This Industrial Relations Bill as it reaches the Seanad is substantially different from the Bill which was originally introduced in the Dáil and it is still more different from the draft measure which was discussed with organisations representative of trade unions of employers and trade unions of workers before the Bill was printed. As a result of the detailed examination of the Bill by the organisations which will be most intimately concerned with the use of the conciliation machinery which it proposes to establish, it has been considerably amended and considerably improved. It can, I think, be fairly presented to the Seanad as an agreed measure, not agreed to the extent of 100 per cent., perhaps, because there is not complete agreement on some details, but certainly agreed in principle and generally accepted as a practicable and workable device. It can, I think, be said that the introduction of the Bill is evidence of a realisation in all quarters that a stage has been reached in the history of "worker and employer" relations in this country at which it is practicable to establish new machinery to eliminate, if possible, or at least minimise, the risk of industrial disputes leading to stoppages of work. Previously any such proposal might have been greeted with suspicion, if not with hostility. The development of opinion, our own experience and the experience of other countries such as Australia and New Zealand which have had in operation for many years systems not very dissimilar to what is proposed in this Bill, have produced a sounder outlook.
The right of workers to have their conditions of employment determined by business-like contracts, freely negotiated, has long been recognised in law and in practice. That right has been won through years of intense struggle in which the strike weapon was frequently used. It is not now questioned and, indeed, very few will contend that the intricate business of labour management in modern conditions could be conducted without the collective bargaining made possible by the organisation of workers in trade unions. There is, however, agreement that the smooth working of industrial relations will be facilitated by the establishment of a specialised tribunal with which collective agreements may be registered, which will have power to interpret and to apply such agreements, which will be available to hear and adjudicate on complaints and grievances and generally to provide impartial and common-sense proposals for the settlement of industrial differences.
The introduction of this measure does not by itself alter the status which trade unions and workers have won for themselves but it constitutes formal recognition of it—recognition of the fact that the trade union organisation of workers is an essential part of the machinery by which democracy can be made to work successfully; and that a state has been reached when trade unions must be given official responsibility, not merely for protecting the interests of their members but in the wider spheres of wage policy and labour utilisation, as custodians of the national interest. The agreement with which the measure has been prepared is an index of the readiness of Irish trade unionism to fill that larger rôle.
The introduction of this measure will coincide with the withdrawal of war-time control of remuneration in private employment and that fact emphasises the principles of policy on which it is based. In a democracy, Government interference in business contracts should be kept at a minimum and should be resorted to only when there is a clear recognition that the general public interest is involved. That applies with special force in the sphere of wage regulation. Whatever measures may be justified in an emergency situation, in normal times State regulation of wage rates cannot be made effective without concentrating powers in the hands of the executive authority which would be incompatible with democratic government. In any form of totalitarian State, official regulation of wages and other conditions of employment is inevitable, but a democracy works on the idea that individual citizens and their organisations can be trusted, as a rule, to regulate their private affairs with due regard to the general interest.
The regulation of wages and conditions of employment is one of the most important matters on which business contracts, in the form of agreements between employers' and workers' organisations, are made. In relation to them, it is believed that, while on occasion individual or sectional interests may be pursued unreasonably, on the whole we can trust the good sense and responsibility of those who make them to relate their proposals in any single instance to a general wage structure which will facilitate national progress and the promotion of employment.
The aim of this Bill is to facilitate the process of wage regulation through freely negotiated agreements, and the reduction of the causes of industrial disputes. It is recognised generally that the withdrawal of war-time control of wages may produce a period of difficulty in which industrial disputes may be more frequent than usual and which might possibly lead to widespread stoppages of work at a time when they would be of very serious consequence to our prospects of trade recovery and economic advancement. That is one further reason why the measure should be enacted now and why its coming into operation should coincide with the end of the standstill policy. It is hoped that the enactment of the Bill will be accomplished before the end of August and, although it is not now practicable to arrange for September 1st as the operative date, which was the date in mind when the Bill was first introduced, steps are being taken to short-circuit procedure for bringing the Bill into effect and the court to be established by the Bill into being, and it should not be, I hope, much behind the scheduled date, the date originally in mind, when those measures will have been completed.
