Léim ar aghaidh chuig an bpríomhábhar
Gnáthamharc

COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS díospóireacht -
Thursday, 6 Mar 2003

Vol. 1 No. 11

2001 Annual Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General and Appropriation Accounts.

Vote 31 - Department of Agriculture and Food.

Mr. J. Malone: (Secretary General, Department of Agriculture and Food.) called and examined.

I welcome the witnesses to the committee. Witnesses should be made aware that they do not enjoy absolute privilege. Witnesses' attention is drawn to the fact that from 2 August 1998, section 10 of the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997 grants certain rights to persons who are identified in the course of the committee's proceedings. These rights include the right to give evidence, the right to produce or send documents to the committee, the right to appear before the committee either in person or through a representative, the right to make a written or oral submission, the right to request the committee to direct the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and the right to cross-examine witnesses.

For the most part, these rights may only be exercised with the consent of the committee. Persons being invited before the committee are made aware of these rights and any person identified in the course of proceedings who is not present may have to be made aware of these rights and provided with a transcript of the relevant part of the committee's proceedings if the committee considers it appropriate in the interests of justice.

Notwithstanding this provision in legislation, I remind members of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that members should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House or an official, either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. Members are also reminded of the provisions within Standing Order 156 that the committee shall also refrain from inquiring into the merits of a policy or policies of the Government, or a Minister of the Government, or the merits of the objectives of such a policy.

Mr. John Malone

I will introduce my colleagues. With me are Mr. John Fox, Mr. Aidan O'Driscoll, Mr. Denis Byrne, and Mr. Seamus Healy, all Assistant Secretaries in the Department of Agriculture and Food.

I am principal officer in the public expenditure division in charge of the agriculture Vote in the Department of Finance. I am accompanied by Mr. Brendan Ellison, my assistant principal, and Mr. Dave Hurley, principal in charge of administrative budgets.

Paragraph 8.1 reads:

Chapter 8 - Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development

8.1 BSE Eradication Programme

Background

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is a progressive and invariably fatal degeneration of the central nervous system in cattle. It is one of a family of similar diseases, which occurs in humans and in animals known as Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs) and includes scrapie in sheep and goats and Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (CJD) in humans. TSEs may be either infectious or genetically determined, and are also known as 'prion diseases' as they involve the accumulation of abnormal prion protein in the brain, which is the main component of the agent believed to be responsible for the production and transmission of the disease.

BSE was recognised in the UK for the first time in 1985. After considering possible causative factors it emerged that exposure to the agent of a TSE in feed containing ruminant-derived meat and bone meal was the most likely source of the disease. As BSE was a newly recognised animal TSE and the possibility of transmission to humans was unknown, surveillance programmes for human TSEs were put in place in the UK and in the EU.

The first case of BSE discovered in Ireland was in 1989 and was regarded with the greatest seriousness by the Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development (the Department) because of the threat it might pose to the cattle industry. The disease was classified as a notifiable disease under the Diseases of Animals Act 1966 and the feeding of meat and bone meal to cattle was banned. However, the threat to the industry and consumers became much more serious in 1996 when British scientists found evidence that a new disease, variant CJD (vCJD) appeared to be caused by the same agent as was responsible for BSE in cattle. As a result of this, comprehensive additional national controls which provided extra safeguards to consumers of Irish beef at home and abroad were put in place in 1996 and 1997.

The estimated number of cattle in Ireland is 7.5 million, which are contained in approximately 138,000 herds. Beef production is predominantly grass-based, with cattle grazing pasture for most of the year. When housed during winter they are fed primarily on silage and/or hay, supplemented by food compounds, which up until 1990 could contain meat and bone meal. Approximately 1.5 million cattle are slaughtered each year, with nine out of every ten carcases destined for export.

Objectives and Scope of Audit

The objectives of the audit were to:

· Determine the extent to which the Department has set objectives for managing and eradicating BSE

· Review and evaluate the strategies and procedures put in place to manage and operate the programme to control and/or eradicate the disease, and the degree to which the programme has achieved its objectives

· Ascertain the involvement of the Department in research into the origins and transmission of the disease and the threat it poses to human health

· Review the systems, controls and procedures in place in relation to expenditure incurred on the eradication programme, and ascertain the level and funding of such expenditure.

The strategies, policies and practices adopted by the Department in operating the programme were ascertained and their implementation reviewed during the course of the audit, including the objectives of the programme and the extent to which they are being achieved. A sample of case files was examined to verify that the established controls and procedures were observed. A rendering plant was visited to ascertain the controls in operation in relation to the production of meat and bone meal, and a number of Departmental and independent reports into the operation of the programme were also reviewed.

