Before proceeding with this debate, I wish to remind Deputies of the practice of the House concerning matters which are sub judice. No reference may be made in the course of this debate to any particular case in which proceedings are pending before any court, such as that concerning Mr. Patrick McVeigh where a notice of appeal to the High Court by way of case stated has been filed by the State.
Private Members' Business. - District Court Extradition Procedures: Motion.
With your permission, Sir, and the permission of the House, I wish to divide my time with my colleague, Deputy George Birmingham.
Is that agreed? Agreed.
I move:
"That Dáil Éireann calls on the Government to review extradition procedures in the District Courts and in particular, to consider legislating to transfer cases brought under the Acts from District Court to Circuit Court."
In putting forward this proposal it is only appropriate that I make a number of points clear at the outset The first of these is that I and my party wish to place on record the debt which we as a society feel towards our Judiciary, from the Supreme Court to the District Court. Our society depends on the independence and integrity of our judges. It is one of the foundation stones of our democracy. It must be a cause of some pride for us as a nation that no judge or justice has been removed from office since independence as a consequence of any charge involving corruption, lack of independence or integrity. There are few other nations that could make such a claim.
However, I think it is appropriate in the context of this proposal to examine the roles which the various courts have and which are permitted to them by statute and under the Constitution. The kernel of the proposal which we put forward today is to amend the law so as to permit the preliminary stages of extradition proceedings to be heard in the Circuit Court rather than in the District Court. It is fair to say that in many ways the District Court is the most important court in the country. We have a full time professional judiciary on that court which is one of the reforms which was introduced after independence. As was remarked by one High Court judge, Mr. Justice Gannon, in a recent case, Clune v. DPP in 1981: “Our District Courts are now administered by fully competent and fully qualified lawyers whose independence as Judges, not only from the Executive but even from their judicial colleagues, must be respected”.
However, it is only fair that we should recognise some of the constraints under which the District Court operates. The first is that the District Court is, of its nature, a court of summary jurisdiction set up under statute. This means that it is in many cases the court of first resort for the majority of our citizens and, as a consequence, there is a very considerable pressure of time. The business before the District Court in a single day can involve applications under the licensing code, criminal proceedings, proceedings under the Road Traffic Act, cases of family law and the law of tort. As a consequence of this there is a very considerable caseload pressure upon all district justices. There is a constraint upon them to be fair and to apply the law in a summary manner.
It is only reasonable to point out however, that the District Court does not frequently engage in cases which involve the minute examination of points of law which might emerge in the Circuit Court or High Court. While case law and legal texts are not infrequently cited, the vast predominant number of cases are dealt with in a reasonably expeditious manner while protecting the rights and liberties of the citizen. It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that the jurisdiction to be exercised by the District Court of its nature must be both limited and local. There must be some limit on the gravity or nature of the cases that such courts can try.
The proposal which we have laid before the Dáil today arises not out of one case but out of a number. All of us recollect that there have on more than one occasion been instances where considerable legal and political concern has arisen from the outcome of extradition proceedings before the District Court. In saying this I wish to make it clear that there is absolutely no reflection being cast on the manner or the methods which have been adopted by our district justices in making their adjudication on extradition matters. However, there have been a number of cases which, from the stand-point of observers both here and in Britain have been the subject of some considerable concern. The net result of some of these has been totally unwarranted and unjustifiable criticism by the British media of our Judiciary at District Court level. This criticism is neither fair nor proper, but our duty as legislators is to deal not only with legal realities but also with political perception.
In a sensitive area such as extradition there are myriad of possibilities of misunderstanding and misconstruction. Sometimes one can almost feel that certain foreign journalists and some of the more hostile elements to us in foreign political parties are almost hoping that controversy will arise out of our operation of the law in relation to extradition and rendition under the 1965 Act. I am sure I am speaking for all parties when I say that it it would be entirely undesirable for us to allow, even unwittingly, any situation to arise which would allow a wilful misinterpretation of events to undermine or even tend to undermine the sensitive and vital continuing process of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Some of the comments that were expressed after the recent case would tend to suggest that there are plenty of people around to avail of every opportunity to suggest that the people here, whether the Judiciary or members of all political parties, are afraid to deal with terrorism in a realistic way. I would like to put on record that, while we regard extradition as being important to deal with terrorism, we also respect the right of the individual to safeguards and make no apology for that.
However, the extradition process, the process of mutual rendition between Ireland and the United Kingdom, may not only have politically grave consequences but also involve, and has increasingly been seen to involve, a minute analysis of the law on extradition or rendition even at District Court level.
This has been illustrated in a recent case. What has happened in this case and in others raises the question as to whether the District Court is the appropriate forum for dealing with matters of such gravity. I do not believe that I would be trespassing on the time of the Dáil if I were to enumerate some of the matters which now must be the subject matter of adjudication in the implementation of our law on extradition and rendition both in the District Court and the High Court. There are four categories of offence which may prevent fugitives from being handed over for this part of the Act. These are: (1) where the offence specified in the warrant does not correspond with a serious offence under Irish law. (2) An issue may arise as to whether the offence is political or is connected with a political offence. As all Deputies will know, there have been very recent developments in the law in this area. It is one of the fundamental contradictions of terrorism that members of illegal organisations will seek to exploit certain democratic rights in this country while at the same time seeking to undermine and destroy them both here and elsewhere. (3) An issue may arise as to whether the offence in question is an offence under military law. (4) An issue may arise as to whether or not the offence in question is a Revenue offence.
Having surmounted that hurdle, there exists the issue as to dual criminality. Generally speaking, extradition arrangements permit extradition only where the fugitive is alleged to have done or was convicted of doing an act which was an offence, both in the requesting and requested states and usually an offence in both states, of a certain minimum gravity. Therefore, if the offence in question does not exist in the requested state, or is a very trivial offence there, the person being sought in respect of it will not be delivered up.
This process of necessity involves a minute examination of whether or not the offence in question is of a certain minimum gravity and also whether it corresponds with an offence under Irish law which is of similar minimum gravity. Under Part II of the 1965 Act, certain requesting states must furnish various details about the offence in question which makes it possible to determine what the offence in stated circumstances would amount to under Irish law.
