I remind members to switch off their mobile telephones for the duration of the meeting. On behalf of the committee I welcome Mr. Denis Corboy, director of the Caucasus Policy Institute, King's College, University of London. I ask him to make a presentation, which will be followed by a question and answer session.
EU Neighbourhood Policy: Discussion with Caucasus Policy Institute.
Mr. Denis Corboy
I thank the committee for the invitation to appear. I am a bit of an oddity because I worked for the European Commission for 37 years and I spent my early years in the Commission's office in Dublin. Since I retired, I have returned as a special envoy to the Caucasus. My last posting was as EU ambassador to Georgia and Armenia. I returned to the Caucasus as a special envoy in 2002 and I was then asked to direct the Caucasus Policy Institute, which is part of the think tank operations attached to King's College, London.
I will discuss the European neighbourhood policy in the Caucasus, particularly in light of the political situation, and put it in its political context, examining relations with Russia and Iran. Energy is the main problem. I do not want to appear anti-Russian but when we examine what has been happening in the Caucasus, particularly in regard to energy policy, one cannot but be critical of certain things that have happened. I would like to focus my remarks on Georgia, which I know well and which I visit five or six times a year. I return next week for meetings and so forth. I was posted there for five and a half years during the 1990s.
The dominant issue, which has received most international attention, is the strained relations between Russia and its neighbours, especially Georgia. Historically, Georgia has had tensions with its big neighbour to the north, which changed from the Russian empire to the Soviet Union. The country strongly preserved its culture. Irish people would be very proud of the way the Georgians kept their culture despite all the attempts to destroy their language and so on.
Georgia is a strong cultural country and its economy is based on agriculture. It was a prosperous part of the Soviet Union and had an extensive trade in agricultural produce, particularly with Russia. Even after the break up of the Soviet Union, the Georgian economy depended very much on Russia. There is an emotional element to this on both sides and that is reflected in the temperaments of both leaders. A great deal of emotion comes into their relationship.
The dispute with Russia has affected investment in the entire Caucasus region and it is relevant to the stability of the region. I refer to the origin of the dispute. One must recognise the difficulty Russia has, having surrendered the "near abroad", and the political objectives behind its energy ambitions, as outlined by President Putin in his new year statement. The crisis that began before Christmas was triggered by the arrest of four Russian military officers who were accused of spying. The evidence presented in court was strong and they were deported. After they were deported, Russia decided to take extreme action by imposing a total trade, transport, communications and postal embargo on Georgia. Wine exports had already been stopped. Mineral water and other main exports were also stopped. The debt Georgia owed to Russia, US $170 million, was drawn in and tax police raids were made on Georgian homes and businesses in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities. More than 1,000 Georgians, some say nearer 5,000, were deported in circumstances that upset the people of Georgia. They were deported in transport planes in which they did not have seats. Various reasons were given for their deportation, usually that their papers were not entirely in order or that they did not have but were waiting for their papers.
The most serious problem for poor Georgians was that their remittances were halted. Over 1 million Georgians in Russia had difficulty sending remittances and this affected many poor people. What added to the emotion of the dispute was that a degree of xenophobia had entered the row. Georgian children were taken out of schools in Russia and school principals had to identify children with Georgian names for questioning. This practice had echoes of the past, which upset people and made the situation highly emotional.
As committee members will know, in the past ten days the Russian Government and its security council have reconsidered the effect of the sanctions. They decided they were not working and last week sent back the Russian ambassador to the embassy in Tbilisi which they had previously closed. Flights are still blocked, but there is hope flights, which are important for those who travel to and from Russia will be restored in March. The trade embargo continues, but it has been eased slightly in some areas, not for wine, but for mineral water.
The conclusion of the international community is that the effort to bring Georgia to book did not work. The four and a half to five months trade embargo only resulted in a 1.5% impact on GDP. In the past year Georgia succeeded in achieving a trade figure of nearly 7% of GDP. If the objective, as people in the Duma suggested, was to achieve a change from the regime of President Saakashvili and destabilise his government, it did not work. Georgia received an amazing degree of international support, particularly among the new member states of the European Union which have great sensitivity for and better understand the position of a small country against a large neighbour.
