Amendments Nos. 1, 8, 11 and 14 are related and may be discussed together, by agreement. Is that agreed? Agreed.
Control of Exports Bill 2023: Committee Stage
Section 1 agreed to.
SECTION 2
I move amendment No. 1:
In page 8, between lines 4 and 5, to insert the following:
“ “automated means” means the use of any algorithm, recommender system, or other automated system which uses data processing, machine learning, or other artificial intelligence techniques to make decisions or suggest information to users;”.
I welcome the Minister of State to the House. It is lovely to see him. This set of amendments addresses something that is very much an emerging concern in the realm of arms control, which is the dangers of the use of artificial intelligence, AI, in weapons systems and dual-use items. This is still an emerging area and a significant body of work is under way to understand how lethal autonomous weapons system operate within an international humanitarian law framework. Currently, the UK House of Lords has a select committee on AI in weapons systems which is examining this issue. It is also undergoing examination at United Nations level in the context of the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons, which may be deemed to be excessively injurous or have indiscriminate effects, and through the group of governmental experts as part of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW.
Use of lethal autonomous weapons systems has been growing globally. The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs has offered the following description of newer forms of autonomous weapons systems:
Newer systems employing increasingly sophisticated technology include missile defense systems and sentry systems, which can autonomously detect and engage targets and issue warnings. Other examples include loitering munition (also known as suicide, kamikaze or exploding drone) which contain a built-in warhead (munition) and wait (loiter) around a predefined area until a target is located by an operator on the ground or by automated sensors onboard, and then attacks the target. These systems first emerged in the 1980s; however, their systems functionalities have since become increasingly sophisticated, allowing for, among other things, longer ranges, heavier payloads and the potential incorporation of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies.
The UN Secretary General, António Guterres, has been unequivocally clear that lethal autonomous weapon systems are politically unacceptable and morally repugnant and has called for their prohibition under international law.
In 2023, in A New Agenda for Peace, the UN Secretary General reiterated this call, recommending that by 2026 states agree a legally binding instrument to prohibit lethal autonomous weapon systems that function without human control or oversight.
International experts have also been raising the alarm. The UN special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, joined the UN Secretary General's call for a global prohibition on lethal autonomous weapon systems in a report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2023. In his testimony to the UK's House of Lord's select committee, Professor Toby Walsh, chief scientist at the new AI institute at the University of New South Wales stated: "Autonomous weapons systems decrease accountability and increase global insecurity" and that resistance to regulating in this space will increase global insecurity. From Amnesty International, Dr. Matt Mahmoudi has highlighted the human rights implications of the digital dehumanisation of people when subjected to autonomous weapons.
Amendment No. 1 inserts in the Bill a definition of "automated means" which is used in subsequent amendments. Amendment No. 8 inserts a new section 20 in the Bill, which would provide that "authorisation shall not be granted to a person or organisation to transit a dual-use item through or from the State where such an item utilises automated means to function or has the capacity to be used through or with automated means." Subsection 2 of the amendment provides that any person attempting to transit such items would be "guilty of an offence" and subsection 3 provides that subsection 1 applies to both "the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána."
Amendment No. 11 inserts a new section 28 into the Bill, which would provide that "authorisation shall not be granted to a person or organisation to transit a military item through or from the State where such an item utilises automated means to function or has the capacity to be used through or with automated means." Subsection 2 of the amendment provides that any person attempting to transit such items would be "guilty of an offence" and subsection 3 provides that subsection 1 applies to both "the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána."
Amendment No. 14 would amend section 29(6) by including a new provision that the Minister shall not grant authorisation for "a military item or dual-use item which utilises automated means to function or has the capacity to be used through or with automated means."
We should be unequivocally clear that lethal autonomous weapons represent a huge danger to people's lives. The UN Secretary General has been clear that they are incompatible with human rights and should be banned. Ireland should not allow the export of such items or their transit through our State. I urge the Minister of State to accept these amendments.
Gabhaim buíochas leis an Seanadóir as na leasuithe sin. I agree with the sentiment of many of the Senator's amendments but I want to put the Bill in context. It is important that the Bill is robust enough, not only to control items that are being used in a dual-use capacity but also to ensure that emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum commuting are controlled, especially if they are to be used for nefarious purposes.
