Before Question Time I was adverting to the question of policy, the inclusion of review of policy in the work of this committee. That is an arguable question. In the case of the Committee of Public Accounts, policy considerations are excluded and a lot of the efficiency of the committee results from that fact in that distracting excursions into that rather vague area are avoided. Policy is clearly defined and the committee can function. We have a slightly different situation here. Unless policy is defined, accounts, reports and operational results cannot be easily assessed and interpreted. Policy can have two meanings. It can have the usual meaning that is attached to it, capital "P", or it can refer to administrative or business policy or the policy of the State body in regard to its priorities. Apparently this committee will merely lay its reports before the Houses of the Oireachtas, which I consider inadequate. For that reason I have asked the Minister to consider a more specific reporting. If the committee cannot at least inquire into what is the governing policy and if the people who are answerable in these State bodies to the committee are not required to at least say what the policy is, then there may be a good deal of stultification.
I should like to see the word "policy" included, with the understanding that the functions of the committee would be mainly in the area of its functioning and accountability. Its policy beyond these limits is a matter for the Houses of the Oireachtas or the Government. Admittedly there is a grey area here, but if this mechanism is to be introduced in an attempt to regularise the responsibility of these State bodies to Parliament, then we have to provide for comment on policy. I see no reason why we should not.
Let us take a typical example and consider the case of CIE several years ago on the question of commercial policy. Was the emphasis to be given to rail or road? Admittedly, in its broader aspects, this would be laid down by the Executive and controlled by the Minister and the Executive but, in the implementation of that, there is surely room for comment. It is precisely in this area that a committee can be useful. Take the closing of the Harcourt Street line, for instance. This line was closed with what most people consider was indecent haste and, to this day, there are comments on the pity of it. That might not have happened with the same precipitation if there had been a committee, and if that committee had power to comment on the implementation of policy in that sense.
I would not seek to make that committee the deciding factor but at least it would be a brake on the responsible parties, not only taking an action, but taking it so precipitantly that it could not be reversed. It is that kind of check on policy I would envisage here and, in the general nature of the committee being set up, I think it would be wiser to include the word "policy" and see how it works. If this committee merely considers social policies—I would not go as far as Deputy Halligan; I see a warning light in his approach to it— then it will solve its own problems very quickly. I do not think anybody would be very worried about it. If it interprets matters rationally and concentrates on accountability of public money and value for money's worth— because this is essentially what is involved here, as I see it—then the inclusion of the word "policy", while necessary to give scope, need not be a cause of apprehension. For that reason, I support that amendment.
Taking our amendments in order, I have already dealt with the question of the chairman. That remark is sufficient to deal with the question of policy. Policy must be clear and defined, and a person answering to the committee should not be able to plead something was a matter of policy and therefore he could not answer. That is not what happens at the Committee of Public Accounts. Certainly, an accounting officer will plead that a matter is one of policy explained in order to put the question at issue in context, and this is very frequently done. The Committee of Public Accounts has a long tradition behind it—110 years. As Deputy Halligan pointed out this new committee is sui generis and it would be safer to add in the word. That accounts for our second amendment.
Our third amendment is in paragraph (2) to delete: "or delete from the Schedule the names of any bodies which he considers no longer to be State-sponsored bodies engaged in trading or commercial activities". If the Minister keeps one set of State-sponsored bodies which has in common with the other State-sponsored bodies that it is in receipt of a subvention from public funds and is spending the taxpayers' money, it should be equally responsible with the others. If the Minister does not mend that situation by bringing accountability into the regular course of answering in the Dáil by whatever mechanism, without casting aspersions on anyone, I fear the road is open to manoeuvre.
In his opening speech the Minister discussed at some length what a State-sponsored body is. The bodies are listed in a Schedule. They are definite. He said that a general principle is being adopted that commercial bodies are those which derive the greater part of their current revenues from the sale of goods or services. That is very vague. It seems to me to open the door for removing a body from that category if things get too hot. In other words, it is too definite and there is a temptation, possibly, for manoeuvre. I do not see why that paragraph should be in the motion. Why would the Minister want to delete one of the Bodies included already? I do not mind him adding to the list, but why would he want to take some of them out of the Schedule? They are a heterogeneous bunch when judged by that one criterion.
With regard to the amendment dealing with confidentiality we suggest the deletion of "shall" and the substitution of "may, if it so decides." Here we are getting at a serious problem for these bodies. They are in a competitive business. Ordinary business confidentiality, and particularly confidentiality about plans, may be very important, and may need care. For instance, take an airline competing abroad. Their plans for the future would have an element of confidentiality in them. So would other bodies. Therefore, one can understand why this is being included.
