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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 4 Mar 1953

Vol. 136 No. 14

Committee on Finance. - Vote 56—Defence.

I move:—

That a supplementary sum not exceeding £695,000 be granted to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1953, for the Defence Forces (including certain Grants-in-Aid) under the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts, and for certain administrative Expenses in connection therewith; for certain Expenses under the Offences against the State Acts, 1939 and 1940 (No. 13 of 1939 and No. 2 of 1940) and the Air-raid Precautions Acts, 1939 and 1946 (No. 21 of 1939 and No. 28 of 1946); for Expenses in connection with the issue of Medals, etc.; for Expenses of the Bureau of Military History; and for a Grant-in-Aid of the Irish Red Cross Society (No. 32 of 1938).

In moving the Defence Estimates for 1952/53, I pointed out that a sum of £928,000 had been provided for warlike stores, including naval requirements. I also informed the House that contracts to the value of about £850,000 had at that time been placed for suitable warlike stores and that negotiations had been opened for the purchase of additional supplies. In replying to the Debate, I envisaged the possibility of a Supplementary Estimate being necessary, because of the fact that the supply position had eased and that there were, therefore, grounds for hoping that suitable extra stores would be obtainable.

That, in effect, has proved to be theposition, and while the Supplementary Estimate which I have just moved relates to a number of things in addition to warlike stores, it will be seen that the provision for warlike stores is the heaviest item in the Estimate and that, in fact, the Supplementary Estimate would be unnecessary were it not for that item.

As regards the additional sum required under sub-head P for warlike stores, which is £860,000, I may, perhaps, say that in 1951 it was found necessary to explore the possibility of obtaining warlike stores on the Continent and, as a result, contracts to the value of £850,000, approximately, were, as I have said, placed during 1951/52 with continental armaments firms. Payments in the present financial year on foot of deliveries under these contracts will amount to approximately £550,000. Deliveries have been proceeding satisfactorily and will, it is expected, be completed in April or May next.

During the past year it was found possible to negotiate further contracts to the value of £2,786,000 with continental and British firms.

Further?

Payments on foot of these contracts will amount to £1,115,000 in the present financial year. The equipment purchased includes anti-aircraft guns and sub-machine guns from Sweden, anti-tank grenades from Belgium, mortars from France and small arms ammunition from England. I should like to emphasise that this equipment is the product of Europe's foremost manufacturers of armaments and the weapons are basic equipment in most armies to-day. In selecting new weapons for purchase, careful consideration has been given not only to the intrinsic merits of each type but also to its suitability in relation to the existing pattern of equipment in the Defence Forces.

The expenditure may appear to be high, but in terms of modern armaments it must be considered reasonable. It should be remembered that for some years past expenditure on warlikestores was relatively small due to the difficulty of obtaining supplies, and that position, I think, judging by the references made to it from time to time, was a matter of regret to all Parties. It is satisfactory to know that, after so many difficulties, we are now in the position to give the Defence Forces reasonable supplies of up-to-date arms and equipment. The effect on training and morale has already been very valuable.

As to the remainder of the Estimate, an additional sum of £15,981 is required under sub-head B—Marriage Allowance—for the reason that, as a result of regulations which amended the ages and service qualifying soldiers for admission to the married establishment, a larger number than that originally provided for has been so admitted. Under sub-head E—Pay of Officers of Medical Service, etc.— an additional sum of £4,500 is likewise required, the number of medical officers recruited during the year having exceeded the number originally anticipated. An additional sum of £48,648 is provided for under sub-head K—Provisions and Allowances in Lieu. A number of factors contribute to this —the principal ones being the increased cost of food supplies and the average strengh having proved to be greater than the original estimate. The cost of petrol and aviation spirit has increased, and the consumption has been somewhat greater than expected, and, for those reasons, it has been found necessary to provide for a further sum of £24,000 under sub-head L—Petrol and Oils. Barrack repairs, renewals and maintenance have also proved to be more expensive than expected, and, accordingly. an additional sum of £20,000, which takes account of savings absorbed in the sub-head, has been provided in sub-head S—Barrack Maintenance and Minor Works. An additional sum of £3,000, which also takes into account savings absorbed in the sub-head, U— provided for under sub-head U— Compensation—in respect of the acquisition of land. The increased employers' contributions under the Social Welfare Act, 1952, necessitate an additional £10,000 under sub-headW—Insurance—and the increased charges for telephones an additional £5,000 under sub-head X (1)—Telegrams and Telephones.

The total of the sums I have mentioned is £991,129, but this is reduced by an anticipated net increase of £20,000 in Appropriations-in-Aid. There are also anticipated savings in other sub-heads, amounting in all to £276,129 so that the Supplementary Estimate is for a sum of £695,000. As I have already pointed out, by far the heaviest item, and the one making the Supplementary Estimate necessary, is the provision relating to warlike stores. I feel sure that, in view of the indication I have given of the type of stores being purchased, and their value to the Defence Forces, the House will have no objection to agreeing to this Estimate.

If we were looking for evidence of the increased cost of living generally, I think we could not have got a better statement than that which was made by the Minister. There is not a single item in regard to the ordinary day-to-day maintenance of the Army which has not increased to an alarming extent. When that increase is experienced in a Department in respect of which tenders, contracts and everything else are entered into to get food and clothing at the cheapest possible price, we see just exactly where we are going.

There are many points in connection with the Estimate introduced by the Minister which strike one. First of all, we are now told that the contracts entered into for warlike stores—some of them in 1951—are now being paid for. I have reason to believe that there were substantial payments on account in 1951. Before there would even be consent to go on with the contracts, payment had to be made, but the Minister has not told us anything about that.

I am glad to know that some supplies are being made available. In my opinion it is fantastic to have an army and have no suitable equipment for it. At the present day we have a bigger Army. I think we have more inthe standing Army than is necessary. I have been for a long time a firm believer in the development of the F.C.A. and the continuance and maintenance of that force in a very efficient manner. We should have it well trained and if we had the nucleus of our training cadre to make that more efficient the money spent on it would be well spent.

The Minister did not tell us—it does not arise on this Estimate—what the position is in regard to the F.C.A.— whether it is being developed or whether any or much of this equipment ought to be diverted to it. The fact of the matter is that we have more men than are required. It is true to say that when the inter-Party Government were in office they built in 1950-51 upon a three years' period of peace—that we had at least two or three years before war was likely to take place. Of course, it was argued that we were taking a very grave risk but we had come to that conclusion from the information at our disposal and from the best inquiries that could be made. The fact that we were right is some justification for our action. When we consider the attacks that were made upon us for failure to have the Army kept up to a certain figure, we now know it was mostly propaganda and that the Government, through the Minister, had to make some effort when it came into office to bring the Army up to the numbers they suggested were necessary.

To be quite candid, I never really understood why it takes such a huge amount of money to run the mechanised end of the Army. I note that, for the small Army we have, it costs now £79,130 for petrol and oil alone. The details given state that the amount includes an increase of £5,062 for the Air Corps. So the Air Corps on its petrol and oil spends only £5,000—which is much greater than normal expenditure would be, as it is necessary to give them the air training they require, and that costs more than the other transport we utilise.