In order to provide regulatory transparency and consistency and to be responsive to such emerging technologies, export controls are implemented using a list-based approach. In other words, the items subject to control are specified in precise and technical terms in published lists. The main list for controlling dual-use items in the EU is annex 1 of the dual-use regulation. These lists are updated regularly by technical experts who are working in the multilateral non-proliferation regimes. They include the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies; the Missile Technology Control Regime; the Nuclear Suppliers Group; and the Australia Group. My concern is that to include specific references to a particular technology such as automated means in the body of the Bill would be contrary to the list-based approach and may have an unintentional consequence of limiting the scope of the Bill to control emerging technologies that we may not know about today. Both dual-use items and military equipment will be subject to export licensing requirements, whether they incorporate automated means or not. In addition to controls on listed items, there is scope within the Bill to control both specific exports and specific non-listed items in certain circumstances.
We are doing a lot of work, separate from this Bill, on AI and regulation of same, and that is something I would like to come back and discuss with the Seanad at some stage soon. I cannot accept these amendments. My concern is that in putting this definition into legislation we would make it harder to keep the Bill up to date and up to speed with the technology that is changing so quickly, whereas the list-based approach, which this Bill endorses, can be used much more quickly in the face of rapidly advancing technology.
I am disappointed to hear the Minister of State will not be accepting our amendments. This is a human rights issue. The Minister of State has heard many of the people I have spoken about speak on the issue. It is worrying. Ireland should not allow the export of such items or their transfer through this State because of those human rights issues. I am disappointed to hear the Minister of State's position but there is nothing I can do about it.
I reassure the Senator about her concerns on autonomous weapons and their danger, particularly as regards civilian populations and human rights. That is why we are working on and leading a unified EU response to the issue. The EU is also reviewing the regulation of autonomous weapons in working parties. We can be more flexible by using the list-based system because with technology changing so quickly, changing and updating legislation may allow a lacuna to arise and some of these new technologies to get through. That could be an unintended consequence of what the Senator is trying to achieve. The list-based system allows the flexibility and speed that we need in the face of such advancing technology.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment No. 2 is not relevant to the subject matter of the Bill and has been ruled out of order.
Amendment No. 2 not moved.
Amendments Nos. 3, 13 and 16 are related and may be discussed together.
I move amendment No. 3:
In page 8, between lines 17 and 18, to insert the following:
“ “Convention” means the Convention on Cluster Munitions adopted in Dublin in May 2008 which Ireland is party to;”.
This set of amendments relates to Ireland's international obligations as a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Ireland played a key role in the negotiation of the convention and it is one particular example of the extremely positive role our neutrality can play in the promotion of peace, multilateralism and human rights internationally. The Cluster Munition Coalition offers the following overview of what these weapons do. It points out that cluster munitions are weapons that are fired from the ground by artillery, rockets, missiles and mortar projectiles or dropped by aircraft. They open in the air to disperse multiple submunitions or bomblets over a wide area. Many submunitions fail to explode on initial impact, leaving remnants that indiscriminately injure and kill, like land mines, for years, until they are cleared and destroyed. Contamination from cluster munitions remnants denies access to agricultural land, creates barriers to socioeconomic development and hinders the delivery of humanitarian assistance and essential services.
Unfortunately, the use of cluster munitions is on the rise internationally. Last month, the annual Cluster Munition Monitor highlighted the fact that cluster munition attacks killed or wounded at least 987 people in 2022, of whom 890 were in Ukraine and 95% of these were civilians. At the outset of its illegal invasion of Ukraine, Russia used stocks of old cluster munitions and newly developed munitions. In July 2023, the US began transferring cluster munitions to Ukraine in a move that was criticised by countries, including Ireland, that have been unwavering in their support of Ukraine's right to self-determination. According to Human Rights Watch, the cluster munitions from the US had a dud or unexploded failure rate of between 6% and 14%. These weapons pose a huge risk to civilians and it is mainly civilians who die because of their use. How devastating is that? We have a responsibility, as a signatory to the convention, to ensure that these weapons are not being transited through Ireland and that our laws reflect our commitment to the eradication of these horrendous weapons.
