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JOINT COMMITTEE ON FINANCE AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 22 Sep 2010

Anglo Irish Bank and Rating Agencies: Discussion with the Minister for Finance

With the agreement of the committee we will defer the consideration of matters to be taken in private session to the end of the meeting. Is that agreed? Agreed.

The items we are about to discuss are Anglo Irish Bank and the credit rating agencies. I welcome the Minister for Finance, Deputy Brian Lenihan, and his officials. We shall have short opening remarks from the Minister which will be followed by a question and answer session. We must finish with the Minister by 4 p.m. at the latest. I request that all mobile phone be switched off.

I draw attention to the fact that members of the committee have absolute privilege but this same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee. The committee cannot guarantee any level of privilege to witnesses appearing before it. Further, under the salient rulings of the Chair, members should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House or an official by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. I invite the Minister to make his contribution.

I thank the Chair and the committee for the opportunity to meet them to discuss Anglo Irish Bank and the rating agencies. As the committee will be aware, following my statement on the future of Anglo Irish Bank earlier this month, the Government's strategy for the restructuring and resolution of the bank has been confirmed and the implementation of the strategy is now under way.

After the submission of the bank's restructuring plan to the European Commission at the end of May, intensive work was undertaken by the National Treasury Management Agency, the Central Bank, the Financial Regulator, my financial advisers, N. M. Rothschild, and my Department during the summer months on an examination of the bank's plan and the optimal design of a bank split. The national authorities' ongoing analysis was strongly informed and guided by the parallel assessment of the European Commission of the plan submitted by the bank. It is important to make the point that as the summer progressed, the financial market environment deteriorated significantly, especially in regard to market and investor perceptions of the peripheral eurozone members, including Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland. That was notwithstanding the positive outcome of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, CEBS, stress tests on the two main Irish banks and the fact that our budgetary targets remained on course.

A further factor was higher discounts on the Anglo Irish Bank loans transferred to the National Asset Management Agency. These were higher than anticipated in the bank's plan. The higher discounts on the transfers led to a need for a fresh estimate of the capital needs of the bank and an application was made to the European Commission to allow further aid to be given, which was approved in August. The market reaction to this development and, in particular, the sharp spike in Ireland's bond deals highlighted the need for clarity and finality on the future and final cost of solving the problems at the bank.

At the end of last month the authorities recommended to me an approach to splitting the bank which was endorsed by the Government soon afterwards and which I announced on 8 September. The revised plan announced on 8 September retains the concept of splitting the bank into two entities — an asset recovery bank which will take all loans not transferring to NAMA and a funding bank to fund the asset recovery bank. The asset recovery bank will work out these assets over time. It will have a specific focus on maximising the return to the taxpayer from the recovery of the assets in the work-out period. The funding bank will house the deposits of the bank and hold its NAMA bonds. It will have as its focus the raising of funds to help fund the asset recovery bank. The relevant State agencies are in close collaboration with the bank, finalising a revised restructuring plan which it is intended to submit to the European Commission in early October.

In addition, I have asked the Central Bank to determine the appropriate level of capital needed for both entities. I am confident that the results of this work will be announced by early October. This will provide clarity on the potential cost to the State, even in a very stressed future banking scenario, to reassure the public and the markets that, as the Governor of the Central Bank has made clear on a number of occasions, the cost of restructuring the bank, while huge, is very manageable in a budgetary context through the promissory note structure.

Turning to the credit rating agencies, I want to say a few words about the new European Union-wide regulatory framework being put in place for these bodies. The EU Delarosière report and the Regling-Watson reports here in Ireland highlighted the significant failures by international credit review agencies as a major contributory cause of the financial crisis. EU Finance Ministers have responded to the deficiencies identified in such agencies by adopting a legislative proposal to strengthen the rules on credit rating agencies and their supervision at EU level. This is considered a priority to restore confidence and the proper functioning of the financial sector. Under new EU rules which will become fully applicable in December, a common regulatory regime for the issuance of credit ratings is being established. Under these rules, all credit rating agencies such as Moody's, Fitch and Standard & Poor's which would like their credit ratings to be used in the European Union need to apply for registration. They will also need to be more transparent, as they will need to disclose the methodology and internal models and key rating assumptions they use in making their ratings.

I welcome the important steps being taken at EU level to ensure the weaknesses identified in the conduct of credit rating agencies which have such an important role to play in influencing investments decisions are addressed. I understand a number of further proposals to strengthen the regulatory framework for such agencies in the European Union are under consideration by the Commission and I look forward to its further proposals in due course. The very significant measures taken by the Government since 2008 to address the significant imbalances that have emerged in the fiscal position have been influential in maintaining international and investor confidence in Ireland's capacity to continue to meet its obligations. Clearly we are engaged in a challenging budgetary adjustment programme which has to be implemented over several years.

Securing fiscal sustainability remains the Government's key objective to underpin the realisation of the economy's growth potential. I have made it clear that the Government will continue to take the steps required to ensure that Ireland maintains the confidence of international markets.

In this context, yesterday's Irish Government bond auction by the NTMA, in which the agency raised €1.5 billion in its ninth bond auction of the year, confirms Ireland's continued capacity to meet its funding requirements. Notwithstanding difficult market conditions at present, the total bids received for the two bonds issued amounted to almost €5.5 billion or 3.6 times the maximum amount on offer. With this auction Ireland has now achieved its target of raising €20 billion from the bond markets in 2010. In addition, allowing for cash balances, retail debt and the long-term funding carried over from last year, the Exchequer is now fully funded through the first half of 2011.

It is particularly important for the committee to note that the weighted average cost of funds raised in the bond market in 2010, including yesterday's auction, is 4.7%, which is the same as the average funding cost achieved in 2009 overall. This demonstrates that the significant decisions that have been taken in seeking to restore the Government's budget and the Irish banking system to health continue to be regarded as the right ones, notwithstanding the financial turbulence we are continuing to experience. The message is clear: we must hold our nerve; we must stay on the course of the path we have embarked upon. We have the ability and the support of the markets to navigate ourselves out of our current difficulties to restore the economy to a sustainable path for economic growth and job creation.

I thank the Chairman and members of the committee and I welcome any questions or comments committee members may have on these issues.

Chairman: Thank you, Minister. I now call Deputy O’Donnell.

I thank the Minister and his colleagues for coming before the committee and I also thank the Minister for his presentation.

I want to touch on a few areas, the first of which is the issue of the banks, the banking strategy and in particular Anglo Irish Bank. I have no doubt the Minister will be aware that for two successive weeks running the editorial of the Financial Times has criticised Government policy on banking and in particular on how it is dealing with Anglo Irish Bank and bondholders in that bank.

Today's editorial related exclusively to all banks; Anglo Irish Bank was not mentioned in it.

The tenet of the article was very much geared towards dealing with the banking strategy and the key feature of that at present is Anglo Irish Bank. Therefore, what the Minister said comes down to semantics.

The Minister has had advisers involved regarding the banking strategy. Was he advised on how to deal with the bondholders, in particular on putting a resolution regime in place to deal with that matter and how far advanced is he on bringing forward legislation to put such a resolution mechanism in place?

Second, the message coming through from the independent commentary and from the Financial Times, which would be extremely credible and would be recognised worldwide, is that the reason the bond yields went up yesterday, and have been going up, is the open-ended exposure of the Irish taxpayer to private debt within the banking institutions and in particular insolvent banking institutions.

In terms of commentary about Anglo Irish Bank in the international press, it is reasonable to state that there is a major problem with that bank. It is effectively a cancer within the banking system and within the budgetary system. One of the key features affecting the budgetary system is the cost being paid to borrow money on the international markets. We can go back to the average rate but the bond yield is indicative of how the international markets perceive Ireland. The Minister has talked about bringing the general Government deficit back to 3% by 2014. The Government will have to continue to borrow billions over the next two years or whatever length of time it will be in office but the international markets are seeking certainty.

