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Committee on Budgetary Oversight díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 19 Sep 2023

Pre-Budget Engagement: Central Bank of Ireland and ESRI

I welcome Dr. Robert Kelly, Dr. Martin O'Brien and Dr. Gillian Phelan from the Central Bank of Ireland.

Before I begin, I must again explain some limitations to parliamentary privilege and the practices of the Houses regarding references witnesses may make to other persons in their evidence. Witnesses are protected by absolute privilege in respect of the presentation they make to the committee. This means that they have an absolute defence against any defamation action for anything they say at the meeting. However, witnesses are expected not to abuse this privilege, and it is my duty as Chair to ensure that this privilege is not abused. Therefore, if witnesses' statements are potentially defamatory in relation to an identifiable person or entity, they will be directed to discontinue their remarks, and it is imperative that they comply with any such direction.

I again remind members of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official, either by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable. I remind members of the constitutional requirement that they must be physically present within the confines of the place in which the Parliament has chosen to sit, namely Leinster House, in order to participate in public meetings. I will not permit a member to participate where they are not adhering to this constitutional requirement. Therefore, any member who attempts to participate from outside the precincts will be asked to leave the meeting.

I now ask Dr. Robert Kelly to give his opening statement to the meeting.

Dr. Robert Kelly

I thank the Chair, and wish the members of the committee a good afternoon. I am joined by Dr. Gillian Phelan, head of monetary policy and Dr. Martin O'Brien, head of Irish economic analysis. We welcome this opportunity to discuss the economic and fiscal outlook with the committee. In my opening statement, I will outline our latest macroeconomic assessment and focus on the implications for the public finances.

I will turn straight to the economic outlook. The quarterly bulletin published today forecast domestic economic growth measured by modified domestic demand of 2.9% in 2023, followed by 2.6% and 2.3% in 2024 and 2025 respectively. This outlook is shaped by evermore binding capacity constraints and the impact of monetary policy tightening on demand, both in Ireland and globally. The economy demonstrated remarkable resilience to the overlapping shocks of the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Demand for labour surged as the reopening of close-contact service sectors amplified strong employment growth across sectors more adaptable to remote working. As a result, vacancy rates rose substantially above trend levels, even as the number of workers reached record highs and unemployment fell to 20-year lows, pointing to an economy operating at full capacity.

Reflecting these capacity constraints, the determinants of the inflation outlook are evolving from external to domestic factors. Although the spillover of higher energy costs to broader consumer basket continues, input price pressures are fading.

Domestic factors, specifically the interplay between profit margins and wage pressures resulting from labour market tightness will largely determine the persistence of inflation. Ireland's consumer price inflation remains high, but it is declining and it is anticipated to reach 2.3% by 2025 in the central outlook.

In order to reinforce progress in bringing euro area inflation toward its 2% target in a timely manner, the ECB governing council last week decided to raise interest rates by 25 basis points, bringing the total increase to 450 basis points since the start of the hiking cycle last year. Based on its current assessment, the governing council considers that policy rates are now at levels that, if maintained for a sufficiently long duration, will make a substantial contribution to bringing euro area inflation back to target. In order to determine the appropriate level and duration of restriction, the governing council will continue to take a data-dependent approach going forward, taking regard of the inflation outlook given incoming data, the path of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

Monetary policy works through multiple channels, and the overall impact is only seen with a considerable lag. The first phase of transmission can be seen in financial conditions where higher bank funding costs, increased loan pricing, tighter credit standards and weakening loan volumes are already evident. Central Bank analysis shows initial Irish interest rate pass-through is under way. It still appears to be slower for new mortgage lending and household deposits relative to historical precedent and euro area peers. Further, scenario analysis based on historical relationships suggests that inflation in Ireland would have been between 2 and 2.5 percentage points higher over the last and next 12 months in the absence of the policy rate increases since July 2022.

The export orientated nature of the Irish economy yields a high degree of sensitivity to the external outlook. Global growth has displayed resilience, but it is projected to slow over the next year as the higher policy rate environment weighs on activity. The decline in Irish net exports in the first half of 2023 was partly due to sector-specific factors, such as vaccine demand normalisation following the pandemic. Still, global headwinds provide a high degree of uncertainty for exports out of the State and contract manufacturing exports undertaken abroad on behalf of Irish resident entities.

What does this mean for the public finances and managing them at a time of full employment? Overall, the public finances are in a broadly healthy position, as evidenced by the Government running a headline surplus last year, having providing a total of €20 billion in temporary supports in 2021 and 2022. In addition, as expected, the higher interest rate environment has led to a notable increase in Irish sovereign yields over the past year. The relatively low number of bonds maturing in the coming years, coupled with large cash balances, provide funding flexibility.

Fiscal policy underpinned the economic resilience we have seen since 2020. The agility of the employment supports avoided labour market scarring from pandemic restrictions and temporary supports protected those most vulnerable in our society from the energy price shock. Given the scale of these shocks, permanently offsetting the real income falls and maintaining current and capital spending in real terms, especially in light of growing demands from evolving demographics, requires significant spending increases. Increasing current spending in this nature, in the absence of offsetting revenue raising measures, risks creating inflationary pressures and feeding overheating risks. This would ultimately reduce the real value of public spending, in particular capital spending. The core consideration is not whether catch-up is achieved - it will be - but the calibration of the appropriate pace.

Let me first highlight the importance of policy cohesion to avoid the costs of persistently higher inflation. The focus of ECB monetary policy is on achieving price stability in the euro area. The effectiveness of monetary policy in Ireland will depend, in part, on the relative strength of domestic demand compared to the euro area. Fiscal policy must avoid working at cross-purposes to monetary policy and providing additional stimulus to an economy currently operating at capacity. The summer economic statement signals that budget 2024 will increase core expenditure by €5.5 billion, an additional €250 million windfall capital investment spend, €4 billion in non-core current spending and a doubling of the tax cut package, before considering the potential for additional measures that may be introduced on budget day.

The overall budgetary package is significantly more expansionary than outlined in April’s stability programme update. Revisions of this nature amplify demand in an economy already operating at capacity and shift the stance of fiscal policy in a pro-cyclical direction. Scenario analysis shows that the upward revisions to permanent core spending leads to short-run inflation, which, if allowed to persist over the medium term, will damage Ireland’s competitiveness and the real gains in living standards Ireland benefits from having vibrant export-orientated businesses operating in the State.

The revised spending for next year and the projections out to 2026 breach the Government’s net spending rule. It was adopted in the 2021 summer economic statement to stabilise expenditure based on trend growth, assumed to be 3%, and the price stability target for inflation of 2%.

The spending rule is expressly designed to support countercyclical fiscal policy. The rule allows fiscal expansion when inflation is low, frequently during periods of low demand. When inflation exceeds trend, notably during periods of strong demand, the rule becomes more binding, requiring expenditure mix decisions. This rule automatically sets the appropriate pace for catch-up outlined earlier. Further, it is important to establish credibility in the framework, especially as common fiscal sustainability tools such as debt-to-GDP and deficit limits provided for in the revised EU fiscal framework will not provide appropriate guidance for fiscal policy in Ireland. This is because of the distortions to GDP figures and the specific risks posed by windfall corporation tax that undermine the usefulness of the common EU framework in an Irish context.

Second, there is an opportunity to enhance medium- to longer-term resilience in both the public finances and the economy as a whole. A lesson from the years preceding 2008 was the vulnerability created by additional spending linked to a growth in property-related tax revenues, which turned out to be transitory. Exchequer tax revenue growth over the last five years is almost identical to the 2002-2007 period but is significantly more concentrated. Corporation tax accounts for 45% of the overall revenue growth and is further concentrated on receipts from a small number of firms. A second consideration is the detachment of these receipts from domestic activity. Up to half of current annual corporation tax revenue could be considered as excess or windfall receipts. This revenue is subject to unpredictability, as evidenced by the recent frequency of upward revisions and the most recent fall in August's corporation tax receipts. Most importantly, the sustainability of this revenue over the long term is not assured. The summer economic statement adjusts the headline budget balance to exclude excess corporation tax, a welcome development considering the uncertainty over this revenue source.

While these excess corporation tax receipts are a source of risk if used to fund tax cuts and permanent spending increases, if these revenues are saved they provide an opportunity to build the capacity to address medium-term challenges. The summer economic statement provides for careful consideration of such challenges, including the so-called four Ds, namely, adverse demographics, possible deglobalisation, decarbonisation of economic activity and acceleration of digitalisation. In response to these challenges, proposals to establish a long-term savings fund are outlined in the summer economic statement, with the Minister for Finance set to bring proposals to Government later in the autumn. Establishing such a fund is a welcome development. A long-term savings fund reduces the risk of linking core spending to transitory revenues that are potentially susceptible to a sudden stop and it builds capacity to meet such medium-term challenges. It will be crucial to establish the instalment schedule, the specifics of the fund’s investment strategy and the policies governing withdrawals from the fund once it has been established.

I thank members for their attention. My colleagues and I are happy to take members’ questions.

I thank Dr. Kelly for his opening statement. I want to begin by focusing on the inflation outlook, its causes and its impact.

The quarterly bulletin provides an inflation estimate of 5.4% for this year, 3.2% for next year and 2.3% in 2025. In his opening statement Dr. Kelly said that domestic factors, specifically the interplay between profit margins and wage pressures resulting from labour market tightness, will determine the persistence of inflation. This point is referenced in today's report as well. I want to specifically focus on the relationship between wages and profits. Research by the European Central Bank on 30 March found that in 2022 the effect of profits on domestic price pressures was exceptional from an historical perspective, contributing much more to inflation from April to December than labour costs. The Central Bank's quarterly bulletin at the beginning of the year showed a similar trend in our own economy. In the past year we have heard calls, including from the Government, for wage restraint to tackle inflation but we hear very little mention of profit restraint. I ask Dr. Kelly to comment on the phenomenon and the impact of increased profits on inflation in the recent period. Why are we talking about wages all the time and about keeping wages down? Why is there little talk about profits or why are the huge profits that are being made being excused away?

Dr. Robert Kelly

I thank the Deputy for her question. I will start and Dr. O'Brien might like to add a little.

The Deputy is right in that, until this point, what we have seen in terms of immediate reaction is that profits have contributed more to inflation than wages. However, it is also important to think about the timing of this. When we see that demand and supply are at the level of imbalance that we now see in certain sectors, it would be natural to think the price pressures would come to the profits, but there could be a number of motives for this. One could be the pure profiteering that people point to, but another could be the timing of when wage pressures hit the system. If people know they are going to experience additional demand for labour in the future, they will have to pay higher wages, so it could be a timing thing. Within our forecasts, we assume there will be no increase in profit share or net profits over the projection horizon and that what will actually happen is that inflation will follow the path of wages. If it were to be the case that some of those wage pressures could be taken within the profits, then inflation would actually fall that little bit faster. However, if it were to be the case that profits remained elevated, which we will talk about shortly, then inflation would actually be on a higher path.

What we have to think about in an economy where we see a settling of demand and supply is what would be the rationale whereby competition would not compete those profits back down. I struggle to see how it would not be a temporary phenomenon. In a short period of time where we have these capacity constraints, we could see it going up, but it should compete itself away and move itself into wages. That would be my sense.