Let me stress that the essential principle of this Bill is that the machinery it proposes to establish will be completely voluntary. Nobody will be compelled to use it. Workers and employers can avail of this machinery for the purposes of resolving their differences or removing possible causes of future friction if they believe it is suitable. If they decide not to use it, they will be in exactly the same position in regard to these matters as they were previously. I believe that, in our circumstances, the use of such a tribunal as is proposed in the Bill will best be promoted by eliminating any element of compulsion. In Australia and in New Zealand, to which I have referred, compulsory arbitration is provided in the legislation enacted there by Labour Governments and the maintenance of that legislation is a central feature in the policies of their respective Labour Parties. Here, the outlook of our trade union movement is different and this Bill does not provide for compulsory arbitration in any form. I believe that the machinery to be set up by the Bill will be availed of if the general view prevails that it is workable, impartial and expeditious and that we can at least feel confident that it will commence to function with a considerable amount of goodwill.
Having made these general observations, I propose to refer to the more-important questions arising under each part of the Bill which were the subject of prolonged discussion in the Dáil. Under Part I of the Bill, it will be noted that it is provided that the machinery to be established will not apply to State employees, persons remunerated out of public funds, or employees of local authorities. That provision in the Bill was the subject of prolonged discussion in the Dáil and I should make it clear that the limitation proposed is Government policy. There is no question of that provision in the Bill having been discussed with organisations interested in the measure, and certainly no suggestion that there has been any agreement in that regard. The Government consider that the machinery proposed by this Bill, particularly the nature of the tribunal to be set up under it, makes it inappropriate to apply it to employees of public authorities. The House is aware that the Minister for Finance has announced his intention to enter into discussions with the several associations representing civil servants with a view to the introduction of legislation providing for some similar machinery in relation to persons employed by the State. While the Bill does not apply to employees of the State or of local authorities, it is, perhaps, necessary to make it clear here that there is nothing in the Bill which prevents the tribunal to be established under it, the labour court, being utilised, with the agreement of all parties concerned, in any form of dispute or being asked to report on any matter which it could usefully investigate.
Part II of the Bill deals with the labour court. The proposal here is that there should be a labour court established consisting of five persons: a chairman appointed by the Minister for Industry and Commerce, two persons nominated by workers' organisations and two persons nominated by employers' organisations. That court will meet, not as a negotiating body, but as a tribunal. Whatever decision may be arrived at, whether arrived at by a majority vote or by any of the methods outlined in the Bill, will be announced as the decision of the court. The views of individual members of the court will not be made known. The idea is that a court so composed should be able to give a view which would represent the combined view of all parties concerned on any issue that may come before it.
The decision of the court will be arrived at by one or other of three methods. If three of the ordinary members of the court, that is to say, two of the workers' members and one of the employers' members, or two of the employers' members and one of the workers' members, agree upon any issue, their agreement constitutes the decision of the court. If the ordinary members are divided as to two and two on any issue and the chairman finds himself able to accept the point of view of either the workers' or employers' members, then that view is announced as the decision of the court. If there is no possibility of a majority of the ordinary members arriving at a conclusion, or if the chairman finds himself unable to agree with the view put forward by either the workers' members or the employers' members, then the chairman's opinion alone is announced as the view of the court. That device is necessary to avoid the possibility of the court being unable to reach a decision on any question. In relation to matters which involve industrial disputes, there is always the possibility of more than two opinions.
It is never a simple matter of finding a verdict for or against a particular contention. There may be as many opinions as to the merits of a particular case as there are individuals considering it. But it is desirable that there should be some procedure within the court itself by which finality can be reached and that view announced. It is to be understood, of course, that the view of the court is ordinarily not binding upon anybody. It is hoped that it will ultimately have behind it such moral force as to make it binding, but there is no proposal to make it binding in a legal sense.
