I have only once during the past year intervened in debates in this House. I have decided, however, to do so again on this occasion because of the gravity of the issues at stake.
I believe that it is of vital importance to this State that we approach these matters in a calm and dispassionate way. I regret that the part of the Minister for Communication's speech that I heard in this House this morning sounded far from dispassionate. I do not believe that it is of any advantage to us that a member of the Government dealing with this issue should use such emotive, and even in Britain, sinisterly evocative phrases as "our patience is not unlimited". Our objective here should be to concentrate on ensuring that any actions taken following the events that have given rise to this debate will be in the best interests of the security of the State, and peace and stability in Northern Ireland.
These events began with three shooting incidents involving the security forces in Northern Ireland — one at least of which involved cross-Border activities by members of the Special Branch of the RUC.
The fact that these three incidents occurred in quick succession and were neither preceded nor followed by similar incidents provides prima facie evidence that they involved a temporary change of tactics on the part of elements in the RUC. As Mr. Stalker has said, these events do not necessarily imply a “shoot to kill” policy decision at the top level of the RUC or at a higher level. They are, as he has suggested, explicable in terms of a change of tactics, involving the “hyping up” of those concerned in the face of the IRA's and the INLA's policy of murder directed against the majority community in Northern Ireland, through attacks on members and ex-members of the security forces.
These events, however, cannot be dismissed, as some people in Northern Ireland have attempted to do, by suggesting they are simply accidents attributable to nervousness on the part of RUC officers in the face of this campaign. Such an explanation is not compatible either with the quick succession of these incidents and their equally sudden cessation, nor with the subsequent cover-up within the RUC. If these events had been accidental, as in some other cases in the past, information about them would have been furnished to the DPP who would have decided whether to prosecute or not, and if a prosecution were initiated, the question of the degree of culpability, if any, would have been determined in the normal way by the courts.
The fact that this normal process was not followed but that, with the involvement of people higher up in the RUC than those directly concerned, it was decided to initiate a conspiracy of silence involving large scale perjury, makes it clear that more was involved here than a regrettable series of accidents.
There followed, after a long period of time, the Stalker inquiry, and later the removal of Mr. Stalker from that investigation, and the appointment of Mr. Sampson to continue his work. Few people now believe that Mr. Stalker's removal was occasioned by the sudden emergence of evidence of malpractices on his part within the Manchester Police Force. The subsequent course of the investigation into Mr. Stalker, and its outcome, makes such an explanation credible only to the prejudiced or naïve.
But, equally, some of the theories that have been propounded to explain his removal from the case, in my view also, lack credibility. It is frankly very hard to believe that the Inspectorate of the Constabulary of the United Kingdom could be moved into action of this kind simply by pressure from the RUC to abort or divert the investigation into the events of 1982. As Deputy O'Malley has pointed out, on the British Government's own statements, the then Attorney General of England and Wales and Northrn Ireland, was in fact involved in this decision. It seems that Mr. Stalker's insistence on pursuing his investigations at the highest levels in the RUC in the spring of 1986 created grave alarm in other circles as to the capacity of the RUC, if this investigation were pursued in a manner Mr. Stalker proposed, to deal effectively with the problem posed by the Loyalist marches and demonstrations then envisaged for the summer months immediately ahead. It is not difficult to imagine someone, somewhere, deciding at that moment that the interests of Northern Ireland and indeed of Ireland as a whole, and of Great Britain would be best served if in some way the investigation into the events of 1982 could be diverted or strung out, something which Mr. Stalker himself refused to contemplate. If this was in fact the scenario then we would have to face the brutal fact that maybe we in this island, North and South, have been the principal beneficiaries of the clumsy, and possibly panicky actions, which have had the effect of leading to Mr. Stalker's retirement from the police force and which have been the source of so much agony to himself and his family.
I am inclined to believe that it was not the intention of the British Government during this period to abort, as distinct from postponing, prosecutions of members of the RUC involved in the events of 1982. The assurance we received from a high political source as late as towards the end of 1986 by way of explanation for the non-publication of the Stalker report, namely, that there would be prosecutions involving senior RUC officers for serious criminal offences, was, I believe, given in good faith. So also, I believe, were earlier assurances that when the investigation was completed we would be given a full report on the circumstances of the cross-border incursion, or incursions, that had been revealed in court during a murder trial arising from the events of 1982.
What is not explicable, however, and has not been explained, is the decision of the present Attorney-General of England and Wales — and, because of direct rule, of Northern Ireland — in relation to these prosecutions. If I am right in speculating that at the time the decision to remove Mr. Stalker from the investigation was taken the intention was to postpone or string out the investigation rather than to abort it, and if I am right in my assumption that the assurances given to us at a high political level that prosecutions would ensue was genuine, then it has to be said that Mr. Mayhew's decision was totally out of line with all this. That his decision did not reflect the earlier intentions of the British Government is also suggested by the fact that, if it had been intended all along to use the Attorney General's power of superintendence over the DPP in Northern Ireland to abort prosecutions, the decision involving the then Attorney-General to remove Mr. Stalker in the spring of 1986 would scarcely have been necessary. For, given the manner in which this affair has in fact been strung out over a period of more than five years, it would seem that, even if his investigation had gone ahead in the spring of 1986, its consequences could have been postponed until well after the summer of that year and the power of superintendence of the Attorney-General could then have been invoked at a later stage, as it has in fact been by Mr. Mayhew.
