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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 21 Jul 1926

Vol. 16 No. 22

DISTRICT COURT RULES. - MOTION OF APPROVAL.

I move:—

Go gceaduíonn an Dáil leis seo na "Rialacha Cúirte Dúithche" a dhin an tAire Dlí agus Cirt an 9adh lá d'Iúl, 1926, fé alt 91 den Acht Cúirteanna Breithiúnais, 1924 (Uimh. 10 de 1924) agus go mbeartuíd go bhfuil sé oiriúnach na rialacha san do theacht i ngniomh anladh lá de Dheire Fómhair, 1926.

That the Dáil hereby approves of the "District Court Rules" made by the Minister for Justice on the 9th day of July, 1926, under Section 91 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924 (No. 10 of 1924) and resolves that it is expedient that such rules shall come into operation on the 1st day of October, 1926.

Deputies will see that in these rules a clear distinction has been drawn as to procedure between the cases in which jurisdiction has been conferred on the District Court by way of transfer from the former Petty Sessions Court, the former Justices of the Peace and cases of a civil nature in which jurisdiction has been conferred on the Court by Section 77 (a) of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924. The procedure of the District Court in cases in which jurisdiction has been transferred to them is to be found in Part I. of the Rules. That procedure is based very largely on the Petty Sessions Act of 1851, and on the procedure which became established by custom in the Metropolitan area in dealing with cases in which jurisdiction was given under the Dublin Police Acts. Many changes, have, however, been made from the old procedure with a view to simplifying proceedings in the court and also with a view to saving expense. In connection with proof of service, for instance, under the old procedure it was necessary that the person effecting service of any summons which was the originating document of the court should attend personally before the court and give proof of service on oath. That meant in many cases that a person had to travel considerable distances to give this purely formal evidence, and in any prosecutions by the police a defendant who was convicted had usually to pay the travelling expenses of the Gárda who attended to prove service. Rule 16 provides that instead of the former method of proving service proof can be given by a statutory declaration to be endorsed on the back of the summons. This will relieve the person effecting the service of the necessity of attending before the court, and in cases where a defendant is convicted it will relieve him of the necessity of paying the travelling expenses of such witness. In cities it may be more convenient for the person effecting service to attend court and give evidence as to service. Accordingly, the rule empowers the former procedure to be continued in any court area in which the Justice may so order. There is another rather material point of difference between the former procedure in cases of summary jurisdiction and the new procedure. Whereas under the former procedure a most complicated form of order book had to be kept by the clerk and signed by the Justice, under the new procedure a simple Justice's minute book is provided for by Rule 49, and in this new minute book short particulars of each case and the order made thereon will be entered and signed by the Justice. If any party, for the purpose of appeal or otherwise, desires to have a copy of a formal conviction or of a full order made, he is entitled, under Rule 50, to obtain a certified copy of that full conviction or order.

The procedure as to the civil proceedings will be found in Part II. of the Rules. That procedure is, to a large extent, based on the former procedure of the County Court. It has, however, been simplified and, we think, improved in many respects. Proof of service, in civil proceedings, can be given by statutory declaration in the same manner as proof of service in summary proceedings. A special method of obtaining judgment in the office of the District Court has been provided for in Dublin, Cork, Limerick and Waterford. It is thought that the time is scarcely ripe yet for extending that special procedure to the country generally, but probably after a period of a year or two it can be extended. It is thought that this procedure will be of considerable convenience to litigants. Provision is made also in this part of the Rules for the hearing of cases in the District Court as to the examination of debtors under Part II. of the Enforcement of Court Orders Act, 1926, and also in interpleader cases, jurisdiction in which is conferred on the court by Section 22 of the Enforcement of Court Orders Act.

Under Part III. of the Rules there is provision for the exercise of licensing jurisdiction, and here also the procedure has been simplified. Formerly an applicant for a certificate of transfer of a licence had to make three separate applications to the court. Under the new procedure only two applications will have to be made. Parts IV. and V. of the Rules deal with appeals to the Circuit Court and the High Court, respectively. Under the Petty Sessions Act of 1851 complicated procedure was laid down for appeals from the decisions of justices. This has been very considerably simplified. The costs in civil proceedings are now, we think, very reasonable. Since the circulation of the draft rules I have had a further conference with the Committee, at which the figures set out in the rules as now made were agreed upon. Deputies will realise that the costs which are now prescribed are a reduction, in many cases, of fifty per cent. on the costs as first submitted. The scale now made is considered fair. That, I think, gives the general framework of the rules. Later I would be prepared to deal with any points of detail that Deputies may raise.

I ask the House to consider the position that we are asked to approve of in these rules. We are asked to alter, in some cases for the better—it is a matter of opinion whether for the better or for the worse— and in some cases for the worse, existing statute law. We are asked by the making of Rules of Court which, in the main, deal with practice and procedure, to agree to embody what are, in fact, in some cases, considerable modifications and considerable amendments of the law, not merely amendments for the purpose of fitting in procedure with the new requirements of the Courts of Justice Act. I am not going to pretend to argue the case of the powers of the rule-making authority: whether they have exceeded their powers or whether we should assist them to exceed their powers if we pass these rules. I do say that the House ought not to agree to any confirmation of the existing law in this formal manner, even where we think that the existing law is such that it ought to be amended, unless we are going to do it by way of statute. I think that the attempt to alter the law in some cases to the detriment of a prisoner or an accused person by a mere rule of court, is not what we ought to be asked to do. If there is going to be an amendment of the law regarding the rights of the citizen, then it ought to be done by regular Bill procedure.

