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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 27 Nov 1957

Vol. 164 No. 7

Committee on Finance. - Agricultural Institute Bill, 1957—Committee Stage.

Section 1 agreed to.
SECTION 2.
Question proposed:"That Section 2 stand part of the Bill."

Major de Valera

I am still in some difficulties about the definition of "research" here:—

"In this Act—

‘agriculture' includes horticulture, forestry and bee-keeping, and also includes facilities, activities and sciences which relate to or tend to promote or improve agriculture, and cognate words shall be construed accordingly;"

Does that mean, if you take it in connection with the word "research" lower down—"research" includes investigation, test, experiment, analysis and study—that, say, a fundamental research into plant biology per se or plant pathology per se or into a physical problem or into a chemical problem that might be conceivably related to agriculture in that it could be applied in agriculture—that that definition is wide enough to bring that about? I do not think that is intended nor do I think it would be wise to envisage such a project.

Major de Valera

Why?

Be careful now. He and I are back to back on this.

Major de Valera

All right. I will take the two of you on. The point, in all seriousness, is really this: I see a real danger in this Bill of duplication of effort and duplication of work with the other institutions. It so happens that the other institutions we have are the universities and I am not pleading for the universities specifically as they are but there are other institutions properly doing research, with limited resources, in sciences which are related, within the meaning of this section, to agriculture. Chemistry, physics, for instance, are two specific ones.

One of the dangers in this Bill is the temptation under the structure to erect machinery to have the institute do research that would duplicate research that could be done and might even be being done in other institutions. That would be all very well if the resources of this country were not limited but we are facing a problem on another front in regard to other institutions which are equally necessary to develop the country in its economy and university life where there are acute shortages of funds and facilities. A shortage of personnel and anything that would tend to dissipate the forces would be bad. We should make it clear that the activities of the institute will be firmly and primarily related to agricultural needs and cognate problems will, if possible, be farmed out to other institutions to avoid duplication.

Surely there is abundant power under Section 4?

Major de Valera

There is power to do it.

Surely also it is true— I think it was agreed on all sides when we were discussing the Second Stage— that there is one body that cannot run the institute and that is Dáil Éireann. The best thing you can do is to get the Government to provide the best council and the best director they can get and give that council and the director the powers requisite to do the job right, and then leave it in their hands to do the job on the assumption that if you have chosen them aright they will not dissipate the resources, duplicate the work that has already been done, or undertake projects that have no relation to their proper function. If there was no provision in this Bill to enable the institute "to review, facilitate, encourage, assist, co-ordinate, promote and undertake" then there would be validity in Deputy de Valera's apprehension, but these powers are there under Section 4 (1).

In sub-section (2) of that section "without prejudice to the generality of sub-section (1)" there are set out (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j) and (k), as 11 specific heads under which the institute can operate to serve the main purpose set out in the definition articles to which Deputy de Valera has referred. Probably the discussion we are now having would be more relevantly conducted on Section 4 and I think if we did conduct it on Section 4 it would become abundantly clear that the difficulties and dangers Deputy de Valera envisages will not arise, provided we get the right council and the right director. If we do not there is nothing we can do about it, because if we do not get the right council and the right director, no matter what precautions we take in the Oireachtas, they will make a hames of it. On the other hand, if we do get the right council and the right director, provided we give them sufficient scope, they will make a success of it.

The new council of the institute to be set up under this Bill will, of course, be bound by the terms of the Act and not by anything any of us may say here. I feel, however, that a council comprising the representatives of these university colleges, five members of the agricultural and rural organisations and certain other members appointed by the board, will keep the director pretty well down to mother earth. If there is a certain piece of research going on in any of the sciences that will be of use to agriculture, information will reach the director, I am sure, and he will have a knowledge of what is going on in the various universities and research establishments which are already here.

What is important, rather than spending a lot of time and money on a particular piece of research that might have general application as well as application to agriculture, is that the knowledge that is already assembled or that will be available from time to time should be brought together in the institute in order to serve agriculture or serve horticulture.

Section 2, as it stands, is wide enough to permit the board to collect all the information that is available and that would be of use to agriculture. It also directs them to pay attention to agriculture as their first interest and not to fundamental inquiries or researches which might have a much greater interest to other branches of science than that of agriculture.

Question put and agreed to.
Section 3 agreed to.
SECTION 4.
Question proposed: "That Section 4 stand part of the Bill."

I wish the Taoiseach would leap into this discussion for a moment. There is a danger in this proposal of which I seem to hear echoes by the Minister for External Affairs from what Deputy Vivion de Valera has said. This is an institute of agriculture. I would like to think of myself as being as pragmatical a person as there is in this house, but I think it would be catastrophic if, at this stage of the institute's history, the threshold of its institution, we were to try and create the impression here that we wished, in so far as it lay within our power, to veto any proposal for fundamental research which the institute might think it expedient from time to time to promote either by way of making grants or providing facilities, etc. There is nothing more dangerous than an undue—and I emphasise the word "undue"—predilection for applied research.

