REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS.

Mr. DAVIN

I move:—

"That the Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, dated 29th February, 1928, which has been printed and circulated, be now considered."

In presenting this Report to the House for its consideration, I take the liberty of pointing out that the work which had to be carried out for the year under review had to be carried out by three separate committees, appointed in the first case by the Fourth Dáil, in the second place by the Fifth Dáil, and also by the Sixth Dáil. Many members of the Committee who will be held responsible for the Report now presented were not members of either of the committees appointed by the Fourth or the Fifth Dáil. I was not a member of the Committee set up by the Fourth Dáil, but I was a member of the Committee appointed by the Fifth Dáil, but was not constantly in attendance at the meetings. Eventually I found myself in the peculiar position of being Chairman of the Committee which had to take responsibility for drawing up the Report now before the House. I want to take advantage of this opportunity of saying on behalf of the Public Accounts Committee, and if I might say also on behalf of the House, that we deeply appreciate the conscientious and painstaking manner in which the Comptroller and Auditor-General and his staff performed the duties which fell to them in connection with this important aspect of Governmental work. The Comptroller and Auditor-General is, of course, an officer of this House, appointed by the House for the purpose of seeing that its intentions when voting money are faithfully carried out in the spending of that money. If I may do so at this stage, I want to emphasise the fact that the work of the Public Accounts Committee should be looked upon as a work of a purely non-party character. It would be a very serious matter in the opinion of some of the Committee, and I hope in this matter members of the House will agree, if the Report or recommendations of the Committee were to be looked upon and dealt with from the party point of view. The Committee consists of members of all parties, but so far as my experience goes, the work done by members of all parties on the Committee was performed in a manner which had no relationship whatever to the views of the parties, if they had any views on the particular matters that came before the Committee from time to time.

The Committee conducts its business in the presence of the accounting officers of the Departments concerned, representatives of the Department of Finance and the Comptroller and Auditor-General. The Committee can, any time it thinks fit, examine official files so as to clucidate any particular matter that it may not be clear upon. The procedure is defined so as to safeguard the taxpayer from official error in the spending of public funds, and to ensure faithful financial administration. I want to emphasise the fact also to members of the House who may be new to the work of the Public Accounts Committee that it is not the Ministers who are called before the Committee to answer for any matters that the Comptroller and Auditor-General may deem fit to report upon. It is the accounting officers of the Departments concerned. Cases have arisen, and perhaps will arise again, where Ministerial policy may cut across the Departmental decisions, and where such matters are reported to the Committee by the Comptroller and Auditor-General the Committee in due course reports to the House, and the Minister or Ministers responsible will have to answer to this House. Any departure from the directions and intentions of those voting the money in this House means a query from the Comptroller and Auditor-General, an examination by the Public Accounts Committee, a report in turn to this House, and disallowance or a supplementary application to the Dáil, as the case may be.

The system of public accountancy or the work and procedure of the Public Accounts Committee has been in existence in Great Britain for a period of, I think, 60 years. We had in this country to erect under very difficult circumstances a Governmental machine. It is only natural to expect that in the earliest stages of the work of a new Government, set up in such peculiar circumstances, that matters would crop up that would not arise under normal conditions. Speaking from a slight examination of the work of the Public Accounts Committee in Great Britain. and of the matters which have come before that Committee. I can truthfully and honestly state that the work performed by the people who are responsible for administration in this country is now as good as if not better than the work performed in Great Britain under the same circumstances. There is nothing of an unusual nature in the Report which I now present to the House which would make one feel that there is any reason for apprehension. Many matters appear in the Report of the Public Accounts Committee in Great Britain which do not now arise in this country, and I say that we can boast of a Governmental machine as good as if not better than that which exists in Great Britain, where you have an old-established Government, and where the machinery, the working and the procedure of the Public Accounts Committee have been in existence for a period of over sixty years.

I have to take the responsibility of presenting the Report to the House under a certain disadvantage. I take it that in the usual way the Report of the Public Accounts Committee would not be considered unless and until the Committee had received from the Minister for Finance minutes with regard to the different matters raised in the Report. The Report was signed on the 29th February, 1928, and in the usual way found its way to the Department of Finance. But as far as I am aware, we have no report or no minute of any kind to give us any indication whatever as to the views of the Minister for Finance on any important matter raised in the Report. I take it that matters which will be referred to by Deputies will be replied to by the Minister to-day. At this stage I intend to refer only to two or three matters raised in the Report. I feel, and I am sure that the members of the Committee also feel, that any discussion and criticism that may arise from the presentation of this Report should, at any rate in the earlier stages of this debate, be left as far as possible to Deputies who are not and have not been members of the Committee. If any Deputy refers to a matter which calls for explanation the members of the Committee, and I myself if necessary, will take responsibility for answering them for anything in the Report that may not appear clear.

I want to refer, in the first place, to paragraph 17 of the Report. I am sorry that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance is not now in the House. Of course we have already been informed that he is Chairman of the Economy Committee, and I would like to direct his attention to the matter raised in that paragraph so that he might, in consultation with his colleagues on the Economy Committee, see what could be done—and we believe that something could be done in this case—to bring about savings in expenses under this head. Ministers, and the Government as a whole, are of course responsible for the administration of Acts, such as the Old Age Pensions Act, and they are very careful not to give away a shilling in the case of an old age pension where a shilling can be saved, under the very strict regulations governing the administration of the Act. Here is a case where we believe—and in this we are supported by the accounting officer responsible—that considerable savings could be effected, and I merely direct the attention of the Chairman of the Economy Committee to this particular paragraph so that he may go into it with a view to bringing about savings.

In paragraph 26 a very important point is raised, a point where the Department of Posts and Telegraphs joins issue with the Minister for Finance on the question of discipline within the service. Those of us who were present in the House a couple of weeks ago, and who listened to the statement made by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs will remember that he made a boast, probably to a certain extent correct, about the discipline of the Department for which he was responsible. Now here is a case where his own Department on a question of discipline is joining issue with the Minister for Finance, who is nominally if not actually the head of the Civil Service. I will read the Report as far as I may have to refer to it:

Sums amounting to £69 10s. 4d. were charged to this account under the sub-head for losses. To this the Department of Finance refused sanction. The losses occurred through defalcations on the part of the officers in charge of two branch offices, and it transpired that the supervision on the part of the Department was defective. As a result of an application for authority to write off this amount, the Department of Finance requested that prosecutions be undertaken in both cases. The Solicitor to the Post Office gave it as his opinion that there was sufficient evidence to sustain prosecutions.

This is not the important point:

The Department for Posts and Telegraphs, nevertheless, refused to proceed on the grounds that it was not in the public interest, and also that the decision as to whether prosecutions should be instituted in this type of case was one for them and not for the Department of Finance.

Now that raises a very serious issue, and I hope that the Deputies of this House will support the members of the Public Accounts Committee in insisting that on matters of this kind the view point of the Department of Finance must be carried out and adhered to, if there is to be discipline in the Civil Service. I would like to hear from the Minister, when he is replying, what he has to say in regard to that particular aspect of the report.