Audit Findings

Policies and Strategies

The Departments ’Statement of Strategy 2001-2004’ outlines nine high-level goals, one of which is to

'Ensure the highest standards of food safety, animal health and welfare and plant health'.

Eighteen strategies and appropriate performance indicators are set out to ensure the achievement of this goal, including the following which relate directly to BSE eradication:

Table 26 - Strategies and Indicators relating to BSE Eradication

Strategy

Performance Indicators

Monitor compliance by producers and processors with requirements on feedstuffs, to detect unacceptable practices, residues and other risks, including disease risks

Number of tests carried out, level of non-compliance/ unacceptable level of residues and actions taken

Implement and review systems for preventing and dealing with Class A diseases

Organisation International des Epizooties (OIE) status Results of monitoring/surveillance programme

Implement the BSE monitoring and control programme with the aim of eliminating the disease

Incidence of BSE in cattle herd

The Department indicated during my audit that the aim of the programme is to eliminate BSE from the national herd and that it expects that the number of cases will decline significantly over the next two to three years. However, it also stated that due to the duration of the incubation period and other uncertainties, some cases will continue to be identified beyond that.

Disease Surveillance

Up to June 2000, surveillance was of a passive nature, whereby farmers and veterinarians were obliged by law under the Diseases of Animals Act 1966, to disclose details to the Department of animals showing clinical signs of the disease. In the years prior to 2000 and the approval of the so called 'rapid tests' for BSE, animals showing clinical symptoms, were put down where BSE could not be ruled out, and their brains were subjected to laboratory examination. In 1996, this examination was extended to all adult animals in herds depopulated for BSE as well as the birth cohorts and progeny animals of the BSE infected animal. Birth cohorts are, broadly speaking, animals in or about the same age and in the same herd as the diseased animal at the time of birth.

In July 2000 a targeted active surveillance programme was put in place whereby a proportion of fallen animals (animals which die on farms) and a random sample of slaughtered cattle eligible for human consumption were tested. In January 2001 testing was extended to cover all cattle over 30 months slaughtered for human consumption, all casualty animals over 24 months (animals which are injured on farms and are considered suitable for slaughter), and a random sample of fallen cattle over 24 months of age using a 'rapid test' approved by the Scientific Steering Committee of the European Commission. Since July 2001 all fallen cattle over 24 months are tested.

The testing regime in force is in accordance with directions issued by the EU on the disease. However the testing regime in place in Ireland since January 2001 exceeds EU requirements in so far as the Department tests all animals over 30 months of age in depopulated herds, birth cohorts and progeny animals.

The purpose of passive and active surveillance for the disease is to further protect consumers of Irish beef at home and abroad by preventing diseased animals getting into the food chain and to provide information on the incidence of the disease in the cattle herd to evaluate the effectiveness of the measures being taken to eradicate it.

Details of the numbers of cattle diagnosed as having the disease are shown in Table 27 below.

Table 27 ^ BSE Cases in Ireland analysed by Method of Identification

Year

Passive Surveillance

Active Surveillance

Testing of Animals over 30months of age in herdsdepopulated for BSE, birthcohorts and progeny animals

Totals

Number Tested

Number Positive

Number Tested

Number Positive

Number Tested

Number Positive

Number Tested

Number Positive

1989

25

15

-

-

-

-

25

15

1990

46

14

-

-

-

-

46

14

1991

32

17

-

-

-

-

32

17

1992

30

18

-

-

-

-

30

18

1993

40

16

-

-

-

-

40

16

1994

36

19

-

-

-

-

36

19

1995

35

16

-

-

-

-

35

16

1996

134

73

-

-

3,230

1

3,364

74

1997

188

77

-

-

5,043

3

5,231

80

1998

176

79

-

-

2,557

4

2,733

83

1999

198

91

-

-

3,260

4

3,458

95

2000

354

138

1,747

7

3,305

4

5,406

149

2001

484

123

662,403

119

12,196

4

675,083

246

2002

322*

66

324,944**

143

10,992*

2

336,258

211

Total

2,100

762

989,094

269

40,583

22

1,031,777

1,053

*to end July 2002

**to 24 July 2002

A total of 1,053 (including 22 cohort animals) cases of BSE had been diagnosed up to the end of July 2002. As can be seen the numbers of cattle tested have been steadily increasing over the years as the level of testing was extended. The huge jump in the numbers tested in 2001 is due to the introduction of testing for all animals slaughtered for human consumption over 30 months under the targeted active surveillance programme. The greater number of animals tested in 2001 under the active surveillance programme, in particular the testing of all fallen stock over 24 months of age is responsible for the increase in the number of cases identified in 2001. The figures have continued to increase in the first six months of 2002 but again this is attributed by the Department to the extension of testing to all fallen cattle from 1 July 2001, and that when this factor is taken into account no significant increase in disease levels is indicated in 2002.