I was reading recently what I thought was a very apt article by a man named Schwartz in the Sunday Times. He was referring to the Labour programme for regulating investment and controlling it. He said 35 years ago a Japanese national let off a rocket and attached himself to the end of it, and the only apparent result was that he burnt the seat of his pants and cut his knees and countenance by being dragged along by the rocket. “Would that man,” said Schwartz, “if he had applied for money to develop his idea have got it from a bureaucracy that was controlling the allocation of capital?” Yet it was that man and his crazy rocket who provided the genesis of powers that to-day control the world.

Accordingly, I think that in the field of research any of us can think up a number of problems beyond which specific applied research can be embarked upon to-morrow, but we should be very slow to say that in addition to these obvious avenues of research and progress scientists should not apply themselves at all or that this institute should not facilitate scientists in turning their minds to fundamental issues.

I cannot emphasise too strongly how profoundly I believe and how urgently I would ask the House to believe that Dáil Éireann cannot run this institute, that the Department of Agriculture cannot run this institute. The only people who can run it are the council and its director, and it is because I am so profoundly convinced of that that I would urge most strongly on the Dáil that if you err at all, err on the side of giving this council and its director too wide a scope. Whatever you do, do not err on the side of hemming them in, because if you do you may get the result of this project being still-born.

I should like to hear the views of some other Deputies on that aspect of the situation. I think that the Bill, as drafted, does give wide scope, sufficiently wide scope, but I would be solidly against the suggestion that the Minister responsible for drafting the Bill should deprecate the principle of wide freedom for applied or fundamental research. I do not imagine that he really does, but I apprehend that the trend of the discussion on this section and on Section 2 might create that impression. It is important at this stage, before such an impression gets abroad, that the situation would be authoritatively clarified. I regret profoundly that I am not in a position authoritatively to clarify this matter.

If I were, I would have no hesitation about it. It is now the responsibility of the Minister for External Affairs and of our new Minister for Agriculture. I have not much hope in the Minister for External Affairs; I have none in the Minister for Agriculture. By the mercy of Providence he apparently has not taken over yet, or the prospects of an institute would be bleak indeed. However, I am prepared to settle for the best I can get. All I am asking now is that on behalf of the Government the Minister should reiterate the principle that the widest discretion is vested in this council and in the director within the reading of Sections 2 and 4.

Major de Valera

There is not very much difference between my point of view and that of Deputy Dillon. I think he has misunderstood me in this matter. My main anxiety is not directed towards narrowly confining oneself to what appear to be practical issues at the moment but towards the economic use of all the research facilities available in the country and towards safeguarding ourselves against the danger of duplication of equipment and effort.

The grounds for my main fear, as I said on the Second Reading, arise from our experience with another institute. I agree with Deputy Dillon that the fundamental research is often more fruitful than what appears to be the practical approach. I gave some instances of that the other day. What is called for here from the institute is a wide discernment of how to place the problem and go about the work of solving it. My main reason for speaking on this occasion is to voice a warning against the temptation to try and do everything. Under this section there is provision for making use of external organisations and persons for the purpose of research and even endowment. That is the policy I want to see adopted. There will be plenty of specific agricultural research for the institute to do directly. Other problems arise in other institutions and I believe that the institute should be able to use these institutions. I am using my right to comment on the section to make these remarks because I think it is better to have the matter dealt with than to feel the necessity of criticising the Bill at a later stage.

I agree with Deputy Dillon that the widest powers of initiation and that the widest facilities for getting answers to problems should be given to the council and its director. But it is at that point precisely that again I want to voice a strong word of warning that the policy should be to use all the resources available within the State and indeed outside it. The Dáil cannot run and should not attempt to run this institute, but if we can give a directing slant to it the slant we should give is that it should use all the resources available and guard against the temptation, where it is not necessary, to set up duplicated systems, duplicated laboratories, duplicated technicians.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 5.
Question proposed: "That Section 5 stand part of the Bill."

Major de Valera

Something more definite is called for in this matter right from the start. The council is appointed to carry out the general government of the institute and the administration of its affairs, but later on the Bill says there is a director who is subject to the general direction of the council. The question immediately arises under this section as to who is going to direct the technical activities of the institute. Will it be the council or the director? Is the director in every sense to be subject to the council or will he be an autonomous person having independence and autonomy in the matter of getting the research work done? This is an aspect of the matter which has been brought to light in a previous experiment. It would therefore be highly desirable at this stage to have that pointed out.

