I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time. This short Bill proposes two changes in the existing law relating to district justices, one affecting the retiring age of justices and the other providing for an increase in the maximum number of justices that may be employed at any one time.
The present position as regards the retiring age of justices is that, under Section 15 of the Courts of Justice (District Court) Act, 1946, all justices must retire automatically on reaching the age of 65. The only exceptions to this rule are three of the Dublin metropolitan justices and the Cork City justice, whose right to remain on until 70 was preserved for them by Section 15 of the 1946 Act. There is also a provision in Section 47 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1936, which empowers the Government to extend the retiring age of a justice assigned to an Irish-speaking district, provided that the Government are satisfied that he is able to do the work of his courts through the medium of Irish and that he is not suffering from any disability which would render him unfit to continue to discharge the duties of his office.
In Section 2 of the Bill we are proposing to confer power on the Chief Justice, after consultation with the Minister for Justice, to continue a justice in office from year to year after he has reached the age of 65. The maximum period for which a justice may be so continued in office is five years. The justice must each year satisfy the Chief Justice that he (the justice) is not suffering from any disability which would render him unfit to continue to discharge efficiently the duties of his office. As a corollary, Section 47 of the 1936 Act, which I have just mentioned, is being repealed.
Views may differ as to the wisdom of keeping justices in office after they have reached the age of 65, which has been the normal retiring age for the general body of justices ever since our own system of courts was set up in 1924. I am fully alive to the fact that Section 15 of the 1946 Act, in so far as it reduced from 70 to 65 the retiring age of the Dublin and Cork justices (with, of course, the saving for the justices then in office in these two districts), reflected a policy with which it may be said the proposal now before the House is in conflict. The conflict may, however, be more apparent than real and in any event I do not think that the proposal in the Bill is to be condemned merely because it may appear to conflict with what was done in 1946. I may, indeed, recall that when the 1946 Act was under discussion in this House more than one Deputy expressed the view that it was a mistake to reduce the retiring age of the Dublin and Cork justices to 65, and some Deputies, in fact, urged that the retiring age for all justices should be 70. I do not subscribe entirely to that view myself. I think that it is better that the normal retiring age should be 65, but, having regard to the safeguards that are provided for in Section 2 of the Bill, I do not think that any valid or reasonable objection can be urged against the proposal in that section to enable the retiring age of any particular justice to be extended beyond 65.
I would invite the special attention of Deputies to the fact that, unlike Section 47 of the 1936 Act which conferred the power of extension on the Government, Section 2 of the Bill proposes to confer that power on the Chief Justice who is the titular head of the judiciary. I feel sure that there will be general agreement that this is an improvement. It will remove even the suggestion of any possibility of interference by the Executive with the independence guaranteed to the judiciary by the Constitution. If a justice, when he is about to reach the age of 65, is able to satisfy the Chief Justice that he is fit to continue to discharge the duties of his office and, year by year, during the next five years, is able to produce satisfactory evidence of this fact, I can see no reason why he should not be retained in office. From the State's point of view the pension of the justice is saved and the State, moreover, benefits by being able to retain the services of a skilled and experienced justice. The risk of loss to the State resulting from a serious and protracted illness is reduced to a minimum by the requirement that the justice must produce evidence annually as to his fitness to continue to discharge the duties of his office. The proposal has manifest advantages also, of course, from the justice's point of view. He will continue in gainful employment instead of being "put on the shelf" while still capable of doing the work of a justice and, in many cases, will be enabled to qualify for a higher pension. This is a consideration of some importance because many justices are appointed to office at 40 or over and they cannot hope to qualify for anything like full pension on retirement at 65. An extension of the period of office for five years will go far in such cases towards improving the superannuation prospects of the justices concerned.
I should perhaps say a word about the provision for consultation with the Minister for Justice. Such a provision is considered desirable because there may be circumstances affecting either the particular justice or the position generally in the District Court at the time of which the Minister for Justice might be aware and which it might be proper and desirable to bring to the notice of the Chief Justice before he decides to extend the period of office of the justice. I want to stress, however, that the Chief Justice is given a completely unfettered discretion in the matter and is not bound to act upon or accept any suggestions or representations that might be made to him by the Minister.
In the new circumstances there will no longer be any need for the provision in Section 47 of the 1936 Act which empowers the Government to extend the retiring age of justices in Irish-speaking districts. In fact, it would be altogether illogical and undesirable that there should be two separate authorities vested with the power to extend the retiring age of justices. Accordingly, the Bill provides, as I have already mentioned, for the repeal of Section 47 of the 1936 Act.