The sharp increase in the figures in 1996 is felt by the Department to be due in large part to a greater awareness of the disease by farmers and veterinarians with the establishment in 1996 of a definite link between it and vCJD in humans and better reporting of suspect cases to the Department.

Table 28 shows the age profile of the animals, excluding the 22 cohort animals, diagnosed as having the disease in the years 1989 to 2001.

Table 28 - Age Profile of Detected BSE Cases 1989 to 2001

Age Category

Number

%

0 to 4 Years Old

70

9

5 Years Old

240

29

6 Years Old

292

35

7 Years Old

133

16

8 Years Old

46

6

9 Years Old

17

2

10 Years Old

14

2

> 10 Years Old

10

1

Total

822

100

The percentage of animals aged under 6 years detected as having the disease for the period 1996 to 2002 is shown in Figure 4.

The Department is confident that the trend shown in the graph indicates that the additional controls introduced in 1996/1997 have been effective in preventing the exposure to the infectious BSE agent of animals born after this time. However, as 64% of all BSE cases in Ireland are diagnosed in animals, which are 5 or 6 years of age at the time of diagnosis, the Department does not expect a significant drop in the number of cases identified until 2003 and 2004. However after this time, the Department is confident that as animals born prior to the introduction of the additional controls are slaughtered or die, the number of cases identified will decline towards zero.

The Department feels that its view is reinforced by the fact that to date only 2 cases have been diagnosed in animals born after 1996.

Control Measures

Control measures introduced in Ireland can be broadly divided into two phases, those that preceded the announcement in March 1996 in the UK of a link between BSE in cattle and vCJD in humans and those which were subsequently introduced.

The main control measures put in place by the Department following the discovery of the disease are as follows:

· In 1989 BSE was declared to be a Class A disease under the Diseases of Animals Act, 1966. This imposed obligations on farmers and veterinarians to report animals showing symptoms of the disease and gave legal powers to the Department to restrict cattle movements and sales, and to slaughter animals and depopulate herds in order to contain the disease.

· The feeding of meat and bone meal (which is thought to be the source of the disease) to ruminant animals, either directly or through feedstuffs was banned in 1990. In January 2001, this ban was extended to all animals intended for human consumption.

· Meat and bone meal produced by the seven rendering plants operating in the State is processed to EU standards and securely stored pending disposal, (mostly by incineration) and since 1996 all mills involved in the manufacture of animal feedstuffs are under the supervision of full-time Agricultural Inspectors of the Department. Regular inspections are carried out and the feed is monitored and regularly tested by carrying out a microscopic examination for bone fragments.

· Under the Designated Bovine Offal Order, regulations prohibiting the utilisation of the brain, spinal cord and intestines of bovine animals for human consumption were introduced in early 1996, with the purpose of protecting consumer health on foot of the revelation that BSE and vCJD could be caused by the same agent. The animal tissues defined under the regulations were those in which, on the basis of animal transmission studies, the BSE agent could be found and the exclusion of those tissues is regarded as an essential consumer health protection measure.

· The Specified Risk Material (SRM) is isolated, permanently stained and removed directly to an approved plant, where it is rendered and the resultant products stored pending destruction by incineration.

· In 1989, the import of animals from the UK, other than animals for slaughter under 6 months, was banned, and in March 1996, under EU Regulations, the ban was extended to cover the importation of all cattle and bovine products from the UK. Procedures have been put in place to trace and slaughter animals imported prior to the prohibition. Such slaughtered animals are rendered and excluded from the human and animal food chains.

· In abattoirs and meat plants Departmental veterinary officers carry out visual checks on animals before slaughter for signs of diseases including BSE. These staff also inspect carcases for SRM removal and the proper staining of such material.

· All cattle slaughtered over 30 months of age are screened for BSE using an EU approved test. Local abattoirs are precluded from slaughtering cattle over 30 months of age since January 2001 and the Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI) carries out audits of the effectiveness of controls at abattoirs and retail outlets.

The following control measures are in place where animals are suspected of or confirmed as having the disease:

· Suspect animals are inspected by a veterinary inspector from the Local District Veterinary Office. Where BSE cannot be ruled out the suspect animal is put down, and a sample of brain tissue is sent for testing. The herd in question is immediately placed under official restriction.

· The carcase of the suspect animal is transported to a designated Department-owned cold storage plant, pending the test result. (Previously the carcases, except for the head, were buried on the farms of the herdowners, but following public controversy this practice has ceased). Carcases relating to animals which test negative for BSE are sent for rendering to a plant designated for SRM destruction. There is currently no method of disposal for the carcases of animals which test positive for BSE, and hence such carcases are currently being held in indefinite cold storage.