I think there will be very little trouble in interpreting this Section 5. The council is there to carry out the general governing of the institute and the administration of its affairs and one of its functions will be to hear reports from time to time from the director. He has the job of putting up a scheme of work to the council and he has the duty under Section 7 to control and direct the activities of the staff of the institute, that is, to see that the staff do their work on the activities they are directed to carry out by the council, as conveyed to them through the director.

Major de Valera

Will it be the function of the council to specify and decide what research activities will be undertaken and the priority for them?

That, I think, is one of the functions. The director may make proposals to the council under Section 7 on any matter relating to the activities of the institute. As he will be the man who will receive suggestions from day to day and, perhaps, many suggestions a day, from various people interested in agriculture, he will have available to him material from which he can draw up a programme, suggest it to the institute and let it be passed. When the general programme of work has been agreed by the council it will be his duty to see that the staff carries it out efficiently.

The point raised by Deputy Vivion de Valera indicates the desirability of clarification. As I see it, the director will direct the actual work on the basis of a programme approved by the council annually. At Rothampstead which has a research station and has a council, so far as I know, the council meets relatively infrequently. It consists of very distinguished scientists and administrators drawn from all sorts of sources and the director is a man of the first eminence. In consultation with the divisional heads of his departments, I think he proposes a programme of work for the year which the council approves and possibly extends in consultation with the director.

So far as I can see in this institute, that will be the procedure approximately. In practice, the council would meet in 1958, the director would propose a programme of research and indicate the procedure that he proposed to employ in order to implement that programme. The council would either approve or amend, or—and I believe this is unthinkable—reject it in toto. It would then be for the council to meet as frequently as they, in their discretion, thought wise, requiring the director to report on the progress made, leaving it to the director to administer the affairs of the institute between one meeting of the council and the other. That is probably as clear as it can advantageously be made by sub-section (2) of Section 7, but if there is anybody with better experience of drafting who will propose a better form of words I have no doubt the Minister would be very pleased to accept it. But can we get our minds clear? Are we all agreed on what we want to do? Is the outline I have now given substantially the Minister's purpose? If it is, I think this form of words gives effect to it and if I am wrong in my belief as to the true meaning of sub-section (2) I would be grateful if the Minister would correct me.

I think that is correct.

Major de Valera

So far as Deputy Dillon is concerned there is this to be said: under Section 8 there is provision for the appointment of committees and commissions and it is apparently envisaged that the council will take a much more active directing interest in this institute than merely meeting once in a while. They are to run the institute and it is highly important at the start that any possibility of conflict should be eliminated. As I read this, the director is an officer, and when it comes to sub-section (2) of Section 7 I shall suggest the deletion of the word "general"—that is what this is all leading up to—in "general direction of the council". In such a case there is a lot to be said for an autonomous director but if it is to be that, let him be put in straight and right at the top. If he is to be autonomous in some ways and not in other ways the seeds of conflict might be sown.

For instance, special committees will be set up, and it will be necessary to have special committees because no one person can possibly be qualified to deal with all aspects of all the problems that will arise, and, when you have advice of that nature provided, one has to be very careful to ensure that the seeds of conflict will not be sown because one could very well find a technical commission of that sort in conflict with the individual views any particular director may hold on a particular problem whether in regard to the actual doing of it, or in regard to the interpretation of priorities. That is a nice kettle of fish to come to the people at the top, especially if they are in any doubt as to their power. It is for that reason I raised this question.

Who is going to be the ultimate control? If the council is to be the control, take out the word "general" in sub-section (2) of Section 7. If, on the other hand, it is intended, as has been tried elsewhere, to set up a committee and leave the director autonomous in technical matters, leave him autonomous in technical matters but then let us face it in the Dáil that your committee at the top is going to be so much window dressing.

There must be some head with whom the last word is to lie. It is clear that in this Bill the ultimate authority lies with the council. It seems to me there is no doubt about that. The words "general direction" do indicate the duties of another officer who is subordinate to the council. If his activities are such as not to please the council, they will have to get rid of him. There must be somebody in charge and in my opinion anyhow the Bill makes it quite clear that it is the council who have the general control. They have to have a technical officer to do certain work and he is the director. A wise council who have confidence in their director will allow him to give them advice to carry through the work and, if he is a good executive, will interfere as little as possible. I think it is quite clear in the Bill. I do not think we will improve on it if you are going to have a council at all. You cannot do anything with the Bill except leave it as it is.

I do not want to score any point on Deputy de Valera but I would respectfully draw his attention to the fact that this is the one section of the Bill which his Government have inserted and I, therefore, propose to withdraw from this argument and leave it to the three of them to settle the matter between themselves because I was afflicted by this conflict of the Austinian theory of authority and where it was going to lie. I sought to resolve it by simply having a chairman who would be a director.