Dr. Martin O'Brien

This is similar to some of the more recent European data. Part of it is that there is just a natural cycle element to this. At a particular point, once the shock happens, like what we have seen, we will see this sort of uptick in profitability at that particular point in the cycle. There is a third element in that relationship, which is productivity, and it is the interplay between wages, productivity growth and profitability that will ultimately determine how persistent or how long inflation pressures might last in the economy. The forecasts that we have - it is similar with respect to the outlook for the euro area overall - is that the buffers of profitability that have been built up in the corporate sector through 2021 and 2022 are now there, in essence, to finance the real wage catch-up that was embedded in our forecast and also for the euro area. For the most part, it is really just a timing issue, I would suggest.

I think it is a bit more than a timing issue, given we see these huge profits. Even looking at the banks alone, they are projected to get something like €5 billion in profits for the next year. It is very hard for people who are experiencing that shock in their own households to see that we seem to excuse away that shock. While I have limited time to talk about this, it is very important not to separate the huge profits that are being made through the pressure on people and households to just accept what is being given to them.

I want to focus on the specific aspect of the current inflation in the energy markets. Electricity prices have increased by 87% since 2021 and they have been applied to people who have had no, or very small, increases in their wages. However, the wholesale prices fell by 64% in the 12 months to July and we have seen a sustained decrease in wholesale costs, and the same has been true of gas prices since the end of last year. While electricity prices across the euro area have fallen substantially since October, we have seen no equivalent fall in Irish electricity prices in this period, which is referenced in today's report at figures 39 and 40. In the quarterly economic commentary in June, the ESRI warned that this could be due to anti-competitive behaviour where firms fail to pass on wholesale price decreases in order to boost profits, although it just says it "could be". Do the witnesses agree with the ESRI’s comments? What is their view on the slow pass-through of reduced energy costs to consumers?

Dr. Robert Kelly

As the Deputy correctly points out, the quarterly bulletin notes that we are out of line with Europe. It is very clearly the case that when we saw the rising prices for consumer energy, we rose almost in lockstep with Europe, but Europe has seen quite a reduction while they have remained elevated in Ireland. There are a number of reasons for this. I will not pretend to be an expert on the actual pricing strategies of individual energy providers, and I would not be able to comment about that. What typically happens within this market is a lot of hedging and there is a question as to what extent that hedging is featuring.

Most certainly we did not see the spike in the wholesale costs going as high in consumer prices. Some of it was taken off but individual hedging strategies could well be slowing down the pass through.

Does the Central Bank have information or transparency on the hedging strategies of these companies?

Dr. Robert Kelly

No, I would not have information on energy providers.

Does anybody other than the companies themselves have sight of their hedging strategies?

Dr. Robert Kelly

That is not something I would know. It is one of the reasons we speak about potential bumpiness on the way down. We could start to see it being passed through in a way that might be described as catch-up to what we see in the euro area. There is a level of uncertainty. When we speak about a potential quicker return to inflation of 2% one of the reasons we point to is consumer energy pricing coming through in bulk.

I want to ask about monetary policy. We know there has been an aggressive tightening of monetary policy since July of last year, with the ECB increasing its key interest rate from 0% to 4.5%. I note that the opening statement referred to monetary policy working through multiple channels and the overall impact being seen with a considerable lag. Will Dr. Kelly outline to the committee what these multiple channels are and the estimated time lag associated with policy tightening in this area? Do higher interest rates disproportionately hurt low and middle income households and households with less disposable income? How much research does the Central Bank have on this to be able to tell what the impact of it is? I appreciate that we have limited time. There are only a few of us here and we have been here for quite a long time.

Dr. Robert Kelly

I will invite Dr. Phelan to speak shortly. I will say something to respond to some of the points at a high level and Dr. Phelan might go through some of the channels. The issue we are focused on now, and the immediate issue, is with regard to passing through the pricing. Loan pricing is the big channel that monetary policy comes through first. We see two very different things in terms of households and firms and sometimes this gets a little bit lost. Firms have experienced quite strong pass through relative to history and it is consistent with what we see in the euro area. The main channel it feeds is their view on investment and how much investment they should make. Essentially, investment is being made more expensive for them. If we look at the data on how much firms are drawing down in terms of loan volumes we are already seeing a reduction in what can be classified as investment loans, which are those larger loans. This feeds into the labour market which, in turn, feeds into households. This is one of the primary channels.

The second channel is through the likes of the mortgage market. There are two elements to this. The first is with regard to the direct impact on new loans. Primarily this is with regard to house prices. There is also a consumption effect, whereby if people's mortgage rates in general go up they have to spend more on their debt so it leaves them with less to consume. This is a second channel. There are a number of other channels that operate more slowly. With regard to the question on distribution, if we look at the cohort of individuals who have mortgages in Ireland they are not necessarily the lower income households. Of course this is a generalised statement. There are mortgages across the economy. When we think about the inflationary shock, in the early stages there were rural elements that were higher because it was with regard to energy prices. The shock itself in its early stages impacted lower income households more. One of the reasons for this is that they have a different consumption basket. Higher income households tend to have more higher paying mortgages, some of which are fixed and some of which are not, and some of which are tracker mortgages. There are many compositional effects. On average, mortgage interest is paid by higher income households in society.

Dr. Gillian Phelan

I will begin with the first part of the question and speak about monetary policy transmission and the lag we often hear about. Ms Lagarde, the president of the ECB, often speaks about the two legs of monetary policy. The first leg is the transmission of ECB policy rates into financing conditions. This is part of what we are looking at in terms of interest rate pass through for the banks. We are quite early in the cycle in terms of tightening but we are already seeing some impacts. We are seeing increases in rates and falling lending as Dr. Kelly has spoken about. We are seeing this pass through to new lending and to outstanding amounts. We are seeing effects on balance sheets. Moving on to the second leg, we are speaking about the transmission from financial conditions into the real economy and how it affects growth and inflation. Much of this has not happened yet. We are waiting to see some of this. These are what we speak about when we speak about long and variable lags.

Deputy Conway-Walsh asked about how long these lags are. From experience, we would say that they are somewhere between 18 and 24 months. One has to remember there was an interest rate hike just last week and we have also experienced hikes all the way - they started back in July. All of that cumulative effect will take between 18 and 24 months to feed through to growth and inflation. A lot of the inflation reduction we have seen so far is mainly just a result of energy and food prices coming down. As I said, we will only see the monetary policy action starting to impact further ahead.

To pick up on the Deputy's question about interest rate pass-through and what we are seeing, this is one part of the first leg of that transmission. As Dr. Kelly said, overall we are seeing quite strong pass-through in Ireland and the euro area. As Dr. Kelly also said, it has been stronger for businesses than it has been for households. For Ireland, there are probably two main exceptions. The first is in the interest rate pass-through, the rates that are being passed on to households for their overnight deposits or the money that we have in our current accounts. The second is on new mortgage lending. We are also seeing that we are slightly weaker than the euro area in that respect.

The Deputy asked about the factors driving this. In terms of deposits, I would issue a caveat that this is early evidence. We are watching this all of the time. We are keeping an eye on transmission but everything we say has the caveat that this is still early in the transmission process and we still expect to see some more.

Back to deposits, in terms of what we are seeing there in this cycle, banks, not only in Ireland but across the euro area, would tell us that slower pass-through is happening because they have a lot of deposits already and they do not really need to raise the deposit rate to attract more deposits. Evidence in the literature across history would say there are various other reasons banks might not pass on interest rate hikes. These could include lots of different things that we will have to unpack over time, such as the structure of the banking system, the availability of alternative products and digitalisation.

The main thing impacting pass-through in terms of mortgage lending is product type, that is, if it is a tracker, variable or fixed-rate mortgage. We have done some analysis on this. We have a scenario which was done before the last interest rate hike. If we assume interest rates increased by 425 basis points, we found that the impact on the average mortgage holder is an increase in repayments of 16%. This is not uniform. It is very different across mortgage holders. Approximately 40% of mortgage holders would not have any increase in their repayment and another 20% would see them increase by 50%. The 20% of mortgages that are seeing a 50% increase - that package of mortgages - would largely be trackers. They would have larger outstanding amounts, longer terms and just bigger mortgages overall. With all of this, it is early evidence. Monetary policy transmission is still happening. Even after we did some of that analysis, the banks had increased their interest rates further. We expect to see more of that in the time ahead.

Deputy Conway-Walsh also mentioned a little bit about profits in her previous question. We are also seeing this play out in bank profits. We would also expect early in the cycle of monetary policy tightening that banks would make bigger profits but as demand comes down, inflation comes back down and the economy slows, we would expect that those profits would recede as well.

That gives rise to more questions, but I thank the Chair.

I call Deputy Durkan.

I thank the Chairman.

I will ask Dr. Kelly about the hedging which he referred to in the energy market. To what extent has anybody in authority investigated the manner in which it works? We all understand how it works - they have to project ahead and when the shock is coming, they hedge - but when they revert, it is not so clear. There is always the question among both commercial and domestic consumers that somebody out there is hiding something from them and that it is impacting on them. That is one question.

The other question is in relation to inflation. When is it possible to tell the effect that deflationary measures will have in actually reducing inflation? How long does it go on? It must be possible. For instance, would it have been better to have a short sharp rise in the beginning, or would it be better to do that now, keeping in mind that the consumer in every shape and form will be affected anyway?

If there is a consequent increase in the cost of living, that is a negative from the point of view of any government anywhere. At the same time, there is an expectation on the part of the general public. They have been under the cosh for some considerable time over the past couple of years and they worry about the possibility of more of the same. We know that housing is a major cost with respect to wages and so on and so forth. What is the answer to it? In the 1970s, we had various answers in relation to inflation and where it was coming from, importing inflation and so on. Right now, there is a cost-of-living crisis, there is a crisis of war and a lack of supply. Decisions have to be made. Yet, many replacement energy facilities have been put in place. I wish to know, if possible, to what extent we are nearing a position whereby we will not be affected to the great extent that we are now by fluctuations in the energy markets abroad.

Dr. Robert Kelly

I will start and perhaps my colleagues would like to come in and join me. On the Deputy’s first point on energy prices and hedging, I am not aware of any study on the individual hedging strategies. I suspect, although I am open to correction, that individual companies would guard quite closely their pricing strategy and the way they manage their risks. Perhaps it is a question for the individual companies.

I will explain how I think this works. Instead of the energy providers buying at a rate on the market today, leaving them exposed to that, they buy at a future price. That works particularly well, as the Deputy said, when there is a spike. However, the reality is that when you are in the heat of the moment and energy prices have risen and you are thinking about your supply six or 12 months out, you have to make a decision in the middle of the shock on how much risk you hedge by locking in the price six months from now versus essentially going unhedged, where you run the risk that potentially energy prices go even further - or they could decrease. Essentially, it is a commercial decision as to how much to hedge them, like any operator hedging any risk. I do not have detail around the specifics of energy and hedging.

What is true, as the other Deputy pointed out, is that we are not experiencing the same level of reduction that we see across the euro area. That leads to a question as to why we are not seeing that and whether there will be catch-up or whether there is a structural feature, such as, potentially, competition. There are potentially a few answers there. That is an open question that we need to examine further.

If I understand the Deputy’s second question correctly, he is asking whether it would be better to let inflation go quite high and not necessarily provide the supports versus providing the supports to smooth it. Would that be a right way of-----

Dr. Robert Kelly

Sorry, I want to make sure-----

It is whether the containment measures, such as interest rate increases and so on, should be shorter, sharper increases in order to slow it down and go back to what the original target is supposed to be. For example, if we are in the business of reducing inflation, what is the best way to do it? Will we do it on an annual basis for five years and strangle ourselves in the course of it so it is worse and worse all the time from the consumer’s point of view and there would be difficulty for all governments, or should we have said that we would have an increase that would curtail inflation for the foreseeable future and have an actual and quick impact?