· The remaining animals in the herd are slaughtered and destroyed, and compensation paid to the farmer at full market value. The birth cohorts and progeny of the diseased animal are traced and are also destroyed. The slaughter of animals is carried out at a dedicated meat factory, and the carcases are then rendered into meat and bone meal at a designated rendering plant. The meat and bone meal derived from the rendering of these carcases is sent directly abroad for incineration and the tallow by-product is burnt on site in the rendering plant. The collection, transport, slaughter and destruction of the animals take place under the direct control of the local District Veterinary Office.

· When an animal is confirmed positive for BSE, a full epidemiological investigation is carried out on all farms on which the positive animal had been resident throughout its life. The epidemiological investigation includes a review of clinical history and feeding practices on the farm. In addition, birth cohorts and progeny of positive animals are traced, slaughtered at a designated plant and their carcases are destroyed.

· The infected farm is disinfected with an approved disinfectant and left vacant for at least 30 days.

· In 1998 a computerised monitoring system was introduced which tracks the location of animals in the national herd. Animals presented for slaughter are validated against this system at slaughter and are only allowed into the food chain when they meet certain validation criteria. The system is also used to trace birth cohorts and progeny of BSE cases and to deter illegal imports of cattle.

The purpose of the control programme is to protect human health by maintaining high standards of food safety and animal health and welfare, to safeguard the economically important beef industry, and in the longer term to eradicate the disease from the national herd.

Penalties for breaches of BSE regulations involve fines and/or imprisonment on foot of criminal convictions and loss or reduction of compensation for culled herds. Three prosecutions have been taken by the Department on charges of intent to defraud the Minister for Agriculture, Food and Rural Development. One case resulted in a five year custodial sentence, while the other two resulted in two year sentences. Five cases have been prosecuted involving eighteen offences for breaches of meat and bone meal regulations. A custodial sentence of five months was imposed in one case while fines ranging from €635 to €1,587 were imposed in the others.

Herd Depopulation and Compensation for Slaughter of Animals

When a BSE case is confirmed the herdowner is notified immediately and it is the policy of the Department to slaughter and destroy all of the animals in the affected herd within six weeks of the date of the notification. Birth cohorts of diseased animals are also traced, slaughtered and destroyed. Compensation is paid to the herdowners in respect of the slaughtered animals.

The amount of compensation is determined by Departmental Valuers based on an assessment of the current market value of the animals. Consequential losses, loss of income, out of pocket expenses etc., are not payable. If the herdowner does not agree with the valuation, an independent valuer is appointed to value the animals and this may be higher or lower than the Departments valuation. Should agreement still not be reached an arbitrator is appointed whose decision is binding on both the herdowner and the Department. Again the arbitrators valuation may be higher or lower than the Departments or that of the independent valuer.

During the course of the audit a sample of case files were reviewed. It was found that the procedures and controls put in place by the Department relating to testing, notification, herd depopulation, valuations and payment of compensation had been operated in accordance with the official procedures in the cases reviewed.

Between 1989 and 2001, almost €83 million has been paid to herdowners in respect of over 85,000 animals, slaughtered under the eradication programme. Table 29 details the outturn for the five years to 31 December 2001.

Table 29 - Herd Depopulation and Compensation for slaughter of animals 1997 to 2001

Year

No. of Animals in Herds

Amount of Compensation - €

Average cost per animal - €

1997

8,321

7,582,384

911

1998

8,481

6,984,843

824

1999

9,983

8,717,138

873

2000

14,748

13,528,596

917

2001

23,399

21,506,937

919

The Department carried out tests for BSE on all of the above animals over 30 months and Table 30 details the results. All of the BSE positive animals were cohorts of the original confirmed cases. The disease incidence while low was many times greater than the rate in the general cattle population.

Table 30 - Results of Tests on Depopulated Herds and Cohorts

Year

No. of Animals Tested

BSE Positives

1996

3,230

1

1997

5,043

3

1998

2,557

4

1999

3,260

4

2000

3,305

4

2001

12,053

4

Manufacture and Control of Meat and Bone Meal

Meat and Bone Meal is manufactured from the waste product of animal carcases and from the carcases of animals considered unfit for human consumption. It was considered to be a good source of protein and for this reason used to be incorporated in animal feed.

From a very early stage following the discovery of BSE in cattle, animal feed containing meat and bone meal was suspected as being the most likely source of the disease. Following the completion of extensive research it is now almost universally accepted among the scientific and medical community that cattle acquire the disease mainly as a result of ingesting the infectious agent thought to be contained in meat and bone meal. Maternal transmission is also theoretically a possible method of transmission, but while there is some statistical support for low levels of maternal transmission, no plausible transmission mechanism has yet been identified. More particularly the infectious agent if present in the animal is thought to be present in the animals nervous system which comprises mainly the brain and spinal column.