The whole Estimate shows the manner in which the cost of living is affecting the Army, just the same as itaffects ordinary people. I always feel there is nothing we can do with an Estimate like this but hope that we are getting the best material that can be got, that we are not depending on obsolete stuff. I am glad the Minister is satisfied with what he is getting and that it has raised the morale of the Army generally. To ask them to train on obsolete material would be lowering to the morale so if we have good material for them it will go a long distance towards keeping up the spirit we would like to see maintained in the Army of the State. We can let this Estimate go through, in the hope that the intention of the Government and the people for the defence of the nation will be maintained and kept up to the proper standard.

I am surprised to hear we have to pay £1,000,000 this year for war supplies. I would reiterate what I said before, that it is time we tried to manufacture some of these things in some of our factories. Is it not a strange position for any country to be depending on outside sources for war materials?

It is alarming also that we have to pay £1,000,000 for war stores while we have so many people in need of the bare necessities of life. I often wonder if we have sufficiently considered the possibility of having a small, efficient Army and developing the Volunteer force. We have 87,000 unemployed and we have old age pensioners trying to live on 21/- a week. In such circumstances, it is hard to agree to voting £1,000,000 for Army equipment. I will be told I have no sense of responsibility, as we must defend the country, but I am not so satisfied that we are defending it in the best way in spending so much on the Army and paying so little attention to the army of £87,000 that will not be allowed to work to produce the goods and services of the country. I suggest to the Minister or to anyone else that an army of 87,000 standing idle, compelled to be unemployed, is as much a danger as any outside force likely to invade the country. Let us remember that, within Ireland, in the Six Counties there are 52,000 unemployed and that, addedto the 87,000 here, gives us a very large army of unemployed. Is that not an army of very doubtful security in this country? I am not going to look at it from the viewpoint of Deputy MacEoin, as an indication of the cost of living. That is not the way to approach a matter of this kind. We know that prices have gone up for Army supplies, but we do not seem to pay any attention to the unemployed army.

The Deputy cannot discuss all these matters on this Vote, by way of contrast.

We are asked to vote £1,000,000 for warlike supplies and I say that there are very large reserves of revolt in the 87,000 army of unemployed.

The Deputy cannot discuss everything by contrast —contrasting the Army with the numbers of unemployed.

With all due respect, I am relating this £1,000,000 to keep out an outside invader, to the greatest danger I see, the 87,000 unemployed army within the country, without means of supporting themselves and their dependents. It is time we thought more seriously about these matters. In conclusion, I suggest again that we have sufficient factories and that some of them should be turned to making some equipment, instead of our depending on outside countries for Army supplies.

I welcome the Estimate and also the Minister's statement that he has been able to get up-to-date equipment. Those members of the House who were invited by the general staff to be present recently at a demonstration of modern arms will agree that we were very pleased with the demonstration and with the supply of equipment—particularly those automatic weapons or sub-machine guns and the anti-tank weapons.

One of the things that was frightening to us in this country was the fear of a tank invasion and we were all delighted to see that, with the equipmentthe Defence Forces now have, they are able to stop any tank. I am not surprised to hear the Minister saying that, by virtue of this new equipment and these new arms, the morale of the Defence Forces is higher than it has been for a long time. I felt very proud of our position when I saw armour-piercing anti-tank weapons, with their wonderful efficiency and their power to demolish or destroy a very heavily-armoured tank. It was the one type of weapon we wanted in this country and I am perfectly certain that everyone who was privileged to see the demonstration was delighted with the achievements and delighted that our Army has been made so effective by means of this new equipment. Although we may be a small Army, small in numbers, with that equipment and the other new equipment, we have a much more powerful Army than we have ever had and an Army which can certainly make a stand, and a very gallant stand, against superior numbers, if the test should come at any time in the future.

For many years, we felt, particularly those of us who were in the Defence Forces, that we had not the equipment which would enable us to face these new modern implements of war and it is wonderful that new inventions have given to us a power that is out of all proportion to the size of our country and the numbers of our Defence Forces. The country can feel, for the first time, that it has a really effective Defence Force, a force which can defend its interests against anything but the most overwhelming odds. There is no use in having an Army or a Defence Force, unless it is fit to fight, and, whatever it costs to provide that Defence Force with this type of equipment, which is simple and easily moved from place to place—it can be carried by individual soldiers—the necessary equipment should be secured, because, while we have a sufficient amount of that equipment, our Army is a more powerful force than it has ever been in the past.

Deputy MacEoin has suggested that our standing Army is too large. That is a matter of opinion and Deputy MacEoin is entitled to that viewpoint, but I think experience has shown thatthe number mentioned by the Minister as the minimum is in fact the minimum that will enable the permanent force to carry out its functions and enable it to administer and train the non-permanent force, to provide the number of instructors, administrative staffs and so on that will be required to make the Defence Forces effective and efficient. I think we have reached a position where on a matter of that kind, we have to be guided by the advice of our own general staff. The Minister has told us from time to time that that is the advice of the general staff and there is not very much opportunity for disagreement with them. It might be a matter of a few hundred or a couple of thousand, but in the long run the responsibility rests on the general staff, and, if we have a general staff in whom we have confidence and if they are not entirely extravagant in their demands, it is reasonable that their professional and technical views should be accepted by the Government and by the House. I do not think it ought to be a matter for debate whether we have 12,000, 11,000, 10,000 or 9,000 men.

Obviously when we spend the amount of money we are spending on the Defence Forces, we have to consider what is the purpose for which we are spending this money. Deputy MacEoin has referred to the fact that a couple of years ago there was criticism here of the then Government for not taking adequate steps to defend the country in the event of war. Fortunately, the clouds of war which then hovered over the world seem to be dispersing somewhat and I think that responsible opinion all over the world is satisfied that a war could only occur to-morrow by a clash between the Russians and the Americans. Responsible opinion also believes that, so far as the Russians are concerned, they do not want war, that, without war, they are consolidating their position and extending the areas under Communist control. Obviously, therefore, it would be senseless on the part of the Russians to want or to bring about war.

The other major force are the Americans, and if there is one lessonto be learned from the result of the recent presidential election in America it is that the American people do not want war. There was a change of president on a promise by him that he would bring the soldiers home from Korea. He was put into power on that promise; in other words, on the desire of the ordinary American people to get away from war. It, therefore, seems to me, anyway—I hope I am assessing the position rightly—that the dangers of war are much more remote now than they were a couple of years back and for that the world, and certainly this country, ought to be thankful.

A nice problem does arise. There are, as one may term it, these two great powers engaged at the moment in a cold war. There is the other great power with which we have been in conflict for a long period—the British Commonwealth or the British Empire.

On a point of order. I do not wish to interrupt the Deputy in the slightest but may I put it to you, Sir, that we are travelling very wide of this Supplementary Estimate? I have no objection to opening up the whole world situation on this Supplementary Estimate but I should like to make the point in advance that if Deputy Cowan is allowed to travel that field, then anybody else who desires to ramble around the world with him will, I take it, be allowed to do so.

The Chair was about to point out to Deputy Cowan that he was travelling wide of the Estimate.

The trouble about the world is that it has become so small that you do not travel very far in dealing with these matters at all. For what are we entering into contracts for approximately £3,000,000? We are not doing so for fun. It is really in connection with a possible war situation.

Which you say is more remote than ever.

It is more remote, in my view—and I hope I am right— than ever.

