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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 14 Dec 1960

Vol. 185 No. 8

Committee on Finance. - Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill, 1960—Committee Stage.

Section 1 agreed to.
SECTION 2.

I move amendment No. 1 :

In subsection (2) to delete paragraph (c).

It appears, and we should like some clarification on the point, that as the Bill stands it would be possible to circumvent the decision provided for in the first paragraph, namely, that no force should be sent abroad without prior consultation with the Dáil. We regard that as a very important principle. We made the point actually in the debate on the original Bill in July last that where any substantial contingent is being sent abroad to serve with U.N. the Dáil should have a full explanation of the reasons why the contingent is being sent, the destination to which it is being sent, its purposes and functions. Under subsection (2) (a) it seems to us that an unarmed force could be sent to assist a U.N. contingent—we have no objection at all to that—but under (c) it would be possible to send a contingent from the Permanent Defence Forces to reinforce that unarmed force and there would not be any limit on the size of such contingent. I wonder if that is a reasonable interpretation of that section. If it is, we should like to have the principle originally enunciated adhered to, namely, the reservation of the right to the Dáil to debate or consider the matter where any contingent exceeding 12 members is concerned.

I should like to make it clear that it would not be possible under this section to reinforce an unarmed force by a contingent such as would be sent to an armed force. If more than 12 members are going to serve with an armed U.N. force a resolution of the Dáil is necessary and paragraph (c) of subsection (2) cannot be used to send a contingent to an armed force under any circumstances except to reinforce a contingent already sent in accordance with a resolution passed or to replace such a contingent. I cannot accept the amendment because its effect would be to make it impossible to maintain a contingent of the Permanent Defence Forces with the U.N. Forces in a satisfactory manner.

The position in regard to a particular situation might be very fluid and the despatch of reinforcements might well become a matter of extreme urgency in which case the Government would want to have a free hand to act quickly. The hands of the Government would be unduly tied if it had to approach the House every time it became necessary to despatch additional troops for service with a particular United Nations Force. I can see no necessity for such a course particularly when we bear in mind that the House would already have accorded its approval for the despatch of a contingent for service with that particular United Nations Force. This section of the Bill only comes into force when the despatch of additional troops or reinforcements becomes necessary.

It must be left to the discretion of the Government to determine the size of the contingent to be sent in the light of all the circumstances from time to time. The Deputy need have no fear that this Government, or any other Government, would provide more troops in a particular situation than the circumstances at the time warranted. Certainly, with regard to replacements and reinforcements, the Government should be free to determine from time to time, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the particular situation, what should be the frequency of rotation necessary or desirable.

I cannot see any reason why the House should be approached each time it is decided to despatch fresh troops to replace the whole contingent or part of it seeing that the House would have decided by resolution in the first instance to despatch a contingent for service with the United Nations forces. If, at any time, the House desires to inquire into the position in relation to the service abroad of an Irish contingent with the United Nations forces they can bring in a motion and have the whole matter discussed here. This amendment is not acceptable to the Government and I must press for its rejection.

I can appreciate the attitude of the Minister when he says that the Government must be allowed to have a certain amount of discretion and to use its initiative in the type of situation responsible for the introduction of this Bill and for the introduction of the temporary Bill in July of this year. It is true, as the Minister has said, that this House in July last gave permission for the sending of a contingent of troops for service in the troubled areas of the Congo in accordance with the responsibilities and obligations which we accepted when we became members of the United Nations Organisation.

However, to say the least of it, the situation in the Congo at the moment is not the same as when it was presented to us in July of this year. I do not want to talk about Lumumba, Mobutu, Kasavubu or anybody else. The situation there seems to me to be as confused as a jungle in the Congo itself. I think that there should be a motion before this House any time we propose to send out a new contingent to the Congo or to reinforce contingents already there. Possibly because we did not take sufficient interest last July it was possible for the Government to send out another contingent in August. I was under the impression that the Government had no power to do that but it may be my fault that I did not pay sufficient attention to the Bill. I was under the impression that this House would have to give permission to the Government to send out additional troops. That was my conception of how things would work and it was my belief as to how things would work in the future.

It is all very well to say that there is the machinery of the House whereby Deputies can put down questions or motions in regard to these matters. These questions or motions are generally misunderstood or misrepresented. Generally speaking, we support the Government with regard to the Congo and its approach to the problem in accordance with our membership of the United Nations Organisation but I do not think that that should debar us from talking about the situation in the Congo. We have heard too little about the Congo. All we have heard is that we are members of the United Nations and that we are supposed to make our contribution to the United Nations effort. There is a little more to it than that. What is the difference between policing the Congo and fighting in the Congo? Our soldiers were sent out to be policemen but the reports in the newspapers are so confused and matters are in such a state that we do not know now with what our soldiers are confronted.

There was a report on the radio or in the newspapers yesterday that because some of our soldiers were acting as policemen they found themselves under severe disadvantages as against approaches made to them by some other groups out there. It is all very fine for the Minister to say that we can use the machinery of the House by way of question or resolution to question the right of the Government to send troops but the Government should also use their initiative in a case like this and they should themselves bring the issue here before the House, say they propose to send out another contingent and give the reasons why. I do not attempt to question what the United Nations or the Security Council has done or is doing but we should know the reason for all these things.

We have a Minister for External Affairs and he has not been in this country for the past 3 or 4 months. I think there is an obligation on the Minister for External Affairs to be here in this House and tell us what he knows about the Congo situation. Instead of that he has been away at the United Nations Assembly since August or September. Surely there is no reason why the political head of the Department of External Affairs should not be here to tell us what he knows of the situation?

This is not a debate on the United Nations administration in the Congo.

We are entitled to know what is being done in the United Nations about the Congo. I believe that, at any time in the future when we have to send out a further contingent or enlarge a contingent, the initiative should be taken by the Government to introduce a motion to this House seeking permission to send out that other contingent or replacement and, when they do that, to tell us what they can about the situation in the Congo. No matter what anybody says, no matter what the Minister for Defence or the other members of the Government may think, the public would like to know a little more about what is happening in the Congo and especially what is happening to Irish soldiers out there.

The fact that the Leader of the Labour Party has used the words he has used is a reflection on the Minister and the Government in that they have not fully informed the House of their intentions and of the situation generally. I should like to point out that this Bill is not for the Congo only but for Siam or any other place in the years to come. While it is true that reinforcements may be sent to the Congo under this Bill now, the Congo situation is only part of the whole.

If there had been no "Congo" we would not have this Bill.

Yes, we would.

