Limerick East): When this Government set out with the British Government on the difficult path of negotiating an agreement between our two countries following the meeting at Chequers between the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister in December 1984, we had before us the basic objective of trying to find ways of enhancing the prospects for peace and reconciliation on this island. We believed that, if we were to have any realistic hope of attaining this objective, it would be necessary to find ways of lessening the alienation of the Nationalist community in the North which the Forum in paragraph 5.1 of their report so clearly identified while, at the same time, providing concrete and visible evidence to the Unionist people that their position was not under threat.
I believe that anyone who studies the text of this agreement carefully will see that it reflects fairly these two fundamental principles. For the first time since the establishment of the state of Northern Ireland a formal structure, the Anglo-Irish Inter-governmental Conference, is to be established within Northern Ireland which will be given the specific remit of concerning itself with measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of both traditions in the North.
This represents significant progress because it means that the Nationalist population of the North now have formal recognition in a binding international agreement that their traditions and rights are to be placed on a footing equal to that of the majority population. Nobody should underestimate the importance of this historic development for the Nationalist people of the North. It represents not only formal acknowledgement by the British Government of the legitimacy within the State of those who seek to work by peaceful means for the re-unification of Ireland, but also provides machinery through which matters of major concern to them can be discussed and differences between the two communities reconciled.
When this agreement was being signed, I was already on my way to the United States of America to provide briefings on the contents and implications of the agreement. I believe that some account of my visit there is appropriate and that the reaction of people whom I met there may be of interest to Deputies in the context of their own attitude to the agreement.
I went there mainly to meet two groups. First, I met people in the general news media, with special reference to those based in New York. After that I met various people with Irish-American interests including both people in Irish-American news media and other people active in Irish-American organisations.
In the event, the agreement received very wide coverage. The New York Times went to the extent of printing the text of the agreement in full, as well as giving it editorial support. I believe it can fairly be said that the editorial and other press reaction in the main American news media ranged from favourable to very favourable. Newspapers with a special Irish-American interest, not being dailies, had not appeared before I had left but, in general, the personal reaction I got from those whom I met from the Irish-American area, both in organisations and in news media, seemed to me to be at least as favourable as that shown by the national news media. All in all, I was more than happy.
I suppose it might be suggested that, as far as the Irish-American groups are concerned, I took care to ensure that those whom I met were people I could depend on to give a favourable reaction. That was not, in fact, the case. Where Irish-American groups were concerned, I exercised some selectivity, simply because I did not think it would be helpful at this stage to extend invitations to people whose attitudes in the past have caused serious concern to a succession of Irish Governments. However, I certainly did not set out to speak only to the converted, and to have done so would not have been consistent with one of the main objectives of my journey.
It might be said — on the face of it, not unreasonably — that such a reaction as I have described, emerging in the immediate aftermath of my visit, is of little long term significance. If all I could claim was that the immediate response was good, I would not myself see very much significance in it. I would not be dismissive about it either, because the published reaction of major organs of opinion in the United States is important to us, as is the immediate reaction of Irish-American groups, but we in the Government are concerned with more than the immediate reaction and I am sure the House is also. That is particularly so because, as we all know, for some years there has been a serious problem about misguided financial support for paramilitaries here and it is very likely that the level of that support can be affected one way or the other by the general reaction of Irish-Americans to the agreement. So the question arises: will the immediately favourable US reaction to which I have referred last? I believe it will last.
I believe this, first of all, for a reason I need hardly mention at all, namely, that I am convinced that the agreement is a good one that will be increasingly accepted as being so in the weeks, months and years ahead. However, that is not a reason that will carry conviction to anybody who has a different view of the agreement, so I will pass on to other reasons. And, of them, the central reason I am confident that the American reaction was no flash-in-the-pan, is that it was not the result of any public relations exercise by me because I did not engage in any such exercise. I did not go to the United States to do a "public relations" job. I am sure it would have been very easy for me to do that kind of job if I had set out to do so and to have ensured, in the short term, an even better reaction than has actually emerged.
I could have done that for the very simple reason that the agreement is a carefully balanced document that recognises different and at times conflicting interests, and it would have been easy, though I believe very irresponsible, for me to have given a distorting emphasis to some parts of the agreement rather than others, tailoring my remarks and my responses to the special interests of particular groups. I went out of my way to avoid doing so. In fact I believe I can fairly say that, although my contacts amongst Irish-Americans were virtually entirely with those in the Nationalist tradition, I would not have had to change a word of what I said if my audience were made up exclusively of staunch Unionists and if my only remit were to persuade them to support the agreement. No doubt I would have got some different supplementary questions from such an audience, but that is all.