In December 2001 the Scientific Steering Committee (SSC), which advises the European Commission on BSE and other issues published its opinion on the origin of BSE. It stated that

The origin and transmission routes for BSE mainly confirms the standing scientific consensus hypotheses of a prion of unknown origin as the agent for transmitting the disease via feed and cross-contamination of feed mainly, and via maternal transmission to a lesser extent. The SSC considers that not one of the alternative hypotheses about a third transmission route has so far been substantiated by scientific evidence. (Source: EU Institutions press release 5 December 2001).

It was recognised that in order to eradicate and prevent cattle acquiring the disease, it was essential to prevent the material thought to contain the infectious agent that causes BSE from being fed to cattle. This material was designated as Specified Risk Material (SRM) and includes mainly the spinal column and brain of all bovine carcases.

SRM is converted into meat and bone meal at three designated rendering plants. This meat and bone meal is classified as high risk by the Department, is banned as an animal feed and must be disposed of by incineration.

Meat and bone meal is also manufactured from low risk material (non-SRM waste from all slaughtered animals) by seven rendering plants. While this is also banned as a farm animal feed it can be used under licence by pet food manufacturers. No licences have been issued to pet food manufacturers in Ireland. Instead they obtain their raw material, which is the low risk carcase material such as trimmings, directly from meat plants and abattoirs.

The following controls are in operation in relation to the manufacture storage and disposal of meat and bone meal:

· Rendering plants are licensed by the Department under the provisions of the Diseases of Animals (BSE) (No. 2) Order, 1996, and in accordance with EU Council Directive 90/677/EEC and EU Commission Decision 94/382/EC. Their manufacturing processes and operations are supervised on a full-time basis by staff of the Department and must operate to standards laid down by the EU with regard to such matters as temperature, pressure and time.

· The storage and movement of meat and bone meal are carried out under the direct supervision of the Department, and as part of the licensing system, rendering plants must keep records of sales for up to 8 years. Officers of the Department inspect these records on a regular basis.

· Sales can only be made to those holding a valid licence to purchase meat and bone meal under the 1996 BSE Order, (e.g. Pet Food Manufacturers and Home compounders) and meat and bone meal can only be moved from a rendering plant on foot of a movement permit approved by an officer of the Department.

The veterinary and inspectorate staff assigned to each meat and bone meal manufacturing plant are required to carry out their work in accordance with detailed, standard, written procedures. As part of this audit these procedures were reviewed and their application was observed on a test basis on-site with satisfactory results.

In 2000 and 2001 rendering plants produced 136,648 and 134,898 tonnes respectively of meat and bone meal and stocks of the material totalling 196,720 tonnes were held at 31 December 2001. A large proportion of the high stocks were due to the market support measure introduced by the EU in 2001, whereby farmers could opt to have their cattle slaughtered and the meat destroyed so that it would not come on to the market, while being guaranteed prices almost equal to full market value.

The current cost to the State of incinerating meat and bone meal abroad ranges from €250 to €320 per tonne. At the time of my audit the Department was negotiating a series of contracts for the disposal of 89,000 tonnes of meat and bone meal mainly by incineration in Germany. The estimated cost of disposing of the stocks of the material held in store at 31 December 2001 is €60m.

Animal Feedstuffs

The ban on the feeding of meat and bone meal to ruminant animals in 1990 had a dramatic effect on the spread of the infection but did not fully address the potential for cross-contamination to ruminant animals, due in particular to the fact that many animal feed manufacturers did not have segregated manufacturing facilities for the production of cattle feed and pig and poultry feed.

Procedures were strengthened by the introduction of the 1996 Order which established a licensing system for the manufacture, purchase and use of meat and bone meal. In effect this confined the use of the material to licensed dedicated monogastric feedmills and specialised pig units where Department Inspectors could conduct checks on its use. These controls greatly reduced the possibility of cross-contamination of ruminant feedstuffs. For analogous reasons, similar provisions were introduced for poultry offal meal in 1997.

The legislation and procedures in Ireland allow no tolerance for the presence of bone fragments in ruminant feedstuffs, and are more stringent than that recommended by the EU Scientific Steering Committee which proposed that only feedstuffs containing a cross-contamination level exceeding 0.5% should be banned.

The EU, in late 2000, following the appearance of BSE in continental Europe, banned the feeding of processed animal proteins to any farmed animals kept for food production. Processed animal proteins cover virtually all products derived from mammals, poultry and fish that can be used in animal feedstuffs and also includes additives, pre-mixtures and compound feeds containing these products. The main products within this category in Ireland are meat and bone meal, poultry offal meal, feather meal and fish meal. Products not covered are animal fats and fish oils. Feedstuffs for pets and mink are excluded from the ban but horse feeds are included.