There was a remarkable turnaround with regard to the acceptance of Georgia as a NATO member. The reluctance to accept it changed after the Russian action and there is now a general acceptance in this regard. Recently, there was intensified dialogue, which is a first step. It looks probable that part of the outcome will be that Georgia will be recognised as a potential member of NATO in mid-2008. It is now the case that Russia must go back to the drawing board with regard to its policy towards Georgia. I will explain how Russian policy affects other countries.
Those of us who analyse Russia's objectives and try to analyse its strategy have reached certain general conclusions. Looking at it from a Russian perspective, Putin came to power with the promise to restore Russia as a world power and reverse the humiliation most Russians felt at the loss of eastern Europe and the Baltic states. At the time he came to power the eastern European countries were already well advanced towards EU membership and prior to that, NATO. When Russia saw the colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the Rose and the Orange Revolutions, it was alarmed and thought that countries such as Moldova would go the same way. This is the serious background to the thinking one sees if one looks at the speeches made in the Russian Duma.
Currently, we have a richer and more self-confident Russia which in the course of the past year and a half has brought about a fundamental change in its foreign policy. My Russian friends, whom I meet frequently, would say Russians now see the world differently. They see a weaker United States and think the war on terror — the so-called war in the Middle East and the Iran-Iraq war — has greatly weakened its standing. Generally, the abuse of the war on terror has weakened the standing of the United States. Russians tend to see the European Union as ineffective and disunited, certainly on issues such as energy. We must recognise there is an end to what we used to call the strategic partnership between the European Union and Russia.
There is another curious phenomenon. I am sorry to return to a Rumsfeld remark, but there is some truth in the one he made about "old Europe, new Europe". The new Europe, namely, the new member states and some small countries such as Finland, seems to better understand and have more sympathy for small countries such as Georgia. On the other hand, there are positive signs in the Russian-Georgian relationship. It has been agreed that Russia will close its military bases. Progress is being made in this regard and the timetable is being kept. The withdrawal agreement is up to date and the transfer of military equipment from Georgia back to Russia is almost complete. However, there are concerns about where the military equipment is going, because the Georgians believe some of what was supposed to be brought back to Russia or Gyumri in Armenia may be going to separatist areas such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia which are separated from Georgia, although internationally recognised as being part of it.
In summary, why were these actions taken? One reason was to teach Georgia a lesson and prevent others from taking the same route, countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, etc., which might want to take a more independent and western orientated route. Even Armenia, a strong ally of Russia, showed stronger western tendencies and was in the process of opening the partnership for peace dialogue more strongly with NATO. I think Russia thought Georgia was the weakest and most vulnerable of such countries, but that is not what emerged. Instead, Russian policy united the people behind Saakashvili.
Looking at the Caucasus, for reasons the committee will understand, Armenia, because of the dispute with Azerbaijan and the problems of Karabakh, will continue to be Russia's strongest ally. Azerbaijan is a different story. It is a country with rich oil and gas reserves and must be handled differently. It is seen by Moscow as a one-man or one-clan, one-family show. It is not something they can handle in the same way as they have tried to handle Georgia.
My thesis is that Russia sees itself as an energy superpower and as such, can play a dominant role in the world. It sees energy as an instrument of foreign policy. It has 27% of the world's known gas reserves, the second largest reserves of coal and is the second largest exporter and producer of oil. Russian imports of gas to the European Union amount to 25% of EU gas supplies. On present trends, this figure is projected to rise to 70% by 2020.