That is not a good case for the Supplementary Estimate.

It is the best case that could possibly be made for it. There is an old saying that it is too late to sharpen your sword when the drum beats for battle: you must have it sharpened well in advance. I think that that is what the Minister is doing: he is sharpening the sword. While the world, to some extent, has gone made we are one of those nations who desire to be neutral and to keep out of conflict. We are still one of the many nations that adopted the line of neutrality, the line of steering clear of entanglement with either America or Russia. My desire was to express the hope that this nation with which we have had so many conflicts in the past and that lives so near us—the British Commonwealth—will organise those neutral nations together as a sort of third force or barrier to endeavour to prevent those major powers—America and Russia—from involving the world in war. I realise that I shall probably get an opportunity of speaking on this at greater length again but I think that it is within the ambit of this particular Supplementary Estimate and I think there is nothing wrong in expressing that hope.

Deputy Hickey has touched on an old point and one which has often been mentioned in this House—the making of our own munitions. Obviously that would be grand if we could do it. In so far as we can possibly make our own munitions we should do so but there are technical as well as other difficulties in the way. I am glad to see that Deputy Major de Valera is in the House because nobody more than he understands and appreciates not only the possibilities but the difficulties in that regard. I believe that it is the desire of the Minister, as it has been the desire of all the Ministers we have had in the past, to establish our own factories for the manufacture of our own munitions and instruments of defence. I realise, just as the members of the House realise, that there are substantial difficulties, but nevertheless I do not think the matter is being overlookedand certainly it ought not be overlooked. Anything we can do in regard to the manufacture or provision of our own munitions should be done.

Deputy Hickey mentioned also what he described as "the reserve of revolt" in the country. There is a large number of unemployed in this part of the country and in the Six Northern Counties. We have had a large number of unemployed in this country for many years. The number is higher now than it has been for some time. I think, however, that Deputy Hickey was drawing considerably on his imagination when he referred to them as the "reserve of revolt." I often wished that they were the reserve of revolt but I was disappointed. I hope that those of them who are within the military age will be induced to become members of the Defence Forces.

I see that the Minister has opened up a recruiting campaign recently in which excellent conditions of service are made available for young people— particularly for young people who have not the benefit of a trade or the benefit of training in any particular profession. I think the military profession gives an excellent opportunity to those young men—and there are quite a number of them in the country, and have been for years—of spending a few years in the Army service under a paternal form of discipline. I hope that the Minister and his advisers will be able to make provision for the training of these young boys for civilian life so that, when their term of Army service expires, they will be able to return to civilian life trained and fitted to take up the employment which I hope will then be available for them.

May I, as a mere civilian, raise a few points on the Estimate itself? The Supplementary Estimate is made up almost entirely of a sum required under the heading of "Warlike Stores". Incidentally, may I say that I think the description given in the smaller print immediately under that sub-head—"Miscellaneous defensive equipment"—is more appropriate than "Warlike Stores". Apart from anadditional sum of £860,000 which is now required under sub-head P—"Warlike Stores"—there are a few other sub-heads to which I should like to advert very briefly. Most of the increases in the other sub-heads arise out of the increase in prices following on the Budget of last year and that applies, in particular, to petrol, oils and food. Under sub-head S—Barrack Maintenance and Minor Works—an additional sum of £20,000 is required for ordinary repairs, renewals and maintenance of barracks throughout the country. That gives a total under that sub-head of £130,000. I am taking this opportunity of raising the matter and of asking the Minister—because obviously I do not know—whether it is necessary, for Army purposes, for the Army to retain all the military barracks that are spread throughout the country having regard, particularly, to the change in Army equipment, Army training and the mechanisation of the Army.

I have found, too, that quite a number of those barracks are rarely, if ever, used. They may be used occasionally by the F.C.A. I think, however, that they must involve the Department in very heavy charges for maintenance. If they are not maintained and kept properly then, of course, it would be better for the Army to get rid of them altogether.

I may say that that aspect of the matter was brought home to me very forcibly on more than one occasion when I was in the Department of Industry and Commerce. I found then that local development associations or persons proposing to engage in manufacture, often came to the Department to discuss the use of a barracks or portion of a barracks as a ready-made factory premises at a reasonable rent or purchase price. Invariably, the reply which came back from the Army authorities was "No". They indicated that that could not be done or said they required the barracks. If there is an absolute necessity for the retention of these barracks by the Army authorities then, of course, that is all right. I want, as I have said, when dealing with matters relating to the Army, to qualify it by admitting that I am speaking entirely out of thedepths of my ignorance. It does seem to me, however, that the changes in the Army—its mechanisation, and the whole Army routine—must, of necessity, involve important changes in the disposition of troops throughout the country. I should be glad if the Minister could tell us something about that and, if not now, that he would look into it and see if anything can be done about it.

There is another matter I must raise on this Supplementary Estimate. In doing so I propose to take advantage of the sub-head for the Appropriations-in-Aid. This matter has been mentioned before, both publicly and privately, and has been brought to the attention of the Minister and of his predecessor. Despite that, I do not know that anything has ever been done about it. My opinion is that something should be done about it. Under the Appropriations-in-Aid we find this item: "Sale of surplus stores and unserviceable clothing, £12,300." What I want to draw attention to is the way in which the Department of Defence disposes of its surplus stores. I understand that it is generally done by public auction. I have no complaint whatever to find with that. But the Department itself, I understand, not only drafts the advertisements, but fixes the conditions of sale. The advertisements inform the public that, when an article is knocked down to the highest bidder, the highest bidder is to pay that sum for the particular article or commodity plus 5 per cent. auctioneer's commission.

That is where I take issue on this matter, because although the citizen or the purchaser has to pay 5 per cent. auctioneer's commission, and although it is conveyed in the advertisement that he will have to pay that 5 per cent. auctioneer's commission for and to the auctioneer, the fact is that the auctioneer does not get the 5 per cent. He may not even get 2 per cent. under the system that is operated by the Department of Defence, so that the Department of Defence puts the difference between the 5 per cent. it takes from the citizen or purchaser over and above the market value of the article and disposes of it itself inthe Department. I do not want to be misunderstood when I say that. It disposes of it, of course, in a legitimate way for a legitimate purpose, but my contention is that the Department of Defence, as a Department of State particularly, has no right, under a public advertisement relating to a public sale, to take from a purchaser 5 per cent. in the guise of auctioneer's commission when, in fact, there is not 5 per cent. auctioneer's commission and when the auctioneer does not get 5 per cent. commission. I think that is wrong. It is doubly wrong when the auctioneer does not get the 5 per cent. and, of course. it is much worse that he should get the name of getting it when, in fact, the Department itself collars the lion's share of it. I think the Department should not do that.

Major de Valera

Does the Deputy think there is any way of extending that practice to the ordinary public?

If the Department can get auctioneers to dispose of their property at 2½ per cent commission, I have no objection to that, provided that is all the purchaser is made pay by way of commission. However, the Minister knows all about this. It has been brought to his notice over and over again. I do seriously suggest that there is something wrong in a Department of State taking from a citizen or a purchaser a sum over and above the market value of the article, and taking it in a way which, to say the least of it, is not open.

Does the Deputy know if they are putting the difference in the Army Benevolent Fund?

For all I know that may be so. In fact, I do not know what is done with it.