I think I am right in saying that the existing courts, in so far as they are acting upon set-out rules, are acting upon the statute. I have not been able to find any reference existing to Rules of Court of the old Petty Sessions courts. I think the procedure of those courts was based on the Petty Sessions Act in respect of the country, and by a special Dublin Act in respect of the city. If we are going to alter that Act in any way beyond the mere alteration for procedure purposes, then that has to be done, I submit, by formal presentation of a Bill and a thorough examination of the Bill by the usual processes. In the Courts of Justice Act—I think the Minister referred to this a week ago— there is in Section 91 a reference to the powers of the rule-making authority. The rule-making authority is authorised to make rules for certain things which, as far as I can understand the section, are confined almost wholly to the procedure of the court. It includes "the granting of summary judgment in appropriate cases, the use of the national language in Saorstát Eireann, and the fixing and collection of fees and the adaptation or modification of any statute that may be necessary for any of the purposes aforesaid." I think it can be shown that certain of the modifications or adaptations of the existing law which are sought to be effected by these rules are not necessary for the purpose of carrying into effect the new procedure. I believe that in some respects the procedure of the statute ought to be altered, but I think it is not wise, to say the very least, for Parliament to hand over its authority to make these alterations of statutes to a Minister advised by a rule-making authority. I think a very important question of principle is involved, and we ought not to become parties to the work of altering statutes by reference to a Minister. The Minister complained yesterday that I had spoken too generally when I was dealing with the Circuit Court Rules. I will attempt to remedy that defect and deal in detail with what I am now to speak on. We will take Rule 4, which deals with the jurisdiction of the Justices. It says:—

"The jurisdiction of the Justice in cases of summary jurisdiction shall be exercised by him within his district as follows:—

(c) In cases of indictable offences in any court area, irrespective of where the crime is alleged to have been committed or the defendant has been arrested or resides."

The Courts of Justice Act, 1924, Section 79, says:—

"Provided that the jurisdictions by this Act vested in and transferred to the District Court shall be exercised by the Justices severally as follows:—In criminal cases, by a Justice for the time being assigned to the district wherein the crime has been committed or the accused has been arrested or resides."

So the Courts of Justice Act limited jurisdiction, and the Rules of Court seem to attempt to set aside that by saying that the Justice may exercise jurisdiction within his district "in cases of indictable offences in any court area, irrespective of where the crime is alleged to have been committed." That seems to be a contradiction, and it seems to be an attempt to abrogate authority in the Courts of Justice Act, and would, therefore, I presume, be ultra vires. Not so many years ago, but still probably only familiar to those acquainted with the agitations under the Balfour régime, we know how attempts used to be made to bring a prisoner from the place where he was arrested to another place to be tried by a Removable. Though this may not be the intention in the present proposals, it is a possible and, I think, an undesirable development, especially in view of the specific authority and limitation set out in Section 79 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Deputy realises a distinction between a District Justice's district and a court area. The district of a particular Justice would of course contain a great many court areas.

Yes, but any court area. It does not say "or any court area within his district."

"The jurisdiction of a Justice in cases of summary jurisdiction shall be exercised by him within his district as follows:—"

Well, it is capable at least of the other interpretation.

Well, it has been interpreted so by quite competent lawyers, and—I am speaking not as a lawyer—it is an interpretation that I have placed upon it. However, I call attention to it. Rules 6 and 7 are taken from the Petty Sessions Act, 1851. Several of these rules are taken practically verbatim from that Act. I want to call attention to Rules 6 and 7. I ask the House to remember that we are now invited to re-enact formally these provisions taken from the 1851 Act, and also to remember the condition of the country at the time that Act was passed. I suggest that if we are going to revise legislation and statutes regarding cases of summary jurisdiction we ought to revise them in the light of present conditions, and not in the light of conditions of 1851. For instance, the question of open court is very important for the public. The right of the public to hear cases tried, even in the early stages, is one that has been fought for and eventually has been established, but in these new rules confirming the Act of 1851 there was a discretion given to the Justice to say whether or not the court should be open. If we are revising the procedure of courts we ought to so revise it as to ensure that the court shall be an open court and that it shall not be within the discretion of the Justice to close the court. But in any case, if we are to alter this matter it should be by legislation, and there is no need I submit, to state in these rules what is already set out in the 1851 Act, because presumably the courts are bound by the statutes, and except in so far as the rules are necessary as a modification for the purpose of carrying into effect the Courts of Justice Act, they will really be of no effect if they run counter to the 1851 Act.

Take Rule 25, which contains provision for a remand: "The Justice may either admit such person to bail ...or by warrant remand such person to prison for a period not exceeding fourteen days to the next court for the court area for which the Justice is sitting or to any other court within the district of such Justice." Two points are raised there. Under the 1851 Act the Justice is not empowered to remand for more than eight days, and this is an extension of the powers of the Justice, to the detriment of the citizen, sought to be embodied in the Rules of Court. It is possible to allow a longer period of remand when both parties agree, but without that agreement the Justice is bound by the 1851 Act not to exceed eight days. I think it is wrong for us to consent to embodying, to the detriment of the citizen, such a change as the extension of the period to fourteen days would involve. But let us assume that a prisoner is admitted to bail. We find that the Justice may call on such person to appear at any court within his district. In the case of the larger counties some of the districts are very wide; unfortunately the usual accused person who appears before these courts is not blessed with very much wealth, and the very prospect of having to travel from one end of the district to the other means involving the accused person in very great expense, I think unjustly to the accused. The court area is quite large enough without asking the accused to have to appear at a place which may be 60 miles away and may be more. I think that that is a distinct defect and a defect against the interests of the citizen, who is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. I think that that is a very important defect in these rules, apart from whether they are within the powers of a rule-making authority or not.