It says much for the agreement that I can say without hesitation that the case I made to encourage Irish-Americans of the Nationalist tradition to support the agreement is a case that I believe would encourage all but the most die-hard of Unionists to do likewise.
On several occasions — and I am referring now to what I said to Irish-American groups and not only to the general newsmedia — I stressed that, at the heart of the agreement and the factor that I believed offered a new level of hope for peace and reconciliation, was the fact that for the first time there was a recognition of the legitimacy of the identity and aspirations of those in the Nationalist tradition and that this major advance was achieved without diminution whatsoever of the recognition of the legitimacy of the Unionist identity.
Likewise, when issues were raised about the UDR and when some very rough things were said by one or two of my questioners about the role of the UDR and indeed the security forces in general, I took care, even in such circumstances — actually, I would say, especially in such circumstances — to give a balanced answer. By a balanced answer I mean an answer that reflected in full the many grounds that Nationalists have had for serious complaint against the security forces and especially the UDR, but an answer that also recognised the fact that the UDR were genuinely regarded by many members of the majority community as providing an essential measure of protection against a ruthless murder campaign. I repeatedly made the point that, in recent times, evidence of even-handed enforcement of law and order had been given by the RUC in some situations that were difficult for them.
I explained that, in the circumstances that now exist where members of both communities have valid points to maintain, the best compromise currently available in relation to the UDR, and one that would recognise the legitimate interests of both communities, was the compromise that was being announced, namely, that both sides in the new Conference would be urgently discussing further ways of ensuring that as quickly as possible the stages would be reached where, except in very exceptional circumstances, a member of the RUC would accompany the UDR in situations where they would otherwise be in contact with the public.
I think, therefore, that I can confidently claim that in my meetings in the US I presented the agreement as it is, not as some people on one side or the other might wish it to be. That is why I have been able to say with assurance that I did not engage in a public relations exercise. What I supplied to my US audiences was, essentially, factual information. Inevitably, and quite properly, I was of course asked for interpretation and assessment and indeed I offered some on my own initiative; but, as I said earlier, my answers were such that I could and would have given them in the same terms to a Unionist audience. And it is because that is so that I feel confident that the initial response that the agreement has produced in the US will be maintained and that the American response will be reflected in a reduction of funds for paramilitary activity.
I might say, in passing, that my experience in the US has reinforced my own confidence in the merits and the value of the agreement, for it has meant that people have come forward to support something that has been presented to them without any sales-talk in a balanced and even-handed way.
This brings me to a related point. I understand that, in a radio interview yesterday, a member of the Alliance Party, Mr. Glendinning, said something to the effect that I had made statements in the United States that suggested that behind the agreement there were secret deals detrimental to Unionists. I think it is important that I should deal with this.
I am glad to assure this House, and indirectly Mr. Glendinning and any others who may share his fears, that I did not make any statements that carried any such suggestions of that kind in any form whatsoever, as I think should be clear enough from what I have already said. I did not do so and I could not have done so for the very good reason that there are no secret deals, whether detrimental to Unionists or otherwise. While I did not hear the interview myself, I understand that what Mr. Glendinning was referring to was, or at least probably was, a newspaper report saying that I said in a television interview in the United States that the agreement was substantial and not merely advisory so, in effect, the Irish Government had been given a substantial role in the day to day running of Northern Ireland.
I should perhaps say at some point — and this is as good as any other — that, while I tried to be careful in everything I said, I was not reading from a prepared text. I spoke at length, in question and answer sessions and otherwise; and if, as inevitably happens occasionally, I felt that some particular statement or even some phrase of mine was perhaps not happily expressed, I tried to introduce a suitable clarification or balance subsequently.
The particular newspaper report which I have mentioned and which I think Mr. Glendinning was referring to, was an edited account of what I had said. In fact, in the interview itself, my reference to the Government's being given a substantial role came after and was directly linked with a statement that the new agreement provides that determined efforts will be made to secure agreement in the interests of peace and stability. That being so, my comment was, and was clearly recognisable by viewers as being, my own assessment of the fact that both sides were committed to reaching agreement in the interests of peace and stability. That explains the words, "so in effect", which are actually quoted in the newspaper report. Nobody who heard my remarks in full could possibly misunderstand them in the way in which Mr. Glendinning apparently did. And I might add that, in that very same interview, and at a very early stage in it, I also made the point which I have already said I made on several occasions, namely, that the recognition of the Nationalist identity and of the legitimacy of the Nationalist aspirations, which the agreement has provided for the first time, is achieved without any loss to the Unionist community.
Incidentally, the House may be interested to hear a brief word about the fact that on that same programme, and at the same time, Congressman Biaggi was interviewed — in other words it was a joint interview. As the House will be aware, Congressman Biaggi has for a long time shown a special interest in Irish affairs. I do not think I would be introducing any note of contention if I said that his views have on occasion in the past diverged from those of Governments here, Governments of different political complexion, of whom indeed he has been critical.