Now I come to paragraph 31 in connection with Trade Loan Guarantees. The Deputies will recognise that a special provision of this Act was that no guarantee was to be given if any part of the proceeds was to be used as working capital. In one case which has already come under the notice of the House in the discussions which took place here last year, and where the Loan was guaranteed, it was found that the State security must stand as a second mortgage in order to allow a first mortgage on the assets for cash advanced by the bank as working capital. I believe it is generally admitted, I am not sure if the Minister is now prepared to admit it, that that certainly was not in accordance with the intentions of the Act. The Act of the 17th July, 1926, made no amendment such as was suggested in the interim report of the Public Accounts Committee dated 15th June, 1926. In another case it was brought to the notice of the Public Accounts Committee that the State security has been reduced by about £20,000 since the loan was guaranteed by the Department of Industry and Commerce. This makes me feel that the Comptroller and Auditor-General, in commenting on these cases, is entitled to deal with them as matters of account and not as matters of law. The Dáil, in granting money for any purpose, looks to the Comptroller and Auditor-General to see that its intention in granting the money is carried out. When a liability on the Exchequer is created, the Comptroller and Auditor-General is bound to bring any matter to the notice of the Dáil, any matter which he thinks should be brought forward. In my opinion the Act should be amended so as to remove all doubt regarding the conditions under which a loan may be guaranteed. The Minister, in speaking on his own Vote the other day, gave the House to understand that in amending the Act, as he anticipated that amendments would be necessary, he would be guided in bringing forward such amendments as a result of the discussion that would take place in the House on this Report.

I want to come to another, the last matter in connection with this Report. It is the matter dealt with in paragraph 42 under the head of Army Pensions. I want to say here and now that the question raised by the Committee under this paragraph has nothing whatever to do with the desirability of granting pensions to able-bodied men. This House has, by the Military Service Pensions Act, made provision for granting pensions to individuals who can prove active service in pre-Truce days, and who could also prove that they had subsequent service in the National Army. The Act which made it possible to pay pensions to such individuals made it also possible to set up what is called a Board of Assessors. And that Board under the Act was charged with the responsibility of going into all applications and making recommendations as to whether certificates could be issued which would enable individual applicants to obtain whatever pensions they were entitled to under the terms of the Act. The Comptroller and Auditor-General, as far as I am aware, is entitled in all cases where moneys are advanced under any Act passed by this House to have access to every document which would enable him to satisfy himself on behalf of this House that the moneys payable under certain sections of the Act would be properly chargeable to the Vote and within the meaning of the Act which gives authority for the granting of pensions or other payments. A definite conflict arose subsequent to the establishment of the Board of Assessors in connection with the administration of this particular Act. If I am wrong, I would like the Minister to point out to me where I am wrong. I hold that the powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General were not in any way limited under the terms of any section of this Act. If they were, and if there was any such intention in the minds of those who were responsible for presenting the Bill to the House at the time, these things should have been mentioned at the time. When the moneys came to be voted for the Estimates in the ordinary way, the Minister, when subsequently moving for several Votes since the first Vote was presented to the House, did not inform the House that the moneys payable to the persons who were considered as entitled to pensions should be subjected to a limited examination. It was only when the Auditor-General came to review the payments made in a certain year that the Board of Assessors declined to give him the papers which he thought he was entitled to under the terms of his appointment under the Comptroller and Auditor-General Act. The point I want to make is this, and I do not want to stress it too much—that the refusal to give to the Comptroller and Auditor-General the papers to which he thinks he is entitled, and to which I think he is entitled under the terms of the Act as it stands, is, I understand, a ministerial decision. Evidence was given before the Public Accounts Committee which makes that quite clear to any person who has read the minutes of evidence. Mr. Brennan, who was then the accounting officer for the Department of Finance, gave evidence before the Committee on the 13th January, 1927. In paragraph 2216 of the printed evidence I find:—

Chairman:—In the Superannuation and Pensions Act, 1923, I find provision is made in respect to the payment of pensions to a variety of classes, including civil servants. Dublin Metropolitan Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Army pensions, resigned and dismissed R.I.C., teachers and others. I find that in the Superannuation and Pensions Act. Section 9, it is provided that the decision of the Minister for Finance on any question which may arise as to the application of any section of this Act to any person or as to the amount of any allowance or gratuity under this Act or as to the reckoning of any service for such allowance or gratuity shall be final. I find this Act is to be cited together with the previous Superannuation Acts from 1834 to 1923. I desire to ask you as to the practice of the Minister for Finance in respect to the audit of pensions awards whether it is usual to submit any documents that may be called for by the Comptroller and Auditor-General which he may require in the course of his audit?

The reply was:

That is the practice in all these cases—that any paper relevant to the award of pensions is sent to the Comptroller and Auditor-General on his request.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

This is the Report which appeared last year; it is the second last report.

Mr. DAVIN

Yes. I said it was the evidence given before the Committee on the 13th January, 1927. In the next question, the Chairman asked:—

Would you base that practice merely upon good will or would you consider it within your rights— would you consider it the right of the Department of Finance—to refuse access to the documents that the Comptroller and Auditor-General asks in respect to a pension of which the Minister for Finance was the final decider?

The reply was:

In general in view of the essential character of the work of the Comptroller and Auditor-General involving audit and criticism of accounts and in view of the more particular provisions in relation to the conduct of audit which are set out in the Exchequer and Audit Act, it has always been assumed that papers relevant to financial transactions an to accounts are proper to be called for by the Comptroller and Auditor-General and that they ought to be furnished to him. The refusal of the paper to the Comptroller and Auditor-General would be a very exceptional matter, and in general it could only be defended where it is clearly a matter pertaining to an account, upon some grounds of public policy rendering it undesirable that the papers should be disclosed. In any such case, the Minister who takes the responsibility of refusing the paper naturally also takes upon himself the responsibility of justifying to the Dáil and to this Committee that such action was proper in the particular case.

This is a Ministerial decision—the refusal to produce the documents considered necessary. I assume that it is now the responsibility of the Minister to justify to the House the action of the Ministry in declining to submit these papers for the examination of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. The question which the House should concern itself with in this matter is, was it the intention of the members of the House who took responsibility for the passing of this Act to limit the powers and the rights of the Comptroller and Auditor-General in making his examination into the payments that are being made under this Act? Was it the intention of the members of the House who voted moneys at different periods when Votes were presented here that the same limited examination should be carried out? If that was not the intention, if it was not the intention of the Minister, and if there is nothing in the Act to prevent the Comptroller and Auditor-General from getting the papers, then a case must be made to the House here and now on behalf of the Ministry which refused to give the Comptroller and Auditor-General the rights which we all believe he is entitled to.

On the question of the work performed by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in matters of this kind I have been informed, as a member and as Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, that pensions were granted under the Superannuation and Pensions Act of 1923 by the Departmental officials responsible for considering applications, and when some of these cases were submitted to the Comptroller and Auditor-General he found the pensions in some twenty odd cases were not properly payable within the meaning of this Act. I notice that the Minister dissents, but that information has been given to me, and, if it is correct, it only goes to show how necessary it is for the Comptroller and Auditor-General, acting on behalf of the House, to make a careful investigation into every case in which a pension has been granted. I am informed also that in order to get the maximum pension under the Military Service Pensions Act it is necessary to produce proof before the Board of Assessors that you had active service in 1916. I am reliably informed that one individual now in receipt of the maximum pension of £350 a year had not active service in 1916. That man, in my opinion and if I am correctly informed, could not be given the maximum pension under the Act. If my statement is correct, if there is any ground for that statement and if the papers were brought in the ordinary way and submitted to the Comptroller and Auditor-General, that would be the time when the Comptroller and Auditor-General would be able to exercise his powers and prevent such a person getting a pension if he thought he was not entitled to it.

Major COOPER

It might be well to have it from Deputy Davin whether he is making this statement purely from his own knowledge or whether evidence on the subject came before the Committee of Public Accounts. I do not think that any such evidence came before the Committee.

Mr. DAVIN

I quite agree that it is not supported by any statement in the evidence, and could not be, simply because of the position that has arisen.