In Rule 26 we find a distinct and, possibly, a very important, and not at all a necessary change. I refer to paragraph (b): "Whenever a person shall appear or be brought before any Justice charged with an offence... such Justice shall examine such witnesses and receive such evidence in proof of such charge as shall be produced before him within his jurisdiction; and if in his opinion such evidence shall be prima facie proof of the said charge such Justice shall thereupon ... commit the person accused to prison or shall admit him to bail." Except the words "prima facie" the whole paragraph is taken from the Act of 1851, but in that Act the words are ‘sufficient proof,' and it is not quite understandable why these words should be deliberately deleted and attenuated to the words "prima facie." The tendency there is distinctly against the accused. In the one case the Justice has to be satisfied that there is sufficient proof to warrant the committal. But these new words put in, not by process of amendment of the law, but by a change of rules, seem to me to be beyond the authority, and certainly an undesirable change from the point of view of the accused.

What is the difference?

There is a difference, else why was the change made? Rule 27 deals with the procedure of admitting to bail. The paragraph opens:—"Whenever a Justice in the exercise of his discretion sees fit to admit to bail a person charged with an indictable offence such person shall enter into a recognisance," and so on. Here again is quite a definite and not at all a requisite change of the law, a change quite distinctly against the interests of the accused. Section 16 of the Petty Sessions Act, 1851, deals with the admission to bail of persons charged with indictable offences and makes certain provisions. Paragraph I gives certain classes of cases where the question of bail is at the discretion of the Justice. But paragraph 2 says: "In every case where any person shall be charged before any justice with any indictable misdemeanour, other than those hereinbefore mentioned"—other than those where there is a discretion—such "justice, after the taking of examinations, instead of committing the person to prison shall, on the application of such person and on being satisfied as to the sufficiency of the bail offered, admit him to bail in manner aforesaid." That is to say, the accused person in these particular classes of misdemeanours has a right to bail. But we are asked to agree to an alteration giving the Justice a discretion in all cases of indictable offences. That is a very important attempt to make a change in the law, and I certainly think that we ought not to be retrogressive in our legislation at this stage as compared with 1851. The right of bail secured in 1851 should not be taken away by merely allowing the justice a discretion. Now let us take Rule 35: There we find a scale of fines with alternatives of imprisonment. "For any sum not exceeding 10/- the alternative imprisonment is 7 days; exceeding 10/- but not exceeding fourteen days," and so on. I find, on examination, that those alternative periods of imprisonment are the same at present. They are based upon Acts which have been in operation for many years. I submit to the House that on the lines of the argument which the Minister has recognised as effective in regard to the sum of £50 as the limit of jurisdiction——

I did not regard it as effective.

Perhaps I went a little too far when I said that the Minister recognised the argument as effective, but the argument that the value of money is not as great as it was 50 years ago or as it was up to the war is effective, and it is not reasonable to put into the mouths of the justices the phrase "ten shillings or seven days, £1 or fourteen days," because although the wording is "not to exceed seven days" we know that where the fine is 10/- in practice the alternative is seven days. Now I say the alternative period ought to be half in each case. We should remember that at whatever period the scale was drawn up ten shillings then would buy, let us say, 50 loaves of bread, whereas it would buy only 25 loaves to-day.

Thirty pounds is not worth six months.

That is a matter of choice; it is perhaps a matter of one's experience of what jail is worth. I daresay there are Deputies in the House who would disagree with Deputy Hewat. Perhaps when he has had experience of six months he might think £30 was cheaply bought. However, I submit to the Minister that this is a matter that really requires revision.

In Rule 37, again, is a proposal which I think ought not to be agreed to by the House. The rule says: "The justice who shall hear and determine any charge or complaint...shall have power to order any party to the said charge or complaint other than the Attorney-General or a member of the Gárda Síochána in his official capacity to pay to the other party such costs, including the cost of any adjournment and any witnesses' expenses as to him shall seem meet." That is to say, the justice is to be empowered to order the payment by one party to the other of such costs and such witnesses' expenses, without limit, as he may think fitting, but he may not be empowered to order costs to be paid by the State. I think that is unjustifiable. If we are going to modify the law in any way it ought to be done by statute, and by a regular process of Bill procedure. We ought not to re-enact in this form any provision which would make it impossible for the justice to award costs against the State. It is just as possible for the State, through its police authorities, to deal unjustly with a citizen as for a private individual to deal unjustly with another individual. If a citizen is being charged unreasonably then costs ought to lie against the State as well as against any other person.

There is no limit to the amount of the costs that may be granted, and I am reminded of a precedent. I gather that under the Dublin Police Act of 1842, which is sought to be extended over the whole country by these rules, there exists power to give costs to an unlimited extent. Some of us remember the case of the batons—the "Up the Mollies" case which came before the court when Mr. Devlin, of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, was prosecuted and three charges were heard for disturbing a public meeting. They were dismissed in favour of the defendant and fifty guineas costs in each case were awarded. It might as well have been 150 guineas. The power sought to be given here is unlimited, and I submit that this defect, apart from the other question, which is a more important one that the justice is definitely and deliberately prohibited from awarding costs against the Attorney-General or the Gárda Síochána. These are the chief points I want to bring before the notice of the Dáil. I submit I have shown that in several of the instances I have given there is a clear attempt to alter the law by a process of rule-making, and that is not within the authority of the Minister. In any case, in so far as its being changed to the detriment of the accused, the House ought not to agree to such change taking place. If there is to be any change in the law regarding procedure and practice beyond what is necessary for the working out of the Courts of Justice Act, such change should be made by the introduction of a Bill which should go through the ordinary stages of examination. I, therefore, intend to ask the House not to agree to the passing of these rules.