We might have.

No. I shall let the Minister answer that but I had better say what I believe, that if there had not been the Congo situation the Minister for Defence, whoever he was, would have had to bring in a Bill similar to this because we had accepted membership of the United Nations and the responsibility to give military aid and send contingents as might be required. My complaint is that it was only when the drum beat and the necessity arose that we brought in the Bill, the very complaint the Deputy was making that things were so rushed last July that we could not give it the examination we should have. That is the fault of the Government and the Minister in not bringing it in twelve months ago when there was no excitement at all.

We must bear in mind in relation to this section that even when the Congo situation has been resolved and a contingent is required for some other place that problem can be dealt with if the Government thinks in its wisdom that that contingent requires further reinforcement. The effectiveness of the force could be destroyed by waiting to get a resolution passed before the troops could be sent. The Government must have the authority to send the contingent. Leave the Congo out altogether.

Let us suppose that in twelve months' time some situation arises in some other part of the world and we are requested to send a contingent. The Minister for Defence or the Minister for External Affairs brings in a resolution to send a contingent to that place and tells us why he is sending it and what is the objective of the force he is sending. When he has everything explained, everybody can examine that very fully. However, in a short time afterwards if it is found necessary and the Government are satisfied that they must send reinforcements, or that they must call some of the troops home and send an equivalent number, they should have that power. If we think things are not being done right, Parliamentary procedure then allows us to put down a motion. I do not think any Government could reject a request for Government time for such a motion because it would be a matter of major importance.

Once we have come to the conclusion that such a measure is necessary, the Government must have that power. It would lessen the effectiveness of the troops being sent, if it would not damage, their effectiveness, if that power were not given. While I have every confidence in the present personnel and would like to give them everything required, I am looking forward to the future rather than concerning myself with the present. I believe the Government should have this section as it stands to enable them to carry out their mission effectively.

In commenting on the Minister's statement may I say without in any way reflecting on him or any other Minister that any assurance he gives in this House with regard to future Governments carries no weight whatever. It is what is written into a Bill that counts. That is why it is essential to have it in black and white what the powers of a Government are with regard to the use of our troops outside the nation. Whatever Deputy MacEoin has in mind in regard to future emergencies, which we hope will not arise, the position we have to face is that this permanent legislation now being enacted affects in the immediate future the welfare of our troops in regard to the Congo, and I want to relate my remarks in particular to the Congo.

The Taoiseach in his opening statement said:

This Bill provides, however, that except in certain clearly defined cases the exercise of this power will be subject to the approval of Dáil Éireann in each instance.

I am quoting from Vol. 185, Column 777, of the Official Report of Wednesday, 7th December. In regard to the clearly defined cases, the principal exception he made is subsection (c) which, in our opinion, completely negatives the assurance given by the Taoiseach that in each instance the approval of Dáil Éireann will be sought. In other words, he said that in each instance the assent of the Dáil will be sought; then he said, "except in clearly defined cases," and the exception, subsection (c), opens the back door to get away from that assurance completely.

As far as the immediate circumstances are concerned, namely, the Congo, the temporary legislation that came in last June authorised the Government to keep these troops abroad for a period of six months. That means that if they intended to reinforce the contingent, or to send a fresh contingent, this House would have to consider, first, the question as to whether the situation had changed completely from the time when the first contingent was sent out and the Dáil, representing the people, would be entitled to comment whenever a new contingent was being sent abroad. Under this new legislation the Government can keep on sending contingents to the Congo for the next 40 years without ever coming back to this House for any authority or discussion. That is contained in this permanent legislation, and I believe that that is wrong.

I feel very strongly on this. The situation may change in the Congo and become such that it would be absolutely essential that this House would have an opportunity of discussing it if the Government decided, say next June or July, to send a further contingent there. But if the subsection is passed as it stands, we will not have that opportunity.

It is all very fine to say that Deputies can put down a motion. That is a very naïve attitude. We know what the present Taoiseach thinks of motions. He has nothing but contempt for motions put on the Order Paper. He has even sought to override the recommendations of the Committee on Procedure and Privileges in connection with motions. We know that motions could lie on the Order Paper for 12 months without being heard. A motion is of no benefit whatever so far as the rights of Deputies are concerned in this question of sending further contingents abroad. As was pointed out, the Bill gives the Government power to send troops to Tunis, Algeria or Japan tomorrow morning. If a resolution is passed authorising the Government to send 12 armed men abroad, three weeks afterwards the Government could send the entire Army. That sounds like an exaggeration, but there is nothing in the Bill to prevent the Government from doing so. The Government can, at their own discretion, reinforce whatever contingent we have abroad.

It may be that we could have another Government which—we will flatter the present one—may not be as responsible as the present Government. There may be a wide divergence of view in regard to the future activities of the United Nations in certain countries. In those circumstances, when the lives of our young soldiers may be at stake, it is absolutely imperative that this House should have an opportunity of discussing the matter and facing, as a responsible body, the decision whether they should be sent abroad or not.

I was originally under the impression that Section 2 of the Bill was purely for the purpose of replacing or reinforcing the existing contingent in the Congo. But having heard several Deputies speak, I have now come to the conclusion we are passing permanent legislation whereby in an emergency we can send troops to any part of the world without any further alteration of this legislation.

That is what I understood Deputy General MacEoin to say.

If I give way to the Minister, would he explain it to me?

In any particular instance where it is proposed to send a contingent to an armed United Nations force and if the proposed number is more than 12, there must be a resolution of this House. In the case of a contingent to an unarmed force, there is no need for a resolution. If it is to an armed force there must be a resolution, but if at some subsequent time it is found necessary to reinforce that contingent or after a period of time to replace them, under Section 2, subsection (2) (c), it will not be necessary to come back to the House for a further resolution in that instance. But in the case of any particular instance, a resolution must be passed first of all by the House authorising the despatch of a contingent of more than 12 to an armed United Nations force.

It is purely for the purpose of replacing casualties or replacing troops on the recall of others to this country and is limited to the number of 12 over and above that?

Over and above 12.

If you have 500 troops in the Congo and you bring back 300 of them, you then can replace the 300 plus 12? Is that the authority given in Section 2?

It gives you more than that. I think it is quite clear.

Is what I have said just now wrong?