The requirements placed on the United Kingdom authorities are somewhat different from this, although there may be adequate information on the warrant. As stated by the Supreme Court in one case, the State Furlong v. Kelly, 1971, the function of the District Court or the district justice involves, among other matters, and I quote:
to examine the documents set before him and to see whether there is sufficient statement of the particulars of the ingredients of the offence alleged, to enable him to bring to bear on them his knowledge of the law of this State so that he may determine whether the acts alleged ... would constitute an offence under the laws of this State ... either the warrant itself must contain sufficient particulars of a factual nature setting out the ingredients of the offence alleged, or it should be accompanied by an affidavit by the Prosecuting Authority ... setting out the particulars of the facts complained of — somewhat as the particulars of offences appear in a Court on an indictment under our law.
Issues arise as to the degree of similarity between the offence in the requesting country and that in the country in which the fugitive is found. A minute examination may well arise as to the procedure which has been adopted in endorsing the arrest warrant. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the actual procedure set out in Part III of the 1965 Act must be followed scrupulously. This means, as a matter of necessity, that the party to be extradited is entitled to rely on technical points of law in his defence which to the layman might appear somewhat extreme. The procedure regarding arrest must be scrupulously observed. Very grave difficulties have already arisen in certain cases under the extradition code regarding the nature of and purpose of the arrest.
In the State Holmes v. Furlong, 1967, Mr. Justice Walsh dealt with the matters which the district justice must consider. These include (1) he must be satisfied as to the validity of the warrant and other documents as prescribed by the Act; (2) be satisfied that the person who has been arrested is in fact the person named or described in the warrant and (3) he should next satisfy himself that the offence in the warrant is one in respect of which he may make an order under the Act. A Delivery Up Order may not be made where it appears to the district justice that the dual criminality requirement is not satisfied.
Technical points have arisen in hearings regarding the admission into evidence of United Kingdom arrest warrants, summons, declaration of service and related certificates and also endorsements by the Garda Commissioner. An onus is then placed on the district justice to consider the point of delivery and make his order in relation to the provisions of the Act. He is then obliged to inform the prisoner of his right to bring an application of habeus corpus in the High Court and to inform him that he will not be delivered up during a period of 15 days except with his consent or while any such habeus corpus application is pending.
Needless to say, the procedures adopted by the district justice in some instances can be the subject matter of judicial review in the High Court. Technical points of law regarding the proofs which have been adopted in the District Court may be minutely scrutinised. As I have already indicated, the political and legal consequences of a failure to extradite a person, be it to Britain or elsewhere, can have the most serious and grave political consequences.
It is only fair to point out also, that it is unlikely that any district justice, prior to appointment, will have dealt with extradition matters in the course of his or her practice as a lawyer. Such matters are not common. They are dealt with by persons who as a matter of practice and experience can bring to bear a very considerable expertise arising from not one but numerous cases. I do not believe that any district justices have had such experience in their legal practice prior to appointment.
I have dwelt on these matters, which are more fully dealt with in Dr. Michael Forde's textbook on the subject, in order to illustrate that the law on extradition has become increasingly technical. It is only fair to point out also, that certain legal practitioners have, by virtue of their reputation and experience, an expertise in this area of law which may well not be matched by the district justices before whom they are appearing. I say this not as a matter of criticism but as a matter of likelihood arising from the very wide and heavy caseload of the District Court.
It is our proposal that rather than have the District Court deal with this matter, the issue should be dealt with in the Circuit Court. Members of the Circuit Court must be barristers of very considerable experience. It is quite probable that they will, in the course of their legal practices, have dealt with extradition cases or have come across points arising from them in other areas of law. The procedures and the time allocation in the Circuit Court would allow for a fuller hearing which would allow for a full exploration of the matters which I have outlined and which would permit the protection of both the person whom it is proposed be extradited and also the rights of the State.
While I recognise that the Circuit Court must also deal with an exceedingly heavy caseload, it seems far more appropriate for the reasons I have outlined that the matter should be dealt with in this way. In conclusion, let me make one thing clear: there is no question in our minds of seeking to weigh the balance against the fugitive or any person who seeks to assert his rights under the Constitution. However, it is one of the requirements of justice that not only should it be done but it should be seen to be done. This is applicable not only in this country but in the perception of our judicial system abroad. If there is no trust or faith in our judicial system it is difficult for us to seek to persuade others to improve or ameliorate their system. If we seek to protect the democratic rights of our people we must be swift to protect the democratic rights of persons living in other democratic countries. The time and circumstances are such that democracies must support each other in the fight against terrorism and we must be seen to play our part in as full and appropriate a manner as possible. In order to do this, we must build on firm foundations and ensure that our judifical system operates effectively and properly from the commencement of proceedings to their termination. This involves ensuring that matters of complexity, such as extradition, are dealt with in the appropriate forum. We do not believe that the District Court is the appropriate forum in these circumstances and it is for this reason that we have proposed this motion.
Finally, let me say that we have put forward this suggestion in good faith. As I said at the outset, we are very fortunate to have an independent Judiciary and any remarks which I have made are not intended to cast any aspersions on any district justice who does his or her job in the way that they see fit and in the manner which they feel is the correct way of doing so. If other constructive suggestions come forward during the course of this debate from any political party as to other ways and means of improving the position in which we now find ourselves, we, on this side of the House, will only be too willing to consider them. I sincerely hope the spirit in which this suggestion is put forward will not be used by others to suggest that we are trying to put the blame on an individual or individuals for any decisions handed down in the past. That is not the case.
The reality is that whether or not we like it extradition cases now bring with them a very high political profile. It is vitally important for the good of this country that we are seen to be prepared to deal with terrorism, with people who engage in acts of terrorism, that we will support other democratic countries which wish to help us in our efforts and that we, in turn, will be prepared to help other countries when perhaps they face similar circumstances. I am confident that if the goodwill is there we can at all times protect the rights of the individual and, at the same time, be seen to bring forward those who should be brought forward before the courts to be dealt with so that all of us can defeat this terrible word "terrorism".
For centuries those whose function it is to fight crime and to bring criminals to justice have faced a problem with fugitive offenders — those who having committed an offence seek to put the maximum distance possible between themselves and the scene of that offence. For centuries those whose function it is to fight crime have found in extradition an important and essential weapon. Over the centuries travel has become progressively easier; it has moved from travel by foot to travel by Bianconi coaches, railways, cars, aeroplanes and inter-continental aeroplanes. Obviously that has required a response from those whose function it is to deal with fugitive offenders. That response has been forthcoming in terms of international conventions, such as the European Convention on Extradition, and in terms of a whole myriad of bilateral treaties.