What does the Minister anticipate will be the final cost in respect of Anglo Irish Bank? I suggest the resolution mechanism could be put in place prior to the break-up of Anglo Irish Bank. There is a general view, particularly among the international bondholders, that the unguaranteed bondholders, in particular, should share the cost of the wind-down of Anglo Irish Bank. There are bondholders with a subordinated debt of €2.4 billion which will not be covered by the guarantee on 30 September, with between €4 billion and €5 billion of senior debt. The Government is running a business. It is all very well for one to say we should protect this and that, but the Government is paying at a rate of more than 6% for eight-year bonds and well in excess of that figure for ten year bonds, which is unsustainable. Furthermore, Greece is paying at a rate of 5% through the financial rescue package. Would it not be reasonable to enter into negotiations with the unguaranteed bondholders who will no longer be covered by the guarantee on 30 September? We are seven days from the end of the month and preparations should get under way. Will the Minister enter into discussions with the unguaranteed bondholders once the guarantee expires on 30 September? That is what has to be stated to the markets. In speaking about Anglo Irish Bank in the way he does the Minister is effectively muddying the waters. The markets are getting confused in the sense that Anglo Irish Bank is a reflection of Ireland Inc. and the entire banking system, but that is not the case. The Minister needs to draw a line under Anglo Irish Bank, but he is not doing so. He has said that in dealing with bondholders he cannot do this, but he must.

There are media reports on bankruptcy proceedings in respect of the former chairman of Anglo Irish Bank. When did the Minister first become aware that €15 million held on deposit as security had been moved and does he believe an investigation into the issue is warranted? Will he comment on the fact that it happened during the period after the bank had been nationalised?

Am I correct in stating over half of the figure in the correction of the general deficit, in terms of the Minister's projections, is related to growth as distinct from tax increases and cuts? His most recent forecast was a growth rate of 3.3% in GDP in 2011. The International Monetary Fund is stating the figure will be 2.3%. The ESRI is quoting the same figure. What are the projected growth figures for 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 and what effect will this have on the Minister's budgetary process or, as the Governor of the Central Bank, Professor Honohan, stated, the reprogramming of the budget?

Will the Minister give us his thoughts on the correction of the budget deficit in 2011, involving a sum of €3 billion, and the revised growth figures in light of the IMF and ESRI projected growth rates which clearly mean he will not be able to meet his targets? Will he give a breakdown of the figure based on capital and current expenditure cuts and taxation increases?

I will let the Minister deal with those points.

Chairman: Does the Minister want to take a few more questions, perhaps from Deputy Burton?

I do not mind; I am in the hands of the Chair and the committee.

I asked for this visitation by the Minister to the committee. I wrote to the Chairman. I think I would prefer the Minister to answer Deputy O'Donnell's questions first and then I would like to put mine, if that is in order.

It is up to the committee to regulate its procedure. I am quite happy with whatever the members themselves want.

There is a considerable number of members here. We are finishing at 4 o'clock and I request members to be sharp with their questions to allow all the members to get in.

First, Deputy O'Donnell wanted to know about the final cost of Anglo Irish Bank. I made clear in my statement on 8 September last that I have asked the Central Bank to assess in detail the capital needs of the Government's plan. I understand that the Central Bank and the regulator have been in a detailed engagement with the bank on this matter, assisted by the NTMA. I do not wish to speculate as to what those figures will be since it is a matter for the Central Bank to determine, as it has done for other banks. It will be a figure independently arrived at by the regulator and, as such, should have the confidence of the markets that it is realistic.

On what date does the Minister expect that will be announced?

I made it clear that it will be announced by early October. I have not assigned a precise date to it yet but it will be announced by early October.

What about the other banks?

I will go through Deputy O'Donnell's questions. That was his first.

His second related to the question of the guarantee. As he pointed out, on 30 September the existing guarantee expires for existing bondholders. Undated subordinated debt was never guaranteed but dated subordinated debt becomes unguaranteed on 30 September. There are some senior bondholders in Anglo Irish Bank whose guarantee lapses on 30 September as well. That is the factual position. My advisers are looking at these and at all of the different interests involved in Anglo Irish Bank and advising me on them. Deputy O'Donnell will appreciate that, as these particular instruments are guaranteed, I am not in a position today to announce what the precise policy will be in relation to them on the expiration of the guarantee but a clear statement will be made in that regard at that stage.

On the Financial Times article, I do not propose that this country should become an experiment for a default strategy. The article today, for example, does not refer to any particular bank. I have asked my investment advisers to have a look at the article. The premise in the article is that the introduction of a special resolution regime similar to that of the United Kingdom would provide a mechanism to secure burden sharing with special bondholders. That premise is wrong. Under the United Kingdom special resolution regime, which is regarded as an example of best international practice, this option has never been pursued to date. This option was not pursued through the nationalisations and subsequent restructurings of Northern Rock or Bradford & Bingley.

In Ireland, the guarantees of large amounts of senior debt makes burden sharing difficult. There are many legal complications here, but the assumption in this article is that one can improve one's sovereign credit rating by somehow dissociating the sovereign from the position of senior lenders to the banking system. In fact, the article went beyond referring to bondholders and referred to liabilities generally, which would include depositors, and it stated that the Government was unwise to have wide-ranging guarantees for bank liabilities for the entire Irish banking system. The reality is that we must sustain funding in the Irish banking system and that is an absolute essential. The advice in the Financial Times has not been taken in the jurisdiction where this newspaper is based.

The suggestion seems to be that Ireland should stage a default to see how it works out, and I am not prepared to act on such a suggestion. I have made it clear throughout this crisis that a default on senior debt is unthinkable, and that remains my position. It is the position on which I have been advised by all of the parties which advise me: the Central Bank, the National Treasury Management Agency and the investment advisers retained by the Government. There is a fundamental distinction between senior and subordinated debt because subordinated debt is subordinated on the insolvency of an institution. That is the clear legal understanding. I will be making clear the position on unguaranteed liabilities in Anglo Irish Bank when I make the general announcement on the costs and losses associated with it.

I call Deputy Burton.

My questions have not been answered.

I am sorry, but there were some economic questions.

I would have thought I would be entitled to ask one or two follow-up questions.

No, the Deputy may come back in later. Other members wish to ask questions.

I merely want to seek clarification, which is what the markets are looking for. I asked the Minister about the budget and the rate of growth.

That is not something that is before the committee this afternoon, but I am happy to deal with it, with the leave of the Chair. I understood I was here to discuss Anglo Irish Bank and the rating agencies, not the budget.

They are interlinked.

We will stick to the agenda. I call Deputy Burton.

Thank you, Chairman.

With due respect, Chairman, the interest rates being charged on international markets are having a direct effect on our budgetary strategy which is linked with Anglo Irish Bank; there is a direct relationship. My question is reasonable. The international markets are able to distinguish between debt within Anglo Irish Bank and sovereign debt. I ask that the Minister provide clarification on his general view of non-guaranteed bondholders. What is his view of what their position will be when the guarantee comes to an end on 30 September?

I have already answered that question. I have indicated when I will make a statement on the matter which is very sensitive. Happily, yesterday we had a successful auction which was preceded by a statement by Deputy O'Donnell on Friday that senior debt was now on the table, as far as both Opposition parties were concerned. That was less than helpful. If the Deputy wishes to discuss these issues, it is important to ensure clarity in the terminology used. If he wishes to discuss——

The Minister was less than helpful in muddying the waters on the international markets.

The Deputy's time is up. I call Deputy Burton.

I am entitled to a right of reply. All of the members of the Fianna Fáil Parliamentary Party are here today and I welcome them. However, I am entitled to reply.