I wonder is paragraph (4) of the resolution really effective. There are many confidential matters in the public service and confidentiality is preserved notwithstanding the Committee of Public Accounts. There was the famous incident with the Department of Justice several years ago to which I referred already. The rules were reiterated in Department of Finance minutes and circulars. There has never been any real trouble about this. As the Leas-Cheann Comhairle knows, that Committee has been composed of the most diverse elements from different parts of the House. There has been no problem about confidentiality so far as I know. I do not see why it should be a problem in regard to this committee, provided it functions in the way I postulated earlier. I do not see why responsible Members of this House would not do so.
On the other hand, how much good is that? I could understand the Minister providing that confidential information would not be given to the committee, in which case the committee might as well go home before it starts. If confidential information is to be given to the committee, all this does is prevent the committee putting it in a report and publishing it. We all know how matters can be disseminated. Either it is genuinely confidential material where the confidence will be respected—and I would say that will be the vast majority of cases—or the confidentiality may be one of convenience for the executives concerned and there might be justification for publication and criticism.
In that case what do you think will happen even if you have this? If I am a member of this committee and I get that information, what is to stop me breaking this here in the House? I have absolute privilege here. I cannot be muzzled. I make that point to show that this provision is to a certain extent unnecessary, and I am not so sure whether the better solution would not be to drop it altogether and to assume that people will act responsibly, as in most cases they will. However, the inclusion of a provision like that will lead to friction and, in the last resort, it will be useless in the very case where somebody would want it to be effective. I would like the Minister to consider our amendment and his own drafting in that light—we are approaching this in a constructive way, I hope— and see whether the provision should be there at all.
Paragraph 4, prompts me to ask a question about technical specialists. I am a little cynical about this. There may be cases where it is necessary to call in a specialist consultant but the spectacle of this committee, with the State-sponsored bodies' technicians on one side and commission technicians on the other side in a technical argument which the lay members of the committee could not be expected to understand, is a futile waste of time and money that I would prefer to avoid. It is probably necessary to include such a provision, but it should not be the rule.
Every one of these State bodies have their technical advisers and experts, and the approach of the committee should be fundamentally to rely on the executives and experts of these bodies rather than to bring in outsiders as a practice. That is the way we function with the civil service and by and large it functions well. The broader thinking of the committee is not dependent on technical details of this sort.
In regard to the list of bodies here, the Comptroller and Auditor General audits some of these accounts. For instance he audits accounts for Bord na Móna, Fóir Teoranta, the National Stud, Nítrigin Éireann and Radio Telefís Éireann; the others he does not. It seems to me that to impose the complete auditorial job on the Comptroller and Auditor General would be overloading him unless a very significant expression were made in his activities. On the other hand, there is a very strong case why such a definite commercial activity as Aer Lingus and CIE should not be governed by the same rules as govern the State service, and there is a case for their own auditors in these instances. Therefore, the question of auditors and the role the Comptroller and Auditor General plays in regard to public accounts and the corresponding role to be played by one agency or maybe several agencies vis-à-vis this committee need examination as well. Certainly the Comptroller and Auditor General would not simpliciter be the answer.
A great deal of thought will have to go into making this committee work. Its terms of reference are important, but its purpose should be made absolutely clear and its limitations defined. It may be that the first tentative effort of the first committee may require modification. We should be prepared for that. On the other hand, the hope would be that this committee would do what it sets out to do, fill the gap in the accountability of the spenders of public money and accountability for public administration. All this involves a structured organisation. It is not like the old days when the House could appoint a committee and could do all the work within itself. In the case of this committee there will be several tiers before it comes to this House at all. The lowest tier will be the State-sponsored bodies; above them there will be the individual Departments to which they are responsible; above them again the Department of Finance and the Comptroller and Auditor General as the controllers and dispensers of public money, the taxpayers' money. Quite possibly the Department of the Public Service would also have a role here, but I do not see it just at the moment. On top of that there would be the committee itself, and then this House.
There is a structure that seems to be taken more or less for granted in this motion, but at every level smooth-working machinery needs to be supplied which would not only do what we are setting out to do, to make these State bodies efficiently accountable for public moneys and for public activities, but would also co-ordinate them and make them part of an effective overall system of parliamentary control of public expenditure and administration.
All these things can be said generally and perhaps that is our job here, to say them generally. But these generalities will produce no fruit unless the detailed mechanisms are provided. I would hope that in the setting up of the committee, the details of the terms of reference and so on would be worked out with greater precision than we have been able to visualise here today.