Major COOPER

Then it is Deputy Davin's own personal knowledge, and not his knowledge as the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. DAVIN

I quite agree. I quoted the case and I refer to the matter now in order to show how necessary it is that papers should be submitted to the C. and A.-G. We had one case, as Deputy Cooper knows—and this is supported by evidence—where an individual was dismissed in disgrace from the National Army and immediately courtmartialled. He wos found guilty of certain shortages. A year after his dismissal the individual in this case came along and made application for a pension. The Board of Assessors granted the pension with or without the knowledge that the individual had been dismissed in disgrace. I hold that if all the facts in connection with that case were submitted to the C. and A.-G. the individual concerned would not be in receipt of a pension. I refer to these matters to show how necessary it is that the officer of this House, who has been appointed with very definite responsibility, and who has been given very definite powers, should have access to every document that is available, so as to satisfy himself on any matter concerning the spending of the taxpayers' money.

The discussion in connection with this matter has no relation whatsoever to the desirability of granting pensions under the Military Service Pensions Act, and I hope the discussion, in so far as it may take place on this matter, will be confined to the issues raised in the report of a Committee of Public Accounts. I hope the members of the House will give expression to their opinion as to whether they think that the C. and A.-G. is right in demanding access to these documents, and whether there is any justification for the action of the Ministry in refusing him access to the documents to which he thinks he is entitled.

I want to refer to one other matter, and that is in regard to the work of this particular Committee. In the discussion on the Vote connected with the Department of the Ministry for Industry and Commerce on the 17th May, the Minister expressed himself very clearly. I am sorry to see that he did it in such a way. He remarked on the red-tape regulations and methods adopted, in his opinion, by the Committee of Public Accounts. The Committee of Public Accounts, as far as my experience of the work of that Committee has gone, merely sets itself out to consider matters which have been brought under its notice in the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. The Committee of Public Accounts has, of course, the right, if it so desires, to go into other matters that they would be entitled to go into under their terms of reference. The Committee, as far as I know, have quite sufficient work to do to deal with the matters that are brought under their notice by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in his report, and during my membership of the Committee they have not gone outside that particular phase of the work which they were appointed to do. Deputy Briscoe and the Minister for Industry and Commerce appear to be a little at variance in regard to the matter. The Minister is reported as having said in the House on the 17th May, 1928:—

Who is responsible for the red tape in Government Departments? This Dáil. This Dáil insists upon a certain responsibility being put on certain people in such a way that there is this red tape. We can get rid of the red tape if the Dáil says in any legislation it passes, "Very well, you can have a free hand." However, it happens that Deputies who complain of red tape in this House go into the Public Accounts Committee and show they are intent on tying up every Government Department in coils of red tape.

The red tape merely consists of this, as far as I know: This House votes so many millions per year of the taxpayers' money. We have to be satisfied that we can justify our action to the taxpayers who sent us here to share the responsibility for the good government of the country. After that money is voted we have to leave it to the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who is appointed by the Dáil, to see that the intentions of the Deputies who voted the money are faithfully and conscientiously carried out. In order to have that work carried out in a proper and efficient manner the Public Accounts Committee has been appointed. It would be impossible for the House as a whole to take up the consideration of the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. Can anyone picture Deputies sitting here for months at a time, having before them the Accounting Officer of every Department responsible for Government administration, and examining him at length with regard to this, that, and the other matters raised in the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General? It could not be done. In order to avoid that a committee of twelve Deputies, representative of all Parties, sit and bring before them from time to time, as and when necessary, the Accounting Officers of the various Departments, and question them upon any matter raised in the report. If that is the red tape which the Minister for Industry and Commerce apparently dislikes, it is for the House to say what other machinery can be adopted which will do the work in future better than it has been done by the Public Accounts Committee in the past.

I have nothing further to say at this stage in regard to the presentation of the Report, other than that I do not feel called upon to refer to any other matter at the moment. Personally I should prefer that criticism of the Report would be taken up by Deputies who are not and have not been members of the Committee. I would emphasise again the necessity for looking at this Report and the work of the Committee from a purely non-Party standpoint. That cannot be emphasised too often or too much, and I hope Deputies, regardless of Party, will appreciate the necessity for that.

(2) The Comptroller and Auditor-General, after satisfying himself that the vouchers have been examined and certified as correct by the Accounting Department, may, in his discretion and having regard to the character of the Departmental examination, in any particular case admit the sums so certified without further evidence of payment in support of the charges to which they relate.

Provided that if the Treasury desires the vouchers or any of them to be examined in greater detail the Comptroller and Auditor-General shall take action accordingly."

That is extending to the whole service what was formerly the privilege of the Army and Navy. It is giving a discretion to the Comptroller and Auditor-General not to carry out an exhaustive audit, but to take a test audit or to accept the audit of the Department concerned. But the vital article concerning us here is in the Exchequer and Audit Department Act, 1866, and that is Section 28, as slightly amended by this Act. I am reading it as amended and not in its original form.

"In order that such examination may as far as possible proceed pari passu with the transactions of the several accountancy Departments the Comptroller and Auditor-General shall have free access, at all convenient times, to the books and accounts and other documents relating to the accounts of such Departments, and may require the several Departments concerned to furnish him, from time to time, or at regular periods, with accounts of the transactions of such Departments.”

Now that is a summary of the statutory authority of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, and the question arises: Who is to interpret these laws conferring these functions upon him? How are they to be interpreted and by what body? Is the Comptroller and Auditor-General alone entitled to interpret them? That is a problem the solution of which I do not know. In England, as I understand, these laws are being interpreted by a long process of evolution going from precedent to precedent and involving tradition and customs of the Treasury. the Audit Department and the Public Accounts Committee. What I am not clear about is this: By the Adaptation of Enactments Act we took over this legislation dealing with the Comptroller and Auditor-General. Did we also take over these laws as interpreted by the traditions of the British Treasury and the Public Accounts Committee in England? Are we bound by the precedents of the Public Accounts Committee in England? While that doctrine has never been stated at the Public Accounts Committee here. I must say that from the very beginning the Committee has acted as if that were the case.

Another doctrine which is accepted as ex cathedra and absolutely unquestioned by the Public Accounts Committee is that the power of the Department of Finance over all other Departments is unlimited. The first item to the First Schedule of the Ministers and Secretaries Act states that the business and functions formerly administered and discharged by the British Treasury in Ireland shall be assigned to the Department of Finance. Who is to interpret that particular item? What exactly were the business and the functions of the British Treasury in Ireland? I strongly suspect that literally the business and the functions of the British Treasury in Ireland were not nearly so extensive as the Treasury functions exercised by the Department of Finance at the present time.

The question as to what the functions of the Treasury are the Committee of Public Accounts leaves to be decided entirely by the Treasury itself. In the course of the last few years I dared to suggest to the House that perhaps the Department of Finance, in certain matters, wielded a tyrannical power, that it exercised legislative, executive and judicial authority—made its own laws, enforced its own laws and interpreted its own laws. I dared make that suggestion occasionally in the House, not that I expected, in any way, to mitigate the occasional tyrannical exercise of that power, but in order to show that there was at least one "Skibbereen Eagle" with its eye on the Czar. The Committee of Public Accounts has meekly submitted to everything which the Finance Department suggested. It is in constant conspiracy with representatives of Finance against the other departments of State. I have noticed a tendency in the Committee to regard its functions not so much as a tribunal to keep the balance between Finance and the other Departments, but as a public prosecutor or devil's advocate with the dice loaded against all the Departments except the Finance Department. I have noticed that some members of the Fianna Fáil Party in this House, and also in the Committee of Public Accounts, fondly imagine that when they are persecuting some particular official, or demanding some impossible economy, the administration trembles to its foundations. These poor, innocent people are entirely mistaken. There is more joy in the Department of Finance at one Fianna Fáil Deputy advocating some impossible reduction than at 99 just Deputies advocating an absolutely essential expenditure of money. That is what they have not yet realised.