I said on the Second Stage it was not a matter of principle. I thought there was a powerful argument for your proposal in Section 7 and certainly I would not argue against it. I think the Taoiseach has fairly stated the position. There must be some ultimate authority. That is in the council. Nobody can close his eyes to the fact that the Government appoints the first director. Sub-section (3) of Section 7 provides that the first director shall be appointed by the Government as soon as may be after the commencement of the Act and shall hold office for such term and on such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Government.

That gives rise to the possibility of a conflict between the council and the first director. Let us face that. The first director will not be the appointee of the council but the appointee of the Government and it is possible that there will be a conflict there. I think that is a risk we will have to take but, if the council is well chosen and the director is wisely chosen, there will not be a conflict. I prefer to run the risk of such conflict arising than take the risk of having a dud appointed as first director.

As I have repeatedly said before, we cannot run the institute from Oireachtas Éireann. We have got to take certain risks and our case should be to minimise these risks in so far as we can. There is a possibility in respect of the first director. Thereafter, the ultimate responsibility will be with the council and, in the event of a conflict, they will have to get rid of the director and find one who has their confidence and whose discretion they are prepared generally to trust, always subject to the overriding consideration which, I think, is inescapable that if the council go berserk there is nothing we can do about it. I do not believe it will. If it is properly chosen it certainly should not.

Question put and agreed to.
Section 6 agreed to.
SECTION 7.
Question proposed: "That Section 7 stand part of the Bill."

Major de Valera

My point there would be completely met by the deletion of the word "general" in sub-section (2). I am not altogether satisfied with the argument that a director can be got rid of. In theory, that is a perfect answer but when it comes to practice there are all sorts of human and other factors. When it comes to the practical application of that remedy it is never really satisfactory.

It is much better to define spheres of action straight away. The word "general" in sub-section (2) should be omitted, when it would read "subject to the direction of the council".

I would strongly advise against the removal of the word "general". I think the words "general direction" ought to be left in. I do not agree with Deputy de Valera. I think that in the relationship between council and director the only suitable ultimate sanction is the sanction of parting company if they have lost confidence in one another. I do not believe an institute of this kind can be run by a director who has lost the confidence of the council. It would be much better for the council to say to the director: We cannot work together any longer. We have no confidence in one another. We had better part. I would even go to the point of saying that if the director was not prepared to go they would have to take steps to remove him. I do not believe it is a good thing to try to plaster up cracks in a confidential relationship such as should exist between a director and the council which is the ultimate authority.

Major de Valera

What is the difficulty?

There is one. This Bill provides that the director will have immediate control of staff. If the council of the institute are going to have day-to-day direction, they will be attempting to control the staff instead of the man whose job it is to do it. As Deputy Dillon pointed out and as the Taoiseach pointed out before, when we were debating the last section, the council have the power to dismiss the second director—not the first. The Government retain the power, under sub-section (9), to dismiss the first director but, like Deputy Dillon, I feel that the whole future of the institute depends upon the director and the institute working together, with the director bringing the council along with him by being left by the council to direct the daily work of the staff. Once a programme of research is decided upon, the director will carry it out, and see that it is carried out by the staff under his immediate control. If the council want to appoint a committee there is power to have the committee. This section deals with the director. Clearly, he has control of the staff, with the council giving the general directions. I think that to go any further than that might be to create trouble instead of allaying it.

Major de Valera

It is not a question of staff that is involved here. It is a question of the actual programme of work. That is my concern in this matter. If that work is construed as leaving a wide selection of programme of work to a director, I feel you will have conflict. If you have a strong council, it will come to a head with the director and he will lose or the council will lose and leave the whole thing to the director. I think you do not take on direct responsibility to the council; you do not make the council turn out and hire lab boys, or something like that, just because you give them the power to do it. I strongly urge that there should be no equivocation about the subordinacy of the director to the council.

Is there any real doubt about it? It seems to me that if the word "general" has any meaning—you can use it in a restrictive as well as in a broader sense—if it has any meaning it is that the council is in control, that if work is not being done the council thinks ought to be done in a proper way, they have a remedy. As regards the first director, can you imagine that any Government would not listen to the council of the institute if it put up a case against the director, if the director was neglecting his duty, if he suddenly ran off the rails and was doing all sorts of wrong things which it was necessary for the council to complain against and really wanted to stop? If he was not a fit and proper person, if such a mistake was made in the first appointment, then the council has a way out. Surely the Minister for Agriculture or the Government would not be deaf to representations made in such instances.

When you are trying to co-ordinate two things like this, all you can do is give a general indication and in the Bill it is that the council is there to draft programmes, to hear what the director has to say—he may have difficulties of various kinds which he may wish to refer to the council. But the day-to-day running, looking after staff, supervising, in so far as he is able or wishes to do it, the researches taking place, that will ordinarily be a matter for the director.

