Before the adjournment on the last evening I endeavoured to show that there was a case of necessity for the existence of this system by which the broad principles and essential parts of legislation are provided for in an Act of Parliament and the subsidiary details, particularly the administrative details, are then worked out by the Minister and published as Orders under his name. That delegated legislation is essentially subordinate in nature and the conclusions arrived at, both from reason and supported by the investigations of the Donoughmore Committee and others, were that the practice was advisable, that in any case it was inevitable under modern conditions, and that it was becoming more and more necessary as the functions of Government were taken up with the details of everyday life more and more as time went on. Further reasoning brings us to another conclusion and again it is a conclusion supported by the investigations carried out by the committee of which I have spoken. That is, that there is clearly a danger in this system, a danger of the Executive possibly acting beyond the will of Parliament. We may as well face the fact that there is a problem here and it is not a problem peculiar to this country. It is not a problem that, as some members on the Opposition tried to make out, is peculiar to the present time here.
It has been convenient for a certain line—I cannot call it policy—recently to work up certain catch-cries, and it is convenient for them to advert to this question of Statutory Rules and Orders now. I should like to remind the House, however, that this problem has arisen in England, perhaps more acutely than here, and that it is a problem for all democratic Legislatures at present. In facing up to this problem, it is accepted that the system must be worked and the question is how to work it. How to work it turns upon the question of safeguards. What are the safeguards that are necessary? The safeguards are these: firstly, that the Orders remain always subordinate to Parliament. Nobody can suggest that this House has not complete power to revoke or alter in the appropriate way any Order of the Minister; the supremacy of this House remains as it has been and as it is.
The second safeguard is that it is desirable that members of the Oireachtas should have access to these Orders. I do not think anyone will deny that it has been the practice, in the case of Statutory Rules and Orders generally, to place them on the Table of the House. In most cases I think there is a provision of annulment within a period of time. If that is not sufficient notice, it is difficult to see what would be. Not only are safeguards provided in the House itself but there are other safeguards for the public. Reason dictates that safeguards be provided, and again it is a question for the House to see how far they have been carried into effect. Publicity, for instance, is one obvious safeguard. What is the publicity afforded? In the case of every Statutory Rule and Order, notice of its enactment will be published in the Official Gazette—Iris Oifigiúil. In addition to that, the Order itself is printed and is available at the Stationery Office. There are copies at the Stationery Office for anyone to buy. I might qualify that by saying that during the emergency certain emergency Orders were roneoed off, prior to printing, in order to save time, but definitely in regard to ordinary Rules and Orders, which I understand form the subject of this motion, they are printed and on public sale at the Stationery Office. What other publicity can you have within reason? Of course it is open to every diligent member of the House to secure copies of these Orders. He can read the gazette to find out what they are, what they relate to and where they are. He can then, if he is energetic enough, go down and purchase a copy and if he does not like the terms of the Order and wishes to criticise it, he can put down a motion for that purpose in this House. What more do Deputies want in the line of safeguards, from the point of view of publicity and questioning the matter in the House?
To return to the Donoughmore Report, the Donoughmore Report mentions safeguards and proceeds to deal with such matters as the need for having the powers of delegation clearly defined. If any Deputy cares to inspect the normal peace-time enactments of this House, I think he will find that the powers of the Minister to prescribe regulations are strictly confined to certain matters, that there is no general power to enact or no power that would give a Minister an opportunity of overriding an Act. In certain cases—I think the Road Traffic Act might be one—you will find the actual matters about which the Minister can legislate enumerated alphabetically. I do not see how you can go further in circumscribing and defining the matters about which the Minister can make regulations, unless, of course, you are going to tie him and prevent him making any effective regulations at all and then you are in the danger, of which I spoke previously, of having the intention of an Act of Parliament negatived by the absence of administrative detail for its implementation.
This logically leads to consideration of the famous Henry VIII clause. That was a clause that virtually delegated complete legislative powers in certain matters to a Minister. That clause you will find is exceptionally rare in modern delegated legislation and the recommendation of the Donoughmore Committee was that it should be used only for very grave and serious reasons. Again I suggest to Deputies who are interested in this matter to examine the statutes which have been passed by this Parliament. Let them take the sections which empower Ministers to make Orders and they will find that this type of clause is of very rare occurrence. I do not know myself of any such clause in normal peace-time Orders. One could go further into detail in regard to this matter but, as I had already taken up a good part of the time of the House before the adjournment, I do not propose to go into the question further. I would ask Deputies who support this motion what other method for making democratic government effective can you have? Is it seriously proposed that we should legislate for every little detail in this House? Let them ask themselves that question and give an honest answer to it. When they do, they will find they have to delegate power to some executive body —and what better executive body can there be than a Minister of State? Ministers are responsible to this House and it is not the practice to delegate to anyone else the powers to make Orders. The House also has complete control of penalties, as it is not the practice to delegate the power to inflict penalties. Again I ask what other system can the House have to make democratic institutions effective in practice?
To return to the terms of the motion, the proposers ask to have a select committee set up. The next question then is—what is the need for such a committee? Again, what can such a committee find out? Here is a problem that has been examined exhaustively and in detail. We have the Donoughmore Report of 14 years ago, we have books published on it from both points of view, we have had the Ministerial answers and the Opposition speeches in this House and in many other Houses. The problem has been thoroughly examined and there is an inevitable conclusion, both from reason and on the findings of those investigations. Delegated legislation by order is a necessity. There is unanimity in regard to the safeguards that should be observed. Why, then, waste the time of this House with a committee to examine such matters? The members of the House would be much better concerned—as they are concerned—with the legislation going through.
I suggest that there is no case for a committee, that the practical problem before us is to continue to work our institutions. In order to administer the law and keep the functions of government going, Ministers will be making Orders from time to time, as may be necessary, and this House can keep its control on Orders. Any Deputy can ask questions or move motions here and so keep the Minister within bounds. The exercise of that safeguard is much more desirable than the setting up of an academic committee to consider something already sufficiently discussed. While the committee may be sitting and considering, and in the end only coming to conclusions already come to, the necessary work from day to day may be neglected. For that reason, I suggest that no case has been made for the appointment of a committee. We are all agreed that there is an inherent problem in this matter, and we can be equally agreed that the only one way to solve it is to provide certain safeguards. In other words, we should make democracy work instead of hindering democracy by some of the talk indulged in by some Deputies who have supported this motion.
For these reasons, while sympathising with the desire of the proposer and seconder of this motion to guard our fundamental Parliamentary rights, I do think it is unnecessary to set up any select committee and I would recommend to the House that that should not be done.