The Committee has accepted the doctrine that the authority of the Department of Finance is absolute. The Committee itself is not responsible for the fact that the Minister for Finance is an infinitely more important and more influential person than the Chancellor of the Exchequer in England. The success of Treasury control in England is largely due to the fact that the head of the Treasury is, ipso facto, the Prime Minister. The First Lord of the Treasury becomes, ipso facto, Prime Minister. In this country, the Minister for Finance combines the functions of Chancellor of the Exchequer and watchdog of the Treasury. I am fortified in my opinion on this matter by the fact that, in the first year, the President himself held the office of Minister for Finance. There is no country in the world, so far as I know, where the Treasury control of other Departments is so great as in this country. There is no country in the world where the Departments, and the Ministers responsible for those Departments, are so bound up by regulations and so controlled by Parliament and where they have so little freedom of action. The tendency of the Committee of Public Accounts has been to enter into a joint partnership with the Department of Finance for the purpose of interfering in all Departments. That is the impression I got—that the tendency was to reduce this State, in the end, to a modified bureaucracy. The traditions of the Treasury have been accepted as gospel. The Committee have not accepted the traditions of the other great Departments of State in England. That is only one of the weaknesses of the present position. In England, simultaneous with the growth of the traditions and rights of the Treasury, there grew up the customs and practices of the other great Departments—the War Office, the Home Office, the Foreign Office, and so on. These traditions have protected those Departments from the encroachments of the Treasury. In Ireland, that is not the case. It is the Treasury alone that decides. The other Departments, apparently, have no rights; they have only duties. The Committee of Public Accounts has supported that situation and, in its Reports, it has been virtually, from the very beginning, the loud-speaker of the Treasury. I myself do not believe that the regulations of the British Treasury, whether written or unwritten, were ever designed for or suited to the position created by an Irish Revolution or an Irish Civil War. The pathetic obedience of the Committee to those regulations often results in rather comic situations.

Mr. DAVIN

Are we discussing the constitutional rights of the Comptroller and Auditor-General?

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

Does Deputy Esmonde give way?

Mr. ESMONDE

Yes.

Mr. DAVIN

Are we discussing the constitutional rights of the Comptroller and Auditor-General or the report presented to the House by the Committee of Public Accounts?

Mr. ESMONDE

A question was raised as to whether or not the powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General were limited. An attempt has been made to limit them. That question is dealt with in the report. I think it is the principal question dealt with in the report.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

Deputy Esmonde began by quoting paragraph 42 of the report, which we are now considering. That paragraph states:—

"On further consideration, however, this Committee is of opinion that it is undesirable to deal with a charge which recurs annually in a manner which appears to limit the powers conferred on the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who is required by the terms of the statutes defining the duties and powers of his office ... to examine on behalf of the Dáil every Appropriation Account, other than those in which a specific indication to the contrary appears on the face of the Estimate."

That paragraph does seem to raise the question of the powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, generally, and his powers in this particular instance. In other parts of the report, the Department of Finance is mentioned, and the Committee states its view in regard to relations between the Department of Finance and other departments where that question arose. That would seem to bring what Deputy Esmonde is saying about the Department of Finance into order. I was carefully listening to the Deputy to ensure that he would not lead us into a discussion on the general functions of the Department of Finance. The relations of the Committee of Public Accounts to the Department of Finance in respect of the work the Committee has to do is relevant, but I will hear the Chairman of the Committee at any moment on that question.

Mr. DAVIN

Might I point out that the Deputy who is delivering this prepared speech was a member of the Committee responsible for presenting this Report and that he did not at any of the meetings of the Committee raise the matter he is now referring to?

Mr. LEMASS

That is a point I would like to get explained. It appears that the particular section of the Report to which Deputy Esmonde is referring was inserted as an amendment to the Draft Report of the Chairman, on the motion of Deputy Cooper. It was agreed to without a division by the Committee of which Deputy Esmonde was a member and at a meeting at which he was present.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

I am not concerned—and I am very grateful— with explaining Deputy Esmonde or any other Deputy to the House. I am certainly concerned with seeing that Deputy Esmonde is in order. The terms of the Report bring the matters that Deputy Esmonde is discussing into order, but it would not be in order to discuss generally the functions of the Department of Finance.

Mr. ESMONDE

I do not know if it is in order to deal with the private happenings at the Committee. As Deputy Lemass has raised the question, perhaps I am entitled to explain the situation. I am criticising the Public Accounts Committee not because it has done wrong—in fact I think it has done admirable work—but I am trying to point out a few defects in the system. I am the only member of this House who has assisted in the drawing up of these Reports, and I am trying to give my experience on the Committee during that period.

As to the particular point with reference to military service pensions, I will deal with that later. I accepted Deputy Cooper's amendment merely because I was aware that the Committee was opposed to my views. I agreed with the amendment because had I not agreed with it the report would have been worse than it is, as the Committee would have passed the original proposal of the chairman. I was dealing with the intensely pathetic adherence of the Committee to the traditions of the British Treasury and the Treasury regulations. That, as I have said, brings the Committee into ridiculous situations. For instance, there is a matter which I have raised in discussions at the Public Accounts Committee, and that is the continued increase of Appropriations-in-Aid. The Accounting Officer of the Department of Finance at the very beginning of the work of the Committee four years ago stated he was strongly of opinion that this practice of Appropriations-in-Aid was a violation of Article 61 of the Constitution. This extraordinary practice of Appropriations-in-Aid exists only in England, and is one the value of which I never understood. When I suggested to the Committee that it might urge on the Department of Finance the desirability of uniformity in public accounts the Committee enthusiastically rejected the suggestion because of its intense affection for old British traditions, and stated that it had the greatest regard for Appropriations-in-Aid and wished to retain them.

Another case arose in the course of the discussion of this Report. The British Treasury have certain regulations dealing with travelling expenses. As an interesting survival of the British regime there are special travelling expenses for Great Britain, and special travelling expenses for Ireland, and then travelling expenses for abroad. In a small item which arose in the accounts mention was made of an officer travelling to London. I suggested to the Committee to substitute for London the word "abroad" in order to show there is some difference between this country and London, but members of the Fianna Fáil Party on the Committee unanimously and enthusiastically proclaimed that in their opinion London was not "abroad" and insisted on regarding themselves as at home in London.

Mr. BRISCOE

Perhaps Deputy Esmonde would state why in the opinion of some members of the Committee of Public Accounts it was considered in this particular instance London could not be classed as abroad.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

I would like to indicate to Deputy Esmonde that he was perfectly correct in saying at the beginning that the Comptroller and Auditor-General could not be criticised, but the Committee of Public Accounts could. The Comptroller and Auditor-General has made a report arising out of purely financial considerations. The Committee considers that report in the same way and reports to the Dáil. It is advisable that the House should consider the report of the Committee in the same manner. The Chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts said so, and the Deputy did not disagree, although I do not know whether he agrees or disagrees—that the Committee had discussed these matters in a financial and not a political sense. I think it would be advisable if the Deputy said what the Committee thought without particularising the Party to which members of the Committee belong. Otherwise we will have a discussion on the very basis which, in the view of the Chairman of the Committee, and it is my own very strong view, is not a proper basis.

Mr. ESMONDE

I only mentioned there was a certain little Party, but in fact there was more than one Party, for the Committee was unanimous on the question of London.

Mr. DAVIN

Including yourself?

Mr. ESMONDE

I know in my criticism of the Committee, and the tendency of the Committee, I am not expressing the opinions, possibly, of the majority of the members of this House. I am attempting to express what will be the opinions of the majority, or the unanimous opinions of the members of this House in four or five years time, when the present process of unnecessary interference has advanced to such a state that the Committee and the House will be obliged to make an ignominious retreat if the elementary efficiency of public departments is to be preserved. I have the utmost respect and admiration for the great work done on the Committee of Public Accounts by Deputy Johnson, who certainly succeeded in stabilising the procedure of the Committee in a very difficult time.

