Léim ar aghaidh chuig an bpríomhábhar
Gnáthamharc

Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 20 Jun 1961

Vol. 190 No. 4

Charities Bill, 1961—From the Seanad.

The Dáil went into Committee to consider amendments from the Seanad.

I move that the Committee agree with the Seanad in amendment No. 1:

Section 1: In subsection (2), lines 10 and 11, "such day as the Minister for Justice shall by order appoint" deleted and "the 1st day of July, 1961" substituted.

It is proposed to make the operative date the 1st July. We are anxious that the Bill should come into operation as soon as possible and the putting of a specific date into the Bill will obviate the necessity for making a ministerial order bringing the Bill into operation.

Question put and agreed to.

I move that the Committee agree with the Seanad in amendment No. 2:—

Section 43: In subsection (1) (b), lines 40 and 41, "appearing to the Board to have" deleted and "having" substituted.

Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 are similar. They cover a point raised in the Seanad. It was suggested there might be some confusion arising out of the use of the words "appearing to the Board to have" and "appearing to the High Court to have". I thought the section as it stood was all right but, once the point was raised, to clear up any confusion, we decided to delete "appearing to the Board to have" and "appearing to the High Court to have" and to substitute "having" in both cases. That is in line with Section 36 of the Trustee Act, 1893.

I oppose this amendment. I think the original drafting was correct and the present drafting is not correct. The situation could very well be that, until the High Court has determined the trustees of the charity, nobody knows who has or who has not an interest. It is perfectly proper, therefore, that until such time as it is determined by the High Court who has an interest, "appearing to the Board to have" would be quite correct because the Board thinks that such and such a body will have an interest. Until the actual decision of the court is obtained, it will not be clear who has an interest and the court will want, appearing before it, the people who are completely found to have an interest and, in addition, the people who are on the other side to argue the other point of view. It does not seem to me that the other House, in their wisdom, have been as clear in this matter as we were in this House.

There is a point in what Deputy Sweetman says. The argument put forward in the Seanad was that if you adhere to the phrasing "appearing to the High Court to have"——

Deal with the first one first.

They are both the same.

They are not the same.

The point in both is the same.

They are not identical. The words may be the same but the point is not identical.

The argument was made in the Seanad that, if you adhere to the phrase "appearing to the Board to have," you would render the section nugatory because nobody could take the action envisaged until he appeared to the Board to have an interest. The only way in which a person could appear to the Board to have an interest would be by having a separate proceeding come before the Board. They could never come before the Board until——

I admit it is a fine point. As a result of the argument made in the Seanad, we had another look at the provisions. We consulted the draftsman and he was quite satisfied "having" was just as good as "appearing to the Board to have."

I still think it is wrong. If the Parliamentary Secretary takes it on his own head, so be it.

Question put and agreed to.

I move that the Committee agree with the Seanad in amendment No. 3:—

Section 43: In subsection (5) (a), line 24, "appearing to the High Court to have" deleted and "having" substituted.

The same observations apply.

Amendment agreed?

We are galloping over these. I want to be a little clearer in my mind. I make no apology to this House for seeking clarification, even though it shocks the Parliamentary Secretary's sense of propriety after he has consulted with the draftsman and with himself.

Under subsection (1) (b), the Board can be moved by any person appearing to the Board to have an interest. Under that subsection, as it stands, if it subsequently transpires that the person in fact has not an interest, his status is still preserved if, as a preliminary to any proceedings that have taken place or any costs he may have been involved in, it was agreed by the Board—or, in respect of the second amendment, by the court—that, when he moved the Board in the first case, or the court in the second case, he had a status inasmuch as they said that at that stage he appeared to have an interest.

If it subsequently transpires he has not, I take it he may be indemnified for his costs. If we stipulate in the Bill that the only person who may move the Board or the court in a matter of this kind is a person who has an interest, a person perfectly genuinely believing in the ambiguous circumstances envisaged by Deputy Sweetman that he has an interest, but it subsequently transpires when the trusts are settled that, in fact, he has not, and never had, will he then be in the position that any indemnification in regard to costs of any proceedings he may have inaugurated will not be available, whereas they would have been available if the original wording of the section had been left and the court was satisfied that the applicant acted bona fide in the belief that he had an interest which, as a preliminary, the court could have said they accepted as quite legitimate?

I do not agree with Deputy Dillon at all. We are dealing here only with who may or may not make an application.