Under this section, we could do what the Deputy has said, but we could do other things as well. For instance, under the previous Bill we sent one battalion originally. Subsequently there was an appeal from the United Nations for a further battalion and we sent a further battalion. We could do that under this permanent legislation if some situation, such as Deputy MacEoin referred to, arose in some other part of the world at some future time and a resolution was passed authorising the despatch of a contingent to that United Nations force. If, shortly afterwards, a further request came from the United Nations for an increased contingent, the Government would be authorised to accede to that request, if they felt that circumstances demanded it and prudence justified it. They would, of course, have regard to conditions here at home, both in regard to the availability of troops and the feasibility of despatching them from this country. The Government would be entitled to accede to that request and also to authorise the replacing of those troops after a period, such as will take place on the 25th January when the troops in the Congo will be replaced. Those who are out there must come back and the Government will be authorised to replace them.

The position is this. If we have troops, as we have now in the Congo, and there is an emergency request for an enlargement of that force, under this Bill the Minister and the Government have power to send that force as requested. Have they to come back afterwards to justify that in Dáil Éireann? I appreciate that any Government must have a free hand to act in an emergency. You could not carry on otherwise, nor could you be a proper member of the United Nations if your hands were completely tied. But if they have to send that force, will they, under the Bill, have to come back to Dáil Éireann and have the matter discussed?

I have only two small points. I do not think anybody would object to the Government having power to act in an emergency. Deputy General MacEoin mentioned that. He gave the example of a Government being faced with the situation, at a time when the Dáil was not meeting, that the United Nations wanted a reinforcement of 300 or 400 men. He said it would be difficult, if not impracticable, to convene the Dáil and get this special resolution passed. That would be a difficult situation but I do not think it is an impossible one. If, for example, the disorders in the Congo extended over the border into the French Congo, the Government would then have to come here to get a brand new resolution to allow our force to go there.

I do not see the difference between the Government having to do that and having to come back to get permission to reinforce a force already out there. I say this, asking the Minister to deny it if it is incorrect —there is permission in this subsection for the Government to send, to the Congo in the present case, the entire Irish Army.

If you had an insane Government, they could do it.

It does not make any difference. We are talking about words. We are talking about legislation. There is provision in this Bill for the Minister and the Government to send out the entire Irish Army.

And the F.C.A. along with it.

And the F.C.A. along with it.

No. There is no authority to call up the F.C.A.

It may seem a ridiculous suggestion but there is power in the Bill for the Government to do it without consulting Dáil Éireann. I do not see any difficulty in the Dáil being convened in the month of August or September. I was not then a member of the Dáil but members of the present Government and other members of the House may remember that the Government of the day convened the Dáil at a very inconvenient time to announce the accession of George VI.

The point we are concerned with is the right of the Dáil to discuss the sending of troops abroad. Is it possible under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) or (a) or (b) of subsection (2) of Section 2 to send up to 12 members of the Defence Forces, armed or unarmed, and having sent them, without referring to the Dáil then to reinforce that force with any unstated number? Is that possible?

No, not if the reinforcement would bring it over 12.

I just want to ask the Minister is there not a conflict between subsections (1) and (2) of Section 2? I take it from subsection (1) that the Minister wants the Dáil to approve before any force is sent out under the auspices, say, of the United Nations or as part of a United Nations force in any part of the world. Is that not correct?

Yes, that is right, to an armed United Nations force.

An armed battalion or two, whatever the case may be. That is the sense of subsection (1) of Section 2. I respectfully submit that subsection (2) controverts to an extent the intent of subsection (1). Could it not be left simply to the Dáil to decide and to give the Minister power to replace only troops that have been sent out to a particular area or to reinforce them?

That is all that is being done.

As subsection (2) (a) (b) and (c) reads, it does appear to be possible that the Government could send out ten or twelve men and then reinforce them later without coming to the Dáil.

I may be completely wrong in that.

The Government is precluded from sending more than 12 to an armed force without a resolution, whether they send them in instalments or not.

Subsection (c) says that they can reinforce a contingent.

But that would be more than twelve. The position is, of course, as Deputy McQuillan has said, that the Government could send out the whole Army to the Congo today if they think well.

Without a resolution?

Without a resolution, but I think they would be fairly certifiable as fit for a lunatic asylum if they did that. However, it is true that they have that power in this section. We gave them that power last year. This is a continuation of it.

That was only for six months.

I know, but this is a continuation of it for the time. I do not know how Deputy Sir Anthony Esmonde got the point that the Government had not to come back to get a resolution to send them elsewhere. They have, if it is a number larger than 12, and they cannot reinforce.

No. They must come first to have a resolution for 12, and after that they can add to that 12 any number they like in any other country.

If they are armed.

That is the point.

The House does know, and I hope Deputies will be serious enough to know, if a resolution comes before the House in regard to a contingent of 12 armed soldiers, what that means, that it may be 1,200 within three months.

Excuse me. They need not come before the House for 12.

For 12, no; for 13, yes.

When the Minister brings in that resolution for 12 or 13, whatever it is, the House will know that that may mean 1,200 and the Government of the day will be asked exactly what they mean. I do not think it would be any defence for them to say: "We have power in the Act to do it".

It is like a token vote in the House for a Supplementary Estimate.

Yes, but then there is responsibility for it. A situation arises in which, say, they bring in a resolution for a battalion again. A situation occurs in which it is found necessary to reinforce that battalion within a month. The Government should have the power to send another battalion if necessary without coming back because it is possible to lessen the effectiveness of the Government's actions, but the Government is responsible to the House and to the people. If they make a mess of it, to that extent, they can be brought to book for it.

Broadly speaking, if this legislation were going through the House without the Congo, and the Minister had taken steps to argue every section as to the why and wherefore and the needs of each section and subsection, we would approach it in a cooler manner but we are a bit upset with the situation. The Government today tells you they are bringing back the two battalions. They are sending out one, they say, but they can send out two, three or four.

And keep on sending them for the next twenty years, if necessary, without coming to this House.

Yes. There is no Minister who would be able to go ahead with that practice without being brought to book by the House. I do not accept the view that a motion would not be put down. A motion of "no confidence" in the Government in that case would have to be discussed by the Dáil. I do not think there is any doubt about it.

The Minister has not yet clarified the point I made. Subsection (2) (c) reads as follows:

the contingent is intended to replace, in whole or in part, or reinforce a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force serving outside the State as part of that International United Nations Force and consisting of more than twelve members of the Permanent Defence Force.

The Minister whether he comes to the House or does not come to the House, can send out 12. Is that correct? Can he or can he not reinforce that 12 with 1,200?

I cannot reinforce it by even one. I cannot bring it up to thirteen without a resolution of the House.