I come now to the subject of the part-time chairman. I have in the back of my mind the possibility that the chairman would be a sort of substitute for a standing committee, that, from time to time the director might have to come to him as representing the council, to confer with him, to ask him about certain things. As part of his work, I imagine, as a part-time appointee, he would be there for immediate consultation by the director if there is to be proper co-ordination at all. But, in any legal document, I do not think you can go further than lay down the relationship that should exist between the council and the director that is in the Bill.

I am very much against any attempt to try and make it more rigid. I know that the argument is not entirely one way. I know that the argument is to get rid of the word "general." But there is a difficulty in that. On the one hand, the director may be self-opinionated and may not do things the council would wish to see done. Another difficulty, which is worse, is that you have the council meddling in things which ought not to be meddled with, and interfering constantly. The director might therefore say: "What is the use of my doing anything? These people fundamentally do not know what is involved. They will not listen to me."

You have two dangers. First, you have the danger that if you do it one way you have the undue interference of the council. Secondly, there is the danger of the director taking to himself powers beyond those which it would be right and proper for him to take. I do not think you should define these powers more closely. You have to depend on human relations in the long run.

I think the Taoiseach is misled here and misunderstands the section. He envisages that, in the event of a conflict between the council and the first director, the council would go to the Minister for Agriculture and explain the nature of the conflict and move the Minister for Agriculture to ask the Government to remove the director as an unsatisfactory collaborator. But the Government cannot do that in accordance with the terms of this Bill. The Government can remove only the first director.

I am talking of the first one only.

They can remove only the first director for misconduct or incapacity. Suppose the council comes along and says: "This is a very brilliant character. He is as honest as the day is long. The trouble is that to live with the saints in heaven is glory but on earth it is quite another story and we cannot get on with him." If the Government tries to remove him, it is earthbound since he may a fortiori say: “You have no power. Nobody alleges incapacity. Nobody alleges misconduct.”

What is "incapacity", I wonder?

Major de Valera

Legally "incapacity" means personal incapacity. Legally it means he has gone out of his head. It does not mean incompetency.

All I want to do is to clarify the matter. Let me recall again, this is not my section. It is possibly because I had canvassed all these great difficulties that I finally came down on the side of having one authority who was both chairman of the council and director. I assure the House the decision was arrived at only after long consideration of the kind of problem which Deputy Major de Valera has raised—the difficulty of resolving this conflict of authority between a director and a council, with a chairman. However, I will revert to what I have already said. No matter what you do, you run risks. The best you can do is to minimise the risks as far as you can.

I think the Taoiseach is probably right when he says that the Bill as drafted goes as near to reducing the risk to vanishing point as possible but, again, I think the Taoiseach misdirects himself when he refers to the adjective "general" in sub-section (2). I think the word "general" in that context is restrictive. I do not think that means that, in every respect and detail, the director is subject to direction by the council. I think that if it was our purpose to effect that end then Deputy Major de Valera's proposal to delete the word "general" would achieve it. If our purpose is to say: "The council will lay down broad lines of policy and, if it considers any subject to be a matter of sufficient gravity to declare policy upon it, the director shall be subject to their control in that respect but, in the matter of day-to-day administration or detail or staff, the adjective ‘general' will be interpreted to mean that the director is independent of the council," I think that is a good arrangement.

Suppose you eliminate it, have not you the other difficulty, the difficulty of undue interference?

I agree.

Therefore, it seems to me that the whole idea is that this body of men will meet from time to time; they will not be there every day; their representative, the chairman, will have a sort of general overlooking, in their interest, generally keeping in touch, as chairman, to know what is happening. If you give the council directly more detailed powers, there is the danger that they will be interfering with details that they ought not immediately to interfere with. Again, I do not think you can do very much better than what you have here. In every case where there are authorities and you give them any kind of freedom at all, you run up against certain difficulties. You have it in the managerial system and a number of other examples of that type. As far as I am concerned, I would be willing to leave it as it is.

Major de Valera

There is that difficulty in the managerial system and, if one is to go by Deputies in the Dáil in the past on that, it would nearly be a word of warning. I should like to point out that I have not suggested, when on Section 5, taking the word "general" out of sub-section (1) of Section 5:—

"There shall be a council, to be known as the Council of An Foras Talúntais, to carry out the general government of the institute and the administration of its affairs."

The word "general" there is perfectly apt and perfectly proper but the trouble is this that here you have a statutory director. If the first thing were visualised, that you would simply have the council running everything, then there would be absolutely no need to appoint the director in this Bill at all. By virtue of the powers given in this Bill to the institute and to its governing council, it could very properly in law and otherwise be left to the council to appoint its own director, as it would probably do in any event in the nature of the thing. Therefore, that being so, one has to ask what is the purpose of a statutory filling of that particular post, which could be very well, naturally, filled within the framework of the Bill without going into that detail here. The only answer can be that this director is visualised as a statutory person. He is given statutory identity and given, therefore, an importance which, per se, carries the implication of autonomy. Now, if you leave the word “general” in there, I am convinced that there is the seed of conflict there and that the danger of a conflict there, from the point of view of getting effect for the purposes of this Bill, is greater than the danger of interference by the council and I am also influenced by this consideration: if you have two people there and their rights are defined and one person has rights over the other and they are defined, they can be perfectly friendly. For instance, if two people have a farm and there is a fence and it is clearly defined that the fence belongs to A and not to B, they live in perfect harmony as neighbours.