We have a particular problem when we come to considering that which applies in relation to Britain and Northern Ireland. In the case of Britain and Northern Ireland travel is particularly easy. For upwards of 20 years, if my memory serves me correctly, no travel documents or passports have been required for travel between Britain and Ireland. In the case of Northern Ireland there is the additional complication of the existence of a de facto land frontier. Obviously that requires a particular response. It requires that our extradition arrangements be fine-tuned and streamlined. That is so whether we are talking about a shoplifter in the High Street in Kensington who decides to seek refuge in Dún Laoghaire or whether we are talking about a cheque forger in Grafton Street who decides to seek refuge in Kilburn. It is of general application but when we come to consider the situation which arises out of the campaign of terrorism this island has known then very particular considerations apply because together we are facing a common enemy, an enemy which has murdered gardaí, members of the Irish Army, kidnapped our citizens and murdered serving Members of the Oireachtas. In those circumstances there is a particular obligation on us to be in a position to ensure that effective action is taken against fugitive offenders and that our jurisdiction is not used as a haven.
It is important that we confront that situation and that there be no fudging on it. That is the choice: there are either effective measures against fugitive offenders or there are none. If we are not in a position to put in place effective measures, whether in terms of the operation of the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act or some other Act that introduces and provides for extra territoriality or extradition, and put in place a workable system of dealing with fugitive offenders, then willy-nilly our territory will become available as a haven.
The fact has been recognised from a very early stage of the present terrorist campaign. The first response to this was the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act which had its origins in the Sunningdale Declaration. The belief at that time was that we had constitutional difficulties in providing for extradition for offences which might be regarded as political and that in those circumstances some alternative measure was required. The alternative measure was found in the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act. Since then our courts in a series of cases, the McGlinchey, Shannon and Byrnes cases, have restricted the extent of the political exemption and have provided in those situations where the conduct complained of was such that no right thinking civilised person could regard it as political that extradition should follow.
Our courts gave the lead but if they gave the lead the Oireachtas was not slow in following. Once it became clear that there was no constitutional problem to extraditing in terrorist-type offences, the State adhered to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, legislation was put through this House to give effect to it and, as we know, subsequent amending legislation was introduced on points of detail. It is important to say that on the two occasions when the Dáil and Seanad discussed at length the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism what essentially was at issue were points of detail, points of important detail certainly, but there was no substantial disagreement in this House about the desirability of extraditing those who were sought for terrorist offences. There was, of course, an anxiety that there would be proper safeguards and there was a degree of disagreement as to what form those safeguards should take, but there was no disagreement whatsoever on the principle that there should be effective extradition for terrorist offences.
If that question of principle is resolved, what is involved now is the question of the mechanics. Of course, the mechanics are vital because in the absence of mechanisms that work we are not standing together in solidarity against a common enemy. We have to accept that if the mechanisms do not work that has an impact not just within this jurisdiction but also on Unionist opinion in Northern Ireland. Many of us know the extent to which the Anglo-Irish Agreement represented a shock to the Unionist community. They saw for the first time that the Unionist veto, the orange card, had been trumped. Those of us who attempted to say to them that there was nothing in the Agreement that was inimical to their interests pointed to the prospects the Agreement held out for ever closer security co-operation against a common enemy. Central to that security co-operation are effective extradition measures so, therefore, the question of the mechanics is vitally important.
This is the third substantial discussion on extradition we have had in this House in 18 months. We have also had a series of discussions by way of statements under Standing Order 30 and it has come up umpteen times at Question Time. It has come up because there has been a series of unhappy cases. Some cases have given rise to scenes of public disorder in places like Portlaoise, Dublin, Cavan, Longford and other towns and let it be said that in many of those cases the fault did not lie with anyone in this jurisdiction. In many of those cases the fault very clearly lay with the requesting authorities. If we are anxious to put our house in order and to see that no stone is left unturned by us that will see cases fall down improperly or unnecessarily in the future, it is equally appropriate that the message must go out to the British authorities that they, too, must do their part.
One has to say that in a number of cases where requests have been made, including requests in cases of apparently great importance to them the attitude they have taken has been less than committed; frankly, it has been lackadaisical. They have sent photostats of warrants, warrants which on the face of them were clearly duplicitous and warrants which quite clearly were never signed by judicial officers. Some of that comes from a certain lackadaisical attitude and some of it comes from a lack of a proper regard for our courts, a belief that somehow or other our courts are not entitled to expect and demand the same standards of proof and adherence to proper procedures as would be required in Bow Street Magistrates Court. In many instances the fault lay with the requesting authorities; in other instances some of the blame rests on our collective shoulders. Wherever the blame in an individual case lies, it is not good enough because the public of this country do not want to be sullied by being associated with the people who have committed many of the atrocities. They are outraged when they see people who are wanted in connection with offences of the utmost gravity walking free on what appears to them to be the basest of technicalities.
I have already said what the effect on Unionist opinion is bound to be. They have been suspicious about our bona fides. The Unionist community in Northern Ireland, who have been the subject of a campaign of genocide, are understandably suspicious. If we tell them that we are serious, with virtual unanimity on the principle, that we have put legislation through this House, they will say "That is fine, but where are the extraditees? Do not all of the cases break down?" Who can blame them if they are suspicious in those circumstances? We know, too, that those who entered into the Anglo-Irish Agreement did so from different motivations. We were concerned essentially to have a forum through which we could advocate effectively the cause of the minority community in Northern Ireland. The British Government saw the agreement as a means to more effective security co-operation. If, despite the passage of legislation, it does not appear that that is happening, if it appears that stumbling blocks still exist, obviously the British will be concerned and anxious and it will call into question the extent of their commitment to the whole Anglo-Irish process.
It behoves us to make sure that the technicalities are right and the mechanisms work. In this motion, because we do not have time to put forward a Private Members' Bill which we might have otherwise done, we have given the Dáil an opportunity to put suggestions to the Government which we hope they will take away and come back with in the autumn, suggestions that would provide for a more effective, a more streamlined system of extradition. I want to put some specific suggestions. The first thing that is urgently required — and indeed at this stage is long overdue — is that on both sides a definitive check list of the proofs in an extradition application should be assembled. I find it extraordinary that that has not happened to date. My collegue, Deputy Barrett, has indicated just what are the obligations on the State, as representative of the requesting authority, in the District Court. That court is only concerned with three matters — the validity of the warrant, the question of whether it is a corresponding offence and whether the identification of the person in court has been established as the person named or described in the warrant. Surely it is not beyond the wit of man that such a check list be assembled and that it then be ticked off point by point whenever the request has been made.