Amendment No. 3 is a technical amendment inserting an interpretation of "convention" used in later amendments. Amendment No. 13 would insert a new section 30 in the Bill that would prohibit the authorising of a person or organisation to transit a military item through or from the State where such an item is subject to the convention, in effect banning the export of cluster munitions from Ireland and banning their transit through the State. Amendment No. 16 would amend section 29(6) by including a new provision that the Minister shall not grant authorisation for a military item where that item goes against the convention, in effect precluding authorisation for cluster munitions.
In tabling these amendments, we are aware of the restrictions placed on the transit of munitions by the Air Navigation (Carriage of Munitions of War, Weapons and Dangerous Goods) Orders 1973 and 1989, which require approval for transit from the Minister for Transport following consultation with the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Justice. However, with regard to cluster munitions, these provisions are not sufficient and are not in the spirit of the convention. While I acknowledge that this Government may not opt to grant any authorisations in respect of these horrendous weapons, future Governments might and this is what we must take into consideration. I urge the Minister of State to accept what I believe are very constructive amendments that would strengthen the legislative underpinning of our commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Before I ask the Minister of State to respond, I welcome from the great state of Connecticut the deputy majority leader of the Connecticut State Senate, Senator Martha Marx, who is originally from Claremorris. She is very welcome to Seanad Éireann today. I also welcome Senator Mae Flexer, deputy president pro tempore and federal relations liaison. I think Nancy Dolan is also in the Public Gallery along with Senator Flexer's daughter. They are most welcome. I thank them for coming to Seanad Éireann today.
I also welcome the delegation. I can see where Senator Black is coming from. In any assessment of an application for an authorisation to export military equipment, consideration is given to, among other things, Ireland's commitments under international conventions and multilateral agreements, particularly the Convention on Cluster Munitions. As the Senator noted, that convention prohibits all use - the production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions - in order to address the humanitarian consequences and the unacceptable harm caused by their use. As the Senator acknowledged, we were a lead state in the design of and one of the first states to sign and ratify the convention.
The EU common military list, which underpins export controls of military equipment in the EU, covers a comprehensive array of military equipment and technology across 22 categories. Category ML-3 of the EU list includes cluster munitions, specifically bomblets and minelets, to which the Senator referred. As the items targeted by the convention are considered as part of military export controls, repeating them in the Bill would not be an advantage and I fear that it may have unintentional consequences in limiting the scope of the Bill in controlling certain items. While I must oppose these amendments, I am happy to engage with the Senator's office ahead of Report Stage to see if we can come up with something that does not have those unintended consequences but lays out the position. It may be hard to achieve but I am happy to engage with the Senator on it.
I look forward to engaging with the Minister of State on this.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment No. 4 in the names of Senators Ruane, Black and Flynn has been ruled out of order as it is not relevant to the subject matter of the Bill.
Amendment No. 4 not moved.
Amendments Nos. 5, 9, 12 and 15 are related and may be discussed together by agreement. Is that agreed? Agreed.
I move amendment No. 5:
In page 11, between lines 5 and 6, to insert the following:
“ “relevant occupied territory” means a territory which is occupied within the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and which has been—
(a) confirmed as such in a decision or advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,
(b) confirmed as such in a decision of the International Criminal Court,
(c) confirmed as such in a decision of an international tribunal, or
(d) recognised as such by a resolution of both Houses of the Oireachtas;”.
This grouping of amendments relates to the export of weapons to the Occupied Territories, a subject the Minister of State understands is very close to my heart. As the Minister of State will be aware, the issue of our trading relationship with the Occupied Territories has long been of interest to me. This set of amendments seeks to address an important issue within our legal framework for weapons export controls by ensuring that weapons or dual-use items leaving Ireland do not end up in the Occupied Territories.