Then the Minister had better clarify subsection (2) of Section 2. Subsection (2) says that a contingent of the Defence Force may be despatched for service outside the State and then gives circumstances. The circumstances are listed and the subsection contains authority to send out a contingent but only if the Dáil authorises the Minister to do so. If the Minister sends out a first contingent he must get the authority of the House. The subsection says:

(2) A contingent of the Permanent Defence Force may be despatched for service outside the State with a particular International United Nations Force without a resolution approving of such despatch having been passed by Dáil Éireann, if, but only if—

(a) that International United Nations Force is unarmed, or

(b) the contingent consists of not more than twelve members of the Permanent Defence Force, and the number of members of the Permanent Defence Force serving outside the State with that International United Nations Force will not, by reason of such despatch, be increased to a number exceeding twelve, or

(c) the contingent is intended to replace, in whole or in part, or reinforce a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force serving outside the State as part of that International United Nations Force and consisting of more than twelve members of the Permanent Defence Force.

In other words, you can send out 12 or, if you have two there, you can send out another 10 but not another 11. You can send out troops without a resolution of the House to replace or to reinforce. It seems to me that under paragraph (c) of the subsection the Minister is taking power without a resolution of the House. He must get authority in the House in the first instance. Having got that, he can then, without a second resolution of the Dáil, send out troops to replace in whole or in part or to reinforce a permanent contingent.

If you had two battalions out there, the Minister would be entitled under this subsection to bring them back and replace them without a resolution of the House. In theory, if you send out two battalions, you can take them back in January and you can send out four battalions in February to replace and reinforce the two that you brought back and when we come back here on February 8th we could discover that four battalions were now in the Congo.

I am not saying a Minister or Government responsible to Parliamentary rule would do crazy things, but if that power is there, I think the Minister should try at least to provide that such a radical change would not be made without Parliament being consulted.

It is a pretty wide power to give the Minister in a new venture of this kind which we started with two battalions, and while it is very understandable that you would want to replace these and bring them back from the rigours of an over-long service overseas, it is travelling pretty widely if you put in a clause which would entitle you to double the force by replacement or reinforcement. For a small country with the limited defence resources that we have, that is a very wide power for the Minister to take and while I am in favour of discharging our responsibilities to the United Nations—if we are in a club we cannot opt out of it just because something happens which we do not like—I still think the Minister should not think it necessary to take such wide powers under the reinforcement provision of this Bill.

It is on the cards that the Minister will say he is as politically wise as the rest of us and that he would not do anything crazy. That is not the answer in a democratic Parliament. The House would probably like to be consulted and, if anything so drastic as reinforcements is concerned, the Minister should consult the House. The more he carries the Dáil with him in this matter the better.

It appears there is slight confusion here because we are forgetting we are dealing with an Army and not with a collection of small boys who must be protected from danger. The men who have enlisted in the Army have done so as fighting men, to be trained and to act as fighting men whenever the Government of the day sees fit to order them to do so.

While not wishing to be callous about it, we must remember that being in an army is a dangerous occupation. Up till very recently our Army has led a comparatively sheltered life and we must not get cold feet simply because we find our fighting men are in danger. That is what they enlisted to do and I think we are perfectly satisfied they will be well able to give a good account of themselves in any circumstances that might arise.

But the idea that this House should control the number of troops, once a decision is taken in principle, is one which I cannot accept for a moment. Even in times of war there are very often attempts made by Parliamentary assemblies to intervene in matters of tactics and strategy and on many occasions these have proved almost certainly disastrous. It is essential that the Government as such should have the control of the armed forces of the State and once they have been committed to a particular operation it is the Government which must control them, which must reinforce them, replace them, withdraw them as the occasion may arise.

Quite apart from anything else, this is a matter to which the Taoiseach referred yesterday in connection with the handling of information and with the debating of events in a situation such as exists in the Congo at the moment. It would almost certainly be the case that in such an event a long and possibly ill-informed debate might prove a considerable embarrassment to our troops at present operating under U.N. control in the Congo.

I would hope that we would bear in mind we have taken a very drastic step already by passing the previous temporary Bill and I think we should have it clearly in our minds that we are voluntarily surrendering part of our sovereignty by committing some of our armed forces to the control of an international body. We are doing this in the belief that it is not alone a correct discharge of our duty as members of the United Nations but also part of the essential defence policy of our country. Once we have parted with control, as we have done, then we must not go back on it.

It would, of course, be the duty of any Government to ensure that a contingent of ours serving under the United Nations should not be committed to action which has not the Government's approval in principle and the Government must retain the authority to withdraw troops should the situation drastically alter. At the same time, we cannot intervene in day-to-day tactical movements of troops, reinforcements, or anything else. We have surrendered that right by passing the Bill we did last July and we shall make that surrender a still more permanent one by passing this measure.

It is a courageous and adventurous thing to make these men available and I am glad we are doing that. I do not think we should be unduly nervous. Our action will certainly prove to be a real contribution to world peace in general. If an operation such as is envisaged in this Bill has to be carried out, it will have to be carried out to a certain extent in camera so far as tactical decisions are concerned. At the back of my mind is the thought that a situation might arise in which our forces might find themselves in a position from which they might not be able to extricate themselves without reinforcements.

In such an event the Government would have to be in a position to send out whatever reinforcement might be required, not alone to deal with the situation but also to preserve the lives of our own troops. Imposing a liability on the Government to have each reinforcement debated in this House could be nothing but dangerous. Deputies will agree that if any Government exceeded its duties an immediate motion of "No confidence" could be tabled and would have to be debated at once. Unless the matter were sufficiently serious to justify such a motion, I cannot see that debating replacements or reinforcements, tactical problems and so on, in this House could be anything but unwise, to put it mildly. It could, indeed, be very dangerous.

For about 20 minutes most Deputies were hopelessly confused. It was like the perennial problem: "Which came first; the chicken or the egg?" We have a clear idea now of what the section means. I accept the section. Having a little military knowledge, I realise it would be a dangerous thing if the Minister had to come before the House on any and every occasion because reinforcements might be held up and lives might be placed in jeopardy. Military matters, about which most Deputies know very little, would have to be debated. Immediate support essential to safeguard lives might be held up. Any hold-up might have fatal consequences for those whom we had already sent. I agree the Minister should have the power sought in this measure.

I am, however, a little concerned about another aspect altogether. If the Minister has the support of the majority of the House, he can send a contingent. That could mean a majority of one. By that majority of one he could commit this country to war because we would have no knowledge of the extent to which we might become involved. We might be asked to send 1,000 men. If they were in danger, we might be asked to send a few more thousands; and if they were not sufficient, we might be asked to send several thousands. We might, in fact, not even be asked. That is just the point. We could become seriously involved because, in the first instance, a majority of one decided we ought to send a contingent.

