Supplementary and Additional Estimates. - Vote 65—Army. – Dáil Éireann (10th Dáil) – Tuesday, 5 Mar 1940

Supplementary and Additional Estimates. - Vote 65—Army.

Minister for Defence (Mr. Traynor)

I move:—

Go ndeontar suim Bhreise ná raghaidh thar £10 chun íoctha an Mhuirir a thiocfaidh chun bheith iníoctha i rith na bliana dar críoch an 31adh lá de Mhárta, 1940, chun an Airm agus Cúltaca an Airm (maraon le Deontaisí áirithe i gCabhair) fé sna hAchtanna Fórsaí Cosanta (Forálacha Sealadacha), agus chun Costaisí áirithe riaracháin ina dtaobh san; chun costaisí Oifig an Aire Coimhriartha Cosantais; chun Costaisí áirithe fé sna hAchtanna um Chiontaí in aghaidh an Stáit, 1939 agus 1940, agus fén Acht um Réamhchúram in aghaidh AerRuathar, 1939; agus chun Deontas-igCabhair fén Acht Croise Deirge, 1938.

That a Supplementary sum not exceeding £10 be granted to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending 31st March, 1940, for the Army and the Army Reserve (including certain Grants-in-aid) under the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts, and for certain administrative Expenses in connection therewith; for the Expenses of the Office of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures; for certain Expenses under the Offences against the State Acts, 1939 and 1940, and the Air-raid Precautions Act, 1939; and for a Grant-in-Aid under the Red Cross Act, 1938.

The Supplementary Estimate for the Army Vote, 1939-40, is necessitated by certain factors which have arisen since the presentation of the annual Estimate for 1939-40 to the Dáil. The first and principal factor is the mobilisation of the Reserve and Volunteer forces following on the proclamation of a state of emergency last September, and the retention of a considerable portion of those forces in permanent service. The additional cost of that mobilisation and retention in permanent service is distributed over some 23 sub-heads of the present Estimate, but the total cost is approximately £499,397, made up as follows:—

(1) Pay, allowances, maintenance and conveyance Army personnel	£465,517
(2) Pay of civilians	16,562
(3) Miscellaneous expenses	17,318
Total:	£499,397

The second factor causing this Estimate is the purchase of mechanical transport vehicles for the Army, and the necessity of laying in reserve stocks of certain commodities such as fuel, medicines, defence stores, etc., vital for the maintenance of the Army. The additional cost of the transport vehicles was £120,056. The cost of reserve stocks, such as defence stores, etc., was approximately £159,000.

The third factor is constituted by what for Estimate purposes are considered "new services", in that the services are either completely new, or revive old services which had lapsed, or expand services already existing. In that sense, no less than five new services are covered by the present Estimate.

The first and completely new service is a Grant-in-Aid of £1,000 to the Irish Red Cross Society. The Dáil will remember that under Section 2 of the Red Cross Act, 1938, the Minister for Finance may, out of moneys provided by the Oireachtas, afford assistance to the society by way of grant or loan on such terms and conditions as he shall think proper. Following on that enactment a Grant-in-Aid of £1,000 was made to the society to enable it to begin its activities, and the Dáil is now asked to give its covering authority for that grant.

The second and completely new service is the provision of grants to local authorities for works carried out in respect of air raid precautions. In a White Paper laid before the Dáil 12 months ago, it was stated that the Government would undertake responsibility for paying, at the cost of the Exchequer, grants to local authorities amounting to a certain percentage of their expenditure on approved schemes. That promise was implemented when the Oireachtas passed the Air Raid Precautions Act on the 26th July, 1939. Under that Act certain schemes throughout the country have either been approved or are under investigation, and it is estimated that the cost of such schemes to the Exchequer during the present financial year will amount to about £60,000 and that sum, accordingly, has been provided for in the present Estimate.

In the same White Paper was indicated the Government's intention to set up a coast watching service and a coast patrol service. The officers and men required for the coast watching service have been found from the personnel of the Army and the service has been functioning for some time past. The coast patrol service is now being organised and the Dáil in this Estimate is being asked to approve of that service under the title "marine coast watching service". The service, when established, will comprise four patrol vessels or trawlers and six torpedo boats, and in this Supplementary Estimate provision is being made for two of the four patrol vessels and three of the six torpedo boats. One of the patrol vessels has been transferred from another Department, a second has been purchased, and negotiations are in progress for the purchase of the remaining two. As regards the torpedo boats, orders have been placed for six, one of which has been delivered, and five of which are under construction.

The total cost of the four trawlers and the six torpedo boats will be approximately £269,822, and of that sum £110,000 is being borne on this Supplementary Estimate, leaving a balance of £159,822 to be borne on the annual Estimate for 1940. In addition, the maintenance of the boats and their stores will cost during this year £4,000.

Each patrol vessel will have a complement of about three officers and 20 men, and each torpedo boat, two officers and eight men. The present Estimate provides for crews for two patrol vessels and three torpedo boats, and their cost in pay and maintenance up to the end of March will be about £4,902.

The fourth new service covered by this Supplementary Estimate is made necessary by the passing of the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939 and 1940, and the sum of £5,000 will, it is estimated, cover expenses in connection therewith during the present financial year.

The final new service covered by this Estimate is the co-ordination of defensive measures, and the sum of £7,056 provided covers both the office of the Minister for Co-ordination and the censorship service controlled by the Minister.

The censorship was established at the beginning of September on the outbreak of the European War as one of the measures which, in the Government's view, it was necessary to take at once in the interests of national defence and public safety. The authority for the censorship is, of course, the Emergency Powers Act, 1939, and the Emergency Orders which have been brought into operation with the approval of the Dáil.

The censorship has been organised in three executive divisions to deal with postal, telegraph and press censorship respectively. The whole organisation is under the direction of a controller who is responsible to the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures in matters of policy.

In the case of the postal and Press censorship, it has been found possible to centralise the staffs in Dublin, but for telegraph censorship it has been necessary to instal small technical staffs at points where messages are received and dispatched. The bulk of the staff employed is engaged on postal censorship, where large numbers are required, and the staffs of the telegraph and Press censorships are relatively small and would be even smaller were it not for the fact that in these two branches relays of staffs have had to be provided to cover the longer hours of working.

The entire personnel for all branches of the censorship service has been recruited from the Civil Service. In the majority of cases officers have been loaned without replacement from other Departments whose normal activities have had to be curtailed in the present situation.

Summarising what has been said, it will be seen that the three factors which have emerged since the presentation to the Dáil of the annual estimate for 1939 will cost £970,411, made up as follows:—

			£
(1) Mobilisation and Retention of Reserve and Volunteer Forces		499,397
(2) Special Capital Expenditure and Reserve Stocks		279,056
(3) New Services—	£
(a) Irish Red Cross Society	1,000
(b) A.R.P Grants	60,000
(c) Marine Coast Watching Service	118,902
(d) Offences against the State Acts	5,000
(e) Ministry of Coordination	7056		191,958
Total			£970,411

Against that gross sum of £970,411, there is a set-off by way of technical savings on the annual estimate of £970,401, leaving a net token sum to be voted of £10. These technical savings have accured, because certain items of special capital expenditure provided for in the annual estimate have not been delivered during the financial year. In the White Paper already referred to, it was stated that the sum of £1,368,685 was being borne on the annual estimate for 1939 in respect of capital stores, but the Dáil was warned that although no time had been lost in placing orders for the materials required, the delivery of such was a matter beyond our control. The possibility then visualised has unfortunately materialised, and we have not been able to get delivery of many of the stores ordered. That is the main reason why we are not asking for a gross vote of £970,411, but simply a token vote of £10.

Professor O'Sullivan

I must say that I cannot consider the statement read by the Minister an explanation of the expenditure of £900,000. We had from the Minister a statement of how this sum of practically £1,000,000 is made up, but there was no explanation and no justification for undertaking the expense. He segregated it out quite distinctly. For that we are thankful. It saved us a certain amount of arithmetical trouble so far as we ourselves are concerned, but he gave no indication as to how the money now asked for in these various services, old and new, will be of any service to this country. He comes in, in a way that is now unfortunately becoming a habit with the members of the Government, with a bald statement of the money that they need, but if you ask why the answer is "We will not give you any information". On this Vote we have not yet had the opportunity of asking why, but in the statement we have heard there is no information and no justification given of the various heads either in connection with the old or the new services. Consequently before a Vote of this kind can be passed, before, I suggest, the debate can come to an end, we will require a justification from the Minister of the expenditure under the various headings. On this matter we have, especially since September onwards, pressed very seriously on the Government to give us information which would enable us to form some kind of a judgment as to whether the increased expenditure, in the present economic and financial position of the country, is justified.

Now, Sir, you have listened to the statement by the Minister from start to finish, and not one word was in palliation of this expenditure of close on £1,000,000. Apparently, the justification is that the Minister, having "saved" £1,000,000 elsewhere, he might as well spend it. He has saved £1,000,000, because on the last occasion he estimated he could spend £1,000,000 on stores. The question was put to him then where he would get the stores: the question was put to him the other day how we would get these stores, and the only attempt to deal with these questions is that his hopes were unfortunately not borne out. He was not able to get them. Is he in any better position to-day to get them? He saves £1,000,000 because he is not able to spend it, but he will admit, I am sure, that having an Army without ammunition is not a very effective piece of defence policy in modern times. But he was not able to spend that money to buy stores. The question was put to him last week, I think it was, whether he could get these stores. He said he could, but he refused to say how. Again, if I may point out to you, that is a habit that is becoming almost endemic with the Government, namely, a refusal to give any information to the country or to the House. There is no reason why the Government should adopt such a policy—a blank refusal to give information.

The first thing that will strike the House as strange is to find one Minister answering for another—I mean it would be strange, if anything could be strange in the administration that we are discussing at the present moment. The Minister for Defence and the ex-Minister for Defence march in here, and you never know which of them is going to answer. In fact, neither of them answers. I thought that the Minister, who was responsible for the other Minister, so far as this Estimate is concerned, that he at least would attempt to give a justification for the other Minister's existence—I mean his Ministerial existence. What does the Minister for Co-ordination do? He controls an executive officer who is also his private secretary, and a typist. Is that serious? The censorship could have been quite as well controlled by other Ministers—by the Minister for Defence. I doubt if his duties are so heavy that he could not have undertaken the censorship as a portion of his work—he and the Minister for Justice. Or is it that it is necessary for the Minister for Co-ordination to keep peace between the Minister for Defence and the Minister for Justice. What does he co-ordinate? The three torpedo boats and the land Army? Now, we have been asking for information about this particular service for quite a while, and here we have an Estimate coming before the House for the first time, with no justification whatsoever for the existence of that Minister. What does the Minister for Co-ordination do except give his moral support to his successor in an Army debate? What work has he?

General MacEoin

To co-ordinate.