To appoint trustees.

To appoint trustees. We are laying down the qualification which such a person must have. Whether or not we insert the words "appearing to have" could not possibly affect the position with regard to costs. Adhering to the phraseology of the section at the moment would undoubtedly create difficulty. At least, the argument can be sustained that it would create this difficulty: an application could be made by a person who appears to the Board to have an interest. Before he goes near the Board at all, he must appear to the Board to have an interest. It was suggested, reasonably I thought, in the Seanad that that was nonsensical.

If he has, in fact, an interest.

The section stipulates who may make an application. No application has been made and we have to decide who can make an application. The section says that the only person who may make an application is a person who appears to the Board to have an interest. If he has not made an application, he has not come before the Board and he cannot, therefore, appear to the Board to have an interest. It has been suggested that that is what is wrong with the wording as the Bill stands.

If that is so, then the Parliamentary Secretary would have properly corrected the matter by putting "having or appearing to the Board to have." The Parliamentary Secretary would then have been right. As it is, he is wrong.

I cannot see the difficulty in using the word "having." It is used in Section 33 of the Trustee Act, 1893. It has never given rise to any difficulty.

What amendment are we on?

Amendment No. 3.

Amendment No. 3 is nonsense. There are no such lines——

Is the Deputy sure he has the right copy—as amended on Report?

I am sorry; I was looking at the wrong copy.

We are at the moment discussing the matter in Committee. Would it make it easier if we left the Report Stage over until tomorrow so that these matters might be reflected upon?

Perhaps that would help us. It would certainly help me. Could the Parliamentary Secretary tell us how the words "appearing to have an interest" came to be introduced into the Bill? My experience is that words are very carefully chosen and not just casually inserted. There must have been some reason for adopting this form "appearing to the High Court to have an interest." I assume that they were probably taken from some previous statutory instrument with equal authority with the Trustee Act that the Parliamentary Secretary now quotes as the suitable precedent for the proposed amendment from the Seanad. If this form appears in previous Trustee Acts, it apparently has some value and preserves some right.

No, I am not aware that it has been used in this particular context anywhere else.

Where did it come from?

This is a new section. It could not have come from anywhere else.

It could not have come from anywhere else.

It is a regular practice to use the words "appearing to the court to have an interest." It is a regular form.

I am prepared to concede that it is a regular form of words but I am not prepared to concede that it is a regular form of words used in regard to applications of this kind. It seems to me that the words might get you into an absurd situation.

Is amendment No. 3 agreed to?

No. I do not think it is right. I think the Parliamentary Secretary should look at it again between this and Report and, if he is frightened of the point that was made in the Seanad, let him insert "having an interest or appearing to the court to have an interest" and you cover both.

Surely there is no Report at this stage? We are just adopting amendments agreed to in the Seanad.

When the amendments are reported they can be discussed on Report and as between the Committee and Report amendments may be submitted for being dealt with on Report. We are in Committee.

Is not that so, Sir?

Will the Parliamentary Secretary look at it between this and the time they are reported?

May I have a ruling from the Chair? Is there a Report Stage? I did not understand there was.

These amendments must be reported to the Dáil. We are in Committee.

And amendments can be submitted for being dealt with on Report.

I was hoping to get the Report immediately after this.

If the Parliamentary Secretary will amend this in the way I say, certainly.

I assure the Parliamentary Secretary that there is no intention to open a trap under his feet. If he will examine this point, I do not think any difficulty will arise in giving the Report of these amendments to the Parliamentary Secretary tomorrow.

If I undertake to have a look at this?

Yes. We are not engaged in any operation of trapping the Parliamentary Secretary.

I am probably the most reasonable of men.

That is not the line to take. Rather, the Parliamentary Secretary should say that the Opposition is most helpful in getting this legislation through. For Heaven's sake, let the Minister for Health keep out of it.

If the Deputy undertakes to examine his conscience, I am sure the Parliamentary Secretary will help him out.

The best course would be for the amendment to be accepted and then amended on the Report.

We will do that.

Yes, certainly. We will accept the amendment which will then be open to amendment on Report, if necessary.

I take it the Parliamentary Secretary will be prepared to accept amendments, if he receives them before the House sits tomorrow? I mean to say, that he will be prepared to deal with amendments submitted by us, if we submit them before the House sits tomorrow.

If I can do so within the rules of order, I will be delighted.

Question put and agreed to.