As we know, international politics is largely a question of ideologies, Russia and the West; and we do not know what will happen within the international framework in the next couple of years. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that Russia may dominate the United Nations. France, and other countries, may turn Left and support Russia. We might be requested by our Russian dominated United Nations to do something. That is where the danger lies. If a Party here became Communist in outlook, we might find ourselves in a very difficult situation. I believe most Governments in the next 20 or 30 years will be coalition Governments. That might mean that a minority group in a coalition Government would be the dominant voice in that Government and commit us to sending, by a majority of one, a contingent abroad, that contingent to be followed by a whole Army. That is not impossible. We have the example of Hitler. His Party was a minority Party.

The Deputy is travelling very far.

I am talking of the dangers involved. Several Deputies have spoken of the dangers. My point is that there should be some further check. A mere majority of the House should not suffice. The President should be a kind of check.

That does not arise on the amendment.

But I am speaking on the section. I am not speaking on the amendment.

We are not dealing with the section. The amendment is before the House.

Other Deputies ranged all over the place. I thought I could do the same. I accept the Minister's view that, once we commit ourselves, the Minister must have the power to send reinforcements in case of danger. It would be fatal for those concerned if he had to come back to the House on every occasion. It is a military axiom that speed decides victories. Delay may cause defeat. I accept the Minister's proposal.

I fail to understand the views of some of the speakers here today Listening to Deputy Booth, I felt for a moment that it was an empire we had here and that the question we had to consider was what country we intended to annex in the next five years. It was a question of sending reinforcements to protect our troops in such a country and a question of essential emergency action. If we got into that position as a result of this piece of legislation, the only comment I have to make is that it was certainly never envisaged. We have been assured that our troops in the Congo are there in the capacity, really, of a police force. They are not there to go to war. Under this section, however, a foolish Minister and a foolish Government could land us in very serious trouble, even in war, by a misuse of the powers that will be given under this subsection if it is passed in its present form.

This is not a question of the tactics or manoeuvers of the military men. This is a question of a dangerous political issue involved in the sending of troops to this area. Nobody wants to question or advise the Army men as to how they should run their manoeuveres or the number of troops they should use for a particular job. That is not what is under discussion. I put it clearly to the House, and I can tell the Minister that the country believes, that this legislation does not give him authority, and will not give him authority, to send any number of troops he likes to the Congo for the next twenty years without consulting this House.

There is one other point. I do not say that he would use this but we are giving him the power. There are two battalions of troops coming back from the Congo next February. The Minister may then send out there thirteen armed members of the Defence Forces at the end of January. Next July, when this House has adjourned, he can send 1,000 troops out without consulting this House and without the country having a say in the matter. That is the power that is being given to him under this Bill.

He could send 13 battalions if he wanted to.

And this House would have no say in the matter. The only safeguard for that, according to Deputy Booth, is that if the troops are sent out in July and the House does not sit until the end of October, a Deputy can put down a motion to have the whole matter thrashed out, There is no good suggesting a motion of "no confidence" in the Government. That is no safeguard because the Government can send out a contingent when the Dail is not in session. They have done things like that before. This very Government, not so long ago, two days after the Dail rose, decided to invoke the Offences Against the State Act while the seats of the Dail were still warm. I quote that as an instance of the action that can be taken by the Government when the Dáil is not in session.

There is another point about the summoning of the Dáil. Is it any great trouble to convene this House by telegram if the question should arise of sending out a further contingent that we never thought would be necessary? There is nothing big in that. The Dail could be called together two days after the necessity arose to discuss whether or not a further 1,000 troops should be sent. No such power rests with the House if this section goes through. There can be no discussion.

Deputy Booth has not been very helpful to the Minister in his general remarks suggesting that certain things have to be done in camera and that we have surrendered some of our sovereignty. I would also suggest that Deputy McQuillan's imagination is taking him away from what the intentions of the House are.

It is in the Bill.

I do not think the House wants to tie up the Minister or the Government in any kind of difficulties with regard to the general situation in the Congo on the one hand or with the intentions of the Army authorities on the other. Again, Deputy Booth has not been helpful when he suggests that the Minister could send out 13 battalions tomorrow. The fact is that the Minister could do it, but we are not so divorced from reality that any of us think that there is the slightest danger of the Government or the Army authorities doing that.

I appreciate, and any Deputy who had any experience of dealing with defence matters during the last war will appreciate, how difficult it is to get any communications of any kind from a Government in that situation. From the time the last war began until France fell there was no communication of any kind from the Government about the ordinary situation. It was with reluctance that the Government agreed to meet the Council of Defence to discuss matters when France did fall.

The remarks that have been made in the discussion on the amendment may help the Minister and the Government to understand that a little more pliability is necessary but all this ought not to blind us to what is the simple thing that we are asked to do. In July last the House passed a Bill which gave power to send a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force for service outside the State as part of the United Nations Emergency force. That was taken as a resolution enabling the Government to send two battalions. The sending of those two battalions was done by a free act of this Parliament. There was no surrender of sovereignty in any respect and there was nothing done in camera in the Dáil regarding the decision to send out these troops or about the selection of the men by voluntary means to go there.

What is being done today is that the Government, in the light of the fact that the power they have expires on the 21st January, is providing a measure, however unsatisfactory it may be from the drafting point of view or from the point of view of the House, in order to be able to replace or reinforce the forces that are there. I think we are all misinformed about the position in the Congo but I have no misunderstanding as to the desire of our people or our Parliament to stand by the commitments we undertook in July when we undertook to send a contingent to the Congo.

We do know that while this Bill would enable the Government to send four battalions to replace the two that are there, they have no intention of doing so, that if they had any intention of doing it they would take the necessary steps to inform the House and get the support and backing of the House for it, particularly in the light of the difficult circumstances that exist in the Congo and in the light of the further difficulties that may arise. Therefore it is rather running contrary to the general spirit and the general intention of ourselves and the people of the country as a whole to raise elaborate problems of a constitutional or of a military nature. However, the discussion that has taken place will be a reminder to the Government that we should be better informed, in so far as the Government are able to inform us, of the situation out there and a reminder to the Government that it may be necessary to have further statutory protection.