I cannot remember them. If you look up the files of the newspapers you will see reports of a number of speeches dealing with this matter as a Party matter during the elections, and for the purpose of denouncing the Government. You will find it particularly in the reports of the June election speeches.

MINISTER for DEFENCE (Mr. Fitzgerald)

Does Deputy Davin say it was never referred to?

Mr. DAVIN

Where did any member or ex-member of this Party or any other Party refer to this paragraph about the constitutional rights of the Comptroller and Auditor-General?

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

The question at issue in this Report is: Whether the Comptroller and Auditor-General, under the terms of the Military Pensions Act, ought to have certain documents.

Mr. DAVIN

Yes.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

And that he ought, in fact, to be furnished with them. The question as to the regularisation of that situation is raised in the last sentence.

Mr. McGILLIGAN

And that was definitely raised in political speeches.

Mr. MORRISSEY

Who started it?

Mr. McGILLIGAN

At any rate, it was done.

Mr. LITTLE

Surely speeches made outside the House should not be the concern of any Party inside the House.

Mr. DAVIN

It is a very serious statement for the Deputy to make, that ex-Deputy Johnson, who voted for the Military Service Pensions Act, ever referred to the issue raised in this paragraph of the Report in a political sense.

Mr. ESMONDE

I have a very distinct recollection that he did so, not once but several times, in the course of the June elections. Reports of the speeches were published rather in extenso in the “Irish Times.” I think also in the debates here, not many months ago, this matter was made somewhat a party issue.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

I think, not. I have read the report of that debate rather carefully.

Mr. ESMONDE

At any rate, my feelings as to the matter are expressed clearly in the Report of the Public Accounts Committee—in Section 18, subsection (3). That is the amendment I proposed to the draft Report of the Chairman. I think I am entitled to read out the reasons which led the Committee to sanction the action of the Department of Defence. The reasons were these:—

1. That, by reason of its nature, the information contained in the documents in question was of a character that rendered it undesirable in the public interest that it should be made available, either now or for many years to come, to any person whatsoever. The matters which the Board investigated were of a type bearing a strong analogy to those ordinarily the subject of secret service, the Vote for which is specifically exempt from audit by the Comptroller and Auditor-General;

2. That stringent assurances that their statements and evidence would be regarded as confidential were given by the Board to applicants and witnesses in order to enable the Board to secure the evidence necessary to arrive at its reports;

3. That, from the nature of the investigation which the Board of Assessors was called upon to make, difficult questions of fact would have arisen in the interpretation of pre-Truce military service; that only a Board of very specially qualified persons could ascertain these facts; and that accordingly its findings on such facts should not be open to review by any other authority. The Committee is further aware that the Minister for Defence had been advised by the Attorney-General that he had not legal power to demand from the Board the production of the required documents.

That is a fair account of the reasons which led the Public Accounts Committee to approve of the action of the Department of Defence. It is quite obvious that the Committee of Public Accounts has no power whatever to limit the powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. There is no authority of any kind to do such a thing. The words of the Report are somewhat vague in that respect. It states:—"It is a matter which appears to limit the powers." It does not say definitely an attempt is made to limit the powers, or that the powers have been limited, but "it appears to limit the powers." I do not believe that any of the statutory powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General are limited or attempted to be limited by the Report of the Public Accounts Committee. I do not believe that any limit has been put to the powers conferred on the Comptroller and Auditor-General by the custom and practice of the British Treasury and the working of the Acts in Great Britain. If it is found that an attempt was made to limit the statutory powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, then steps will have to be taken to deal with the matter. If, on the other hand, it only limits the customary powers granted to the Auditor-General in Great Britain. I do not see where the actual necessity for action arises. I am quite satisfied that the action of the Committee in approving of the action of the Department of Defence is in strict accord even with the traditions of the British Treasury and the British Committee of Public Accounts. A very clear precedent appears in the Report of the Public Accounts Committee of 1875, and, strangely, it deals with this country. It is a Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General on accounts dealing with the Commissioners of Church Temporalities in Ireland. Under the Irish Church Act, Commissioners have been appointed with judicial or quasi-judicial powers. A question arose as to whether their findings were to be investigated by the Comptroller and Auditor-General. The Report states:—

"It has been distinctly admitted, on the part of the Commissioners, that the Comptroller and Auditor-General has the fullest right to require vouchers of payments to be produced to him. The terms of a Minute dated 6th January, 1874, adverse to this right, have been qualified and explained in evidence and by a subsequent Minute. Nor is it disputed that it would be his duty to point out a departure from the express provisions of the Act.

"It has been not less distinctly admitted that the Comptroller and Auditor-General has no right to call in question the finality of a decision or Order of the Commissioners deliberately made in their character of judges of law and fact under the Irish Church Act. He disclaims ever having disputed such finality, and adds that he never differed from the Commissioners upon a point of law without diffidence, recognising that the functions of his Department are primarily financial. Again, the Comptroller and Auditor-General cannot claim that the Commissioners should furnish him with the reason of, or justify their judicial decisions to him; any information or explanation they may have, or may hereafter afford him, of the grounds of any such decision is a voluntary act on their part."

The opinion of the law officers of the State in this country is that the Board of Assessors is a quasi-judicial body. I think in that capacity their rights are very similar to those of the Commissioners appointed under the Irish Church Act. There is certainly one thing which the Dáil will have to decide sooner or later. When there is a conflict of opinion between the Comptroller and Auditor-General and the law advisers of the Government as to the interpretation of an Act of this Oireachtas, what authority is able to decide? That is the problem. I do not know. Certainly it is one which will have to be either explained to the House or legislated for in the House. Such conflicts have arisen in the course of examination of public accounts. At present there seems to be no machinery for co-ordinating the interpretation of an Act between these two authorities. That, I think, is a matter which the Dáil will have to consider, possibly in the near future. In conclusion, I only wish to state it is quite obvious that Treasury control is absolutely essential for the proper conduct of the Departments of State. Although I have criticised the methods of the Treasury, I fully realise that Treasury control is absolutely essential. Also I realise that Parliamentary control over expenditure is absolutely essential. The rights of the House ought to be maintained. But there is a very great difference between control and dictation. There is a great difference between control and unnecessary interference. There is a just medium in these matters, and as yet, I will admit, I am of opinion that the balance has not yet been reached. I think the present tendency which is visible in the public accounts, if continued, will result in a considerable weakening of the efficiency of the Departments of State.

AN LEAS-CHEANN COMHAIRLE

took the Chair.

Mr. LITTLE

On a point of order, I ask a question. Can it be considered a breach of the Standing Orders of this House to quote the report of a Committee of this House on a public platform outside?

I also think that Deputy Davin's suggestion that the Act should be amended so as to remove all doubts as to the conditions under which a loan could be guaranteed is a wise one. I understand that the Minister claims that his action in connection with the three firms that came within its terms by process of reconstruction was perfectly legal, and that he has legal opinion to that effect. The Committee of Public Accounts apparently has a different opinion, and it would be in the public interest that any doubts in the matter should be removed. As the amending Bill will be introduced in the course of a month or so, the occasion should be availed of to define the term "capital expenditure" in such a manner as to cover the action that the Minister has already taken, and to permit him without any doubt as to his legality, to take similar action in the future.

I think that that is all I have to say in connection with this Report, but I do hope that we will have full statements from the Minister for Defence, the Minister for Industry and Commerce, and the Minister for Finance concerning the different matters that are raised here, because I think it is undesirable that important issues like those raised in this Report should be treated in the flippant manner in which Deputy Esmonde has thought fit to treat them. They are matters that do concern the welfare of the public and the authority of the Dáil over all matters concerning public finance, and definite statements in the Report of the Committee should be treated in a definite manner by Ministers, and their attitude in relation to them clearly and definitely defined.

