While the banks had a reduced annual income of £13,332 as a result of that transaction, they had certain receipts, because they lent the money either to the Dublin Corporation or to the Government at a certain rate. If they lent it to the Government at a rate of 3 per cent., then they had, as a result of the income on Government securities, £30,000 coming into them which, placed against the loss of £13,332, gave them a net annual profit of £16,668. If their loan was made to the Government at 2 per cent., they had an income from their additional Government securities of £20,000, which, placed against the previous loss of £13,332, left the banks with a gross profit of £6,668.
I have stated that, when the public lent £1,000,000 to the Government, the banking system had a net loss of income of £3,333, and when the banks themselves lent to the Government, even at 2 per cent., they had a profit of £6,668. I ask the assistance of the Minister and the Department of Finance in indicating whether that is right or not. What is wrong in that calculation? If we establish the arguments that are made there as correct, then we can proceed to superimpose on that any other facts that arise out of such a transaction. I isolate it completely for the purpose of having it clearly examined and for the purpose of seeing where the arguments are wrong. I do not think it can be demonstrated that they are, but I think it is essential for us to say to one another: "Here is a thing we agree happens, when the banks lend money to the Government, on the one hand, and the people lend money to the Government on the other".
I have shown that in the early part of 1939 the standing committee declined to underwrite a loan of £2,000,000 for the Dublin Corporation. Then, having dragged it out for a couple of months, and having, to my mind, injured the credit of the Dublin Corporation in the finance market, they agreed to underwrite a loan of £1,500,000, which was not all taken up. The standing committee of the banks had to take up £650,000. If the public had lent, at no matter what rate of interest, the £2,000,000 originally asked for by the Dublin Corporation, the banking system here would have lost a good income. It would not have killed the banks; it is simply one of the ordinary things that happens to the banking system. But they would have lost a certain amount of money. On the other hand, when the banks lent £650,000 to the Dublin Corporation, which was supposed to be a bankrupt concern whose loan to the extent of £2,000,000 could not be underwritten by the banks—when they lent them £650,000 at what amounted to 4.1 per cent., the banks made a profit of £19,000 a year out of this bankrupt concern. I ask the Minister to examine the case I have made with regard to the loan, under two alternative conditions, of £1,000,000 to the Government or to a public body.
There is another aspect that also requires examination. The same report in paragraph 652 says:—
"We assume the adoption of a building programme of 2,300 dwellings per annum for 20 years, on capital borrowed at 3 per cent. for a 60-year repayment period, and we estimate the financial effects to be as under...."
Later, on the question of the capital cost, in paragraph 660 the report says:—
"The total capital expenditure involved would be, therefore, for 20 years £22,135,000."
Let us take that figure for the moment. That capital will be borrowed under circumstances in which the Dublin Corporation, it is assumed, would pay 3 per cent. for the money over a 60-year repayment period. All the money that we have borrowed in the past for housing purposes has been borrowed over a period of 35 years.
There is a difference in the amount of money that is paid as an annuity for a loan borrowed for 35 years or borrowed for 60 years. If the Minister will refer to any of the general tables dealing with these matters, he will see that for £100 borrowed at 3 per cent. for 35 years, the annuity required to pay off capital and interest over the period of 35 years would be £4 13s. 1d. If the repayment is to take place over 60 years, the annual amount would be £3 12s. 3¼d. The Minister will find that if he was borrowing money at 3 per cent. over 35 years, on the one hand, and over 60 years on the other hand, the total amount he would have to pay to redeem the 35 years' loan would be £162 17s. 11d., by way of principal and interest, whereas if he were borrowing over 60 years he, or the local body, would have to repay £220 8s. 6¼d. That is to say, that he would have to pay £57 10s. 7½d. more when borrowing over a period of 60 years than if he were borrowing over a period of 35 years.
If we take it that the Dublin Corporation will have, over 20 years, a capital expenditure of £22,135,000, then somebody in Dublin will have unnecessarily to pay out over those 20 years, by way of additional interest charges alone, a sum of £17,727,000, an amount greater than the whole of State grant and the whole amount of capital which it is contemplated will be given by the State for housing plans in the City of Dublin.