We understand the Government's intention in this matter and we want to make the Government's difficulties and the Army's difficulties as light as possible in doing whatever they consider has to be done to provide the assistance we were asked to provide, not for a police purpose and not for a military purpose but for the purpose of peace and of encouraging the various nations of the world to have a better understanding of the situation and to use their forces and their intellects in the best way they can to prevent a general war flare-up in the world. Therefore, while the Minister may have difficulty in explaining some of the drafting here, the intention is quite clear and I for one would not ask for any particular commas or dots to be inserted to make clear the Government's intention.

When I spoke a few moments ago I think I was under a misapprehension in regard to the second part of Section 2. I was under the impression that the Minister could circumvent the wishes of the Dáil by sending out a force of 12 men and then reinforcing that with a substantially larger force. The Minister has stated that that is not so, that for any force in excess of 12 members he must come to the Dáil to secure a resolution.

That is not so.

Any force in excess of 12.

He must get a resolution for 13 men. After that he can add to the 13 a thousand if he likes.

The resolution would be required if we proposed to send more than 12 but the exact number will not be specified.

Surely those 12 men would be for a particular type of operation?

Yes, in an armed force.

Is it not true the Minister can send four battalions if the Government so decide under 2 (c)?

Or as Deputy Booth says, 13.

Let us hear Deputy Russell.

What I want to get clear is this. If we want to send a force any place—leave out the Congo —the Minister cannot send out any more than 12 without a resolution. Is that correct?

Can he thereafter reinforce that with 1,200?

If 13 men were sent out first.

That is not what Deputy Russell asked. Deputy Russell asked could I send 12 without a resolution.

I said 12 specifically because I presume if we want to send 13——

I cannot bring that 12 up to 13 without a resolution.

The Minister cannot send more than 12 men, he cannot send one, two, three or four battalions without a resolution of this Dáil? Is that correct?

To replace the existing men?

He is not asking about replacements. He is starting from scratch. This does not refer to the Congo at all.

If the Minister wants to send out more than 12 men, he must get a resolution from Dail Eireann.

Yes, to an armed force.

And those 12 cannot be augmented at all; he must bring back one and send out one?

I think it would be entirely wrong in this Bill to hamstring the Minister with regard to the obligations we have accepted in the United Nations. In saying that, we must have regard to the fact that this discussion cannot be divorced from the events in the Congo. I do not intend to discuss the events in the Congo but there is the fact that a decision to send men out there is not purely a matter for the Army who may be very competent from the point of view of exercising their troops in warfare or other duties. If it should happen that a country like Ghana or Nigeria who threatened to pull out their troops, did pull out their 1,200 or 2,000 men we could be called upon to supply that defection and, in fact, we are giving power to the Minister for Defence to decide. It is my opinion that that should be the decision of Dáil Éireann. That is a political decision, a decision of policy, not a military decision. I go along with the Minister the whole way in support of the fulfilment of obligations in the Congo if we must send out two, three or four battalions and if we decide to substitute those battalions or possibly reinforce them to a modest degree. However, if any of the other nations pulled out—and we already have indications that some other nations intend to pull out—we could be called upon under our obligation to make good that defection.

We could be asked to but the decision would be ours.

The Minister could decide to do that without any reference to Dáil Éireann. If the Dáil has to give the Minister that power it should do so with its eyes open, but it ïs not a military decision but a major decision of policy.

I do not think that Deputies fully realise what they are suggesting when they suggest we should withdraw the paragraph. It would mean that we would have to come back here in the case of sending out any reinforcement to a contingent sent out there originally as a result of a resolution passed by the Dáil. Deputies have admitted that the type of situation against which they want to guard was really a fantastic situation, a case in which a Government would do something crazy or work some despicable kind of trick on the Dáil, such as sending out 13 originally and then sending out some thousands, thus tricking the Dáil into giving them authority to send out a contingent and then send out a number of men in excess of what the Army could reasonably provide.

It might not be a case of the Government meaning to trick anybody. Suppose the Government asked for 30 first and a month afterwards the United Nations suddenly told us: "We want 1,000 men." That situation could arise and the Government could say "All right. We shall give them to you." There would be no need to come to the Dáil.

It would be hardly necessary to specify with mathematical accuracy how many men the Government propose to send. For instance, in the case of the original decision to send a battalion, the battalion was not organised at the time the decision was taken. The actual detailed establishment of it was not worked out. The Army authorities did not consider that a battalion, as it is organised in our Defence Forces, would be the most suitable unit to send out. A provisional establishment was set up. That was amended on a number of occasions according as details were worked out.

Were we not asked by the United Nations to fulfil a certain quota?

And it is on that the Dáil based its decision.

We were asked for more than we agreed to supply. We were not by any means bound to supply the exact number the United Nations asked for, nor are we bound to supply any on request. We cannot supply any unless the Dáil approves the sending of a contingent.

The Dáil will not have to approve any more.

It will be a matter for decision by the Government, not the United Nations. The United Nations are not in a position to decide how many men we can send out.

The Dail will not have to approve any more. The Minister has made that statement. It is the Government who will approve now, not the Dail.

The Dail has to approve the sending of a contingent in the first instance. The size of the contingent is obviously a matter for the Government to decide, on the advice of the Minister for Defence; and he, naturally, is advised by the military authorities. I think it is reasonable to ask the Dáil to assume that the Government will have some sense of responsibility in the matter. Surely Deputies can realise the type of strait-jacket into which this amendment would put the Government? It would make the whole idea of sending a contingent unworkable. We would be compelled to come here in the first instance with a certain specified number and get authority to send them. If it was discovered afterwards that there was need to amend that number in any way, the Government would have to come back here to do it. That would be a ridiculous situation. After the battalion was sent out to the Congo, we got a request for additional Signals personnel. If this suggestion were carried out, we would have to come back here to get permission to send out even one wireless operator.

It is up to the Minister to produce a draft proposal to cover that. It does not require the blank section we have in the Bill.

I think Deputy Mulcahy explained quite clearly that it would be unreasonable to ask that such provision should, in fact, be drafted. After all, we have the Army staff and the Government. Surely you have to assume there will be some sense of responsibility somewhere and that we shall not send out more troops than the country can afford to send, either from the military or financial point of view?

There is more in it than that.

If this paragraph were to be omitted, you would not be able to send out extra transport drivers if it was discovered after the troops had arrived that the situation required the sending of further technical personnel.

I do not think the Dáil would wish to do that.

This is obviously a power the Government must have If the Government use it in an irresponsible manner——

It will be too late to do anything about it.