Major COOPER

This Report can be looked at from many points of view. Deputy Lemass apparently looks upon it as a hat-peg, upon which he can hang speeches which may be and certainly are made on the Estimates, and which can be made on the Bill which the Minister for Industry and Commerce is to introduce. But Deputy Esmonde is more serious; Deputy Esmonde looks upon this Report as a thorn in the flesh, a dangerous symptom. I hope that Deputy Esmonde feels better, now that he has delivered himself. Evidently for four years, during three of which I have been a colleague of his on the Committee of Public Accounts, he has been nourishing his sorrow in secret, and it has grown, grown, grown. I hope now, in the terms of the psycho-analysts, that he has liberated his complex and that he feels happy. Of course I knew that Deputy Esmonde was not satisfied with all that we did. He moved occasional amendments to the Report. An historical one was about London, when he wanted to substitute "abroad" for "London." I was enthusiastically in favour of "London" for the simple reason that I believe in giving the Dáil the most detailed information possible whenever I can do so without using too many words, and I do think that members of the Dáil and members of the Committee who have not had a university education are aware that London is not in the Saorstát. I would have gone further if necessary and would have referred to Oxford; I would have preferred Oxford as against London, because Oxford is not in the Saorstát either. I think the real reason for Deputy Esmonde's feelings is one of disappointment. Deputy Esmonde spoke of the Committee of Public Accounts as a tribunal—that it should be a tribunal to settle contentions between the Department of Finance and the other Government Departments. I sympathise with Deputy Esmonde's disappointment. He thought that the Committee would be nothing but a prize fight, but instead of that he found that it was more like a mother's meeting. The position of a man who thinks he is going to referee at a prize fight and then finds himself thrown into the middle of a very harmonious discussion, with very little contention at all, is a position of acute disappointment. But the function of the Committee is not to act as a tribunal to settle disputes between the Department of Finance and other Departments; its function is to see that money voted by this Dáil is expended for the purpose for which it was voted. In doing so it has to realise that to some extent the Department of Finance is a permanent body.

The Committee changes its composition from year to year, and it changes as the result of elections; the Department of Finance will go on; it will have an assured practice and a definite mode of dealing with questions. There will be contention in the Committee between the Comptroller and Auditor-General and Government departments, including the Department of Finance, and we have always found—I speak with three years' experience—that there are two view-points. The Comptroller and Auditor-General says: "In my opinion this is illegal," and the Department concerned immediately comes up and says: "The Attorney-General says it is legal." Then Deputy Esmonde asks in a very pertinent sentence: "Who is to decide?" I can tell him at once that neither the Committee nor the Dáil can decide. Our function is not to interpret the law, but to make it. The Comptroller and Auditor-General cannot give a final decision; the Attorney-General cannot give a final decision. Obviously the only body who can possibly give a final decision, if the issue is sufficiently serious to make a decision absolutely essential, is the courts. The only body that has the function of interpreting the law is the courts, and if the matter is of sufficient importance it must be taken to the courts. Certainly neither the Committee nor the Dáil are in a position to decide between these two contentions. Deputy Esmonde made the statement that the Committee challenged decisions of the courts.

Mr. ESMONDE

That they discussed them.

Major COOPER

That they discussed them, and that was misleading. I asked Deputy Esmonde for an instance and he gave me one. You would infer from that that the Committee had said something about decisions of the courts in their Report. That is the inference. There is not a word in the Report. I spent some time hunting in the Report for the reference. What happened was this. It was a case of property losses compensation. We did not discuss the decision of the courts, but what we did discuss was whether the Department concerned in defending the claim had brought the case properly before the courts and had the necessary knowledge that it had brought the case properly before the courts. There was some doubt about it. Question No. 251, put by the Chairman, is as follows:—

It is a case, I think, where the Comptroller and Auditor-General should refer again to the files to satisfy himself that the State Department did exercise due care in obtaining knowledge and in the presentation of the case to the court.

I do not think we exceeded our duties in that respect at all, and the State Department concerned was that very Department of Finance which Deputy Esmonde says we are too subservient to.

The functions of the Comptroller and Auditor-General were discussed at length by Deputy Esmonde. It was remarkable that when he read the Comptroller and Auditor-General Act. 1923 that he did not read the whole of Section 7:—

(1) It shall be the duty of the Comptroller and Auditor-General to control all disbursements and to audit all accounts of moneys administered by or under the authority of the Oireachtas at such times and in such manner as shall from time to time be prescribed by law.

(2) It shall also be the duty of the Comptroller and Auditor-General to report to Dáil Eireann on such matters and at such periods and times as shall from time to time be prescribed by law or required by resolution of Dáil Eireann.

(3) Unless and until it shall be otherwise provided by the Oireachtas, the Comptroller and Auditor-General shall have and exercise all such powers and perform all such duties as are prescribed by this Act or are conferred or imposed on him by any Act of the Parliament of the late United Kingdom...

This Act which is the latest Act and which is our own Act quite definitely prescribes that it is his duty to control all disbursements and audit all accounts. I think that obviously when you say to a man it is your duty to do this, and say that without exception, you do confer on the Comptroller and Auditor-General the duty of examining every account. It has been questioned whether it was wise and whether he acted wisely. I think he acted fully within his powers in every case.

There is one specific matter arising on the Report that I would like to refer to and that Deputy Davin did not refer to. That is the matter of an honorarium paid to the Chairman of a Temporary Commission and paid without the knowledge of the Oireachtas. I hope when the Minister for Finance replies he will assure us that that is a precedent he will not follow. I do not dispute the fact that the gentleman who received the honorarium performed most valuable work and rendered very useful service and probably he was well deserving of it. But a substantial payment of this character should not be made without the matter being brought to the notice of the Dáil, because it obviously opens the door to abuses. Suppose, for instance, that the Minister for Finance says that Deputy Davin, as Chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts, is deserving of an honorarium.

Mr. CORISH

He will not do that.

Major COOPER

I hope I am not raising false hopes.

Mr. DAVIN

Probably it might be as well if the Deputy included Deputy Ryan's name in this with my name.

Major COOPER

I will certainly include Deputy Ryan's name, but I do not know that it will make the parallel more convincing. Let us suppose that subsequent to the receipt of the honorarium Deputy Davin went into the Government Lobby—I cannot conceive Deputy Ryan doing that—there would be a certain atmosphere of suspicion if it was found that a substantial sum of money had been paid to a Deputy and subsequently that Deputy happened to support the Government, even though he did it with the best motives in the world. That is why I think it is undesirable to have large sums of money paid to individuals, even outside the Dáil, without it being clearly brought to the notice of the Dáil that the money was being voted and expended.

As regards Army pensions, I concur with the report. I take a rather different view to that taken by Deputy Davin. Deputy Davin is of opinion that these papers should be made available. I personally think they could not be made available without grievous injury to individuals. If they are made available to the Comptroller and Auditor-General he must be at liberty to publish some comment on them; otherwise there is no use in having them. He must be at liberty to report on them.

These papers—I have not seen very many of them—are concerned not merely with the applicants, but with statements of individuals quoted by the applicants, and referees quoted by the applicants, to whom the Board of Assessors applied for information, and who gave that information under a pledge of secrecy. They gave the information under a pledge that the evidence would not be published. The Board may not have right or power to give that pledge, but at the same time it was given, and if those papers are now published it will make it much harder for a Government Department to obtain information in future, especially having given an undertaking that it would be secret and now being obliged to disregard that undertaking. In future it could be said, "I gave you evidence in confidence and it was published." That is a very strong objection to the publication of these papers. All this matter should have been foreseen when the Act was passed, and it should have been definitely stated in the Act that application forms and evidence shall not be submitted. Of course, all the claims are properly vouched. The Comptroller and Auditor-General knows who is getting the money. The only thing is the original application is not available. nor is the evidence on which the pension was granted. I think it should be regularised now either by resolution or by an amending Bill. For that reason I concur with the Report. The present arrangement is not one that you could continue. It is extremely bad, and I think the Minister for Finance ought seriously to consider this matter. We have heard a quotation from the Minister for Industry and Commerce about red tape. Deputy Davin quoted the Minister. I find the Minister on Thursday of last week said:

If the Public Accounts Committee is to insist rigidly on certain things being observed, the more insistent they are on a rigid observance of rules the more red tape there is going to be, the more minuting there is going to be from one civil servant to another, and the more delay there is going to be. The House has it in its own hands to relax all that and to institute another system.