Some disagreement arose in the Dáil as to the size of the court. When the Bill was originally introduced I proposed a court of three members, with provision for the appointment of deputies to act in lieu of these members in various circumstances. It was argued in the Dáil that both the workers' members and the employers' members might, in various circumstances, find themselves able to arrive more confidently at a conclusion upon any issue if they had an opportunity of consulting with a colleague of like mind to themselves. It was also pointed out that an occasion may arise when a workers' member or an employers' member may, by reason of illness or some similar cause, be unable to attend and the court might thereby be unable to function. The proposal in the Bill is that, in such an event, a court of three will act at the discretion of the chairman, subject to the requirement that one of the three must be a workers' member and one of the three an employers' member.
We also had to bear in mind the possibility that objection might be advanced to an individual member of the court, either a worker or an employer, by reason of some previous association which the individual might have had with the parties concerned in a dispute or with the issue raised, and that the presence of that individual member might give rise to doubts as to the possibility of an impartial verdict being given. Again, in such circumstances, the chairman of the court may provide for the hearing of the issue by a court of three members.
The device of having a court of five members also permits of an arrangement by which a particular difficulty stressed in the Dáil might be met. It was urged that, for a period after the Bill comes into operation, and possibly at some other time, there would be a temporary rush of business to the court, such a number of cases arising simultaneously as to make it impossible for the court to dispose of them expeditiously. Everybody who has had experience of handling industrial disputes will appreciate the importance of having arrangements which will enable the court to deal expeditiously with disputes that arise. By having a court of five members it is possible to provide for a device by which the court could be divided into two divisions in circumstances where such action would be necessary to enable the business to be expeditiously disposed of.
Part III deals with registered agreements. The Seanad will remember that under the Conditions of Employment Act, 1936, there was provision for the registration of industrial agreements, with certain consequences following upon registration. That section of the 1936 Act was largely inoperative; only one agreement was registered. It was inoperative because it was confined to agreements relating to wages. All industrial agreements apply either directly or implicitly to conditions as well as to wages, but a strict interpretation of the section of the 1936 Act precluded the registration of agreements which related to conditions. Under this Bill, all industrial agreements relating to wages or conditions of employment may be registered, subject to their conforming, in the opinion of the court, to the provisions outlined in Section 27.
An agreement may be registered for any class of workers. We have not attempted to define the word "class". I was advised that any attempt to do that would, in fact, have a limiting effect and, consequently, workers subject to an agreement can be defined by reference to the name of their employer or employers, the class of work they do, or the place they Work, or by any description which will enable one group to be effectively distinguished from another group. The effect of the registration of an agreement is to make it binding on all workers and employers of the class to which the agreement relates, whether or not they are parties to the agreement. An agreement cannot be registered unless the court is satisfied that those who made it are substantially representative of the class so concerned.
When I say an agreement is made binding upon all workers and employers of the class concerned, I mean that employers are required to give to their workers wages and conditions not less favourable than those prescribed in the agreement, while a union, party to the agreement, may not support out of its funds a strike to compel any individual employer to pay more wages or to give better conditions. It will be appreciated that the agreement is registered with the consent of all the parties to it, or with the consent, in the case of an agreement entered into between a number of trade unions and employers, of a substantially representative section of both. If they consent to the registration, they voluntarily accept the obligations that follow, the obligation on the part of the employer to observe the agreement and the obligation on the part of the unions not to finance a strike to alter the terms of the agreement.
If a union complains to the court that an employer has paid less wages or given less favourable conditions, the court can direct the employer to keep the agreement and to make such repayments to the workers concerned, in respect of past under-payments, as equity requires. If the employer complains to the court that a union is financing a strike in contravention of the provisions of the agreement, the court can direct the union to desist from giving that assistance. In either event, failure to fulfil the direction of the court is an offence which may be punished by a fine.