During the discussion on those various Rules of Court it has been very noticeable that the Dáil has lacked the guidance that might be derived from experience. Those Deputies who have the advantage of being learned in the law, with the single exception of the Minister, who could not help being here, have been conspicuous by their absence. I have no knowledge of proceedings in the High Court or the Circuit Court, and so I refrain from speaking on their rules, but as regards the District Court, I have some knowledge of the courts that preceded them, the Petty Sessions Court. I was a Justice in them for fifteen years. I also appeared in those courts as a plaintiff and a defendant. I was convicted and fined one penny, and costs were given against the other side, having conducted my own case.

That is the explanation.

I have some knowledge of proceedings in what corresponded to the District Court, and although the form of the courts changed I do not know if the character of the litigants changed, and that is a point we ought to consider in dealing with these rules. I am inclined to agree with Deputy Johnson that these rules weigh the balance a little more heavily against the accused than was the case in the past, but that is not my main quarrel. My main quarrel is that they impose a spirit of formalism.

Nominalistic.

No. Realistic formalism. I should never suspect the Minister of nominalistic formalism. It is being imposed on the Courts where I think, on the whole, it is undesirable. Certainly the average litigant of the District Court is not represented by counsel. In the Circuit or High Court it does not matter what rules you make. You will have experienced people dealing with the rules, and bad rules are better than no rules. In the District Court you are dealing with the defendant or litigant, who knows about as much about the Rules of Court as Deputy Lyons knows about the Standing Orders in the Dáil.

He is absent.

I am sorry he is absent. He was here some time ago. I shall substitute the name of any other Deputy present if it is wished. The litigant who goes into court is largely ignorant of the law and absolutely ignorant of those Rules of Court. I suggest that the tendency reflected in those rules to codify and make everything formal will be a disadvantage to the litigant. To illustrate my case I am not going to take as many instances as Deputy Johnson, but I shall take Rule 16, which deals with the service of a summons. In the past in the Petty Sessions Court the person who served the summons, usually a policeman, had to appear in the Court and prove service. Rule 16 provides that the person who served the summons shall make a statutory declaration on the back of the original summons and that such statutory declaration shall be considered sufficient evidence of the service and that it shall not be necessary for the person effecting service to personally attend, which is a split infinitive.

That damns it. We cannot approve of it.

I hope that when these are translated into Irish that split infinitive shall be remedied.

Mr. O'CONNELL

You cannot split an Irish infinitive.

The normal procedure would be merely a written form on the back of the summons. There are obvious conveniences in that from the police point of view. It is inconvenient to have a large number of policemen to attend in court when they ought to be elsewhere on duty. From the point of view of justice and fair play it is desirable to have the men who served the summons there because, as I say, no reasonable man on a minor case, such as cattle straying on the road or not lighting up in time, where the penalty is a small one, will brief a barrister or instruct a solicitor, and he might not be able to attend himself. In my experience the policeman who served the summons was always asked did he serve it, and he was usually asked, what did the person say? The answer was that the wife said her husband could not attend because he was a cattle driver and had to be at the fair. The Bench knew attendance would mean the loss of a considerable sum of money to the defendant, and that in order to meet the charge punishable by a fine of 2/6 he might lose two or three pounds. If you only have your written formula the Justice will not be able to ask why the man was not present. He will treat the nonappearance of the defendant as a form of contempt and increase the penalty. I suggest in Rule 16 the rule should be the exception and the exception should be the rule, that in cases, possibly in the city of Dublin, I think it might be desirable to dispense with the presence of the summons-server, but, broadly speaking, the expenditure suggested may change the fee required. Viva voce proof of service should be the normal procedure, and where it is proved that it is exceptionally inconvenient and imposes undue burden on the police, then a Justice might be permitted to depart from it. We cannot at the present time amend these rules, but I take it that they are not rules for all time, that they will need revision when there is some experience of their working. Therefore I put this particular case before the Minister, in the hope that when the time comes to revise these rules he would consult the Justices who had experience of their working and amend this particular rule in the direction I suggest. As regards the rules in general, I agree, on the whole, with Deputy Johnson's criticism, but I would call attention to a certain omission. The rules for the High Courts and the rules for the Circuit Courts prescribe a certain mode of address to the judge. As far as I have been able to discover there is no mode of address prescribed in the rules for the District Court. It is open to a litigant in the District Courts, as far as I see, to call the Justice, Minister for Justice. I know the mode of address that would be adopted outside the court by a disappointed litigant, and I do not suggest that the Minister could frame rules to meet that particular case, but it is desirable that all the rules should, as far as possible, be standardised and follow the same lines. In their whole arrangement the District Court Rules differ very substantially from the other two sets of rules, and when the time comes for revision, I hope that the Minister would have that fact before his mind.

I desire to support Deputy Johnson's contention that we should not agree to the Minister's motion. The latter part of Rule 25 has been alluded to by Deputy Johnson "where there is to be a remand of such person to prison for a period not exceeding fourteen days for the next court of the court area." The Deputy has taken exception to the rule as it makes provision for a period of remand as long as fourteen days. The situation I see is, in, say, a rural area in the extreme west of my constituency, about which I had occasion to make representation a few weeks ago to the Minister so that another court should be held in that area owing to the distance litigants had to travel. The courts are held for that district once a month, but the district has about the worst railway service in Ireland. What would be the position of an accused person charged in that area if no court is held there for a month? The nearest court in the district is across in Leitrim, and would be ten or fifteen miles away.