Do they, always?

If they do not keep hens.

Major de Valera

Nobody knows better than Deputy Sweetman that if there is any doubt as to who owns the fence—A or B—they will probably end up as enemies and in court. You have the same type of psychology in this.

It also operates when they know who owns the fence that they very often as a result bring an action quicker.

Major de Valera

For what purpose?

If a hen walks over the fence.

Major de Valera

Do not bring that in. I was going to call your hen a red herring.

A red hen.

Of which there might be many on the staff of this institute.

Major de Valera

The point is that in the light of experience to date in other places, and so forth, the deletion of the word "general" in this particular sense is highly desirable, will not interfere in practice with the legitimate autonomy of the director in carrying out his work and will make it much easier for both the director and the council.

Suppose we end it by saying that we will have it examined again for the Report Stage?

Major de Valera

An amendment could come in on Report, if necessary.

This is all your baby. I am only assisting at the accouchement of this section. I think the Taoiseach's suggestion is an admirable one—to have the matter reviewed over the week and, if it is thought desirable to amend it, to introduce an amendment on Report Stage. I will guarantee not to take violent sides with either section of this monolithic Party.

I would like to draw the attention of the Taoiseach to another aspect of this problem which it may be advantageous to consider at the same time. I think he envisaged a situation in which the director might from time to time take counsel with the chairman as a kind of standing committee of the council. If that is intended, it might be well to look again at the section which erects the council and consider investing the chairman with that authority to act in a consultative capacity to the director on behalf of the council between meetings of the council. I do not urge that view.

It would be difficult.

I do not urge it but if the Taoiseach has that idea in mind that the chairman should so function, it might be well to indicate somewhere in the Bill that that had been thought of. Otherwise, you might have a director in his own defence giving the chairman a pretty short answer or you might have the council, on the other hand, querying the discretion of the chairman of the council to have discussed the institute's affairs with the director divorced from the council over which it is his duty to preside. I do not press the matter but, in examining this question of the relationship of the director to the council, I think it would be no harm to consider whether any more specific provision should be made for any interim relationship between the chairman of the council and the director.

I am afraid——

It might be very difficult to express it but it is worth considering.

It is not the expression which would be difficult but the defining of the conduct. If there is goodwill, the thing will work. If there is not, you will only be making greater difficulties.

Very possibly.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 8.
Question proposed: "That Section 8 stand part of the Bill".

Major de Valera

That will be a very useful provision if it is worked properly.

Question put and agreed to.
Sections 9 and 10 agreed to.
SECTION 11.
Question proposed: "That Section 11 stand part of the Bill."

On Section 11, I have a certain difficulty. This relates to the endowment fund. I think, in fact, there is no difference between myself and the Minister for External Affairs, but I am bound to place this on record: In the discussion that I had, preparatory to the drafting of this Bill, with the American Ambassador I sought authority from the Minister for Finance, now Deputy Sweetman, and said to the American Ambassador on behalf of and with the full authority of the Government to which I belonged that if any additional funds were necessary faithfully and effectively to carry out the work of this institute, over and above what the income of the endowment would yield, the Government of which I was a member would certainly recommend the appropriation of such funds to Dáil Éireann within the limit of the resources of the Exchequer in accordance with the informed view of the Minister for Finance. I believe that is the intention of the present Government but I would be grateful if the Minister for External Affairs could definitely reiterate that undertaking now or it may be that perhaps he would prefer to look at it and consider the terms in which a statement of that kind could be made on the next stage of the Bill.

I am bound to make that statement here and now, and had I been responsible for the introduction of that Bill it would have been my duty, as part of the case on which I recommended the Bill to this House, to state that it was an honourable commitment on the part of the Government of which I was a member and that it constituted a significant part of the discussions on foot of which the American Government agreed to allow £1,000,000 of the total gift to be earmarked as an endowment as distinct from their original proposal that the entire £1,800,000 odd should be appropriated to capital purposes.

Section 11, regarding the endowment, does not stand alone. The next section, Section 12, provides that where the council think their funds are short of their requirements and they have propositions for the expenditure of more funds than the endowment will yield, they have the right to approach the Minister and the Minister has the right to approach the Minister for Finance. The matter will then be determined by the council, the Minister and the Minister for Finance, after consultation between each other. Certainly that section, Section 12, providing for giving right to the Dáil to pass by a Vote further funds, would not be put in if it had not been envisaged that the Dáil would be asked for an appropriate sum when the time arrived when it was required.

