist on this. Had it received what it should have, what would that have meant to it by way of beds and equipment? What had the hospital to do without while this racket of illegal car parking was taking place? This is the bottom line. Had the hospital received the €1 million a year from car parking for the next 13 years, which it thought it would, I presume it would have made a huge difference.

Do I take it that one of the reasons the hospital was not able to turn off the tap, as Deputy Fleming phrased it, was that the legal agreement which had been entered into might have stopped it from doing so and that this was a legal problem until Mr. Lamont discovered more about the legal ground the hospital was on?

I must say to Mr. Kelly of the Department of Health and Children that I cannot understand, given the problems in the health service over the years, why his Department did not keep a close eye on what was happening in Beaumont. This was another way of providing a car park for which the Department would normally have had to pay. Would it not be normal in the Civil Service for someone to keep an eye on what was happening in Beaumont? It seems that, once the project was initiated, no one took notice of what was happening. It also appears that the Department of Finance, which has an eye on everything, knew nothing about it.

It is similar to what we hear in the committee each week. A problem develops which is the fault of no one and no one can be blamed. It would be highly improper to attach any blame to Mr. Lamont because he is new to the business. Neither the Department of Health and Children nor the Department of Finance was responsible. The taxpayer paid heavily for this and, worst of all, the future growth of the hospital suffered to the extent of at least €1 million a year because a mess was made of handling the contract for operating the car park. I am sure the hospital has many uses to which it could put €1 million a year.

This was a case of unequal partners. The commercial side ran rings around the hospital's negotiators. If this is to be an example for public private partnerships, people would need to monitor how they are being negotiated. Does Mr. Lamont accept that this is the level of funding that has been lost? I know the car park will revert to the hospital in 13 years, but is that the extent of the revenue that is being lost?

Mr. Lamont

The reality is that there has been a loss of that nature. However, as I explained to Deputy Fleming earlier and while I am not saying it is an insubstantial loss, in the greater scheme of things it is a small percentage of our overall expenditure. The reality is that it has made things more difficult for the hospital in the absence of that income. There is no doubt about that and I would be foolish to deny it.

I cannot say what has suffered in terms of service. It has made management of the hospital more difficult because every €1 million of additional income is welcome and working with €1 million less makes matters additionally difficult.

Regarding Deputy Connaughton's question about how so many cars could be parked illegally, while there was an acknowledgement that cars were being parked illegally, the difficulty in trying to prevent illegal parking was that the hospital would have had to spend money, which it did not have, on putting down fences, barriers and bollards to prevent it. One the one hand, it was losing income in terms of rental and, on the other, it would have had to spend more to stop it.

While all this was going on, was the car park itself filled?

Mr. Lamont

No, it was not filled, it was just partly filled. The occupancy rate was between 50% and 60%.

So the belief on the part of the people who knew what they were doing was that there was free parking around Beaumont and if one went into the car park they would have to pay for it?

Mr. Lamont

Yes.

How much did the developer owe the hospital for insurance and electricity costs?

Mr. Lamont

The hospital is owed an outstanding bill in excess of €20,000 which the operator has agreed to pay.

When were the charges first incurred?

Mr. Lamont

These services have just been negotiated by me in recent months. Up to the time I took over as chief executive the services had not been charged for. That has now been redressed and part of the settlement under the terms of the new deal is that services will be paid for on a quarterly basis, as allowed for under the original lease.

Have invoices been issued for these expenses?

Mr. Lamont

Invoices have not been issued but I discussed the matter as recently as two weeks ago with the operator, Howard Holdings. We agreed mutually that services will be paid for retrospectively to date, as agreed, and will be paid for in future on a quarterly basis, together with the rent.

Has the hospital succeeded in recovering arrears of rent from the developer?

Mr. Lamont

To date the hospital has not finalised the deal that has been agreed in principle by the board. Our legal advisers are working with the operator's legal advisers and I hope we will have something in place by the end of next week. We have targeted 1 June as the cut-off point. At the time the operators have agreed that they will pay arrears of rent for the last 12 months, going back to March 2002.

What figure will that be?

Mr. Lamont

The figure we anticipate we will receive is €290,000 which, in addition to the €164,000 paid last June, amounts to €450,000. This is the annual rent, less the loss for illegal parking which we have agreed they can——

On Deputy Connaughton's point, can you give an estimate of the penalty charge for illegal parking which has occurred since the publication of the report?