Professor O'Sullivan

Not to co-ordinate the old Army and a new Navy, the old Army and the new Volunteers; such co-ordination is the responsibility of the Minister for Defence—and we have grave doubts how some of it is done. What does he then co-ordinate? What are his functions? Why is there a salary of £1,700 a year paid to a Minister whose functions and whose duties have never been explained to this House? Will the Minister adopt the usual procedure and refuse to give the information? Is the work of his colleague, the Minister for Co-ordination, so important and so vital to the nation that what he does cannot be disclosed? Is he like Providence? Does he work in secret, and are all his good deeds done in secret? Must the country be kept ignorant of the immense services that he is rendering to the country at the present moment? What is his relation to the Minister who now answers for his salary, the Minister for Defence? Is he his colleague, or is he subordinate to him? I presume that the person who has to justify his existence and his policy is not the Minister himself but the Minister for Defence who answers for this Vote.

But that is a minor point. The real point, so far as the Minister and his salary are concerned, is that we have never heard a single word of justification for the creation of this position— unless he is the Minister without portfolio. Is this the portfolio or not? It is within the power of the Cabinet, I understand, to transfer from one Minister to another various functions and duties. What functions and duties have been transferred to the present Minister for Co-ordination? Practically half the sum asked for here is due to the mobilisation. The Minister will remember that this side of the House always has questioned what was done then. We questioned it last September, we questioned it last January, and we question it now. What was the value of the mobilisation at a time when the country was faced with the most serious financial and economic crisis, outlined, not merely by people on these benches, but by members of the Government on the opposite benches?

Let the Minister read the statement of his colleague, the ex-Minister for Finance, on the occasion of the last Budget. Let him read the gloomy picture of his colleague, the present Minister for Finance, in the Supplementary Budget which was introduced before the end of last year; and then let him try to justify, if he can, this expenditure of money. Again and again, we have asked him and members of the Government what they expected to gain, what they had in view, in calling up an extra number of people to the colours. What precise trouble did they foresee? How did they prove, or show—or attempt to show—that an increase in the personnel of the Army put this country in a better state of defence? Did it? Is a mere increase in numbers of that kind a guarantee or a proof that we are in a better state of defence, especially when £1,000,000 is to be spent on stores which cannot be got? The Minister may say he was hopeful about stores last September: I presume he is still hopeful. The fact remains that the Government never have put up a case to show what events they had in view facing the Army—the regular Army, plus the reserves and the Volunteers—which it would not be possible for the small regular Army to deal with effectively. Again and again, we have urged that question from these benches, but without getting any answer.

Is this expenditure for the purpose of preserving our neutrality, or for the purpose of the effective preservation of our independence, if it were threatened seriously by either of the two big sides at present engaged in the war? The Government has never shown in either of those two contingencies that the measures they have taken will increase our effectiveness in the slightest. The Minister knows that if it suited one of the belligerents at the present moment to land an army in this country—and if they were able to do it—the addition to the Army would not be able to combat them. Now, the inability of one belligerent to land is not due to any measures the Government has taken: it is due to the interest that the other belligerent has to prevent an invasion of this country. He is not doing it for our sake, nor for his own. The only excuse I have ever seen that the Government could give for this increased expenditure is the existence of the European crisis. They wished to offer some pledge that they were doing something, and the first thing that came into their heads—without any consideration or counting of the costwas to summon up a number of men.

As an instance of the lack of information in the Minister's statement, let me point out that he spoke of the mobilisation and said that, where men were called up to the colours, some of them—I think I am not misinterpreting him—were retained for permanent service. I gathered from that that a number must have had their services dispensed with. To what extent has that happened, and in what way has the situation changed now compared with last September? Certainly, it is hard to draw any clear conclusion from the Minister's statement, but if there has been a diminution in the number of people with the colours and if he uses the phrase: "Some of them are being retained for permanent service", I gather from that that a certain number must have been demobilised. In what way has the situation changed? It is said that the calling up of a large number was necessary and justifiable last September; but they are going to be dispensed with now. Our contention is that the Government could have dispensed with them all the time and could have relied upon a small welldisciplined, permanent Army. We cannot look upon the additions which have been made to the Army by means of the volunteers as anything but a weakness in our defensive position, a weakness that, unfortunately, has cost the taxpayer a considerable sum of money—and that at a moment when every effort should have been made to cut down unnecessary expenditure.

I put it to the House and to the Minister that, in the present instance, we are paying not for anything useful, but for a mere gesture; and that gesture—with all respect—has not even the merit of being impressive, either to ourselves or to outsiders. This is a time when there certainly is no money to waste. As everybody must admit, and as also must be admitted by his colleagues here responsible—one was, and the other is, responsible; or supposed to be, anyhow—for the finances of this country, we are faced with the prospect of declining revenue, and of diminution in production in many spheres. Yet this is the time chosen by the Government to indulge in mere wasteful expenditure. I wonder whether the Minister would have any objection now to giving to the House some idea as to the numbers which were called up, in addition to the regular Army, in the mobilisation, and as to how many of them have been kept. He must know that any Power interested in us—if there is any—could easily get that information; and if he refuses to give it I can only take it that he simply refuses to give the information to the people of this country.

The Minister then deals with the various heads of expenditure. He calmly says that practically £500,000 is to be spent on what we have always held to be not merely wasteful but harmful expenditure. It has dislocated unnecessarily the commercial life of the community. There was no return for it in the form of a useful service to the nation. Men were called up from their ordinary work to join the colours, for this mere display, and it cost the country £500,000. The only thing he accomplished was a disturbance, and it cost £500,000 to do it. Then there is special capital expenditure amounting to £275,000. The Minister detailed how that was spent, but he did not say what useful services the nation would get from that expenditure. I gathered that in the present financial year he is going to build up half the fleet of two patrol boats and three torpedo boats. I presume in another year we will have the other 50 per cent. of the fleet, and we can boast to the world "In one year our fleet has been doubled; can any of the Great Powers show anything to equal that?" See the marvellous tempo of the Irish Government. What is the purpose of the fleet, except possibly to give his colleague, the Minister for Co-ordination, something to co-ordinate—and possibly to wear an admiral's uniform. I understood—I cannot follow their politics too closely—that they did something similar as regards the co-ordination of the forces in Great Britain. Possibly we thought we should follow suit here, and as we had not a navy we determined to invent one, so to speak. Would the Minister tell us what services those three torpedo boats and two patrol boats can give us? What is their office? What is their job? He is asking for £110,000 this year; I think that is the figure. For what? The Minister simply says: "I want £110,000 for five boats," but he does not tell us what the boats are to do. He comes in and asks for the money, but when he is asked: "What are they for?" he says "I refuse to tell you." When asked "How will they help the commerce or defence of this country?" he says "I refuse to tell you." Certainly he did not tell us. What does he expect the three torpedo boats to effect?

Am I right in saying that each torpedo boat has two officers and eight men? I took down those figures from the Minister. What does he expect those torpedo boats, each manned by a crew of two officers and eight men— I am glad it is not eight officers and two men anyhow—to do? Does he expect them to cope with the British Navy should that be necessary, or with the German submarines if they threaten? What is their function exactly, to say nothing of the patrol boats.

The coast watching service is costly, too. How does it work, would the Minister mind telling us? If some people on the coast of Kerry see something floating on the surface that they think is a submarine, do they cycle into Dingle, and is a report sent to Tralee and then on to Dublin? If it ever gets there in time what happens then? Will there be an urgent message sent out to the submarine to wait until investigations take place as to what is happening? And what then? I have heard various discussions in the country as to what it is all about, as to what the coast service does, how it operates, how it functions. All that the Minister says is that he wants so many tens of thousands of pounds for it; otherwise, he gives no information.

I think it must be clear to the House that, taking the Minister's lumping together of the different sub-heads, the only information given is what is to be the total cost to the taxpayer, but no information whatever is given as to what the taxpayer is going to get for the money that is being spent, or why it is necessary. Is that a military secret that must be kept from the potential enemy at all costs? Perhaps the torpedo boats are used for purposes never dreamt of by anyone else, some new class of service that other nations are not fortunate enough to have happened upon? Otherwise, why the modesty on the part of the Minister in justifying his expenditure? I will say it is a modesty that since 1932 has always characterised the Minister responsible for that Department, the refusal to give information, the objection that a speech is not helpful, as if it is not the business of the people in this House, when money is asked for, to demand to be told why, and to ask the Minister to put up at least the semblance of a case that it is being spent for some useful purpose.

I certainly am not going to try to disentangle the question of A.R.P. except to say that the Minister added nothing to the information that has already been put before the House. But I will say this for him: by refusing to give any additional information he has not added to the confusion which prevails in the House and the country as to how A.R.P. stands, as to whether the A.R.P. measures taken by public bodies or private individuals are due to the direct orders of different Government Departments, as I sometimes gathered, or whether as it was "seriously" alleged, they are due to listening in to some foreign wireless, the foreign wireless being unnamed. The fact is that there is an expenditure here of £60,000, the Government's contribution—not the full expenditure for A.R.P.—to measures that have been effected in certain counties; we have no information even as to what the counties were. Again, is this strategical information that would be valuable to a potential enemy? What has been done for the £60,000? How has this expenditure of £60,000 contributed to either of the two big tasks that ought to be before the Minister for Defence, the preservation of our neutrality and the preservation of our independence? This £60,000 is merely the Government's contribution. There is no indication as to what the local contribution is. Perhaps the Minister might tell us. I presume he has the figure at his disposal. One cannot calculate it from the Government expenditure, because one merely finds a maximum ratio for the Government expenditure, and we are not told if the maximum was given. We are not even told whether the maximum has been given in some cases. Perhaps the Minister might, in the course of his intervention in the debate, tell us what it cost the local authorities. I do not know what it has cost private individuals and institutions of all kinds through the country in their vain effort to follow the advice, the commands, that they got from the different Departments. As there is a Minister for Co-ordination he might have done a little co-ordination there. Those who have listened to the answers given at Question Time in this House will be struck by the complete lack of co-ordination between the different Government Departments. I must say that to present to this House a Vote of £1,000,000—much of it new expenditure; in fact, practically all of it new expenditure—and give no justification for it, merely shows the contempt that the Government has both for Parliament and for the country. The only function of Parliament apparently is to vote the money, and the only function of the country is to pay up the money.

If they ask what the money is for they are not going to be told. It will be probably suggested that they are asking questions that should not be answered. Why? There is not one of the questions that I have put the Minister that could give any more information to a potential enemy than he has got already. It must be clear to the Minister, unless he has his head very much in the sand indeed, that the only people that are kept in ignorance of what is going on are the people of this country.

Is there any effort at economies in this expenditure and, if so, to what extent? The Minister cannot pretend that that matter comes before him as something new. From the very start the occupants of these benches insisted on the necessity for rigid economy and particularly here. I admit that more recent statements of fromt bench opposition Deputies as to where economies could be effected did not get into the Press but the fact remains that economies have been pressed on the Government, particularly in this service, and we should like to get from the Minister some indication that they have a sense of duty, where possible, to effect such economies. I must confess that, if we are to judge them by their actions, I see no indication of any such awakening sense of duty on their part. A number of new services are provided. This is the first time we discuss them and are asked to provide the money for them and the Minister comes in and simply throws them to the House, saying, "Take it or leave it." Having a majority, and a crowd that will not ask him any question, that will not ask him where the money will come from or what is the use of the service, he knows perfectly well he can afford to adopt an attitude of that kind. But in doing so he certainly is treating the House in the way in which he and his colleagues have been accustomed to treat the House, but in a way that must spell the death of Parliamentary institutions in any country.