I hope the House will not relax all that and institute another system. Red tape properly used is a very useful thing. If you have matters to deal with and you have no red tape, and no method of segregating one type of document from another, there would be a much worse system in vogue. I firmly believe that the machinery of the Public Accounts Committee and of the Comptroller and Auditor-General are valuable elements in the State. It is not, perhaps, for a member of the Committee to boost up that Committee, but I hope this debate will not pass by without some reference being made to the Chairman of the Committee in former years, Mr. Johnson, who did a very great deal of work on that Committee, work along the right lines, in spite of what Deputy Esmonde has said.

The Committee serves not only to ventilate things, but it has been a very powerful lever in the direction of economy. If anybody reads the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of three or four years ago on the Army Estimates and compares it with the current report he will realise the improvement made. The bulk of the credit is due to the Army Finance Office, no doubt, but I cannot help thinking that the Committee was a useful weapon for the Army Finance Office to have at their back. They are in the position to say: "I could not get that passed by the Committee of Public Accounts," or, "The Comptroller and Auditor-General will not receive it." That is to my mind a most valuable function in the State. I believe it is being exercised cleanly and decently, and most certainly after three years' experience I must say the work has been carried out with an entire absence of Party spirit on the part of the Committee members. There was one occasion when during the heat of an election the Chairman used certain remarks. They were to be regretted, and they are only to be accounted for by the heat of an election. The work has been, on the whole, conducted free from any Party spirit, and that freedom, I am happy to say, continues to the present day.

Mr. BLYTHE

Deputy Davin and, I think, Deputy Cooper suggested that I should give verbally the substance of the Minute that is normally prepared in the Department of Finance on the Report of the Public Accounts Committee. I am not in a position to do that. This Report was signed at what was the busiest period of the year for me personally and for my Department. I have been unable to give any consideration to the Report up to the present, and I can only try to have the minutes supplied as early as possible, and if further discussion is necessary an opportunity can be given. There are one or two questions to which Deputy Davin refers, and which I would like to deal with. He referred to the question of certain officials who have been guilty of defalcations in the Post Office and who have not been prosecuted. The Executive Council agreed with me that no money lost through defalcation, through default, should be written off without a prosecution, but the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs at that time was not a member of the Executive Council, and there was no means of getting him to accept the view of the Executive Council, and consequently we were only able to deal with the matter by disallowing it, or by refusing to write it off and having the matter dealt with and commented on by the Public Accounts Committee.

Coming to paragraph 42, I do not know how many Deputies who have commented from time to time on the refusal to submit the papers of the Board of Assessors to the Comptroller and Auditor-General have read the Military Service Pensions Act of 1924, because it seems to me to be perfectly clear from that Act that the Comptroller and Auditor-General is not entitled to receive the papers. The Act sets up such procedure in relation to these pensions, and it removes from the Minister discretion that either the Minister for Finance or the Minister of the particular Department concerned would normally have in regard to pensions. I will take up the time of the Dáil for a moment or two in reading some of the passages of the Act. Section 2, sub-section (1) of the Act states, that persons to whom this Act applies may apply to the Minister and the Minister may grant to him a certificate of military service. Sub-section (2) of Section 2 says: "The Minister shall refer every such application for a certificate of military service to a Board of Assessors appointed under this Act to hear all such applications and shall, before granting any such certificate, take into consideration the report made by the Board of Assessors, and subject to the provisions of this Act shall grant or refuse a certificate of military service in accordance with such report." That is, in the normal case the Minister has no discretion whatever in regard, to the issuing of a certificate of military service. The Minister is bound by the report of the Board of Assessors. He is not entitled to query their findings; he is not entitled to have the information or the evidence which that Board of Assessors had before them.

Mr. DAVIN

Will the Minister say then what is the meaning of the words, "shall grant or refuse a certificate of military service"?

Mr. BLYTHE

The words, "shall grant or refuse a certificate of military service in accordance with the report" are the words of the section. If the report says that there has been military service the Minister must grant the certificate. If the report says that there has not been military service he must refuse the certificate. He has no discretion. Section 3 of this Act says: "A Board of Assessors... shall be constituted under this Act and shall consist of three members who shall be appointed by the Minister with the approval of the Executive Council, and one of whom shall be a person who at the date of his appointment is a Judge of the Supreme Court, High Court. Circuit Court, or District Court of Saorstát Eireann, or is a practising barrister of not less than ten years' standing." That section indicates plainly that it was intended that the Board should have something of a judicial character, and in point of fact there was appointed as Chairman of that Board a District Justice who holds office from which he cannot, practically speaking, be dismissed, and who is not subject to the control of the Executive Council in any way.

Mr. AIKEN

Does the Minister say that the present Chairman is a District Justice?

Mr. BLYTHE

There is no Chairman at all.

Mr. AIKEN

No Chairman?

Mr. BLYTHE

Mr. SMITH

There is none of it left.

Mr. BLYTHE

The Deputy is too deep a lawyer for me. Now, with reference to Deputy Esmonde's remarks, I feel the work of the Public Accounts Committee has been most valuable work, and I think the present state of administrative efficiency could not possibly have been reached without the work of the Public Accounts Committee, and that the service which the Department of Finance is able to render would be very ineffective if there were not a Court of Appeal which exists in the Public Accounts Committee. On the other hand, I am inclined to think that the Public Accounts Committee here has tended towards increasing the rigidity of the system which we took over from Great Britain. I am not sure that it is desirable that there should be greater rigidity here than in Great Britain. Experience will show us, and, of course, if we have been making matters too rigid it will be possible —the Public Accounts Committee is not bound by its own precedents—for the Public Accounts Committee this year or next year to reconsider matters. Possibly it was the fact that at the moment that the Public Accounts Committee began to function there was a rather unsatisfactory position arising out of the civil war and the start of government here that caused the Committee to be stricter than, as far as I can ascertain, the Public Accounts Committee in Great Britain is. What is called red tape is, I believe, inevitable in Government administration. In accountancy, in Government departments, there must be greater strictness and more careful checking than is normal in business concerns. The directors of a business are regarded as practically dealing with their own money, and they can have decisions taken, and expenditure incurred with an informality that, I think, is impossible for Government departments dealing with public money.

Our system of accounting and reporting to the Dáil by means of the Public Accounts Committee also increases the care that must be taken. The accounting officer who is responsible for the expenditure of huge sums of money is very liable to have himself condemned and surcharged 6/8, and held up to odium in the newspapers as a result of the investigations of the Comptroller and Auditor-General and the Public Accounts Committee. The managing director of a big business outside is not in any danger, if it happens that 6/8 has gone wrong, of seeing himself figuring in a headline in the newspapers.

On the other hand, I see no way out of the strict accountancy and of the procedure that we have adopted. If we loosen that in any way I believe great evils would speedily creep in. I have heard it suggested, from time to time, that in certain Departments there need not be such careful checking and counter-checking of accounts and claims as is the present practice. People have told me of cases where it cost £100 to trace a difference of three half pence in accounts. That may have happened, but if we were to allow the accounting officer any margin which might be set against small losses I am afraid great evils might grow up, although from the point of view of economy I have once or twice had discussions in regard to the possibility of spending less time on minute and detailed checking and counter-checking of accounts, and of having less of the business of applying for sanction, and justifying expenditure in advance, to the Department of Finance, as is the practice at the present time. I have always, as a result of such discussion, been driven back to the conclusion that this financial system which we have taken over from Great Britain, built up there as a result of long experience, and which gives them a very sound and efficient administration, is one that we cannot with advantage substantially alter or modify.