Mr. Lamont

We have agreed a figure of less than €250,000 as against €650,000. It has now been reduced to €250,000. We have agreed that figure as being the figure equivalent to the daily rate, multiplied by the number of cars parked illegally on-site.

Has the hospital agreed a tariff for illegal parking at the moment? The previous rate was €13 per hour for visitors? Is it less than €13 per hour?

Mr. Lamont

The operators are continuing to calculate fines based on the multi-car facility. As I said, we wrote to them in May 2002 rejecting that calculation. They have now agreed as part of the settlement terms that the multi-car effect will be taken out totally, therefore, the effective fine per car for the year March 2002 to March 2003 will be less than the daily rate. They have accepted our contention that 40% of the cars they deemed to be parked illegally were, in fact, cars belonging to staff who did not display stickers. That has changed dramatically since February when the new ID system was put in place.

Is there any possibility they will repay the penalty charges retrospectively since the car park was built?

Mr. Lamont

Part of the problem is referred to in appendix E of the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General. A letter written in September 2001 accepted all fines up to March 2001. The operators are claiming that at a meeting in January 2002, of which I was not aware, it was agreed to accept fines up to September 2001. As part of a deal I have negotiated, the application of the multiplier back to the beginning of 2000 has been taken away. The application of 40% of the fines has been taken away, therefore we have agreed that instead of having incurred fines of approximately €2.4 million, we only legitimately accept fines of €700,000, which is less than one third of what had been applied to us. As part of the recovery of the deal, we will be getting €290,000 for three of the four quarters of the last year, up to March 2002. Under the terms of the new agreement, we will receive all rental from June 2003. We will also receive €100,000 per year as part of the deal and we will be in receipt of 125 free car parking spaces. The total commercial value of the deal is in excess of what the hospital lost over the last four years.

Is it a debit and credit book balance as against giving actual cash?

Mr. Lamont

No, it will not be in the form of specific cash. I have been informed by our financial adviser that the deal I have negotiated is reasonable. It more than approximates the loss in actual terms.

Is there any option whatsoever on this contract over the 13 year period? Given that there is talk of renegotiating the initial agreement, what powers have you to confirm the type of deal you indicated?

Mr. Lamont

The board have approved it in principle. There are clauses in the agreement to which I alluded earlier, that is, the bank charge on the sinking fund. If we fail to negotiate the lifting of that charge the new negotiated agreement will fall apart. We will then have to engage in further negotiations but I do not anticipate that will happen.

There are other clauses in the agreement I negotiated which will allow the operator to withdraw from the agreement if unexpected events take place. However, these are just safety clauses. We were keen to ensure that the hospital will not be locked into another agreement from which it cannot escape should things not go according to plan.

Have you estimated the tax exposure on the deal?

Mr. Lamont

No. To date we have not received a final answer to that query. The query is currently with our financial advisers who are preparing documentation for submission to the Revenue Commissioners to ensure that all the angles are covered. Part of our responsibility as a public body is to ensure we look at the bigger picture to ensure all aspects of the new deal are confirmed in detail.

There were two specific questions, one from Deputy Fleming and one from Deputy Connaughton. Guidelines for the provision of structured car parking facilities in acute hospitals have been issued by the Department. They were cleared before issue with the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General and they build on a whole series of documents already in place, beginning with EU directives, Department of Finance guidelines, Department of Health and Children accounting standards and ten or 11 different guideline documents around public procurement in relation to construction contracts. This set of guidelines is in addition to the compendium of information which already exists and the issues the guidelines go through around the whole process in terms of this type of arrangement.

The basic foundation on which this is based is that the Department acknowledges the need to provide parking facilities in acute hospitals. These facilities should not absorb much needed capital funding required for the direct provision of patient services. It is the policy of the Department of Health and Children that, where appropriate, new parking facilities at acute hospitals should be self-funded by income derived from the facilities. This is very much a follow through on the model already in place. However, we must ensure there is a full pre-project appraisal, including a proper business case and specification, proper control and management of the project and facility and proper tendering procedures and contracts and post-project review. It is directly taking on board the critique put forward in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report on this project. We also plan a further set of guidelines for issue to all boards and hospitals in relation to other commercial activity on the sites of hospitals in terms of shopping and so forth. I will happily provide copies of that documentation to the committee.