Sir, I stated at the beginning that it would be impossible without a further and fuller statement from the Minister properly to discuss an Estimate of this kind, and I put it to him that at some time during the debate he should intervene and either tell the House that he will give the information straight away or that he will refuse to give that information but, that he should be allowed to conclude, without any further statement seems absurd.

Mr. McCann

I look upon this Vote as one which should be passed through this House without debate. The only complaint which I think ought to come from any side of this House or from any Irishman outside this House is that we cannot vote more. I believe we must arm and continue to arm. I believe that it is the duty of any free nation firstly to build up her army. I have listened to Deputy Professor O'Sullivan and, for a man of his cultural attainment, I am more than surprised that he should engage for more than half-an-hour in mere political diatribe. Not once during his speech did he indicate what Fine Gael's policy is in relation to the Army. He indicated to us, in the same lines as Deputy Dillon would on the economic question, that we are not prepared to spend, but can he or any member of the Opposition justify the position that we, after centuries of struggle, and having won a hard fought victory, should then throw open our doors or take the risk of invasion from here, there or anywhere? Deputy O'Sullivan asked what did the Government foresee when they were engaging in this Army and armament programme. Deputy Dillon, less than a year ago, in this House indicated that he foresaw and expected an invasion from some powers—I do not know from whom. These were his words: "I wonder how many Deputies realise that certain powers in Europe have contemplated an attack on Great Britain from Ireland? Do Deputies realise that certain parties in Europe actually made plans for attack on Great Britain from a base in Ireland?" The Deputies on the other side of the House seem to have been informed beforehand, and were anticipating such an attack before we ever contemplated launching upon an Army or an armament expenditure such as we are doing to-day.

As I said at the outset, the only fault that I can find with the Vote is that it is not sufficient. We should continue to arm, and I think we should take as our text the words of Padraig Pearse: "I do not know," he said, "how nationhood is achieved except by armed men. I do not know how nationhood is guarded except by armed men." We must continue to arm in the same way as every other country in Europe has armed and is arming further. If we look at the smaller countries particularly, there is not one single nation in Europe that I know of that has not got compulsory military training. In practically all of the countries, so far as I can see, every man must be a soldier. In a country like Finland, gallant Finland, as we hear it called to-day, with a population of about 800,000 more than we have, they have a standing army of 28,000 and a volunteer reserve of 100,000. Are we prepared, in the face of any difficulty; are we prepared in the face of no difficulty, to see that as a nation we are prepared to maintain here, as any free nation should, an army?

I do not know what the Opposition's policy is in relation to this. I do not know what their policy is in relation to the economic sphere except Adam Smith's policy, about 200 years old, often glibly spoken of here in Deputy Dillon's most up-to-date terms. But Deputy Dillon, when speaking in this House in the debate of last year, said: "It does seem that we could build up a very effective and valuable force in this country, to be used either in the defence of our own coast or in the defence of shipping." He went on further, during the course of the same speech, to say: "We hold that we are a sovereign and independent State responsible for our own destiny, and as such we have got to make up our minds whether or not we are doing enough to fulfil that destiny. To do that, I think, we have got to take a reasonable stand on the principle that the first vital interest of this country is to protect Ireland and its independence." I submit, Sir, that the Opposition have made the very best case possible for the maintaining of an army and for the augmentation of an army in Ireland.

General MacEoin

I agree with the last speaker. We have made the best case possible, and it is a great comfort to me at this late hour of my life to hear a Fianna Fáil Deputy speaking from those benches in favour of the Army in such terms.

It is true that we have made the best case possible because we helped to build that Army and to make it what it is, but who would suggest, some years ago, that we would ultimately arrive at the stage when a Deputy of the back benches of Fianna Fáil could find that there was nothing good enough to say for the Army? I do not criticise him for it; I merely say: "Thank God such a day has come."

Before I pass on to the details of the Vote, I should like to pay a tribute to the Army, and in that tribute I include volunteers as well as regulars. To all outward appearances, they are a splendid force physically, fully up to the standard of any Army in the world. I want to congratulate them on their appearance and upon their physical fitness. I am satisfied that should their services be required for the defence of the country, they will give that service willingly. I have only one fear, and that is that all is not just as well with the Army as it should be. I am not going into that particular phase of the situation on this occasion, in view of the fact that there is a certain motion on the Order Paper dealing with the Army, and I would rather reserve what I have to say on that particular phase until the motion comes up for discussion.

In regard to the Estimate itself, I agree with Deputy O'Sullivan that this House was never so unfairly treated by any Minister in charge of a Department as it has been treated this evening by the Minister for Defence. The Estimate contains alterations in every sub-head, and as such comes under review on this Vote. The Minister gives no explanation as to why supplies were not available, beyond the bald statement that they could not be got. The Department saved £900,000, roughly, on supplies which they had hoped to get and then they expended that money on something else. The Minister did not avail of this opportunity to tell us how the Army stood in regard to training and what periods were spent, or are being spent, by the various units in field exercises. A large number of the present forces are volunteers who had only a very slight training before they were taken on permanent service. The Minister has not told us to what extent field exercises or manoeuvres have been carried out or will be carried out in the coming financial year. He has not told us the number of officers he has taken from the Reserve, the number he has taken off the Reserve or the number returned to their civilian occupations. I know that in that respect some considerable hardships have been inflicted on certain men. Some officers who had good appointments in civil life were kept on in the Army contrary to their wishes, while others who were not so well placed in civil life, who had ample time at their disposal and who would make just as efficient officers as some of those who were retained, were sent back to their civil occupations.

It is an astonishing fact that the Minister for Defence carries on his Vote the cost of another Minister, and that he paid no attention whatever, in asking the House to pass this Vote, to the duties and functions of that Minister. I think it is most unusual in Parliamentary procedure that one Minister should carry another on his back in the same Vote. For the future, in my opinion, there should be a separate Vote for each Minister, now that the Ministers and Secretaries Act has been passed. There is no reason why one Ministry should be tacked on to the other. I presume the Minister for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures will, at some stage in this debate, tell us what are the duties which he performs. I can understand certain people in this country following the standards of foreign countries in their activities, but I cannot understand the Government of this country constituting itself upon the model of a Government in another and a richer country. A Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures would be understandable in England where there is a huge army, navy and air force and where there is a marine service and a vast quantity of supplies to be taken care of. It would be certainly a very large undertaking for one Minister to supervise a whole group of services of that kind. It is understandable, therefore, that a Co-ordinating Minister should be appointed in a country of that kind, but in this country we have no force of a comparable size nor are we at war. Notwithstanding the predictions of the Prime Minister himself, that neutrality in the event of a world war was almost impossible in this country, and notwithstanding the fact that my colleague in Longford— Athlone, Deputy Victory, assured the people that in the event of our supplying food to England, we could not remain neutral, the fact is that we are neutral.

Mr. Aiken

You settled Deputy Dillon over in Merrion Street, in No. 3.

General MacEoin

The Minister would like to settle in No. 3, but I do not suggest that he would be let in.

Dr. O'Higgins

The difficulty now is to settle the Minister. He has a back room in another Minister's office.

General MacEoin

I never thought I would see the day when the Minister would be on someone else's back and be carried around. I have the greatest respect for the Minister as an Army officer, but I hate to see him on the back of the Minister for Defence. That is a fact.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Order.

General MacEoin

As we are discussing this matter in friendly terms, the Chair was not supposed to hear what was said. The Minister has made no case for this Vote. I distinctly remember the case being made that the Army in 1931 was costing too much. The Army in 1931 was an efficient and an effective Army, with reserves that could be called into line if and when required, and at the shortest notice. While paying tribute to the Army's present formation and physique, I am not satisfied that it is as good as it was then. I hope it is, but I think the Minister would be well advised to take the House into his confidence, and to give it a survey of the activities of his Ministry, and justify this expenditure at a time when the country is being hard pressed. I notice that even amongst prominent Fianna Fáil supporters in my constituency, at the last meeting of Longford County Council, it was stated, no matter what anybody said to the contrary, that the agricultural and farming community were in a very bad way and that something should be done about the matter. The effective defence that the farming community could give is being neglected, while this extraordinary expenditure is to be used on defence in another way. In my opinion that is quite wrong and should not be approved of by this House. Therefore, I regret that I cannot approve of this Vote, and I intend to ask the House to vote against it.

Colonel Ryan

I also wish to oppose this Vote. In fact, I do not agree, no matter what the circumstances, that there should be such expenditure on an Army, having regard to the position that exists here. I feel that it would be just as well that the people should remain slaves or become slaves as to be starved and impoverished in order to build up this kind of an Army. Information has been sought about the numbers in the Army and what its purpose is, but we have never got any definite answer. The most definite information we got was from Deputy McCann, who is on the back benches, when he stated that it was to protect the nation and its independence. If we are to depend on it now to defend our independence, I am sure people will feel scared. Like Deputy MacEoin, I would like to see a decent and efficient Army here, but not one costing three times what it should cost. We have neither a contented nor an efficient Army. Nobody in this House can get any information as to what the Army is like, its numbers, its efficiency or what it is to do. We had numbers of volunteers drawn from various walks of life, and when they were first brought into the Army their qualification was that they should be backing a certain political party. If they were in the I.R.A. that was the only qualification when coming in, and Civic Guards or anybody else would be afraid to give them bad characters as long as they shouted "Up the I.R.A." Most of these are still in the Army.

I hold that the Army is harbouring nests of men who might be all right in the British Army because of its nature and characteristics but who are traitors and disloyal to our Army. That is the great trouble. No steps have been taken to put them out. Perhaps the Minister has been doing it quietly. This House does not know that, because we have not heard a word about what has gone on in the Army, the regulars or the Volunteers, except what we got by way of public questions. I cannot understand any sensible man, no matter on what side he is, standing up for an Army being carried on like that. On the other hand, we had an Economic Committee set up at the instance of the Government at the time that this expenditure on the Army started, and one of the Parliamentary Secretaries is at the head of that committee. It does not seem to have done anything to bring about economy in the Army. There is no doubt that economies could be brought about in the Army and that we could have a more efficient Army.

In this Vote there is an item of £16,000 provided for civilians who are employed to assist the Army. Perhaps it is necessary that the Army should employ civilians without going through the ordinary routine of the labour exchanges or without bothering who is employed. But what is the position? In one case, of which I am very well aware, and about which I had to write to an officer, every civilian employed in a certain barracks was recommended by the secretary of a Fianna Fáil club. If the Minister wishes I will give names and also mention the barracks. After I had written to this officer some of the civilians were let go. What do we find soldiers in that barracks doing? I am sure the ordinary taxpayers would not object, in fact they would be glad to see them doing such work if there were not sufficient civilians available, but when men go out doing ordinary labouring work it causes bitterness—I mean such as work in sandpits and drawing sand in lorries. The Minister knows about this; yet, we have £16,000 here for the employment of civilians. When a question was asked what the Army authorities were doing about it, or what the people at the employment exchanges were doing, the only reference to it is that the Army employs its own civilians. I do not mind if the Army employs civilians for technical jobs but from my experience of the job in question, it was not a technical one. There were men with families depending upon them idle, decent working men, who should have been employed there through the labour exchanges and not through the secretaries of local Fianna Fáil clubs. That is not many months ago. That alone would make anybody oppose this Vote.