Dr. Robert Kelly

I might ask Dr. Phelan to come in. One thing I will say at a very high level is that the response has to reflect the shock. Ordinarily, you might not respond at all in terms of monetary policy if you believe it is a short supply-side shock. That is not what we have seen over the past two to three years, so the response has to be tailored based on the shock being faced. Usually, monetary policy takes action when it is believed demand is driving some of that inflation. I ask Dr. Phelan to come in.

Dr. Gillian Phelan

It is a good question. To follow up on what Dr. Kelly said, taking monetary policy action has to be done with careful consideration and understanding what is driving it. We know and we can see out there that taking this action is not costless; it has a cost for firms and households. We also know that not responding is even more costly because inflation imposes enormous costs on society. When action is delayed or weak, those costs are even greater.

We know interest rates have increased an unprecedented ten times in 14 months.

This represents a very significant tightening of monetary policy at a very fast pace. Reflecting the Deputy's comment, it shows the significant challenges we have in terms of price stability. When thinking about taking action, very much as my colleague said at the beginning, when inflation started to rise, it appeared very much like a supply shock. The overlocking and interlocking shocks led to some persistence in inflation. At that point, it started to feed into demand, and it is at this point that monetary policy action can help. Monetary policy action cannot do anything about supply shocks, on which it has no impact, but it can slow demand to bring it back down in line with supply, which will then bring down inflation.

On one of the Deputy's other points, it is important not to overreact, say, with one big jump. If we know we need to get to a certain level, why would we not go to another level? There are a couple of reasons, but a fundamental one would be that monetary policy action is not a precise science. Taking these steps incrementally gives us time to assess how monetary policy is tracking through the system, how strong transmission is and the impact on firms and households. Were there no cost to taking monetary policy action, we would do that jump. However, the fact the costs are there means we have to balance the risks on either side to make sure we are leading to the best outcomes for the economy.

My time is up but I may have an opportunity to come in again later.

I will come back to the Deputy.

One of the big debates as we head into the budget is around the fact we have a large surplus but we must be careful not to spend it because it may feed inflation. Although it is rarely stated upfront, most economists acknowledge that it is okay to spend more if it is covered on the other side by increased revenues. If people think that is true, it should be said. In other words, if we decide we desperately need to spend more on housing, put more into the health service and protect the less well-off from the impacts of inflation, we can spend more and it is financially acceptable, from a prudential point of view, to do so as long as it is covered on the other side by increasing revenues through, for example, raising taxes on wealth or on the super-profits being earned and which, to a significant extent, as the witnesses acknowledge, are driving inflation. Is it not important to acknowledge that fact? It is rarely acknowledged. It is always about the need to be careful about spending. Should we not say we must be careful of spending only if we do not know we will raise additional revenues to cover it but if we raise additional revenues that possibly reduce less important demand, let us say, it is not a problem? If we stopped the demand for luxury yachts, for instance, that would not be a bad thing because there would then be more money available to provide houses for people. The same would apply to demand for very expensive champagne or for swimming pools in people's houses. There are different types of demands. Should we not spell that out a little more?

Dr. Robert Kelly

I will not comment directly on yachts. I will make two points in response to the Deputy's question. First, I think there are two elements to the restrained spending right now. The most acute, which probably accounts for the vast extent, is the need not to feed inflation, as the Deputy mentioned. The other element is vulnerability and ensuring the public finances are put on a firm foot structurally, which requires that we do not start to use potentially transitory receipts to feed expenditure.

To come back to the Deputy's main point, the net spending rule that was designed in the summer economic statement in 2021 relates to net spending. It is exactly relevant to his point. If revenues are raised, more spending can be done. The rule just means that net of balance of revenues and expenditure, the growth will be 5%. Exactly as the Deputy outlined, we are saying that within that structure, the 5% is to provide guidance. As to the relativities across policies in terms of how that spending versus tax revenues is done, that is a Government decision. On the Deputy's point, yes, what he is proposing would still keep us in line.

I just think it is important to stress. It is not in the language and it should be emphasised a little more. The problem from the point of view of ordinary working people and those on lower incomes and so on is that when we have budget deficits, they have to get it in the neck and when we have record budget surpluses, they still get it in the neck. Meanwhile, super profits are being earned. I am not asking the bank officials to agree with my particular policy proposals, but it should at least be seen as a legitimate option to say there is actually a way we can prevent austerity or restraint being imposed on those who really need support, provided additional revenue can be raised from elsewhere. Do the officials know what I mean?

Dr. Robert Kelly

Yes. From a macro perspective, it is the net point.

Dr. Robert Kelly

I agree with the Deputy. The decisions in between, whether it is yachts, champagne or anything else, I leave for others to decide, but the macro stability requires that total demand is kept at a capped level.

There are a couple of other points that are worth clarifying in this debate and I want to see what the officials think. Capacity constraints are being mentioned quite a lot. A major factor, possibly the major one, is labour and skills shortages. The officials might accept it is a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation. I met a group of teachers today who said there are loads of people out there who want to be teaching and that we have a shortage of teachers, but because teachers cannot get permanent posts and people cannot afford to live in Dublin on the earnings they will get as a teacher, they are leaving the country. That is a chicken-and-egg situation, because if we do not give them decent wages and do not give them housing they can afford, all of which require spending, then they are going to leave and our capacity constraints and labour shortages get worse. We must address that problem. Again, maybe we need fewer people working on building luxury yachts, which I am using as an extreme example, and more people working in our schools to educate our children because that is a prudential investment in our society. Is that a reasonable observation?

Dr. Robert Kelly

The way I would describe what the Deputy is saying is that, within that net rule we have talked about, there is current spending and capital spending, and the latter is speaking to what the Deputy is talking about. There is potential to increase the capacity of the economy going forward if we deal with infrastructural spending, for example. The reality is that, given the size of the shocks to restore people's real incomes, avoid a fiscal drag in terms of the tax system and have capital spending, it is just too much spending for where the economy is at right now, and the tough choices are between those. There is a need to support households, without doubt. Some of them have experienced huge increases in their cost of living. To the earlier point, and maybe I did not come across right, I did not want to be dismissive that people with mortgages have higher incomes. They could also have very high costs and could be the most acutely affected. It is about identifying those households and getting the balance right between that and doing capital spending to unlock infrastructure to support the provision of housing, for example, which increases the potential for more people to come into the State to provide the labour and to stop people leaving the State, as the Deputy pointed out. It is about getting that mix right, but again there are trade-offs inherent in all that and getting the balance correct.

Yes. My last point, and it follows from the previous one, but again I feel it is worth spelling out, is that one of the big ongoing current expenditures that is ballooning is the amount of money the State is forking out every year in housing assistance payment, HAP, rental accommodation scheme, RAS, and leasing arrangements. The same could probably be said about the outsourcing to the private sector of healthcare, although maybe it does not get talked about as much. If we increase spending and investment that reduces the ongoing, and in some cases ballooning, current expenditure by bringing down over the medium to long term the cost of housing by investing directly in public and affordable housing, is it fair to say that is a prudential expenditure, even if we are significantly increasing it, because it is going to reduce our financial exposure over the medium to long term?

Dr. Robert Kelly

Basically, what the Deputy is saying is you trade off future current expenditure by doing the capital expenditure now. Rationally, from an economics point of view, that makes a lot of sense. However, it still meets this point of the capacity constraints of the economy.

If we do not have construction workers, it is very hard to deliver X thousand more houses and, if we try to do it, we run the risk of pushing up the cost of supplying those houses and not actually getting good value for the State's capital spend. That is potentially the issue here. It is about finding that balance. From an economic standpoint, if we had a clear map, we would say that, of course, investing in the provision of more social housing would mean that current expenditure could be lowered in the future but it is about getting the balance correct right now to ensure that we do not get bad value for money with regard to that capital spending.

The witnesses are all very welcome and I thank them for their presentation. In its statement and in a range of different interventions it has made recently, the Central Bank seems to be saying that the spending and tax plans set out by Government both in the summer economic statement and, subsequently, in the more concerning pathway it put into the public domain post the summer economic statement in April are expansionary. If they are expansionary, logic suggests that they will contribute to inflation. Has the Central Bank at any point calculated or assessed the portion of the inflation we are likely to experience next year - the witnesses said that inflation is expected to be at 3.2% next year - can be accounted for by the spending plans as presented at the moment - let us see what happens on budget day - and the increased expenditure of the expansionary budget that the Government seems to be on a trajectory towards?

Dr. Robert Kelly

Perhaps I will say two things. I may also invite Dr. O'Brien in because there was a piece in the latest quarterly bulletin that looked at this exact issue. It does not necessarily capture all of the elements of the summer economic statement but we ran scenarios where we essentially increased core spending up to around the figure of 6.5%, which is the longer-term figure. There may be another point-----

May I make an intervention, just to be clear? It would be useful to get a sense of this from the Central Bank. These are the published figures but €4 billion in non-core expenditure is also expected. Will Dr. Kelly add that into the calculations?

Dr. Robert Kelly

I do not believe we have a calculation that captures it all. We just capture the increase in core spending. We can certainly consider whether it would be of value to think about these scenarios in the future. However, let me just give the Deputy the context as regards some our thinking on the expansionary fiscal policy and the relativity and put some numbers around that. The European Central Bank does a forecasting exercise every quarter and one of the elements involves thinking about how much what is happening in fiscal spending is impacting on the economy. It measures, by reference to output, how much of an increase or fiscal expansion there is. From last September to now, the average across Europe was approximately 0.2%. The difference from the stability programme update to the summer economic statement is 1%, five times the European average. We are extremely focused on-----

This excess spending, as Dr. Kelly would have it, is adding to inflation and creating a bigger problem. This excess is also counter to the approach of the ECB.

Dr. Robert Kelly

Relative to a counterfactual in which we did not have it, it is definitely contributing to short-run inflation.

Government spending is contributing to higher rates of inflation than would otherwise be experienced.

Dr. Robert Kelly

If we have a more expansionary budget, yes. However, the other crucial factor, about which I am just as concerned, is the potential detachment from the inflationary dynamics of Europe because if we become too out of step, as a central bank, we cannot respond by raising interest rates even further to tame demand. We are within the euro system, a monetary union, and we are a very small part of it when considering the size of our economy relative to the rest of Europe. ECB monetary policy has got to be set with the whole of the European economy in mind. If we end up on a path where inflation is deviating from what is happening in Europe because of fiscal expansion, that creates this competitive problem we have seen.

Tax cuts contribute to fiscal expansion and, therefore, to inflation.

Dr. Robert Kelly

On tax cuts and spending, to go back to this net-----

I mean tax cuts contribute if they are net tax cuts in other words, unless revenue is generated from another source to make up for them.

Dr. Robert Kelly

There is a nuance to the discussion of tax cuts versus spending. In a scenario analysis, spending is slightly more inflationary than tax cuts. The reason for this is when there is a tax cut, it will not all be spent as some of it will be saved whereas spending tends to be a direct injection of Government spending on something.

If we accept the Central Bank's forecast for inflation next year at 3.2%, is Dr. Kelly in a position to provide us with at least an estimate of how much of this inflation next year will be accounted for by the Government's expansionary budget, as he has described it? I am using his own term when I say "expansionary". Would it be 3%? Would it be 2.9%?

Dr. Martin O'Brien

It would be between 2.5% and 3%.

Okay. That is significant.