It might be that in certain details we could do away with a degree of red tape, but if Deputies themselves think of the losses of money that undoubtedly did occur in connection with Army administration in 1922 and 1923, when there was no red tape, they will, I think, be driven to the conclusion that whatever is the objection to red tape it is a thing we must bear the expense of, and the inconvenience of, to avoid greater evils and greater losses than are now incurred.

Mr. DERRIG

I would like to ask the Minister a question. It seems to me that there is a great deal in what he says with regard to the attitude of the Public Accounts Committee. He stated in his Budget speech, as well as on this occasion, that he does not quite know where he stands with regard to the system taken over from the British Government. I suggest to him that a great deal of the difficulty which has arisen, in connection with the Public Accounts Committee, is due to the fact that the accounts are not presented in as simple a way as the Public Accounts Committee would wish and, certainly not in quite as simple a way as the man in the street could easily follow. That might be done without any great revision of the system of accountancy if the sub-heads, particularly with regard to salaries and allowances, could be set out in a more distinct manner so that the different branches of the service in the different Departments, as, for instance, the Army, could be distinguished from one another, and so that on an easy survey of the face of the Estimates you could find the total cost on every head of expenditure. There is also the question of superannuation. Superannuation allowances could be shown on each Vote. Superannuation at present is bulked together. An official goes out on pension and the Superannuation Vote is made responsible. That creates a vacancy and the Public Accounts Committee are more or less led to believe that there is a saving effected on that account. The word "saving" occurs in a great many cases throughout the Appropriation Accounts which the Committee examine, but that saving does not really represent a saving as compared with the expenditure for the previous year.

That is quite satisfactory so far as I am concerned. With regard to the Trade Loans guarantees, there is a difference of opinion not only among the members of the Committee of Public Accounts but those who are not members. We got general agreement for the purpose of this Report from the Committee. I may say that I, for one, am at complete variance with the outlook of the Minister for Industry and Commerce on this matter. When the State guarantees a loan which it did not advance in the first instance. I consider that a contingent liability, and it is a liability which the State may be called upon to pay at any time, or a portion of it. Therefore, the State should see that that liability should be kept at all times before the Departments concerned, particularly in connection with any changes that affect the assets upon which the State has a lien as a result of its guarantee. It would appear from the action of the Minister for Industry and Commerce that that is not his view, because in one particular case to which reference is made the loan was guaranteed, and in exchange for the guarantee given by the State the State became in a sense the mortgagees of certain assets. Rightly or wrongly, I am not disputing the point that when the necessity arose something had to be done, but on the loan being granted and subsequent to the formalities being gone through whereby the State had a lien on certain assets, the company in question again found itself in need of financial assistance. I am not quarrelling with help- ing the company to carry on, but the method adopted to enable it to do so. The State in this case receded from its position on the lien. It had to weaken its position with regard to the lien to enable that concern to borrow fresh money from outside sources, and to enable it to give as a security the property or asset on which the State released its hold.

If the Minister thought it necessary —I am not saying it is wrong to help these people—to get further money, and if we had to take a lien on an asset in exchange for a guarantee which we extended, and if we found afterwards that we were faced with the position. that the concern assisted had to get further money to carry on, it would be far better to bring the matter before the Dáil and get an increased loan if necessary, and to hold our lien on the asset as before. If this particular arrangement were allowed to go on it would be quite possible, where the State had a lien on assets and where there was a recurrence of such cases, that subsequently the State would find itself without any lien on any property which it originally held, and find itself called upon to pay the guarantee in full, without any hope of recovering the money from the lien on the assets which it held. The underlying principle of these loans, which I can understand and with which I am quite in sympathy, is the promotion of industries to give employment.

Mr. DAVIN

New employment?

Mr. McGILLIGAN

Any employment.

Mr. BRISCOE

Mr. BRISCOE

I do not believe that any member of the I.R.A. in pre-Truce days, who served as a volunteer, as he was at that time, and who is entitled to a pension, will object very much to having his identity made absolutely known, if his services are questioned. If the Act means that a person is entitled to a pension on the grounds that he was a member of the I.R.A. in pre-Truce days and subsequently a member of the Army, where does the argument of the Minister come in, that the making known of a man's identity, his unit, the rank he held and his present address, is going to create disturbance and to bring about violence? There are many members of this House who were members of the I.R.A. and it is quite certain no one is going to do them violence because they were members of the I.R.A. If the Minister said that there were other reasons, and that there are men benefiting under the Act who were not actually recognised as members of a unit who had service which could be classed as good as that of an active member, there would be an argument for that, and we should probably meet that argument. I am not satisfied, and I do not believe any members of the House can be satisfied, that when it is stated the only people who benefit under the Act are those who had I.R.A. service in pre-Truce days and National Army service subsequently, there is any reason why there should be secrecy about the identity of these men, the period of their service, details of the units to which they belonged, and the areas to which they belonged.

I am referring to that and to other matters. Everything that was reported on by the Public Accounts Committee was again brought before the Public Accounts Committee in this year. They expressed their opinion in a particular way; they reported their opinion to this House as to how the Act was carried out. I say that if the Act is given to me, when it comes up for amendment, in the form in which I introduced it, I will continue to interpret it as before. It will be for Deputies who are on the Public Accounts Committee to justify the opinion that they have set their hands to in this Report by moving amendments to change it. I hold that I am acting quite legally, and I am fortified by legal opinion in saying that. I am fortified by the opinion of the Advisory Committee with regard to the business side of all that I have done, and I do not intend to change it. That is the situation with regard to the Trade Loans Act.

Mr. DAVIN

And the Minister intends to oppose amendments for any changes?

Mr. McGILLIGAN

No, amendments can be discussed. In 1926 I said that if amendments were brought in they would be left to an open vote. On the amendment moved by Deputy Johnson to the Money Resolution, I think it was stated that it would be left to an open vote. A division was not challenged; apparently the House was satisfied. I do think that the Committee, in reporting on this matter, might have taken into consideration what had happened when these criticisms were previously made. I said that they were their criticisms; that I did not admit that they were proper criticisms, and that my conduct had been beyond criticism.

Mr. COONEY

Would I be in order in asking the Minister a question?

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

No.

Mr. DAVIN

On the one point raised in paragraph 42 I deliberately refrained from expressing my own opinion or the opinion of the Committee as to whether or not it was desirable to disclose certain information given in evidence in support of certain applicants for military service pensions. I agree with Deputy Cooper that it would be very undesirable indeed in the interests of applicants in from 20 to 30 cases to make public the information which these individuals gave in support of their applications for pensions. The whole point at issue in the matter raised by the Committee is whether the moneys voted by this House for the payment of pensions under the Military Service Pensions Act should be treated in reality as a Secret Service Vote. I am satisfied so far as the Minister for Finance has gone with his statement, which means that there is doubt and reason and justification for the doubt raised in the Report of the Public Accounts Committee. And to that extent he intends and promises to introduce amending legislation to remove that doubt. On that and other points raised in the discussion I am satisfied to leave the matter where it is now, realising that all the points raised in the Public Accounts Committee's Report must be dealt with in due time by the Department of Finance, for the Department must make a minute which will come before the Public Accounts Committee in due course and on that minute we will have another opportunity of dealing with these matters on the merits of the minutes sent to the Committee by the Minister. With the leave of the House I beg to withdraw the motion which is down in my name.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Dáil Éireann díospóireacht - Friday, 25 May 1928

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS.

Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Friday, 25 May 1928