The Anglo-Irish Agreement contemplated that the Conference established by that agreement would concern itself with policy questions of extradition. There is a secretariat in place. There is apparently constant communication between the Attorneys General and their respective offices. It must be possible for such a check list to be established. Then, associated with that, it seems that, certainly in our Attorney General's Office and in the office of the British Attorney General or the Crown Prosecution Service —I never quite understood the chain of authority there, wherever it is appropriate in Britain — in each jurisdiction one person should be assigned whose function it is to take charge of all extradition requests, who would see to it that a request does not proceed until he has satisfied himself that everything is in order and that he has, at least internally, certified that fact.
We have had a whole series of cases where different things have gone wrong and afterwards we have had people clucking around the place, one blaming the other. Let us now, before there are any more requests, decide in future who is going to take responsibility for seeing this through, from the issue of the warrant to the delivery up at the port of wherever. Then if something does go wrong, at least it would be possible to ask how that could be, since the senior legal assistant, or whoever, in the Attorney General's Office certified that everything was in order. The first suggestion was a check list and the second a certifying officer to take charge and see to it that there will be no further messing, or, at the very least, who will be responsible and identifiable if something else does go wrong.
The next suggestion that I want to put is that in cases that arise from the 1987 Extradition (No. 2) Act — and essentially I am talking about any cases of a terrorist type — because of their sensitivity, because of the inevitability that they will be fought all the way, the State should be represented by senior counsel and by senior counsel drawn from among the small group who have held themselves out and have developed a specialist expertise in this field.
I intervene to advise the Deputy that five minutes now remain of the time available to him.
The fourth suggestion that we are putting is that cases involving extradition should not be heard any more in the District Court. Again, as Deputy Barrett has said, this is not designed as a criticism of the District Court. Our whole legal system operates on the basis that there are courts that are appropriate for particular kinds of offences. We are saying that extradition cases, both because they involve very complex questions of law and because the implications of particular decisions are very wide reaching, are not appropriate for hearing in the District Court. There is nothing new or radical about that. In a whole series of instances, jurisdiction of the District Court has been confined over the years. That court can deal only with minor criminal offences and there have been all sorts of challenges, on matters ranging from road traffic offences to butter smuggling, to decide how minor is minor. The District Court cannot grant bail in certain serious cases — for example, in a murder case. That court is specifically stated in the Constitution to be a court of limited and local jurisdiction.
It is not appropriate that cases of this importance should be sandwiched into the District Court list. Frankly, it is unreal. I do not know if this happened in the case that is uppermost in all our minds, but it is unreal that a District Justice with a long list interrupts his list, halfway through granting an extension of a licence to the local rugby club and about to take up the list of parking summonses from the local traffic warden, to deal with a case of somebody wanted in connection with a mass murder, with all the implications that will arise depending on the decision to which he comes. It is just not the appropriate legal forum. Such cases should be taken away from the District Court. We have suggested that they should go to the Circuit Court. There would, of course, still be the opportunity to go from there to the High Court and raise issues wider than those now open in the District Court and, with the change, open in the Circuit Court.
Since our suggestion was first put forward by Deputy Barrett during the statements made to the House on the McVeigh case, others have said that they see a certain merit in it, but have put forward alternative suggestions. Deputy Colley, in the course of a radio programme at the weekend, suggested one set of proceedings in the High Court. I do not close my mind to that possibility, but it seems desirable to operate some kind of two-tier system, a screening system whereby the large number of cases which are non-contentious can be dealt with at local level and those that are contentious can find their way to the High Court. We do not hold ourselves out as being infallible on that.
I toss out another possibility; that all cases would go to the District Court and the defendant would be asked whether he is consenting to extradition or not. A very large number of defendants do consent to extradition. If they do not consent to their extradition, then without further ado the cases would be transferred for hearing in the High Court. We do not pretend to have the last word on that. There is a degree of public disquiet about the frequency with which extradition cases have broken down. That requires a response from the Legislature. Because of the calendar, we are not in a position to put forward legislation tonight. We have afforded the Dáil an opportunity to consider different options. We ask the Government to think about the matter and come back with proposals in the autumn, proposals that will involve the transfer of extradition cases from where they do not belong to places where they would more properly reside. If that does not happen we are prepared to use our Private Members' time in the autumn to put forward specific legislation and, if necessary, to vote it through. On the basis of the talk around the House it seems that the Government see a degree of merit in our proposals and that they will not oppose our motion. That is welcome, but I hope that the Minister for Justice or the Government will not say that there is a certain degree of merit in our proposals, that they will think about it and that that is the last we will hear about it. The Government will have the summer recess to consider our proposals and we want specific legislation introduced in the autumn. Otherwise, we will be obliged to act ourselves.
The part of the motion which calls on the Government to review extradition procedure in the District Courts will not cause problems to anyone in the House because a review of extradition procedures under Part III of the 1965 Act is already laid down in section 6 of the most recent Extradition Act whereby the Government are enabled to organise a review of the extradition procedures under Part III of the 1965 Act on a yearly basis.
Deputy Birmingham said earlier that he thought the Government accepted the motion, but I have a problem in regard to transferring cases from the District Court to the Circuit Court. Having listened to Deputy Barrett and Deputy Birmingham, I am still not convinced that such transfers should take place. Neither of them advanced any cogent reasons for taking extradition cases in the Circuit Court instead of the District Court.
The Legislature should not get involved in a motion which was brought in very quickly after a problematical case in relation to extradition over the last week or so. The Dáil is reacting to something which took place last week and the motion is a knee jerk reaction. The House should not react to particular incidents, it should react to a general situation; and a motion like this is not the correct way to deal with the problem. We often hear the maxim that hard cases make bad law and that applies in relation to this matter.
Deputies Barrett and Birmingham said that they were not casting any reflection on the district justices. However, my reading of the motion leads me to believe that there is a reflection on the district justices——
I was referring to the District Courts.
Deputy Barrett said that district justices should not deal with these cases, which, in effect, means they are not competent to do so. They are competent because the vast majority of extradition cases have been dealt with quite well in the District Court. Indeed, even when cases have been appealed to the High Court, the decision of the District Court has been upheld in the vast majority of them. I do not accept that extradition cases should not be dealt with in the District Court.