I have a few more questions to ask in my limited time. They go back to a point I touched on earlier concerning so-called once-off expenditures. We are getting into a dangerous game now where we have three or four separate expenditure headings. It seems to me that this Government must know more about the conduct and outcome of the war being waged on Ukraine than either Vladimir Putin or President Zelenskyy. The reality is that this conflict, the fallout from it and the human consequences are going to be with us for some time yet. We are rightly spending significant amounts of our resources accommodating refugees here who are fleeing the dreadful war being waged on Ukraine, but the expenditure on that side is still being characterised as once-off. Is this not a dangerous way to account for public money from a fiscal perspective and in terms of fiscal plans and strategy?

Dr. Robert Kelly

Potentially, I would separate aid, or however we wish to think about these supports for Ukraine and what happens there, and-----

It refers to what happens here in terms of the impact on our finances. We are happy to do this but it is about how we do it.

Dr. Robert Kelly

Yes, when I say "here", I mean in respect of the expenditure in respect of accommodating and facilitating people in our country who have had to leave what is essentially a war-torn area-----

They have been forced to do so.

Dr. Robert Kelly

-----and separating this expenditure from potential temporary supports being allocated to households here due to the effects of the war in Ukraine. I think these are two different things. Potentially, both these aspects will be in the next budget, where they will be characterised as temporary-----

But non-core.

Dr. Robert Kelly

Exactly, as core and non-core. These supports really had a role early in the shock of shaping that shock and ensuring the most vulnerable were protected. To describe this expenditure, I used to use the phrase "temporary and targeted". I think it is now targeted and sustainably funded. We must think about what elements of the cost of living are going to remain with us. I say this because there can sometimes be a misconception regarding the difference between the price of things and the cost of living and inflation. There is no projection which states that prices are going to fall broadly across the board. They are just going to rise at a more moderate pace. If cohorts of households are going to experience difficulties and need further supports, therefore, then we will need to think about how this will be done on a more permanent basis. This is the reality over time.

To do that, I think Dr. Kelly, as an economist, will agree with the recommendations or overarching guiding principle of the report of the Commission on Tax and Welfare. It stated that to have a more sustainable tax base, which we would need to allow us to have the resources required to do the things I think we all agree we want to do, we would need to broaden the tax base rather than narrow it. Dr. Kelly will agree that doing this is a challenge for society. I do not expect Dr. Kelly to comment on this point, but in my view we are running the risk of further narrowing the tax base.

Dr. Robert Kelly

The mix of expenditure versus tax-raising is a matter for the Government to decide. That is literally Government policy as we go through the budget, so it is not for me to comment on the exact mix.

Dr. Robert Kelly

I do think, however, that having a narrow tax base has inherent risks, while broadening the tax base mitigates some risk to the public finances. There are arguments therefore that having a broader tax base always puts us on a firmer footing. How that is done, though, is a different matter.

I thank Dr. Kelly.

We have two members of the committee online. I call Deputy Patricia Ryan.

I thank our guests. I note that Deputy Nash spoke already about the once-off payments and the witnesses have already responded in respect of the household supports. Do they share any of the concerns expressed by the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, IFAC, regarding repeating past mistakes? We talk about households and perhaps supports for them as once-off measures. I am thinking particularly of our elderly who are struggling now and will struggle again with the costs of food and fuel. I am concerned in this regard. The response might be that the Government provides them with a fuel allowance, but sometimes this is simply not enough. What are the thoughts of the witnesses in this regard?

Dr. Robert Kelly

I found it a little hard to hear the Deputy, so I am sorry if I have misinterpreted her questions in any way.

Dr. Robert Kelly

It is fine but if I have strayed from the Deputy's question at all, please let me know. We are talking about the mix of expenditure again. Our focus is much more on the totality of what the impact of the level of expansion in the budget will be. We have been quite careful that it is relative to the stability programme update, SPU, until now. It has become more expansionary. Without doubt there are cohorts within that which have experienced more acute impacts from the interlocked shocks that Dr. Phelan pointed out earlier. It is about designing and thinking about the trade-offs within those as to how you best protect what you believe is most vulnerable from a Government point of view. There is a separation between the total demand you can create versus how you distribute that demand within the bounds of the 5% spending rule. What the Deputy is speaking to is that she feels there is a particular cohort, and I would not disagree, who may have experienced a more acute nature of the shock.

Okay.

Briefly, I also was concerned about the National Reserve Fund. I wonder whether it will be used for the benefit of the people. Maybe Dr. Kelly cannot answer this question. Will it not be used as collateral down the road for any future financial crisis caused by outside factors? What are the Central Bank's thoughts on that?

Dr. Robert Kelly

As I said in my opening statement, the development of a fund is a welcome development that is in the right step. It provides the capacity to deal with medium-term challenges. One of the biggest such challenges we face is demographics. The demographic shift over the next decade to 15 years in Ireland will be quite substantial. We will need to think about taxation versus the potential to have this fund to help address that. There are a number of other challenges, all equally of merit when you think about decarbonisation. At this point, we have all agreed that the fund is a good idea and I finished by saying that the details of the fund are important. It is important to examine how it will be invested, how the instalments are done and, crucially to the Deputy's point, what exit from the fund will look like. How will we think about what the right way of exiting will be? The details around that could determine the success of the fund. I agree those details are really important.

I have two main questions, one of which is on public investment in the context of the budget. In its bulletin, the Central Bank projects housing completions to be 29,000 next year and 30,000 in 2025. That compares with targets of 33,450 next year and 34,600 in 2025 under the Government's housing plan, and we know that these targets are well below what is required. Would the Central Bank agree that these projections are greatly concerning, not only for citizens but for the broader economy in terms of capacity? When we speak to businesses, the main threats are the labour shortages and housing, as there is nowhere for businesses to house their staff. What impact will that have on our competitiveness, as well as the humanitarian nature of homelessness and all of that context?

Dr. Robert Kelly

I agree with the way the Deputy is framing it, in that the delivery of the number of houses is below the level we would say is needed in terms of demographic shifts and that. We did a piece a number of years ago that came up with similar numbers, in the mid-30,000s. As we have seen things develop, that is probably a lower bound in terms of what is needed to meet the demographics. We do similar market intelligence as part of the quarterly bulletin and it is linked. You will generate more labour to live and work in areas if there is accommodation and housing so there is an interlink between the capacity constraints in the labour market and the availability of accommodation. You will hear a lot of firms talk about how they are taking steps to increase or rent out large amounts of accommodation to put their workforce in, to make it more attractive to come and work for them. Hotels are being used for this as well.

I am trying to get at the drag of productivity and how concerned the Central Bank is about that in terms of our growth potential in the future and our productivity levels, because housing and productivity are so closely linked, particularly when we are at this stage of the crisis.

Dr. Martin O'Brien

We published numbers today on the slowdown in growth. The main driver of that is the real capacity in the economy cannot grow any further.

What does the Central Bank offer as a solution to that? It obviously is of concern to the Central Bank.

What proposals would the Central Bank provide to address that situation?

Dr. Martin O'Brien

As far as I understand, there is a commission already in place, which is considering the various policy proposals in that regard. From the perspective of the public finances or the budgetary stance, within that mix that Dr. Kelly was talking about and the constraint of needing to provide sustainably funded expansion in either current or capital spending, it is reasonable to consider that relative mix. If there is scope for sustainably funded capital spending that is paced appropriately and does not necessarily add to the inflationary problems people are facing, then a certain argument could be made for increasing the capital expenditure in that regard. However, at the current juncture, we are still facing the overall macro picture that we cannot do that in a way that will ultimately damage competitiveness and inflationary pressures in the near term. That is one of the challenges we face. There is certainly an infrastructure gap that has to be addressed, but in the very near term we have the issue of doing that in a way that does not necessarily stoke inflation in a negative way that will ultimately damage households and businesses as well.

Is that not the real dilemma for us? If we look at the published article, Managing the Public Finances in a Full-Employment Economy, we are trying to balance things. Dr. O'Brien has just given us the message from the Central Bank that we are not to spend any more and should tighten everything, yet we can see the threat to our competitiveness as well as the impact that has on immigration, the labour force and all of that. I am just looking to the Central Bank for direction in terms of what it would do. The witnesses say we cannot do this but what can we do?

We could expand the role of the Central Bank to answer a question that is not strictly on the subject under discussion.

Dr. Robert Kelly

While I appreciate that it is not my role, I will offer one additional comment. I agree with everything Dr. O'Brien said. Financing is part of this. If we look at our capital spending and what we have done around housing, we could challenge the assertion that finance is the biggest block to the provision of housing, for example. There are a lot of other things. In the housing commission Dr. O'Brien referred to, there are a lot of ways in which we could think about the delivery of housing that, absent additional capital spending, could actually unlock more housing.

In planning, for example.

A point occurred to me which presents a challenge to governments, some more than others. To my mind, there is a possibility that the same rules do not seem to apply right across Europe. The costs are different. We are in the European Union and we have a Single Market, which is supposed to deliver in a particular way, but I do not know whether it does. There are exceptions to that. The rules are a bit selective in the way they apply. Let us look at what governments have to face now. They have increasing inflation, interest rates and mortgage repayments. We are told we cannot follow that with interest support for mortgage holders and so on. There is a difference between now and 25 or 30 years ago because the interest rate increase has a much bigger impact now on the householder than it did previously, as the cost of housing is a multiple of what it was before. What would the witnesses advise? The Government is being told it cannot increase day-to-day expenditure. There are warnings all over the place in policy and fiscal policy. At the same time, the consumer is faced with a very considerable increase in mortgage repayments, which is exacerbated by the interest rate increases that are still coming at us. Which way do we go? It is an issue because we could destabilise every country in several ways if we do not find the right way to deal with that situation.

Dr. Robert Kelly

I will deal first with the comment on the uniform nature of the euro area or eurozone.

It has to be taken into account that there are specificities around individual countries. For example, even as regards the shocks we saw, levels of inflation are not uniform across Europe, although we operate against them. Countries closer to the war in Ukraine have experienced much higher inflation rates than we have. There is this variation and each economy is slightly different across Europe. We will never arrive at a point where we will necessarily see the same level of inflation across Europe. Different factors are driving inflation in different areas.

I will go back to the Deputy's core question around monetary policy essentially increasing the cost of mortgages, which it is. Everyone has experienced, in some shape or form, the impact of the inflation shock. The reality is the response has been and is to increase the cost of debt for households. That is one of the transmission elements of monetary policy. The other thing that complicates this a little more is that it is not uniform. We have seen a change in the structure of our mortgage market. We now have some fixed rate mortgages. Some of those will roll off over the next couple of years. Maybe close to 10% a year will roll off over the next three years. That is coming. We have seen tracker rates where there is an automatic pass-through and standard variable rates, SVRs, where there is not. We have a real unevenness across the book.

The Deputy talked about potential support for mortgage holders. We need to think about what the aim is. For example, mortgage interest relief is quite broad in that it will just tackle those who have experienced an increase in the interest on their mortgages, which I do not doubt causes pain for households and is an additional cost, but in no way captures the capacity of that household to absorb that increase. These broad measures, first, completely contravene what monetary policy is trying to do: they are acting against it and lowering inflation. Second, there are definite side-effects, some of which, if you read the international literature, are unintended, of doing broad-based policy such as this. A lot of it ends up in house prices. To my earlier point, the reality is higher-income households have bigger mortgages and hence pay higher levels of interest.