Would not that be a good idea?

If they were to give double or treble the amount to the Army Benevolent Fund I would still object to an advertisement which says that the articles offered will be knocked down to the highest bidder plus 5 per cent. auctioneer's commission, when in fact, that is not so. I object to theauctioneer or the purchaser being told even by implication that the one is to pay 5 per cent. auctioneer's commission and that the other is to receive it when in fact that does not happen. If the Minister were prepared to make it clear that 2½ of the 5 per cent. was to go to the auctioneer, and that the other 2½ per cent. was to go to the Army Benevolent Fund, I would have no objection to that.

Would it not be a good idea?

The Minister may have thought of that idea but I do not know. I can only assume that the difference between what the purchaser pays and what the auctioneer receives is put to some purpose. I do not know what it is.

I do not want to take up the time of the House further on this supplementary Vote talking about a number of matters that I have very little knowledge of. I certainly have no intention of rambling around the world in the way that Deputy Cowan did trying to express an opinion as to whether the danger from our point of view is likely to come from the East or from America.

Poor Stalin is lying down to die.

I had not heard that. That, however, may be the reason why Deputy Cowan was able to tell us with apparent confidence that the world situation was such now that the danger of war had become more remote than at any period during the last three years.

He probably knows those in Stalin's entourage.

I, like a number of other Deputies, cannot but feel amazed at the fact that we should be presented with a Supplementary Estimate for such a large sum. It would now appear that, in addition to the sums already voted for Army supplies, we have now to foot a bill for £24,000 additional because of the fact that there has been an increase in theprice of petrol. The impact of that on the vehicles in the Irish Army would lead us to believe that the impact on business must be quite considerable.

The Minister also referred to the situation caused by the increase in food for the Army. For telegrams and telephones the additional sum required is £5,000. This additional expenditure can be attributed to the last Budget. The Minister also proposes to expend a considerable sum on equipment in the present year. He mentioned the sum of £1,115,000.

There is some little difference of opinion as to the numbers we should have in the standing Army. Some of us feel that 12,000, the figure that has been mentioned from the other side of the House, is rather on the large side. There are many Deputies who disagree with that.

We feel that more attention should be given to the Second Line Reserve. There are many men in productive employment in the country who rendered very valuable service during the emergency, who learned a good deal of military warfare and who, whether in the Reserve or attached to the F.C.A., would be available if the country were in danger. In that respect it is a very sad feature that so many men who were trained in this country at considerable expense and who would be of infinite value to us were the occasion to arise, have been lost to the country. How many of us in the course of the past few years have had to sign forms certifying that these men had given up equipment that had been issued to them so that they would be allowed to depart? How many of them are to-day in the American Army and the British Army all over the world?

In a situation where there are unemployed a considerable number of men who had given service during the emergency and who are to-day in the F.C.A. we should bend our efforts towards putting those men into productive employment and should apply all the money that comes for disposal in this House in that direction. Unless we arrest the presenttide of emigration we will lose many of these lads who are of infinite value to the country, whether in the production of essential goods or in defence, in the event of an emergency.

This Supplementary Estimate for £1,115,000 is for anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, small arms and ammunition—all designed for the Regular Defence Forces. Our Second Line Reserve are not trained in these weapons so there is no indication there that there is any large-scale development to be expected in that direction.

I would urge upon the Minister to dispose of Army huts to the F.C.A. to as great an extent as possible and to provide amenities in far flung areas where lads could meet weekly for training. As much attention as possible should be given to summer camps and winter courses and men should be encouraged to avail of these facilities and the requirement should be rigidly adhered to, that a certain period of training should be done in local training centres. If we direct our attention more to that matter and keep these men in their normal avocations, on the farm or in industry, and at the same time afford them an opportunity of becoming trained in military affairs it will be far better than expending an immense amount of money on the purchase of warlike stores which may become obsolete in a short time.

Even though it is conceded that, in the normal course, these are moneys which must be met by the House, we feel that in the present circumstances we are spending too much money in directions that are unproductive in view of the fact that there are only about 24 per cent. of the people in productive employment at the moment.

This is the first of a bunch of 11 Supplementary Estimates which we discuss to-day, after we have received notice that we are to discuss four more to-morrow and they are all introduced by a Government which nine months ago was telling us that they had not enough money to pay the civil servants. A Leas-Cheann Comhairle, you will remember that we thendescribed such representations as being fraudulent, political stunting and I think it ought to be manifest to all and sundry now that if the Government had not got the wherewithal to pay the civil servants ten months ago, they could not in conscience bring in Supplementary Estimates to-day.

We cannot discuss the civil servants on a Supplementary Estimates.

I am talking about revenue. I suggest that the Government which said it had not enough revenue to meet the essential requirements of the Exchequer ten months ago could not possibly be bringing in Supplementary Estimates for between £5,000,000 and £10,000,000 now.

Major de Valera

That is rather a non sequitur, is it not? They have to bring in the Supplementary Estimates to find the money.

Oh, no, no. Let us not ride off on that. We had a Budget day before us and we were told that the Minister was imposing additional heavy taxes which would just barely meet the demands that that Budget laid upon him. If that was so one would imagine that his business for the last ten months would have been the instruction of all his fellow Ministers in the simple lesson that they would have to cut their cloth according to the measure of their Estimates, that he would bring in no Supplementary Estimates for there was no money. We told the House then that he was budgeting for £10,000,000 surplus which he is now in these Supplementary Estimates preparing to spend. That is the first interesting feature.

The second thing is: I want to ask the Minister for Defence, who is the Minister of an Irish Government, whatever Party he belongs to, on behalf of the Irish Government to repudiate the disgusting doctrine enunciated by Deputy Cowan to-day. I am prepared in times of emergency to face the question of a conscript Army in which young men will be called from every walk of life on a roster of equalpriority to serve in the Army if that necessity should arise. I am prepared and prefer to have a volunteer Army in which those prepared to serve are asked to come forward and to give as many years as their circumstances will permit to voluntary service in the Army.

But, there is one thing that every Party in this House rejects as unthinkable and that is a pauperate in which you drive a certain element of the community into the ranks of the Army with the instrument of unemployment and starvation. I understood Deputy Cowan to say that he noted that the figures for unemployment stood higher to-day than they have stood for many years and his suggestion to the people who were unemployed was that they should go into the Army. Those who want to make their career in the Army would be welcome in the Army on their merits, employed or unemployed, but I would be long sorry to say to any young man in this country that any Party in this House would desire to see men forced into the Army by the alternative of unemployment and starvation. I do not believe that is the policy of the Government and certainly it is not the policy of this Party. I think it would be apt if the Minister would reiterate that this Oireachtas has determined on a volunteer Army in the fullest sense of that word, that those who volunteer for it are honoured members of the community and that there is no intention in this Oireachtas now or hereafter to drive any section of our people into the ranks of the Army through the instrumentality of engineered unemployment.