The Deputy has given up expecting; he is hoping. We are asked to vote practically £1,000,000 to pay for political elements grafted on to an Army which certainly was reliable and knew how to keep its ammunition before political elements were grafted on to it. The Minister has made several attempts to suppress discussion on the ground that certain persons are awaiting court martial. I have ventured to suggest that, if certain persons are awaiting court martial the Minister and, above all, the Minister who sowed the seeds in the Army, should have their conduct and their policy subjected to investigation. I leave it at that in deference to the Chair. I have heard more nonsense talked from the Government Front Bench about the Army in the last year or two than I ever heard talked about any other subject, and, if it is the result of thought, then it is evidence of muddled thinking. I would not mind nonsense; we are accustomed to that from that Bench; I would not mind muddled thinking; we are accustomed to that, too. But when that nonsense and that muddled thinking are converted into money and result in costing the people a few million odd pounds per year, then it is time that we began to wade through all the nonsense to see what it is all about.

We are a small island country not at war, and we either pretend or believe that there is danger of invasion. There is no justification for the millions that are being demanded except we believe or pretend to believe that there is danger of invasion. In order to defend our action in mobilising a comparatively huge army and in demanding millions from poor people, we point to inland European countries and we say: "Oh, but they have mobilised." We try to mislead ignorant people that our danger is similar to theirs, with huge armies massed on their frontiers and with the danger in each of one or other belligerent crossing their frontiers. We are trying to make the case as the Ministers opposite and the Taoiseach himself has made it, that because these small neutral European countries have mobilised, there is just the same case that we, here in an island, should mobilise.

If the danger of invasion was real, or if the Government had only taken this House into its confidence, then what we would be doing would be spending our millions to prevent any invading army reaching our shores. We would be spending these millions not in demoralising decent young fellows by keeping them tramping around barracks when they are pining to be at work—when work is there waiting for them and when the vital necessity is the production of food— we would be spending our millions on submarines to prevent the enemy coming before us. I said before, and everybody knows it is so, that on the day it was invaded, if this country were invaded by any big belligerent, on that day the war was over. The idea of waiting until the enemy were landed, and then putting up before them even our best, when we actually saved £1,000,000, or £970,000, by starving the Army of the supplies which we were told six months ago were vital, is purely childish. Either we are to believe the statements we hear from the Government Benches and from the mouths of Government Ministers, or there is no use in our coming here at all. We had a Vote presented to us, I think it was last November, and we were asked for hundreds and thousands of pounds for armaments, munitions and machinery of war. We were told the menace was real and the situation grave and that not a £5 note should be saved out of that huge sum—that it was all required. We were told that the last thing the Government would do would be to ask for too much. We are now told that £970,000 of that Vote was not required at all for the purpose for which it was asked; that it could be devoted to pay, to barrack maintenance and transport, but that the armaments and munitions which were asked for could very comfortably be done without or that we could do very nicely without them.

We are getting no explanation from either the Minister for Defence or his side-drummer as to how exactly the Army is faring with £1,000,000 less material than we were told was essential and vital. Now there is a very uneasy feeling throughout this country with regard to the whole defence position. That position is, perhaps, worsened by the fact that we are living under a censorship. Rumours were going around long before Christmas week, but they have been multiplied considerably since Christmas. There were rumours of leakages, rumours of lack of discipline, rumours of shootings, rumours of discontent. Those rumours were not lessened by the exhibition of a soldier in uniform retusing to stand or to recognise the courts of this country. In that kind of a situation, with the Minister asking for the transplanting of a sum of approximately £1,000,000—which we were told was urgently required for armaments and machines of defence last September, which the Taoiseach himself said was to be spent mainly on aircraft defence and aeroplanes, should now go for pay and maintenance instead—one would imagine the Minister's usual reticence would in these circumstances be put aside and that he would attempt to take the House into his confidence. Remember that every Deputy is not simply a "Yes-man", a man who comes along here to support whatever demand Ministers place before him; that the position of the ordinary taxpayer of this country is getting rapidly worse and that even hundreds of pounds, not to say millions of pounds, must be reasonably justified here before they are demanded from this House.

We have another rather revolutionary thing in this Vote. I may be inexperienced but I never before heard of a Vote for one Department being introduced and having included within it on a back page a Vote for another Minister and another Department. In the money sense now we are proceeding to create an expensive new Department headed by the Minister who was removed from the Ministry of Defence. We have got to approve of a rather grandiose new title, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, and that in a neutral country with 3,000,000 inhabitants and an Army of something about 20,000. The other Minister, the senior Minister, carries the title not of Minister for the Army or Minister for War but Minister for Defence, irrespective of whether it is Army, Naval or Air. We are to pay tens of thousands of pounds for another Minister to co-ordinate that Minister with himself—to co-ordinate Minister Traynor with Minister Traynor. No reason has ever been advanced for this arrangement in this House. Consequently the only reason one can give for it is that there is such an office in the mighty countries where there is a Minister for War, a Minister for Air and a Minister for the Navy and somebody else co-ordinating all three of them in the three Departments. So we have that expensive, unwanted and apparently useless and superfluous new Department being created now as if the money came down with the rain from the sky. We have not even that Department standing on its own feet and coming in here like an ordinary Ministerial Department with a Vote for itself—coming in here where the whole thing can be discussed—but we have it shoved in at the tail end of a Supplementary Vote for the Department of Defence. This is the first time the Dáil has been asked to vote money for this new Department. One would imagine that the Minister introducing the Vote would give some reason for such an office.

Apparently, he agrees with others that he cannot advance any reason and that the easiest way to get away with it is by silence. We know that one of the functions of that Ministry is to carry within itself the censor's department. Surely, in a country of this size and in our neutral position, neither the Minister nor the Department of Defence is so overworked that they cannot include or look after the activities of the censor's staff. We have a picked man, an expert and experienced man, specially selected to take over the censorship department. Is it necessary to have a special Minister and a special Ministry as well? With the title of "Minister for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures," we have a special Minister for this purpose. What are the defensive measures that require co-ordination? Is it that, in addition to the Minister for Defence, we want a Minister who will co-ordinate the activities of one section of the Army with another. We have a Parliamentary Secretary to deal with A.R.P.; we have an expert to deal with censorship. Surely it is not playing the game with either the Parliament or the people at a time when money is, to say the least, getting tight to create these new expensive, superfluous, ceremonial departments with grandiose titles.

I saw in a paper a quotation from a speech of one of the present Ministers when dealing with an Army estimate some eight years ago. That Minister was deploring the extravagance and the squandering of public moneys involved in keeping an Army in a country of this size which was costing £1,000,000 a year. He charged the Government with spending his money on extravagant ceremonial. He was speaking either as an honest and sincere man or as a first-class humbug. If he was speaking as an honest and sincere man, is he now going to vote for four times the expenditure and the creation of a second Ministry, with increased ceremonial? It is all very well for people who are anxious to strut about as war lords if they do it at their own expense. This city is well stocked with theatres and it would possibly be a popular turn to ape the European war lords there. But we are mobilising thousands of men who have nothing to do. When we recollect that every thousand men cost £100,000, that the people are run to the point that even much smaller sums are hard to get and that to raise revenue and pay for the grossly inflated cost of Government we have to tax every article bought by the poorest of people, then we should, at least, throw over-board unwanted Departments. We should face up to the fact that, if there is a danger of our being pulled into the war at a later stage and if the speeches made by some Ministers are true—that costs are going to rise and that financially things are going to get harder—it is a time for retrenchment, for saving every pound we can as against the rainy day, for conserving whatever we have as against the day of strain. It is certainly not a time for squandering and it is not a time for dissipating not only our wealth but our man-power. We are doing both. We are asked to do that at a time when public confidence and parliamentary confidence is shaken in the Army and, above all, when that confidence is shaken in the Ministers who have charge of the Army.

We are asked to say nothing about this matter because subordinates are being put through the mangle. We are asked to vote another £1,000,000 to carry out a policy that has resulted in nothing, so far as we can see, but danger to the State. We are asked to let that through on the ground that, in fact, it is only a £10 note because, although we were asked for £970,000 last November on the assurance of two Ministers and the Taoiseach that it was vitally necessary for specific purposes, the Ministers now ramble into the Dáil and say: "In spite of what we said last November, we found we did not want the money and, since we did not want it, will you allow us to spend it on paying political troops"—on the increased cost of the new political troops they have brought into what was the grandest, most loyal and most splendid little Army in the whole of Europe. That was the case before the politicians started playing tricks with it.

Mr. Benson

I should hate to accept the thesis of Deputy McCann that the larger the Army, the greater the freedom. If he casts his eyes on the Continent of Europe, or beyond it, I think he will find that the reverse is true and that the countries with the smallest armies are the most free. The real purpose of my rising here to-day was to extract some information from the Minister in connection with the marine coast watching service. Included in this Supplementary Estimate is a figure for a patrol vessel which I take to be only a book-entry as it is a transfer from one Department to another. I should like to hear from the Minister what treatment was meted out to the crew of that vessel on transfer from the other Department of State. Were they transferred with the vessel and, if not, why not? My information is that in the case, at least, of one man, with many years' service on that vessel, on transfer from the other Department he received one week's notice. Whether that is correct or not I do not know, but, if so, it seems to me to be a sad reflection on the Government if, because of a small transfer from one Department to another, the crew must be dispensed with at such short notice as that after, presumably, they have given good and faithful service over a considerable period. Possibly, the Minister would give us some information, when he is replying, on that subject.

General Mulcahy

I think that the introduction of this Estimate, the way in which it has been done, and the significance of it, is an outstanding example of the way in which Parliament has been throttled and sandbagged by the present Government. The Army was fully mobilised in or about the first week of September last —about a week after the giving to the Government of certain emergency powers. Within a week of the introduction of the Emergency Powers Bill, and the passing of that Bill, the Army was mobilised. The action of the Government in mobilising the Army was quite in keeping with their mentality.