I turn now to the provisions in Section 3 of the Bill for an increase in the maximum number of district justices. Prior to the enactment of the Act of 1946 the position was that under Section 68 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, the number of district justices was limited to 33. The Courts of Justice Act, 1928, provided, however, for the appointment of not more than four assistant justices. The office of assistant justice was distinguished from the office of justice only in that the assistant justice was paid a smaller salary than a justice and was not permanently assigned to any particular district. In 1946 there were three assistant justices holding office. For several years before that temporary justices had been employed on an everincreasing scale, as many as seven or eight such justices being necessary at times. I do not think that I need dwell now on the reasons for this except, perhaps, to mention that the main reason was the extraordinary increase in the volume of business in the Dublin District Court, particularly in the war years. There appears to have been general agreement that the employment of temporary justices on so extensive a scale as had become necessary was most undesirable and open to serious objections, and I think I am correct in saying that one of the main objects of my predecessor in office in introducing the Act of 1946 was to get rid of the necessity for the continual employment of temporary justices. The Act of 1946 abolished the office of assistant justice and provided for an increase to 40 in the maximum number of justices. The three assistant justices in office at the time were appointed justices and permanently assigned to the Dublin metropolitan district where, in fact, they had been continuously employed for several years before that. The position then was that there were six justices permanently assigned to Dublin. Four new justices were then appointed, bringing the total number up to 40 as permitted by the new Act. The four additional justices were not permanently assigned to any district and were, in theory at all events, supposed to be available to be assigned, from time to time, to any district in which their services might be required. Hence they became known as "moveable" justices. It was recognised quite frankly at the time that the services of at least two of these justices would be required in Dublin for some time to come but it was thought, or, at any rate, hoped, that the four "moveable" justices, with, perhaps, occasional help from "temporaries," would suffice to meet all needs including the provision of reliefs for country justices as well as the extra help required in Dublin. In fact, two of the "moveable" justices have been employed continuously in Dublin ever since their appointment in the autumn of 1946 and a third "moveable" has been similarly tied down in that district for the last 15 months or so. The fourth "moveable" justice has been immobilised for more than half of his time in one of the districts adjacent to Dublin in which the volume of work for several years past has been far more than the permanently assigned justice could cope with.
In these circumstances it is not surprising to find that the hopes entertained at the time of the passing of the 1946 Act that it would be possible thereafter to do without temporary justices, except perhaps occasionally, were doomed to be very quickly disappointed. Except for a brief period last year, there has been since the 1st October, 1946, no time when we have not had at least one temporary justice operating and on occasions we have had as many as four, five or six. In the period from the 1st October, 1946, to the 31st March last, which covers two and a half years, temporary justices were employed to an extent which was the equivalent of more than two full-time justices. Present indications are that additional assistance to very much the same extent will continue to be required for a very considerable time to come.
I want at this stage to revert to the position in the Dublin metropolitan district. As I have explained, following the permanent assignment to that district of the three assistant justices on their appointment as justices in 1946, there were then six justices permanently assigned to that district. Two of the "moveable" justices, as I have also explained, have been employed continuously in that district for the last two and a half years, and the Government, when I recently brought the matter before them, decided that as these two justices were doing exactly the same work as the permanently assigned justices and that as there was no prospect of being able to do without their services in Dublin in the foreseeable future, they should now be given the status of Dublin metropolitan justices which would entitle them to the increased salary of £1,430 per annum as compared with £1,300 per annum. In pursuance of this decision, the Government formally appointed the two justices in question permanently to the Dublin metropolitan district as from the 1st April last.
The present position, therefore, is that, instead of having four "moveable" justices as was contemplated by the 1946 Act, we have only two and one of these is at present immobilised in Dublin and is likely to remain there for some considerable time to come, while the other will continue to be required to give at least half of his time to one particular district adjacent to Dublin. Faced, therefore, with a situation in which the services of temporary justices would be required more or less continually for an indefinite period, the Government have decided that it would be preferable to increase the number of permanent justices rather than carry on as has been done for the last couple of years by having recourse to the employment of temporary justices. The Bill, accordingly, proposes to raise to 42 the maximum number of justices that may hold office at any one time. I want to stress that the figure of 42 is a maximum figure and that there will be no obligation to have that number all the time if the state of the business in the District Court does not warrant it. On the other hand, I should like to make it clear that I can give no guarantee that, even with the maximum number of justices raised to 42, it will be possible to dispense entirely with the services of temporary justices, but I think we may hope that in the altered circumstances it will be possible to avoid employing "temporaries" except very occasionally. No reasonable person would, I think, expect that we should maintain a permanent establishment of justices sufficient to meet all and every kind of emergency. To do so would be to err needlessly on the side of extravagance. What we should aim at is to have a permanent establishment as nearly adequate to meet all probable needs as is consistent with prudent economy and so reduce to a minimum the occasions upon which recourse must be had to the services of temporary justices. This is the underlying idea in Section 3 of the Bill and I am confident that it will commend itself to all sides of the House.