As far as I know the court in Leitrim is not held within fourteen days of the court held in the adjoining area of Cavan. The Justice has his time fully occupied and may not have a vacant day in a fortnight so as to arrange to have a special court for the hearing of such cases. It is a hardship that a man should be kept so long without having an opportunity of proving to the Justice his innocence. According to the rule, a defendant resident in Swanlinbar area would have to be taken across to the next District Court in County Leitrim. If he is to prove his innocence he should be given facilities to do so. It would be necessary for him to get witnesses and to bring them to an adjoining county to prove his innocence. He will also have to get a lawyer to go there, so that the expense involved will make it difficult for the ordinary accused person to prove his innocence. Undoubtedly justice will not be done if that rule is applied all over the country. The rule might do if it was applied to the City of Dublin or to places where the courts are held weekly or fortnightly. The liberty of the citizen must be the predominant thought of all, and we have to consider how far that liberty will be endangered because of the difficulties that are placed in the way of parties appearing in court to prove their innocence. It seems to me that it makes it impossible for a defendant to prove his innocence if he has to appear in a court with his witness twenty miles away from his own area. To ask the Dáil to agree to a rule like that is. I think, expecting too much from those who have a knowledge of the rural districts.

Rule 22 (a) says:—

"Whenever any person shall appear as a witness either in obedience to a summons or by virtue of a warrant, or shall be present in court and shall be verbally required by the Justice to give evidence, and shall refuse to be examined upon oath concerning the matter of the information or complaint, or shall refuse to take such oath, or, having taken such oath, shall refuse to answer such questions concerning the said matter as shall then be put to him, or shall refuse or neglect to produce any such accounts, papers, or documents as aforesaid (without offering any just excuse for such refusal), the Justice then present may adjourn the proceedings to the same or any other court in his district for any period not exceeding eight clear days."

That is the same story. It means that the accused will have to appear in another court, and the nearest court may be thirty or forty miles away. In an area that is badly served by the railway I am positive that the liberty of the citizen is going to be endangered by the acceptance of that rule, to a greater extent than by any of the other rules. Rule 124 says:—"An affidavit grounding an application for an examination order may be sworn before a Justice or a Commissioner for Oaths." Rule 178 says:—"Any affidavit to be used in a District Court may be sworn before a Commissioner for Oaths or a Justice." I want to ask the Minister where does the poor Peace Commissioner comes in? Does he come in at all where an affidavit is to be sworn?

Section 88 of the Courts of Justice Act specifically provides

"that a Peace Commission shall have all the powers and authorities which immediately before the 6th day of December, 1922, were vested in a Justice of the Peace."

It gives these in detail, and in further explanation we find:

"It may be noted that the expressions ‘oath' and ‘affidavit' in the case of persons allowed by law to affirm and declare include affirmation and declaration."

Now, is it not possible that it shall be legal under these rules not to have an affidavit sworn before a Peace Commissioner? It seems an extraordinary change from the position that was created by the passing of the Courts of Justice Act and also the Enforcement of Law Act of 1924.

He makes nothing out of it.

Yes, perhaps that is it. I do not know whether that is the point. That is what I want to come to. I know the Commissioners for Oaths will make something out of it. Those of us who have the experience of going to the Local Government Department looking for old age pensions find dozens of affidavits sworn before the Peace Commissioners in that office.

Deputy Johnson is so shocked at anyone making anything out of anything that we may expect to get houses for nothing soon.

I want to have this thing cleared up. I want to know exactly did we vest in the Peace Commissioners power to have affidavits sworn before them under the Courts of Justice Act, and if we did why is it not legitimate under these rules that the Peace Commissioner shall have the same power as was conferred on the Justice of the Peace or the Commissioner for Oaths? I think there are some Peace Commissioners who are members of the Dáil, and I think they are just as competent to see that an affidavit is made properly and in order as many of the Commissioners for Oaths down the country. As Deputy Johnson asked, is it right that we should seek to alter by rules what we have already established by statute? I want to know from the Minister whether it is accepted that the Peace Commissioners are empowered to have affidavits sworn in their presence under certain conditions, but under certain other conditions they are not? I do not know what the charge for these oaths is—perhaps a couple of shillings, perhaps four or five shillings.

Two shillings.

If what we have here embodied in these rules is to be accepted as the position of the Peace Commissioners all over the country I do not see how you are going to make a distinction that a P.C. is no longer in the position of having power to have affidavits sworn in his presence. I can see great difficulties, indeed, for many of our poorer people who have already sufficient difficulties to overcome, when they are confronted with the position of searching for ages for qualification for an old age pension if the Peace Commissioner is not competent. If he has authority in one case, why should he not have it in the other? If we give him authority by an Act of the Dáil are we trying to take that authority from him now under the Rules of Court? I want to have that cleared up. I support Deputy Johnson in his amendment, and I hope he will press this if the Minister is not prepared to agree to follow the course he has already indicated in the matter of the Circuit Court rules, that is, to withdraw his motion and give an opportunity for further consideration of these rules during the period that will elapse between now and when the Dáil meets in November. We are trying to examine these matters under great disadvantages and great disabilities.

What, precisely, are the great disadvantages and the great disabilities? The Deputy suffers from a kind of chronic melancholy. He must always have his whine. In this instance I would like to get the grounds for his whine.

The Minister has behind him his staff; he is very well served. We got the rules of court ten days before the Dáil was to adjourn along with a dozen other measures crowded into a long and strenuous session. We are expected to swallow everything in these rules, and expected to say that they are correct and to give them our approval. I say that is asking too much. The Minister ought to have consideration for the inability, perhaps, of the Deputies who are asked to examine these. While appreciating the fact that the Minister is anxious that the rules should be got through, the Minister is served by a staff equipped with knowledge of what is in the rules. These rules were running on for a long time. Deputies who are asked to give their approval have not that advantage and they are certainly entitled to get from the Minister sufficient time to enable them to examine the rules or to get assistance in the examination of the rules. I have no doubt, whatever, if the rules are closely and carefully examined that many flaws would be discovered in them, and in view of the possible necessity to amend them later on, it would be advisable for the Minister to follow the same course with regard to the rules of the District Court that he thought it advisable to follow in the case of the Circuit Court rules.