Deputies will remember that when the emergency arose in the beginning of September last, even those of us in Dublin heard only on Friday afternoon, that the Dáil was being specially summoned for 3 o'clock on the following day. It was not until 25 minutes to 12 that night that the responsible leaders of the Opposition could be shown what business was to be transacted on the following day, what Bills would be dealt with, or what powers were being taken by the Government. It transpired that the Government was taking powers, in effect, to wipe out all Bills or to add anything to these Bills that they might wish to add, and to do all these things inside the five hours. We heard that decision at 25 minutes to 12 on Friday night—the Dáil having been summoned—and we were invited to meet the Taoiseach at 11 o'clock on Saturday morning only in order to be told what had been agreed to at 25 minutes to 12 the night before. We were summoned simply to be told what was being done. We did succeed, at that time, in getting the Government to take its hands off the throttle of Parliament and to allow Parliament to discuss, in its own necessarily limited time, the circumstances in which emergency legislation was being introduced, the type of the legislation and its purposes. In other words, we were able to persuade the Government that if they wanted the assistance of Parliament or of the people of the country, they should have a discussion and the guillotine must go by the board. As a result, the Government got the powers that they wanted. However, within a week after that, the Army was mobilised without any further consultation with members of the Opposition. After the Government had got the emergency powers from the Dáil, without any further communication to any responsible person belonging to the chief Opposition Party in the Dáil, or to any other Party in opposition in this Parliament, the Government mobilised the Army. Now, five and a half months afterwards, Parliament is being given an opportunity of discussing the matter. Now, either in a state of emergency, or out of a state of emergency—but particularly in the light of what we have seen that the Government has done and of the things that we see the Government is capable of doing, against or in the face of Parliament, by doing things to it or withholding information from it —I do not think that this Parliament can afford to continue without discussing important matters here.

I think it is an outrage that the introduction of a matter as important as the mobilisation, and the retained mobilisation, of the Army, should be made in the way in which the Minister for Defence has made it here to-day. The Minister is aware that the Opposition Party, feeling their responsibilities in this matter, were prepared to act fairly and, in the main, assistfully; but the Government, in less than seven days afterwards, mobilised the Army. We conveyed to the Taoiseach what our opinion of that mobilisation was. In the first place, we felt that the mobilisation of the Army was objectless; that there was no apparent reason in the world why the Army should be mobilised, and that, to mobilise the Army, without an object, in our circumstances here meant the removal of large numbers of men from their occupations, and a resultant loss of their earnings to their families. It meant detaching these men from their families, and also taking away the earnings that would normally be coming to these men and their families. It meant that there was, not alone a dislocation of industrial life, but a considerable hardship on the families of these men—particularly when we consider the difficulty that men have, not alone in finding, but in holding, employment under recent circumstances. Here there was the threat to the future of all these men: that, after whatever period in the Army they might be called up, it might be impossible for them to get back to their work. There was that dislocation in industry and also that hardship to be faced by these men and their families, but apart from that there was the fact that, when the Army was mobilised, it had nothing to do. Apart from what a man might feel about the inconveniences and losses occasioned by his being mobilised, he might be anxious to be an efficient part of an efficient Army in the country, and to do all that he could for the country, but he was bound to become disillusioned, demoralised and disaffected by being mobilised to do nothing. The steps that the Government, inevitably, would feel bound to take in order to make use of the Army in such circumstances would embrace the scattering of the men of the Army here and there, thus providing points of irritation to any disorderly elements in the country, and thus also further demoralising the Army as an institution. I do not think that anything that was put before the Government by us at that time can be said to have been exaggerated, or can be said to have been not true, because I think the Minister must have found that everything that was said at that time turned out to be true.

The principal thing that fault is found with is the enormous expense on the country at the present time arising out of the mobilisation of the Army. Others have indicated that the present Minister for Defence is not in the position of being so much to blame as the previous Minister for Defence for certain things arising out of this Estimate, but I make the present Minister for Defence entirely responsible for what I object to in the present situation. I think that the futility and the failure of Army policy since last September—and even before that, if you like to go back before that date—is clearly indicated by the mobilisation of the Army in September last. With a country situated as we are, it showed the utter failure of Army policy and the utter failure of Ministerial outlook that the Army should have been mobilised before the tendency in the war situation disclosed itself. Here in a hurried week, when the Ministry did not know whether there was going to be a war or not, the Army was mobilised at a cost which, in spite of all the Minister says here in dividing his figures, is not £499,000 but £778,000.

The Army has been mobilised for at least six months. I submit that the additional expenditure in connection with defence forces, transport vehicles and all that arose out of the mobilisation of the reserves and the volunteers and must be regarded as all part of the mobilisation scheme. We here maintain, and have maintained, and we indicated it to the Government within a week after the volunteers were mobilised, that the mobilised Army was not wanted here; that it had no object here, and the expense of it, in the circumstances we were facing, was such that it could not be borne.

Will anybody who understands the circumstances, both from the point of view of defence and general local economy in any part of this country, consider the bill that is presented here for £970,000 for six months for additional personnel for the Army? Will he consider that amount of money and the way in which it is being spent and contrast it with the other demands that have been made for facilities for seeds and other things to enable us to dig our first line of defence—to put our agricultural industry on its feet during the present Spring so that there may be something to be harvested? I should like to ask the back benchers of the Fianna Fáil Party, who seem to be so few in number when it comes to discussing an additional bill for a six months' addition to the Army, a bill bigger than the amount that they boasted the whole running of an Army should normally cost in this country? I should like to hear from either the one or the two Fianna Fáil back benchers who are here when we are discussing this huge amount what they think of the money that is put down for this additional mobilisation as compared with the amount of money we were discussing on the Seeds Bill the other day, £600,000.

There is only one real danger to this country at the present time and that is the danger that we will not be able to produce enough to keep our people, on the one hand, and our expensive Government on the other hand. What I think is a real outrage on Parliament is that a bill like this should be presented for an Army mobilised five months ago, an Army that is still here, and, as is indicated in the Book of Estimates published to-day, is going to be kept. It is an outrage that that Bill is presented without a single word being said to Parliament about the purpose for which the Army is wanted. If this is the Parliament of the country it ought to ask, and should be allowed to know, what dangers there are of a military kind to this country that warrant the expenditure of £1,000,000 now and that warrant additional expenditure next year of a sum as great.

We are told that in 1938-39 the actual amount of money spent on the Army was £1,771,000. In the year 1938-39 the Government spent £142 on the Army for every £100 spent on it before they came into office. We are now being asked to give them, through this Supplementary Estimate, £183 for every £100 spent on the Army before they came into office, and it is indicated that this is the foundation upon which we are going to continue next year, and that next year £190 will be spent on the Army as against every £100 spent before Fianna Fáil came into office. The money is asked, not so grandiloquently here, but very grandiloquently throughout the country. It is asked in order to defend our liberties, to defend our independence. If this is a Parliament at all, it will want to know, and it ought to be told, against whom we are defending this country at this additional cost.

Who are the people likely to attack this country? Are we going to be attacked from Great Britain, from Germany, from the Six Counties, by any organisation inside? Why should Parliament not ask itself this question, and why should we not get some kind of Ministerial answer to it? Why should people who are supposed to represent the country in Parliament, and handle its affairs intelligently and effectively, and in a way that will secure all the national interests, including its independence—why should they not discuss these things? It has been pointed out that this is an additional bill for men as distinct from the materials that we were told were going to be bought. Whatever it is, it is an additional bill of £1,000,000. Is it to defend our country against Great Britain? I think the House ought to be told that.

In so far as we can know from the Government, we have nothing against which to defend ourselves from Great Britain, that is, there is nothing in the policy of Great Britain, so far as either the Ministers or we know here, that would suggest that there is any reason to prepare ourselves for defence against Great Britain. We are told the British have not sought facilities in our ports; the British have not sought any war assistance from us; the British have been scrupulous in their recognition of our declaration of neutrality in this war. Is there any reason why we should not accept as sincere and definite Ministerial statements on these matters? Is there any reason why we would not interpret the suggestion that is made by Ministers to the House that our declaration of neutrality has been respected by Great Britain? Is there any reason why the House would not interpret this declaration as indicating that we do not need to build up an Army because of any danger from Great Britain?

We have been told explicitly that the German Minister has conveyed to the Government here that Germany recognises our neutrality. Has there been any sign on sea or land, or any indication of any kind, to suggest that our liberties are endangered from the German side? I think that six months after war was declared, and six months after continuing to carry on whatever normal trade we have been able to carry on outside, it is no harm to ask that question when presented with a bill of this kind, and to hear the Government tell Parliament, as clearly as they think they can, whether our liberties are threatened from the German side. If there is any danger either from the Six Counties side or from any internal situation here, then I think the Government should discuss that in the fullest, clearest and most open detail with the House. Lack of discussion, if there is danger, is only going to allow a kind of conspiracy to breed in a kind of silence outside. It is going to allow worse than a conspiracy to breed in the silence of Ministers, because it is going to allow inefficiency, a lack of grip on the situation, and a detaching of themselves from the assistance that Parliament and public opinion can give them. That is what silence on the Ministerial side is going to give us. A thing like that is even more dangerous than silence under the conspiracies that can grow either here or in any place in the Six Counties.

I seriously suggest to the Minister for Defence that, with his particular responsibilities for the Army, with his general understanding of the country and with his joint responsibility with his colleagues in the Government, he does not appear to have given any thought to what he is doing to-day. I appeal to him to realise what he is doing. He is asking the House, for the first time, whether it approves of the Vote of £1,000,000 to pay for the mobilisation of the Army that took place in September last, but the Minister has not told the House a single thing about that. I ask him to contemplate what he is doing, and to tell the House why the Army was mobilised in September last: to tell the House why it is going to be continued to be mobilised. If the Minister does that, then we can meet on fair, reasonable and decent grounds, using our intelligence to deal with that situation, and to discuss it across the floor of this Parliament where, I suggest, it must be discussed. If the Minister does not face up to his responsibilities in that kind of way, and if he does not lead and help the House to discuss this matter, then he is going to fail miserably on his job.

If the Minister for Defence fails miserably on his job to-day, he may, as a consequence of that, bring very serious trouble on the country. At any rate, he will inevitably bring this trouble on it: he will bring expense on the country that it cannot bear. We are simply throwing down a sewer, from which none of it will come back, hundreds and thousands of pounds beyond the million mark on the Army to-day, money that is very badly wanted for other things. If that money is not used on other things, as distinct from the Army, and if the Army cannot be paid for, then I shudder to think of the economic situation that is going to face the men who have been mobilised into the Army, and of the men in the Army if they are kept in it for another two or three years at this expense. I shudder to think what their position is going to be in a country that has had this financial blister on it for two or three years, when the time comes for their demobilisation.

The Minister has not been fair to the Army, he has not been fair to himself or to the country, and he certainly has been particularly destructive of the idea of Parliamentary institutions in this country because of the way he treated the House to-day. I entreat him to realise, from the point of view of an Irish Parliament, what he has been doing here to-day. I ask him to help an Irish Parliament in the only way that it can be helped, and that is by having a serious, open and clear discussion of what it is doing. It is being asked to vote £1,000,000 to increase the Army. Parliament ought to know why it is necessary to increase the Army. The Minister ought to have sufficient knowledge and experience after six months of a war situation to be able to talk to Parliament.

Deputy Mulcahy spoke of a debate on general policy. Policy is not discussed on a Supplementary Estimate. Nominally, this is a token Vote of £10, but the Chair is prepared to take a wider view of it. There are certain new services in this Vote which could be fully debated. The Chair does not hold that only administration could be discussed on these new services.

