We are pleased to have the opportunity to make this presentation to explain the role of the Department of Agriculture and Food in dealing with the risk of avian flu being introduced into Ireland's poultry flock. As the Chairman said, we are joined by colleagues from the Department of Health and Children and the Health Service Executive who have responsibility for the human health aspects associated with any human influenza pandemic.
As this is the first occasion on which we have formally given evidence to the committee, it will be useful to provide some background information on the current international situation. Avian flu is a highly infectious disease that affects normally only birds and, less commonly, pigs. As we have seen elsewhere, however, in certain circumstances people can also become infected. All birds are thought to be susceptible to infection but some species are more resistant to infection than others. Migratory waterfowl, notably wild ducks, are the natural reservoir of avian influenza viruses but such birds are also most resistant to infection. Domestic poultry, including chickens and turkeys, are particularly susceptible to epidemics of rapidly fatal influenza.
Avian flu viruses are classified by reference to their ability to cause disease. High pathogenic viruses cause severe disease and mortality, whereas low pathogenic viruses generally cause only mild disease or none at all. Over the years, outbreaks of both classes have been reported in many countries. In Ireland, the most recent confirmed outbreak of high pathogenic avian flu occurred in 1983 but the disease was successfully eradicated at that time. In the European Union, the most recent outbreak of a high pathogenic strain - the H7N7 strain - occurred in the Netherlands in 2003, resulting in one death and mild illness in 83 other humans.
A particularly virulent high pathogenic strain of avian flu - the H5N1 virus - has affected countries in South-East Asia since mid-December 2003. Between then and early February 2004, outbreaks of the virus were reported in eight Asian countries. In late July 2005, Russia reported its first outbreak, which was followed by reports of the disease in neighbouring Kazakhstan in early August 2005 and in Mongolia almost simultaneously. Last October, H5N1 was confirmed in poultry in Turkey and Romania and, subsequently, in wild birds in Croatia. The only incidence of the virus identified within the EU occurred on 23 October 2005, when it was reported to have been found in a consignment of imported Taiwanese birds that was being held in a quarantine facility in the United Kingdom. However, this is not regarded as having compromised the avian flu-free status of either the United Kingdom or the European Union as a whole.
The recent sad events in Turkey do not alter the risk of the virus being introduced into Ireland. The available evidence indicates that the virus was introduced into domestic poultry in Turkey by migrating wild birds. There are suggestions poultry movements may have contributed to its spread within that country, where the human cases all appear to have resulted from direct contact with infected poultry, either alive or dead. All of the evidence to date indicates that close contact with dead or sick birds is the principal source of human infection with the H5N1 virus. Our current assessment of the risk is shared by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in the United Kingdom which has concluded that recent events in Turkey do not materially alter the assessment that the likelihood of the imminent introduction of the H5N1 virus into the United Kingdom is low.
Representatives from the Department of Health and Children are present, but I will make a number of points regarding the human cases in the pandemic. The latest official figures from the WHO, dated 23 January, indicate 151 laboratory confirmed human cases. There have been some 82 deaths from the H5N1 virus in six countries. There have been four deaths in Cambodia, all in 2005; six in China, with five occurring in 2005; 14 in Indonesia, with 11 occurring in 2005; 14 in Thailand, with 12 occurring in 2004; four in Turkey; and 42 in Vietnam, of which 20 occurred in 2004 and 19 in 2005. An updated WHO situation report from Turkey on 18 January indicated a total of 21 confirmed human cases, of which four had been fatal. Two appeared in official figures, but there may well be more.
The WHO pandemic alert remains unchanged at phase 3 which is defined as a virus, new to humans, causing infections but which does not spread easily from one person to another. Until there is evidence of sustained human to human transmission of a new influenza virus, the threat of an influenza pandemic remains unchanged. I will leave it to my colleagues in the Department of Health and Children and the HSE to elaborate further on pandemic issues.
With regard to inquiries about advice on travelling to Turkey and other countries affected by the avian flu virus, and to those advocating that people should be advised to avoid such countries, it should be repeated that we have not changed our advice to those travelling to Turkey and other affected countries. At this time we are not advising people to avoid particular parts of Turkey. We advise people travelling to an affected country to avoid contact with wild birds and poultry, as well as live bird markets, farms and other places which may be contaminated by bird faeces. Other sensible precautions should be taken, including seeking advice on eating and handling poultry and poultry dishes. This travel advice was reissued in national newspapers last Friday. It is worth pointing out that people have been travelling to and from affected countries in South-East Asia, notably Thailand, for the past two years without introducing the virus into Ireland. At no point in the past two years did we advise people to avoid affected countries.
The recent coverage of events in Turkey serves to highlight the need for continued vigilance in the fight against this disease. The Department has at no time been complacent in its approach and has put in place a series of measures aimed at minimising the risk of the virus entering the country. Unfortunately, given the role played by wild birds in the transmission of the disease, we can only act to minimise rather than eliminate the risk. Since last summer, when the presence of the virus was first confirmed east of the Urals and subsequently in parts of Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Croatia and Turkey, the European Union and the Department have put in place a series of measures to deal with the risk. These have included, among others, a ban on the importation of live poultry, unprocessed poultry products and feathers from affected countries or, in certain cases, the regions of affected countries at risk. There is a Commission ban on the importation of captive and pet birds from outside the European Union, except where they comply with certain conditions, including a 30-day quarantine period.