I was anxious to get from Deputy Baxter just the substance of his complaint. It seems to fall under two heads. First, that I have a staff, and, second, that he has not. Now time may remedy that. Just at the moment I do not see what can be done about it. I do not see that it would be feasible for me to dispense with the officials of my department, neither do I see that it would be feasible to provide the Deputy with a similar staff. There ought to be a certain amount of common sense in this. The Deputy says we have these difficult and technical rules for ten days. In fact, he has them for more than ten days.

One week.

He had the draft rules for a fortnight. Assuming that he had them for another week what would his position be? I do not want to over-paint the picture, but I submit that this is what would happen, that the Deputy or any other Deputy would go to some legal friend. He would throw him a copy of the rules and say: "Give me something to say on these." The man would skim through the rules in his armchair that night or perhaps two nights in succession and give him hasty, ill-considered, superficial comments, and the Deputy would stand up here with a certain gusto and eclat and unburden himself of these comments. That will be the difference between a fortnight and three weeks—just that. The Deputy knows it as well as I do.

Is the Minister suggesting that the method of dealing with legislation is of that kind and that therefore the Oireachtas is of no use?

I am not suggesting anything of the kind.

What other inference can be drawn from the Minister'c statement?

I am taking the Deputy's own statement that he confesses himself unqualified to pronounce on these rules.

Not in a week.

Would you in a year?

Perhaps.

I want to make this clear—Deputy Baxter in this matter is a Deputy of this House and is in the same position as any other Deputy of this House. If Deputy Baxter is to be assumed by the Minister and charged by the Minister that he is not——

Not assumed by the Minister; it was Deputy Baxter's own statement.

No. Deputy Baxter said that perhaps in a year he would. The Minister is suggesting that no period of consideration would be sufficient to qualify Deputy Baxter to deal with these rules or, for that matter, with any Act of Parliament.

The suggestion was that Deputy Baxter would not trouble himself to understand the rules.

The position occupied by Deputy Baxter is the position occupied by every other Deputy. The inference from the Minister's statement is that the House is a useless institution and that there is no necessity to submit rules or legislation to the House because Deputies are incompetent to deal with such matters. That is the position the Minister is taking up, and it is the position that I wish to protest against.

Does the Minister imagine that my attitude in regard to measures brought forward in the Dáil is the same as the attitude I take up on those rules? I would like to inform the Minister that any measures that were brought forward here and that I had anything to do with or made a statement on, are measures that I gave considerable attention to. I have gone to great pains carefully to make my points and to understand what I was talking about. If a reasonable opportunity were given to Deputies to consider these rules carefully and understand them, we would be better able to discuss them and we could come here fully equipped with a knowledge of what underlies them. We have not been given that opportunity. I repudiate the suggestion of the Minister that I would put on to anyone else the responsibility of pointing out where weaknesses lay in the Rules of Court now submitted.

I wish I could get a definition of a reasonable opportunity. The Deputy has had the rules for a fortnight. He is inclined to agree with me that his position would not be substantially different if he had them for three weeks. He does not make the claim that it would be very different if he had them for a year. I concede that.

I never mentioned a year.

Taking Deputy Johnson's points in order, I congratulate him on the fact that he has been more detailed and specific in dealing with these rules than in dealing with the Circuit Court Rules. He dealt first with Rule 4, and he dealt with it inaccurately owing to an apparent confusion between the district to which a particular Justice is assigned and the component court areas of that district. Section 79 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, applies to the entire district of a Justice. Rule 4 applies only to the particular court area within a Justice's district in which cases are to be brought. Section 79 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, sets out:—

Provided that the jurisdictions by this Act vested in and transferred to a District Court shall be exercised by the Justices severally as follows:

In civil cases, by a Justice for the time being assigned to the district wherein the defendant or one of the defendants ordinarily resides or carries on any profession, business or occupation;

In criminal cases, by a Justice for the time being assigned to the district wherein the crime has been committed or the accused has been arrested or resides;

The provision dealing with licensing cases sets out a Justice for the time being assigned to the district wherein the licensed premises are situate. That section applies to the whole district of a Justice. There are thirtythree Justices in the area of jurisdiction of the State. Rule 4 applies only to the court area within a Justice's district in which cases are to be brought. The whole rule is governed by the jurisdiction of the Justice, and that jurisdiction is to be found in Section 79 of the Courts of Justice Act. The rules do not confer or purport to confer any jurisdiction on a Justice in any case in which he has not jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act. So much for the charge that we are really attempting to legislate by Rules of Court.

The Deputy passed from that to Rules 6 and 7, and dealt specially with the question of open court and the exception which it is proposed to make to that general position. He says that matters of this kind cannot be dealt with in the atmosphere of 1851. That is a general maxim that I would have no hesitation in subscribing to; but there are certain things which do not alter even in such a length of time as that between 1851 and 1926, and the need for this discretion in a Justice to close his court exists to just as great an extent now as then. The only case in which a Justice may exclude the public is the preliminary investigation of indictable offences, and the only class of case in which power of that kind is ever exercised is that in which charges of a sexual nature arise. I submit that it is not in the public interest, it is not for the general good of the community, that the Justice should be deprived of the discretion of deciding to hear the preliminary investigation of a particular indictable offence in camera.

Does the Minister suggest that this rule would limit the Justice to closing the court in such cases?

No, I do not. I suggest in practice the exercise of the power will be so limited, and if it is not the matter can be raised again.

Rather than attempt definition I think it is better simply to give that discretion to the Justice. There are cases from time to time in this country, as in any country, of a particularly revolting nature, the publication of which in the Press, or the hearing of which by the general public in the locality in which they occur, would not be in the general interest. That rule is inserted in recognition of that fact.