Instead of thinking about the issue in that way, we should come back to what we talked about around targeted and sustainably funded measures. If these come from the perspective of those households that may have experienced cost-of-living increases, part of which are mortgages, supports should be designed for them rather than policies where we are potentially designing a broad policy that is untargeted as regards people's need for that assistance. That is the overall constraint we are trying to manage within. There are many pressures to deliver on because it has been a big shock. The economy is trying to absorb it. What will be needed to ensure we do not raise total demand too much is a very careful balance of assisting those who need it most.

I do not know if the witnesses have any comment on this but on the mortgages point, and it is a Government decision, is there any reason we cannot just fix mortgage interest rates at a level that is sustainable for people? This is particularly when the Peppers of this world are lashing them up to 5%, 6% or 7%, which is crippling people. The Government has the power and should cap interest rates, especially when Irish mortgage interest rates are higher than everybody else's. That would be a good measure.

The witnesses can obviously comment on that but I will ask for comment on something else relating to the Central Bank's quarterly report. Is it only in its first quarterly report that it outlines the net household income distribution or total net household income? Is it done in quarter 1? I do not think it is in the report before us.

Dr. Martin O'Brien

We published an analysis earlier in the year-----

It always seems to be in the first bulletin at the beginning of the year. I never see it in the others.

Dr. Martin O'Brien

It is more a deep dive. It may just have happened in the first quarter repeatedly but-----

I always find that interesting because it can be seen year on year, basically since the recession, that net household wealth has dramatically increased. The most recent Central Bank bulletin I saw indicated such wealth was more than €1 trillion for the first time. That was net. That will come as a huge surprise to the bottom 50% or 60% who have a tiny proportion of that or, in some cases, owe more than they own. This wealth is heavily concentrated at the top. Is it fair comment, because it seems to be self-evidently the case, that inequality in the distribution of wealth is likely to have grown even further in the past couple of years?

When talking about the cost of living, if someone has surplus money they can invest in bank shares, for example, or in fossil fuel companies or property speculation, not only may they not have lost out as a result of the cost-of-living crisis, there is a very good chance they have seen their net wealth dramatically increase in the last two years. If someone owes a lot of money or does not have a lot of surplus money to invest in bank shares, they will have lost a huge amount. What we are actually seeing as a result of the cost-of-living and inflation crisis is a redistribution from the less well off to the very wealthy. Is that a fair comment?

Dr. Robert Kelly

Dr. Phelan might have something to add on the monetary policy impacts of distribution. Maybe I will start with the first point around the potential capping of mortgage interest relief. I would be cautious-----

Mortgage interest rates.

Dr. Robert Kelly

Sorry; that was my fault. There are a couple of things that strike me about that. First, it acts as a direct impediment to the pass-through of monetary policy. If it is the case that we have fixed-rate mortgages that do not variably adjust, although we could develop a fixed-rate market for other reasons, that becomes the provision of the private sector financing of mortgages. If they develop in that way we would have a more US-style market with long-term fixed-rate mortgages. That is a different type of mortgage market and that has impacts on how banks price other elements. These are real commercial decisions that a bank has to trade off. If a bank has a predominantly variable rate book, it will price differently than if it has a long-term fixed-rate book. This is the structure of the market. If we were to come along and say, for any given reason, that we insist mortgage rates can never be above X - let us pick a random number - is it the case then that if policy rates and the cost of funding for the banks were to rise above that, it would not reflect that? That would be a real impediment to monetary policy pass-through.

The second element is that it could over time leave us in a situation where it might cause anti-competitive pressures. When you think about the banking system, we are trying to introduce more and more competition, which generally drives down rates as we have seen before the recent increase, or certainly the premium above the policy rates. Introducing caps like this could have the unintended consequence of deterring some of that competition if banks believe they have to compete in a certain way.

On distribution, we had a couple of pieces of analysis. What I recall from them, and others might want to join me in a moment, is that during the actual pandemic what we saw in terms of the likes of the Gini coefficient distribution of wealth and income was actually the reverse. In that period, it became more uneven because of the supports. If we want to tease through the implications of that for monetary policy, there has been a lot of work in Europe on these distributional effects that Dr. Phelan might want to add on.

Dr. Gillian Phelan

Generally, from the literature, the drivers of inequality are largely structural rather than cyclical. As has been said with regard to monetary policy tightening, we have rates increasing so essentially there is a redistribution there. It is bad for borrowers but good for savers when interest rates go up. We know also that a downturn is like when the tide goes out in that it lays bare a lot of the inequalities that were structurally there already. Overall in terms of thinking about monetary policy and the effect it has on the economy in the long term, we generally think of it from an economist's perspective. We talk about the general equilibrium effect. The best impact monetary policy can have in terms of inequality is actually achieving its mandate. It is having price stability, having inflation at 2%, ensuring the right conditions for growth and investment and having supply and demand back in balance. They would be the main concerns around the interrelationships between monetary policy and inequality. It works both ways. There are also implications for monetary policy decision-making in terms of inequality as well so the relationship goes both ways.

On the capping of interest rates, Dr. Kelly talked a little about this. Interest rates are for sure the main tool and anything that caps rates would slow that pass-through into the economy. It would slow that transmission of monetary policy and it would slow the reduction of inflation in Ireland. We are back to the comment from before about the relativity between Ireland and the rest of Europe becoming problematic. Of course, there are effects on competition and things like that as well but more fundamentally, perhaps, the public authority in a way would be replacing the core function of risk management, which is the function of the banking sector.

That is something we would have to think very carefully about.

I thank the witnesses for their contributions and the detailed answers they have given. Regarding the comments about capital spending, as they are aware, to stand still costs money but obviously demands are placed on capital expenditure during any Government's tenure, particularly with regard to the national development plan. The witnesses said that constraints regarding the Government's ability to deliver are not merely financial constraints. This applies in particular to housing and, it could be argued, to health and education where arguably record spending - current and capital - is provided for. The issue with housing may be related to planning. The issue with infrastructure may be related to planning. The ability to deliver a national development plan on time and on schedule is unknown to us and this may be because of planning.

In the coming weeks, the Government will publish a planning and development amendment Bill that we hope will address many of the logjams that exist. I am conscious of the length of time associated with judicial reviews, courts holding up planning and development and infrastructural capacity to deliver planning and development at a time of great crisis. I hope the witnesses agree with the sentiments behind that initiative and impart them to us in order to ensure that other parties also recognise that fact and help to ensure that the delivery of this change is timely and can deliver and address this issue as soon as possible despite my belief that it is very late in the day.

Dr. Robert Kelly

I do not know the specifics of the Bill and what is planned there. More generally, we need to think above and beyond. Planning is one of the issues and might be the first stage but it also concerns locations and whether we can create scale and unlock productivity. It is not just about houses. We get caught up in talk about 30,000 or 40,000 houses. The location of those houses could require a train station to be built to transport people to centres of work. There needs to be a partnering of thinking between private capital in terms of the delivery of housing and public capital - infrastructure, childcare support and schools that are needed to create these communities. Bringing that together potentially has scale above and beyond what we think about in terms of just increasing the funding. That might not necessarily deliver that on its own.

Towards the end of his presentation, Dr. Kelly said that the lesson of the years preceding 2008 was the vulnerability created by additional spending linked to growth in property-related tax revenues that turned out to be transitory. He is mindful of the excess income involving corporation tax and welcomes the proposal to bring about a long-term savings plan he expanded on during some of the questions. Again, this is timely but it is a challenge, as Dr. Kelly rightly said, to support households in the face of the cost of living and taxation so that we can have a modest package that ensures that any wage increases do not equal tax increases. That has been a long-standing commitment of the Government and will continue. We acknowledge and appreciate Dr. Kelly's contribution and his recommendations and guidance to this committee in its effort to be an adequate budget oversight committee for all parties. We will suspend the meeting while we await our other witnesses.

Sitting suspended at 3.19 p.m. and resumed at 3.25 p.m.

I welcome to the meeting Professor Kieran McQuinn, who is in the committee room, and Dr. Claire Keane, who is joining us online, both of whom are from the Economic and Social Research Institute, ESRI.

Before we begin, I will explain some limitations to parliamentary privilege and the practice of the Houses regarding references that witnesses may make to other persons in their evidence. The evidence of witnesses physically present or who give evidence from within the parliamentary precincts is protected, pursuant to both the Constitution and statute, by absolute privilege. However, witnesses are giving evidence remotely from a place outside of the parliamentary precincts and, as such, may not benefit from the same level of immunity from legal proceedings as a witness who is physically present. Witnesses are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice that they should not criticise or make charges against any person or entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable or otherwise engage in speech that might be regarded as damaging to the good name of the person or entity. Therefore, if their statements are potentially defamatory in relation to an identifiable person or entity, witnesses will be directed to discontinue their remarks. It is imperative that they comply with any such direction.

As is my duty, I remind members of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person or body outside the House or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable. I also remind members of the constitutional requirement that they must be physically present within the confines of the place in which the Parliament has chosen to sit, namely, Leinster House, in order to participate in public meetings.

I will not permit members to participate where they are not adhering to this constitutional requirement. Therefore, any member who attempts to participate from outside the precincts will be asked to leave the meeting.

I invite Dr. McQuinn to give an opening statement.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

I thank the Chair for the invitation to the ESRI to appear before the committee. I am joined by my colleague Dr. Claire Keane. We are grateful for the opportunity to appear before the committee today to provide our views on the budgetary position.

In terms of Government budgetary policy, it is important to understand both the current and recent Irish macroeconomic context. The last number of years has seen the Irish economy perform particularly strongly, even after experiencing the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. It is, of course, difficult to get an accurate understanding of the underlying pace of growth of the economy, especially as certain multinational-related transactions can cause significant distortions to headline economic indicators. In that context, it is worth reflecting on the recent contribution by our former colleague, Professor John FitzGerald, that seeks to estimate the underlying pace of growth in the Irish economy in the post-great financial crisis era. Professor FitzGerald indicates that the Irish economy has been increasing at somewhere between 4% and 4.5% over that period. This correlates with work carried out by the ESRI to address this issue. Presently, the Irish labour market is experiencing a degree of buoyancy unseen since the days of the Celtic tiger. The unemployment rate has been hovering around the 4% rate since May 2022 and employment creation has been significant over this period. The recovery in the labour market since the challenges posed by Covid-19, when unemployment was in excess of 30%, has been substantial.

Another indication of recent growth in the economy has been the strength of the public finances. After the Covid-19 shock, when the Government increased expenditure considerably to deal with the crisis, the general Government balance, GGB, experienced deficits of 5% and 1.6% in 2020 and 2021, respectively. However, since then the public finances have benefited from swift recoveries in income taxation, VAT and especially corporation tax receipts. In 2022, a surplus in the GGB of 1.6% of GDP, or €8 billion, was experienced, and this was after €2 billion was diverted to a special reserve fund, SPF, which we will discuss later. In the present year, the expectation is that a GGB of 1.8% of GDP, or €10 billion, will be achieved, and this is after €4 billion has been diverted to the SPF.

Notwithstanding the strength of the recent performance, it is now more than likely that the Irish economy will experience more moderate rates of growth. There are a number of reasons for this. Much of the post-Covid-19 growth performance had to do with the exceptional performance of the ICT and pharmaceutical sectors, sectors which have a significant presence in the domestic economy. While these sectors still perform well, it is highly unlikely that they will continue to sustain the rates of growth that characterised their recent performance. Therefore, as these sectors observe more modest rates of growth, this will be reflected in the domestic economy. Indeed, the current moderation in exports in pharmaceuticals and the global challenges in the ICT sector highlight the reliance of our overall growth on these key sectors.