I move: That the Committee agree with the Seanad in amendment No. 4:

Section 45: Section deleted.

This amendment is to delete Section 45. The House will notice that the amendment to Section 46, which follows, is, in fact, in substitution for Section 45 as in the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

I move: That the Committee agree with the Seanad in amendment No. 5:

Section 46: Before subsection (2), the following subsection inserted:

"( ) For the avoidance of the difficulties which arise in giving effect to the intentions of donors of certain gifts for the purpose of the advancement of religion and in order not to frustrate those intentions and notwithstanding that certain gifts for the purpose aforesaid, including gifts for the celebration of Masses, whether in public or in private, are valid charitable gifts, it is hereby enacted that a valid charitable gift for the purpose of the advancement of religion shall have effect and, as respects its having effect, shall be construed in accordance with the laws, canons, ordinances and tenets of the religion concerned."

I take it that these two amendments march together.

Nos. 5 and 6.

Nos. 4, 5 and 6.

Nos. 4, 5 and 6. Amendment No. 5 is in substitution for the section deleted.

No. 6 is consequential on No. 5.

Yes. Will the Parliamentary Secretary explain No. 5 to us?

Section 45 dealt with gifts for Foundation Masses. I have explained the position with regard to these gifts in the House. Difficulties arose in connection with gifts for Foundation Masses and, indeed, in connection with gifts for Masses generally. We set out in the former Section 45 to deal with that situation. On reflection, we decided that we could deal with it better by making a general provision with regard to all gifts for religious purposes, which provision would apply not only to gifts for Masses but to other valid gifts for religious purposes or for any religion. We decided, therefore, to delete Section 45 and introduce this amendment to Section 46. We achieve all that we had formerly achieved in Section 45 and a great deal more. It is a general provision covering all religions and covering all valid charitable gifts for religious purposes.

I think it is a very valuable reform and I am quite certain that it will be welcomed by all the different religious denominations. The amendment of Section 46 in this way involves the deletion of Section 45 and also involves the consequential provision which is made by amendment No. 6.

There are certain important matters that arise in this amendment of which the House should be made aware. This Charities Bill was, in fact, drafted—the Parliamentary Secretary will agree—some four or five or six years ago. It is not unnatural for people to ask, if it was drafted by the previous Government, why was it not introduced. The answer is it was not introduced because the previous Government proceeded to consider this extremely difficult problem of an appropriate description for religious charities and, very often, when Governments come to consider specific questions of this kind that seem to the uninitiated to be relatively simple, the more one considers them the greater the difficulty of providing appropriate statutory definitions to meet every possibility becomes.

The plain truth is that the Charities Bill we are now considering remained on the files of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice because, after giving days of careful consideration to it, we had not yet arrived at a satisfactory drafting for the subject matter of Section 45. Section 45 is new to the Charities Bill. That section was not in our Charities Bill. It was not in our Charities Bill because, having given it the most careful consideration, we had not yet found a form which seemed to us adequately to deal with this tangled problem. The view was pressed, though not finally accepted, that possibly there was a good deal to be said for allowing this problem of charities to remain temporarily at any rate, a specific problem.

This is a Second Reading speech.

Do not be silly.

Or at least a speech that ought not to be made on the Committee Stage.

We are deleting Section 45 and introducing a new section in place of it. How could I discuss the new section on the Second Stage of this Bill when the section now submitted to the House from the Seanad was never heard of until this moment? We never saw Section 46 before.

It is an amendment to Section 46.

It is a completely new subsection, something entirely new.

It is an amendment.

Yes, but it is an amendment that goes to the heart of the matter and changes the whole basis of this section from being a section designed to make a specific bequest for Masses valid as a charity and extends that to any bequest for a religious purpose, so any bequest "for the purpose of the advancement of religion shall have effect and, as respects its having effect, shall be construed in accordance with the laws, canons, ordinances and tenets of the religion concerned". I think the Parliamentary Secretary will agree with me that greatly widens the ambit of the original intention of the section. I am certain that when considering that matter we ought to have very careful regard to the history of this whole story and recall the O'Hagan clause and all the devices developed down through the years to avoid the consequences of the obscurantist decisions of British Chancery Courts in this country during the 18th and 19th centuries.

