As Senators have in their hands the explanatory memorandum which was circulated with the Bill they will be aware that the object of the Bill is to improve the administration of criminal justice. Most of its provisions are of a technical character designed to provide remedies for defects that experience has brought to light. I propose to confine what I have to say at this stage to some remarks of a more general character.
By common consent, the experiment, introduced by the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, of a court of summary jurisdiction manned by judges with the necessary legal qualifications and experience, has proved an unqualified success. It is fitting that I should avail myself of this opportunity to pay a well-deserved tribute to the district justices and their clerks who have contributed so much to the success of this experiment and I hope that it will not be thought invidious of me if I single out for special mention the pioneers amongst both justices and clerks who set the precedents and established the standards which have earned for the District Court as a whole the confidence and respect of the people. It is in a sense, a measure of the success that has attended the working of the District Court that it is possible now to contemplate, as does this Bill, an important extension of the court's criminal jurisdiction. For a long time it has been felt that the District Court's jurisdiction on the criminal side could be safely and usefully extended. Such an extension, by enabling cases to be disposed of summarily in the District Court which otherwise would have to be sent for trial before judge and jury after depositions had been taken, might be expected to result in an appreciable saving of time and money and in a substantial measure of relief for witnesses and jurors, while from the point of view of accused persons protracted delays in the disposal of cases would be eliminated and speedier trials ensured.
I do not intend to enter into the details of the proposed enlargement of the court's jurisdiction. These are dealt with fully in paragraph 20 of the explanatory memorandum. Speaking generally, however, I may say that, so far as the summary trial of indictable offences is concerned, the powers of the court are being extended by Section 1 of the Bill in two ways, firstly, by adding specific offences (for example, perjury, forgery, conversion, and so on) to the list of indictable offences that are at present triable summarily and, secondly, by increasing the property value limits in cases of larceny and of malicious damage to property. The very considerable fall in the value of money is, of itself, a sufficient justification for such an increase.
I want to stress the fact that the power of the District Court to deal summarily with indictable offences will continue to be subject to two conditions, namely,
(a) that the offence must be in the nature of a minor offence, and
(b) that the accused does not object to a summary trial.
These provisions are in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution which guarantee the right to trial by jury except for minor offences.
Power is being taken in Section 1 to enable the Minister for Justice to prescribe further indictable offences as offences that may be tried summarily in accordance with the provisions of the section. But an order made by the Minister in exercise of this power must be approved by both Houses of the Oireachtas before it can come into force.
Section 2 of the Bill aims at expediting and shortening the proceedings, to the advantage of all concerned, in those cases in which the accused wishes to plead guilty. At present, in the type of case in question, although the accused may, at all material times, be prepared to plead guilty, the full procedure must be followed of taking the depositions from all the witnesses who may be required at the trial. The accused is then sent forward for trial and may be kept waiting for months before his case can be disposed of and, notwithstanding his admission of guilt, the depositions have to be copied and the State has to instruct counsel and to ensure that all the necessary witnesses are available in case the accused should change his mind at the last moment and withdraw his plea of guilty. To save the waste of time and money which this procedure involves, and at the same time secure a speedier trial for the accused, is a manifest advantage if this object can be achieved without the risk of infringing the Constitutional and traditional rights of accused persons. I think that Senators will agree that the safeguards provided in the section are adequate to protect these rights.
The provisions of the section are self-explanatory and do not call for detailed comment; but perhaps two observations are called for. The powers of the District Court under the section do not extend to the more serious crimes of murder, treason or piracy or their cognates. It would obviously be inappropriate and undesirable to vest the District Court with the power to deal summarily with such serious crimes, or even to apply, the alternative procedure provided for in the section, of allowing the accused to sign a plea of guilty and thereupon sending him forward for trial without taking any depositions. As regards the provision of the section which vests a discretion in the District Court, either to deal with the case summarily or to send it forward for trial without depositions or with such depositions as may have been taken up to the time at which the accused signs the plea of guilty, it is contemplated that the district justice, in determining which course to adopt, would, apart from any other relevant considerations, have regard to the adequacy or otherwise of the punishment which he was permitted by law to impose for the offence. If he thought that the maximum punishment which he could order would be inadequate, he would doubtless send the accused forward to the Circuit Court, which would have the power to impose a heavier sentence. The Justice's discretion is not wholly unfettered, however, because, if the Attorney-General objects, he cannot deal with the case summarily. This is thought to be a desirable safeguard, but it is to be noted that while the Attorney-General can object to, he cannot insist upon, a summary trial.
This brings me to Section 3, which provides for the punishment by the District Court of offences dealt with summarily under Section 1 or 2. In view of the increased powers being given to the court to deal summarily with a wider range and more serious types of cases, it is necessary to give the court the power to impose correspondingly greater punishment. Six months' imprisonment is the maximum sentence that the District Court may impose at present (unless it imposes consecutive sentences for two or more offences), while the court has no general power to inflict a monetary penalty. Under Section 3, the court will have power to impose a fine of up to £50 or imprisonment up to 12 months, or both fine and imprisonment.
As Senators will have gathered, one of the primary objects of Sections 1 and 2 of the Bill is to reduce the amount of time that has to be spent in the District Court on the preliminary investigation of indictable offences by, on the one hand, extending as far as possible the range of cases that may be disposed of summarily and, on the other hand, enabling cases to be sent forward for trial at the earliest possible stage, once the accused is prepared to plead guilty. It is only right that, in this connection, I should tell the House that we considered very carefully whether any other measures which might be expected to help towards achieving the same object were feasible and desirable. I might mention, for example, such suggestions as the returning of a person for trial on the establishment merely of a prima facie case against him and notwithstanding that all the depositions had not been taken or, where there was a multiplicity of charges, returning the accused for trial on one or two charges and preferring the remainder on indictment, although depositions had not been taken in regard to them. Such suggestions would involve a more or less radical departure from the existing procedure for the preliminary investigation and trial of indictable charges and would not, it was felt, on the whole, be in the best interests of the administration of justice.
The remaining provisions of the Bill are, as I mentioned at the outset, of a technical character and the House will, I think, agree that they can be more conveniently and appropriately dealt with in detail on Committee Stage. If, however, there are any points which Senators may desire to raise on any of these provisions, I shall endeavour to deal with them when replying or shall give them consideration between now and the Committee Stage.