It is difficult, therefore to avoid the conclusion that we are now faced with the consequences — and they are serious consequences for this island — of muddle and confusion within the British Government. I do not believe that we would have been given the assurance we were if at that time it had been contemplated that the power exercised by Mr. Mayhew would be used in the way in which it has been.
It seems, moreover, that whoever Mr. Mayhew may have consulted, his decision was not communicated to or discussed by the British Cabinet, and there have been some circumstantial press reports, which I for one am inclined to credit, that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was given only minimal notice of this decision as, it has been suggested, was the Foreign Office. Apparently in consequence of this, but also because this Government do not appear to have kept in touch with this matter through the Conference as our Government had done, the Irish Government received no advance warning of this decision, never mind an opportunity to discuss, through the Conference framework, the implications of the decision for confidence in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland.
It would thus seem that Mr. Mayhew, in exercising his function of superintendence of the DPP in Northern Ireland, totally failed to take account of the British Government's obligations under the Anglo-Irish Agreement — of which he, as a law officer of the Crown, was one of the guardians. Furthermore, it would appear that his concept of the public interest was so narrowly defined as to conflict most dangerously with the broader public interest of peace and stability in Northern Ireland, which ought, surely, to be the overriding interest of the British Government, as it consistently has been of the Irish Government. There is also another public interest which Mr. Mayhew has not take into account — the public interest in the maintenance of confidence and trust between the British and Irish Governments, which has been put seriously at risk by his decision to falsify assurances given to the Irish Government in relation to these prosecutions.
Faced with the serious damage which Mr. Mayhew's decision has inflicted on the public interest in peace and stability in Northern Ireland and on the maintenance and enhancement of confidence in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland, as well as on the public interest in the maintenance of confidence and trust between the British and Irish Governments, the British Government now have a duty to do all in their power to minimise the damage done and to restore the confidence that has thus been undermined. Both Governments have a duty to give absolute priority in present circumstances to their common interest in securing the people of Ireland, North and South, against the threat of terrorism which has been so grievously heightened by the massive delivery of arms and explosives from Libya to the IRA and from Libya, or wherever else it is, to the Protestant terrorists.
For their part, the British Government must take immediate action to remove from the RUC the officers responsible for a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, the retention of whom in that force is incompatible with confidence by anyone in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland.
I noted the statement of the Secretary of State in the Commons an hour ago announcing that Chief Constable Charles Kelly would investigate the cases involving people of the rank of Chief Superintendent and below and referring to the police authority in Northern Ireland on the question of whether there was an involvement of people higher up. I regret that the method that the British Government have felt necessary to adopt involves a further delay in dealing with this matter. The decision, which was simply one of referring it to somebody else, could have been done a long time ago. The delay might have suggested that immediate action was going to be taken, but that is not the case.
The British Government should also take immediate action to reform the structure of the RUC so as to ensure that never again can a unit of that force, acting independently of other law-abiding units be free to undertake the kind of activities which became the subject of a cover-up within the force since 1982. The Secretary of State also referred to this in his speech. I have not had the opportunity of becoming aware of what he has said in this matter, so that I cannot comment further on it at the moment.
In this connection it is worth remarking that during 1986, as part of the programme of work for the enhancement of cross-Border co-operation on security matters set in hand by the Conference under article 9(a) of the agreement, consideration was given by us to suggestions in relation to the organisation and work of the Garda Síochána. We took into account suggestions made, most of which appeared constructive, and gave effect to all but one of these.
The exception was a proposal that would have introduced into our force a separation of function and responsibility in respect of certain matters at local level which, although quite different from that which gave rise to the incidents of 1982 in Northern Ireland, would have created dangers for the coherent operation of the force in areas near the Border. We not only rejected this proposal but suggested, in turn, that our system, under which responsibility for all police activity in a given area is under the control of a single officer, should be introduced in the RUC. I trust that the British Government, in the light of the bitter experience of the events of five years ago, will now give effect to this suggestion, which we are entitled to pursue under this article of the Agreement, just as, through the channels of the Conference, questions relating to the organisation and work of the Garda Síochána were raised with us and we responded positively, except in this instance here, to the suggestions made. It is equally our right, and I feel our duty, to make similar proposals, through the Conference, in relation to the organisation and work of the RUC.