I would like of course to be able to say that he expressed himself as being enthusiastically in support of the agreement, but I cannot honestly go that far. However, I think it can fairly be said, without risk of exaggeration, that he was moderately supportive of it. He had, earlier that day, on the basis of what I assume was a first look at the agreement, issued a more sceptical — though not a condemnatory — statement. However, on further consideration, he moved to the position I have described. As I have indicated, I would not want to overstate the position. He certainly emphasised, indeed rightly I think, that the real test of the agreement will be how it will be implemented. But, at the end of the day, he left viewers in no doubt that he believed that the agreement should be given a chance to work. I was happy with the assessment from him and grateful for the trouble he had taken, in the interests of this country, to appear on the programme.
I think it right to add that I was also glad to have had the opportunity to meet him. His knowledge of and interest in Irish affairs were indeed very impressive; and if I hope that I was of some help to him in assessing the agreement, I for my part benefited from what he had to say to me on various points that arose in our conversation. With that report, if I may so describe it, I now return to home ground.
As I am a member of the Government and a member also of the party of which the Taoiseach is leader, I know it can seem to be just a sycophantic exercise if I say anything in praise of the speech with which he opened the debate. But, having listened to him last evening, I cannot refrain from saying that few of his listeners can have been unmoved by the ringing sincerity of what he had to say and few can have been unimpressed by the strength of his determination to build bridges where bridges are so desperately needed.
I also listened with great attention to the Leader of the Opposition, Deputy Haughey, and I propose to make a few comments on some of his remarks, especially some that impinge on matters in which, as Minister for Justice, I have a special interest.
It will hardly come as a surprise that I disagree with much of what Deputy Haughey said and specifically with his conclusions. But, as the Minister with special responsibility in the area of law and order, I think it is right to begin with an acknowledgment. Although I regretted the tone of his remarks at certain points and felt they were a cause of some concern as to the effects they could have, yet I am glad to place on record my feeling that, in his speech generally, Deputy Haughey was careful about the way in which he put forward his criticisms of the agreement, careful in the sense that he was conscious of the possible effects of statements that might be inflamatory. As I have said, that is a matter in which, as Minister for Justice, I have a special concern and I would now add an appeal that the tone that Deputy Haughey set will be maintained on that side of the house.
Deputy Haughey's criticisms could be grouped under two or three heads and since one of them was security I think it right to respond to what he said on that score. The heart of that particular criticism was, I think, contained in one short paragraph of his script, which was as follows:
In this area also [here he was referring to security] the position will continue to be, that the decisions will be taken by the Northern Ireland Secretary of State and the British Government. This creates a situation where the Irish Government will be locked into a position where it will have to accept responsibility for the undesirable, an unsatisfactory and an unpalatable security apparatus and its operations without having any real control over them.
That paragraph was followed by one which began:
Is anyone prepared to make the claim that what is proposed in this agreement will provide lasting peace and stability to Northern Ireland even in the longer term...?
To that I would reply that it is perfectly true that the agreement carries risks for us in the area to which Deputy Haughey's remarks relate. What he actually says is, I believe, an exaggeration, for it ignores the fact that we will have a role and a substantial role and that there is commitment, which I am confident was given on the basis that it will be honoured, that determined efforts will be made to secure agreement. But, that being said, agreement will at times not be forthcoming without concessions on both sides, and there will be risks. I am certain that the Government would not wish to deny that or to blur it in any way. Rather would we wish to underline it. We recognise that there are risks, and in particular risks of political damage to us. It is a measure of our commitment to the cause of peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland that we are prepared to take those risks. No Irish Government can hope to achieve anything, either on behalf of the Nationalist population or on behalf of the population of Northern Ireland as a whole, unless they are willing to take risks and to commit themselves to doing so.
Why are we prepared to take those risks? I suggest that nobody who has read the Forum report would feel it necessary to look beyond it for an answer. The answer leaps from its pages at various points, but if I were asked to single out one paragraph that sums it up, I would suggest paragraph 3.21, which refers to deaths of over 2,300 people, to injury or maiming of over 24,000, to over 43,000 recorded separate incidents of shootings, bombings and arson, to an increase in prison population from 686 in 1967 to 2,500 in 1983. But over and above what is directly represented by those statistics, the paragraph draws attention also to the fact that thousands are suffering from psychological stress because of fear, intimidation and the impact of security measures. I rather think that that reference to thousands is an understatement — I would suggest it must be tens of thousands. And the paragraph makes the chilling point that the effect on society has been shattering — that there is hardly a family that has not been touched by death, injury or intimidation.