With regard to Deputy Connaughton's point about keeping an eye on Beaumont, the Department operates through a framework around budgeting and service planning. It is all contained within what we call the accountability legislation which sets out the roles of the Minister, the health boards and the Eastern Regional Health Authority. Within the legislation setting up that authority, the relationships between individual service providers and the authority are also set out. It would be physically impossible for either me or other members of the staff of the Department to micro manage either car parking or any other services in Beaumont or other hospitals. We rely on the accountability framework in place, and it depends on competent management being in place, procedures being followed and, ultimately, an audit process based on proper accounting information.

In this case, the audit process has brought the problem to the surface. It has also surfaced some of the issues that Mr. Lamont referred to earlier about poor management information being generated not just outside the hospital but also within the hospital with regard to this project. It was one of the experiences Mr. Lamont has referred to, and it would also be the experience of the Department, that getting hard information on this project, once some doubts began to attach to it, was extremely difficult. Happily, at this stage that problem has been rectified.

That is the framework within which we operate. We keep an eye at a particular level on all major service providers but it would be impossible to get into the detail of how this or that part of a hospital is managed on site.

I am not satisfied with that response. It did not deal with the question I asked. I am also waiting for a response to my question to the Department of Finance. Mr. Kelly outlined the memorandum that has been issued. It covered tendering, accounting, analysis, cost and so forth. It dealt with everything except the issue before us, the question of appraising the cost over a 13 year period for a tax based deal versus a direct provision deal. The memo Mr. Kelly issued did not mention that. One of the main issues before us is the appraisal being carried out by health boards, acute hospitals and other hospitals so they can carry out a comparison between direct provision of the services by Exchequer funding and a tax based deal. The memorandum Mr. Kelly referred to made no reference to that. Perhaps he will clarify that. That is the part of the documentation I wish to see.

My apologies, I should have mentioned that it does require hospitals or health boards to go through a full appraisal, involving all possible methods of funding the particular development and to look at the full cost of those in each case. It directly follows through on the——

Is that the cost to the organisation or the cost to the Exchequer?

The full cost to public funding.

Is that specified as opposed to the cost to the individual health board or cost to the hospital? Does the documentation refer to the full cost to the taxpayer in terms of tax write offs and so forth?

No, it does not.

This is the point. This is the issue we want to prevent recurring. I do not expect the Department of Health and Children or hospitals to be tax experts. What caused the problem here from the taxpayers' point of view was the tax foregone and that is not within the Department's jurisdiction. However, the mechanism by which it happens was done through the Department. I do not expect the Department to have financial expertise in these areas as it is not its job.

Mr. Kelly did not say that the new directive which went to the hospitals and health boards told them they must carry out an assessment comparing the overall cost to the taxpayer of the tax based way of doing similar deals in future compared with the cost to the taxpayer of direct provision. They are carrying out an analysis of costs as to how they affect the hospital or the health board but that was not the problem here. The problem is that the hospital has its car park, which is fine, but because of the tax breaks the taxpayer is picking up an enormous cost. That is what should be addressed by the document. Perhaps it is not possible to do that. If not, perhaps the Department of Finance could help out on this aspect of the question.

The guideline asks anybody contemplating a project such as this to consider all funding options, including loan finance, tax break initiatives or associated tax exposures etc. These should be fully evaluated and appraised to determine the preferred funding option. The costs, benefits and risks associated with the proposal should be rigorously assessed over the full lifespan of the project to ensure value for money, and that is dealt with.

The area we are getting into here is one involving the principles in public private collaboration. The PPPs are one dimension of that and this type of collaboration is another. The process that is now well articulated and described in relation to PPP, and we are conscious of it because the Department is examining a number of projects in a PPP context, involves a total analysis of all costs not just to the Department or an individual provider but also to the taxpayer. That message has been carried through to the PPP side and the guideline we have issued to hospitals and health boards.

With regard to who would carry out the analysis and whether that expertise is there, our job is to place that requirement on the hospital or health board undertaking something like this. They will more than likely commission financial expertise and describe terms of reference to their consultant that this is the type of appraisal that needs to be done. Anybody with a finance background who looks at the guideline will see that what we want is the full cost to the taxpayer investigated and considered as part of the analysis.

I am not getting a satisfactory answer. Mr. Kelly outlined a memorandum which asks a hospital manager or a chief executive to consider the full cost. His or her only brief is to consider the full cost in the context of his or her health board or hospital. The letter did not mention anything about the overall cost to the taxpayer in terms of corporation or income tax foregone. Mr. Kelly changed the goalposts by referring to a different issue, which is public private partnerships and which have a tax implication. However, what Mr. Kelly read from the memorandum did not mention income tax or revenues foregone or cost to the Exchequer. If I am the chief executive of a health board and I am told to analyse the total cost of a project, I only analyse it in the context of how it affects my health board. If I am a chief executive of a health board, I am not the Minister for Finance. That is somebody else's problem. The memorandum did not address the basic issue.