Mr. Cosgrave

I am at a disadvantage in having to dispute anything that comes from the Chair, but I do wish to point out that this Estimate, taken in conjunction with the Estimate we had last year from the Minister for Defence, shows a divergence, and that there is much antagonism between the two. Really, the question of policy never, to my mind, loomed more prominently in the Estimate of the Minister for Defence than it does on this Estimate. Last year, when we were committed to an expenditure of something like £5,500,000 for equipment, if there was one matter more than another stressed by the Minister for Defence it was the change that had taken place since he became responsible for the Department of Defence, the change that had taken place in the extra sum that had been allotted each year for munitions, warlike stores, and so on. He told the House that it had varied from having been 5 per cent. before he took office up to 12½ per cent. in his own time.

Last year the case that was made by the Prime Minister was that there was £1,000,000 for guns and £1,000,000 for aeroplanes. This Estimate is an Estimate which is responsible for the grand larceny of a £1,000,000 out of that £2,000,000. Instead of purchasing warlike stores we are spending it on other things. I do not think that there was ever a more deceitful transaction before this House. Last year the Minister for Defence asked for money, it was voted to him, he got it; he is succeeded by a Minister now who has spent the money for another purpose. What is that? Why, the courts of this country are full of evidence of people being prosecuted for that sort of thing. The Minister got money for munitions; he has spent it on something else. Has he saved the money on the munitions? Apparently, he has saved practically £1,000,000. The case that was made, not only by the Minister for Defence but by the Prime Minister himself was that we now had an Estimate far bigger than ever before for warlike stores—for munitions, ammunition and so on—and we spent it on coast watching.

An Ceann Comhairle

The Deputy may take the assurance that the Chair does not disagree with such discussion of administration.

Mr. Cosgrave

There is more than administration in that—very much more. There is an absolute negation of the policy of the Department of Defence as we knew it or as we were told it was 12 months ago. Some of these items are much more striking than others. While we can increase the national expenditure very much in the short space of 12 months, this Estimate gives us no idea of the actual increase that has taken place during the 12 months. Last year we were presented with a document—on the occasion of the discussion on the Supplementary Estimate for the Department of Defence—in which the pay of officers, cadets, non-commissioned officers and men was provided for to the extent of £572,686. The Minister asked for £686,839. Now, the new Minister for Defence has spent £931,361. He got no authority from the Dáil for that, no authority of any sort or kind. I do not know whether he has made any case to the Dáil for it or not. I would like to know how he seeks to justify it. It is a sum of £350,000 over and above the Estimate voted 12 months ago. For what purpose? Is it to protect this State?

If we are to take the evidence with which we were furnished on the 23rd December last, it would appear that we have mobilised these troops on an occasion of national emergency. For the first time for something like 13 years, the Army had to go on active service. While we have not spent money on ammunition during the year, we have had to put the Army on active service to get back what had been bought at very great cost to the State. That ammunition would certainly be needed, even for our very small Army, not to mention the Army that was mobilised. I would like the Minister to give some justification to the House for that departure from the policy of 12 months ago. The Dáil voted money to buy munitions: it has been spent otherwise. We are entitled to know whether, in the case of such a large departure from the stated policy, involving an expenditure of almost £1,000,000, the Government can take that decision and then simply come to Parliament and say: "We have done that; you pay up."

Coming down along these items, one is struck by the very large difference in the cost of petrol and oils. For the year 1938-39 the sum voted amounted to £16,000, and the sum asked for this year is £55,000. What is the reason for the increase? The Army may be mobilised, but it is not on active service, though it may have been for the short space of a couple of weeks. Over three times the amount of money is to be spent on petrol and oils. Has it gone up so much in price, or what is the reason for such an enormous increase in expense? Regarding the transport of troops, the original Estimate for 193940 is £14,672; it has gone up now to £21,000. When we come to mechanical transport, the original Estimate was £14,419; it is now £140,000. According to the pay—if we are to take that as a basis—we do not quite double the number of men; it has not gone up 50 per cent.—it has gone up a little over 40 per cent.; but in mechanical transport the cost has expanded by 1,000 per cent.—it is ten times as much as was anticipated. Surely the Minister must have an exaggerated view of the wealth and the capacity of this country to meet this very large increase in expense. Can he tell us of any business which, during the course of the last 12 months or during the course of the past seven or eight years, has expanded its mechanical transport to ten times what it was seven or eight years ago. While we may have very exaggerated views regarding the majesty of the State, after all, the State is merely the addition of all the people in it. The State has not got all the money of all the people; the State at most can only get a portion of the income of all the people and it must behave itself with regard to public expenditure just the same as the poorest man in the State.

Regarding the marine coast watching service, it is costing us £118,902. That means fairly heavy expenditure— amounting to over £2,000 per week. What are the people paid for who are engaged in this particular phase of modern activity? Where do they send reports? What is the nature of the reports? Is the Minister satisfied that it is a useful service? There have been communications from the coast life saving service people that they ought to have been employed in this service; they have had associations with the sea; they know the Morse Codes and the peculiar methods adopted by sailors for making themselves known to their fellows and to the people in their neighbourhood. Is this on an absolutely new foundation? Did the Minister get it from scratch, or did he take advice from the lifeboat people or the coast life saving service in connection with it?

The figure for engineer stores has gone up from £5,000 to £25,000, an excess of £20,000. I have always a suspicion of those round figures when I see them. There was an early method adopted in the schoolbooks, by which the answers were always even. When a boy was doing his exercise he was always satisfied that he was right if he got an even answer. Somehow or other it does not pan out that way in life. We do not get it to pan out exactly to the even figure to which the school boys were accustomed. It may be that this is merely an estimate. We have another example of it in the case of the protection of civil population against air and gas attack. The original Estimate showed a very odd number of pounds— £34,554—and the supplementary figure required is an even £60,000. It may be that those who live in the cities know all the intricacies of this new service, but I do not know that there is any service I have heard of in which there has been greater cause for complaint. People were committed to very heavy expenditure, advised to do certain things, warned to do certain things, and almost threatened with prosecution for failure to do them. Then suddenly it is all over, and they are told not to bother about it. Is the Minister going on with it when everybody else has stopped, or is it considered that there should be the skeleton of a machine there? If so, the opinion prevailing now would appear to be very different from what prevailed 12 months ago. We thought then that something like £30,000 would be sufficient, and now it amounts to nearly three times that sum.

I am very disappointed in this Estimate. I am not satisfied that we have at all achieved what had been at any rate fairly generally accepted by the two Governments with regard to the Army, however much they may have differed in other matters—that it was to be a small Army; that it was to be efficient; that it was to be well disciplined, and that it was to be capable of rapid expansion. The only evidence we have had of the expansion or our Army has been the loss of our ammunition. Personally, if I were offered a choice, I would prefer to keep the ammunition and to have had a small Army. To my mind, the objection to this Estimate is that the House and the country have been deceived. We were told last year that we had now got our freedom; that one of the advantages or disadvantages of freedom was that you had got to pay for it; that we might even have to fight for it; and in order to maintain it and fight for it we had to have munitions. We got the money to purchase them. I do not know whether we have purchased them or not, but it does appear to me that it is in connection with the purchase of munitions that we have saved the most of this £970,000. We gave no sanction at any time for the expansion of the Army to the extent to which the Ministers have expanded it. It was a panicky gesture on the part of the Government; it was panicky, unwise, ill-balanced and illconsidered. It was an expansion for which this country cannot afford to continue to pay. It will possibly make unpopular this national institution of the State which should be and was popular. It gives rise to uneasiness when, in an expanded state, it is unequal to the small burden placed on it of holding what it has, of keeping possession of what was provided at great cost to the citizens of this State. It is a sorry, lamentable story. This is an Estimate which ought to be rejected by the House, and I propose to vote against it.

Mr. Linehan

It would appear to the House that one of the main reasons for the increased moneys required in this Supplementary Estimate is the fact that there was a general mobilisation of the Army last September, and that the ranks of the Army were increased numerically to a very great extent. First of all, I should like to know from the Government whether there was any justification whatever for the rushed mobilisation of the Army last September? Was there any need at all for it? Can any explanation be given to justify the waste of public money on the mobilisation of the Army last September, and on the continued mobilisation of the Army since that date? It is perfectly obvious to anyone that the mobilisation of the Army which took place then could not be a mobilisation that was concerned with invasion from outside, and it is still more obvious that a not very mobile infantry force— which forms the bulk of the Army here —would not be the best means of defence against invasion from outside. One thing which the present Minister for Defence will be called upon to explain is this: in view of the present situation in the country, when everybody is finding it hard enough to make ends meet, when the farmer and the labourer and the professional people and everybody else are finding it hard enough to carry on their ordinary avocations, what was the justification for increased expenditure on the Army? There could be only two reasons: one, fear of invasion from outside, and secondly, fear of internal trouble. There is no justification at all for assuming that this country has reason to fear invasion from outside, and, as I say, if we had to face invasion from outside, it is not the type of Army which the Minister and his predecessor have recruited for the last four years that would be an effective answer to that invasion. I think the Minister will find it very hard to convince this country that the expenditure of those extra moneys was justified, or would be necessary in order to meet internal trouble. The Minister or his predecessor never gave any indication to this House that there was any likelihood or danger of internal trouble which would justify the mobilisation of the Army or the expenditure for the sums for which he is now looking.

One of the most amazing items in the entire Estimate is the enormous increase in the pay of civilians attached to Army units. There is an increase of £16,000 there. I am given to understand that the method of recruitment of civilian workers attached to Army barracks and other Army units is entirely at variance with the ordinary method of recruitment of civilian labour. When people are taken on for other Government services, relief works, works under local bodies or anything like that, they are expected to be employed through the local labour exchange. I understand that the civilian workers attached to Army units are not recruited through the labour exchanges, and I find it very hard to understand that, when people are unemployed and are capable of doing the work required of them when attached to those Army units. I do not believe there is any justification for not taking on those people in the ordinary way through the employment exchanges. It is not a thing that gives any great confidence in the people that are recruited for this type of labour to say that the one body in this country that has to hand-pick its outside labour without any regard to the employment exchanges is the Army. As I say, the information I have is that these people are not recruited through labour exchanges. I would be very glad if the Minister could say that that is incorrect. I do not think it is incorrect, and, believing that such is the position, I hope the Minister will at least take immediate steps to remedy it. There is no earthly reason why people sweeping barrack yards or doing jobs of that nature could not be employed through the labour exchanges. I am quite satisfied that the Minister would get just as loyal subjects of the State by recruiting through the labour exchange as he does by hand-picking. I do not think that the hand-picking of the last four years has improved the Army. I think they would be just as good if they were recruited through the labour exchanges.

Deputy Cosgrave referred to the question of the A.R.P. One of the most peculiar results of the first expenditure on A.R.P. in country towns is a sort of half black-out. Originally, the lamps on the Shannon scheme standards used to have a nice white bowl around them. For one period they were shut off altogether. Then we got full light for a few weeks or so. Then they painted a nice white band around the lamps, with the result that there is a circle of light directly below the lamp, and ten to 15 yards are blacked out until you come to the next lamp. It is hard to see the sense in doing that. A black-out or a one-third black-out is merely a nuisance to anyone who has to walk on the streets of these towns at night.

