As I think I said in the Dáil, I quite understand the feeling of Senators here that I should have perhaps used this occasion to speak more widely on the question of the League of Nations, and perhaps even the merits of the present quarrel between Italy and Ethiopia; but I very deliberately chose a different line. I do not agree with Senator Blythe that there is any real difference of opinion amongst our people. I believe that on the plain issue that is here before them they are substantially agreed. They recognise that we are members of the League of Nations. They recognise that that membership involves certain obligations, and they are satisfied that this is an occasion in which these obligations should be fulfilled. Now, that is all that is material. As the last speaker has pointed out, nobody can show enthusiasm for a measure of this sort. It is a painful thing that one has to engage in sanctions, but there is no other way by which a restraint can be put upon nations that are prepared in their own interest, for some reason that appears good to themselves, to break the obligations which they have entered into. It is because we believe that these obligations which were entered into by members of the League ought to be kept, and that it is for the good of humanity generally that they should be kept, that we are engaged in taking our part in these sanctions, but we do so naturally with a feeling of sorrow that such should be necessary.
Now, with regard to our people, it is only natural that our people should be suspicious on occasions like this, and it would be a very big mistake for anyone to hope to go out on a campaign of this sort and be able to remove those suspicions. In fact, it would be highly dangerous to do so, because it might give to our people the feeling that their Government was led away by some wild enthusiasm and did not have a proper sense of the dangers that exist in a situation of this sort. There is no doubt, as was pointed out here by one or two speakers, that the past history of the dealings of certain imperial States with Ethiopia leaves a very bad taste in the mouth of anyone who reads about them, as I have, in detail. That is a fact, and there is a suspicion abroad amongst our people and amongst the plain, common thinking people of the whole world, that some of these States at present might not, under other circumstances, be enthusiastic in carrying out their obligations under the Covenant. That suspicion can only be removed by watching carefully that the action of the other members of the League, in supporting the Covenant, does not tend to a result in which Abyssinia, so to speak, would be partitioned out amongst the States in question. What every small State has to look to in the present instance is to see that their co-operation and their support in maintaining the Covenant should not be utilised to the advantage of any imperial power whatever.
Now, every person in this country, I believe, is thinking like that. Our history teaches us to think like that. There are very few of us here who were not able to think and form judgments some 20 years ago. We know perfectly well what doubts we had in our minds 20 years ago as to what were the objects which were behind the Great War of that period. It may be necessary, as Senator Blythe seems to suggest, that we should go out on a campaign to explain to our people what is the reason for our action and what advantages are to be derived from the League of Nations, and so on, but in my judgment this is not the time to do that. If we have to talk about the League of Nations, its value, and so on, my opinion is that we should do that on another occasion, and that we are doing the best thing for our people now, by simply doing our duty as we see it at the present moment and by keeping a watchful eye on the results.
I do not think it necessary to deal with some of the statements that were made here. I think every Irishman knows perfectly well how, on an occasion like this; everything that is wrong in a country can be used as an excuse by a Power that wishes to take possession of that country. I am not saying that the facts stated are all untrue, but I do hold that whether they are true or false they are no excuse. As Senator Douglas has said, if these evils exist, and I think it is admitted that many of them do exist, then there is a way for ending them, but that is not the way that has been tried by the State that has broken the Covenant. That is my view. My personal view is that I would support—I would support them also as a representative of this State—any measures that were taken at Geneva to try to improve the conditions in Ethiopia, and, if necessary, professes to take, on behalf, if you like, of civilised humanity, strong measures to try to improve the conditions there, though I know that would be regarded generally as something immediately outside the scope of the League. Ethiopia is a member of the League, and it was not brought before the League until the decision to make war upon her had already been reached that Ethiopia should be expelled from the League if she did not remedy certain evils that were said to exist there. That is the course that one would naturally expect to have been tried if there was real sincerity behind the case that is being made.
I think then that, in the main, the purpose we ought to have in mind is that the League of Nations will best be served by passing this Bill and acting in agreement with the other nations. As Senator Blythe pointed out, this action can be little more than a gesture. We are not one of the nations that are going to suffer most by it. We will suffer to a certain extent. Certain hardships may come to some of our people as a result of these sanctions, but mainly our greatest suffering is our sorrow that we should have to engage in measures of this kind in order to preserve the peace of the world and to preserve one of the members of the League from having its freedom taken away by another member that had contracted not to take it away but to support it.