We are trying now to do by statute what Judge Gavan Duffy's judgment, I think, did in respect of a judicial decision and which had, up to the date of that judgment, been provided for by the O'Hagan clause. We are now taking a further step and saying that any bequest "for the advancement of religion shall have effect and, as respects its having effect, shall be construed in accordance with the laws, canons, ordinances and tenets of the religion concerned". Whether that is a wise provision or not is another matter. In this country we are fortunate in that we have a number of Christian churches all of whose theology and structure are well-known to us and deservedly respected by all other communities. We have the Jewish community with their religious institutes; we have the Unitarian Church which I think does not desire to be known as a Christian community but as Unitarian and we have other recognised religious institutions, access to whose laws, canons, ordinances and tenets is readily available from sources on which our society can confidently depend. But we are very fortunate in finding ourselves in that position and we are quite unlike many other countries.

One of the problems here involved is that, to take a country like the United States, you can have all sorts of strange sects arising and many of them describing themselves as being religions with laws, canons, ordinances and tenets which are ascertainable. Now, you can see this subject is a matter of some little embarrassment to me to discuss here and yet we have a duty to face embarrassing problems. I know a sect in the State of New York whose laws, canons, ordinances and tenets require every female who becomes associated with it to be at the disposal of the head cook and bottle washer of that particular sect. That may sound very amusing to Deputies but it is not a bit amusing to me.

I could multiply cases of that kind. I remember a sect manifesting itself on one occasion on the Californian coast, the high priestess of which sect was alleged to be kidnapped and turned up as a Spanish bullfighter emerging out of the sea and the sect were required to believe that she rose from the sea mysteriously. But she had a sect and she had laws, canons, ordinances and tenets, and I have not the slightest doubt that, in the period of her ascendancy, there might have been very substantial sums of money provided for the promotion of this now long-dead activity.

That would come under the Gaming Act.

I do not think these things can be spoken of thus trivially because Deputy O'Malley, who has a plain and simple mind, I think rightly illumines this matter. Are we to identify the Mass with activities which Deputy O'Malley considers to be appropriate to the Gaming Act? We did not think so. I am now going out to the extreme fringe of extravagance. But one of the things we were slow to deal with by Statute was to tamper with a delicate situation of this kind lest we give an opportunity to Deputy O'Malley to say that everything from the celebration of the Mass to what might be more appropriately controlled by the Gaming Acts is to be gathered into one omnibus section covering charitable bequests.

We pride ourselves in this country on the respect that all sections of the community have for the religious beliefs of our neighbours but we forget sometimes how fortunate we are to be in the position of giving that respect. Am I not right in saying that this new omnibus definition which the Parliamentary Secretary asks us to accept—

May I interrupt for a moment?

Of course.

May I point out that the section itself deals entirely with a valid charitable gift—"it is hereby enacted that a valid charitable gift for the purpose of the advancement of religion..."

Yes, surely that is the essence of the whole thing.

It must be a valid charitable gift.

Aimée MacPherson may now come before the Court and say: "I represent a religious sect in Los Angeles. I am prepared to give the Court expert evidence of the laws, canons, ordinances and tenets of my religion. One of the first tenets of that religion is that all its property must be held by me personally."

May I point out to the Leader of the Opposition that the section does not deal with the question of whether the religion is valid or not or whether some of these exotic sects about which he is talking would be regarded as religions here? It deals purely with the situation, when you have a valid gift, as to how that valid gift shall be administered. We are not making any decision as to whether any particular sect or religion would be regarded as a religion or whether a gift to such a body would be regarded as a valid charitable gift for the purpose of the advancement of religion. We are dealing only with the administration of a valid charitable gift for the advancement of religion.

Suppose you have such a sect as I describe, which establishes beyond all doubt that this bequest has been made to it and that it is for the advancement of religion as defined by the secretary concerned, and that secretary goes on to say: "and I am the sole repository of the laws, canons, ordinances and tenets, of which I am the head, and accordingly I direct the Court that I am the only evidence to the court. There is no other evidence that these are the terms in any appropriate scheme that can be formulated, because your obligation is to formulate in accordance with the laws, canons, ordinances and tenets." I think there is an obligation on the court to prepare schemes which in my respectful submission to this House, would constitute an outrage to our legislative intention.