In addition, recent ESRI research has shown that, after decades of falling income inequality, the latest data show a fall in income growth for the lowest 10% along with a stalling for others in the bottom half of the income distribution. This has been driven by a fall in work hours and months of full-time work per year, which suggests an unequal labour market recovery.

The immediate aftermath of Covid-19 gave rise to a significant degree of volatility in economic data because the periods of lockdown resulted in significant base effects whereby growth rates oscillated depending on the nature of Government restrictions up to a year previously. As we move beyond that period, the underlying pace of growth is more readily apparent.

Inflation is still exerting a negative impact on the Irish outlook. While the pace of price increases, which had peaked at over 9% in May 2022, has been declining on a persistent basis to its present rate of 6.3%, the decline has been somewhat more gradual than what many had originally envisaged. Energy prices are coming down. However, inflation is now being driven by other factors like food costs and housing costs. Higher rates of inflation act as a drag on domestic consumption levels, in particular as real household income levels are struggling to register positive growth.

Budget 2023 was unique in containing many one-off measures designed to provide relief to households experiencing strong cost-of-living challenges due to high inflation.

While budget 2023 met this challenge in a progressive manner, this was driven by one-off measures. Most permanent tax-benefit measures were either frozen or increased below the forecast inflation rate. This highlights the difficulties that will be faced in maintaining living standards when one-off measures expire.

Arguably a greater challenge at present is that posed by the response of monetary authorities to the inflationary period through increases in official interest rates. These have been substantial, with the official policy rate of the ECB increasing by more than 400 basis points in the past year. This constitutes a major degree of monetary tightening, which has also been observed in the United Kingdom and the United States. While it aims to curb inflation, it brings significant adverse side-effects as far as overall economic activity is concerned. These have been elucidated recently by contributions such as those of Ma and Zimmerman and Swanson, with investment in particular, and economic growth more generally, negatively affected. Rising interest rates across western economies inevitably have a contractionary impact on the global outlook through investment and consumption channels.

In a domestic context, higher interest rates will have negative implications for the housing market, where the cost of finance has increased significantly in the past year. There is a generally acknowledged deficit between actual housing supply levels and the structural demand for housing, the latter being determined by trends in demography and net migration. Increasing interest rates will have negative repercussions for the construction sector as the cost of finance is clearly an important consideration in housing supply. Increasing interest rates also pose affordability challenges for households looking to secure mortgage finance and this comes against the backdrop of continuously increasing house prices over the past ten years. The rising cost of finance will also pose challenges for other sectors of the domestic economy, including SMEs looking to access funding from debt financing. Recent research by Paul Egan, Conor O'Toole and Eoin Kenny has quantified these effects and notes the drag on activity caused by the higher rates.

The impact of rising mortgage interest rates will also differ across the income distribution. Work by the Central Bank may provide some reassurance as it shows that lower-income quintiles are much more likely to have a fixed-rate mortgage and are therefore less exposed to interest rate rises. Middle and higher-income groups, who may be more financially able to meet rising interest rates, are more likely to be exposed to interest rate increases due to a higher prevalence of tracker and variable mortgages among these income groups.

Another challenge on the horizon is the difficulties the Chinese economy is experiencing. While some believe that the present Chinese difficulties are somewhat transitory in nature, others such as Posen are less sanguine and suggest more structural issues are at play. In particular, the increasingly autocratic nature of the Chinese regime appears to be impacting consumer and producer confidence, with Chinese consumers and companies increasingly prioritising short-term liquidity over longer-term investments. This trend of saving rather than investing in the Chinese economy could result in less spending by Chinese households on technology goods and other durable goods which require imports, resulting in the Chinese trade surplus with the rest of the world continuing to grow. In that regard, it is worth recalling that Chinese growth was one of the main instruments of global recovery in the aftermath of the great financial crisis.

Finally, I will speak about the policy outlook. The present budget occurs at a time when the domestic economy is performing very close to capacity, but also at a time when it is likely to transition from a period of high growth to a more moderate pace of expansion. The substantial improvement in the public finances in recent years presents a certain opportunity for policymakers to address key infrastructural deficits in the domestic economy. In areas such as housing, healthcare and climate change, it is clear that significant investment by the State is required if infrastructural bottlenecks are to be addressed. Unfortunately, due to the higher interest rate regime we are now in, investment in these key areas by the private sector is set to be more expensive. This may entail the State having to incur greater levels of expenditure than had been previously anticipated. It is correct and prudent that a special reserve fund, SPF, has been established. This allows policymakers to differentiate the recent surge in revenues between those that are sustainable over the medium term and those that are more transitory or windfall in nature. This is particularly pertinent given that a large measure of the revenue surge is associated with increases in corporation tax receipts. Such transitory funds clearly should not be used to finance day-to-day current expenditure. At present, policymakers must be aware of stimulating the economy at a time of record low unemployment. Therefore, restraint is needed in other areas of fiscal policy in order to create the space for the investment that is necessary.

In particular, taxation policy must be particularly prudent if this risk is to be avoided. While our experience with managing and delivering large-scale investment projects has been problematic in the past, the present budgetary position is relatively unique in terms of the opportunities it presents. It will take a considerable degree of judgment and discipline in realising this opportunity while maintaining stable and persistent growth in the overall economy.

I thank Professor McQuinn.

I thank Professor McQuinn for his statement and I welcome both witnesses. The recent research to which Professor McQuinn referred showed that in 2021 half of all households saw their incomes decline or stagnate. In 2022 there was a sharp rise in the rate of material deprivation. As Professor McQuinn stated, this raises the prospect of three years without real income growth for most of our households. The proportion of individuals being unable to afford two or more items from the list of the ten essentials rose from 13.3% to 16.6% in 2022, with rates among lone parents being particularly high, at 42%. What is happening around inequality? Is it on the rise and has poverty increased?

Perhaps we can talk about some of the key factors around that because the Central Bank representatives in attendance earlier cited, as one of the key driving factors, the right conditions for growth and competitiveness. The ESRI's statement is linked in terms of the opportunities for investment in infrastructure.

Will the witnesses address the issue of inequality and whether Government expenditure and taxation policies contributed to the rise in inequality? What recommendations would the ESRI make on how best public spending, the budget and taxation can be targeted to address poverty and inequality?

Dr. Claire Keane

It is important to note that, unfortunately, all this research is based on Central Statistics Office, CSO, data from 2021. We can see that Ireland, until that point, was a very good news story. While pretty much every other OECD country saw a rise in income inequality in the past few decades, we have bucked that trend and seen continuous declines in income inequality. The most recent data, from 2021, show that we are now going in the other direction. That is driven by a drop in income among the lowest decile and right up to the 50th percentile, or in all of the lower income groups. It is important to note that what is driving that is a drop in work hours and in months of full-time work. There is, therefore, a drop in employment earnings. We need to be careful and dig deeper and follow up with 2022 data on what is driving that. Is that just an overhang from Covid-19? We know that as regards unemployment, or employment related to Covid-19, the shocks that happened were really felt by the lower part of the income distribution, the people in jobs in retail and restaurants and all of the sorts of sectors that were shut. We need to be very careful and keep an eye on that to see if it is a continuing trend or a hangover from Covid-19. We are talking about 2021 so it could just be that the recovery in those sectors is taking a longer time.

We know the rise in inequality and drop in income have been driven by falls in employment earnings. How has the welfare system responded to this? In the most recent budget, particularly when faced with coming out of Covid-19 and the cost-of-living measures, the one-off measures we saw, such as the additional social welfare payments etc., did do a good job and were progressive. They supported the lower end of the income distribution and, more so, they were well targeted. It is also important to note that if we think about the tax benefits system as a whole, outside of those one-off measures, we do not see social welfare rates and tax bands and tax credits rising in line with inflation. If that happens, what is generally seen is that inequality will worsen because for those at the lower end of the income distribution, their income will not keep pace with other incomes. It is important that we do not obsess too much about that fall in income because we are not fully sure if it is just post Covid-19. However, it is important we keep an eye on it, monitor it going forward and see what happens next year as well.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

I echo that. The unemployment rate in the aggregate for the period Dr. Keane referred to was still very high, about 30% at its peak. Since then it has been falling almost like a stone. It reached 4% in May 2022 and has been flatlining at that rate ever since. To echo Dr. Keane's point, it could be a timeliness issue. When we see the 2022 data, we will probably get a better handle on whether the trends being observed in the data are structural as opposed to being related to the tail end of the Covid era.

Has an examination been done of the lower unemployment levels and the increase in household incomes? What is the relationship between increased employment and household incomes?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

I do not know if Dr. Keane is familiar with whether any of the taxation, welfare and pensions, TWP, work has addressed that issue.

Dr. Claire Keane

It is a unique situation. Generally, we think if employment rises, then overall incomes should rise. There has been a longer running and more structural issue in Ireland in that we have the highest inequality in employee and self-employed earnings, and this has been consistent across the OECD. We do not really know what drives that but one of the drivers is the fact we have a higher proportion of households out of work. Across the OECD there might be one partner out of work, but Ireland has a higher proportion where both people in a couple are out of work. That can cause issues. There is a lot to unpick about what drives that. It is tricky because Covid-related unemployment was concentrated at the lower end of the income distribution. We would expect as those sectors bounce back there should be a boost to employment in the lower income groups, but we have to keep a careful eye on that and will not really know more until we have 2022 data from the CSO, the survey of income and living conditions. That will tell us much more.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

Possibly one indication is that some of the sectors Dr. Keane referred to, which were particularly impacted by Covid, have seen increases in employment levels in the past six to nine months. That suggests there should be a pick-up in some household income as a result.

What I am trying to get at is there are so many struggling households and people appear never to have been working harder. People are working multiple jobs as well. It is important not to take low unemployment as people being better off in the economy.

I turn to housing because Dr. McQuinn's opening statement outlined how inflation is being driven by housing. Will the witnesses elaborate on the way housing is driving inflation and the effect that has on household income and the wider economy?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

Housing inflation is an interesting point. There is a mathematical issue there in terms of how inflation is measured. There are two measurements: the consumer price index, CPI, and the harmonised index of consumer prices, HICP. One is a common measure across European data and the other is more specific to the domestic case. The CPI, which is a domestic measure we tend to focus on, incorporates housing costs while the HICP does not. Typically over the past 20 years, those two measures of inflation have been closely aligned but in the past year, or certainly the past six to nine months, there has been a divergence. The CPI has been higher by around 1.5% than the HICP. One reason for that is it incorporates housing costs. The way the CSO measures housing costs is essentially to look at mortgage repayments. Those repayments have gone up significantly in the past year, going back to the basis point increase by the ECB. That increases the CPI measure compared with the HICP. However, one of the ways increasing interest rates are supposed to operate and impact on inflation in the general economy is through the housing market. Rising interests rates over the medium term will adversely impact housing demand so, technically, housing costs should begin to come down as house prices begin to come down.

As I said, it is a kind of mathematical issue to a certain extent. Overall, however, when policymakers are raising interest rates such as what they are doing at the European Central Bank, ECB, one of the ways in which they are hoping to impact inflation through the general economy is through the housing market by eventually curbing demand in the market.