Taking the most extreme example of the member states, Germany is now dependent to a figure of more than 50% on Russian gas supplies, which figure is projected to rise to more than 80% by 2020. In this situation everybody is agreed on the need to try to find a single EU voice but this will be extremely difficult. The German problem is the biggest. The German economy depends to a degree on Russian gas supplies and this dependency is very difficult to alter. The experts who come to talk to us at the Caucasus Policy Institute in King's College, London, nearly all agree that Germany will not be able to solve the problem of its dependence on Russian gas supplies without tackling the nuclear issue. As members of the committee will know very well, this is very difficult for politicians and particularly difficult for the Chancellor, Angela Merkel, because she is in a coalition with the SPD which is committed to the closure of the existing German nuclear power stations. There is also a very close link between the SPD and the Green Party because of the last government. It will, therefore, be very difficult for Germany to tackle the nuclear issue. In her speech in Davos last week Angela Merkel addressed the question bluntly and said she would propose to the German Government the freezing of the plan to close the existing nuclear power stations. This is another step to try to get the German Government, people and politicians to agree to what the experts say is needed.
My main concern is the policy to establish a gas cartel, a type of OPEC in gas supplies. I refer to the warnings set out squarely last week by the EU Energy Commissioner, Mr. Piebalgs. The reason he spoke was that the Russian delegation had reached an agreement in Algeria, a country which provides 10% of Europe's gas supplies. Last week the Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Medvedev, who is also vice chairman of Gazprom, with the Energy Minister, reached an understanding but not a signed agreement with Algeria to set up a forum of gas exporting countries. This has caused concern in many political circles. The visit on Monday to Tehran by Igor Ivanov, the head of Russian national security and a former Foreign Minister, has added to the concern. It is reported that Russia and Iran are willing to add to this forum. I remind the committee that Russia and Iran together hold half the gas reserves of the world, not just of this region. Iran has the largest natural gas resources after Russia.
The other part of the equation is that Libya is an important exporter of gas supplies to Europe but it is curious that it does not intend to join the gas cartel — I should not use the word "cartel" — this grouping is a type of OPEC. Everyone denies it will be another OPEC because they say there are longer term contracts. However, I remind those who say there are longer term contracts that the Russians would not give Georgia a contract for more than one year. What happened in Libya is interesting. Romania, a new EU member state, used its influence with Libya and the Libyans have stated they will not join this forum or grouping.
One of the difficulties with reference to Iran is the US policy of sanctions. This policy presents a problem for the Caucasus countries because they already receive gas supplies from Iran which is part of the equation of that part of the world. There is a political need for Europe to use the Caucasus as an energy transit route from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. This alternative forms part of any diversification which in a political sense for Europe is the most important factor in the energy picture.
Europe has always been a significant customer in respect of Russian gas and oil supplies but dependence is the problem and diversification is the name of the game. Liquefied gas and its transport by ship are becoming increasingly important. Qatar is an important factor in this market. However, the discussion always returns to the nuclear issue, including safety problems and the problems of disposing of fuel. Nuclear installations are targets for terrorism. It should be noted that China and India are going ahead with massive development in the area of nuclear power.
In summary, it is undesirable for two or more countries to control 40% of the EU gas needs. Efforts are being made to arrive at an EU common energy policy but the difficulties are considerable. We need to persuade our Russian friends to provide for reciprocity. Foreign companies are currently denied access to Russian production and pipelines. As Chancellor Merkel and the European Commission have done, we need to try to urge them to sign the energy charter which would open up Russia's markets as part of the process of reciprocity.
I will deal with the ENP in answering questions from members. The European neighbourhood policy is the building block in creating the new relationship with the Caucasus.
I thank Mr. Corboy for his presentation. He spoke about diversification as being the issue. Hypothetically, if President Putin were to start wielding his stick and if things get more serious regarding energy supply in the next two or three years, how crucial are the Caucuses countries? What kinds of reserves are involved? How rich are they potentially? If the European Union collectively made a decision to move on the European neighbourhood policy, how much of that would supplant the Russian energy supply? Is it extremely significant or relatively significant?
Mr. Corboy
It is relatively significant. It is not, of course, as big as the Russian resources of oil and gas, both of which are very important to the Caucuses, the Caspian. The important thing about the BTC line, the new BP line, from Baku through Georgia to Turkey, is that at the moment it carries approximately 1 million barrels per day. It has great potential. What the Caspian has is supported by the North Sea. There are plans to extend it to Central Asia, giving rise to the possibility of bringing Kazak oil and gas from the other side of the Caspian Sea to western Europe. It is a very important alternative if it can be kept independent from the major big supplier. It is of increasing strategic importance. It will never replace the need for Russian oil and gas, but, in the belief of my colleagues and me, it is one of the main reasons Russia has been so tough with Georgia. If it could control Georgia, it could control the pipelines. Russia already owns the pipelines going through Armenia and some of the other countries.