The extradition procedure laid down in Part III of the 1965 Act is probably the most simplified procedure there could be. Deputy Birmingham dwelt on this point and said that the procedure should be streamlined. It is the most streamlined procedure possible in any extradition procedures and, but for the 1987 Act, it would be a backing of warrants. The corresponding legislation in England is called the Backing of Warrants (Ireland) Act, 1965, which was brought in simultaneously with our 1965 Act.
The District Court has a vast area of case law with which they can deal in relation to the procedure. It was implied that the State should be represented by senior counsel expert in this area, but that is casting a reflection on the State solicitors who, day in and day out, process extradition cases and bring them to court. Indeed, they may decide in some cases that they should not be brought to court. Decisions in recent cases in the District Court may not have gone the way that some people in this House would have wanted, but it should be rememberd that these decisions are not binding on any subsequent extradition case, a point which seems to have escaped many people. I know that the State is appealing to the High Court by way of a case stated in relation to that. The 1987 Act came in for some cricitism in relation to the most recent case but that case had nothing to do with the 1987 Act, which has worked well——
How can the Deputy say that the legislation is working well when not one person has been extradited?
The point was raised by Deputy Birmingham——
Does Deputy Barrett not understand our law? What is the problem?
(Interruptions.)
On a point of order, I proposed this motion and not one Minister from Fianna Fáil came in here to respond——
Deputy Barrett is a well established Member of the House and he knows that it is not a point of order.
Deputy Barrett should extend the same courtesy he was given to this side of the House. He and Deputy Birmingham were not interrupted.
(Interruptions.)
Deputy Barrett, if you interrupt again I will ask you to leave the House. Deputy Barrett must obey the orders of the House the same as everyone else.
It is a scandal.
Whether or not it is a scandal, you must put up with it or I will ask you to leave.
Perhaps I would be better off leaving.
Well, do so. You are not going to continue interrupting the House.
They are playing politics with a serious issue where people's lives are at stake.
(Interruptions.)
He is misquoting me. Here is a copy of the script. Let him go and read it and then come in here and speak.
(Interruptions.)
Deputy Barrett, you must contain yourself.
He is implying that I am casting aspersions——
(Interruptions.)
You ought to be ashamed of yourself. A silent Minister of State has been sent in here——
Deputy Barrett, if you interrupt again I will ask you to leave the House.
I might leave of my own accord if this is the way the motion is to be treated.
I will ask you to leave the House, Deputy Barrett. You are no different from anybody else here.
Hear, hear.
You are expected as a Member of the House to give a headline as to how people should behave themselves.
I do not want to be misinterpreted.
I would ask you to leave the House.
Deputy S. Barrett withdrew from the Chamber.
On a point of order——
Is it a point of order, Minister of State?
I wanted to say that the Government in the normal way will be making a measured response to this motion——
That is not a point of order. You do not have to justify the presence or absence of any Minister. Deputy Ahern, you are in possession now and I would ask you not to refer directly or indirectly to any case that is before the court. Skirting it but still making it quite obvious does not circumvent our requirement in respect of something that is sub judice.
I referred to the most recent extradition legislation passed by this Dáil. It is interesting that a portion of that has already built into it a mechanism whereby the whole extradition procedure under the 1965 Act, Part III, can be reviewed. Apart from that — and this was a suggestion made by Deputy Birmingham — one particular person should be delegated to see that the extradition documents are in order. In the 1987 Act it was specified that the Attorney General would certify that there was a case in relation to the extradition. That is exactly what some people on the far side of the House found fault with in the 1987 legislation.
In relation to the idea of the District Court not being a fit place, I have to disagree with that. Deputy Birmingham said that some extradition cases might be intertwined with small traffic offences. That may well be the case, but it could also be the case in the Circuit Court. One major point that should be made from a practical point of view is that in extradition procedures once the warrant is brought to a court and a person is brought to the court, he has to be brought as soon as possible to the next available District Justice in the area where the arrest was made or, if there is no District Justice available, to a peace commissioner. I question how somebody could be brought to a Circuit Court in my area as the Circuit Court sits only four times a year. It sits in May and there is not a sitting then until September/October. How can anyone be brought to the Circuit Court for extradition? It is just not practicable. Speakers on the other side of the House talked about unhappy cases. Surely there would be unhappy cases if they went to the Circuit Court or the High Court. Their motion — while there well may be a need for a review of the whole extradition procedure from time to time as laid down in the most recent Act, — their motion suggesting a transfer of cases from the District Court to the Circuit Court is totally misguided and I could not go along with it.
I would like to begin by saying that this debate is a sham, not to mention a shambles. The Minister for Justice is absent, no doubt on business. We do not have a responsible Minister, or a Minister who is accepting responsibility in the House to answer the debate, and neither do we have the proposer of the motion due to an understandable anger about the way this motion is being treated. It is a very serious issue. I move amendment No. 1:
To delete all words after "Dáil Éireann" and substitute:
"calls on the Government to review the provisions of the Extradition Act of 1965 and in particular, to consider whether in any proceedings under that Act, where the person arrested does not acquiesce in the making of such extradition order when brought before the District Court, the hearing of all matters relating to the making of such order should be before the High Court".
This motion deserves a lot more consideration than is being given to it. It is unfortunate that Deputy Ahern has stepped in, apparently to oppose the motion, but we are not certain. We do not know, having heard the speakers from the Government side, the opinion of the Government on this issue. That is disgraceful. I will continue with my speech which I hope the House hears, giving it the importance that other motions in the House have been accorded previously.
Extradition is that arrangement between civilised countries which allows for the pursuit of those who have been tried and sentenced or those who are wanted for trial by one state in the jurisdiction of another state. It is a long-established practice which recognises that there is common case between civilised nations when it comes to defeating crime. The process of extradition operates by way of treaties between different nations or reciprocal legislation passed by the two states. Many types of offences are dealt with under extradition law, offences from common theft to serious cases of kidnapping or murder.
The Extradition Act, 1965, which was introduced following on the case of the State's Quinn v. Ryan that year, sets down the basis for extradition from this country firstly to the UK and secondly to other states. Procedures laid down in Part III of that Act involve the endorsement of the foreign warrant by the Commissioner of the Garda and the arrest of the wanted person by a member of the Garda on foot of that warrant. The person arrested must then be brought before a district justice or a peace commissioner who may remand him in custody or on bail for not more than eight days until the next District Court sitting. The proceedings then move to the District Court which under the Act must now make the order for the fugitive to be delivered up to the requesting State. Prior to the 1965 Act, the Garda simply arrested this person on foot of the endorsed warrant and delivered him or her up without any necessity to go into court at all.