Question put and agreed to.
Sections 12 to 16, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 17.
Question proposed: "That Section 17 stand part of the Bill."

Major de Valera

In relation to what we were discussing on Section 7, it is to be noted that the staff are appointed by the council. I could build an argument on this section also for the removal of the word "general" from the structure of that section.

I wonder are we wise in retaining a provision that the staff should be appointed by the council, or should we insert there that the staff should be appointed by the council on the recommendation of the director?

Major de Valera

That simply means that the staff is being appointed by the director.

Substantially. The director controls the staff.

Major de Valera

All perfectly logical again if you take out the word "general". If you leave that word in you have a fog.

I am only trying to help in clarifying the position. I imagine that this is a residue over from the situation which envisaged the chairman of the council being the chief executive officer of the institute. Then I suppose it appeared clear and logical that the council should appoint the staff even though the staff was to be controlled by the executive officer who would have been, in my version of the Bill, the chairman of the council. But there is now a new element here introduced that the staff is appointed by the council but is subject to the director who is in a state of quasi-independence.

Under the 1956 Bill there is this provision: "the members of the staff of the institute shall be subject to the general control and direction of the chairman." Now the director has part of the chairman's functions. Section 17 (2) provides: "Subject to the provisions of the next following sub-section the members of the staff of the institute shall be appointed and removed by the council."

The next sub-section provides for the setting up of a board, but there is no provision that the director will appoint the stai. It is the council that will select the staff and, if they are wise, if there is a big number of applications a board of selection will be set up by the council or by whoever is the appointing authority in order to examine in detail the qualifications of the applicants. Of course, if a very highly qualified person was available they might know that and would not go through that procedure.

I would like the Minister to think this over. It must be clear to him that the 1956 draft envisaged the director and the chairman being the one person. Therefore the appointment of the staff by a council over which the director presides as chairman is quite a different proposition from the appointment of staff by a council of an institute whose day-to-day affairs, and especially staff matters, are controlled by a director.

I only read out the 1956 Bill for the Deputy's information. I think this is a good provision on its own without any reference to the old Bill or to anything outside the section itself. It is right, I believe, that the council should appoint and remove the staff of the institute. It is a protection for the director. If people are badgering him about getting a position in the institute he should have somebody to consult in the matter. When he has not the full power himself he can simply say he will put the matter before the council.

Surely if the word "staff" is taken to include porters, charwomen, messengers and minor staff of that character, it is not suggested that their appointment should be reserved to the council?

Unless common sense prevails I do not know of anything we could do here to settle it. The council may be advised by the director upon whose recommendations they may not, however, be bound. If they refuse to act on the recommendations of their director they will know what the natural consequences in many cases might be. They will have particular cases in front of them upon which they may judge. If the suggestion now advanced is adopted there would only be one way in which an appointment could be made and that would be through the nomination of some person by the director. When a post falls vacant there may be certain applications and the board would have before it the director's report. Then, perhaps a few members of the board will be technically qualified to examine the qualifications of the applicants.

Major de Valera

It is for that reason that this fits in with the framework of the Bill providing you have a controlling director such as any big company would have. The director's position would be equivalent to that of the general manager of a large concern. In a large concern the board would not be concerned with the employment of a charwoman. That, however, does not mean the board would lack authority to appoint or remove that charwoman. If this word "general" were removed, the position would be changed. The whole position is bedevilled by the words "subject to the general direction of the council" in Section 7. If the word "general" were omitted, everything would be all right.

Do we seriously suggest that a messenger could not be discharged by the director?

Major de Valera

Of course, he can.

Not in the Bill. Its "staff" is taken to mean every employee of the institute. It means the director cannot dismiss a messenger because sub-section (2) of Section 17 says: "subject to the provisions of the next following sub-section, the members of the staff of the institute shall be appointed and removed by the council".

It is better to leave in everybody because what will happen is that the council will delegate the powers for doing it.

Major de Valera

The board can delegate its powers.

That is all very well if all people were rational. However, occasionally we find the irrational, cross-grained person. Supposing some person declines to be dismissed. Any of us who has had experience of government knows that from time to time in the ordinary course of the discharge of normal duties some cross-grained person queries our jurisdiction. When you consult with your advisers you find that you are exercising some power that was conferred on you in 1861 and that you have a clear statutory power for doing what you did in order to maintain order in the Department of which you were in charge. We had such a cross-grained person in our employment for many years. He was an old gentleman whom we sacked regularly and just as regularly he came back every Monday morning and resumed the even tenor of his way. Of course, we had the Common Law right to discharge him in perpetuity. I also remember the man who, when told he was to be discharged, said he would go on a hunger strike and he had his family dispatched to the country in order better to conduct his hunger strike. I always like to see the powers defined even though it might not be necessary to invoke them.