Is Professor McQuinn surprised that housing prices are not reducing at a greater rate at this point or is just due to the lag effect that they are not?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

There is a number of factors, including the lag effect, at play in the housing market at present. The Central Statistics Office, CSO, prices, which were out just yesterday, show the year-on-year increase is now 1.5%, whereas throughout a lot of last year it was up at 13% or 14%. If we take a slightly longer term perspective on house prices, it will be seen they had actually begun to ease off considerably just before Covid-19 hit. We were back down to a scenario where nominal prices were growing at near enough to 0% in late 2019, early 2020. The pandemic hit, and despite what some of us thought, it actually had a big impact on house prices because, clearly, what happened was the construction sites were shut down for a period due to the measures taken, the income levels were sustained by the compensatory payments introduced, and there was a surge in savings by people. People did not have the opportunity to spend in the way in which they usually would, so what happened was the savings rate increased substantially. There is good evidence to suggest this started to find its way into the housing market through 2021 and 2022, so we began to see a surge in house prices again, but now it is beginning to come back down.

At present, there are a number of different factors at play. There is the fact these excess savings are beginning to work their way through the system, and there are the rising impact rates, which will undoubtedly have an impact on demand, but we still have the scenario where there is this imbalance between supply and demand. The structural demand estimate at present is somewhere between 30,000 and 35,000 units per annum. My colleagues in the ESRI will be revising that late this year. There is every expectation this figure will be higher when they do revise it because of demographics and net migration trends. This means the existing imbalance between supply and demand is probably even greater than what the figures would suggest at present. That is keeping a floor on prices, if you like. It is preventing prices from falling because there is that imbalance, but obviously there is the effect of the interest rates, which will have a negative effect.

Have some of the housing policies around the help to buy scheme and others contributed to inflationary aspects, in Dr. McQuinn's opinion?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

We have stated before what we thought about the help to buy scheme, that it is inflationary in nature. A report was published by Mazars last year on the scheme which raised a number of different issues about it. The report did not find evidence that the scheme was inflationary but it found evidence of other issues. In general, the basic problem to which we keep coming back in the housing market is that we need more supply; that is ultimately the issue. The demand-side measures which have been introduced may help certain households. Overall, though, ultimately it is stimulating demand at a time when supply is relatively fixed so we are not huge fans of those policies.

Dr. McQuinn also touched on the important issue of how interest rate increases will affect the private sector housing construction and how that will be negatively impacted as the Government relies heavily on the private sector to deliver the housing targets. Do the increased rates increase the risk of these targets being missed in the short term?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

It probably does, to be honest. What it means is that if we are committed to a certain number of units being built, it may mean that to fulfil that, we will need increased funding. The Government has allocated quite an increase in funding through the Housing for All scheme and there is a significant amount of funds now pledged. It means that if we are going to look to meet the targets that were established in Housing for All and the other policy documents, the interest rates will affect the private sector's capacity to deliver. It may mean the funding may need to be increased if we are committed to achieving those targets.

Is there potential there, with the right ambition from Government, to ensure the decline in the private sector is then made up by the public sector to ensure the skills are maintained and ultimately there to deliver the houses we so badly need?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

It goes back to the basic point that, ultimately, the way to deal with the housing supply issue, because of the scale of the number of units required, is that it needs both the private and public sector. We have talked before at this committee about the reasons housing supply in Ireland fell off so sharply, some of which were specific to Ireland and some of which were general issues. There was a general fall-off in government investment in housing across western Europe. That was for a number of reasons, a lot of which were tied in with the financial crisis. Governments were unable to spend the money on investment which they would have previously. Ultimately, a mixed solution is needed. Private sector involvement is needed and government commitment is needed, particularly to provide social and affordable housing. We can look at situations where there are synergies between the two. In some of the recent schemes the likes of the Land Development Agency and others have talked about, of engaging with private developers to try to activate planning permissions which have been granted but not activated, for example, there is scope for what we call crowding in investment rather than crowding it out. Sometimes when there is increased government investment, you can crowd out private sector investment. In this case, there is actually the opportunity to crowd in private sector investment. If you can provide funding, like the Government is in a position to do, it could mean more private sector involvement and greater government involvement too. Overall, you could end up with a net increase in supply.

You could have both. Obviously, what has contributed to this as well, is the overconcentration on the housing assistance payment, HAP, and the rental accommodation scheme, RAS, and the €1 billion per year which we are transferring to the private sector without having any long-term gains from that.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

I think most people would probably agree that HAP was never envisaged to become the huge policy instrument that it has. Subsidising the rental market at a time when there was such a fall-off in supply ultimately ended up with high rental growth as well as high house price growth.

I will leave it at that for the moment unless Dr. Keane wants to speak to any of those.

I welcome our guests and thank them for their contributions, not only now but over the years. I have had occasion, as I am sure everybody has had from time to time, to question some of the decisions and opinions at particular times. The difficulty is from the point of view of the experiences of the past. How much have we learned? We are in a pretty difficult situation at present, not because our economy is going badly but because we are not in a position to deliver the options the public sees as being available. We are not in a position to deliver because, for example, and we have just mentioned house prices, house prices are having a much bigger negative impact on the economy than we think. We can say we do not build them if we do not pay for them and so on. The problem I see is that the selling price of this month's house becomes the starting price for next month's house and next year's house. The multiplier continues to evolve rapidly, to such an extent that I cannot see where it is going to stop. Various resolutions have been put forward. One is that the witnesses have warned, rightly, against the use of our healthy economy and corporation tax profits to fund day-to-day expenditure. We know about that. We also know, although not much has been said about it, that we have a total debt of approximately €210 billion. It is a sizeable amount. At the same time, there is reluctance to put money into a reserve. Even though the reserve is right, there is reluctance coming from some quarters.

How do the witnesses see the economy, the country, the Government and the public managing to absorb the challenges ahead in the short term? There is an inability to deal directly. We cannot deal directly by paying for everybody's shopping basket. Yes, cost-of-living crises are built into the system in such a way that there must be some reaction to it.

We must try to stabilise it or slow it down a little to give a little bit of hope there. What in the opinion of our guests is the appropriate way to go about this?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

If one thinks of the challenges confronting the economy at present, some, particularly around inflation, are generated externally. If one thinks back to the original reason why inflation started to increase, it was due to the kind of post-Covid-19 issues around supply chains which were not coming back on stream quickly enough to meet demand globally. Then one had the war in Ukraine which caused very significant energy price issues. It is very difficult because the Government cannot do very much to directly address those issues but what it can and has been doing is providing quite a degree of income and welfare support to sustain and to provide some comfort to households as they face the very significant costs over the past period of time.

Dr. Keane’s point in this regard is important in this context in seeing how one can incorporate those one-off measures and how best to address that going forward. It is a question then of whether we need a spate of measures again or whether the economy is in an inflationary position that households do not need quite the support that they had in the last budget, for example.

The main issue which faces most people, as we have been just discussing, and the most significant cost being domestically generated, is the housing issue and costs. That is clearly an issue which is ongoing for people, both through high house prices but also through high rents. The rent levels have been very high over the past period of time.

Again it comes back to this issue that there are no magic remedies there and that this is essentially a problem of an imbalance between supply and demand. Unfortunately, we saw that supply levels were beginning to come back up albeit from a very low level around 2018 and 2019, so one was beginning to see an increase in housing supply levels at that time. Covid-19 did intervene and caused a slowdown in construction in 2020. There was a big surge in 2021 when everybody went back to work. Covid-19 definitely caused problems on the supply side of the market and as one comes out of Covid now into a more stable period, one is looking at 29,000 to 30,000 housing units this year and probably 30,000 units plus next year.

It is clear that the upward trajectory is positive and one is seeing more supply coming on stream. It is not coming on stream quickly enough to deal with the kind of pent-up demand that is there which is an ongoing issue. The only way to address that is to facilitate greater housing supply over the short to medium term. That is why we discussed some of the opportunities that are there now because of the very significant increase in corporation tax receipts which the Exchequer has been in receipt of in the past few years. There is an opportunity to address these issues as significant funding has been provided but, as I said earlier, more funding may need to be provided because of the high interest rates that will weigh down particularly on the supply side of the housing market.

This will basically be done through a prudent use of those funds and of the National Reserve Fund. The idea is a fundamentally prudent one in the sense that one is looking at the very significant surge in funds that we have been in receipt of in the past couple of years and asking how much of this do we think is permanent in nature and will continue to go on over the next couple of years, and how much of that increase is transitory and we do not really believe will continue to surge. It is then a question of separating out those funds and essentially using the funds one perceives to be transitory, once off or are not likely to continue for once-off capital investment projects. That is fundamentally a good idea.

There is also the opportunity to address other investment needs in the economy. There are issues around climate change, for example, which will require very significant amounts of investment in the years to come. That is the broad overview as I would see it and perhaps Dr. Keane might like to add something on the tax and welfare side.

Dr. Claire Keane

Sure. As we discussed there, the one-off measures have actually been very successful in protecting incomes. They have very much supported incomes at the lower end of the income distribution and the big worry there is as to when they expire.

Something else which we have repeatedly talked about previously in this committee is indexation. Should we on an ad hoc basis add certain amounts to welfare rates, tax bands and tax credits?

If we do not index or increase in line with inflation the parameters of these taxes and benefits, then we will see that people will, just because of an average wage increase, experience higher taxation. That is something that could also be looked at. Should we be indexing the tax and welfare system to give people certainty, so that if they are in receipt of welfare, for example, then their income will grow in line with inflation? Then, of course, we have to tackle this very unusual situation. Usually, wages grow faster than price inflation and there is not as much of a worry there, but this is obviously a very extreme situation. It is worth noting that the one-off measures have been very successful, but we do need to think about whether something is needed this year. We know that in the budget last year, the tax and benefits parameters were not increased in line with inflation. Therefore, if it were not for those one-off measures, there would have been a regressive pattern seen in the impact on the income distribution.

In the witnesses’ opinions, do they see a need for a correlation between the totality of the national debt, the need for reserves and for putting money aside for any shocks that might occur in the future and the domestic demand arising from the cost-of-living crisis? How do we get the right balance there?

Dr. Claire Keane

Dr. McQuinn will probably want to weigh in here, but I might just point out as well that it is interesting to note this. I had been speaking about indexation or increasing the tax and welfare system in line with inflation. We do not do it as a rule and some countries do have a rule where things have to be increased in line with inflation. Yet, it is worth noting that in our actual outcomes, if we look back over the last few decades overall, we have increased things in line with inflation. It is therefore worth pointing to the sort of certainty that indexation would give to people. I think Dr. McQuinn will probably want to jump in there.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

Yes. On the national debt, as was pointed out, when people talk about the national debt levels, it is always quite striking. People naturally want to focus on the size of the debt. The only point to be made in relation to it is that typically what we do when we look at the debt from an economic perspective is that we look at the sustainability of the debt. We look at it in terms of a ratio of economic output in some shape or form, or the taxation base, for example. It is clear that no matter what indicator one uses, the debt as a percentage of that has been coming down quite strikingly over the last number of years. Whereas before and in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, we would have been one of the higher debt countries in the euro area when using those kinds of metrics, it is now evident that we are back down to the middle of the league in terms of our debt position. That is not a reason to be complacent about it, but it is worth keeping that in mind.

Certainly, what one does with the reserve fund is an important point. People have noted that the Department of Finance has put forward proposals for it to be used, or for a sizable portion of it to be used, to look at pensions. That is a very prudent, good idea. However, there is still some element of the present fund that should be used for investment purposes. That may be investment targeted particularly at more capital-intensive projects because we have a very low unemployment rate and because there are probably certain labour market constraints out there. Yet, we need to think of that fund for addressing the housing issue and the climate change issue. Even the national development plan, NDP, may need to be topped up in light of the demographic and migration trends that are there. It therefore would be wise to have that option within the fund for that purpose.

I thank the Cathaoirleach.

Does Deputy Conway-Walsh wish to come back in?

