I move:
That, in view of the diplomatic opportunity that has arisen to reduce global nuclear risks following Germany's new policy on nuclear fuel reprocessing, Seanad Éireann calls on the Government to act as a facilitator and to call together the stakeholders – Germany, France, Britain and Russia (CIS) – to explore and negotiate the cessation of reprocessing and its replacement with a nuclear cleanup programme, in the interest of international security, public health and the environment.
Ireland is a major diplomatic player in reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons and has longstanding concerns about nuclear fuel reprocessing at Sellafield. I support the view that we should now consider a new diplomatic opportunity to reduce global nuclear risks. The opportunity was created in mid-January when the German Government announced its plan to end the reprocessing of Germany's spent nuclear fuel in France and Britain after December 1999. That announcement triggered angry protests and legal threats from the French and British Governments and their reprocessing companies COGEMA and British Nuclear Fuels Limited. Two weeks later, in response to these threats and pressure from the German nuclear industry, Chancellor Schröder modified Germany's position. Germany remains committed to ending reprocessing but over some longer period.
German reprocessing contracts are said to be worth US$5.3 billion to COGEMA and US$2 billion to BNFL. Cancellation of the German contracts would be a major economic blow to COGEMA and BNFL and could end their reprocessing operations. The economic viability of those operations has already been questioned and reprocessing is highly controversial for other reasons. Thus, France and Britain have at best obtained a reprieve for an unpopular activity with an unpromising future.
Viewed from a broader perspective the new diplomatic situation holds the potential for what has been described by Dr. Gordon Thompson from the Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Massachusetts as a grand bargain that would benefit Britain, France and Germany, both reprocessing companies and many other parties around the world. Ireland could play an important facilitating role. This is the point of our motion tonight. I ask the Minister of State to initiate Ireland's role as a facilitator in the diplomatic opportunity that has opened up before us because of the German position on reprocessing.
In the grand bargain described by Dr. Gordon Thompson, Germany, France and Britain would agree to stop reprocessing, to initiate a vigorous programme of nuclear clean-up in Russia and elsewhere, and would involve other nations in the bargain. These actions would enhance international security and provide lucrative new busi ness for COGEMA and BNFL. Rather than take on these commercial interests and demand that they stop nuclear reprocessing which is in our interest we are offering them an alternative commercial outlet to justify our request that they stop nuclear reprocessing.
Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is a chemical process that separates plutonium from the fuel. Initially reprocessing's sole purpose was to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Later, reprocessing became a commercial activity, separating plutonium that was intended as a fuel for fast breeder reactors. In the 1980s it became apparent that the breeder reactor programmes had collapsed and that reprocessing no longer had a purpose. It continued because of institutional inertia and is producing many tonnes of separated plutonium that has no economic use. Britain's Royal Society expressed concern in a 1998 report about the nuclear proliferation and public health risks posed by the world's growing stock of separated plutonium.
While reprocessing has been a major part of their business, COGEMA and BNFL have also acquired capabilities in managing radioactive wastes and decommissioning nuclear facilities. These capabilities provide a basis for future business that does not pose a risk to the environment, public health or international security. Indeed, the application of these capabilities in Russia could make a major positive contribution to international security.
Russia is experiencing a political and economic transition that has brought hardship and insecurity to most of its citizens. This transition could threaten international security in several ways, of which two deserve special mention. First, budget shortages and social disruption in Russia could lead to diversion of nuclear weapons materials, technology or expertise from the many nuclear facilities that were established during the Cold War. Second, poverty, economic disorder and national humiliation could feed a reactionary body politic with militaristic tendencies. Rich industrialised nations have a major interest in preventing such outcomes in Russia and the CIS states.
The United States, western Europe and Japan responded to the nuclear diversion problem by sponsoring programmes in Russia that dismantle nuclear weapons, redirect weapon scientists to alternative employment and reduce the risk that nuclear weapons, materials or technology will be diverted. These programmes, and related programmes focused on chemical and biological weapons and have enjoyed some success. President Clinton proposes to increase America's spending in this area to a total of $4.2 billion over the next five years. Yet, many observers believe that a greater effort and a new approach are needed. A particular concern is that the existing programmes have done little to establish self-sustaining commercial enterprises in Russia.