Russia has taken a different direction recently. It has moved from its previous position with flights beginning in March, etc. Mr. Corboy referred to Azerbaijan as a one-clan show. How is the EU getting on in Azerbaijan?
Mr. Corboy
If we compare the European neighbourhood policy action programmes, which have only come into force since November, the most advanced of them is Georgia. Georgia's agreement with the EU is everything but membership. It is not the case with Azerbaijan which has not developed itself to the same degree. It has not met the same democratic norms and does not have the European aspirations that Georgia has. Azerbaijan is a special case because of its richness in oil and gas. When we refer to the Caucuses we are not talking about those three countries, we are talking about the region. Turkey is the key to the region. Russia and Iran are part of this region and the energy resources flow through the region. Another important part of the ENP for the region is the Black Sea. There is new focus and co-operation on the Black Sea.
I thank Mr. Corboy for a very enlightening contribution. In dealing with what he termed a humiliated world power, Russia, will he not agree on the need for great sensitivity in dealing with countries like Georgia and other countries in the Caucuses? In implementing the ENP do we not need to be very conscious of the sensitivities of Russia? I suppose that is obvious. Would some countries' aspirations to bring Georgia into NATO not act as a red rag to a bull for Russia? Does Mr. Corboy regard it as a misguided aspiration for some of our European Union colleagues to pursue that line, with a wounded world power trying to assert itself? It certainly has the energy, in every way, to reassert itself. What would be the Russian reaction to Georgia entering NATO?
What is the level of corruption in Georgia and are the pipelines being used in a corrupt way? I ask Mr. Corboy to comment on the need to bring some control over the storage of obsolete nuclear weapons and the concern of them falling into the hands of rogue states or terrorists. How can we help in conjunction with Russia in bringing those nuclear weapons under control? On the influence of Islam, Russia has obviously great sensitivities over its vulnerability to the south. How does that issue come into play?
Does Mr. Corboy believe it was unhelpful for Germany to enter a bilateral agreement with Russia when the European Union as a unit was beginning to negotiate with Russia on the matter? On the nuclear issue again, when considering future energy policy, three European countries, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have embarked on a joint venture on future nuclear plants and the dismantling of obsolete plants. How does that fit into European energy policy vis-à-vis Russia?
Mr. Corboy
On NATO, I would have agreed with the Deputy up to three or four months ago. The French and Germans were very hesitant about giving encouragement to the Georgian aspiration to join NATO for the reasons he mentioned. Since this dispute began Georgia has succeeded in uniting its people behind the idea that rightly or wrongly it needs the protection of being in NATO. Even the French, who were the most reluctant at the Riga summit, rode back and agreed to Georgia becoming an applicant member, without indicating how long it would take. It formed part of the reassuring of Georgia because of the extraordinary nature of the treatment being meted out to Georgians. There was a sense that while it might upset Russia we would accept Georgia's aspiration to be more a part of the western Europe scene.
Many in the European Union would say that we heard all this before when the Baltic countries decided to join NATO. Some people warned of dire consequences. However, it changed once it was established as a fait accompli. We need to remember that NATO is trying to have a dialogue with Russia, and it does its best, just as the EU is trying to restore what we call the strategic relationship to have a new partnership co-operation agreement, which at the moment is being blocked by Poland. It is a point about sensitivity which everybody must take on board. We cannot afford to have a major rupture with Russia on Georgia or the Caucuses, nor can the United States afford to do so.
