I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time. The purpose of this Bill is to amend existing legislation dealing with reformatories and industrial schools. In 1936 a commission of inquiry, which was set up to deal with the reformatory and industrial school system, reported and made certain recommendations which included proposals for the amendment of the law regarding the care and protection of children. Experience of the administration of the industrial and reformatory school system has also shown amendment of the Children Act in certain respects to be desirable and this Bill provides for such amendment. The provisions are explained fairly fully in the explanatory memorandum which has been circulated.
The most important amendments, I think, are those relating to the grounds for committal to industrial schools. These are laid down in Section 58 of the original Act and it is proposed to make certain amendments to that section. For example, in clause (b) of the Children Act, 1908, where the ground for committal is laid down as "is found wandering and not having any home or settled place of abode, or visible means of subsistence, or is found wandering and having no parent or guardian, or a parent or guardian who does not exercise proper guardianship," it is proposed to delete the two words "wandering and" in both places where these words occur. The position is that there is no legal definition of the word "wandering" in the Principal Act, and I am advised that in actual practice the provisions of clause (b) of Section 58 are interpreted as if the word had no material effect in the context. It is therefore proposed that the other circumstances mentioned in the clause, apart from wandering, should be regarded as sufficient for the court to commit a child to an industrial school.
With regard to clause (c) in the section, which is mentioned on page 1 of the memorandum, where the child "is found destitute, not being an orphan and having both parents or his surviving parent, or in the case of an illegitimate child his mother, undergoing penal servitude or imprisonment," a case has actually arisen where a parent, in prison for a rather serious offence, refused his consent that the child might be committed under the Children Act, 1929, which governs the committal of children against whom no offence has been charged but who are found in a state of destitution.
Under that Act the consent of the parents is necessary, but we have had this case where the father, although in prison, refused to give his consent. In any event, quite apart from such cases, I feel that the court ought to have discretion where not both but one of the parents is either in penal servitude or in prison. The court in such a case should have discretion to consider whether in the child's best interests he or she should not be committed to an industrial school.
The next provision in the Principal Act reads: (d) "is under the care of a parent or guardian who, by reason of criminal or drunken habits, is unfit to have the care of the child." Cases have arisen where it has not been possible to deal with children satisfactorily under the provisions of Section 58 of the Principal Act and neither has the coúrt had that discretion under the Act of 1929 to commit the children by reason of the fact that, although it felt that in the child's best interests committal was necessary, the consent of one or other of the parents was not forthcoming. It has been represented to me that an endeavour should be made to give the court more discretion to deal with such cases. While I do not think it advisable to recommend an amendment of the 1929 Act which might appear drastic, an amendment involving the question of the consent of the parents, I feel, even if there is a relatively small number of cases, and these cases may be very exceptional or they may be border-line cases, that so long as there is even that small number of cases where it would be in the child's best interests that the court should have discretion to consider whether he or she might or might not be committed, the best course is to endeavour to increase as far as possible the reasonable discretion of the court. I am proposing to delete the words "by reason of criminal or drunken habits", though I admit frankly that I feel some further amendment of the clause will be necessary and that as it is at present set out in the Bill it may not command the assent of the House.
With regard to the amendments affecting committals to reformatory and industrial schools, there are a number dealing with the age of committal. The House will have seen in the explanatory memorandum that the proposals in the Bill involve increasing the age where a young offender may be committed to a reformatory school from 16 to 17 years. The definition of a young person formerly was from 12 to 16 years. We are now proposing to alter it to read from 12 to 17 years. This is following on the lines of legislation elsewhere. In the case of committal to industrial schools, we are making no change in the age for committal. A good many people feel that there should be discretion given to the courts to commit children to industrial schools even above the age of 14 years. I have not found, however, after an examination of this matter, that those who are in the best position from practical experience to speak on these questions feel that that is the best solution.
It is felt that after the age of 14 years boys in particular undergo certain changes in character and development, and that they present a somewhat different problem to that of boys under 14 years of age.
I should have explained to the House that we are changing the period of detention which ends at the age of 16 years in the case of industrial school committals. A boy at present may be put into an industrial school up to 14. After 14 he is sent to a reformatory or dealt with in some other way. I am informed, as I have said, by those who are best in a position to judge, and who have most experience of the actual handling of young people of that age who have been committed, that after the age of 14 years conditions, sociological or otherwise, make the treatment of young people over 14, different from the treatment of those under that age. We are, therefore, taking special powers to continue the detention of such children until they are 17, but only with the consent of the parent or guardian, where it would appear that the child would benefit substantially by giving him a special educational training, by sending him, for example, to a secondary or a vocational school.
With regard to the period of detention, we are reducing this in the case of the reformatory schools, from three to five years to two to four years. It is felt that at present justices who might feel that it was in the child's best interest to be placed under the care of one of the religious orders who have the management of these schools, might have a certain reluctance in committing a young offender for such a lengthy period. Experience seems to indicate that the shorter period of from two to four years may be more satisfactory and may work out to greater advantage.
There is then the important question of after-care supervision. At present, a child or young person may be released on licence by the manager or conditionally released by the Minister. In certain cases the manager has power to bring him back again to the school if the conditions on which he was granted release or the terms of the licence are not fulfilled but, in order to do this, he has to be brought formally before a court. I feel that this procedure is unnecessary, and that it should be sufficient, when the licence is revoked, and when it is clear to the manager or the Minister that the conditions attaching to it are not fulfilled, that the Gárda should be empowered to bring the child or young person back to the school from which he was licensed or conditionally released.