What we mean to do is to say here that if money is left to the Presbyterians, to the Methodists, or to the Jewish community, or the Unitarians, or some money is left to the Roman Catholic Church, the court would hear from the responsible authorities of such communions what are the laws, canons, ordinances and tenets of the religion in question and that the prepared scheme would conform with those. All sides of the House would readily agree to that approach. But it is because this goes far beyond that that it has created such difficulties in the minds of previous Governments. It is because this section of the Bill now to be amended goes miles beyond what all of us could agree upon, that this Bill was held up. We could not find the section which would go far enough, or as far as we thought it should go, without in fact taking us far beyond the distance we think Oireachtas Eireann ought to go.

In effect, it comes down to this: you have got cold feet.

I think the silly little man who has just interrupted me is wholly oblivious of the significance of the amendment. He just does not understand what he is talking about.

That is not unusual.

We are stumbling into an error on the assumption that a situation will never arise in this country such as we know has arisen——

The courts in England have dealt with the situation.

Of course the Parliamentary Secretary will agree with me that this is not England. All decisions which outraged us were derived from English laws. It is scarcely a reassurance to me to hear that they have dealt with the situation on these lines. I do not think it matters in Great Britain today. The matters with which we are concerned to deal do not give rise to much interest in Great Britain or in California.

I am merely pointing out that the courts in Britain have ruled that one of the sects referred to by the Leader of the Opposition is not a religion.

That may have been their opinion. They also ruled that the Holy Roman Catholic Church was not a religion.

Does the Deputy suggest that our courts would rule that way today?

Who is in charge of this Bill?

I am trying to follow the Deputy's argument but I cannot.

Is the Minister or is the Parliamentary Secretary in charge of this Bill?

I am listening as an interested party.

If the Minister would listen as an interested party, he would benefit, but if he is going to make disorderly interruptions he will merely make a nuisance of himself. I am not attempting to forecast what our courts will rule or will not rule. What I am trying to avoid is putting an obligation on the courts to form a scheme under charitable bequests which will conform to the laws, canons, ordinances and tenets for any sect which may have been decided by our courts to be a religious sect. That goes far beyond what we want to do. I am not at all sure that, when this section with this amendment in it appears in the Bill, our position in relation to this delicate matter will be any better than in fact it has been with the Gavan Duffy judgment and the O'Hagan clause to provide for any contingencies that could arise in the future, or did arise in the past, in regard to charitable donations and bequests for the advancement of religion.

I thought Section 45 in the original Bill did not present much improvement on the actual situation in which we were. As I understood it, it sought to follow substantially Gavan Duffy's judgment. This goes much beyond it and I do not know where the Minister got this addendum to his original section. I do not like it and a realistic examination of this problem should make manifest to any reasonable Deputy the new elements that are being introduced in this legislation which I think we are, rightly, profoundly reluctant to contemplate.

I have not the slightest doubt whatever that the fears of the Leader of the Opposition in this matter are completely groundless. As I, perhaps in a disorderly fashion, pointed out in my interruption we are not making any change whatever in the law as to what is or is not for the advancement of religion. For three or four hundred years, the courts here, and in Great Britain, have had to contend with this problem as to what was and what was not a valid charitable bequest for the advancement of religion. That problem has always been with them——

Surely not during the Reformation?

I said for three or four hundred years.

That is a very different thing from "always".

I will qualify "always" to mean three hundred or four hundred years.

Since the Reformation.

Do not be splitting hairs.

My goodness, splitting hairs! The Reformation splitting hairs! Go bhfóire Dia orainn!

That problem has been before the courts, a problem which they decided from time to time and one which they will have to continue to decide. This section does not alter the situation in that regard in any way; it merely stipulates that where a gift is a valid charitable gift for the purpose of the advancement of religion it should have effect and be construed in a certain way. If the appalling problems which Deputy Dillon has outlined in the matter of deciding whether or not certain sects are valid religions or not, if they are as appalling as he suggests, well, they have long been so and will continue to be so. This section does not create them nor does it do anything about them.

Surely it does, because subsection (2), the new subsection, must be construed with subsection (1)?

I am saying that the new subsection which it is proposed to insert does not in any way either create or minimise the problem with which the courts are faced in deciding whether or not some gift is a valid gift for the purpose of the advancement of religion.

Surely it does? Subsection (1) and the new subsection must be construed as being cognate. Is it not in subsection (1) that the construction would arise?

I agree that subsection (1) does affect in a very definite and concrete way whether or not a gift is a valid charitable gift for the purposes of the advancement of religion. I have no doubt that Deputy Sweetman realises exactly the sort of case towards which it is directed. The type of case towards which subsection (1) is directed is the case where a gift is left to an enclosed Order of nuns. Up to now, there seemed to be some doubt as to whether or not such a gift was a valid charitable gift because it did not include any element of public benefit. Subsection (1) is designed to remedy that situation but I was not talking about subsection (1). I was referring exclusively to the proposed subsection (2).