This is a very sensitive issue for the country. The Deputy chose to issue a statement last Friday, on the eve of a State bond auction, suggesting bonds which he did not characterise as subordinate should be defaulted upon. There was no differentiation in his statement between subordinate instruments and senior debt. He simply said bond default should be examined as an option by the State.

No, I did not. That is not correct. The Minister is misrepresenting what I said.

Unfortunately, I received a report from an analyst who indicated that to me. I would never have made this charge against an Opposition figure before now because I never had any empirical evidence. However, I received a report from an analyst that such statements were not assisting us on world markets. There have been no such statements from the Labour Party.

The Minister is misrepresenting what I said and I should be entitled to clarify the position. I was speaking specifically about Anglo Irish Bank, to which he did not refer when addressing the public. Anglo Irish Bank is confusing the issue on international markets.

Anyone who suggests that it is somehow an attractive option for Ireland to have in the European Central Bank and-or the International Monetary Fund does not know what the IMF does when it arrives in a country: there is the sacking of public servants, as well as massive reductions in pay, salaries and pensions across the board. I lived in Tanzania in the 1980s when the men from the IMF — they are generally men — arrived. They stopped the provision of universal primary education services and introduced fees. That meant that girls dropped out of school because families with four or five children decided to pay fees for the boys, not the girls. Second, there was a rudimentary form of village health and all of that was wiped out. While some people might think that a visit from the IMF would be attractive for a period of five or seven years, I want to make the position of the Labour Party clear. We do not wish to see Irish national sovereignty traded to the ECB or the IMF. We believe the consequences for Ireland would be exceptionally severe and damaging.

The Minister's strategy has been little short of disastrous. I requested this meeting on 25 August at a time when Anglo Irish Bank had transferred more troubled loans to NAMA and the discount on the transfers was just under 62%. In international publicity terms that was a disaster. However, it was followed several days later by the mid-year results when the bank clocked up world record breaking losses and the Minister announced a further €8 billion in support for the bank, which I am sure he will recall. Strategically, his decision and that of the Taoiseach last Easter to drip feed bad information on the inevitable consequences of the disaster that is Anglo Irish Bank and the Irish Nationwide Building Society slowly but surely to people in Ireland and also to the bond markets has been a mistake of historic proportions.

The last paragraph of the Minister's statement has a Lenihan-esque rhetoric to it in stating that the message is clear provided we stay the course. Is the Minister serious that the country should continue to ship the kind of damage that every man, woman and child in this country is shipping regarding Anglo Irish Bank? The Government's strategy is appalling. We have a common end to ensure that the country does not fall into the clutches of the IMF and that we retain our sovereignty for which so many people fought so hard. However, the Government's strategy since Easter and since the night of the blanket guarantee is leading the country perilously close to the rocks.

The Financial Times has always shown a fondness for the Minister since its leading front-page article on St. Patrick’s Day 2009, which was also covered in many international newspapers around the world, including the International Herald Tribune. It contained the Minister’s description to journalists — presumably at some lunch with them — of crony capitalism in Ireland, which he condemned. He got great brownie points for being quoted saying that in the Financial Times at the time. Let me comment on what the latest Financial Times article states: “Mr. Cowen should change a perverse policy that pushes up interest rates and crimps growth.” That is a statement, with which every man, woman and child would agree.

Which statement?

The Minister condemned the Financial Times——

——leading article of today. I will just quote one sentence: "Mr. Cowen should change a perverse policy that pushes up interest rates and crimps growth." What is the perverse policy to which it refers? It refers to a strategic disaster in which the Government has rolled out piecemeal one disastrous fact after another every two or three weeks or months about Anglo Irish Bank and the Irish Nationwide Building Society so that now we have the bank with the largest losses, the largest default, the largest call on the State and the largest transfers at disastrous levels to NAMA. The international community has great admiration for the forbearance of Irish taxpayers, public servants and social welfare recipients, who have taken enormous cuts. By the way, the leading article recognises that in its content, if the Minister has had a chance to read it.

I am sorry, but I did not condemn the article.

The Financial Times praises Ireland.

I took exception to a particular presumption in the article.

No policy is recommended in the article.

A policy is recommended in the article.

What is the policy?

The policy that is recommended in the article is a resolution regime.

I addressed that in my response.

Will the Minister let me speak? Senior Irish economists have spoken in detail about the possibility of a resolution regime, which would represent a signal that this country is prepared to deal with Anglo Irish Bank, which may be described as an absolute mess, pit or swamp. The problem is that the people in that bank are surviving the pit or swamp, unlike the rest of us. Ordinary businesses in the real economy are going down the tubes for the sake of Anglo Irish Bank. The Minister took comfort from some of the positive things Professor Honohan said in his report. In his report, he described as folly the guarantee that was given on a blanket basis to the senior and subordinate bank bondholders. The Minister and his officials will be familiar with the section of the report in which Professor Honohan suggested that there was no need to guarantee the senior and subordinate bank bondholders at the time of the guarantee, because they were locked in and had already made their investments. He argued that the guarantee would have happened whenever the bondholders rolled over their debt and their debt expired. That is the view of Professor Honohan and of almost every sensible economist on the planet.

What is the Minister's strategy with regard to Anglo Irish Bank? He allowed the board of the bank and its senior executives to trick around for almost nine months with a good bank, bad bank scenario. The Minister and his officials knew by the beginning of July that such a scenario was not acceptable to most considered opinion, including considered opinion in the Department of Finance, who knew the notion that a good bank and a bad bank could be made of Anglo Irish Bank was complete folly and had simply no credibility. We need a strategy if we are to restore our credibility as a country and our credit-worthiness. In such circumstances, our bond rates and interest borrowing rates will decrease. I accept that the officials in the NTMA did a good job of organising yesterday's bond auction. Like me and everybody else around this table, the Minister is aware that the rates which were charged are not sustainable. The Minister has to reconsider his strategy. Commissioner Almunia made it clear to the Minister, as he made it clear to others, that the good bank, bad bank strategy is not a runner. The Commission has considered the view that the losses to be sustained in Anglo Irish Bank are significantly higher, perhaps to the tune of €10 billion. We hope that is not the case.

We cannot continue to drift as we have been drifting since the week before Easter. On the Tuesday before Easter, the Minister made a shock and awe announcement in the Dáil to the effect that €8 billion, along with a further €2 billion, would be needed by Anglo Irish Bank. He has delivered another major piece of bad news every month since then, culminating in disaster during the last two weeks of August, when it was announced that a further €8 billion is to be put into the bank and that the discounts on transfers to NAMA are a frightening 62%. I plead with the Minister to give some hope to the people. Can he level with us about what he believes he will actually do? The proposal to create a funding bank and an asset recovery bank is basically a fig leaf to save the Minister's reputation. It is meaningless.

It has been approved by the Governor of the Central Bank.

Anyone who knows anything about banking knows it is a fig leaf.

We have to stop this, Deputy.

The position of this country is far too serious for this kind of rhetoric.

I wrote to the Minister a month ago. This is the first time the Minister has been asked to answer direct questions on the record, away from press conferences. What is his exit strategy for us? We have two banks, Bank of Ireland and AIB, which everyone wants to see saved, but one cannot do so. They cannot borrow money now, except at these exorbitant rates because of the damage caused by the Minister's policy on Anglo Irish Bank. When will he exit the Anglo Irish Bank nightmare and give those who are losing their business or have lost their jobs some hope we will get out of this quagmire? While today's Financial Times article is critical, it still has a lot of regard for this country and recognises, in particular, the sacrifices people have made. Will the Minister, please, tell us what he proposes to do and cut the shilly-shallying that we will drift for another while without a resolution of the Anglo Irish Bank mess?

The core question throughout Deputy Burton's contribution and the article in the Financial Times is that of resolution. The strategic plan announced by the Government for Anglo Irish Bank is precisely that — a resolution regime.