Amendment No. 5 inserts a definition of "relevant occupied territory" into the interpretation section of the Bill. It closely mirrors the definition used in my own Control of Economic Activity (Occupied Territories) Bill, which is itself based on the definition within the Fourth Geneva Convention. The one small difference in paragraph (d) allows for a relevant occupied territory to be recognised as such by resolution of both Houses of the Oireachtas rather than by ministerial designation. The reason for this change is that the ministerial designation provision was based upon the premise of the Minister creating regulations under section 4 of the Control of Economic Activity (Occupied Territories) Bill, which obviously does not apply here. That is the only reason for the change.
Amendment No. 9 inserts a new section 20 in the Bill that would provide that authorisation shall not be granted to a person or organisation to transit a dual-use item through or from the State where such an item is destined for a relevant occupied territory or where there is a significant likelihood that the item may be transported to a relevant occupied territory. It also makes clear that an attempt to do so is an offence under this Bill and the provision applies to both the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána.
Amendment No. 12 inserts a new section 29 in the Bill that would provide that authorisation shall not be granted to a person or organisation to transit a military item through or from the State where such an item is destined for a relevant occupied territory or where there is a significant likelihood that the item may be transported to a relevant occupied territory. It also makes clear that attempting to do so is an offence under the Bill and the prohibition applies to both the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána.
Amendment No. 15 amends section 29(6) by providing that the Minister shall not grant authorisation for a military item or a dual-use item where it is destined for or has a significant likelihood of ending up in an occupied territory. In tabling these amendments, we are trying to make sure that our laws ensure that weapons or dual-use items are not exported or transited through Ireland to an occupied territory. It is breaking international law. We have to face that. All of us in this House see on an almost daily basis the violence in occupied territories around the world, including occupied Palestinian territory, Ukraine and western Sahara. As a neutral country, Ireland needs to ensure that we are the voices of that de-escalation about which we heard the Tánaiste speak today, international law because we do not want to break international law and human rights and that weapons and dual-use items leaving this country are not being used against people who are the subject of occupation. This is key here. We have to be mindful of it. I urge the Minister to accept these amendments as they would ensure that the Bill protects people and our application of it is not just concerned with whether we are meeting obligations under the EU directive but rather it is legislation that ensures we are not inadvertently enabling violence towards occupied peoples and escalation of military conflicts.
I hope that going forward we can work with the Minister of State on this issue. I would really appreciate that.
I thank Senators Black and Boylan for the amendments. Again, I am worried that the inclusion of the amendments would limit the effectiveness of the Bill rather than do what we all want to do, which is to stop dual-use items going to occupied territories.
As the Senators are aware, an authorisation is required to export dual-use items. They are listed in annex 1 of the dual-use regulation to a third country. An authorisation is required for transfers of military equipment within the EU as well as for export to a third country. As part of the assessment of applications for authorisations, a number of factors are taken into account, including the type of item; what it is designed for; whether it has purely defence applications; the stated end of use; the end user; and the ultimate destination.
The EU common position defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment sets out eight criteria for assessing an application for an authorisation, including respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law; the internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts; whether sanctions or embargoes apply; and whether there is a diversion risk, among other things. Furthermore, Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that trade with third countries falls within the common commercial policy of the EU.
Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 sets up an EU regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items. In this Bill, Ireland is seeking to give full effect to that regulation. The EU Legislature, the European Parliament, did not seek to introduce measures relating to the export of dual-use or military goods to occupied territories. Unfortunately, I cannot go beyond what is in the regulation but in the context of the criteria and the aim here, we will work with officials in that regard.
Trade with third countries is an EU competence so I am very constrained in what I can do in the Bill. I do not see today as an end game in terms of how we progress the Bill. I acknowledge the Bill and the work done by Senators Black and Boylan in particular on the occupied territories in Palestine. I do not think I can do anything in regard to the amendment but as we go forward, I want to reflect the views of the Oireachtas that have already been agreed. While I cannot accept the amendment, I want to try to reach a position where we can reflect the concerns of the Oireachtas.
Would I be right in saying the Minister of State is open to discussing the issue before he makes a final decision?