I think the Minister will find it very difficult to convince the people of this country that the State has even got value for £34,000 out of this service not to speak of £94,000. As Deputy Cosgrave said, they ask for a nice round sum—they want £60,000 extra. I wonder would the Minister say actually what has been done as regards air raid precautions? I wonder do they think of taking their courage in their hands and going the whole hog, as they have done in other countries? Do they intend to dig large underground caverns and make air raid shelters, or is it merely that they want to get £94,000 odd, tinker with a new service, and waste money just as they are in the habit of wasting large sums of money which this House has been voting in many other directions. It will be difficult for the Minister to convince anybody in this country that the Department will give value for the £94,000 that they are asking this House to give them. It was £34,000 originally. It is now £94,000.

One of the reasons for a Supplementary Estimate—and really the only reason—ought to be that the original amount estimated was not sufficient to carry on the service. Apparently that is the position as regards these air raid precautions. One of the things agitating the minds of the people of this country very much is to know what is the Government's policy at all about air raid precautions. Take, for instance, the black-out. We blacked-out and then we did not black-out, and then we half blacked-out. What is the position at the moment? What is the policy about it? Are we going to have air raid precautions or are we not? Are we going to black-out or are we not? The Minister really ought to make up his mind on the question of the black-out and say either that it would be as well to black-out altogether or get the Shannon scheme authorities to erect a huge descriptive sign over the whole country pointing out that this is Eire, in order to show our neutrality and keep foreign aircraft from coming over us.

Another reason why I feel impelled to vote against the Supplementary Estimate is that it contains one item for which there is no earthly justification. It is a new institution. It has been and will be a wasteful institution. There was no necessity for it. There never will be any necessity for it. I refer to the office of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures. First of all, I wonder and everybody else in the country wonders, what was that Ministry established for. What has the Minister to do? What have his Department and the officials to do? It would not be very difficult to co-ordinate the defensive measures of this country, one would imagine. There was a reasonably sized Army up to last September; there was a small air force and a very small fleet, and one would assume that it was hardly beyond the capabilities of either the last Minister for Defence or the present Minister for Defence, without creating an additional department, to co-ordinate these three arms of our defence forces into one defensive measure. Apparently, the Government did not regard it so. I am afraid what really happened was that the last Minister for Defence plainly made a mess of things. He made a mess of the Army with his harebrained Volunteer force and his harebrained recruiting scheme since 1934. Obviously, things were going from bad to worse. Public confidence in the Army was shaken and when the European war broke out it gave the Government the chance of shifting them all around and landing somebody else, very unfortunately, into the job, to hold the baby. I am sorry for the present Minister for Defence that he got landed into that rather awkward position at a time when he was going to be let in for a lot of trouble, as he was. It is quite possible that the last Minister for Defence would be entirely incapable of co-ordinating our defensive arms, our air force and our navy, during the period he was in command. I hope the same could not be said about the present Minister. I hope that if he were left to do the job properly he would be capable of doing it. Apparently what happened was this: the Government, or rather the Taoiseach, decided to get rid of the last Minister for Defence—he was a failure at his job—and put the present man in. He could not get rid of him altogether; that would not look well. It would mean admitting that at long last he had to sack one of the boys. That would not look well at all. They had to get a way out. The Taoiseach could have adopted another expedient, that is, to hand over one of his own Ministries, the Ministry of External Affairs or the Ministry of Education. Apparently, the Taoiseach did not want to surrender these two posts. Having no other job for the man, not liking to sack him altogether for fear of being held up to ridicule publicly and the reactions in the Government, the one way was to create a new job. They created a new job. They called it the Ministry for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures.

Dr. O'Higgins

The Irish House of Lords.

Mr. Linehan

They are asking for £7,056, in addition to officers whose salaries are already borne on other Estimates, to create a nest-egg for that Ministry. Deputy O'Higgins says it is the Irish House of Lords. One disadvantage of putting the ex-Minister for Defence, or anybody like him, into the job of co-ordination of defence is that it is not like the House of Lords. When a man is sent to the House of Lords he is rendered harmless and it does not cost the public very much, but in a new Department he is rendered anything but harmless. If the last Minister for Defence made such a mess of the one single item, the Department of Defence, what can the country expect he will do when he has the job of supervising our present Minister for Defence, possibly cutting completely across him and saying: "You have got your job to do. Look after the Department of Defence. When you have fixed it up I will co-ordinate it." I do not know what the idea could possibly be. One would imagine that we were a large Power, that we had millions of men in the Army, that we had an air force running into thousands of men and thousands of machines, that we had a fleet that had to sail over every ocean in this world and that, in addition to the people in control of the various individual services, we would want some co-ordinating machinery. I do not think the present Minister or anybody else can justify in this House the creation of an additional burden on the backs of the Irish people, in other words, putting a watch-dog over the present Minister for Defence, putting a man into a new job called the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, obviously with no particular job to do except possibly to keep his eye on the Department of Defence. I do not believe any Deputy in this House would be justified in voting for the Estimate if it contained nothing else but this little item of £7,056 for the creation of a Department called a Ministry for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures.

At one time Fianna Fáil had economy on the brain. There is one small item— the smallest in the Estimate—another round figure of £5,000—and, even though the Army has increased and even though, possibly, their activities have increased considerably, it seems to me that it is a shocking waste of money that telegrams and telephones cost the Army £5,000 per annum. They are not tens of thousands of miles away from each other. They are not holding a long front where there is vital necessity to get into immediate communication with each other. I think that it is little items like these that go to increase the cost of administration.

It is very hard to know what justification there is for expending £5,000 on telegrams and telephones. If everybody in the Army rang one another up once a week for the next 12 months, we would hardly expect them to spend that much on telephones.

Another peculiar feature about this Estimate is that it is not balanced. As Deputy Cosgrave stated, the expenditure is tested by the pay which is increased by £244,522, on a total payroll of practically £1,000,000. The increase in mechanical transport is entirely out of proportion to the increase in the expenditure on pay, because mechanical transport is costing ten times as much as was provided for in the original Estimate. Again, the increase in the Estimate for fuel, light and water in kind, and fuel oils is £108,000. Thus it will cost half as much to supply the extra men with water, fuel and oil as it will to pay them their actual salaries. There is certainly something wrong when it is costing ten times as much for transport as was originally provided for. The Minister would be a much better judge of the situation if he went back for ten or 12 years and reflected on the promises of his Party to wipe out the Army altogether, before coming into this House for a third time this year to present us with an Army Budget. We had the ordinary Estimate for the Army in April of last year. We had the increased Estimate last September and now we are asked for the third time to provide additional money for the Army. If the Minister, as I say, went back ten or 12 years and adopted the dictum of his Party at that time, that the sooner the Army was wiped out the better, one might say that there might be some justification for that point of view, seeing what their handling of the Army has cost the people in the past year.

If the Minister could give any justification for mobilising the Army last September, or any explanation of the increase in the personnel of the Army; if he could explain anyway reasonably why this extra money or the mobilisation was required, he might get Deputies to agree that this Estimate was necessary. The Minister will have to convince me that there was some reason for the mobilisation or that there was some reason for the extra expenditure before he can persuade me to vote for it. The Minister will have to convince the people that the extra recruitment and the mobilisation were not merely an attempt by the Fianna Fáil Government to get certain people into the Army, not because they were going to do any good in it, but because it gave the Government a chance of fitting in the boys who were probably getting fedup because they were not being properly provided for. They had hoped that the Government would have looked after them for the last seven or eight years, but the Government were not making any effort to do so and these supporters of theirs thought they were being let down. Then the happy idea occurred to the Government to take these gentlemen and plank them into the Army, where they hoped they would be satisfied. The Minister will find it very hard to convince people of the necessity for this extra expenditure when it is recalled that the Fianna Fáil Party told the people before they came into office that by their new Constitution, and their various constitutional measures, they would create a State to whose internal structure nobody would ever object and that there would not be the slightest possibility of any armed opposition to Fianna Fáil as the national aspirations of everybody could be peacefully realised. Apparently, that stunt has not come off. I want to know whether the increase in the personnel in the Army and the vast increase in the expenditure is due to any fear of invasion or whether there is some other reason for it.

Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence (Mr. Moylan)

I thought that the particular section of which I am for the moment in charge was going to escape criticism. Nothing very much has been said against the various operations of the A.R.P. services, but Deputy Linehan is prepared to fight this question of North Cork "along these lines if it takes all summer".

Mr. Linehan

That is an old saying. Where did I hear that before?

Mr. Moylan

Mr. Dillon

Would the Parliamentary Secretary take this occasion to say, in the event of basements being placed at his disposal, what sort of reinforcement does he contemplate it will be necessary for the Government to make? Will it result in unsightly alterations, or will the alterations be of a character that will fit in with the normal user of the place?

Mr. Moylan

Mr. Hurley

There are some items on this Estimate to which we take very serious exception. There is one in particular which will require some explanation from the Minister and that is the sum of £60,000—"Protection of Civilian Population against Air and Gas Attack." We can all throw our minds back to the early days in September when the Dáil met here and when certain emergency powers were given to the Government. As a result of that session of the Dáil and as a result of the discussion that took place here, there seemed to be a panicky kind of idea not alone amongst the Government but through the country and the people as a whole. Orders were issued with regard to precautions against air raids, gas attacks and matters of that kind. The people were ordered to black-out every light and every semblance of light that might in any way cause an enemy to attack us from the air. I remember for the first few days the state of affairs in the City of Cork. The city was completely blacked-out. There were complaints to the corporation in every direction with regard to what was happening under cover of the black-out. As a result of the representations to the Minister the black-out was partly lifted. This is the point on which I would like some explanation. Institutions such as the vocational schools in Cork were still ordered to go ahead with their preparations for a complete black-out. I am a member of the vocational schools committee in the city and, with the other members, I was faced with a sum of £400 in expenses for the carrying out of the orders of the military. We pointed out that there was no reason, or very little reason, for such measures because, as we said, in our opinion the schools would be completely blacked-out at 9.30 when the classes finished and that for the short time required the expense was unnecessary. But an order from the Minister came drastically, ordering that the money was to be expended. The committee had to undergo that expense and to make all the preparations necessary for the black-out. So far, the black-out has not been put into operation, so apparently there was no necessity for it as far as the ordinary man in the street can see. In that way people were needlessly burdened with expenses which with a more reasonable outlook on the part of the authorities they should not have been compelled to undergo.

We have this figure of £60,000 here in this Estimate. I would like to know on what that sum is to be expended? For some time expenses have been falling on the local authorities caused by the sending of officials to Dublin to attend lectures on air raid precautions, but very little has been done about these lectures since. The Cork Corporation are not making any preparations to meet the suggestions with regard to air raid precautions. The situation or location of Cork City would not permit of the digging of trenches for air raid shelters because these would be flooded at once. As a matter of fact the city itself is flooded at high tides. Such a proceeding would be utterly out of the question. I should like to know what exactly the Minister has in mind when he puts down this sum of £60,000 as contribution to air raid protection costs. Does he intend to insist on a contribution from the local authorities? I know that the Cork Corporation and, I think, the county council, would be very slow to make any provision in that direction. Is this sum to be handed over to the local authorities or is it to be used exclusively for Dublin, because other parts of the country would require protection, in case of attack, as well as Dublin?