When we consider the arguments that have been included in the report, based on costs, I think the houses will cost very much more. It is shown in appendices 21 and 22 that flats in the City of Dublin in 1939 cost on the average £913 and cottages £620. If we are to be able to get our houses built even at 1939 costs, it is going to cost us more. The total capital expenditure for a 20-years programme in Dublin would be £31,000,000 and the excess interest paid in borrowing for the 60 years as against 35 years would be £18,000,000. The report on building indicates that unless steps are taken pretty quickly to get started, valuable opportunities will be lost and we may not be able to get our programme started at all. The report on the postwar building programme at page 9 says:—
"The successful determination of these two elements of the building programme, namely, the best initial effort and the best rate of development, is of paramount importance to the future of the building industry. Unless there is an effective start, opportunities may be lost which can never be recovered".
Unless we get clear immediately as to the principles upon which we are going to finance housing carried out by local authorities there can be no reasonable or quick start which will ensure systematic continuity of the building of houses.
The cost of money is of the highest importance in connection with housing, so that these points have to be examined urgently and at once: the rate the Government are going to adopt as a policy in respect of payment for money and the period over which the Government are going to borrow. It is very difficult not to comment in a general way on it, but all our purposes would be better served if these matters were examined in a practical and detached way as early as possible. There is a very considerable amount of additional money in circulation, and, so long as that additional money is in circulation, it will be making claims of one kind or another. There is a tendency for the population to fall, a tendency for the national income to become static and a tendency, because of the greater amount of money in circulation, and particularly idle money, which does not know what to do with itself, to make very considerable claims on the people. I do not think that persons holding idle money should be given the opportunity of making additional claims on the national income, which would reduce the amount of national income available for those who are workers.
In that connection, and just by way of suggestion, I should like to refer the Minister to a paragraph on page 34 of The Economist of 14th July, 1945, which, rather in connection with a different matter but nevertheless with a bearing on the distribution of the national income, says:—
"The primary need now is to re-establish in the ordinary man's mind the idea that there is a direct connection between his own output and his own income. If the unions..."
—that is, the trade unions—
"...would join in a campaign of industrial education of this kind— similar to the war-time drive for production—then, as was suggested in The Economist's Election Manifesto, some sort of solemn treaty should be concluded with them guaranteeing that the lion's share of any benefit from increased productivity should go to the wage earner. The lion's share is not the whole—the wealth-producing capital must be remunerated sufficiently to maintain its flow—nor would it be right that any benefits of increased productivity in an industry should go exclusively to the wage earners in that particular industry, who may have had little to do with it and may deserve a bonus no better than the workers in other industries less susceptible of technical improvement. Some part of the benefits of technical progress must be allowed to go, by lower prices, to the generality of consumers. But the principle does mean that a demonstration must be made at all times that the ordinary man is the main beneficiary of the fruits of progress and that they are not squandered on the capitalist or the rentier.”
That does not bear directly on what we are discussing here, but I quote it in order to emphasise that producers, whether workers or people with capital which they are using in a productive way — increasing employment and increasing production— cannot afford to have merely idle money demanding such rates of interest as will raise the cost of houses and take substantial sums—small individually, but substantial in the aggregate—out of the pockets of people who are the real workers in the country.
There is a definite problem to be faced there and I think we can face it effectively and with understanding only if we isolate, in the way I endeavoured to isolate them in March last, and in which I again endeavour now, some of the important aspects of the transactions which have to take place in the lending of money, examine them carefully and openly and are enabled to come to a common understanding on them. The Minister, when speaking on his Estimate, seemed not to have quite grasped either what I was at or the spirit in which I was arguing. I ask him now to refer to the things I have said here to-day and to the matters I put before him on 14th March last. I can communicate with him, and put the matter on paper for him, and would be glad to receive any comment from him on the case put up here and, if necessary, follow it up either by correspondence or by further examination from my point of view.