We saw what happened at the United Nations before Christmas, when resolutions relating to the separated territories in Georgia were considered. One of the resolutions aimed to refuse the request made by Georgia to internationalise the peacekeeping forces in the separatist areas, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in which Russia has interests. When push came to shove, even the United States had to back off. No agreement was reached on anything that would damage or undermine the sovereign territorial integrity of Georgia. It was decided that agreement had to be reached on North Korea, Iran and Iraq before the Caucasus could be considered. The needs of Caucasus region had to be set aside. The same can be said about the EU's approach to this matter. Its relations with Russia are so important — the point that was made about sensitivity is so valid — that we need to handle these matters carefully.
The recent World Bank report on corruption outlines comprehensively the steps which have been taken by Georgia to tackle the problem of corruption. Since the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia is considered by the World Bank to have done more than virtually any other emerging economy to deal with corruption. As someone who travels to Georgia quite often, I can bear that out. Regardless of what else we might say about Mr. Saakashvili — he can be somewhat emotional at times and flamboyant in his language, especially when he speaks about Georgia's neighbour to the north — he has succeeded in fighting corruption in the police, where it was very bad, and in the business community. Bribery is no longer tolerated when people are trying to get licences. Most licences have been abolished. Emergency telephone lines are available to be used by people who are asked for bribes by policemen or anybody else. Severe action is taken in such circumstances.
Mr. Saakashvili has dismissed 35,000 policemen, which is not an easy thing to do in a small country. He has dismissed the entire customs service. Some young guys are now managing the customs service. It seems to be working, even if it was very drastic. I had dinner with Mary Robinson and Mr. Saakashvili when she visited Georgia recently. Mr. Saakashvili said it was hard to fire 35,000 policemen because it involved letting such people, who knew nothing else, loose on the streets. Most of them have become taxi drivers, fortunately. Many of the 35,000 former policemen were synonymous with criminals. It was a very big risk for Mr. Saakashvili to take. The World Bank has given Georgia due recognition for that. If one asks BP about the way the pipelines work in Georgia, one will get the same response. One will be told that matters have changed dramatically on the corruption front.
Deputy Allen raised the nuclear question, which is very interesting. The recent discovery of highly processed nuclear material passing through Georgia represented a wake-up call for the relevant authorities. Everyone knows that a great deal of such material is still hanging around the countries of the former Soviet Union. A major United States programme is trying to manage the old nuclear plants that have Russian stockpiles of nuclear material. The US and the EU will probably revisit this issue on foot of the recent disclosures and the successful prosecution of those involved.
On Islam, the main worry in the Caucasus is the north Caucasus. The Chechen independence dispute, which continued throughout the years of the Russian Empire and subsequently during the years of the Soviet Union, was always about seeking some degree of national autonomy. It was Islamised in more recent years, however. Fundamentalist Islamic thinking now has a strong influence in the north Caucasus, not only in Chechnya but also in Dagestan, Ingushetia and some other areas. This is a great cause of concern in the south Caucasus which, with the exception of Azerbaijan, are very Christian countries. Georgia and Armenia are Orthodox countries. There is a great deal of worry about the conflict in the north Caucasus, particularly the Chechen problem, about which we do not read very much in our newspapers. People always tell me they are not told every night about the major conflict in Chechnya because it is not shown on CNN.
The Deputy asked me about the role of Germany in the energy affairs of the Caucasus region. I agree it is most regrettable that European countries have been picked off one by one in this regard. However, such countries had very little choice, in many cases, other than to reach bilateral arrangements, particularly in respect of gas. Companies in France, Austria, Italy and Germany have entered into agreements with Gazprom. Under the agreements, Gazprom will have certain downstream distribution and sale rights in the countries in question, which is what it wanted. The position of the EU has been that member states should not really adopt such an approach until there is some reciprocity on the Russian side. In particular, the EU believes that Russia should sign up to the energy charter. I have forgotten the Deputy's last question.
It related to Estonia and Lithuania.
Mr. Corboy
The three Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — are the strongest supporters of future relations between the Caucasus and the EU. They will face the problem of the nuclear question, which will have to be faced by every other country. They have inherited some of the former Soviet Union nuclear installations, which are a cause of concern. We will hear much more in the coming months about the need for the EU to tackle the big nuclear issue, which is politically very difficult.