How? A resolution regime involves debt for equity swaps.

The Minister did not interrupt the Deputy.

It splits the bank into two elements, an asset bank which will work out the assets over a period of time and a savings bank which will safeguard deposits. Far from being a fig leaf, it is a precise structure which was recommended to me in late August by the Governor of the Central Bank. If we are to quote his opinion on various matters, let us have some respect for a proposal he has elaborated on. It is one I was happy to endorse and accept, discuss with the European authorities, recommend to my Government colleagues and have approved by the Government. It is a resolution regime because when one splits a bank in two——

Hold on a moment.

Excuse me. I will take a question from the Deputy in a moment.

In late August the Minister was still favouring the good bank and bad bank option in public.

The Minister is saying that in private he had junked it.

Let us have order.

Let us deal with the good bank.

This is chaos.

Let us be clear about this. Deputy Burton brought Commissioner Almunia into the discussion. The Commission always insisted that we look at the good bank-bad bank option elaborated on by management.

The Minister knew that.

We looked at and worked through it. We gave it a hearing.

Why did the Minister leave it there, damaging us for months on end?

Let us be clear about another element of this equation. Anglo Irish Bank has not been lending outside its existing book since it was nationalised. Carving it into a good bank and a bad bank was not an issue that had arisen since nationalisation. In effect, the bank has been——

The Minister let the board and the chairman, personally appointed by him, run with it for nine months.

If the Deputy wishes, I will be happy for her to come in later with supplementary questions.

I will take the Deputy's questions, but I am entitled to finish my answers. The position is——

This is outrageous.

Excuse me, Deputy. The position is that the board elaborated on a proposal to divide the bank into a good bank and a bad bank for the purposes of seeking to establish whether an additional return could be made for the taxpayer from the assets of the bank. That was the motivation of the board in good faith, but it was something that had to be assessed by my Department and the Commission. The proposal was assessed. The final board proposal was completed in late May to early June. Work continued in my Department throughout the summer and a conclusion was reached on these matters in late August to early September. What we now have to do is cost that proposal in great detail in terms of losses. The regulator will address the required level of capital adequacy.

The key point to understand in terms of the Financial Times article is that one must have a strategy. Deputy Burton did not advance one. She did not suggest a resolution regime. The article talks in general terms about such a regime, as did the Deputy. If she has precise details of a resolution regime that she would like to see implemented, of course, I will examine it. I am working on one. I have made it clear that what was announced was a resolution regime to split the bank in two. It will allow the bank to be downsized over a period of time.

Where are the bondholders going in the Minister's new regime?

Let us talk about the Anglo Irish Bank balance sheet.

Deputy Burton should please allow the Minister to conclude. She may ask supplementary questions later.

Let me outline the Anglo Irish Bank balance sheet to the Deputy. The most significant item on it is deposits, not bonds. The figure for deposits from other banks in the annual consolidated statement as of June 2010 was €33 billion. The figure for customer accounts was €23 billion. On 30 June the figure for derivative financial instruments was €4.391 billion. Debt securities in issue totalled €16 billion. These pertain to the bondholders but not exclusively. A proportion of the figure pertains to short-term commercial paper. The rest is divided between subordinated debt and senior bondholders.

Is the figure approximately €8 billion?

The bonds are divided between subordinated bonds——

Let us remember that €7 billion worth of the deposits or bonds matures this month. It is worth noting this. A block of senior and guaranteed bonds is left.

How much are they being traded at? The Minister's officials would be able to tell us.

I am aware that the senior bonds are close to par.

What is the subordinated debt being traded at?

The values fluctuate widely.

It is right down at the bottom.

They stage rallies and revive. There is a great deal of speculation. I agree with the Deputy that they are certainly very low, but that is the position on the values of these bonds. The question of their treatment arises in the course of the establishment of the resolution procedure, whereby we are dividing the bank into the asset resolution company and the savings bank. The subordinated bonds will be in the asset company in the resolution process.

When the Minister went on his various tours to meet investors, did he meet the bondholders? Did he, on behalf of the Government, give them explicit commitments?

I cannot understand the strategy. I have not understood it for a long time.

To which bondholders is the Deputy referring? Is she referring to senior bondholders or subordinated bondholders?

I am talking about both. We do not even know, for instance, if some of the people involved in Anglo Irish Bank are in the subordinated debt category, which involves the risky stuff.

I cannot speak for the NTMA on this issue because I do not have the full factual information. It may have been questioned at particular roadshows.

The Minister took part in well publicised roadshows. Did he give separate undertakings above and beyond those given by Mr. Whelan?

No. There is no question of any such undertakings having been given by me. The position on the roadshows is that they take place all the time. The NTMA conducts them on a constant basis. I do not have knowledge of what assurances were given.

Mr. Oliver Whelan

We did not give any assurances to subordinated bondholders in Anglo Irish Bank at any roadshow.

When we are talking about bondholders, we must distinguish between senior debt, which is the same as the debt in respect of which the NTMA must borrow and ranks equally with other creditors, with ordinary depositors, in the insolvency law of Ireland, and junior or subordinated debt, which clearly ranks behind other debt in the event of an insolvency. I appealed to Deputy O'Donnell in this regard previously.

I am aware of that.

I know the Deputy is so aware, but it does not come out in his policy statements.

Members should——

The Deputy has asked me about this and——

There were four Fianna Fáil——

The Deputy cannot intervene twice.

They were down in Galway with him. They heard it all in Galway. This is our first sight of the Minister.

We were waiting for him to come in.

They were all away.

I am sure Deputy Burton will allow the other members of the committee to speak.

I have another brief question for the Minister.

I call Deputy McGrath.

Thank you, Chairman.

This is a brief question. Does the Minister now believe that, in the context of what has happened to our ratings, it was a mistake on his part to put NAMA into the NTMA and damage the latter's credibility?

The NTMA's credibility has not been damaged by NAMA. It has been enhanced by NAMA because the NTMA has done a tremendous job.

On what planet is the Minister living?

Before the Deputy attacks public servants as part of her diatribe, she should make it——

I did not attack them. I asked the Minister a question. I have the greatest of respect for Mr. Whelan and the senior bond seller for the NTMA.

NAMA is made up of senior public servants who have done a tremendous job.

I have the greatest of respect for them. The Minister has no respect for Dr. Somers.

It has gone into the banks——

I call Deputy McGrath.

The Minister had very little respect for Dr. Somers when he offered the view that he did not actually believe NAMA should be in the NTMA——

I will suspend the meeting if this continues. I call on Deputy Michael McGrath.

——and he has been proved correct.

Dr. Somers was present at all meetings relating to the formulation of policy in this matter and subscribed to it.

Is that Government policy or Fianna Fáil policy?

Is the Minister referring to Government policy?

I welcome the Minister and his officials to today's committee meeting.

I am surprised Deputies O'Donnell and Burton will not allow other members to make their contributions.

I thank the Chairman. I welcome the Minister's announcement today that there will be a statement on the issue of guaranteed liabilities once the blanket guarantee expires at the end of September. It would be irresponsible to speculate about the future of debt which is under guarantee until the end of September.

As the Minister outlined through the analysis of Anglo Irish's balance sheet, my understanding is that there is subordinated debt of €2 billion. There is a senior debt of approximately €4 billion which was taken out before the guarantee in September 2008, which may be the subject of the statement along with the €2 billion in subordinated debt. Since the guarantee in September 2008, approximately €10 billion was raised by various debt instruments.

There is no question of any suggestion of a default or otherwise. I welcome the fact a statement will be made once the blanket guarantee expires. It would be irresponsible to speculate on the issue of debt currently covered by the guarantee.

There was some speculation earlier this year that if the promissory note were to be accounted for in full, the general Government deficit in 2010 could be pushed towards 24% of GDP. On 1 January 2011, we would then revert back to a normal fiscal deficit which we would be hoping to reduce to 10%. Is that the view of EUROSTAT and the Commission? Is it the Minister's view that this is the best approach?