With regard to some of the special points that have been raised, Senator Johnson said that I should point out in general what was the evidence that determined me to agree that Italy had violated the Covenant. I think the evidence is so obvious to everyone that it hardly needed to be stated. The fact was clear, and the Italian Government had admitted that it had crossed over the frontiers and was making war on Ethiopia. That was a course of action which it was bound not to engage in without having submitted the dispute to settlement by pacific methods. These methods were not availed of in the requisite time, and it was obvious that there was a resort to war in violation of the obligation of the Covenant to seek first pacific methods. That is all that was necessary then, as far as I was concerned, to decide the issue finally. Like most Senators and other people interested in public affairs, I have read pretty widely the whole of the literature connected with the dispute, but it does not lead me very far except to this point: that if Italy had a case, and I am not saying that there is not a case to be made, then Italy should have made it otherwise than by invading and occupying territory and by making war on Ethiopia.
Senator Milroy raised a point as to what losses we were likely to suffer, and asked what other nations had requested us to enter into trade to permit them to sell to us things for which they had a market formerly in Italy. As far as we are concerned, the total amount will not be very large. I think it will be in the neighbourhood of £80,000. That figure refers to goods consigned from Italy. If our statistics enabled us to attribute to Italy the goods that actually came from Italy, it would probably be somewhat greater. The figures that we have relate to the country of assignment only. We have arranged that in future our statistics will be based on the country of origin, but Senators may take it that, roughly, our trade with Italy was in the neighbourhood of £80,000. We have not ourselves entered into or sought negotiations with other countries to give us the market that we have lost, and other countries have not, I understand, applied to us to enter into negotiations as far as they are concerned. That is all that I can say at the moment on the point raised by Senator Milroy.
The whole question of our membership of the League of Nations is like most questions. It is one in which there is a balance. You have to balance the pros and the cons. Our entry, I take it, was dictated, in the first instance, by the hope that for ourselves membership would be a certain guarantee of future security. We had wider hopes that we would take our share in securing the reign of law. That is a matter about which some people may differ, but, in any case, there was, I suppose, the hope of, so to speak, killing two birds with the one stone: of obtaining security for ourselves and also contributing our share to the general bringing about of pacific methods for settling disputes which formerly were settled by resort to war. Whether our hopes in that respect can be realised or not, is a question on which there is likely to be difference of opinion. We know that such efforts were made in the history of mankind in the past and that, because of the natural selfishness of human nature, these efforts failed. When we enter into combinations, as I think I pointed out in some statement I made on this subject at Geneva, or here, when nations or individuals co-operate with one another for certain purposes, their selfishness leads them to get as much out of the co-operation as they can, and, very often, to give as little towards it as they can. As long as dividends—if I may use the expression—are being paid, they are very loyal to the combination, but the moment it is necessary to contribute something or to bear some burden or hardship in order to maintain co-operation, natural selfishness prevents them from being quite as enthusiastic as they were in sharing the dividends. It is not when the advantages are being shared but when the sacrifices are being shared that we have the test—the test which will determine whether the co-operation can last or not. When the test comes those only will be prepared to make the sacrifices who have clearly in mind what the advantages are. If, while you are getting the advantages you lose sight of the sacrifices for which you may be called upon, or if you lose sight, when asked to make sacrifices, of the advantages for which the sacrifices are being made, it is quite clear that you are getting a completely one-sided view of the whole problem. At present, what is necessary is that we should bear whatever hardships are to be borne in the full knowledge that what we are bearing them for is going to be to our advantage ultimately and to the advantage of the world.