Investments targeted to the nuclear cities and other selected locations might establish a nucleus of commerce that could spread to other parts of Russia. The United States sponsors a small programme to promote commercial enterprises in Russia's nuclear cities. This programme has long-term promise, but a substantial influx of investment and expertise is needed to prime the pump of commerce in Russia's nuclear cities. Such an influx could be provided by a vigorous programme of nuclear clean-up, implemented through partnerships between Western and Russian companies that are a spin-off from Russia's nuclear sector. The term "nuclear clean-up" refers to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the consolidation and storage of radioactive waste that has accumulated over the decades, especially from reprocessing. COGEMA and BNFL are among the world's leading companies in nuclear clean-up work.
Nuclear clean-up is needed in every country that has nuclear technology, but especially where reprocessing has been conducted. Thus, it is fitting that a halt to reprocessing, which we have long since called for in relation to the activities on the Sellafield site, should be linked to a new, vigorous programme of nuclear clean-up. A large part of this programme would occur in Russia whose nuclear facilities have created high levels of radioactive contamination, but accelerated clean-up would occur also in Britain, France and elsewhere. Wherever the work is done, it should be implemented through partnerships between Western and Russian companies. The benefits that would flow to Russia would be matched by Russian obligations to cease their own reprocessing, to properly account for their nuclear materials, to be open and to promote commercial enterprise. At the political level, this arrangement would provide the Russian people with a global role they could be proud of, enhancing international security and protecting the environment.
Some Western sponsored work on nuclear clean-up is now being done in Russia. Britain and France have taken steps to clean up their radioactive contamination. Each year the United States spends approximately $6 billion cleaning up its nuclear weapons complexes. The new programme of nuclear clean-up I propose would dramatically increase the scale of clean-up work in Russia and accelerate clean-up in Britain and France. The programme would be financed, first, from the cost savings that would occur from the end to reprocessing; second, from investments by development banks and Western Governments who would see the programme as a new conduit for promoting economic development in Russia; third, as a part of other programmes that seek to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials, technology and expertise from Russian facilities; fourth, from public funds and a levy on the nuclear industry, in recognition of this generation's responsibility to reduce the burden of radioactive contamination that is handed on to future generations and, fifth, from the redirection of Western funds that would otherwise support the upgrading of nuclear reactors in the East, an effort whose achievements have been questioned on many occasions.
The proposed grand bargain is simple in concept – reprocessing would stop and a new programme of nuclear clean-up would begin. Execution of the bargain would require considerable planning and negotiation. The negotiations would proceed more smoothly if the parties agreed to set aside issues which are not essential to the bargain and would delay agreement. Three issues of this kind deserve mention: the use of nuclear energy as an electricity source; the burial of radioactive wastes and the disposal of existing stocks of separated plutonium, whether of military or civilian origin. Each of these issues is controversial and divisive, but could be set aside during negotiation of the grand bargain to ensure progress.
The British, French, German and Russian Governments would be central participants in this bargain, but other players would also have central roles. Several western European countries and Japan have reprocessing contracts with BNFL and COGEMA, and would have to accept an end to reprocessing. Japan also performs reprocessing in its own facilities. An end to that reprocessing would be a desirable complement to the proposed grand bargain. The United States does not reprocess, but is a major sponsor of nuclear-related programmes in Russia, and would, therefore, have a central role. Western countries and the international development banks would be major funders of the proposed nuclear clean-up programme. BNFL, COGEMA and other Western nuclear companies would have a major role in executing the clean-up programme, as would a variety of organisations and government agencies in Russia. Governments of smaller countries not directly involved in the bargain, especially Ireland, could play an important role as facilitators of the bargain. Finally, the international community of environmental organisations could play an essential role ensuring that the final bargain is sound and enjoys broad-based support from the public.
In conclusion, Germany's new policy on reprocessing has forced a long overdue reconsideration of the merits of this activity. Britain and France may be able to delay a halt to reprocessing for a few years, but the interests of both nations and their reprocessing companies COGEMA and BNFL would be better served if they participated enthusiastically in the proposed grand bargain which would give them an alternative commercial and economic outlet. A united Europe, working with other partners, could make this bargain an important instrument for enhancing international security, public health and the environment. Ireland, under the guidance of the Minister, could play a crucial early role by convening groups of stakeholders to explore and negotiate the bargain.
I am indebted to Dr. Gordon Thompson of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies for his expertise and interest in this particular area.