We will definitely have a discussion on it, but I want to be realistic as well. We are tied because this Bill is implementing EU legislation. I would like to hear the thoughts of Senator Black on that, and to hear from Senator Boylan, based on her experience, as to how we can reflect the concerns in the legislation. I am not sure we can but there may be ways of doing that within the criteria that are laid out. We are due to take Report Stage next week. I need to be very honest. I believe the amendment will limit the capacity to do that and to influence that, but I do not want to definitively say there is nothing we can do either because we can knock heads together and knock experience together. We may not get anywhere but I would like to try. I want to be very realistic.
I appreciate that.
We are implementing an EU law here which does not give us a lot of wriggle room, but I want to try to see if we can knock heads together on this.
Ireland does not want to be complicit in breaking international law. We have to be mindful of that at all times. What is happening in the occupied territories is that international law is being broken. We must be mindful of not breaking international law. Ireland is meant to be a neutral country, which I believe is one of our core values. I urge the Minister of State to consider the amendment. We do not want to be complicit in breaking international law. That is very important. We have always stood up for basic human rights. I urge the Minister of State and the Department to seriously consider this amendment. I know we do not have much time but let us be open to more discussions on this. I understand Report Stage is next week but at least it gives us some hope.
I am absolutely open to discussion but, equally, I want to be very clear. We are 100% open to have a discussion on this and how we can reflect it but the advice we have is that trade is an EU competence and the EU has set that out. Let us thrash it all out and see what we can do.
Having been in the European Parliament, I know that trade rules are often cited as reasons for not doing things. However, there are mechanisms for governments to place restrictions on items. Other member states have done this. It can be done on the grounds of public health or environmental grounds, and I am sure international law is another ground. I think there is scope. There are ways around this if people who are brighter than me put their heads together. Other member states have certainly imposed restrictions in their trade rules, which we have been told is not possible in this country. I know the Minister of State wants to do the right thing but there is scope for some discretion in all EU legislation.
Let us engage. If there are other member states that have done something in this space, let us see it. I will be very happy to engage with the two Senators on that.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 2 agreed to.
Section 3 agreed to.
SECTION 4
Amendment No. 6 has been ruled out of order on the basis that it is not relevant to the subject matter of the Bill.
Amendment No. 6 not moved.
Amendment No. 7 has been ruled out of order on the basis that it is not relevant to the subject matter of the Bill.
Amendment No. 7 not moved.
Section 4 agreed to.
Sections 5 to 19, inclusive, agreed to.
NEW SECTIONS
I move amendment No. 8:
In page 18, between lines 21 and 22, to insert the following:
“Control on export of dual-use items featuring automated means
20. (1) Notwithstanding sections 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, authorisation shall not be granted to a person or organisation to transit a dual-use item through or from the State where such an item utilises automated means to function or has the capacity to be used through or with automated means.
(2) Where a person or organisation attempts to export a dual-use item in contravention of subsection (1) they shall be guilty of an offence.
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, subsection (1) applies to the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána.”
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 9:
In page 18, between lines 21 and 22, to insert the following:
“Restriction on export of dual-use items to a relevant occupied territory
20. (1) Notwithstanding sections 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, authorisation shall not be granted to a person or organisation to transit a dual-use item through or from the State where such an item is destined for a relevant occupied territory or where there is a significant likelihood that the item may be transported to a relevant occupied territory.
(2) Where a person or organisation attempts to export a dual-use item in contravention of subsection (1) they shall be guilty of an offence.
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, subsection (1) applies to the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána.”.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 20 agreed to.
Sections 21 to 24, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 25
I move amendment No. 10:
In page 21, to delete lines 13 to 16.
I have tabled this amendment to section 25 as I have a concern about section 25(3), specifically due to the manner in which it disapplies section 25(1) to brokers who have "an authorisation or other licence or consent for the provision of the brokering services with like effect to an authorisation, granted to the person according to the laws of a Member State other than the State."