At the commencement of the hearing the district justice must inquire whether the person arrested is legally represented and may adjourn the proceedings if necessary if he or she wishes to be legally represented and a case prepared. The district justice under the Act must be satisfied on a number of counts before he can make an order. Controversy and a considerable amount of litigation has grown up over the last number of years around the three main elements about which the district justice must be satisfied. These areas are: (1) the validity of the warrant and other documents; (2) that the person arrested is the same person as that named on the warrant; and (3) that the offence is one in respect of which he may make an order.
In recent times it has become clear that in cases involving political offences these issues which the District Justice must be satisfied with are being called into question on a regular basis. What apparently was a simple procedure as laid down in the Act is now the subject of a great deal of legal argument in these cases. Almost invariably where this occurs the person who is arrested on foot of extradition warrants exercises his or her right to state a case to the High Court or to apply for habeas corpus also in the High Court. This means that these issues are first of all discussed and argued about in the District Court and are then repeated in the High Court in most instances.
On a number of grounds the Progressive Democrats feel that the District Court is unsuitable for the resolution of sometimes fine and complicated legal issues. Despite what Deputy Ahern said, there is certaintly no reflection on my part or on the part of the Progressive Democrats on the capabilities and abilities of district justices. If the circumstances and the back-up facilities were such in the District Court as to enable a distict justice to spend the time then the case could be regarded in a different light. We should not confuse the competence of district justices and the suitability of a court of summary jurisdiction for extradition.
The order in the District Court is, in effect, a preliminary order. Extradition may not actually take place on foot of such an order without the person who is the subject of it being informed of his right to apply to the High Court within 15 days for habeas corpus. The person in custody must not be handed over until at least 15 days have elapsed from the time of the District Court order unless that person consents to being handed over. It is clear that unless the arrested person consents to the order the matter will almost undoubtedly be heard before the High Court. It is, therefore, inefficient and a waste of time and money to have two similar hearings in different courts on the same subject.
It was never intended that the District Court should have to grapple with fine points of law and hear lengthy submissions on the pros and cons of executing an extradition in this court of first instance. The District Court is a summary court dealing with everyday issues such as petty theft, drunkenness, soliciting, road traffic offences, etc. Summary justice is effected, which is not to detract from its fairness or its effectiveness. It is also a court which is the point at which more serious criminal matters are initiated. Defendents then move to a court of a higher jurisdiction for the substantive issues to be heard and decided on. This procedure is very much akin to what we are suggesting in our amendment to this motion. The same procedure is at present used in bail applications where decisions of a substantive nature are taken by the High Court. It is important to remember that in all extradition cases the liberty of the individual is at stake and, even more importantly he or she is being delivered up to another jurisdiction. The court must be satisfied that the requesting state is entitled to extradite from Ireland for the offence concerned and that the judicial authority issuing the warrant is appropriate.
Real concerns have been expressed over the last number of years with regard to some aspects of British justice and its particular impact on Irish people. Reservations have been expressed about the conviction and confirmation of appeal of conviction of the Birmingham Six among others. There has also been disquiet about the failure to prosecute members of the RUC implicated in an apparent "shoot to kill" policy. That episode appeared to be more concerned with justice bowing to political considerations and seemed to many Irish people to indicate that British justice does not extend to an Irish context.
The fact that these causes for disquiet have arisen should not, in my opinion, mean that the whole process of extradition should grind to a halt. The two Governments, of Britain and of Ireland, share a common objective, that is to restore peace to the island of Ireland. In order to achieve this it is essential that co-operation exists as regards the tracing and prosecution of criminals involved in terrorism. It must be recognised also that neither Government can combat this problem on its own, no matter what efforts are made. The two jurisdictions are, therefore, inextricably linked in this cause. It is only right therefore, that we ensure that the extradition procedures which we have available to us are made effective.
There have been a number of cases in recent years where extradition applications from the United Kingdom have failed at the District Court in this jurisdiction. These cases have failed for a variety of reasons, mostly involving a failure to provide proper proofs, or a failure to adhere properly to the requirements of the 1965 Act. It has to be said that as between the UK and here, there seems to be some sloppiness in the approach that the British authorities take towards the District Court hearing. Other decisions are, on the other hand, inexplicable, given the evidence before the court.
In order to introduce some certainty in these decisions and proper responsibility for the results of them, I feel it is quite appropriate that any contested case should be transferred to the High Court for hearing. This will have the effect of leaving in place the two layers of judicial responsibility that exist at present. However, it will acknowledge what is realistically the case, that is, that the District Court should not be expected to entertain difficult legal argument on which a person's liberty and delivery to another jurisdiction depends.
The whole issue of extradition as between Britain and Ireland has become clouded by the political storm which was introduced into the issue by the Government when they brought in amending legislation last winter prior to our ratifying the European Convention on Terrorism. There was a carefully orchestrated campaign at that time to, first of all, whip up fears about the effect of our ratification of this treaty and, secondly, to play them down when it appeared that it would be very difficult for the Government politically not to ratify the convention.
Fianna Fáil backbench opinion, of the very green variety, was fanned into believing that vast numbers of our citizens were going to be at risk following on the ratification of the Convention on Terrorism. They then found themselves in the situation where, due to a number of unfortunate incidents of a terrorist nature occurring at around that time, they were forced to ratify the convention. However, to put some kind of political gloss on their about turn, they introduced the Extradition (Amendment) Bill and rushed it through the Houses of the Oireachtas.
The main feature of this Bill was the introduction of the Attorney General into the process of extradition as between Ireland and the United Kingdom. Following that legislation, the Attorney General, a political appointee, is an integral part of the procedures, having been given the responsibility of certifying that there is a clear indication to prosecute and that this intention is founded on the existence of sufficient evidence. As the Taoiseach himself said, in the Second Stage debate on the Bill, the introduction of the Attorney General into the process was a new procedural step which would require the Attorney to "exercise his function and form his opinion about the existence of, and the foundation for, the intention to prosecute in each and every case".
It was the Progressive Democrats opinion then, and it remains so, that this new function of the Attorney General is a quasi-judicial function at the very least, and is, therefore, constitutionally suspect. Sooner or later a case will be brought to the High Court and Supreme Court on this issue, which will, if it is found to be unconstitutional, put in jeopardy the whole extradition process between the two countries.