This week Professor Honohan referred to the possibility of reprogramming the budgetary strategy over the next several years to ensure we come within the eurozone's 3% deficit limit by 2014. David Begg of ICTU yesterday countered this by saying a €3 billion cut next year is too great and recommended the correction of the budget deficit be phased in over a longer period. What is the Minister's view on these recommendations? Will he outline the Government's commitment to sticking with the overall plan of dealing with the Commission?

I agree it is irresponsible to speculate in advance of the expiration of the guarantee and the other matters to which the Deputy referred.

The Minister gave him a good briefing with the figures. Did he give him the lines too?

The mouse will play when the cat is away. Will Deputy Burton please desist from interrupting other members?

These were figures from published documents.

Deputy Michael McGrath has a remarkably good insight into the Minister's mind. I mean that as a compliment too.

The figures I quoted were from a public document.

Deputy Michael McGrath has asked difficult questions.

I have no doubt the rest of his party colleagues will ask the same questions.

For which the Minister is fully prepared.

Deputies Burton and O'Donnell have not asked any difficult questions themselves. The matter of the different categories of debt involved in Anglo Irish bank and the relevant debts were raised by all members. The current total of subordinated debt is €2,448,385,423. I will arrange for the full figures to be forwarded to members.

Is that of this week?

That is of today. Dated subordinated debt was guaranteed.

In relation to Anglo Irish Bank, none of its subordinated debt matured during the guaranteed period. There was no payment of a principal sum on foot of the subordinated debt during the guarantee period. That is important because Deputy Burton, in particular, constantly refers to the losses the guarantee caused. It did not cause any loss in this context because the payment of a principal sum did not arise in Anglo Irish Bank in that context. The Governor of the Central Bank has been very clear and he said it again in an address the other day that the Government had little alternative to announcing an extensive guarantee of bank liabilities. If we cannot get beyond that stage, where so many other European governments had to take the same——

He did not say blanket. He said extensive.

Yes, extensive.

He absolutely avoided the Minister's blanket guarantee, and that is in his report.

I am glad the Deputy has raised that question. I am making the point that in that gap between extensive and blanket is the subordinated debt in respect of which no principal sums were paid in Anglo Irish Bank during the guarantee period. It is true that interest would have been paid on foot of the dated debt but no principal sums would have been paid on foot of those.

They were rolled over.

There was a liability management exercise and they may have been rolled over into future post guarantee periods.

They were so attractive.

The point I am making, and this is a very important point in this debate since the allegation of loss has been made repeatedly and constantly without my having an opportunity to defend the issue, is that no principal sums of subordinated debt were paid by Anglo Irish Bank during this period. There was a liability management exercise at which a sharp discount was applied to the bonds. In relation to the character of these bonds, I will furnish this information to the Opposition and to all Deputies. They divide between perpetual bonds which have no maturity date and tier one capital securities and non-cumulative preference shares — I am sorry, they are different liabilities. The undated subordinated debt amounts to approximately €700 million — I am not going to give the precise figure — while the dated amounts to €1,742 million. The maturity dates for the dated debt range from 2014 to 2017. In relation to the senior debt, the amount which will be outstanding at the time of the lapsing of the guarantee is €4,241 million.

Does the Minister have the figures under the ELG as to what the total is at this point, that is, the rolled over guarantee? Does the Minister have those figures?

I do not have them to hand, but we can arrange to have them provided to the Deputy.

Are all the questions answered?

Deputy McGrath is correct that the promissory note structure means that there will be a substantial spike in the general Government deficit this year. Again, this is a matter which will be clear at the time of the announcement of the capitalisation requirement for Anglo Irish Bank and for the two new banks over the relevant period. The Deputy's assumption on EUROSTAT is correct but beyond that I cannot go in terms of a figure at this stage.

Will the Minister's €8 billion in August go in too?

It is included in it.

What is the total for Anglo Irish Bank?

Can we take this in stages? The fiscal targets in relation to income and expenditure are on target for this year, but the promissory note structure does impact on the general Government balance. That will mean there will be a very substantial spike in the general Government balance this year.

Will that be roughly €20 billion?

Deputy, please allow the Minister to continue.

I am not going to speculate.

I am trying to add up the figures.

I have made it clear.

The Minister was asked a specific question.

Mr. Whelan will be able to tell us. He is the expert.

Deputy McGrath asked a specific question and he should be allowed to hear the answer.

Is it €20 billion to be added on to the deficit?

I would like to be helpful in this matter.

Will the Deputy allow the Minister to continue? Deputy, there are other members of this committee. There is no point in continuing with this meeting if Deputy Burton and Deputy O'Donnell think it is a personal meeting. Other members are entitled to hear the replies to their questions.

This size of this spike will turn on the final assessment that the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator make about the capital needs of the split up Anglo Irish Bank in the future.

Is the Minister saying there will be much more?

I am not saying that. Can I finish on this?

That is what he is saying.

I said there will be a substantial spike in the general Government balance and the percentage GDP of the general Government balance that is borrowed this year due to the impact of the promissory note. While the promissory note has that impact as an Exchequer instrument, the actual funding pattern has to be distinguished from the promissory note structure. In other words, the promissory note structure has an immediate impact on the general Government balance and will cause a substantial spike in our debt to GDP ratio this year that will disappear next year. However, side by side with that, the actual Exchequer funding of the liabilities on foot of the promissory notes are extended over a period of time. That distinction is absolutely crucial to our credibility in the markets in funding our position in the years ahead.

Does the Minister have an estimate of the cash flow for his budget next year of the promissory note?

I have asked you not to interrupt.

It is a perfectly reasonable question. Is it €2 billion or €3 billion?

Other people want to ask questions.

What is the cash flow requirement?

I will suspend the meeting for five minutes.

Sitting suspended at 3.31 p.m. and resumed at 3.37 p.m.

I understand that Deputy Michael McGrath still awaits a reply from the Minister to a question.

It was about the comments by Professor Honohan on the reprogramming of the budget strategy. In contrast, Mr. David Begg of ICTU gave an alternative perspective that involves dragging out the correction over a longer period. My question relates to the dichotomy between the positions of Professor Honohan and Mr. David Begg.

On the possible reprogramming of Government strategy, the pre-budget outlook in October will set out the position regarding the fiscal and economic outlook. Clearly, a range of data must be collected in its preparation and it would be premature to make a definitive statement at this point. Mr. Beggs's suggestion that we should extend the period under the Stability and Growth Pact to meet the target of 3% is a highly unrealistic strategy because it would mean that we would have very little credibility in respect of our commitment to tackle our fiscal problems and would further erode the confidence that markets and investors would have in investing in or dealing with this country. Consequently, it is not a realistic strategy to suggest that the figure of €3 billion is too high. Were that figure to be departed from, what would be visible is that the dependence of our public finances on extensive and large-scale borrowing was becoming irremediable. For this reason, I do not consider Mr. Beggs's proposal to be workable. As for the views of the Governor, he is highlighting that there are risks on the downside at present.

I call Senator Quinn, to be followed by Senator Boyle and then Deputy Morgan.

I have two brief questions for the Minister. Why has the attitude of the international bankers and markets changed recently? It seemed to me that when the Minister took tough budget decisions, he received almost universal approval from the markets, bankers, journalists and the European Central Bank. However, international businesses, bankers and investors do not appear to value these decisions in recent times. Is this all due to the banking guarantee decisions? Second, I revert to the decisions taken on 29 September 2008 concerning the bank guarantee. I understand from the Minister that they were based on the advice he received from Merrill Lynch at that time. In hindsight, does he consider that he received the right advice and that he then took the correct decisions?