This is not an appropriate provision. As I said earlier, Ireland is a neutral country. It is markedly different than many other EU countries in that we do not have a significant weapons manufacturing industry. Returning to my earlier point regarding cluster munitions, we know from Human Rights Watch that at least 12 other EU countries including France, Germany, Spain and Italy, have weapon manufacturers which produce these awful weapons. If, for example, a broker based in Ireland decided it wished to export cluster munitions from Germany to a third country and received such authorisation from the German Government, would it be able to do so, all the while being based in Ireland? That is the question. If this is the case, it is unacceptable and is one example of how this system could be exploited. In a separate example, France exports large numbers of weapons to Saudi Arabia despite the well-documented horrific actions of that country in Yemen. Could an Irish broker utilise section 25(3) to obtain authorisation to export arms to Saudi Arabia from France under this legislation? If this is the case, I strongly urge the Minister of State to reflect and accept this amendment or maybe to bring his own version at a later Stage, which would be even more helpful.
I thank the Senator again for the amendment. Military export controls overlap with dual-use export controls in several ways. The effectiveness of the implementation of exports controls is predicated on consistency and uniformity both within member states, and between member states. It is vital that dual-use and military items are closely co-ordinated and that there is a common policy framework in place to ensure consistency and transparency. Therefore, the approach that has been taken in this Bill is to ensure clarity for our exporters. The paragraph proposed for deletion mirrors controls on the brokering of dual-use items. It recognises consistency in controlling brokering across the EU. I am afraid that removing this paragraph would reduce the consistency sought. I will have to come back to the Senator on the specific examples, just to be absolutely clear on them. To maintain consistency, I cannot accept this particular amendment.
Will the Minister of State come back to me with the answers to some of those questions?
Absolutely. I will definitely provide those answers before the next Stage.
Okay. It is very important and is something that needs to be addressed.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 25 agreed to.
Sections 26 and 27 agreed to.
NEW SECTIONS
I move amendment No.11:
In page 22, between lines 2 and 3, to insert the following:
“Control on export of military items featuring automated means
28. (1) Notwithstanding sections 24, 25, 26 and 27 authorisation shall not be granted to a person or organisation to transit a military item through or from the State where such an item utilises automated means to function or has the capacity to be used through or with automated means.
(2) Where a person or organisation attempts to export a military item in contravention of subsection (1) they shall be guilty of an offence.
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, subsection (1) applies to the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána.”.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 12:
In page 22, between lines 2 and 3, to insert the following:
“Restriction on export of military items to a relevant occupied territory
28. (1) Notwithstanding sections 24, 25, 26 and 27 authorisation shall not be granted to a person or organisation to transit a military item through or from the State where such an item is destined for a relevant occupied territory or where there is a significant likelihood that the item may be transported to a relevant occupied territory.
(2) Where a person or organisation attempts to export a military item in contravention of subsection (1) they shall be guilty of an offence.
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, subsection (1) applies to the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána.”.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 13:
In page 22, between lines 2 and 3, to insert the following:
“Restriction on export of military items in contravention of Convention
28. (1) Notwithstanding sections 24, 25, 26 and 27 authorisation shall not be granted to a person or organisation to transit a military item through or from the State where such an item is subject to the Convention.
(2) Where a person or organisation attempts to export an item in contravention of subsection (1) they shall be guilty of an offence.
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, subsection (1) applies to the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána.”
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 28 agreed to.
SECTION 29
I move amendment No. 14:
In page 23, between lines 20 and 21, to insert the following:
“(d) the authorisation is being sought for the export of a military item or dual-use item which utilises automated means to function or has the capacity to be used through or with automated means,”.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 15:
In page 23, between lines 20 and 21, to insert the following:
“(d) the authorisation is being sought for the export of a military item or dual-use item which is destined for a relevant occupied territory or where there is a significant likelihood that the item may be transported to a relevant occupied territory,”.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I move amendment No. 16:
In page 23, between lines 20 and 21, to insert the following:
“(d) the authorisation is being sought for the export of a military item in contravention of the Convention,”.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 29 agreed to.
Sections 30 to 74, inclusive, agreed to
Title agreed to.
Bill reported without amendment.
When is it proposed to take Report Stage?
Next Tuesday.
Report Stage ordered for Tuesday, 17 October 2023.
Cuireadh an Seanad ar fionraí ar 1.58 p.m. agus cuireadh tús leis arís ar 2.32 p.m.
Sitting suspended at 1.58 p.m. and resumed at 2.32 p.m.