I was arguing how right or wrong Deputy Dillon may be in his statement about this problem, and whether or not it is ever likely to arise with us. My simple answer is that subsection (2) does not affect it in any way. I have considered this matter very carefully indeed. I have been in consultation with a number of interested parties and people who are vitally affected by the provisions of the new subsection, and I am quite satisfied that it is a very valuable piece of reform. I have no fears whatever in regard to it.

I must confess that I disagree entirely with the Parliamentary Secretary. Under subsection (1) of Section 46, the courts would make certain declaratory pronouncements in relation to what was a gift for the advancement of religion, including a public benefit. The court cannot construe subsection (1) entirely in a vacuum. In considering what the word "religion" means in subsection (1), it must consider its meaning in the new subsection also. It cannot consider it in a vacuum but will look to the nearest place where it has some cognate statutory notice of what "religion" is. It then goes on to the new subsection where it is "construed in accordance with the laws, canons, ordinances and tenets of the religion concerned."

Let me ask the Parliamentary Secretary one simple, straight question. No; perhaps I will not. One does not like to refer to matters that have actually taken place here. We know there is one small body of people who operate in this country who would certainly come within those terms.

I think the body to which Deputy Sweetman is referring was decided in England not to be a religion.

I do not think the English have this section. I do not think that under this subsection bequests for the purpose of enabling them to carry out their somewhat unpleasant methods of proselytising would be valid because the court would have to go back again to subsection (2) in making a construction under subsection (1). No one would want it to do that. It seems to me that you cannot construe subsection (1) in a vacuum. If you cannot construe subsection (1) in a vacuum, then inevitably you are thrown on to the matters raised in the new subsection which says: "... and, as respects its having effect, shall be construed in accordance with the laws, canons, ordinances and tenets of the religion concerned".

If it is construed "as respects its having effect" when you have nothing to define what "religion" is in subsection (1), you must consider the laws, canons, ordinances and tenets of the religion concerned to decide, if it has all these things, whether it is a religion to which subsection (1) refers. If it has those things, then it gets thrown back on to subsection (1) and the court has no option. I think this is a very wide amendment, the implications of which the Parliamentary Secretary does not at all understand.

I am not in the least influenced by the interpolations of the Minister for Health or the arguments of the Parliamentary Secretary. I am dealing with this section on the basis of a situation which happily does not exist here at present but may at any time. It does exist elsewhere and we should have regard to it. When the Parliamentary Secretary says an English court decided this or that activity was not a religion, I am not interested. An English court decided some time ago that the Roman Catholic religion was not a religion——

The Deputy has said that three times.

——but a mass of superstition.

Perhaps the Minister would polish off the speech that he has been correcting and recorrecting.

Give him a chance to make it.

The longer you keep me, the better it will be.

I do not look on this as a light matter but as a very grave matter. I am not in the least encouraged by the predictions of the Parliamentary Secretary that the court will hold one thing to be a religious activity, and will hold some other thing not to be a religious activity. If there is a body of persons who honestly believe themselves to be a valid group with religious convictions, my whole instinct is to lean towards them and to hope that this Legislature and our courts would be as jealous of their rights in our society as they would be of the rights of the most powerful and highly organised church in our community.

You should be extremely chary about doing violence to a religious group simply because it appears to you that their religious conviction is at variance with what you yourself believe to be true. The very quintessence of a Christian society, and particularly a society where the population is more than 97 per cent. Roman Catholic, is that everyone's religious convictions will be most scrupulously respected. It is with that situation in mind that you have got to face this whole problem and while your inclination is to see that everyone will be perfectly free to hold such religious convictions as may appear appropriate to them, do you want to go the step further of saying that, however incongruous, incomprehensible and inexplicable these religious convictions may appear to be in the eyes of reasonable men, the courts, once they determine it is a religious issue and that a bequest to it is technically for the advancement of religion, will then have put upon them an obligation by this Legislature to ask that group: "What are your laws, canons, ordinances and tenets?" and, if there is no other source of evidence available to the court, that the court is bound to approve a scheme in accordance with those laws, canons, ordinances and tenets as reported to them by that group, whatever these laws, canons, ordinances and tenets may be?