Has the Minister forgotten that there have been cases not unknown to this city and the House, where individuals have been charged preliminarily and their names suppressed because of the fact that they were individuals of particular reputation and particular standing in society, and they were so removed from the mind of the public at the discretion of the Justice?

I do not quite follow the Deputy in that; I do not know to what he is referring.

To save the reputation of a particular individual.

The Deputy passed from Rules 6 and 7 to Rule 25, which deals with the question of remand, on bail or in custody, and attention is drawn to the fact that it is proposed to extend the period of remand from eight to fourteen days. That is a modification of a statute, and the question arises as to whether it is such modification as is contemplated by Section 91 of the Courts of Justice Act, which says:—

"Such rule-making authority may at any time and from time to time after the passing and before or after the commencement of this Act make rules to be styled ‘District Court Rules' for carrying into effect this Part of this Act (except the hearing by the Circuit Court of appeals from the District Court and the hearing by the High Court of cases stated by the District Court), and may annul or alter such rules and make new rules. In particular rules may be made for all or any of the following matters, viz., for regulating the sittings and the vacations and the districts of the Justices and the places where proceedings are to be brought and the forms of process, summons, case stated, appeal or otherwise, and the conditions which a party who requires a case stated or an appellant must comply with in civil cases or in criminal cases or in licensing cases as the case may be, and the practice and procedure of the District Court generally, including questions of costs and the times for taking any step in the District Court the entering-up of judgment and granting of summary judgment in appropriate cases and the use of the national language of Saorstát Eireann therein and the fixing and collection of fees and the adaptation or modification of any statute that may be necessary for any of the purposes aforesaid and all subsidiary matters."

"The adaptation or modification of any statute that may be necessary for any of the purposes aforesaid." Deputy Johnson stressed the word "necessary," and, by jumping very hard on it, he sought to convey the impression that it must be absolutely necessary—something in the absence of which the whole court machinery would fail. I do not think that we need take it in that way just as strictly as the Deputy, for the purposes of his argument, endeavoured to convey. The rule-making authority has power, amongst other things, to deal with "the adaptation or modification of any statute that may be necessary for any of the purposes aforesaid." It is necessary for the due administration of justice under the system which we have created by the Courts of Justice Act to extend this period of remand. The courts are held in some areas not more frequently than once a month. In others they are held fortnightly, and only in some populous areas are they held as frequently as once a week. The State is divided into 33 districts. There are 33 District Justices functioning, and it is simply not always possible, administratively, to deal with a prisoner within a space as short as eight days.

Is that stated in the Courts of Justice Act? Does the Minister say that the Act must conform to administrative convenience, or that administrative convenience must conform to the Act?

I say that the rule-making committee has been given power to make any necessary adaptation or modification of any statute, and that this is a necessary modification of a particular statute. With regard to the power that it is proposed to give to a District Justice to remand to another court area, that, of course, is inserted to deal with custody cases only. No Justice would ever remand on bail to another court area, but power is inserted to enable him to deal with custody cases. In many court areas courts are held monthly, and it may not be possible for a Justice to get to that particular area within a fortnight. It is reasonable to leave it within his discretion to remand, if necessary, to a neighbouring court area in which he will be due within that time.

Would the Minister point out where that power is limited to prisoners who are remanded? I read it as though it were quite within the competence of the Justice to allow bail.

I did not say that the power to remand on bail to another court area was not contained in the rules. I say, in fact and in practice, no Justice would ever remand on bail to a different area. Why should he? If bail can be given, there is no reason whatever to remand to a different area. There may, on the other hand, be good reason for using the powers to deal with custody cases, and it is with a view to dealing with custody cases that the rule has been framed.

Then we should confine it to custody cases.

Is the Minister satisfied that the ends of justice will be served by the interpretation which he has put on Rule 25?

Yes, entirely.

That the ability of a prisoner to get his witnesses and so forth for the purposes of his defence will be made possible by transferring the prisoner and the witnesses from his own area to an area, perhaps, more than twenty or thirty miles away? It may be the only possible court within the area within a period of fourteen days.

The Deputy cannot have it every way. We cannot have a court in every offender's kitchen. On the one hand, there is objection to an extension of the period of remand. The Deputy had his growl there, and then the extension from eight to fourteen days is regarded as shocking.

I did not make that point.

On the other hand, to have power inserted specifically to enable custody cases to be tried without undue delay is also objectionable.

And bail cases also.

The fact is that if the joint ideas of Deputy Baxter and Deputy Johnson were to be carried out one would want at least double the number of district justices that we have at present, and we just cannot have them. These rules constitute a reasonable effort to meet the requirements of the case. It has been necessary to add some five or six days to the remand period and, on the other side of the same issue, it has been necessary to take power to remand a prisoner to another area than that in which he is originally brought forward. I do not know that there is anything unduly harsh or unfair to the prisoner in either of these provisions. In regard to Rule 26, Deputy Johnson rung the changes on the sinister change from "sufficient" to "prima facie" in connection with the preliminary investigations of an indictable offence. Everyone knows that in connection with a preliminary investigation of an indictable offence, it is not the business of the Justice to decide whether the defendant is guilty or innocent. It is the business of the Justice simply to decide whether evidence has been put before him which constitutes a prima facie case. That is the expression that is always used in connection with these preliminary proceedings—is a prima facie case established? If it is, the Justice has no more to do with the matter but to return for trial at the court which has jurisdiction to try that particular offence. There is nothing sinister at all in the change of language from the petty sessions position to these new rules. It is simply that the more correct expression, the more technical and the more commonly used expression, "prima facie case," is substituted for the word "sufficient."