I do. Professor Honohan has looked back at this in his report and while he had reservations about the blanket character of the guarantee, which I addressed in my earlier answers, he reiterated his view that the Government had little alternative to an extensive guarantee of bank liabilities. That clearly implied that we had to guarantee substantial amounts, all of the deposits and certain bonds. This discussion has taken place for two years as if there were another policy that could have been pursued. No one has outlined the alternative policy that could have been pursued and the alternative policy was to let the banking system collapse in that period.

That is not our view. Formerly, that was not our view.

Deputy Burton has had an extensive audience on this matter over the years. I wish to make the position clear. The banking decisions taken in the past two years have been taken in the context of the Irish banks having great difficulty in accessing funding in world markets. We all agree on that. In the absence of a guarantee, that funding would have dried up. In the event of funding drying up, we would not have a banking system. That is clear and indisputable and I do not understand why we must keep coming back to this argument about the guarantee. We have charged the banks for the guarantee and have received in excess of €1 billion from the banks for it, but the difficulty with the guarantee is that the vulnerability of the banks becomes apparent and the world markets see the banks are tied to the sovereign. The reality is that in a small country like Ireland, it is entirely unrealistic to think one can detach the banking system from the sovereign. That is the other crucial point. It is very difficult to distinguish the two.

Returning to the original question on market sentiment, there is no doubt the main factor, according to the report I have received in regard to the deterioration of market sentiment, surrounds the cost of banking arrangements in Ireland and the fact that, apart from the guarantee which was essentially introduced to secure funding and which was a measure to indicate to the international community that the Government stood behind the banking system and banking stability, the losses incurred by the banks are such that they require significant capital requirements if the banks' liabilities are to be honoured. I refer to the core liabilities of the banks. Let us leave aside the arguments about bonds and what can and cannot be done about them. The bulk of liabilities of Anglo Irish Bank is deposits, not bonds. This is an important issue that the public must understand. At all stages, before and since the guarantee, the bulk of liabilities of Anglo Irish Bank were funded by deposits, not debt finance.

Is the Minister referring to short-term money market deposits?

Deputy Burton should allow the Minister to respond.

This has a different meaning to someone putting money in the bank. Let us be honest.

The funding strategy of that bank was to rely on corporate deposits and short-term deposits.

Money market deposits.

The money market deposits. The point is that they are deposits.

I ask the Minister to remain with Senator Quinn's questions.

That was the funding mechanism of the bank. All of the Icelandic banks engaged in similar deposit-taking activities. That is the core problem the Irish State and Government has had to face in respect of this bank. We have had a major debate about bonds and we can have that debate but the fact remains that substantial deposit finance was used to fund this bank and that continues to be the case. Much of the original deposit finance has now been replaced with European Central Bank collateral.

It is quite helpful that the guarantee will be followed quite quickly with a statement on what will happen to unsecured debt. I want to put questions on three areas of the Anglo Irish Bank situation. Regarding the reassessment of the spiralling cost of Anglo Irish Bank, does the Minister accept that one of the factors in it was how the Department and State agencies were given misleading and incorrect information by the previous management of Anglo Irish Bank? To what extent does he believe those who gave that information should be identified and held legally accountable? This is one of the main issues that accompanied public concern with regard to the fiasco that has been Anglo Irish Bank.

My next question is with regard to the new management of Anglo Irish Bank. Does the Minister accept that assumptions seemed to have been made by the new management before a decision had been made by the Government and before a decision had been made by the European Commission with regard to the proposal on a good bank bad bank, which saw the new management facing two ways at once and causing a good deal of confusion? The people who were responsible for winding down the assets of Anglo Irish Bank were the people who looked forward to resurrecting a new bank out of it, and that sent out a series of mixed messages also.

In so far as he can, what active role does the Minister see for the European Central Bank with regard to Anglo Irish Bank? Obviously, the ECB has been a main lender of resort in Anglo Irish Bank and will have a huge role to play in its ultimate future and final resolution as an operating bank.

The management will have to account for themselves but I have full confidence in the chairman and board and they have always liaised with me about matters with regard to the bank. It is important to note that since the bank was nationalised there has been no expansion in the loan book, so the bank was down-sized since it was nationalised. The theoretical issue was whether the good bank bad bank split, which on occasion was advocated by the Fine Gael party, was worth looking at.

In a different format.

Fair enough, but it was the function of management to evaluate that and to see whether a workable proposal could be built around it. Their view was that it could.

The initial proposal they formulated in that regard was rejected by the Commission before the national authority was even asked to comment on it. Following that, I met the board of Anglo Irish Bank and I stated that if it wished to pursue that option it would have to be in a realistic form, and a revised proposal in that regard was submitted by the end of May. I outlined already to the committee the consideration it went through over the summer. Those who were entrusted in the public interest with managing and holding to account the management of this institution are entitled to their views being evaluated in that regard and this was done.

In regard to the European Central Bank, as a lender of last resort it has been a considerable support to the Irish banking system. It has ensured the stability of the system and that is a matter for the European Central Bank, which makes determinations on these matters, but our membership of the euro system means that the banking system can be collateralised, and in the case of Anglo Irish Bank, it has also been provided with emergency funding.

Is the Minister aware of precedents whereby the European Central Bank gave particular supports to banks in other jurisdictions and the length and degree of such support? That would help in this process?

The Governor liaisons with the governing Council, the president and the executive directors about all of these matters. They are independent in the performance of their functions.

The Financial Times is not normally a publication with which I would concur, I assure the Minister, but the case it makes on this occasion, or rather the body of evidence surrounding the case it makes this time, is particularly compelling. We can compare that, for example, with what the Minister has told us this afternoon. He stated that the budgetary targets remain on course. How can that be? How can he stand that up when we have seen the rise? The Minister calls it a spike, but there is no evidence that it is a spike.

It refers to revenue and expenditure this year.

The Minister loses credibility substantially when he tells us the budgetary strategy is completely on course. It will cost us substantially more and therefore that is where the difficulty is. He already indicated that he will roll over the guarantee at the end of this month. Does he envisage that if he is still in office by the end of December he will again roll it over? If he does, will he accept that what he will do effectively, will be to lock in any future government that will come in to pick up the pieces to his strategy?

Would the Minister accept that in September 2008, when he made the decision, supported by his Government, to institute a blanket guarantee for the six institutions, that it was a major error? Perhaps I am being harsh in the terms I am using. I acknowledge that at that time he was a new Minister of four or five months' duration. This would not have been his forte and it was a considerable learning curve. The Minister's predecessor, the Taoiseach, obviously stood back, either not knowing or not caring about all the problems it would cause down the road. Is the Minister now prepared to at least consider other options which are less costly to the taxpayer?

If the Deputy wants to outline options to me, I will have them costed.

I have done so time out of number——

What options is he talking about?

——and I will do so again.

What options is the Deputy talking about?

I am talking about ending the blanket guarantee that is in place.

The blanket guarantee, as the Deputy chooses to call it, ends on 30 September.

The Minister will roll over a similar guarantee that will protect——

Protect all deposits.

I agree with the protection of deposits. I do not disagree with it.

That will be before the House on 29 September. Will the Deputy support it?

Of course I am supportive of protecting deposits, but I am not supportive of the other aspect of what the Minister intends to bring in, which is the protection of senior bond holders.

No, the motion before——

That is part of the motion.

No. The motion before the House will deal with the extension of the guarantee in the context of——

Can we have a copy of the motion so we can examine it?

Yes. We will arrange for the Deputies to be briefed on it. It will be published shortly.

Would the Minister not give us a copy so we can do some work on it?

It went to Government yesterday and received EU approval. I will arrange for a briefing for the Opposition parties as soon as possible. They will appreciate that we are finalising the data at present.

Let us be clear about this. What is being proposed is that we guarantee all deposits, including short-term deposits, until 31 December. The Financial Times is saying we should cut ourselves off from guaranteeing all bank liabilities.