I welcome Mr. Corboy, whom I met in his former role as the head of the European Commission's office in Dublin. I remember meeting him in the old Hibernian Hotel, which has ceased to trade.
Mr. Corboy
That was a very long time ago.
It was quite a while ago. He has a wealth of experience, having filled a number of key roles within the EU. He is now working in a research and development role. We do not have time to get into all of the many topics that Mr. Corboy touched on in his address to the joint committee. He spoke about Iran, Turkey and the north African states, which are terribly important in this context. Perhaps we can follow up on such matters on some other occasion. As an Irish committee dealing with European affairs, it is important for members to bear the interests of this country in mind.
In so far as the Caucasus are concerned, it is right that we should concentrate on the question of energy. Is Mr. Corboy confident that a Europe-led energy policy will satisfactorily guarantee Ireland's needs into the future? It does not look great that the former German Chancellor, Mr. Schröder, became a consultant to a Russian company, Gazprom, at the same time as Germany did a deal with that company. Regardless of the reality, the optics are terrible. I refer to representatives of the Government of Germany, which currently holds the Presidency of the EU. I am not saying anything other than that the optics are terrible. We have to look after ourselves, quite frankly.
I do not blame Russia for maximising the amount of money it can get for its resources. Every other country does the same. There are significant problems in Russia. Its nuclear facilities must be decommissioned, its population is declining and some of its regions are very poor. I do not think we should underestimate the amount of money Russia needs if it is to pursue such projects, but we have our own interests. We must consider Ireland's interests over the next 20 to 30 years. If we cannot have confidence in a European energy policy, perhaps we need to go down the road of bilateral agreements. We need to be more proactive about talking to other countries that have energy supplies. The United States is very quick to condemn Iran and come down heavy on it but it has no problem signing a new nuclear deal with India which is not even a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It is regrettable that the world is declining into a laissez-faire system of bilateral arrangements but we must look after own interests. If the major institutions are not going to look after us, we will have to look after ourselves. My central question is whether Mr. Corboy has confidence that the European Union is either determined or capable of providing energy security for Ireland in the next 20 to 30 years?
Mr. Corboy
If one considers the statements made by the EU Energy Commissioner recently, certainly the Commission views it as a high priority to get a common energy policy. No matter what angle one considers, together the European Union can negotiate from a position of strength. It is regrettable that we have been allowed to do it piecemeal. I also agree that if the European Union fails to have an effective common energy policy towards the outside world, it will be most unsatisfactory for a small country such as Ireland because we will not be very strong on our own. It depends on so many issues. The ideal solution would be to begin during the German Presidency to lay the foundations of a common energy policy. It has to be credible. Currently that is not the case. Deputy Mulcahy's point is well made. In the coming months and year we have to try to do everything possible to get a common negotiating position in order that we can be strong. I agree that if we fail, we will be in a very unpleasant position.
Mr. Corboy may be playing devil's advocate but this also applies to beef. The Taoiseach made the same point about our relationship with Russia. He ruled out any bilateral agreement with it in that regard. It is not just a question of energy; a number of issues are at stake.
I thank Mr. Corboy. It was fascinating to hear him speak on such a range of subjects. I especially enjoyed the tour of the Caucasus and what was said about Georgia, in particular.
I return to the European neighbourhood policy. I am not sure I understand its objectives. In business we know that what is measured gets attention. How do we measure whether the European neighbourhood policy is reaching its objectives? Have we set out aims which we hope to achieve in the next five to ten years? Where does it stop? What is a neighbour? Are north African countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, etc., considered neighbours? If they are, what is our objective in regard to them?
Is what happened last year in the Caucasus region, right up to Ukraine, an indication of what is likely to happen elsewhere? Is this an East versus West issue? How significant is it if Turkey joins the European Union? Do we have to wait until it joins before anything else happens with other neighbours? Is it possible for other countries to join ahead of Turkey, even though they have not started negotiations yet?