The Minister has the word "sufficient" in paragraph (a) and he has changed it in paragraph (b).

At that rate we have gone half way to meet the Deputy. We have given him his own word in one of the paragraphs.

I am only suggesting that there has been a change in the word in paragraph (b), that it was not made in the same connection in paragraph (a), and I suggest there must be some reason for it. What is the reason?

There is no reason; it is the same thing.

I suggest it is an attenuation. It is a sufficient change to press somewhat against the accused.

It is not. There is no change.

Well, then, alter it to the old form.

No. Paragraph (b) states: "If in his opinion such evidence shall be prima facie proof of the said charge, such Justice shall thereupon either by a like warrant commit the accused to prison or shall admit him to bail..." I ought not to waste the time of the Dáil in discussing whether or not it is a sinister menace to the liberty of the individual to say that if a Justice is satisfied that there is a prima facie case of a criminal offence against him, he shall return him for trial.

Why alter the statute?

In regard to Rule 27 governing the procedure of admitting to bail, about which the Deputy was also advised, I think he seemed to have the opinion that under the rule a person was deprived of his statutory right to bail, that by virtue of this rule some statutory right to bail which existed in the past is removed. If I am not representing the Deputy accurately perhaps he will correct me.

I think it is an attempt to remove it. I do not think it will in fact remove it, but I am suggesting that wherever these rules vary from the statute the rules will fall. We should not even attempt to suggest that we are trying to alter the statutory power.

We all will sleep the sounder for that assurance by the Deputy, that even where we are trying to undermine the liberties of the individual and to take away his statutory rights, we cannot succeed.

Not by this method.

An examination of the Deputy's points on specific rules does not lead one to accept his preliminary objections to the rules, that they were in fact an encroachment of existing rights and existing liberties and an attempt to do by means of rules what should be done, if it were done at all, by legislation. I expected that the Deputy having made that preliminary charge would support it with some substantial instances and some substantial arguments. In fact I put it to the Dáil that he has utterly failed to do so and that he has shown no sufficient cause why approval to this set of rules should be withheld and the District Court left without rules for a further period of four or five months. I simply want to say in connection with these rules, as in connection with the other set of rules for the High Court and the Supreme Court, that have been approved of by the Dáil, that they are necessarily tentative, that their effect in operation and in practice will need to be carefully observed and that we hold ourselves perfectly free to bring forward to the Dáil at any time or from time to time such amendments as may appear necessary. In that spirit I recommend the rules to the Dáil and I ask that they be approved.

Will the Minister deal with Rules 124 and 178 and explain them?

That is in connection with peace commissioners and affidavits. I am advised that the peace commissioner at present has not a statutory power to take an affidavit. He has statutory power to administer oaths, but as regards taking affidavits for court purposes, my advice is that he has no such power at the moment. If he has not we cannot confer it on him by rule. We can, as I pointed out, where necessary alter or modify a statute, but we cannot confer an entirely new power upon a peace commissioner. Without committing myself on the question whether or not it would be desirable that he would have such power, for the moment we cannot give it to him by these rules.

But is the peace commissioner not doing it?

No; he is not taking affidavits. A statutory declaration in connection with old age pensions and matters of that kind is a different thing.

I have a handbook here for peace commissioners in connection with the Courts of Justice Act, 1924. The reading of that would indicate that the peace commissioner has this power.

I do not accept that, but if there is anything misleading in it or contrary to my present advice it will have to be altered. The Deputy can take it that I am advised definitely that the peace commissioners throughout the country have not that statutory power, and we cannot confer it on them by a rule of court.

Question put.
The Dáil divided. Tá, 30; Níl, 23.

  • Earnán de Blaghd.
  • Séamus Breathnach.
  • Seoirse de Bhulbh.
  • Próinsias Bulfin.
  • Bryan R. Cooper.
  • Máighréad Ní Choileain Bean Uí
  • Dhrisceóil.
  • James Dwyer.
  • William Hewat.
  • Seán MacCurtain.
  • Maolmhuire Mac Eochadha.
  • Pádraig Mac Fadáin.
  • Patrick McGilligan.
  • Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
  • Liam Mac Sioghaird.
  • Pádraig Mag Ualghairg.
  • Martin M. Nally.
  • John T. Nolan.
  • Michael K. Noonan.
  • Peadar O hAodha.
  • Mícheál O hAonghusa.
  • Parthalán O Conchubhair.
  • Eoghan O Dochartaigh.
  • Peadar O Dubhghaill.
  • Pádraig O Dubhthaigh.
  • Eamon O Dúgáin.
  • Seán O Laidhin.
  • Risteárd O Maolchatha.
  • Séamus O Murchadha.
  • Seán O Súilleabháin.
  • Caoimhghín O hUigín.

Níl

  • Pádraig Baxter.
  • Seán Buitléir.
  • John Conlan.
  • Seán de Faoite.
  • David Hall.
  • Séamus Mac Cosgair.
  • Tomás Mac Eoin.
  • Pádraig Mac Fhlannchadha.
  • Patrick McKenna.
  • Risteárd Mac Liam.
  • Tomás de Nógla.
  • Ailfrid O Broin.
  • Tomás O Conaill.
  • Aodh O Cúlacháin.
  • Tadhg O Donnabháin.
  • Eamon O Dubhghaill.
  • Mícheál O Dubhghaill.
  • Seán O Duinnín.
  • Mícheál O hIfearnáin.
  • Domhnall O Muirgheasa.
  • Pádraig O hOgáin (An Clár).
  • Pádraig O hOgáin (Luimneach).
  • Nicholas Wall.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Sears and P.S. Doyle. Níl: Deputies Morrissey and Baxter.
Motion declared carried.

took the Chair.

Barr
Roinn