The EU Commission and the EU Food and Veterinary Office are responsible for prescribing and monitoring controls and standards in relation to animal feedstuffs imported into the EU. The importing of meat and bone meal into the EU is banned. According to the Department no compound feedstuffs are imported into Ireland other than from the UK. Imports from Third Countries are confined to ingredients such as corn gluten and citrus pulp which are subsequently compounded. The Department routinely samples all such imports to ensure that they do not contain any processed animal proteins.

In 2001, 1,231 feedstuff samples were taken. Ten samples tested positive for meat and bone meal, all of which were traced back to one consignment of maize gluten which was imported from the USA.

The Department points to the dramatic decrease in the frequency of positive bone samples since 1996 (from 24% to 0% of samples tested) and also to the improvement in the age profile of animals diagnosed as having BSE, as demonstrating the success of the controls introduced in 1996 in greatly reducing the risk of exposure of cattle to the infectious agent which is thought to cause BSE.

Cost of Eradication Programme

Up to the end of 2001 the cumulative direct costs of the eradication programme amounted to nearly €127 million excluding the Departments administration costs. Table 31 shows an analysis of these costs for the period 1997 to 2001.

As can be seen there was a substantial increase in costs in 2001 due to the vastly increased level of testing for the disease and increased compensation to farmers due to a greater rate of detection.

2001 was the first full year of a new regime of testing introduced under the Targeted Active Surveillance Programme. The testing of large numbers of carcases became feasible because of the development of a number of new faster tests for BSE, which took as little as four hours to complete compared to the earlier traditional tests which take about fourteen days, and makes testing on carcases in abattoirs feasible. The tests are carried out under contract for a fixed fee per test by two private laboratories. There is no recognised test to detect BSE in live animals.

Table 31 ^ Direct Costs of BSE Eradication Programme 1989-2001

1989-96 €000

1997 €000

1998 €000

1999 €000

2000 €000

2001 €000

Total €000

Compensation to Farmers and Herdowners

24,404

7,583

6,985

8,717

13,528

21,150

82,367

Haulage Costs

-

229

226

290

367

521

1,633

Factory Slaughter

-

820

623

729

1,116

1,771

5,059

Storage and Disposal of Meat and Bone Meal*

-

336

423

551

669

880

2,859

Rendering Costs*

-

1,827

1,316

1,774

2,289

3,300

10,506

Surveillance Programme (Testing)

-

-

-

-

396

23,295

23,691

Total

24,404

10,795

9,573

12,060

18,366

50,916

126,114

Less Costs recouped from EU

43,806

Net Cost to Exchequer

82,308

*These costs refer to the rendering of and manufacture, storage and disposal of meat and bone meal from animals slaughtered through having been in contact with BSE infected animals i.e. depopulated herds and cohorts.

70% of compensation costs are recoupable from the EU. As at 31 December 2001 a total of €43.8m has been received from the EU, out of total compensation paid of €82.4m. In 2002 the EU agreed to fund a portion of the test fee costs incurred under the active surveillance programme. No contributions towards costs were sought or received from farmers or meat processors.

Industry and Market Support Measures

As stated previously the significance of BSE lies in the threat it poses to human health and to the economically important beef processing industry, by undermining consumer confidence in beef products. The control measures put in place to contain and eradicate BSE have as their twin and complementary objectives the protection of human health and the sustenance of the domestic and foreign markets for Irish beef, in the face of the periodic crises posed by the emergence of the disease.

The discovery of the disease in Ireland led to closure or restricted access to many of the traditional markets for Irish beef particularly non-EU markets such as Egypt, Libya and Russia in the early 1990s.

Furthermore the discovery in Autumn 2000 of BSE in countries which had up to then claimed not to have had it, such as Spain and Germany, resulted in a collapse of consumer confidence and in a significant reduction in beef consumption across the EU during 2001. It led also to the closure of most major third country markets for EU beef generally. Ireland was particularly affected given its dependence on both EU and non-EU markets.

A range of measures was adopted in late 2000 at EU level to increase consumer protection, to restore consumer confidence in beef and to provide support for the market. These included the banning of meat and bone meal as a farm animal feed, the testing for BSE of all cattle slaughtered over 30 months and fallen animals over 24 months, and the introduction of partly EU funded cattle destruction schemes (Purchase for Destruction and Special Purchase Schemes), whereby farmers could opt to have their cattle slaughtered and the meat destroyed so that it would not come on to the market, while being guaranteed prices almost equal to full market value. The cattle destruction schemes applied for 2001 only.