That is the advice in the editorial today.

That is actually not correct.

It is not correct.

I am sorry, that is what——

It is not correct.

It is not, actually. It is speaking about bondholders——

In any event, we do not need the Financial Times to give us guidance.

No, we do not.

The Minister is wrong.

I have already said I did not concur with this, but I made the case that the Financial Times makes. There is a compelling case——

The Deputy brought it up.

What it is saying stands up.

The Deputy brought it into the equation.

I am supporting those who make a compelling case in line with what it is saying.

The article talks about bondholders.

The bondholders are key. Will they continue to be guaranteed?

There is no reference to depositors.

Deposits are liabilities. Bonds are not in the guarantee motion that is before the House next week.

When will the Minister deal with that issue then?

Longer term bonds are already part of an extended liability guarantee scheme——

The Minister has not even given us the figures for that.

——which was approved by the House some time ago. We will arrange for the Deputy to have the figures.

That is why I mentioned December. Is the Minister saying he will continue to roll it over if he is still in office in December?

There are so many assumptions being made now.

Will the Minister continue to roll over the guarantee?

I will take the advice of the Central Bank in that regard. The Governor of the Central Bank has said it is essential for financial stability that we extend the guarantee until the end of December, and I am taking his advice.

When will the Minister give us a copy of the motion?

I think we can arrange for the Deputies to have it tomorrow.

I thank the Minister.

Has the Minister released it to the media already?

No, I have not released it to the media. Most of the media I have to talk to these days are the international media. I do not have much time to talk to the local media.

A Member

That is ridiculous.

He did not go out with his hand fast enough.

I did, last week, and that is why the tone of the editorial changed today from last week.

It did not refer to Anglo Irish Bank at all but to the whole Irish banking system.

Did the people involved change their tone compared to the previous discussions?

Let us be clear about the Financial Times. If members want to follow that advice and stage a bank default as an experiment in Ireland, let us do it.

It does not talk about a bank default.

It does not. It talks about a resolution——

It talks about cutting the umbilical cord.

It is reasonable. I thought the dialogue was two-way.

There are other members here as well. Senator MacSharry has been given the floor.

I thank the Chairman and I thank the Minister for attending.

There should be no monologues.

The only monologues I have listened to have been from the Chairman and Deputy Burton. Members should note that this apparatus before me is called a microphone.

The Senator's remarks will not go down well with Deputies on this side.

There is no need to use anything other than the microphone.

The Senator should continue with his questions.

I thank the Minister for is his brief presentation and for answering some of the questions, many of which I would have risked to raise. Notwithstanding the relative success of the bond auction yesterday, which was very good, the cost has been higher.

(Interruptions).

I did not give a commentary on the Deputy's questions. If the Deputy does not mind there might be something of benefit that I could bring up, even without my mathematical background or having lived in Tanzania. I will not tolerate it from the Deputy or from anyone else. The Deputy should note that I am just as much——

On a point of order, I have not said one word. If I was going to ask Senator MacSharry——

I am just as much a member of the committee as Deputy Burton. The Deputy has had 40% of the time. I have had to put up with this waffle long enough.

If I was going to ask Senator MacSharry anything I would ask about the cancer services in the north west.

Will the Deputy stop shouting? She is shouting again. Will the Chairman please ask the children to desist from shouting?

That is all I would ask.

(Interruptions).

That would be better than hearing the rhetoric we have been listening to for six months. I have a concern, as do we all, in terms of the spread since it is greater than 6% on certain things. Recently, some of the analysis which I have read and listened to would appear to be somewhat non-specific. Are we being superficial with our systematic communication with the core providers of debt, the bond market strategists and economic market commentators. I hold a concern that the message, which is very plausible and tangible, that the Minister has made here today is not getting through to the people to whom it should.

The Minister remarked that the NTMA is undertaking roadshows. The next month is going to be critical as people anticipate the announcements in October to do with Anglo Irish Bank and others. Will the Minister inform us what is planned in the next month? Will the Minister be undertaking a roadshow with Professor Honohan? Will the Central Bank be doing the same? What are the NTMA's plans? Who else is involved in informing the core providers of debt and debt markets on its behalf? Do we have specialist advisers who do that? Are there such officials within the NTMA? I hold concerns that the message is not getting through. The financial media will always reflect the jitters of the market, which are clearly present at the moment. What are we doing to get our message directly there? How can we best do that?

I refer to the forthcoming extension of our guarantee for depositors that will run from the end of December. Where is the wisdom in that? Does that not create another cliff? As we approach that time, it may contribute somewhat to further jitters in the market. Those are the points I wished to make. I am amazed Deputy Burton managed to stay silent and I thank her for it.

The Senator should not raise hares. I call on the Minister to reply.

The main point about which the Senator expressed concern was the case of funding. There is no doubt that it has contributed to market concerns as we approach the expiration of the guarantee date. I am confident the banks will be in a position to re-finance themselves. They have demonstrated this to date and they will continue to do so.

Which banks will be in a position to do that?

Their pricing mechanism has been changed to encourage longer-term funding.

I refer to communications with core debt providers and the markets. What is the Minister's strategy in this regard? I realise the NTMA is going around. There has been a rise in the spread in recent days but it is somewhat non-specific. We cannot tie it down to one specific thing. My concern is that we are not being penetrative enough in getting the message across with our roadshows. There is a superficiality. What are we doing in the coming month, which would appear critical, to deal with that? Will the Minister be undertaking a roadshow? Will the Governor, Professor Honohan, do so? Clearly, the NTMA will be doing this. What specialists will be assisting in this regard?

The Governor, Professor Honohan, conducted a major visitation to far eastern venues in the month of August. I refer to the NTMA. I am aware there has been a very intensive round of roadshows this year. These have been conducted by Mr Corrigan. Naturally, I am open to doing roadshows myself in the wake of the Anglo Irish Bank announcement.

I call Deputy Andrews to be followed by Deputy Flanagan.

I refer to the other issue on the agenda, that is, the credit rating agencies. The influence these three rating agencies have is incredible. In 2007 these agencies gave AAA status to various institutions which held a huge amount of sub-prime mortgage bonds. That was only three years ago and yet they are able to be paragons of virtue or knowledge. I understand there are investigations into the relationships between the banks and the particular rating agencies. Clearly the rating agencies are financed by vested interests within the US, the banks. The former chief executive of Bear Stearns has cited the whole reliance on these flawed credit rating agencies as one of the major contributors to the credit crunch. There are three global credit rating agencies into which I understand criminal investigations are being carried out. They can intervene within the financial markets and they impact negatively our attempts at European level to stabilise the financial markets. Earlier this year, it was mooted and supported by Angela Merkel that there would be some form of European credit rating agency. What is Ireland's input into this and at what stage is the setting up of a European credit rating agency?

Europe is going to regulate credit rating agencies. There are various proposals in that regard and we are working on the formulation of these proposals. There is no suggestion of a separate European credit rating agency although I think it might be a good idea. I think the Deputy was making the point in the context that the current ones are based in the US and in the United Kingdom.

There is a lack of transparency around the three rating agencies. If we had our own European credit rating agency it would be beneficial.

I will certainly raise that issue. The key issue about the rating agencies is that they got it wrong on the way up and there is no guarantee they are getting it right on the way down.

Three years ago they gave AAA status to many of the banks which held huge amounts of sub-prime mortgage bonds.

That is correct.

And now, somehow, they are considered experts.