Yes, there are risks for us in this agreement, and that is why I believe we should and must be prepared to take risks. And that, too, is the reason why I suggest that when Deputy Haughey asks if there is anybody who is prepared to make the claim that what is proposed in the agreement will provide lasting peace and stability he is not asking the right question. Nobody with any sense of the complexity of the Northern problem could possibly make a claim that any agreement that might conceivably be made at this stage, or indeed for quite some time to come, would provide lasting peace and stability; nor should anybody claim that this one will do so. What we claim and urge is that it offers a serious prospect, and by far the best prospect available, that it will do so. The horror of what has been taking place in Northern Ireland, to which I have just now alluded in my reference to the Forum report, is such that it is nothing less then our clear duty to take that option, with its risks and with its uncertainties, quite simply because it offers real progress — surely major progress — and that the available alternatives ought to be unacceptable.
Deputy Haughey has suggested that we have abandoned our claim to unity and the rights of the Nationalist majority on this island. Of course, we have done nothing of the kind. The British Government know that; the Unionist community know it; and no prospect of temporary advantage in our dealings with either has tempted us to do so.
When I was in the US I quoted more than once from a speech made by a former Taoiseach and Leader of Deputy Haughey's Party, Mr. Seán Lemass, during one of his own visits to the United States. It was a speech in Washington in 1963, so, as I emphasised, it was not today or yesterday. I made the point that, as well as being Taoiseach, he was himself a 1916 man and was also, as a political leader, like our Taoiseach, widely respected across party political boundaries. The following is the quotation, which I gave in full:
We have always based our case for the reunification of our country on the assertion of Irish rights in the matter — our right to sovereignty over all the national territory, our right to reject the claim of a minority to vote itself out of the nation, and our right to have our national destiny decided by the democratic process of majority decision. We have come to realise that the reiteration of rights is not enough and that we also need to have regard to the causes of the divisions amongst our people which were used as a justification for Partition. We see our task now as reuniting the Irish people as well as reuniting Irish territory.
Deputy Haughey devoted much of his speech to a criticism of the agreement in the constitutional context. His central theme is that we have acted in breach of Articles 2 and 3 and that we have thereby abandoned the claim to Irish unity, leaving a political vacuum to be filled by men of violence if it is not filled by Fianna Fáil. I do not propose to embark on an argument about constitutional law. If I were to attempt to do so, I should have to seek legal guidance from constitutional experts about what I might say and I see no reason why I should embark on such a course for the purposes of my present contribution. But I would like to make just a few comments from a layman's standpoint and from what I believe is a standpoint of reason and commonsense on some of Deputy Haughey's remarks about the implication of the agreement.
Certainly, if we had abandoned our aspiration to unity, or even left its existence in some doubt, Deputy Haughey would, I think, have an arguable case in what he says about the dangers of a political vacuum. The answer to him is that, as I have said earlier, that has not happened. Frankly, I do not understand what he is saying about his position in the 1980 communique being misunderstood despite his explanations. If he commits himself to saying that a change in the status of Northern Ireland — and, by the way, his communique, unlike the agreement, actually uses the word constitutional status, though I do not suggest that that adds any problem for him — if, as I say, he commits himself to saying that a change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority in the North, I personally accept without question his proposition that he was referring to what is its constitutional status as a matter of practical reality. What I cannot accept is a suggestion, echoing an interpretation that he placed in a statement in the Forum report, that he was accepting the principle of the consent of a Northern majority in relation to the form of unity but not to unity itself.
At the best of times, it seems to me to be stretching credibility to say that we can differentiate between the principle of consent in relation to any particular form of unity and consent in relation to unity itself. But there is more to it than that. Deputy Haughey did not just say that a change in status would only come about with consent. He said that he agreed with the British Prime Minister that it would only come about in that way. He could not possibly have been in agreement with the British Prime Minister on this matter unless what he actually said was to be given its ordinary meaning.
I have said that I am not making any legal or legalistic analysis and I would repeat that point now. If Deputy Haughey suggests that there is a significant constitutional difference between including a particular affirmation in a communique and including it in an agreement, I will leave it to other people on another day to argue the point. But I will offer a comment from a point of view of political reality on this suggestion that we have abandoned the principle of Irish unity by repeating Deputy Haughey's own language. I strongly suggest that the men of violence, to whom Deputy Haughey suggests we are in danger of abandoning the high ground of Irish Nationalist aspirations, are unlikely to be influenced by arguments that are as elusive as those about the number of angels that could dance on the head of a pin. To them, an affirmation that something would only come about in a certain way is an affirmation that it would only come about in a certain way. On that particular issue, I would be disposed to agree with them.
We have not in fact abandoned anything. We have not asked the Unionists to abandon anything either. That is the strength and the special value of this agreement. I add my voice to the support for it that has already been expressed.