The other direct result of the involvement of the Attorney General in the extradition process is that that process becomes politicised. The Attorney General is the legal adviser to the Government and reports directly to the Taoiseach. He is a political appointee who loses office with a change of Government.
The close relationship between the Attorney General and the Government, taken together with his responsibility for consenting to the endorsement of extradition warrants, especially where many of these warrants concern people wanted for quasi-political offences, sets a very dangerous trend. At the very least the Attorney General leaves himself open to allegations of political pressure, no matter which way he decides the matters. There is the added aspect that the opinion he forms, on which basis the consent is given or withheld to extradite, is formed behind closed doors with no reasons given and therefore no way of countering the information which he has considered.
This is one of the major reasons why the whole extradition process as between Britain and Ireland has become politicised, and reaction, therefore, to a perceived failure on the Irish administration's part to extradite, is seen in Britain as being politically motivated.
At the outset I omitted to say that I wished to share my time with Deputy O'Malley, if the House agrees.
If the House formally agrees to that there is no difficulty. Is that agreed? Agreed.
When an extradition case fails in these circumstances the fact that it is the District Court which has jurisdiction and makes the order, or fails to make it, is seen as further evidence of our lack of willingness to extradite persons wanted for terrorist offences. The District Court is seen, nowithstanding the undoubted capabilities of district justices, as a court in which uncertainty on this issue reigns. The procedures and discipline required in a High Court hearing would, I believe, inject a degree of care in the preparation of warrants and accompanying documents which has been recently so lacking.
There are many cases of extradition warrants being executed over the years where the person arrested did not challenge the warrant and consented to his extradition. These are the cases we do not hear about and which cause the District Court no problems. There is no real reason to remove these cases from the jurisdiction of the District Court as it is fully competent to make such orders, which are then confirmed by consent of the person extradited, as set out in the Act. However it is surely more appropriate for judges of the High Court to examine issues in an extradition case where a person's liberty is at stake and we are taking another jurisdiction, to a certain extent, on trust that the requirements of their law have been fully complied with.
For example, the court is required to establish whether the offence is one which satisfies the dual criminality rule, that is, whether there is a similar offence in this jurisdiction to that claimed to have been committed in the warrant which is also considered to be a serious offence here. This examination may bring in claims that the offence was a political offence or committed in connection with a political offence, which is a matter that the High Court properly has jurisdiction to exmaine.
Under the Act of 1965 the arrested person has a right to judicial review of the case under a number of headings. These include whether the offence is political, military or a Revenue offence and whether the person would be in fact prosecuted for any such offence even though extradited for another one. The habeas corpus provision under the Constitution also allows questions regarding the validity of the original arrest in Ireland and general constitutional questions to be raised. These all however are proper to the High Court jurisdiction alone. Once more, I believe that the examination of these issues should be restricted to the High Court in the first instance. Similar provisions exist in the law on bail in this jurisdiction and therefore it is not a new concept. Our amendment also allows the possibility of appealing to the Supreme Court, which of course is there at present. This would not be affected by a change in the legislation.
I would like to turn to the particular proposal which the Fine Gael Party have made in this motion. While I see merit in removing some of the responsibility from the District Court in extradition cases, I feel that the proposal to transfer the first instance jurisdiction to the Circuit Court is mistaken. What is the purpose of this? It would seem that, in their rush to change the procedures urgently, Fine Gael have decided to, perhaps, throw the baby out with the bath water. I take on board the comments of Deputies Barrett and Birmingham and their openness to other suggestions on this issue.
To initiate all extradition cases at Circuit Court level would first of all introduce a greater amount of expense into the proceedings for all concerned. Many of the cases, as I have already said, are unopposed and would be quite rightly dealt with in a District Court setting. This occurs in many other criminal cases where the defendant is given the option to have the offence tried summarily at District Court level or to opt for the Circuit Criminal Court. In this case the arrested person would be given the option, by consenting to the extradition order, of having it dealt with at District Court level. In the event of his not consenting the issue would then properly go to the court which already has jurisdiction in matters of the liberty of the individual.
The Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction in such matters in general at present. Its jurisdiction in relation to the deprivation of a person's liberty is restricted to the trial of criminal cases in the Circuit Criminal Court, which itself must be initiated in the District Court. It is therefore not a court of first instance in these terms. However the High Court in fact often hears cases which are brought initially before it without going through any prior procedures.
It is an interesting aspect of the whole extradition process that those judges who at present are expected to make extradition orders have no access to a library, are not officially circulated with law reports, and are therefore ill-equipped to deal with the nuances and finer legal points which may be presented to them. It is the case, for instance, that the most recent publication on extradition law published last December would not be supplied to district justices as a text of the issue. Add to that the fact that the District Court is a court of summary justice and that the pressure is on the justice to make quick decisions, it can be seen that it is very difficult for the justice to give the matter the kind of consideration it would get at High Court level and which is necessary for the protection of citizens and the enforcement of the criminal law.
The district justice is required to decide whether or not the offence claimed to have been committed on the extradition warrant is comparable to an offence in Irish law. How can he or she, without the back-up of a proper library, be expected to do so? The Garda are often caught in the middle of wrangles in regard to extradition. Because decisions can, and sometimes are, altered within the space of an hour or two inside the District Court in extradition matters, the Garda, in whose custody the arrested person is, are sometimes made to look foolish and incompetent. In the majority of cases that impression is unwarranted. We should make every effort to ensure that that does not occur again, irrespective of which court has jurisdiction. The credibility of our legal system is at issue when we see changes in decisions being made within the space of a couple of hours.
The reputation which the country has around the world as being a nation of terrorist, or fellow travellers, is one which we can ill afford. I believe that it is high time we took note of the trend in recent years in exradition cases, looked to the reasons for these incidents and took it upon ourselves to amend the law so as to avoid any confusion in the future.
Deputy O'Malley has three minutes.
I cannot say a great deal in three minutes but I want to say that there are two potential methods at the two extremes of dealing with extradition and each of them is equally unacceptable. One is that it becomes an almost automatic administrative slot machine system, which is sometimes urged on us, and the other extreme is what frankly we have at the moment — something of extraordinary legal technicalities where people are able to avoid extradition by a reliance on extremely technical matters that do not go to the merits of the case at all and where, even if they are ultimately extradited, they are able to avoid that extradition for an abnormally long period of time. I do not think that either of those extremes is satisfactory. What would be satisfactory is something in between, something that is more expeditious than what we have but which is obviously fairer than just an automatic or administrative type system.
