Others, however, may be disappointed. I do not have a legal background but when given a brief, I tend to stick to it. I will deal with the impact of the PR-STV system on intra-party dynamics, constituency work, representation of certain demographic groups in Parliament and the influence of individual Members in Dáil Éireann.
The PR-STV system delivers a result proportionate to the share of votes a party wins. If it wins 10% of the popular vote, it should have 10% of the seats available. However, this does not apply equally as not all parties contest in all constituencies. In some cases, smaller parties may have a particular appeal or strength in specific areas such as Dublin or along the east coast. Invariably, the larger parties which contest in all constituencies and run more candidates than smaller parties tend to receive a seat bonus. In the 2007 general election Fianna Fáil won 41% of the popular vote but 47% of the seats, while Fine Gael won 27% of the votes but 31% of the seats.
Our electoral system, in which a party can run more than one candidate, creates competition within parties. Traditionally, the larger parties run more than one candidate in each constituency. In the past three general elections Fianna Fáil ran two candidates or more in every constituency. Fine Gael has run multiple candidates in 70% to 87% of constituencies. In the 2007 election it was 30 constituencies; in the 2002 election, 34, and in the 1997 election, 36. By comparison, the Labour Party ran multiple candidates in fewer than ten constituencies. As recently as 2002, there were three constituencies in which the party did not field a candidate.
The particular phenomenon of intra-party competition arises in Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. Competition within party tickets is frequently credited for increasing a party's first preference vote but this does not always result in seat gains. The role of transfers can be critical, particularly if one candidate is to be eliminated. There is also a premium on vote management to ensure a party maximises its position where it has sufficient votes to gain an extra seat. However, this practice is becoming more difficult, given the reduced likelihood of voters supporting a party ticket down the line.
Electoral strategy of candidate locations and numbers when fielding multiple candidates is all important and each party has its own way of dealing with this. Candidate selection depends on party structures. Who has the power? Who decides the strategy, the degree to which the process is centralised and the role for party members in deciding these matters?
In achieving a balance on party tickets Fine Gael provides for a good deal of centralised control vested in the party leader and exercised through the party's executive council. This includes approval for selection conventions, directives regarding the number of candidates but also taking other factors into account, including gender and geography. In the 2007 general election Fine Gael had approximately 18,000 members out of 35,000 present at candidate selection conventions. That can, of course, be an administrative nightmare. Party members determine the outcomes but the party leader retains power, exercised through the party's executive, to review the tickets, including the power to add, delete or substitute candidates. This power tends to be used more by way of addition than deletion.
When managing campaigns, committee members will be familiar with another aspect of intra-party competition, that in which campaigns turn out to be fractious affairs, particularly if multiple candidates are chasing the same seat. There is plenty of evidence, even around this committee room, of people who have survived such campaigns.
Another aspect of intra-party dynamics which affects all parties but which will continue regardless of what electoral system is in place is the competition to be selected as a candidate in the first place. Frequently, the nature and spread of party membership serve to reinforce existing perceived norms and make it more difficult for new candidates to succeed or outsiders to break into the system.
Fine Gael's internal studies confirm what other studies have reported — that women, in particular, are less likely to be motivated to contest conventions, less likely to succeed at conventions and that party structures frequently create barriers against women's participation. More recently, in approaching the 2009 local elections for town councils the party indicated nationally that no selection convention should proceed unless there was at least one woman nominated. Having made a comprehensive analysis of election results, we are satisfied this policy resulted in more female candidates running and being elected. Ultimately, party support increased in areas with more women on the ticket in comparison to those areas where we did not succeed in running women candidates. An academic study of Fine Gael's quota system showed that over ten years the party had increased its number of town council seats from 39 to 65. The increase was greater with female candidates. That study is available to the committee if it wishes to read it.
There are some aspects of town council conventions which allow for an approach such as more latitude in candidate strategy in a contest for nine seats. In county council or Dáil elections the issue of incumbency is frequently the main obstacle to expanding the range of candidates contesting an election, allied with various other factors such as geography and the optimum number of candidates to maximise the number of seats gained.
When considering the lack of representation of various demographic groups, apart from gender and ethnicity, other deficiencies become apparent such as occupation when one considers the number of lawyers and teachers who represent parties. There is also the issue of dynasties with a tendency for seats to be taken by the next generation of an incumbent. Perhaps these issues would be best addressed by the parties themselves. However, that assumes they will try to succeed in introducing legislation to create, say, a list system which would also address other perceived deficiencies such as the lack of businesspeople, etc. It would address the issue of constituency work dominating one's workload, but the benefits of a list system would depend entirely on how parties responded to such an opportunity and whether they sought to use the facility creatively to bring about some balance in the Dáil. The obvious temptation would be to allocate places on a list to those candidates otherwise less likely to succeed in contested elections and there may be some evidence of that happening in the filling of Seanad positions.
The issue of constituency work being a dominant factor probably has more to do with the nature of Irish politics and society than anything related to the electoral system. For all the earlier arguments about intra-party and inter-party competition the lowest common denominator will always prevail. We are a small country and everything is local. The system is driven at least in part by clientelism and the fact that members of the public feel they have to approach politicians to help them achieve their entitlements, as opposed to having a well-developed system of citizen advice centres, may reflect a failure on the part of the State. It also reflects a national psyche that believes politicians are local and that the public should be able to communicate with their representatives on a personal basis.
The nature of constituency work frequently reflects an individual politician's standing, such as when he or she is a Minister. It might also reflect the type of constituency and it would be interesting to carry out a study of whether there were more clinics in constituencies where there is greater deprivation than others. Even in the UK, where each constituency elects one member, constituency work is a feature. Unfortunately, this aspect of a politician's work may also inhibit people from offering themselves as candidates. We need to be careful lest any introduction of a list system, which might facilitate the entry of new blood, creates a two-tier Dáil in which some Members are elected because they are good workers on the ground while others think of themselves more as legislators who do not have to engage with people.
Ultimately, the mix of those elected, how they become candidates and how they succeed in elections at constituency level all have a bearing on the make-up of the Dáil. The influence of individual members, once they have been elected, is then subject to the limitations associated with party membership, for the most part. The question of whether a Member is to be a backbencher is a matter not for the party but for its leader.