We shall look into these matters and if there is any necessity to alter the situation in relation to the powers of hiring and firing we shall do so.

Major de Valera

I would not like to accept the Minister's suggestion at all. If, as I said earlier, we remove the word "general" from Section 7 (2) we will be making the director the general officer. I think that would be fairly sound. In other words, we would be making it clear that the director is the manager, the chief officer of the board.

Question put and agreed to.
Section 18 agreed to.
SECTION 19.
Question proposed: "That Section 19 stand part of the Bill."

There is a problem in this context which has been experienced in the case of a number of other institutions. It provides that the accounts shall be submitted annually by the council to the Comptroller and Auditor-General for audit. That carries with it some sort of implication that the Public Accounts Committee of this House has some responsibility for certifying those accounts. Then you are led into the complicated situation in which it is alleged against the Public Accounts Committee that, if they do their duty, they are trespassing on the rights of these institutions. Take the case of the National Gallery, which enjoys a constitution not entirely dissimilar from what is envisaged for this institute. It has its council, its director and its income. The Comptroller and Auditor-General audits its accounts. The accounts are brought to the Committee of Public Accounts, but supposing the Committee is not satisfied that the accounts are adequately and properly kept, what is the Committee to do?

Might I interrupt the Deputy? While I cannot detail them here, a number of boards, State companies and organisations of that kind, have their accounts examined and audited by the Comptroller and Auditor-General but they are not subject to review by the Public Accounts Committee. When the accounts are audited, the Comptroller and Auditor-General certifies them and they are presented to whatever authority that board or State organisation is supposed to present them to.

But is it not a fact that, in the cases of which the Minister speaks, the Comptroller and Auditor-General is selected by the organisation concerned, not under statute?

I think it is by statute.

In some cases.

I can think of several cases where the Comptroller and Auditor-General audits the accounts of various boards and companies but, speaking without having checked the record, I do not think in those cases the Comptroller and Auditor-General is named in the statute. I think he is selected as the auditor by the organisation concerned as a result of administrative practice in the Department of Finance. When the Comptroller and Auditor-General is specifically named in the statute I think the situation is different and the Public Accounts Committee comes into it.

That is not so. My memory of the matter is reinforced by a very short note which I have on this section. It says: "These provisions in regard to accounts and audits are in their customary form for boards of this kind."

In the case of the National University and its colleges, I think their accounts are also presented to the House when audited by the Comptroller and Auditor-General. I do not know whether that is done under statute.

As chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, when I occupy that position as I do at present, where there is a Grant-in-Aid and when the accounting officer is asked if he has made over the grant and answers, "Yes", I rule out further questions as irrelevant to the proceedings of the Public Accounts Committee. But I do not think there is any provision—I am not certain—in the Charter of the National University by which they have to render their accounts so audited to the Minister who shall thereupon lay them before each House of the Oireachtas.

They are presented as a matter of course.

Perhaps I can clea this up. In the case of State accounts, accounts of Government Departments which are subject to the audit of the Auditor-General, when he makes his audit he also gives a report and sends the lot to the Committee on Public Accounts. That is direct, but in this case the C.A.G. having audited the accounts of this institute presents them to the Minister, not to the Public Accounts Committee, to be laid before each House of the Oireachtas. I think there is no doubt about it, but if there is I shall have the matter looked into. It was not contemplated that these accounts should go to the Committee on Public Accounts and I think that is what all Deputies want. If there is any doubt about it we shall have it cleared up.

That is the proper course to take.

Question put and agreed to.
Sections 20 to 23, inclusive, agreed to.
SCHEDULE.
Question proposed: "That the Schedule be the Schedule to the Bill."

Paragraph 2 of the Schedule gives rise to a matter which I think I ought to mention. The view was strongly pressed by the American Government that the members retiring at the end of a three year term should not be eligible for immediate reappointment. They had some idea that provided a desirable introduction of new blood into the governing body without disrupting the continuity of control. I pressed the opposite view and in no matter did the Government of the United States unduly press their view upon us. With great generosity they made available to us their best advice but with the equal generosity and decency that one would expect from them, they in no way tried to coerce our judgment in the matter when in respect of paragraph 2, I dissented from the advice that was very strongly tendered to us, and I expressed the view that a person who had served effectively should not be automatically disqualified from reappointment. I would like the attention of the House to be directed to that, so that if there was a general review this opportunity should be taken to consider an appropriate amendment of the Schedule should the other view prevail.

We shall look into this more closely in view of what the Deputy said, but I think in our circumstances it is wise for the Government to be able to re-appoint the ordinary members of the council whose term expires.

Question put and agreed to.
Title agreed to.
Bill reported without amendment.
Report Stage ordered for Wednesday, 4th December, 1957.

I do not propose to tender any amendments.

I shall have the points we agreed to have examined looked into in the meantime.

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