The Deputy is seeking independent appraisals.

The memorandum going to the hospitals and health boards should specify, which that one did not, that the assessment of total cost means a full and rigorous comparison between direct provision and a tax based deal, having regard to the cost to the Exchequer as distinct from the cost to the health board concerned.

Mr. Murphy may wish to comment on that.

The Department of Finance has said it would have preferred if this had been examined in the light of those factors. I wish to see the relevant memos, guidelines, instructions and assistance the Department provided prior to this deal being struck, not afterwards. It is not fair to tell the health board afterwards that this should not have been done.

Does Mr. Murphy wish to reply?

Mr. Mooney will deal with that. I will come to the tax aspect later.

There are two documents relating to the point that Deputy Fleming raised. One, dating from July 1994, sets out the guidelines for appraisal and management of capital expenditure proposals in the public sector. Those guidelines are intended to indicate best practice for all public sector bodies and, obviously, there is no problem in making that document available. It covers appraisal, planning and implementation stages. At the time of this project, there was also in existence a code of practice for the governance of State bodies, dating from 1992. A subsequent document issued in October 2001 has amplified and extended the 1992 guidelines. The one currently in place covers a range of issues, including procurement, investment appraisal, strategic and corporate planning, reporting arrangements and tax compliance. Again, we have no difficulty in making that available to the committee, as well as the 1992 document, if that would be of assistance.

With the Chairman's permission, I wish to respond to Deputy Connaughton's reference to public private partnerships, to which the Secretary General also referred briefly. We do not regard the Beaumont Hospital project as a public private partnership at all. It might be helpful if I outline what we see as public private partnerships and the reason the Beaumont project did not fit within that framework.

Yes, please do.

There is an existing framework for public private partnership which identifies a PPP as an arrangement where the following key characteristics are present: the first requirement is a shared responsibility for the provision of the infrastructure or services, with a significant level of risk being undertaken by the private sector, for example, in infrastructural projects, linking design and construction with one or all of financial, operational and maintenance elements; the second requirement is a long-term commitment by the public sector to the provision of quality public services to consumers through contractual arrangements with private sector operators; and the third requirement is better value for money to the Exchequer and optimum allocation of risk, for example, by exploiting private sector competencies over the lifetime of the project and by promoting cross-transfer of skills between public and private sectors.

The C&AG's report in relation to Beaumont makes it clear that none of these characteristics were present, either as stated objectives or outcomes of the project. In fact, the Comptroller's conclusions, as set out in paragraph 225, clearly identify the segregation of the design elements of the project from the construction elements and the segregation of both the design and construction elements from the operation of the contract. I believe this is entirely contrary to the essence of a PPP approach, where the design, construction, finance and operation are interlinked and delivered by one entity, namely the special purpose vehicle. Moreover, there were two separate tenders for the construction and the concession in the operation of the Beaumont project. This is not consistent with a PPP approach and is closer in form to the traditional method of procurement.

The Beaumont Hospital project developed the design of the car park with design consultants and then requested tenders from the construction industry. Clearly, this is an input driven approach, where the client, in this case the hospital, defined its requirement and then requested the tendering contractors to build the structure to these specifications. This is fundamentally different to the approach adopted by PPPs, where the client supplies the tendering contractors with the outputs it requires. The PPP approach allows the tenderers to use their innovation to identify the best and most cost-effective means of constructing the building to meet the specified outputs.

The Comptroller's report raises concerns about the tax treatment of this project. The tax arrangements set out in his report are entirely contrary to the PPP approach, which requires the project team to identify opportunities to deliver value for money for the Exchequer over the whole life of the project. Value for money in a PPP is measured by an exercise which compares the cost of procurement under the PPP, including the tax effects, with a public sector benchmark. The public sector benchmark is a detailed cost of procuring the project, using traditional procurement arrangements. It is compiled, in a PPP process, by the public sector before the tender process commences. Obviously, this did not happen in the case of the Beaumont project. The PPP process also requires monitoring of the project while it is in place.

It is very important to have full clarification of the PPP process for future reference as it is such an important feature of development in relation to roads and other infrastructural projects.