€312m was paid out to farmers under the cattle destruction schemes by the Department of which €208m was funded by the EU. The costs of slaughtering the animals and destroying the meat by rendering the carcases and their conversion into meat and bone meal, are estimated to be about €76m. The cost of storing the meat and bone meal in 2001 was €0.9m resulting in total net scheme costs of about €182m to the Exchequer in 2001. Pending the destruction of the meat and bone meal ongoing storage costs will continue to arise.

Prior to its being banned as a farm animal feed, over 90% of meat and bone meal production was exported, mostly to non-EU countries. The imposition of EU temperature, pressure and time standards in relation to the rendering process in 1997 gave rise to significant extra costs to renderers in the form of expenditure on new equipment which could meet the more demanding standards. The difficulties being experienced by renderers were exacerbated by the banning of the feeding of meat and bone meal to all farm animals in January 2001 which transformed the product from having some commercial value to being a waste product having a negative economic value because of the cost of safely disposing of it.

To avert a possible collapse of some if not all rendering operations in the State which would in turn have been likely to bring the beef processing industry to a standstill, the Department supported by Government felt that intervention was essential. Accordingly, in late 2000 it entered into an agreement with renderers and beef processors whereby it agreed to underwrite a large portion of the renderers costs, including the cost of rendering low risk carcase material such as trimmings and carcases unfit for human consumption, as well as the costs of storage and disposal of the meat and bone meal. However the costs of rendering the Specified Risk Material continued to be borne by the beef processors. The costs incurred by the Department in funding rendering operations and the storage and destruction of meat and bone meal was €5m and €66m in 2000 and 2001 respectively. These costs can be analysed on an estimated basis as shown in Table 32.

Table 32 - Funding of Rendering Operations

2000

2001

Rendering

€4.9m

€53.7m

Storage

€0.1m

€1.3m

Disposal

-

€11m

According to the Department the present position in relation to beef markets is as follows:

· While consumption of Irish beef has improved considerably within the EU since its low point following the 2000/2001 crisis, Ireland continues to be without access to some of its important export markets.

· The Egyptian authorities have recently reopened their market to Irish beef from young cattle.

· The Gulf States markets remain closed but efforts are ongoing to have them re-opened by the Department.

· The Russian market is open but adheres to its policy of taking beef only from selected counties.

· The current improved prices for cattle are based to a large extent on increased demand in the UK as a result of Foot and Mouth Disease destocking.

The increased number of BSE cases in 2001 and 2002, albeit resulting mainly from increased levels of testing, brings with it further risks of market restrictions in the future.

Table 33 and Table 34 show details of beef exports and sales into Intervention for the years 1995 to 2000 and cattle prices (Table 35) obtained during the same period. Approximately 90% of Irish beef produced is exported.

Table 33 - Beef Export Trade 1995 to 2001*

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Live Cattle Exports - ’000 head

UK

18

10

27

5

18

27

50

EU

89

41

23

137

324

311

40

Other Countries

263

139

7

29

74

65

11

Total

370

190

57

171

416

401

101

Processed Beef Exports ’000 tonnes (carcase weight)

UK

100

60

95

85

95

125

210

EU

158

100

90

130

150

135

75

Other Countries

183

265

265

295

309

255

95

Total

440

425

450

510

554

515

340

Cattle Slaugherings at Meat Export Premises - ’000 head

1,363

1,508

1,675

1,753

1,950

1,755

1,783

*An Bord Bia Annual Meat Review and Outlook 2001/02 (2001 figures are estimated).

Table 34 - Beef Bought into Intervention (Tonnes Carcase Weight) 1996 to 2001

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

51,807

54,215

17,364

9,612

0

8,123

In addition, during 2001, 277,860 animals representing a total tonnage of 90,523 were slaughtered under the Purchase for Destruction Scheme, and some 61,000 tonnes of beef, representing an estimated 215,000 animals (mainly in the form of cow beef) was taken in under the Special Purchase Scheme.

Table 35 - Cattle Prices 1996 to 2001*

1996 €/kg

1997 €/kg

1998 €/kg

1999 €/kg

2000 €/kg

2001 €/kg

R3 Steers

247.0

230.5

231.5

225.6

248.6

230.8

R3 Heifers

245.9

233.1

229.3

218.5

244.3

233.6

O3 Cows

194.1

188.3

180.3

160.1

183.4

167.5

*An Bord Bia Annual Meat Review and Outlook 2001/02 (2001 figures are estimated).

Committee Enquiries

In April 1996 the Minister for Agriculture, Food and Rural Development established an expert advisory committee with the following terms of reference:

To report in the first instance on the transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) situation in ruminants in Ireland, and in particular to establish options in the light of the current state of scientific knowledge for an enhanced programme for the elimination and prevention of the disease in this State.