——an alternative is always open to the Dáil to put down a motion condemning that irresponsible use. There are many instances in which the Dáil just has to assume, for the time being at any rate, that the Government will have some sense of responsibility. I know we all have different ideas as to the sense of responsibility exhibited by different sections of the House, but you just have to have some confidence in the Government. If the Government act in an irresponsible way, that can be dealt with in the normal process.

What we are asking is that the Dáil will share the responsibility.

Some strange reasons have been given for the maintenance of the section in its present form. I do not think Deputy Booth helped the case the Minister is endeavouring to make. Deputy Booth talked about the movement of troops in camera, that the operation could only be carried out by stealth and secrecy. There was other talk about troops being in a very tight position, and the picture was painted of our fellows falling all over the Congo. If we reached that stage, then the Congo venture would be an appalling disaster for the United Nations. But never let us think we shall reach that stage. Our troops are not there to fight or to hold the Congo for any particular individual or group of individuals. Our people are in the Congo for one purpose, and that is to maintain the authority of Parliamentary Government.

As I said the other day, I am not concerned with these individuals who flit across the stage—a variety of names which change from week to week, one taking the place of another temporarily displaced. All that does not matter. So far as the masses of the people and democracy are concerned, we must concern ourselves with maintaining the supremacy of democratic and Parliamentary Government. Our troops are not there for the purpose of fighting or showing their fighting power. Our troops are there for the purpose of a police action. It may be necessary, when you are dealing with semi-primitive people which colonising powers have kept in a primitive state for a long number of years, to defend yourself from attack, but that is only incidental to our purpose there. Our main purpose is to act as a police force and to try, along with the other nations associated with the United Nations there, to create a climate in which the Congolese people will endeavour to work out a settlement which pleases them and not one which pleases the Irish, the Belgians or any other group, whether represented in the Congo by troops or not.

I am in favour of discharging our obligations to the United Nations. I do not think there should be any two views about that. We have committed ourselves to sending out troops there, and they are there. They will be coming home and they are to be replaced in accordance with our undertaking that we would make a contribution towards the policing of the Congo State. I travel that far without question, but I am not prepared to give the Minister power to double or treble that force without coming back to the Dáil and saying "Look, a new situation has arisen in the Congo. Here is the situation"—let him explain—"The Government have considered the whole matter. We feel it is necessary to do this, that or the other thing, and in these new circumstances we ask the Dáil for authority." We do not ask for a Bill to go through five Stages in the Dáil and in the Seanad. We ask only for a motion.

It takes three or four weeks to prepare these battalions to go to the Congo. I remember one summer in 1936 when this Dáil was recalled by telegram for the purpose of reporting the fracture in the British Act of Succession caused by the sudden abdication of the now Duke of Windsor. We all assembled here and in one day we put George VI on the British throne, by our action in meeting here in response to that telegram, repaired the fracture in the Act of Succession and made George VI King of England. That was done by telegram. It was done in a day. It takes three or four weeks to assemble a battalion for the Congo. Why, while the assembling is going on, do not we call the Dail by telegram or in any other way we like? The Dáil proceedings can be disposed of in 24 hours. It will be another three or four weeks before the battalion is ready. Then you have your moral authority and legal authority from the Dáil to add substantially to the force if in its collective wisdom the Dáil by a majority decides that the force should be substantially extended.

Nobody has suggested that the Minister must come to the Dáil with a resolution if, when a battalion arrives in the Congo, somebody notices that they forgot the dentist and they send back for him, or if there is a driver short. Nobody suggested that it would require a resolution of this House before odds and ends of people like that can be sent to the Congo.

I do not know the respective viewpoints of those who appear to share some of mine but we know the pattern of our Congo representation and I am in favour of allowing the Government to replace those people out there so that they may come home. But, if the Government makes, as it is empowered in this section to make, a very substantial change in the number of troops that we send to the Congo, the Government should be asked to come back to the House. The House can meet and discharge its responsibilities in 24 hours. As I said, the battalion will not be ready for another 30 days. Is it anything irksome to ask the Government to do that? Is there any difficulty in that respect seeing that we have not a plane that will transport any of our troops to the Congo and have to rely on other people to provide that kind of transport?

I would ask the Minister to look at it from the point of view that all that is being asked of him is that before there is a substantial change in the pattern of our representation in the Congo the Government ought to be brought back to the Dáil and asked to put before the Dáil a resolution and the reasons for the resolution seeking to increase our military representation in the Congo. That is not an irksome request. It is not a difficult request. A sudden meeting of the Dáil has been used for a much less noble purpose and I can see no reason why it should not be used on this occasion to provide the Dáil with an opportunity of considering whether in the circumstances we should send additional troops or not.

Judging by the rate at which troops are pulling out of the Congo at the present moment it looks as if we will have the honour of being the last there. The story of the ten little nigger boys looks like being a longer saga than the story of representation in the Congo, judging by the rate at which troops from the different countries are pulling out, troops of countries who have a much deeper interest in the maintenance of peace in the Congo and in Africa than we have.

This is not merely a military question; it is a political question as well. If the Government want to change the pattern of our representation in the Congo they should be required to come back here and each Deputy who is legislating to draft these people to the Congo should be given an opportunity, and should give his own conscience an opportunity, of saying whether in the new circumstances he thinks it wise that we should embark upon a policy of large-scale extension of our representation in the Congo.

There is nothing irksome in this at all. It is merely asking the Minister to come here. A review in any case at any stage would be well worth while from the Government's point of view, the Minister's point of view and the Army point of view. The proceedings in the Dáil for one day will not interfere with the 30-day preparation necessary to assemble the battalion. I do not see that there is any real difficulty.

Are we to specify the number when we come looking for authority to send a contingent in the first instance?

If there is any substantial increase, you should come here. I am personally prepared to agree that we should send out people in replacement.

I was a little surprised at the intervention of Deputy Mulcahy, who is a distinguished and very experienced member of the Legislature. I was surprised by his suggestion that while he saw that there were certain loopholes in this legislation we should trust the Minister and the Government in the circumstances and allow this Bill to go through. I was deeply interested because my memories are so fresh of the debate which took place earlier on today here, when we were discussing the Order of Business and the interpretation of certain legislation concerned with C.I.E., in which the Taoiseach was reminded of what he had said when he was Minister for Industry and Commerce. He pointed out, quite rightly, "It is not contained in the legislation, so I am not bound by any reflections I may have made at that time". It seems to me that that as much as anything else of general principle would reinforce our contention that whatever we intend should be the law binding any Government. We are not particularly concerned about this Government or its successors but any Government should be precisely guided in any action that it may be called on to take in future in another contingency such as the one we are concerned with at the moment.