I would like the Minister to advert to the sub-heads K, L, and X in each of which the increases are described as being in large part due to the increased cost of rations, the increase in the price of petrol and the increased charge for telephones. When a Department of State comes in collision with these consequences of the Budget of 1952, it has a very simple way of meeting them, that is, to ask the responsible Minister to introduce a Supplementary Estimate and in that way get the money to pay these increased charges. There is nota citizen in this State who does not have to buy food. There are many thousands of our people living in rural Ireland who depend for the illumination of their kitchens on paraffin oil. There are many thousands of people who have to use the telephone in the ordinary course of their business. None of these can have recourse to the simple procedure of introducing a Supplementary Estimate in Dáil Eireann. The only means they have of meeting charges of that kind is to do with less food, less petrol and less telephoning. Most people can get on all right by reducing their telephone calls, their petrol and their paraffin oil. They can go to bed an hour earlier, but it is a bad thing that our people are driven by their own Government to do with less food, and I think the Minister ought to look at his own Estimate and think well on the impact of these difficulties with which he has to contend as Minister for Defence on the humble citizen of this State who has not got at his disposal the Minister's financial get-out of this dilemma of increased costs.

I come now to the last matter that I would like the Minister to elaborate when he is winding up. When he told us that he wanted an increased sum of £260,000 for defensive equipment, he mentioned also a sum of £2,000,000. Frankly, I lost the thread of his discourse then. He spoke of contracts laid in 1951-1952 which, I think, he spoke of as amounting to £2,100,000——

£2,786,000.

——part of which were delivered in this financial year and in relation to which this sum of £860,000 is needed to complete the payment that falls due in this financial year. Are we to understand that the balance of £2,000,000 odd warlike stores will be delivered in the coming financial year and will come in course of payment then?

We hope so.

That is the intention, but the £2,860,000 covers——

Contracts entered into.

Including the deliveries this year and the probable deliveries next year?

Inasmuch as the total appropriation for warlike stores in 1952-53 comes to £1,710,000 the sum for next year will probably be in the order of £1,000,000. I would like to think that these warlike stores were more truly described in the note to the sub-head where they are referred to as defensive equipment because the more I reflect on this matter the more convinced I am that every rational person in this State would be very much easier in his mind if he felt that the outlay on defensive equipment represented the purchase of effective equipment for a commando or a guerilla type of force.

The plain fact is that if we seek to equip our Army with artillery and heavy equipment of the tank and heavy transport character, which is an essential element in the equipment of modern European armies, that equipment will be obsolete and ripe for destruction within 12 or 18 months of its delivery here. Unless we can hold out to our Army a clear prospect of replacing this type of equipment with every development of obsolescence that transpires it is the merest illusion to be laying out hundreds of thousands or millions of pounds on buying equipment which almost on delivery is obsolete and should be in the process of replacement when it is perfectly manifest that the resources of this State can never maintain an adequate programme of the replacement of obsolescent equipment if we attempt to emulate the type of equipment ordinarily used by a European army. It will be quite otherwise if we resolve that the equipment for our Army should be of the very best on the basis of a commando and guerilla trained force. We could then say to our Army with a clear conscience and in the knowledge that we could make good our undertaking that we accepted the proposition that all their defensive equipment must be deemed to be starting on the road to obsolescence on the date of its delivery and thatit is our firm intention to maintain a constant stream of replacement with the most modern versions of commando equipment they can have for their use.

There is no use concealing the fact that as a layman looking at this whole Army question from the outside of the Army, as indeed every taxpayer in the State is entitled to do, the question of equipment causes me the gravest possible concern. I cannot conceive that our Army can be content with any less than the best. I am satisfied from my knowledge of the personnel and the spirit of that personnel in the Army that they are prepared to give of their best. I think it is historically manifest that the regiments manned by our people in every army of the world have been in the very front rank of performance. I am convinced that it is no vain ambition to aspire to make the Irish Army the best of its kind in the world. Anything less is a quite unworthy objective for this Oireachtas to aim at.

However, if they are to be the best in the world, the Army must be given the opportunity of acting on a basis where we would be able to provide them with the equipment to function as efficiently as it is humanly possible to do. We cannot do that if we attempt to set up in this country a toy army on the lines of the European army because our resources do not extend to it. We can, in my opinion, establish, maintain and equip an army second to none in the world for the very highly specialised task of defending the sovereignty of this State against any external threat if we accept the fundamental principle that the limitations imposed by our resources require our Army to be a guerilla commando formation.

I would ask the Minister to reflect on this, that the danger against which we have to guard is invasion, that it is now common case amongst all small countries in the world that the resistance to invasion by a great power single-handed is not possible. Therefore, what a small nation's army must do is to defend the sovereignty of the State until its allies can be deployed to assist it in resistance to aggression.What our Army's function in the time of invasion must be is to constitute a citadel within which the sovereign independence of this State can be preserved for the Irish people until such time as Ireland with her allies can deploy forces to drive out whatever aggressor has succeeded in securing a foothold in our country.

Major de Valera

Surely, on that premise, guerilla commando formation is the wrong basis?

No. That is the very thing I think a guerilla formation is uniquely equipped to do, for it can withdraw into suitable units, into inaccessible parts of the country. It is highly mobile.

Major de Valera

But the big defect of merely relying on that is that the opposing forces get in all over the country. However, I do not want to start a discussion on it at this stage.

I think it is a thesis pretty generally accepted all over the world that with the modern method of invasion, shown at the successful invasion of the island of Crete, plus the successful invasion of Normandy, plus the successful invasion of North Africa, plus the counter invasion across the Mediterranean to Tunis, it is perfectly idle for anyone but a power of the first class to contemplate preventing another power of the first class securing a foothold on your coastline, more especially when your coastline is so greatly disproportionate to your hinterland, as is the case in a small island like ours. If it is impossible to defeat them on the beaches, the next thing is to try to maintain the sovereignty of the State until such time as irresistible forces can be deployed against the aggressor.

That is the purpose, as I see it, of the Irish Army and I think it is an illusion to ask the Army to undertake an assignment greater than that because whatever the values of the personnel of that Army may be, it is not within our power to give them the equipment effectively to deploy against the equipment of a modern Europeanarmy en masse.Their only hope is to take advantage of the terrain and the friendliness of our people to them as opposed to the aggressor and their ability to hold out by avoiding strategy and by wrecking strategy on the aggressive forces.

I know there are Deputies in this House who will say: "What is the use of bothering our heads with that kind of thing? What do we know about it." The answer is that this is the Parliament of Ireland and it is our duty to lay down policy; it is our duty and privilege to know that the army council of this country will take their instructions from Parliament and carry them out, and God forbid that a situation other than that should exist in this country. It is poor service to this country for Parliament to shrug its shoulders and say: "Leave that to the soldiers." I think our soldiers are the right kind who do not want that left to them. They want the will of Parliament to be made known that they may give the best possible and most efficient effect to it.

It is for that reason that individual Deputies in this House should not be so coy in speaking of defence matters, because they are the intimate interest of us all. Whether what we say pleases or displeases individual soldiers, whatever their rank may be, unless I am greatly mistaken, they like to know that this House and this Oireachtas is concerned for the Army and about the Army; that if there are criticisms to be made of the Army they will be made here; if there is praise to be given it will be given; and if there are suggestions to be made they will be made here; that the Minister for Defence is here to speak for the Army and about the Army and to tell this Oireachtas what the Government's intentions are in respect of the Army.

I press these points upon him and although I see now from the opening statement that he did give the relevant information about the £2,000,000 odd which is appropriated for defensive equipment if it would be convenient to him I would be grateful if he would elucidate them again in his concluding remarks.