The registration of an agreement can be terminated with the consent of all the parties, or on the application of one party, if the court is satisfied that the conditions in the trade have so altered that the agreement is no longer suitable, or with the efflux of time, subject to certain notice.
Part IV deals with what were formerly known as trade boards. Trade boards were established by Ministerial Order for certain occupations which were regarded as depressed trades in the past. Where a trade board was established in the past it had power to make recommendations to the Minister as to minimum rates of wages. If the Minister acted on them, he gave effect to the minimum rates by Orders which made the rates enforceable by him. The effect of a Ministerial Order was to make it an offence for an employer to pay less wages, and the obligation of prosecuting the employer for that offence was on the Minister. It is proposed in the Bill to transfer to the labour court the functions previously exercised by the Minister. Henceforth it will be the court which will decide if and when a trade board is to be established. We are proposing to alter the name "trade board" to "joint labour committee", but I am using the term "trade board" so as to enable Senators to grasp fully what is proposed in the Bill.
The court will decide whether such a committee is to be established and the procedure for the establishment of the committee is considerably simplified. The circumstances under which it can be established are being widened. The powers of a committee are also being altered. A joint labour committee can in future prescribe not merely minimum rates of wages for workers in trade board trades but can also prescribe minimum weekly remuneration. It is also being given powers to deal with conditions of employment. If and when a recommendation of a trade board is confirmed by the labour court, the enforcement of the minimum wages or minimum rates or the conditions so prescribed will in future, as in the past, be a function of the Minister for Industry and Commerce.
Part V of the Bill deals with joint industrial councils. It proposes to give formal recognition to those councils which were brought into existence by negotiated agreements in the past and to give them a specific part in the operation of this scheme of conciliation. If there is a joint industrial council in existence, it is proposed that the labour court will not have power to intervene in any dispute in the trade concerned, except at the request of the joint industrial council or where conciliation machinery established by the joint industrial council has been applied but has failed to avert a possible stoppage of work.
Part VI of the Bill is the part which gives the court general power to intervene in trade disputes. The intervention of the court will be on its own initiative. The effect of its intervention will be to have a hearing of the issues involved in the dispute and the publication by the court of its opinion on those issues. The award of the court under that section will not be binding on anybody. However, as a result of the hearing of the dispute by the court, ample publicity will be given to the merits of the claims of the parties concerned in the dispute and there will be an authoritative view on those merits. The court may not intervene in a dispute if there is a registered agreement providing for alternative methods of negotiating on differences—if a trade union shows that it has in existence an agreement relating to the trade concerned, providing for an alternative method of negotiating in disputes, or if there is a joint industrial council—unless it is clear that the alternative methods provided under one system or another have been availed of unsuccessfully and that a stoppage is likely to result.
In that regard, I might draw attention to the provisions of Section 71 of the Bill. It is the only section which proposes to give the court any coercive power. Section 71 deals with disputes in which unorganised workers are concerned—unorganised either because they are not members of a trade Union or because they are acting in defiance of the authority of the union committee, in what are usually called unofficial strikes. It has been the policy of the Department of Industry and Commerce to decline to negotiate or to provide conciliation service in the case of unofficial strikes, the aim being at all times to get unofficial strikers back under the authority of trade union leaders. It has been a matter of some difficulty to decide whether or not it is better to give this court any function in relation to unofficial strikes. What is proposed here is that, in the case of an unofficial strike—or of a strike of unorganised workers, where the difficulty is to get somebody who can speak on behalf of the workers concerned or enter into an agreement binding on them—the court may intervene and if it thinks fit to do so, having examined the situation thoroughly, it may eventually make a binding award. That award will be binding for a period of three months only and will have the effect of requiring an employer to observe only such rates of pay and conditions of employment as the court may prescribe during that period, thus making a strike for better pay or better conditions ineffective and making it illegal for the employer to pay less. The idea is to provide a "cooling-off" period, during which action may be taken, either for the organising of the workers in a trade union or the negotiation of a longer term agreement, which could be registered under the Bill.