Absolutely.

Can the Department furnish the relevant documentation to the committee?

Yes, of course, Chairman. I have just a briefing note with me but I will ask my colleagues in the PPP unit to amplify it for the committee in the light of this discussion.

That clarification will be very welcome.

I wish to re-state that the project was not seen by the Department of Finance or, indeed, the Department of Health and Children, as a PPP project.

Are there any further questions before we conclude?

I have one specific question which I asked at the start of the meeting. Beaumont kept the Department of Health and Children informed. When I asked whether the Department of Health and Children had kept the Department of Finance informed, the reply was that it did not, because it did not have to do so. I understand that fully. Mr. Purcell's report stated quite specifically that this project cost the State a great deal of money. As far as we are concerned, that loop is still open. There are guidelines in place but there does not appear to be anybody taking overall responsibility.

I know the project in question is not a PPP - it is a joint venture, or whatever one might call it. However, it has significant financial implications for the Exchequer, as distinct from the two Departments represented here. The question I am posing is as to whether, if this project were to be initiated today, the Department of Health and Children would refer it to the Department of Finance for approval. In that event, would the Department of Finance make its decision on the basis of the value to the Exchequer? Aside from the Beaumont case, the issue is as to how such joint ventures should be structured so that, ultimately, the taxpayer gets value. As yet, I have not heard any answer to that point, on which this meeting commenced a couple of hours ago.

I appreciate the point made by Mr. Kelly in relation to what happened back in 1998 and 1999, that there was no onus on his Department to bring the matter to the Department of Finance. While I accept that fully, we have seen from Mr. Purcell's explicit comment in his report that, with all the various tax breaks, this has cost between €10 million and €13 million to the Exchequer. What is to prevent that happening again? Have we learned a lesson and are there specific procedures in place to ensure that the matter is referred to the Department of Finance for evaluation and to determine whether it is the best way forward? I believe that is the question Deputy Fleming has also been pursuing. The issue has gone beyond the remit of Beaumont Hospital. We are concerned with the bigger picture, in terms of how joint ventures or other arrangements, which are distinct from PPPs, will be subject to some mechanism to ensure the State is achieving best value for money. We have not had a satisfactory response on that issue and there is concern on the part of this committee in that regard.

Following from Deputy Curran's point, the responsibility of hospitals is in the area of caring for people. It is apparent from this situation that when a hospital has to engage in deals of this nature, everybody loses. This committee has observed more than a fair share of bad management in the health sector. The Beaumont case has certain implications for joint ventures in future. Deputy Curran referred to unanswered questions and a lack of accountability. It seems that it was just a matter of putting the car park in place, regardless of the cost, as long as it did not have an impact on direct budgets. I am quite astonished, given the size of Beaumont Hospital, that the car park was not used as the basis of its hospitality and care at any given time. The report suggests that those who were bereaved encountered huge car parking difficulties when they came to the hospital for the removal of their loved ones. Similarly, there were problems in relation to car parking for persons with a disability. The deal, which should have incorporated all those factors, was a dreadful experience. This problem goes back to 1998; it would be different if it was going back to 1978. A climate of accommodation and care should have been provided to those visiting relatives in hospital, some of whom may have been there for sad occasions. Such people were harassed when they tried to avail of car parking facilities, which are fundamental to a caring institution but which were haphazardly provided in this case. It is a staggering case from start to finish.

Perhaps the Departments of Health and Children and Finance could speak about the current position in relation to the evaluation of the joint venture projects. I speak in relation not to the promoters of such ventures, but to the State and the taxpayer.

I am happy to respond to the Deputy's query in the spirit in which he expressed it. The big picture in relation to this matter is that the evaluation of future projects of this nature will consider the full cost to the Exchequer. I have made it clear that that is the intention behind the guidelines issued by the Department of Health and Children to all hospitals and health boards on foot of this experience. I am quite happy, as a follow-up to today's meeting, to re-examine the wording of the set of guidelines to ensure that its message is absolutely and abundantly clear. The key issue is that the analysis be done and not, in relation to a question put to me at the opening of this meeting today, that each of the separate projects be passed off to the Department of Finance or elsewhere for approval. Such a move would, quite simply, clog up the entire system. The important thing is that the analysis is done. Future projects of this nature will possibly be handled on a public private partnership basis. As I said earlier, the PPP methodology will have to be very explicit. The entire cost structure will have to be examined and compared in an explicit way with direct provision. We will have to make our decisions on that basis.