Major de Valera

The debate has become rather wide in relation to the Supplementary Estimate and since we will have, on the main Estimate, an opportunity of going into these matters again, I do not think I should follow in detail the line of Deputy Cowan and to some extent of Deputy Dillon. However, I suppose Deputy Cowan is right to this extent when he says that a general opinion seems to be abroad that the risk of war is less now than it was. That may be the general opinion but I wonder whether the risk, such as has been there for the past two or three years, is in any way abated; that is not to say that war is a certainty or that it is a certainty that it will be avoided. We all have our own personal opinions. I have no hesitation in expressing my personal opinion, which is the same as it has been for a number of years, ever since 1948, in fact, when there was the reverse of engines as I have called it on previous occasions like this when talking about it in regard to defensive policy in the world. Personally I can find no cause for very great consolation. I fear that at the present moment the fact that the threat has, so to speak, got into a more or less static phase leads people to believe that there is nothing very new to be reported from day to day.

But Marshal Stalin's impending dissolution is something new.

Major de Valera

I have that only from the Deputy.

It is from Radio Éireann.

Major de Valera

I will leave it to the Deputy to make his interpretation whether that is an augur of peace or otherwise but at the moment I am taking some broader facts.

That is about the broadest fact in the world to-day.

Major de Valera

The situation as far as potential danger is concerned, or what I may call tension, remains to-day very much as it has been since 1948. The very fact that it has remained more or less at the samelevel and that the type of news in relation to it tends to become repetition in newspapers, has led the public to regard it more or less as normality and they have been lulled into the feeling that just because it has not become very markedly worse, then it has become better. That in itself is a rather dangerous thing and I, for one, do not agree—I may be wrong—that the danger is any less to-day than it was. I am afraid, if one looks at some other factors in the situation, whether from the point of view of development of equipment, expanding armaments, development of new weapons and of the political and military moves we see taking place, if one looks at the overall picture, one must regretfully come to the conclusion that things are not getting any better and, as the patient is sick, we have got to be prepared, or —I am very much afraid of the "or". However, that is a matter of speculation to a certain extent. The question is whether we should continue now with the policy of taking reasonable precautions. I have no hesitation in saying that we must continue taking these precautions and providing the insurance which is necessary and essential at the moment.

We are all agreed on that.

Major de Valera

I am grateful to Deputy Dillon for that remark because it helps us a good deal and it enables us to consider the problems connected with this question. Deputy Dillon will appreciate that I have adverted to this, not so much in regard to what Deputy Dillon has said as in regard to what Deputy Cowan has said. I think there is still danger and that we should provide for it. I join issue with Deputy Dillon in regard to the point of organisation, the main issue, though perhaps in our fundamental premises Deputy Dillon and I, for once, are not so far away as one might think at first sight. I see great danger in our making a catch-cry—I say this without offence to Deputy Dillon, but it has happened in other quarters in the past—of organising for guerilla tactics. It has been used as a plea for saving money in very many ways. The danger I see is that ifyou merely look at it from the point of view of organising a purely citizen guerilla force, without making any other provision to provide yourself at the outset with that holding power that Deputy Dillon wants to have and that I want to have——

A guerilla force and a commando force—the one being defensive and the other aggressive.

Major de Valera

It is a matter of having initially that holding power with a transition to the commando and guerilla stage, if you want it later. That is a point of policy that I have tried to put over on previous occasions here. However, we shall have an opportunity of discussing the matter further on the main Estimate when I think the Minister and others will welcome reasonable discussion on these matters. It is a matter in which we should take an interest, and I am sorry that on past occasions so few have taken an interest in it.

To get down to the question of equipment, Deputy Dillon asked about the nature of the equipment. I, too, would like to ask some questions in that regard. I am glad to know from the information made available to us that the equipment that is involved here is practically exclusively, with one exception which I think the Dáil would approve of, since it relates to the protection of populous areas, of the light mobile type. It is a type of anti-tank weapon which can be used by the individual and which can be carried easily—weapons which are particularly adapted for the type of commando movement which has been mentioned. I think it is right that the Minister should have taken that view. If one looks at the details there is not any great cause for difference of opinion between us here. That being so, one infers that we all welcome the fact that the Minister has been able to get this equipment.

In regard to equipment generally, I should like to make the point that, apart from supplying the need which has been adverted to by Deputy Dillon, no matter how you look at theArmy, the type of equipment which the Minister has provided for and which he has actually obtained, represents the closing of what has hitherto been a very serious gap in the defensive equipment of our forces such as they were. Many Deputies will know already that when we mobilised in 1939, for instance, we were completely deficient in field artillery, combat vehicles and anything in the nature of an anti-tank weapon or an anti-armoured weapon.

With regard to field artillery of the light type which we need here, you may talk about obsolescence, but the degree of improvement made in weapons of that type since the 1914-18 war is not of such a revolutionary nature as to render the previous type of equipment useless. That equipment is still useful although it would not be represented as the very best. That gap was fairly well filled during the emergency period by the supplies we got in here. It has been filled to an extent sufficient to enable us to face the future.

In regard to the second item, combat vehicles, I purposefully use the words "combat vehicles" because we have not been, and we are not likely to be, able to equip ourselves with a sufficient amount of the modern defensive or heavy armoured vehicles. But the reconnaissance car, that is the car armoured against small arms, has a rôle to play here even on the basis Deputy Dillon mentioned. We have been able to supply that want to some extent. I think we should continue to supply that want as we get the opportunity. Where we were not absolutely defenceless was in regard to anti-tank devices. I have a little bit of experience or a little bit of special knowledge of that because I happened to be one of the people who were charged with looking into that problem at the time we were so completely devoid of them. It is true that there is no possibility of our supplying that want from our resources. We can go some distance with certain improvisations but the weapon you really need cannot be devised here.

I am told they can use a service rifle in the American army to launch a very effective weapon against tanks.

Major de Valera

I am coming to that.

I am told it is used by the Americans.

Major de Valera

The Deputy does not understand what I am saying. What I am saying is that we could not improvise at the time the necessary type of weapon. It was a type of weapon that was purchased here up to a short time ago. One of the weapons which some of us have seen demonstrated was an anti-tank grenade of the type which could be launched from a rifle. The source from which we got it does not very much matter. It is essentially the same thing as the American weapon which Deputy Dillon talks about. A great part of the expenditure concerned in this is related to that particular weapon.

It is, perhaps, one of the most important purchases that we have made for the Defence Forces since the emergency. The stores that have been purchased are of the type which would even meet some of the Deputies' postulated requirements. They fill what has heretofore been a very serious gap in the equipment and armament of our Defence Forces such as they are. After these stores are obtained our Defence Forces will be more effective. I think that is the justification for these particular purchases.

To summarise. I am afraid it is prudent to continue to look to these matters and provide for them. That being so, the best way in which provision can be made on the equipment side is to get the type of equipment purchased. We should, therefore, welcome this Supplementary Estimate in spite of our financial difficulties and the necessity of having to find the money. I am not going to follow Deputy Dillon at the moment on the question as to why we cannot find other moneys if we can find moneys for these. You cannot just take isolated incidents. That is a type ofargument which can be applied in a variety of ways. One can run to the next when you have been cornered on one.