Yes. Dr. McQuinn answered my next question in his last statements. I want to expand a bit on the fact that there is room to get a balance. There is nobody across the board who is advocating that the windfall tax would be used in current expenditure-----

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

Right.

-----but there is the threat to productivity and the threat to competitiveness going forward if we do not invest in our infrastructure. We have, as Dr. McQuinn rightly says, housing and health to deal with and things should be thrown at them because of the impact they will have in the longer term.

In terms of regional imbalance, when we look at the European Regional Competitiveness Index for the west and the north-west, we can see that those regions are way below. It is something like the bottom 7% in terms of competitiveness. That is impeding our growth in the west and the north-west regions. The witnesses rightly spoke about the opportunities that are there. I would see that as an opportunity to address that deficit. In fact, we cannot continue with this lopsided situation across the country. I refer to investment into the likes of rail infrastructure, the western rail corridor and other pieces of infrastructure so we are able to maximise the potential for renewable energy and all of that, and it is done in the right way.

It includes investment in the Atlantic Technological University, ATU, and Atlantic economic corridor. Will Professor McQuinn speak about what we could do to address the regional imbalance with some of the money we have?

What money do we have where? Is the Deputy referring to windfall taxes?

I am talking about some of the windfall tax.

Does the Deputy not advocate saving that?

The Cathaoirleach was not engaged carefully enough. One can certainly have both, if we look to next year and the year after. We know it is not just dependence on corporation tax-----

Can I interrupt the Deputy?

-----but the fact that it is reliant on ten companies, and even three when we decide we are enough-----

Most witnesses who have come before this committee, including the two today, have stated quite stringently the need for us to have learned from the use of transitionary funds in the past and that, under no circumstances, should windfall revenue from corporation tax be used as current expenditure. Some can be for capital expenditure but as provided for in a fund that is invested and can deliver hereafter.

That is clearly what I am saying.

Just to draw that line.

There is no need to draw lines. That is absolutely and clearly what I am saying. It would be crazy to do it any other way. Because of the drawback on competitiveness and productivity as a result of us not having the necessary infrastructure in place to guarantee growth in future, there is an opportunity for us. We have to look to the demographic challenges, the challenges with pensions and the challenges with climate change. We also have to do that. I think we can do both of those things in a responsible way going forward. The regional imbalance concerns me a lot because of my own geographic location. It cannot be ignored.

I ask Professor McQuinn, when answering that, to elaborate on the point he made about infrastructural bottlenecks. We were talking to the Central Bank earlier and I would have identified those bottlenecks as being specifically related to planning. There is a planning and development (amendment) Bill to be published in the coming weeks and to go through the Houses in the coming months. It will be incumbent on all parties and none to address that in a way that seeks to learn from the lessons of the recent past at the time of the housing crisis, when An Bord Pleanála had no statutory time period to make a decision, judicial reviews went all the way to the High Court, taking up to five years in some cases, and where they took three years, there were only two years of permission left before it lapsed. An Bord Pleanála made decisions on new plans that were pertinent to the permission granted some years ago for the same development. It is what I and many members see as the infrastructural bottleneck that needs to be addressed because we have been unable to deliver on our national development plans over the last number of years in the way which was envisaged, not because of the lack of funds being allocated but because of an inability to put that infrastructure in place in a timely fashion.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

I thank the Deputies. There were a number of points there, so I will try to tie it all together. Dr. Keane can jump in if she wants to add something. There are a couple of points to draw out. The idea of the special reserve fund and the reason we think it is a good idea is that it is specifically there to split out the revenues between what is sustainable going forward and, hence, can be potentially used in day-to-day current expenditure, and what is regarded as being windfall, and therefore not sustainable. The proposal is that a certain chunk of the non-sustainable windfall receipts would be used for pension purposes. I think that is a good idea, given the issue of pensions that is coming down the track. A certain amount would be reserved essentially for capital investment, particularly in projects that would not have had investment earmarked over the last number of years for all sorts of reasons, including constraints that made us feel they were not possible, but which may be going forward, given we have the presence of this fund.

I refer in particular to projects that are more capital-intensive. There is no doubt that we have labour constraints at present in the economy. There are ways and means by which we can try to get around them but there are labour constraints and a very low unemployment rate. If we try to put too much money into the economy at a time when we have a low unemployment rate, there is a danger that it will just cause inflationary pressures. That is why I think some of the projects we might envisage funding from the reserve fund for investment purposes would be more capital-orientated or capital-intensive in nature. For instance - I am not saying I am an expert in this - one project is about onshoring wind energy, which would require sizeable investment in ports to develop the capacity and the resources there. That is one possible opportunity.

The other point it is important to mention is that, apart from the reserve fund, there are significant funds that are already pledged, for instance in terms of the national development plan going forward. These are coming from the normal budgetary returns. It may well be that because of higher interest rates, particularly in the case of housing, we may not meet the targets. Because of the changing demographics we may need to top up that fund if we are to achieve the same outcomes, even allowing for any planning issues, which I will talk about in a minute. It may well be that we could possibly use the fund to top up the national development plan with a view to trying to hit the targets in the plan, given that the plan is being revised at present because of the additional demographic pressures and trends that exist. That is another possibility in terms of using it.

I fully agree with what the Deputy is saying in terms of bottlenecks. We are doing a project at present for the shared island unit, which we hope to have it published before Christmas, in which we are looking at housing supply in the Republic compared with housing supply in Northern Ireland and across the rest of the UK housing markets, in England, Scotland and Wales. We are delving into that issue quite a bit, looking at differences across planning, zoning and regulatory issues. There is no doubt that there are sizeable issues around bottlenecks and planning issues there. They are not just particular to us here in Ireland but are observed across the UK as well. There are many complaints in the UK. What is more interesting is that there seems to be a comparison between ourselves in Ireland, the UK and then the rest of Europe in how some of these issues are dealt with. Clearly some of the bottlenecks can be addressed without any sizeable increase in funding. It is more a case of learning from best practice elsewhere, possibly increasing resources in places like An Bord Pleanála and dealing with certain other legal issues around appeals and that. One issue which jumps out from the work we have done is that many people point to the Scottish model of how development plans are formulated. The point they make is that there is quite an extensive process at the outset of development plans to try to engage with local communities.

As is the case here. I was a councillor for 20 years. It is a two-year programme with extensive consultation, taking cognisance of different regulations and guidelines on density, design and infrastructural capacity, all of which are highly appropriate and needed, and having regard to the failings of the planning system prior to that. However, in seeking to address that we may have gone too far. Somebody may not engage in that process despite the huge detail that is associated with arriving at a development plan, but can engage in the planning process when there is an application for two houses and hold it up for five years. It is crazy.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

I agree. The Scottish model is highlighted because Scotland has a particularly extensive process for getting local engagement, which is said to mitigate the need further down the line for some of the kinds of objections that can arise.

Exactly. That is what I am saying. That is the way it should be.

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

That is just one example. I do not know whether Dr. Keane wants to add anything.

Dr. Claire Keane

No.

Is Deputy Patricia Ryan still online? I cannot see her on the screen.

I am still online. I thank our guests. I would like to get some information on the proposed increased in excise duty on petrol and diesel in the budget. I think it will impact more severely on lower income households and will also further drive up food services costs which are dependent on transport.

Irish food prices are already among the highest. I note that Dr. McQuinn said earlier that energy prices were coming down. I am not sure if it was fuel he was talking about. I cannot see prices coming down in my area. Maybe they are in other areas. What purpose is served by further increasing costs for families who are already struggling?

Dr. Kieran McQuinn

Dr. Keane will talk about the impact of fuel. Certainly, I remember, in terms of the work Dr. Keane and her colleagues would have done on the tax, welfare and pensions, TWP, team in terms of looking at the initial surge in inflation, it was quite striking in terms of the families and the parts of the income distribution which were particularly affected that clearly it was those at the lower end of income distribution who were more reliant on fuel. People in rural areas in particular were especially affected because fuel is a higher component of their day-to-day budget than more urban-centred households, and then, particularly now, where it is more food that is one of the driving factors for inflation.

Dr. Claire Keane

More recent inflation has tended to be higher for people on lower incomes and, exactly as Dr. McQuinn has said, driven by what has been fuelling inflation, such as rises in energy and food costs. These are components of people's budgets who are down the lower end of income distribution that they spend a lot more on. Anything that drives up the price of energy or fuel, so things like excise duties or food, will be felt more strongly by those at the bottom of the income distribution. We tend to take them into account when we analyse the budget every year. We look at increases in things like excise duty. We also look to see if rises in things like social welfare actually compensated people enough for those rises. The Deputy is right in that those increases will be felt more by people at the lower end of the income distribution and those in rural areas who tend to spend more of their money on energy and fuel.

It was said we have never had more people working. However, we depend on hauliers to supply people, particularly people who live in rural areas, and we are looking at the prices haulage companies must pay. This is going to have an effect not only on people in receipt of lower incomes but also on businesses that depend on fuel for running their lorries and everything else. Is there anything around that we need to address the matter before the budget?

Dr. Claire Keane

Our modelling focuses on individual and household incomes because we can easily capture that. Again, one-off measures can help to tackle that, but in a way it does not make sense to have one-off measures while also increasing a charge at the same time. That can be avoided by not increasing the charge in the first place. There are obviously, when we get back to all this, calls around carbon taxes. Carbon taxes are unique because their aim is to reduce usage of things that will cause emissions, and there are certainly ways they can be used. When we look at tax rises based around carbon, and they will often fall on fuel, the money generated by carbon taxes can be used to buoy up the social welfare system, and there is a rationale for that. We are using carbon taxes to try to reduce consumption. Dr. Muireann Lynch of the ESRI and others have looked at whether people can adjust their behaviour that quickly. You want to try to push people to change their behaviour through carbon taxes but, in the shorter term, where they cannot adjust very quickly and move into energy-efficient houses or buy a new electric vehicle, you want to support them through the social welfare and taxation systems so that people are not at a loss in the shorter term.

That brings me back to the question I asked the delegation from the Central Bank, who were here previous to the witnesses. I want to know the witnesses' views on once-off payments as part of last year's budget and the coming budget. Do they share the concerns of the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council about repeating, if not last year's mistakes then certainly past mistakes?

Dr. Claire Keane

The rationale for one-off measures is to try to not. We keep hearing from Dr. McQuinn and the Central Bank that by releasing more money into the economy, we can make inflation worse and it becomes this cycle that is difficult to break. That is the rationale for one-off measures. They are given but they are not permanent increases, so that when inflation falls back, they can be withdrawn.

We need to keep an eye on what inflation looks like and what the forecasts are. Do we need more one-off measures this year? Last year they were successful. But for the one-off measures, it would have been a regressive budget. However, because of the one-off measures, the budget represented progress and supported those on lower incomes more so than those on higher incomes. We have to keep an eye on that. We will do an analysis of the budget. We will have an event in the week following the budget to see whether any one-off measures were effective in supporting the incomes of those at the lower end of the income distribution. That was a plug for our post-budget analysis. We will do that. We do it every year.

That is fair play. I will give a plug as well. As spokesperson for older people, I deal with many people who worry and have concerns about food and fuel. It has become increasingly difficult for them this year. They are concerned. I would be quite concerned about their being looked after in this budget. We certainly need to see something in the budget for older people.

That concludes our session. I thank the Professor McQuinn and Dr. Keane for making themselves available and for their presentation and the comprehensive responses to the various questions put by members. I look forward to meeting them again in the future.

The select committee adjourned at 4.26 p.m. sine die.
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