The extradition of a person is not his conviction and it is because of the apprehensions in regard to cases in Britain that the House has seen fit to put in place a system that is extremely complicated. One can, perhaps, understand why that is so. We are entitled to ask the question, why is there not such an extraordinarily complicated system in place in regard to extraditions to other countries? The criminal trial process in many of the continental European countries is, to say the least, very unsatisfactory but we do not seem to have any great concern about people who might be extradited to them.
In an effort to simplify the system — a great many people would like to see it simplified — the Progressive Democrats, in their amendment, have made the suggestion that except in the many cases where the defendant acquiesces in his extradition, and he does in the great majority of cases in this country with the exception normally of the so-called or allegedly quasi-political cases, the actual hearing should be, in these quasi-political cases, in the High Court. It is much more satisfactory than the Circuit Court. The proposal in the motion to substitute the Circuit Court for the District Court is simply substituting one unnecessary layer for another. The Circuit Court is not suited to this type of hearing. It does not engage in summary hearings of first instance in criminal matters. The obvious place where all the argument goes on is in the High Court. Rather than have the case duplicated, it should start there except for a formal appearance in the District Court where the defendant says that he does not acquiesce in his extradition. If he is going to contest it, let him do so in the High Court. That seems to make more sense.
I would like to comment on the opening remarks in Deputy Colley's speech in which she said that this debate was a sham and a shambles. As one of the contributors to the debate, I take grave exception to that. I can only conclude from the remark that anything which does not accord exactly with what Deputy Colley thinks or says must be a sham and a shambles. Some of us may have reservations or may wish to make points either amending, adding to or taking from what has been said before. Later in her speech — I do not have a copy of it before me — she appeared to call into question the credibility of our law. She certainly used that phrase. As a Member of this House, as a practising lawyer and as a citizen of this country, I take grave exception to that phrase. There is no doubt in the minds of the people about our law. It is an entirely credible body of law, founded on the Constitution and the Acts of this Parliament. The Deputy then went on to say that this country has a reputation for terrorists and fellow-travellers of terrorists. Again, I take grave exception to that.
It is true.
It is not true.
It certainly is.
If Deputy Colley feels that she is part of such a State, then I suggest that she is in a minority of less than 1 per cent.
It has that reputation.
Deputy Colley prefaced her remarks by saying she hoped that she would get the silence and respect of the House. Having got it, it would be a little remiss of her to prevent Deputy Swift from getting the same. Deputy Swift, without interruption.
He is provoking the Deputy.
I am not being provocative.
He is misquoting.
There should be proper use of the House.
Any impropriety that the Deputy is aware of he can bring to the appropriate committee. Deputy Swift, without interruption.
We will see about that.
I understand I am entitled to quote or paraphrase what has been said. Those remarks were said. They are in a written speech of Deputy Colley which, if she wishes, she can show me afterwards.
Absolutely.
If what I have just said is true, then I want to reiterate in the strongest possible terms that I take grave exception to those remarks. I am sure a majority, not just of this House but of the people of the country, would take grave exception to what she has said.
In regard to the motion and the amendment, in the 1987 Act there is a review procedure which is due to come up after 1 January next year. This House is going to go into recess next week and will not resume until October. To be quite candid, I honestly do not see the need for this motion and this amendment. The review procedure is already in place and it has been enacted as a result of decisions of this House less than 12 months ago.
There are a number of points in favour of going through the District Court, which deserve to be mentioned specifically here. The first point, which should be acceptable to people whether they be defendants, plaintiffs, people acting for them or the general public looking on at the procedure, is that the procedure is a relatively simple one. Times out of number we hear commentators, especially politicians, saying that the law and its procedures should be simple. Here we have a relatively simple procedure and apparently, even though it has operated satisfactorily for quite a period of time, it is now being called into question. The second point is in relation to the speed of the procedure. We often hear people quoting that justice delayed is justice denied. There is no quicker form of justice than to go into the District Court and have your case disposed of at the end of the week.
The question of the venue also arises. If the matter is tried in the District Court it is tried in the defendant's home territory; He does not have to be dragged off to Cork, Limerick, Dublin or some other venue. It is tried in his home venue, possibly less than fve or ten minutes walk away. All these are practical considerations of justice. There is the additional practical consideration of expense. If we are going to bring people into the District Court, then we are going to involve barristers. We have been debating in this House and outside it for some time about removing barristers from certain aspects of the legal scene, or at least cutting down on their numbers so that we can cut down on expense. Are we going to load expense onto the defendants who will be brought before the court? If we beat our breasts and say: "No, we are not going to load expense onto them", then are we going to load expense onto the Exchequer by creating additional fees, to be met out of the free legal aid scheme?
Furthermore, nobody is precluded from appealing these decisions, either the State or the defendant. If somebody says you can only appeal to the High Court, I presume that neither the motion nor the amendment would want to preclude an appeal to the High Court. Instead of having two courts, the initial court which is the District Court and the court of appeal which is the High Court, we are now going to introduce a third court. We will then have the District Court, the Circuit Court and the High Court.
There is a final practical consideration. I would throw this out as a very reasonable point of view to anybody who is familiar with the court scene at present, in particular the Circuit Court scene. There are a number of lawyers on all sides of this House at present. The list in most Circuit Court areas is such that justice is often denied by being often delayed. If we are to introduce extradition cases into the Circuit Court, as envisaged in the Fine Gael motion, then we may very well be over-burdening the Circuit Court, as it is constituted at present, beyond what it can stand. That, again, is a practical consideration.
Deputy Barrett said that the question of the British media was relevant. He mentioned unjustifiable criticism and then went on to say that this was a matter of perception. I would like to take this opportunity of agreeing 100 per cent with Deputy Barrett when he said that in many instances this is unjustifiable criticism by the British media. That is a correct statement. I have made it from time to time and I am sure most other Deputies have as well. I would like to commend him, as Fine Gael spokesman for Justice, for putting this on the record of this House. It seems that the chorus of unjustifiable criticism, as he calls it, or, as I would call it, an ignorant, ill-informed anti-Irish gutter press criticism, always emanates when some decision, as they perceive it, does not go their way. It is time somebody said this was totally unjustifiable and to that extend Deputy Barrett is completely in the right. I agree with what he said.
Debate adjourned.