When is the next bond auction due to take place? Will the Minister change his strategy in dealing with and speaking directly to the markets? Is it his view that the strategy for Anglo Irish Bank and the announcements he will make in October will bring greater certainty to the international markets and that the cost of funding should drop accordingly for the Irish sovereign state? In regard to the Anglo Irish Bank investigations, there was no mention in the Minister's presentation as to who how those investigations are being conducted. The public is very annoyed and disappointed at the length of time it is taking. The fraud squad has gone in and there has been no update as to what is happening. In regard to the closing of Anglo Irish Bank, will the Minister give a date or say if it will be ten years from today? People need to know why the money is being spent on the bank and how long this mess will continue. A comment quoted by the Minister and attributed to the Governor is that while the cost of restructuring Anglo Irish Bank is huge, it is very manageable in a budgetary context. Clearly that is not the case for most people. Given that we are facing into one of the toughest budgets in the history of the State, that kind of remark is not helpful because we are all feeling the pain owing to what happened with Anglo Irish Bank and there is no equity in that.

In fairness to the Governor——

I said at the beginning that the Minister has to leave at 4 p.m. It is now 4.05 p.m.

I will take Deputy Flanagan's questions and a brief question from Deputy Burton.

I will be very brief.

I thought Deputy Byrne gave us all the answers last night.

In fairness to Professor Honohan, when he said the cost was manageable, he was addressing the world markets. He is saying the cost is manageable in terms of the Irish fiscal position.

As to when Anglo Irish Bank will disappear, it will disappear early next year when the division will take place between the savings bank and the asset management company.

(Interruptions).

The asset management company will work out the assets over a period of time. Clearly, the asset management company selling the remaining bank assets in a fire sale would not be in the best interests of the taxpayer——

Are we talking about a period of eight or ten years?

——because the maximum possible value would not be obtained. Clearly, the savings bank will require to continue for as long as the asset bank is in existence. A future strategic direction may be found for the savings bank as a national savings bank.

On the question of——

The bond auction.

The bond auctions will continue on a monthly basis.

The Minister is saying we have enough money until next July. Therefore, why are they continuing?

Because we have to fund ourselves into the future.

On the progress of the Garda investigation, that is a matter for the Minister for Justice and Law Reform.

The Minister should have made a comment on it.

The Minister referred to the impact of the Fine Gael-Labour Party statement last week, although I believe the Labour Party has now denied it — the cock is about to crow — and the professional advice he received on that statement. Is he willing to make that advice public or, at the very least, bring the Opposition spokespersons into his office to show it to them?

I did not refer to professional advice. I said a market analyst had contacted me and said it was unhelpful that such statements had been made in advance of the bond issue. I had never received such a comment from market analysts before, but I did notice that in a broadcast interview last week Mr. O'Mahony of Davy's had made the point that the incessant debate in Ireland about default was part of the problem on world markets.

(Interruptions).

Chairman, I am entitled to——

No, the Deputy is——

May I ask a brief question?

Will I be allowed to make a brief comment?

No. Deputy Burton is next.

I will be very brief.

I will come in afterwards.

The statement I made was valid. It was about negotiations with bondholders. There has been an increase in the cost of Government borrowing in recent months and we must be mindful of what is said by the various commentators. What the Minister should be addressing is the commentary on the international stage.

No, that is a different issue.

Anglo Irish Bank is muddying the waters. The Minister needs to deal with this.

I call Deputy Burton to ask a question and for a final comment.

My point was reasonable. The Minister is indulging in politics when the state of the economy is the most important issue.

In earlier discussions with the committee the Minister suggested he and the Taoiseach would be prepared to answer questions. That is helpful. In terms of the Minister's own insights into what happened, does he now have an answer to what happened to the money? Where did the money go in Anglo Irish Bank and the other banking companies?

I raise a matter of serious concern. Since we last met and during the summer, there have been continuous media reports indicating various figures. I understand the former managing director of Anglo Irish Bank has relocated to Massachusetts. Some developers are in the Far East, while others have set up businesses in the United States. I ask this question on behalf of constituents because I am sure they ask the Minister the same question. Can he give the people an answer to the question of what happened to the money because many are concerned about the ease with which many of the individuals central to this issue, particularly given what happened in Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society — management and borrowers — appear to have moved abroad? There are various reports that most of them have been able to transfer significant funds offshore——

Deputy, please——

No. This is very important. First, this might be for a future meeting but can we get serious answers to the question ordinary people in the street are asking, namely, where did the money go? Second, taking the Minister back to——

The Minister is due to leave at 4 p.m. I am bringing this meeting to a conclusion.

——the night of the guarantee, the Comptroller and Auditor General's report showed fees for banking advice of around €33 million. That included a significant sum to Merrill Lynch. In material made available to the media during the summer since this committee last met, it is now clear that the Merrill Lynch advice to the Minister's Department ruled out a blanket guarantee and specifically excluded a guarantee of the senior bond holders and, even more particularly, of the sub-debt. Will the Minster make the full Merrill Lynch report available to this committee? The Minister paid €11 million for the advice and then rejected it.

The Deputy said she would ask a brief question. She is elaborating and I intend to bring this section of the meeting to a conclusion if the Deputy does not allow the Minister to reply to the question she asked.

The Minister paid €11 million for the advice and rejected it. Could he tell us the reason his Government did that and did the Department of Finance——

——consider Anglo Irish Bank insolvent at that point?

There is no point in four people talking at the same time. When the Chairman is talking I ask the Deputy to desist and listen.

Of course. I am always delighted to give way to the Chairman.

We will allow the Minister answer the question.

Mr. FitzPatrick, who is a former chairman of the bank, has been adjudicated a bankrupt, as I understand the position, but if Deputy Burton has information about individuals who have amassed moneys and removed them from the jurisdiction or removed them from the bank who are substantial creditors of this bank that information should be put at the disposal of the bank, of NAMA, and if there are criminal elements involved that will be a matter for the Criminal Assets Bureau. That is how we deal with these matters. We have procedures and authorities who deal with these matters. Much of what Deputy Burton said in that regard seems to be highly speculative and I would like hard information——

No. I do know that several of them are in the United States. They are in Switzerland and in various jurisdictions. They have given interviews in the media from their new locations. Members of the media visited the most recent chief executive of Anglo Irish Bank, Mr. Drumm, whom I understand has relocated to Massachusetts——

Yes, and there are proceedings instituted here in Ireland against Mr. Drumm. Mr. McDonagh made it clear in Navan recently——

How have they been able to relocate abroad so easily? Did they take a great deal of money abroad with them?

We do not have exit control in Ireland. If people want to move to other countries they can do that but the point I am making is——

With millions of euro.

No. The crucial point is that we have proper enforcement procedures available before our courts. We have in the National Asset Management Agency and at the bank individuals who are being pursued. There is no concealment about that.

Why have they all gone abroad?

Proceedings have been instituted against a number of individuals.

Why have so many of them gone abroad?

I am not accountable for their movements. What I am concerned about and what I have raised with the board of the bank and with the chairman and the chief executive of NAMA is that every step possible is taken under our law to secure moneys due and owing to either of these institutions. That is what we have to do as a Government and that is what these entities have to do. They have to follow the money trail and collect all the money they can collect. I am not responsible for the reason people move around the world. I am responsible to ensure these authorities do this.

In regard to the advice of Merrill Lynch——

We are moving away from the specific discussion on Anglo Irish Bank.

I am sorry, Chairman. I was asked about the advice of Merrill Lynch. The option canvassed by Merrill Lynch was that we should not guarantee the entire banking system but just guarantee Anglo Irish Bank and all of that bank's liabilities, including all subordinated debt. That is on the record.

Will the Minister publish the advice? Will he give us a copy of the advice? He never published it.

It is already published.

Taxpayers paid €11 million for it.

If the Deputy does not have a copy, we will arrange for a copy to be transmitted to her.

I do not have a copy. I thank the Minister for agreeing to make it available.

I thank the Minister, Deputy Brian Lenihan, and his officials for attending. I will suspend the meeting for a brief period following which we will go into private session.

The joint committee went into private session at 4.30 p.m. and adjourned at 4.40 p.m. sine die.
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