Part VII of the Bill deals with transitory provisions. The House is aware, no doubt, that under the Wages Standstill Order a number of standard wages Orders were made by me as Minister for Industry and Commerce. These standard wages Orders. purported to set out the rates of wages actually paid in various occupations in April, 1941, the date upon which the standstill Order came into effect. Subsequently, bonus Orders were made for various occupations, which permitted the payment, over and above the standard wages permitted under standard wages Orders, of the amount of the prescribed bonuses in each case. It has been decided to endeavour to deal with the immediate difficulties involved in the withdrawal of war-time control by utilising the machinery of standard wages Orders made under the Emergency Powers Order. What the Bill proposes is that any trade union or any group of workers to whom a standard wages Order applies can register that Order with the court. The registration is automatic and can be accomplished by sending a copy of the Order by registered letter to the registrar of the court. The court is given no discretion to accept or refuse a standard wages Order for recording, except where there is objection on behalf of some trade union on the ground that the Order has been submitted for recording by individuals or a union which is not, in fact, representative of the workers concerned.
The effect of the recording is to make it obligatory on the employers concerned to pay the wages therein prescribed, that is to say, the standard rate as set out in the standard rate Order plus any bonuses prescribed in bonus Orders made subsequently under the Wages Standstill Order. The effect of these Orders was to fix a ceiling to the wages that could be paid. An employer could pay these standard rates and prescribe bonuses, and no more. There was no obligation on him to pay wages at these rates, but a trade union was free to take action to enforce the payment of those rates in whatever manner it thought fit. The repeal of the Emergency Powers Order and the enactment of this measure will change that ceiling upon wages to a floor. Instead of the Orders operating to limit wages to the amount of the prescribed rates plus bonus, the payment of those prescribed rates plus bonus will be a legal obligation on the employers concerned.
When, however, a trade union or a group of workers decides to avail of that provision of the Bill, it is also undertaking certain obligations. It secures immediately the advantage of having a prescribed rates of wages— the standard rate plus the bonus payments—made legally enforceable, but it limits its freedom of action in certain respects. It cannot initiate a strike for higher rates until it has applied to the courts for sanction for such higher rates. If it applies to the court for such sanction and the court makes such order, then the trade union or group of workers concerned may consider whether they are satisfied with the court's award or not. If they are satisfied, that award becomes effective and a new rate as defined by the court is also legally enforceable on the employers. If the trade union or group of workers are not satisfied with the award, they may decline to accept it and may require the court to cancel the recording of the standard rate Order, in which case it recovers its freedom to take ordinary industrial action. Then the employer is no longer bound, and the position is that which would exist in normal times, prior to the emergency.
There are various consequential provisions necessary to deal with certain difficulties that arose in the preparation of that scheme. There were some occupations in which standard rate Orders were made where it was found that the practice with various trades was so complicated by traditional arrangements or individual payments, that it was not practicable to prescribe a standard rate of wages for the workers concerned under a standard rate Order. The Emergency Powers (No. 260) Order made provision for the making of bonus Orders despite the fact that no standard rate Order had been made, where the Minister deemed it appropriate. Unless provisions were made in this Bill, the workers in those occupations could not avail of Part VII. For that reason, we are proposing to have the court, in such circumstances, prescribe a rate of wages on the application of the workers concerned and, if the court so prescribes, that rate comes into effect in the same way as the standard rate is brought into effect by the recording of a standard rate Order. The same circumstances would apply in any case where no standard rate Order was made under Emergency Powers Order because no application was made for such an Order.