I am bound to say that we were very much better off before Section 45 and Section 46 were presented to us. I am of opinion that Section 46, as here amended, may give rise in the future to most undesirable difficulties which we have successfully avoided to date and may give rise to conflicts which none of us would wish to see develop in our society. I am not one bit ashamed in declaring that, in regard to delicate matters of this kind, it is very often wiser for the Legislature to stand aside and let the Court of Chancery in our own country deal with the problems that arise in connection with matters of this kind.

The Court of Chancery is there with its own code to mitigate the rigours of the statute and common law. It has done so with remarkable success. It has shown that flexibility and wisdom which has enabled it to adapt the common law and the statute law itself to the requirements of our society, since our independence was established here. We are going in now with the crude machinery of the statute law to try to improve upon what the Court of Chancery has already done.

I think the decision of the previous Government to leave this matter with the Court of Chancery was probably the wisest and I believe that the Parliamentary Secretary has found himself already slipping down the slippery slope and devised Section 45 and Section 46 as an innovation which he thought would tidy up this difficulty because he was persuaded in the Seanad to offer amendment No. 5 as a further elaboration of what he first recommended to this House as a solution to this proposal. I think he has allowed himself to be pushed too far.

He has not given us the history of the amendment, where it came from or who urged it upon him. If it were desirable, why did he not include it in his original draft to this House? He has fallen into the exact pit which we sought to avoid and that is to try to improve on what the Court of Chancery has done. He is now doing by statute far more than the Court of Chancery would have done and very much more than this Legislature would have approved of, if they could foresee its potentialities and we were confronted with such developments as have taken place both in the United States and elsewhere throughout the world.

The fact that we are free from such aberrations gives us no guarantee that we will do better. We are cutting a very awkward stick which may be used upon our own backs in the years to come if and when the contingencies which I regard as quite possible arise to plague us here as they have done elsewhere.

First of all, let me deal with the point made by Deputy Sweetman. Subsection (1) of Section 46 does not have, I think, the effect that he thinks it has. Merely excluding the necessity for an element of public benefit will not let in as a religion something which is not there at the moment. If I read the subsection for the House, I think the House will agree with me. Subsection (1) states:

In determining whether or not a gift for the purpose of the advancement of religion is a valid charitable gift ...

The determination there is directed to the charitable nature of the gift and not as to whether or not the religion is a recognised religion or one that would be recognised by our Courts as a religion. Exactly the same point arises——

No. Let the Parliamentary Secretary continue reading the subsection. It is precisely because you are excluding the provision about the public benefit that you are widening what a religion means.

It is a mandatory presumption.

My argument is that subsection (1) of Section 46 does not say a thing about the tests to be applied to determine what is a religion.

What are the tests? The Parliamentary Secretary is taking the public benefit away.

The element of public benefit is concerned with the purposes of the gift and not the religion. The religion will either stand or fall as a religion by existing tests. It is only the purposes of the gift that are in issue. Let me give an example. Our Courts would regard the Catholic Faith as a valid religion: It is a religion which they would recognise as such. Nevertheless, it is conceivable, although unlikely, that under existing law, even though the Catholic Faith is recognised as a religion, a gift to a particular Order of Catholic nuns would not be a valid charitable gift because of the lack of the so-called "public benefit" element.

A contemplative Order?

A contemplative Order. There is the difference.

Subsection (1) merely stipulates——

I will accept what the Parliamentary Secretary meant it merely to stipulate but it does not do so. That is the point.

It seems to me that the argument of Deputy Dillon and particularly of Deputy Sweetman is that by taking away this element of public benefit, we were letting into the category of recognised religions some which we should not. I think that is just not so. The subsection does not say that. I do not think it can be read as saying so. May I go on to put a couple of points in reply to what Deputy Dillon has stated? I think anybody would agree that the proposed new subsection (2) very clearly envisages that the religion concerned must have laws, canons, ordinances and tenets. Therefore, Deputy Dillon's suggestion that some of these sects would not have laws, canons, ordinances and tenets and that we would have to take the word of the secretary of the organisation just does not stand up.

I have said before that law reform must be a continuing process. All we can hope to do in this Bill is to give ourselves a piece of legislation which will be adequate and suitable to our times and circumstances. Deputy Dillon admits that the problems he envisages are not with us today. His concern is that they may arise in the future. I suggest we cannot legislate on that basis. We must try to give ourselves a charity code to suit the times and circumstances of today. If those circumstances change, if developments make this legislation out of date or unsuitable, then it will have to be amended. That is the essential process of law reform. Because that process is going on all the time we have this Bill before us.

