Yes. However, the first four were opened within 23 months, which is extremely fast.
The prices per kilometre of the Madrid metro can be considered when calculating those pertaining to Dublin. In the centre of Madrid, between the first six stations, construction involved going under or over metro line 7 and the Renfe line. The Renfe line is the busiest line and has 485 trains per day, 38 of which are long-distance trains. It goes from north to south beside station 2. The contractors working on line 7 had to go under or over all the lines they met and then connect to them, which demonstrates the complexity of the line and why it can be used as a model for costing the airport route.
Interlinked carparks were built. The first has two bus stations, one for long-distance buses on one level and one for metropolitan buses on the next level. Below this there are short-term carparking facilities, and below that there are long-term carparking facilities.
The slides I have shown to the committee demonstrate the extent of construction in the 1999 to 2003 period. MetroSur, line 12, serves as a template for Dublin. The slides also show the other lines near the airport. Professor Melis constructed these. The line to the airport, on which construction did not begin until 2000, opened a year ago today. It was open for service having taken only 25.6 months to complete. MetroSur, the line in the south, took 35 months.
The overall cost of the metro per kilometre was €44.7 million, but that takes into account some very expensive construction work on the airport route because it was next to the Renfe line. A huge station was built there. All the stations that were built are of a very high standard. There are marble lifts, escalators, travellators, etc.
The MetroSur line has eight interchange stations and took €38.5 million per kilometre to build. The fact that there were six contracts meant that one did not have the economies of scale that would obtain if there were a single contract. The price of €38.5 million is the outturn price. I obtained it from the computer of Professor Melis in February and I am using his times and dates.
With regard to Dublin, let us consider the cost and the EU stability and growth pact, what is involved in the works order and how we should approach construction and operation. The EU stability and growth pact has the same requirements as us. It states that the contracting administrations cannot take on financial liability. In Spain, Comunidad de Madrid set up a special agency called Arpegio and guarantees its credit with its land reserve. We can use the new National Development and Finance Agency and the CIE landholding could provide the guarantees. In Madrid, finance was ring-fenced from the beginning and minimal administration was involved in releasing it. This meant that the consortia that bid for the proposal could give competitive prices because there was no complicated bureaucracy involved in the draw-down of finance, which comes out of somebody else's pocket at some stage.
The metro tunnel in Madrid can take two trains of 2.8 metres in width side by side, which demonstrates how big it is. Bearing in mind that there are two port tunnels, each one would take less than €31 million per kilometre. On that basis, €32 million is a safe bet. This is a ballpark figure and I have overestimated the cost considerably.
Let us consider lines 7 and 12 in Madrid, the former of which was very complex. These cost €38.1 million per kilometre and €38.5 million per kilometre, respectively. Based on current prices, the Dublin equivalent would amount to approximately €45 million per kilometre, which compares with the costs of the MetroSur and line 7. That is a robust figure.
What is the capital cost of construction as far as the airport? Given the distance, 11.5 kilometres, and taking into account rolling stock, land and depots, the cost would come to just under €600 million or €52 million per kilometre. The estimate of €600 million is more than robust.
The timescale and works order issues arise frequently as reasons for delay. However, a metro can be constructed in a fraction of the time it takes to construct a surface road system because it is more straightforward. One has only to consider the complexity of on-street construction compared to underground construction. In the latter case, one does not have to contend with flora or fauna. Air and noise pollution are much simpler to tackle, there are no views, and traffic surveys, involving thousands of cars and modelling, are not necessary. There is no need for utilities diversions, except in areas such as stations. I am speaking from experience. I have a substantial track record, having worked on many successful road-based projects. For the Luas, an on-street system, a ten-book EIS was required. The scheme to extend the Jubilee line on the London Underground was 20 times larger than the Luas and 20 times more expensive, but its EIS is one twentieth of the size. Some road schemes have similar sized EISs, but one project in which I was involved, the northern motorway going from Dublin Airport to the Balbriggan bypass, has an EIS one book long.
The CPO timescale requires a schedule of the properties and rights of way and maps of the land that must be acquired. The 300 metre section at Capel Street, just below Broadstone, is probably the most densely built section on the whole route. The mapping can be done very fast. Compensation is a different story. In terms of the works order, it is not as complicated for a metro system. The compensation paid during the building of the Dublin Port tunnel was between €600 and €6,000 per site. There could not be more than 600 individual owners on the airport route and if each one got €6,000, this would work out as €3.6 million. The average amount that people got in compensation is less than €6,000, so €3.6 million is a maximum figure.
How do we approach construction and why has it not happened to date? We have to change the prevailing mindset with regard to the type of contract and how it is managed. Gus MacAmhlaigh of the IFSC has proved that this can be done. He did exactly as was done in Madrid when the IFSC was being built - he advertised in June for expressions of interest and went for the competition in July. By 7 August the offers were in. This was done as a business project, not as an infrastructural project. It was done from day one as a package and that is why it succeeded, although at that time we were more strapped for cash than we are now. The estimate for the IFSC at that time was €200 million, which is more than €600 million in today's terms. We had no money at that stage. Gus could not have built it if it were not for the fact that the €200 million was fully underwritten from day one. That was a DBFOM project. We must link the statutory process, route selection, operation and contractor from day one into a consortium business plan focused on getting passengers. Getting passengers is what it is all about; this is why the operator needs to be involved from the start. We must put it to the market and see what the market comes back with. That has not been done. We understood that it would be done from our meetings with the Minister in 1978 and 1979. In 2000 the infrastructural committee was to go to competition. The competition, in the form we understood it was to take, has not happened. The result would have been similar to what happened in Madrid and in the IFSC.
No major consultant was employed in Madrid. The staff was very small, which meant that they could deal with everything. Everything was done on a lump sum basis.