It is fair to say that we will look to see if any strengthened reporting arrangements or clarifications that might embrace Deputy Curran's concerns are needed. I will convey this message to my colleagues in the public expenditure division of the Department. I welcome the Secretary General's comments in relation to the actions he has taken. He has made clear that the intention behind his Department's guidelines - it would be the intention of any Department producing such guidelines - is that the Exchequer's position will form part of the evaluation to be conducted. I will consult with my colleagues to see whether anything needs to be done to make the message clearer and to bring it home to all concerned, such as those who may be involved in similar projects in future.

I do not want to be selfish, but it was my personal concern. Mr. Mooney said in an earlier contribution that he would have preferred if things had taken another course. It came across from the meeting that this particular project was not evaluated in view of the bigger picture. It was specifically evaluated for its own merits and I am not detracting from that. Based on the outcome of the project, I think we need to look at it in a different way going forward. I appreciate Mr. Mooney's comments.

Before we conclude our consideration of this matter, I would like to thank the Comptroller and Auditor General, Mr. Purcell, and his team for producing an excellent report. This document has generated huge debate here. I hope lessons will be learnt from its findings going forward. This has been a dreadful experience for everyone concerned. I am anxious, based on his presentation today, that Mr. Lamont should keep the committee fully advised of any changes on an ongoing basis. We would appreciate it very much if he would keep us informed as he sees improvements taking place. Mr. Purcell's report has brought a huge mindset of thought to the development of PPPs going forward. The events we have heard about should not have happened. I invite Mr. Purcell to comment before we conclude.

Mr. Purcell

I will not go over old ground, although there is one point worth making if I am to make clear to everyone where I am coming from. Of course the Government will bring in tax incentive schemes and tax break schemes from time to time, for example as an economic instrument. That is fine as an instrument of policy. In implementing and using that instrument of policy, however, special responsibilities attach to Departments of State and public bodies. I do not think one can say, willy-nilly, that public bodies should consider themselves to have an equal freedom to use in their own narrow interests tax incentives that may be provided for in one of the Finance Acts. That is the danger and I think that is what happened here.

Without delaying the committee, I would like to use an analogy which I brought to the attention of the Department of Finance many years ago when there was tax-based leasing of equipment in public bodies. In the course of my audit of such bodies, I saw that there was huge recourse to leasing, which seemed to me to be a false economy. Bodies that were depending totally on the State for their financing were using the tax system to work against the Exchequer. As a result of such conduct, a section was introduced into legislation when the public financial procedures were being revised in the 1990s. This reiterated the point that the full cost of any tax-based leasing arrangements should be established before such arrangements are entered into, to ensure no overall cost to the State is involved. An analogy can be drawn between the circumstances at that time and the matter we have been discussing.

The committee has examined most angles of the report. Tallaght Hospital, which I do not audit, also had a tax-based deal. I was grateful to receive information from the hospital in recent days, which indicated that the structure of the deal was similar to that in Beaumont Hospital. If the structure was similar, I do not doubt that there was a loss to the Exchequer in that instance also. The Tallaght Hospital authorities confirmed to me that they did not have to pay any penalties, however, and that they used the excess income stream as security to fund certain services. I think this is one of the points that was made by members of the committee earlier, when the impact of this matter was illustrated. If it was worked and managed correctly, or if it was set up correctly for Beaumont Hospital, there may well have been an opportunity to fund certain service developments in the hospital in one way or another. I agree with Mr. Lamont that the gains may have been quite modest, but the possibility would have existed.

I referred to this deal as a public private partnership-type arrangement. I would not like my comments today to be considered as critical of PPP programmes going forward. It certainly shared some of the characteristics of a PPP project, as responsibility for the construction contract was taken over by the developer. It was financed by a developer and it is being operated by the developer. I will not go into the terrible analogy involving quacking and ducks, but the matter bore some resemblance.

I propose to note the report. In light of the huge amount of time we have spent examining Mr. Purcell's value for money report and given the great importance of Chapters 9.1 and 9.2 of Vote 33, I propose to deal with the Vote at our next meeting. Is it agreed to note the VFM report? Agreed.

On the agenda of next week's meeting will be Vote 42, Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands, Chapter 12.1, State subsidised transport to the islands, and Dúchas.

The witnesses withdrew.

The committee adjourned at 2 p.m. until11 a.m. on Thursday, 29 May 2003.
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