Part VII will remain in operation for one year only and the binding effect of orders made under the Part will continue for one year. There is provision for a possible continuation of the Part for a longer period, but it is intended to provide merely for a time in which the inevitable adjustment of wage rates to new conditions following the withdrawal of the standstill Order can be made effective without trade disputes. It will enable the situation to be stabilished and will permit workers to obtain increases in wages which the court considers reasonable while new long-term agreements are being worked out for registration under Part III of the Bill.
In consequence of the enactment of this measure the schedule provides for the repeal of the Conciliation Act, 1896, the Trade Boards Act, 1909, and the Industrial Courts Act, 1919. There are some other consequential repeals, but I draw attention to the repeal of the Conciliation Act, and the Industrial Courts Act, in order to make it clear that the conciliation services heretofore provided by the Department of Industry and Commerce in industrial disputes will cease when this Bill comes into operation. It should be clear that the court to be established under this Bill will proceed by way of conciliation in regard to disputes. It is contemplated that the court will have at its service a number of conciliation officers, and when any dispute arises these conciliation officers will intervene in the first instance, to try to get an agreed settlement. It is only where an agreed settlement proves impossible that the issue will go to the court. It is not contemplated that the court should function in all industrial disputes. The great majority of disputes can, in fact, be settled by conciliation methods, and it is intended to continue using these methods. The only difference in the future, as compared with the past, is that the conciliation officers will be officers of the labour court, and will act under the supervision of the labour court, and not under the Department of Industry and Commerce.
The Bill will, I hope, be generally availed of by workers' and employers' organisations. I realise, however, because of its voluntary character, that it is certain it would only be availed of if the court established under it functions in a satisfactory manner; if there is general belief that it is not merely impartial, but is working on a practical basis. For that reason, the court is not given any obligation to consider, in the discharge of its functions, any particular social or economic theory. It is asked in relation to industrial disputes to have regard, only subject to the public interest, to the arrangement most fair to the parties concerned in disputes, and the arrangements most likely to be acceptable to the parties. Unless we can get that relationship in the court it is almost certain that its services will not be availed of. If we get a court which is expeditious, impartial and common-sense, I am quite certain that in a good many industrial disputes it will be availed of, and be successful in avoiding stoppages of work which are sometimes consequential.
I think it is particularly important that this measure should be enacted now, and the court brought into existence soon, because the withdrawal of war-time control of remuneration will inevitably mean here a period of intense industrial disturbance, unless we can get some such machinery as this functioning to smooth out difficulties, and to provide a common-sense and workable arrangement for the period of adjustment. I stated that I hoped originally that the standstill Order would be repealed on the date on which the Emergency Powers Act would cease to operate, September 2. That assumption was based on the expectation that the Bill would have had a quicker passage through the Dáil than it had and that instead of meeting in the middle of August to have the Committee Stage—as it is likely that there will be some amendments submitted to the Dáil as a result of consideration here—it is unlikely that the date, September 1, can be adhered to as the operative date. It is possible that the Bill will not become law before that date. Some time will be required after the enactment of the measure to complete arrangements for the establishment of the court, for the appointment of staff, for the preparation of rules and for the solution of the housing and accommodation problem that arises in connection therewith, so that it may be some date near to the end of September before the Bill, when an Act, will be brought into operation.
I am endeavouring at the present time to short-circuit the arrangements. Assuming enactment of the measure in its present form it will, perhaps, enable the date of operation to be advanced earlier than was otherwise possible. I think I have dealt fully with the provisions of the Bill, certainly with those provisions that aroused most discussion in the Dáil. I emphasise that sections of the Bill that were debated in the Dáil were fully discussed outside with organisations representative of workers and employers, and many of these sections represent the result of prolonged consideration and a balance of agreement, which should not be lightly upset. I realise that everyone who applies his mind to a problem of this kind will have a somewhat different approach, and that everyone will not regard the machinery as the most suitable. There is this to be remembered, that while a great deal could be said, those who will be most directly concerned, while perhaps not fully agreeing with every section, agree that it will do a great deal as it stands, and is a workable measure.