I suppose that the Government—like all Governments—are faced with the desirability of providing for more than they can provide for and of having to make up their minds as to what our necessities are and provide for them. In this particular instance the Government have considered that in the long term and in the prudent view it is a virtual necessity to provide the sums in this Supplementary Estimate. With their view on that matter I would agree.

These are scarcely isolated items are they Deputy?

There is only one Estimate before the House.

There are 11 on the Order Paper, Sir.

Major de Valera

We will have an opportunity of joining issue with Deputy Dillon on that matter on a more general motion. I do not intend to hold up the House now.

It will be too late then.

Major de Valera

I should like to refer to one or two matters mentioned by Deputy Morrisey. First of all, I do not understand Deputy Morrissey's assumed deference in approaching this. These problems are merely problems of common sense and we are just as competent to approach questions of defence on the basis of common sense as we are to approach any of the other complicated matters that arise in connection with State administration. I think Deputy Morrissey was unduly hesitant and modest in his approach. After all, this is a matter of common sense too. It is good to raise the question of the Army barracks. It does seem, looking at it from the point of view of the civilian and from the point of view of the ordinary man, to be unnecessary to maintain barracks that are not occupied. What is the answer? The answer is simply that these barracks are in the same categoryas equipment and the Defence Forces as a whole. They will be, as far as the Exchequer is concerned, an expenditure in the nature of insurance for an event that may happen. Most of us hope it will not happen.

On the last occasion we had one experience to which there are two facets. When it came to the limited mobilisation of 1939, which involved merely the mobilisation of 20,000 men, we were immediately in trouble for accommodation. I remember a battalion moving into Mullingar barracks which was a wreck at the time. The barracks had been lying there for years disused and grass was growing on the floors. It represented considerable expenditure at a time when you wanted all the money you had, just as you want it now. It represented a diversion of effort and a serious problem for the health and morale of people who were not used to living under those conditions being suddenly thrown into them. On top of all that, there was a scarcity of accommodation even at that time and some of us were, towards the end of that year, living in bivouac conditions out in the fields before we had been hardened to it. You had problems for the medical officers, apart from protection problems and all the rest. When it came to the question of expansion afterwards, it was worse; but it would have been unmanageable only we had two bites of the cherry in having the first mobilisation in September and the second mobilisation in June. We cannot hope to get that fortunate type of experience again. We may hope for but we cannot bank on having the fortunate type of experience we had then when you got six to eight months' warning before you really got on to an emergency at all.

That being the experience of the time, I remember at the end of the war, when reviewing the whole thing, that this question of accommodation loomed large in our calculations. I suppose if we were to get by again as a neutral the only prudent thing would be to see that these Army barracks should be kept available for the forces. That does not mean that ifany temporary use could be found for them they should not be availed of. I am glad to see that the F.C.A. can make use of them. I would concede that if any temporary use were made of these barracks it would have to be subject to two conditions. First, the barracks should be kept in a condition for immediate occupation by troops, and secondly, they should be made available immediately.

Those requirements may militate against the barracks being made available for factories or as residential accommodation for families. Once you allow a barracks to become a factory, on account of the internal alterations the barracks would not be available when you would want it. The same thing would apply if you were to have them for residential purposes. We could not clear the barracks quickly enough. In theory you could. In order to know what the practical problem is likely to be like you must see what you have.

Regretfully, one has to regard this as another defence expenditure. I think Deputy Morrissey was within his rights and acted reasonably in raising the question but I think what I have said must be the answer to it. As to the remainder, any other points that arise can more appropriately be dealt with on the main Estimate. I will conclude by simply saying that the Minister is to be congratulated on his success having regard to the circumstances under which he had to operate to get this essential equipment. I think it is still necessary to get it and I disagree with Deputy Cowan if he suggests otherwise. That must of necessity be a personal expression of opinion. We should pass the Estimate and leave policy over until the main Vote.

I want to say to the Minister: "Well done" on the purchase of the most modern equipment possible, having regard to our purse. I was one of those present at a demonstration of weapons in Gormanston Camp last summer and I was agreeably surprised to see the firepower that has been placed in the hands of the infantry, firepower with a sub-machinegun and firepower in the form of an armour-piercing warhead which can be converted and used with the service rifle now in possession of our Army. It entails no extra cost and on that account the Minister, the general staff and the personnel are to be congratulated on their foresight.

In making provision for the comfort of troops, there should be better provision for married men in the provincial towns. Housing accommodation is hard to come by in some of those towns and the married quarters available in the barracks are crowded out. I would suggest some arrangement between the Army and the local authorities to make better provision for married men.

It is also a matter of gratification to see that the benefits of the Social Welfare Bill have been extended to the personnel of the Army.

Regardless of the number of unemployed we may have in the country, it behoves us to make provision for the purchase of the most modern equipment possible, having regard to our purse.

I welcome the way in which this Estimate has been debated. It is what I would naturally expect in view of the expressions which have come from all sides of the House in regard to the purchase of defence equipment whenever it would become available. My predecessor put on record his views in that respect and made it very clear that he would not let money deter him from purchasing such equipment if it were available. Perhaps I was more lucky than he, inasmuch as I was occupying this honourable position when the equipment became more easily obtainable. Shortly after I assumed—or reassumed—office, I was in the happy position of being able to send away a delegation of experts to examine certain equipment that we were led to believe was available. As a result of that examination, the experts recommended a particular type of equipment which could then be procured. Being experts, they would not recommend anything which wouldnot be of the greatest value to the Defence Forces of this State. A contract was immediately entered into for the purchase of certain quantities of equipment and I am very glad to be able to say that most of it has now been delivered. Further contracts were entered into with other countries and some of the material has been delivered, some is awaiting delivery and I hope that all of it will be in our custody in the course of another year or two.

Generally speaking, the criticism in this debate was reasonable. In one or two cases, Deputies were inclined to spread out a little and go off the rails or play a little with politics. Deputy MacEoin gave me the impression that he disagreed with the Army strength we are aiming to secure but which, unfortunately, we have not secured, although we have recruited in the past year in the region of 5,000 men. The fact that we are still only in the 10,000 mark, after recruiting 5,000 individuals only goes to show the absolute necessity to continue annually a recruiting campaign similar to that which we entered into at the beginning of last year. Deputy MacEoin knows that, even if we had the 12,500 men which the peace establishment aims at, we would still be very much below that of the normal division as army strength goes. We aim at 12,500, as I explained on former occasions, in order to ensure that there will be an annual outflow from the Army into the Reserve and a principal reason why the Army experts, who made their recommendations in regard to the desirable strength, require 12,500 men is in order to secure that outflow into the Reserve, so that in the course of some years the Reserve will be there behind them, available at very short notice, highly trained, and ready to go into action if it should be necessary to do so. From that point of view, every Deputy who will give that aspect of the matter a little examination will see how desirable it is to have the Army at full strength.

I am just as anxious about the F.C.A. as Deputy MacEoin is and I should like to see the F.C.A. at thehighest possible strength. We have been endeavouring to build up that organisation and to make available to it various ways and means by which men would not only join the organisation but continue in membership of it. It is rather regrettable to have to say that there is a continuous flow in and an equally continuous flow out, and the only thing I can say is that whatever limited amount of training these men get in the short period in which they are members of the organisation, should an emergency at some time or other arise, will be of some value, however small, in adding to the strength of the Defence Forces.