That is a question upon which there is doubt at the moment. There is a doubt in the minds of a number of people as to whether the sacrifices that may have to be borne by every State-member which engages in these sanctions will be justified by the ultimate results. If there were a definite conviction that the sacrifies would bring the fruits for which they are being made, I do not think that anybody would grumble. There is, however, that doubt, and I think it is a healthy doubt. By having that doubt, we may make it less easy for States, for their own selfish interests, to avail of the sacrifices made by others. I am not by any means sorry that our people occasionally ask these question as to whether the various States in the League are completely and absolutely sincere in this matter or not. I do not think that that is harmful at all. If the same state of mind existed in every country that exists here, I do not think it would be harmful, provided only that people were not led, because of that doubt, to deny the aid which is necessary to maintain the League. If you withhold your service, if you do not give your aid properly and loyally, then you are doing your part to bring about the wrong results which you fear may be brought about by the action of others. While there may be doubts of this kind, these doubts should not lead us to withhold the aid we should give as loyal members of the League in order to make the League successful. If that be done, I shall be satisfied. We are doing our part loyally here.
Some people ask why this is the first occasion for the League to take action and why the League did not take action previously. Even in the countries that are most strongly in favour of the League, there are large sections of public opinion which are not prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to make the League really effective. If people remember that, they will realise why it was that, in certain cases, the League was not as ready to take action as some people would expect. I can give my own experience when I first went to Geneva. The Japanese crisis was then on. To me, that was a clear case of aggression, and I had no hesitation in giving my view to that effect. The methods of the League were resorted to for a certain period. If I had to judge, I would have held, without any hesitation, that there was a clear violation of the League Covenant in that case. Why was not action taken then? Well, a beginning has to be made some time. That is all I can say in excuse of that. There were certain circumstances at that time which made the application of the obligations under the Covenant difficult. I think it would be better for the League if action had been taken, and I am not trying to excuse in any way the failure to act. But, in a matter of this sort, one must take all the circumstances into account, and it must be remembered that Russia and the United States were outside the League at the time. While I strongly represented, so far as the representative of a small country could, that the sanctions of the League Covenant should be carried out, nevertheless, I understood the difficulties that lay in the way.
In the same way, there are difficulties, and great difficulties, in applying sanctions in the present case. The fact that they were not applied before would not be an excuse for inaction now. That attitude would be completely and absolutely wrong. We should regret that action was not taken by the League in the other case rather than use that as an excuse for inaction now. My conviction is that our people fundamentally understand the question, that what we hear is not criticism of the Government's action in doing what it did, but doubts as to the sincerity of certain States in their support of the League in the present instance. I do not think that we can entirely remove that. It is in the nature of things that it should be present. The only way by which it would be removed not only now but in future would be by all States showing, in connection with the ending of the present dispute, that their action is really in accord with the principles of the League. The public opinion of the world will judge these States by the results, and it will not make, in my opinion, for the good of the League that there should be any failure on the part of these States to act solely in the League's interest. In every case in which the League has to take action, there will be certain States which will be more interested than others. The State attacked will generally have more interest in its defence than any other State would have and there will be certain States in every crisis which will have more interest in the issue than other States will have. It will always be suggested that these States are taking a special interest in the issue for selfish motives. The very fact that they have some special interest does give them a special driving force. That is quite clear. If we think not of the present dispute but of disputes which may occur in the future, we can see in advance that a number of States will have a special reason for using the League. The League will be there for their protection, and they will be using its instruments as an alternative to using the methods they might possibly adopt if the League were not in existence. That is a natural state of affairs. When a crisis arises, we must not always say that, because certain States appear to be more interested than others, that, in itself, shows that the League is fundamentally faulty. It is natural that certain States should take more interest in the present case than other States, and, while we may be suspicious of them, we must not, on that account, say that the idea of a League of Nations is a bad one or that it is utterly unworkable or that human selfishness will finally triumph over altruistic feelings. I do not think that much good would be done by going into further detail on this question.
I hope that when we come to the Estimates in a few months, the whole question of the advantages and disadvantages of membership of the League of Nations will be the subject of discussion in the Dáil. I think it would be very appropriate that it should be. It is well that these things should be decided in advance so that, when the occasion for carrying out our obligations comes, we shall not start examining, for the first time, the question whether it is advantageous for us to be members of the League or not. I hope we shall have here the same unanimity in support of the measure that we had in the Dáil. The unanimity we had in the Dáil is, notwithstanding Senator Blythe's view, fairly representative of the unanimity that exists in the country. There is support for the Government in bringing in this measure and acting loyally by the League of Nations. At present, I think that that is all that is required.