The British Government should also take this opportunity to review other matters arising from the agreement. These include, first, the full implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 8 of the communique accompanying the agreement, which involved ensuring as rapidly as possible that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, there is a police presence in all operations which involve direct contact with the community, namely, the accompaniment of British Army and UDR patrols by the RUC; secondly, further consideration of the courts system, including the mixed-court concept referred to in article 8 of the agreement itself and, thirdly the publication of the code of conduct that was promulgated some time ago for the RUC, in accordance with paragraph 8b of the communique, as well as the promulgation of a similar code of conduct for the other security forces. An early timetable for the implementation of the anti-discrimination legislation by parliament should also be furnished to the Irish Government. There is no shortage of matters that the British Government should take in hand at present with a view to undoing the damage done by recent events.
Finally they must also fulfil their obligation and their commitment to the Irish Government to furnish them with a full account of the cross-Border violation or violations revealed in court. I am not convinced that the Government have given sufficient emphasis to this matter at recent meetings of the Conference. The Government at this time have to face the reality that demands for a reconsideration of the Attorney General's decision regarding the Stalker-Sampson report are unrealistic and that attempts to press this issue at this stage, however strong the temptation may be to take this approach, can only prove counter productive.
Another quite different matter has surfaced in the last couple of days, that is, the issue of the implementation of extradition. It would be quite simply intolerable if people against whom there is evidence, and who might on trial be convicted of crimes of violence committed in Northern Ireland or Great Britain, should be allowed to continue to remain at liberty in this country, constituting a further threat to the lives of people in this State, in Northern Ireland or in Britain.
Given the concern already felt here about the action of the Attorney-General of England and Wales and Northern Ireland in relation to the decision not to prosecute arising from the Stalker-Sampson inquiry, there is bound to be concern at the suggestion that the same Attorney-General has, by neglect of the legal process, inhibited the prosecution of suspected terrorists here. But there must also be concern that the initial negative reaction of Mr. Mayhew to operating the law on extradition has been compounded by an apparent failure on the part of our Attorney-General and our Government to respond over a number of weeks to a request from the British side for a meeting to discuss this matter, a discussion which appears most urgent, with a view to resolving this impasse, for which our Government appear to share responsibility.
In this connection I note the Taoiseach's rider to his complaint about Mr. Mayhew's attitude to our extradition legislation, namely, that he was giving a solemn assurance that the new Act will be strictly adhered to and the safeguards in it fully implemented by the Attorney-General acting effectively. This part of the Taoiseach's statement involves such a degree of adjectival and adverbial emphasis as to raise doubts in the mind of some of his listeners as to his intentions, doubts not totally stilled by his subsequent expression of concern about extradition remaining inoperative. I hope the Minister for Justice can reassure us on the Government's intentions on extradition when he comes to reply.
Above all the Government have to repudiate any idea of weakening North-South security co-operation. On the basis of their own statements about the scale of the importation of arms and explosives in recent times, and the arms finds already made by the Garda Síochána and the finds of bunkers, empty unfortunately, it is clear that this island now faces a greater threat to peace and stability than we have known for a long time past. It is a threat which can be met only by the closest possible co-operation between the Garda Síochána and the RUC which, indeed, there is reason to believe has already been productive in terms of arms finds.
An Irish Government who did anything whatever to weaken security co-operation on this island would deserve, and would be the object of, the contempt of our people if, as is morally certain would be the case, such a decision contributed to the loss of lives on either side of the Border. An island that has already suffered 2,650 deaths, almost all of them at the hands of or provoked by the activities of, paramilitaries, and a State whose security forces have already suffered significant losses at the hands of the IRA and INLA, does not need, nor will it tolerate, any other kind of Irish Government.
It is inconceivable to me that any responsible Government of this State could adopt a suicidal policy of making it easier for those who have murdered so many people on this island and in Britain to multiply their efforts in the months ahead. The preservation of national security and of lives are the first duties of any Irish Government, to which nothing else may ever be given precedence.
It is true, tragically true, that the decision, the consequences of which we are discussing here today, has reduced confidence in the administration of justice, and in the security forces in Northern Ireland. Our task in the face of such a situation must, however, be to seek urgently and with dedication to undo the damage that has thus been done unthinkingly to the security of the people of this island and under no circumstances perversely to aggravate this damage by making it easier for those who have murdered so many people on this island to take advantage of the situation thus created.
The tone of one paragraph of the Taoiseach's speech gives rise to some concern in this context, that is, the paragraph in which he speaks of the importance of not allowing the Garda Síochána's asset of virtual total community support to be endangered. No one, of course, could fault the sentiment itself but the manner in which the point is made and the particular emphasis given to it, together with the subsequent comment about the impossibility of compelling one force to have confidence in another or to give that full measure of confidential co-operation which should exist, is capable of being interpreted as a hint about the Garda Síochána being capable of being damaged by too close co-operation with the RUC. The Minister for Justice must repudiate this interpretation unambiguously in his reply. There must be no ambiguity whatsoever on this issue from an Irish Government addressing the Parliament of this country.