The Supplementary Estimate, as a whole, is very distasteful to us, of the Labour Party, because we feel that finance for social services is much more necessary than finance for the Army. The discussion to-night has been all one-sided but, at the same time, a good deal of truth has been stated. I think that what was said regarding the unnecessary panic in respect of equipping and preparing an army for the defence of the country was largely justified. We want to get more definite and more detailed information with regard to the items of this expenditure and, especially, with regard to the item covering air raid precautions.

Minister for Defence (Mr. Traynor)

Practically every member on the opposite side referred to the mobilisation of the Army in September and the justification for that step. I can only say that the explanation given by the Parliamentary Secretary, Deputy Moylan, regarding the justification for action taken in respect of air-raid precautions applies equally to the mobilisation of the Army in September. The responsibilities of government are very heavy. Many members on the opposite side have practical experience of that. Many members on the opposite benches have not had practical experience. Those responsibilities weighed, naturally, very heavily with the Government when taking its decision to mobilise the Army last September. The world situation which existed at that time was probably the most precarious that had existed for a generation. We saw small nations and large nations all over the world calling up their reserves and their volunteers and making every possible preparation to defend the liberty which they possessed. It may be that we were influenced—I am not saying that the Government itself was— by the fact that a world conflict of a magnitude which none of us could foresee was about to begin. We felt that, as a free people, we should take all necessary precautions in defence of the liberties which we possessed. That, as far as I know, was the main reason for the mobilisation of our Army in September. There was nothing in the nature of panic about it. It was discussed with the responsible heads of the Army. All were in agreement that, in view of the situation which existed, this was the proper precautionary step to take and it was taken. As soon as it was possible to begin the demobilisation of the Volunteers and the reservists, that demobilisation was undertaken but, there again, it had to be carefully done. We had to make certain that the situation was such that we could safely do it. Wherever men were in gainful employment or whereever they had commitments of a domestic nature which necessitated their return to their homes, these circumstances were taken into consideration. The members of the Army who made application for exemption from service had their cases examined, and, where it was found possible to exempt them, they were exempted.

Deputy O'Sullivan asked what the strength of the Army was on that occasion. It never exceeded 20,000, and its reduction has been proceeding gradually ever since. I am taking every opportunity that offers to reduce the numbers and I can assure the House that I am just as much concerned about expenditure on the Army as any other Deputy is. If it were possible, I should like to see an Army of 4,000 or 5,000, but I am afraid that that is Utopian and that, in present world conditions, it cannot be realised. In my humble opinion, to go to anything near that figure would be to invite invasion. I have been asked by many Deputies on the other side from whom we expect invasion. The only answer I can give to that is that I do not know. I only know that it is the duty of this Government, as I believe it would be the duty of any Government, to make provision for the defence of this country against such a possibility. That is the only thing I can say in respect of the query as to from whom we are expecting invasion.

Deputy MacEoin asked a question in respect of the number of Army officers who were exempted following mobilisation. Since these men were called up something like 109 officers have been exempted, and about 5,000 men have been returned to their employment. We are continuing that policy of returning men to their homes or employment as fast as it can possibly be done with safety. I do not think we can regard ourselves as being out of the wood yet, but there is one thing that we have done as a result of the general mobilisation, and that is we have secured a very large number of very highly-trained men. We have the regular Army, the members of which, beyond question, can be regarded as specialists in their profession. We have reservists who have been in such positions and who, if I may say so, have been re-trained. We have a large number of volunteers who have received sufficient training to enable them to be regarded as welltrained soldiers, capable of taking their place with the regular Army in matters connected with the defence of this country. That is one thing that has been gained as a result of the mobilisation of the Army.

Certain things have been said about the Volunteers. Now, I have been speaking to many of the senior officers of the Army with regard to the Volunteers. I have made it my business, because of the charges—the unfounded charges—that have been made against the Volunteers and the Volunteer movement, to make inquiries among the senior officers of the Army. I have gone out of my way to make inquiries with regard to the general demeanour, general attitude and discipline of these Volunteers, and also with regard to the general desire of men to become Volunteers, and I have been assured that the Army appreciates the services given by these Volunteers. While it is admitted—and of course it is only natural—that among these Volunteers there may be certain undesirable people, the fact that we may have these undesirables should not give to this Volunteer movement the name that has been attempted to be given to it by certain people, and mostly by members of this House.

Certain questions have been raised by one or two Deputies in respect of the manner in which civilian employees have been recruited into the Army workshops. I think that the Parliamentary Secretary answered that question already, but most of these men have been taken through the labour exchanges. So far as it is possible to do so, men with large families are given priority, but mostly these men are taken through the labour exchange. Where they are not taken through the labour exchange, they are taken through the recommendation of Deputies of this House, and I want to say that Deputies of this House, from all sides, have sent forward recommendations of such individuals for employment, and all these recommendations have been given consideration, no matter from what side they came.

Deputy O'Higgins, in the course of a tirade—mostly against the Minister, but largely against the present Army— described the present Army as a potential menace. I can assure Deputy O'Higgins that that will not be appreciated, I feel, by the Army generally. The Army, as it stands to-day, is, in the opinion of the General Headquarters Staff, with whom, as I mentioned a moment ago, I have discussed the question of the serious charges made against it, in as high a position as it ever has been. Many of these officers are men who have been in the Army for the last 17 or 18 years, and that is their opinion. That is the opinion of the General Headquarters Staff, and if anyone wants to dispute that, or if anybody should think I am making a mistake in saying so, they can easily find out for themselves by getting into contact with these officers.

There was also the question of the purchase of munitions. That, certainly, has been one of the gravest difficulties with which we have been confronted. However, I think that my predecessor made it clear last year, when putting through the annual Estimate, that not only was there the danger that there would be restrictions in respect of securing the Army requirements, but that there would also be the possibility that we would not be able to get any of our requirements at all. Now, it has not been just as bad as that. I think that we have purchased something over half a million pounds' worth of armaments during the present estimate year. We have received quantities of various types of ammunition, and we have received numbers of aeroplanes as well as numbers of defensive guns in the way of anti-aircraft artillery and so on, but we have not received anything like the numbers we should like to have received. I suppose that it was natural, in the circumstances, that we could not receive all the armaments we should have liked to receive. However, the question of the purchase of these has been mentioned in the course of this debate. There, again, we feel that, whenever and wherever it is possible to purchase armaments for the Army, they should be purchased, if only for the purpose of holding them in reserve in case any necessity should ever arise of having to re-mobilise the Army. That is something that I sincerely hope will not take place, but nevertheless I feel that it is one of these things for which we must make preparations.

Deputy Benson raised a question with regard to the staff of one of the coastal patrol vessels, and he mentioned the fact that, when we took over one of these patrol vessels from another Department, we dispensed with the services of a large number of men. In taking over that vessel, we did have to dispense with the services of one or two or perhaps three individuals, but if we did so it was because the individuals concerned either were over age or physically unfitted to undertake the work which would be necessary in order to man a vessel of the type which we desired. The "Muirchu" in the past was a fishing patrol vessel. In the future it will be more than that; it will be a war patrol vessel, and the people who will be on board that vessel will have to be up to the standard which is required generally in the Army.

Mr. McMenamin

With regard to these men who were displaced—the displaced men of the "Muirchu"—did you place them anywhere else?

Mr. Traynor

Not to my knowledge.

Mr. McMenamin

Had they any retiring rights?

Mr. Traynor

They were retired in the ordinary way as per their contracts—there was no question about that. Their engagements were terminated in accordance with whatever contracts they had with the Department. Deputy Cosgrave, in the course of his remarks, said he was far from satisfied with this Estimate. I do not suppose we could ever hope by any possible means to satisfy any of the members of the Opposition in respect to any Estimate that we might bring in. It is only natural they would take up the attitude they have taken up to-day in respect to this Estimate.

The Parliamentary Secretary has, I think, explained fully the matter raised by Deputy Hurley. Deputy Hurley was not in the House when the Parliamentary Secretary dealt with A.R.P. I think the Parliamentary Secretary covered the matters raised by Deputy Hurley, and I shall have to refer the Deputy to the Parliamentary Debates, where he can read what was stated here by the Parliamentary Secretary.

There were various statements made in respect to some of the figures connected with this Estimate. For instance, Deputy Linehan spoke of the cost of telephones and telegraphs. While the figure given merely mentions telegrams and telephones, I might say it also covers the wages of the operators in the various exchanges in the military barracks. Petrols and oils cover the stock of reserves and, while it may be suggested here that there was some type of joy-riding and something else going on, that is not so. The figures given cover reserve stocks and so on. I think I have dealt with all the points that have been raised.

Question put.

The Committee divided: Tá, 52; Níl, 30.

Tá

Aiken, Frank.
Allen, Denis.
Bartley, Gerald.
Beegan, Patrick.
Boland, Gerald.
Bourke, Dan.
Brady, Brian.
Brady, Seán.
Breathnach, Cormac.
Breslin, Cormac.
Buckley, Seán.
Crowley, Fred Hugh.
Crowley, Tadhg.
Derrig, Thomas.
Flynn, John.
Flynn, Stephen.
Fogarty, Andrew.
Fuller, Stephen.
Hannigan, Joseph.
Humphreys, Francis.
Kelly, James P.
Kennedy, Michael J.
Kissane, Eamon.
Lemass, Seán F.
Little, Patrick J.
Loughman, Francis.
Lynch, James B.
McCann, John.
McDevitt, Henry A.
Maguire, Ben.
Meaney, Cornelius.
Moore, Séamus.
Morrissey, Michael.
Moylan, Seán.
Munnelly, John.
O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
O'Grady, Seán.
O'Loghlen, Peter J.
O'Reilly, Matthew.
O'Rourke, Daniel.
O'Sullivan, Ted.
Rice, Brigid M.
Ruttledge, Patrick J.
Ryan, James.
Ryan, Martin.
Ryan, Robert.
Sheridan, Michael.
Smith, Patrick.
Traynor, Oscar.
Victory, James.
Walsh, Richard.
Ward, Conn.

Níl

Bennett, George C.
Benson, Ernest E.
Burke, Patrick.
Byrne, Alfred (Junior).
Cole, John J.
Cogan, Patrick.
Cosgrave, William T.
Costello, John A.
Curran, Richard.
Dillon, James M.
Dockrell, Henry M.
Fagan, Charles.
Giles, Patrick.
Hughes, James.
Hurley, Jeremiah.
Keating, John.
Linehan, Timothy.
MacEoin, Seán.
McFadden, Michael Og.
McGovern, Patrick.
McMenamin, Daniel.
Mulcahy, Richard.
Murphy, Timothy J.
Nally, Martin.
O'Higgins, Thomas F.
O'Neill, Eamonn.
O'Sullivan, John.
Redmond, Bridget M.
Reidy, James.
Ryan, Jeremiah.

Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Smith and Seán Brady; Níl: Deputies Bennett and Nally.

Question declared carried.

Votes 53, 55 and 65 reported and agreed to.

Progress reported; the Committee to sit again to-morrow.

Dáil Éireann díospóireacht - Tuesday, 5 Mar 1940

Supplementary and Additional Estimates. - Vote 65—Army.

Tá

Níl

Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 5 Mar 1940