Mr. Corboy
The new European neighbourhood policy, ENP, is significant in the first respect in that each country is differentiated. It is not like the old partnership co-operation agreements or the programmes we used to have for the former Soviet Union. Each country now has a tailor-made relationship with the European Union. All the relationships are different. In the case of Georgia, the difference is that it is recognised by us all as a European country and is a member of the Council of Europe. It is European no matter what tests one uses. Its people are Christian; they have a Shakespeare theatre and more symphony orchestras than we have in Dublin. They feel European and once one has lived there one senses how European they are. This is not true of countries in north Africa but all of them are now part of the European neighbourhood policy. However, there are different relationships and they will move at different speeds.
How this will play out is a big political question in the sense of what relationship will be involved, particularly if we cannot get our institutions to work better now there are 27 member countries. The question of other countries joining the European Union means we have to consider the matter differently. Success is measured in terms of the achievement of the overall objectives of the ENP which are to widen the area of peace, provide economic stability and economic success. This is in all our interests. Security, peace and stability and economic development also help us.
An enormous number of Irish interests are already represented in Georgia. This began during my years there but the number has expanded considerably since. Irish people are popular there, as we are very similar in many respects to Georgians. I will not go into that aspect in great detail, as it is sufficient to say we have many similar traits, good ones as well as some less positive ones.
The countries in question feel European and they are getting a response in the ENP which will gradually meet this objective. The more they take on board the acquis and the more they accept the four freedoms about which we talk within the European Union, the more they will be tied in to it. That is good for them and for our security.
It is important to remember that if it all goes wrong, one will have a tinderbox in the Caucasus. I do not believe the Russian policy of trying to regain control over these independent countries is considered feasible in Moscow by serious people, but if it does destabilise them and they begin to unravel, the situation will be very unstable on the border. We could have a return to the Balkan conflict with Bosnia written in large letters. It would be back on our doorstep to try to resolve it and lead to problems in energy supplies security, right across the board. It would also worsen our relationship with Russia, with which we must keep a good relationship in so far as we can and try to open a dialogue. It is most important that we keep working on Russian relations, no matter what problems we see there in terms of the new approach to less vigorous support for what were the Council of Europe commitments in the fields of democracy, governance, human rights, etc.
Success will be achieved if one considers the eight priority points for the next five years in the Georgian ENP, for example. They are most specific to what it is hoped will be achieved. They include the rule of law; the business investment climate; economic development; justice, in respect of which a good programme is in place; human security and border management, which becomes more important, and how far the European Union will become involved for the first time in the resolution of internal conflicts. This has not been part of its mandate up to now. We will also consider the extent to which it will comply with the requests we will make in foreign and security policy. Georgia has stated it will support EU initiatives at the United Nations. In addition, there are overall transport and energy issues to be considered. We will have to judge the success of the European neighbourhood policy in so far as each of these objectives, as set out in the action programme published last November, is met.
Senator Quinn's last question was on Turkey. This issue is very difficult because of the problems associated with ensuring that Turkey will become a member of the European Union. Many will agree that it is strategically important to the European Union and its relations with the Middle East that Turkey become a member. Turkey is a big country and will be very strong. If the membership negotiations can be brought to a successful conclusion, it will be a very good day for the Union, the Middle East and the region around the Black Sea, which is now an EU sea. The Black Sea is like the Mediterranean, and Romania and Bulgaria, which border it, are members of the Union. Turkey is very important in this equation.
Let us assume that Turkey's application for membership works out and that it joins in 15 years. Some of the chapters in this regard are closed. If there is a serious roadblock with regard to Turkey, what effect will it have on the action plan in respect of the countries about which we are talking? How much of a key player is Turkey in dealings with these countries?
Mr. Corboy
It is very much a key in respect of Georgia and Azerbaijan. It is their biggest trading partner and it is replacing Russia, certainly in respect of Georgia. If one excludes energy, one will find it has replaced it already as the principal trading partner. Turkey holds the key to the whole region. If its membership application becomes blocked, it could look in other directions. It would change and complicate the implementation of the European neighbourhood policies in the region.
I am afraid we have run out of time. I thank Mr. Corboy, whose attendance we appreciate. Our meeting was very worthwhile and extremely informative.
Sitting suspended at 3.03 p.m. and resumed at 3.05 p.m.