Deputy Hickey played a little politics with the question of the 88,000 unemployed. I do not know how he managed to bring it in, or how he managed to get away with it when he did bring it in, but he ought to know that, during the period of the last Government, there were 70,000 unemployed, with something like 34,000 people leaving the country annually. I did not hear him making similar remarks on any Defence Estimate of that time about the unemployment situation. He went on to elaborate on the question of providing for our own equipment—the manufacture of our own equipment. I do not think there is a Deputy who would not be delighted to subscribe to that view, but we have no heavy industry here which would be capable of entering into the manufacture of, say, the anti-aircraft guns which we have to purchase from foreign countries. If we had such industries, the full requirements of this State could, I believe, be met in the course of a month or two and the industry which would be established for the production of that type of equipment would find itself without contracts unless it was able to secure contracts for manufactures other than defensive equipment.

Does the Minister for External Affairs hold that view now?

I do not know what view he holds. All I know is that it is a sensible view.

We told him that often, too—that it was no use.

It is true that we endeavoured for a considerable time to get established a munition factory for the purpose of producing .303 ammunition, but even there the difficulty was that we could supply our requirements of .303 ammunition in the course of a very short period—perhaps a month or so—so that, unless we could get outside contracts for the supply of that type of manufacture to some other people, the industry would either have to be abandoned at the end of a particular period or we would have to find other means of providing work for the factory staff.

There were quite a number of references to Army personnel, their value to the nation and what the State should do to provide these boys with work when leaving the Army. The State cannot undertake to produce a particular type of employment for these boys, but there is one thing we can all say: that is, that, as a result of their Army training and the sense of discipline inculcated into them, these boys are outstandingly better citizens than they were from the point of view of discipline, physique, health and so on, when they leave the Army.

Deputy Dillon was inclined to advocate rather strongly that the type of equipment we should purchase now is the type of equipment that would be used by guerillas in any emergency situation. That is what we have been aiming at. We have been aiming at the type of equipment which is highly mobile, which can be carried about from place to place by individuals and perhaps on mobile carriers of one kind or another; but the Army is organised to defend this State as any army would defend it. The Army has quite an amount of artillery equipment which Deputy Dillon seemed to think was obsolete and would be of little value. Whether he is correct in that view or not remains to be seen, but the fact is that an army without that type of equipment could hardly be described as an army at all. The men are being highly trained in the use of that equipment,and I should be inclined to say that they would give a very excellent account of themselves, if they should ever be called into action with that particular type of equipment. Should the necessity arise for the Army to go guerilla, they are fully equipped to do that and I am sure it would be part of their plan to continue fighting as such, if they were in fact defeated in the field.

Deputy Morrissey raised the question of barracks. It is an important question. I cannot say that we would be prepared to forgo the use of these barracks because they happen to be vacant at the particular moment. The Army has had a rather bitter experience in respect of the giving away of barrack sites because they happen to be unoccupied at a particular period, and, as a result of that experience, I do not think they are prepared to forgo vacated barracks again. They are, in the main, held by caretaker parties and they are being kept in reasonable condition. In the course of his speech, Deputy Major de Valera referred to the circumstances under which he and his colleagues of the emergency period had to exist in Mullingar barracks. He talked of occupying rooms in which the grass grew up through the floors and in which the rain came through the roof and through the ceilings from one storey to another. That building was rebuilt and put into a habitable condition, and it has been kept in that condition. I do not think that, in any circumstances, the Army would be prepared to forgo any of these vacated barracks at the present moment. It is true that some of them are occupied. The barracks at Dundalk is occupied by an industrial firm, but it is occupied on the understanding that the firm undertake to vacate the premises if the Army require it urgently. I believe, from experience, that when the time would come to reoccupy a barracks there would be considerable difficulty in getting a concern out, and it is from that point of view that I think the Army would not, in any circumstances, be prepared to forgo these barracks. There would be the further question, in an emergency, ofnot having all the accommodation we might require and of again having to take over large mansions throughout the country which were the cause of considerable expense in the last emergency.

Deputy Morrissey referred to the auction of surplus stores. I cannot say a whole lot about that but I know that the Department take responsibility for the issue of these advertisements. I think it is an ordinary statement in these types of advertisements that there will be a 5 per cent. auctioneer's fee.

But the auctioneer gets it, ordinarily.

I am not arguing that point at all. I think it is a normal procedure—is not that so?

Quite. That is right.

After that, there is the question of tender. I do not know how the auctioneers tender. Naturally, the auctioneers can tender for the particular sale only on equal terms. I assume that that is so and, from that point of view, they are all equal. There may be some arrangement between the auctioneers, of which I am not aware, in which some of them might be prepared to forgo a portion of the 5 per cent. or, in some circumstances, of all of that percentage. I am not stating that as a fact: I am suggesting it after having heard the Deputy. That may have been the ways and the means by which the contract was entered into. I can see no other possible way by which the 5 per cent. auctioneer's fees should not go to the auctioneer.

If the Minister would give that as an instruction to his Department it would solve all the trouble.

I do not see what instruction I can give.

Just exactly what you have said.

They are all open to tender. I will certainly have thematter looked into. I suppose that will satisfy the Deputy?

Thank you very much. That satisfies me.

In the course of his speech, Deputy Dillon expressed the desire to know something about the years which the payments of these sums of money would cover. The payments will cover the years 1951-2, 1952-3, 1953-4, and 1954-5. It will be seen that this large sum of money will be spread over a period of years. It will not fall in one particular year and, from that point of view, it will not be a strain on the Exchequer.

I can assure Deputies that I do not get any pleasure in having to bring in a Supplementary Estimate: I am sure no Minister does. In a case of this kind, where it is necessary to bring in a Supplementary Estimate because of a certain success achieved in the securing of this type of equipment, it takes away some of the feeling that one does not wish to have when bringing in this type of Estimate.

The added expense in regard to petrol and other matters of that kind is due to a number of causes. When Deputy Dillon was talking about provisions and allowances in lieu, he blamed the added expenditure entirely on the rise in the cost of living. That is one of the reasons but it is not the main reason. The main reason is the increased strength of the Army. The expenses involved in regard to oils and petrols—which, also, were much criticised—apply to Army transport and to the air corps. Again, the matter of added strength arises. There have been 1,000 more hours of flying time in the Air Corps and, naturally, that uses up a considerably greater quantity of aviation spirit.

As some Deputies mentioned, the debate on this Supplementary Estimate was somewhat on the lines of a debate on an annual Estimate. I do not wish to go into a number of matters which would be more appropriate on an annual Estimate.

Mr. Byrne

Deputy Cowan, whentalking about unemployment, suggested an extension of the armed forces in order to absorb some of the unemployed. I hope the Minister will not be guided by that principle.

Deputy Cowan is the captain of his own soul.

That is about all.

He is an Independent Deputy, like Deputy Byrne, and he expresses his own opinions. I am not responsible for the views the Deputy expresses. We are told that there are 88,000 persons unemployed. The number which the Army could absorb at most is 4,000. I do not think, therefore, that we need worry about that aspect of the matter.

Mr. A. Byrne

And the Minister will not be guided by that principle in lieu of providing decent employment for these people?

Question put and agreed to.
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