We have put in place a range of biosecurity measures aimed at reducing the risk of transmission from wild birds to poultry and other captive birds, as well as an early detection system. We have placed a ban on the collection of poultry for poultry markets and other events, although we are prepared to licence other events classified as being low risk. These include caged birds, showing birds bred in captivity from aviaries in Ireland and the United Kingdom, as well as pigeon shows. We have also introduced a registration system for all individuals and companies which keep domestic poultry, however small such stocks may be. This also covers those who own, handle or trade in domestic poultry or other captive birds for sale or sports purposes. This includes enterprises such as aviaries, pet farms, game clubs or pigeon breeders. It does not include pet birds kept in domestic households. There has been a very good response to the registration arrangement and to date, over 6,300 flock owners have registered, in addition to the approximately 1,100 commercial poultry flock owners, whose details we already had. The Commission is drafting a series of separate decisions providing for interim protection measures where there is a suspicion of highly pathogenic AI in wild birds or poultry. These are under ongoing review in Brussels.
In addition to these specific measures, we have issued a series of advice and information notices in national newspaper advertisements or posters on biosecurity, symptoms of avian flu and travel to and from affected countries. In addition, a booklet providing comprehensive biosecurity advice will be posted to almost 7,500 poultry flock owners for whom we have contact details before the end of this week. We have put in place an early warning system with the assistance of the national parks and wildlife service, the National Association of Regional Game Councils and BirdWatch Ireland.
In recent months a small number or suspect cases of avian flu have been investigated and all proved to be negative. In all cases staff in local offices, as well as the laboratory on the Backweston campus, moved very quickly to secure and analyse samples and rule out the possibility of avian flu as a cause of mortality. The Department also undertook a successful trial slaughter of a flock of poultry using the method of slaughter which would be used in the event of a poultry cull.
Apart from this, close contacts is being maintained with a number of Departments and bodies, particularly the Department of Health and Children, the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in Belfast and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in London on issues of mutual interest. In particular, a number of meetings have taken place with our colleagues from Northern Ireland and a further meeting is to be arranged early next month. These colleagues are at work in Agriculture House dealing with, among other items, avian flu. We are closely monitoring the spread of the virus in consultation with international organisations such as the World Organisation for Animal Health, the World Health Organisation, and the United Nation's Food and Agriculture Organisation. We are also in close contact with the European Commission and our EU partners.
While offering advice on a number of issues, the Department has attached particular significance to the availability of accurate and up-to-date biosecurity advice for poultry flock owners, including advice on measures to be taken to reduce the risk of the introduction of avian flu, the housing of poultry, cleaning and disinfection, as well as advice for employers. As a Department, we are satisfied the biosecurity arrangements are robust and work effectively to combat the threat of animal and plant health disease. It is our view, based on the Department's experience, that our biosecurity regime is highly effective and serves the consumer and producer well. Our commitment to the application of very high farm hygiene standards is demonstrated by the production of a booklet containing a wide range of bio-security measures which is being posted this week to every registered poultry flock owner in the country.
The recent events in Turkey have heightened awareness of the issue and, notwithstanding our view that nothing significant has changed in terms of the country's current exposure to the virus, a number of initiatives are under way. These include a series of advice and information notices in the national newspapers, beginning with travel advice last week; a notice on bio-security to appear this Friday and an advice notice to employers to appear next week; and a local radio campaign aimed at encouraging those poultry flockowners who have not yet registered to do so promptly. We are also providing material to provincial newspapers with local contact numbers for reporting unusual patterns of wild bird mortality or registering with the Department. We are contributing to wildlife and agriculture programmes on national and local radio stations and are holding ongoing meetings with our colleagues in the Department of Health and Children to discuss issues of mutual interest. We will issue a comprehensive bio-security information pack this week and have provided poster material in additional languages, such as Turkish, Romanian and Russian, for use at ports and airports.
The Department's consistent position has been to act proportionately in our actions and reactions to developments. The measures introduced since last autumn are a combination of EU-Ied measures and domestic measures. As the risk assessment changed, so too did our approach and, where appropriate, additional precautionary measures were added. The Department continues to assess the risk and will not hesitate to take any additional appropriate veterinary or scientific measures that would assist in minimising the risk of the introduction of avian flu.
I emphasise that the Department's role is to minimise the risk of the disease being introduced into the poultry sector here and, in the event of an outbreak, to ensuring its early detection and speedy eradication. Public health issues are proper to our colleagues in the Department of Health and Children and the Health Service Executive, with whom we continue to work very closely.
We could well be affected by a human flu pandemic without birds ever having contracted avian flu. Likewise, we could well have an outbreak of avian flu without ever being affected by a human flu pandemic. We maintain a high level of vigilance and constantly revise our contingency arrangements in light of any emerging information. We are confident that the measures already taken are proportionate to the current level of risk and we will not hesitate to put in place any such additional measures as are appropriate to any change in the risk of the disease.
I thank the committee again for the opportunity to make this presentation. We will be happy to answer any questions.