We accept completely, with the reservation I have made in other debates, the need to send out the reinforcements required by the Government. We have accepted that principle but I must remind Deputy Mulcahy again that we all pass away but legislation is permanent and whatever any of us may decide to-night may be the law under which some future Minister, who does not share any of our views, even though they may be diverse at the moment, may bind the Legislature or the country to the letter of the law as he reads it.

So, I would appeal to Deputy Mulcahy, if he has any doubts about the powers being given here, not to depend on the goodwill of future Ministers or the present Minister but to bind him very precisely to whatever he has in mind in relation to future actions of this kind.

The suggestion has been made that we could put down a motion. Everybody knows that I would very much like to discuss in great detail this Congo situation and that I failed to have been allowed to do so. I am not questioning that at this stage but, clearly, I did not have as full a debate as I would like to have had. That may not be of very great importance in so far as I am a minority but it is important that whatever views any Deputy may have on any particular subject and which represent a point of view held by any minority of people, he should be allowed to put them forward here. I am sure that is a point which should have occurred to Deputy Booth. I am sure Deputy Booth cannot give us an undertaking that if we were to put down a motion of censure in relation to the activities in the Congo, which I could justify I think, that we would get a debate on that motion before this Dáil dissolves, do not mind before the Dáil rises for this recess, before the Dáil dissolves completely. In fact, although they did not say it, that was a dishonest evasion of the real point at issue in this whole question—the reason for which this amendment was put down—namely, Parliamentary control, democratic control. Whether we are right or wrong and whether our views recommend themselves to the other members of the House, is immaterial beside the fact that we have a right which is a sacrosanct principle in our Parliamentary democracy. That is the point that is at issue here, not whether the military will be allowed to use machine-guns or old fashioned weapons or whether they will be allowed to go on ten-day patrols to one part of the Congo or another.

We are involved in the most delicate political situation that has faced this country since the last war or perhaps even since the appalling Civil War. We are facing a deteriorating situation in the Congo. The Taoiseach and the Leader of the Opposition agree that it is impossible to forecast what is going to happen in the Congo in the next few months. Nobody can tell. There is the awful possiblity of a civil war involving 12,000,000 people, a situation which does not bear thinking about. We, with our own knowledge of our own civil war tragedy, must understand that is a situation which may present itself with great speed to the Government.

The Minister may be presented with the problem of what action he proposes to take should these unfortunate people decide on civil war. The whole United Nations conception is a wonderful one which we all back to the hilt, but it is in its toddling stage, in its absolute infancy. It is inconceivable you could give a measure of the situation such as exists in the Congo to the Minister until we know what is involved in our guarantee to the United Nations.

I am completely at odds with the Taoiseach on this question. He holds that our commitments are of one kind while I hold they are of another. None of us knows until we have had considerably more experience of this action how far we will be committed in any activity in the Congo or elsewhere. If the United Nations takes over Algeria and its problems from de Gaulle we shall have another terribly difficult situation. In the quickly changing and unfortunately deteriorating situation in the world—in Africa, Asia and elsewhere—I think we must here retain as close a control on the Army as we have up to the present retained.

The Army is merely like the Garda or any other part of the services— an instrument of policy. It has no independent right of expression at all in the taking of political decisions. Every action we take is a political action and the Army carries out our political decisions and we feel those political decisions should be retained here in the House and by the House and that we should not surrender any of our sovereignty, as Deputy Booth suggested we had done, in our participation in this operation.

Neither do I accept his suggestion about what he called our ill-informed debates. I can only describe that as being a very insolent reference. Why should our debates be ill-informed? Admittedly, we are not fully informed at times, but to the best of our ability we inform ourselves and it is to that purpose that we put down Questions and intervene in debates—so that we can ask people who have the information that we cannot have for the correction of any misapprehensions under which we may be labouring, or any false conclusions at which we may be in danger of arriving, from the facts at our disposal. That is the whole purpose of the Parliamentary democracy in which we believe.

Because of the serious nature of the present situation we feel the Dáil should continue to reserve to itself the final power to send out those troops after examination of the problem and after, as the Taoiseach has explained, the decision has been justified. I have had very bitter experience of attempting to get information as a result of Parliamentary Questions. I have been pilloried here by the Taoiseach simply because I ask questions. When we were discussing the motion on the Congo, we heard the Taoiseach tell the Leader of the Opposition that he would not give Government time, even to the Leader of the Opposition, for a motion unless he himself were allowed to write the motion. I think that must dispose of the suggestion that there is any satisfactory way of dealing with this difficult question other than by bringing it before the House.

Anyone who examines the actions of the Government in this matter objectively must concede that they have certainly changed their minds from the time they took action at the beginning. The Taoiseach's subsequent actions are a complete reversal of the Government's original action. Consequently, we cannot accept the suggestion that the Taoiseach or the Government are the best arbiters, are the most infallible arbiters, in taking any decisions in relation to our soldiers.

I would say again that we press this amendment. I would add the suggestion that if the Minister wishes, if he really is solely concerned with the matters he referred to—the lorry drivers and the dentists—if he feels he would be confronted with that kind of problem, his draftsmen would give us a new section which would meet with the wishes of the House.

I have dealt already with the reasons it is impossible to accept this amendment. I do not think it would be feasible for the Government to ask for anything more specific than the authority to send a contingent overseas. It would not be feasible to specify the number of men it is proposed to send. For instance, in the case of the present contingent in the Congo, we originally sent one battalion.

In a very short time we had an urgent request from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to send more troops. It would have been ridiculous if we were tied by a decision to come back and ask for authority to send one further battalion which was, in fact, doubling the one we had actually sent. We had the advice of the Army authorities that it was a feasible proposition to send another battalion there. We had the urgent request from the Secretary-General that it was vitally necessary that further troops would be sent.

It was not long since the matter had been debated and the Dáil had given authority to send a contingent. It would be unreasonable, I think, to tie the Government to coming back in every instance. It would be absolutely unnecessary, in the first place. I have made it quite clear that this is a necessary power for the Government to have. Provision is made that in specific instances the authority of the Dáil to send a contingent of more than 12 must be sought. After that, it should be a matter for the Government to decide whether or not reinforcements are necessary and desirable. Practically every speaker has admitted that the type of situation he is anxious to guard against is one which is unlikely to arise. The type of situation we want to provide for is the situation that has actually arisen and is likely to arise again in similar circumstances. It is one in which the Government would require to be in a position to act with reasonable speed. I cannot, therefore, accept this amendment.

I move to report progress.

Progress reported; Committee to sit again.
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