The statute of 1634 was possibly appropriate to its time. The whole social set-up and fabric of society was different then from what it is today. That statute may have been suitable and adequate in 1634. Because of changing circumstances, we must have law reform and amending legislation from time to time. It is not a valid argument on the part of the Opposition to say, in effect: "We admit everything is all right now and that the Bill deals with the situation as it is today but such and such a situation may arise."

I did not admit it.

I am referring to what Deputy Dillon said. His contention was that such and such a situation may evolve in 20 years' time and that this Bill will not be adequate to deal with it. I can only repeat that the proposed new subsection has been very carefully considered by people wise and experienced in this field and that they are quite satisfied with it.

Question put and declared carried.

I move that the Committee agree with the Seanad in amendment No. 6:

Section 46: Subsection (2) deleted and the following subsection substituted:

"( ) The foregoing subsections shall not apply in the case of a gift which takes effect before the 1st day of January, 1960."

It is consequential on No. 5.

I do not quite understand that. Why are they not to apply before 1st January, 1960?

That is the same date as before. What was the significance of that date?

We took that date as being as far back as we could go. We wanted to bring the reform into effect as soon as possible but we did not want to upset any existing rights. Estates may have been distributed and things done on the basis of the old law. If we went back further than 1st January, 1960, we might have affected distributions which had already taken place.

Was it just, after all, a date? It was not the date of publication of the Bill, for example?

The Bill was published about nine months later.

I do not understand that. It is not possible that charities have been distributed——

No. We ascertained there were not.

Through the Estate Duty Office of the Revenue Commissioners to whom all these things would have to be notified.

No. I will give the Parliamentary Secretary an exact case of which the Commissioners of Charitable Donations and Bequests would not necessarily know at all. I have in mind a gift residue to a charity away back in 1920—a gift, by will, of the residue, or a fixed sum; it does not matter in the slightest—dependent upon the death of the life tenant. The notice would have been published under the Charitable Donations and Bequests Acts in 1920. The life tenant does not die until 1960, 40 years afterwards.

It is out, I think. The gift takes effect on a particular date.

On the death of the life tenant, surely?

No, on the death of the original donor.

Because then the charity had a vested interest. I think that is probably right. The Parliamentary Secretary has convinced me on that. I am sorry I was not able to convince him the last time: I was clearly right then.

Question put and agreed to.

I move that the Committee agree with the Seanad in amendment No. 7:

Section 47: In subsection (2), line 22, ": provided that, in the case of any two or more charities of which the Board are trustees, the Board may make a scheme of their own motion" added after "charities".

Some doubt was expressed as to whether under Section 47 as it stood, the Charity Commissioners could bring into being a common investment scheme for charities of which they are themselves trustees. This amendment puts the matter beyond doubt and makes it absolutely clear that they can do so.

Question put and agreed to.

I move that the Committee agree with the Seanad in amendment No. 8:

Section 53: In subsection (1) (a), line 37, "morning" inserted before "newspaper" and "on every week-day" inserted before "in Dublin."

This amendment is designed to bring Section 53 in line with what has been the practice for many years. Doubts were expressed in the Seanad—we have to admit there was some validity for those doubts—that we were not achieving that the publication involved would necessarily be in one of the Dublin national dailies, which was what we wanted. Therefore, we simply inserted the word "morning" before "newspaper" and "on every week-day" before "in Dublin." Instead of having "a newspaper published in Dublin" we have "a morning newspaper published on every week-day in Dublin."

Why should the Cork Examiner be excluded?

We discussed that at some length in the Seanad.

Suppose there is a bequest to take effect in Munster for example?

It provides that where you have a newspaper circulating in the locality, the advertisement is published in that newspaper. It is only if there is no direction as to a locality that you go to the Dublin newspapers——

You can publish it, for example, in the Leinster Leader if it affects Kildare?

Yes, if there is such a local paper circulating in the locality.

I still think the Cork Examiner is getting a raw deal. I cannot understand why some of the Corkmen in this House do not rise up to defend it.

The answer is simple. It is because there is no Cork Deputy in the House at the moment.

Question put and agreed to.
Report of amendments ordered for Wednesday, 21st June, 1961.
Barr
Roinn