The Committee reported in July 1999 and stated that the BSE controls in place were adequate provided that they were stringently implemented as evidenced by independent auditing procedures and total transparency regarding their enforcement.

However, the Committee did recommend a number of additional procedures to prevent the transmission of the BSE agent, including

· Burial of BSE suspect animals on farms should cease.

· Effective incineration facilities for BSE carcases should be provided as a matter of priority.

· The mandatory veterinary ante mortem examination, provided for in EU Regulations, should be rigorously implemented at all meat plants and abattoirs. The efficacy of the procedures should be continuously reviewed and externally audited.

· All cattle movements should be controlled and recorded and the records made available for inspection.

· Research within Ireland into BSE and related conditions was considered to be essential in order to develop local expertise in this field. The State should not be solely dependent on research conducted elsewhere.

On farm burial of BSE infected animals ceased in October 2000. Since 1996 BSE and scrapie controls are independently audited on an annual basis and sometimes bi-annually by the Food and Veterinary Office of the European Commission. The Food Safety Authority of Ireland also carries out periodic reviews.

The Scientific Steering Committee of the European Commission carried out a risk-based assessment of BSE controls in 25 countries in May 2000, including Ireland. It assessed Irish controls as being 'optimally stable' from 1 January 1998, stating that all three main stability factors (feeding, rendering, SRM removal) were in place, well controlled, implemented and evidenced, and the procedures should fully prevent propagation of BSE infectivity.

Research

As BSE is a disease which originated in the UK and since the UK has had far more cases than any other country (over 180,000), that country became the logical site of primary research in relation to the origin, transmission and pathogenesis of the disease. Over the years, the UK has undertaken a number of lengthy, complex and very costly experiments, the results of which have been used by the international scientific community in understanding BSE. The Department's approach has been to concentrate resources on a number of projects designed to add to current scientific knowledge taking account of research findings generated elsewhere, and to build epidemiological and practical expertise both at central and local level. Research into BSE in Ireland, under the aegis of the Department, can be divided into four main categories:

· Projects carried out on behalf of the Department under the EU Food Sub-Programme

· TSE projects funded under the EU Food Research Measure

· Projects funded by the Department carried out as part of the Department's involvement in committees such as the BSE Scientific Advisory Committee, the BSE Sub-committee and CJD Committee of the Food Safety Authority of Ireland

· Other Research ^ collection and monitoring of epidemiological information in relation to each case of BSE including a number of projects undertaken by both laboratory and headquarter staff.

Some of the projects carried out under the above categories were in relation to scrapie disease in sheep, which may act as a possible masking agent for BSE. Because of the hypothetical risk that BSE may occur in sheep, the Department has implemented a control policy with a view to eradicating TSEs in the sheep population as soon as possible.

The Department expended approximately €2.4m since 1997 on TSE related research.

Conclusions

· The Department, based on the opinion of the international scientific community that contaminated animal feed is the prime cause of BSE in cattle, is confident as a result of the measures it has taken to cut off the supply of contaminated feed, that the number of cases will decline substantially within the next 3 to 5 years. However, in terms of complete eradication, it may be the case that, as in other diseases, as yet unidentified factors may have an influence on whether the disease can be fully eradicated and the time span over which this may occur.

· The limited checks carried out on audit would tend to confirm that the surveillance and control measures in place in terms of testing of carcases, removal of specified risk material, control of meat and bone meal, depopulation of infected herds and the tracing and slaughtering of infected animals cohorts and progeny, are being applied.

· On the assumption that the Department's confidence on the future epidemiology of the disease is well founded, some of the costs of controlling and eliminating the disease, such as compensation for herd depopulations should decrease substantially over the next two to five years. However testing for the disease is likely to continue at a significant level for a longer period in order to reassure consumers and monitor the disease levels. The restrictions in relation to meat and bone meal are also likely to continue and to result in increased rendering costs of waste animal material which will have to be borne by the Exchequer and/or the industry, unless a cheaper method of safe disposal can be found. In this regard the level of Exchequer subsidy for rendering operations and the storage and disposal of meat and bone meal, which cost €66m in 2001, should be kept under review.

· In the event of the subsidising of rendering operations continuing in the longer term it would seem prudent that the subsidy be directed towards the rendering of the high risk SRM rather than, as at present, the low risk carcase material to remove any possible financial incentive which might exist to dispose of it illegally.

· The review indicated that the controls and procedures in place in relation to expenditure incurred on the programme were satisfactory.

· The effort to retain and sustain markets would appear to have had reasonable success. However it would seem that confidence in beef will only be fully restored with the elimination of the disease and the belief by consumers that beef is not a causative factor in vCJD or in any other human disease. In this regard it is likely that resources prudently invested in ensuring the highest standards of safety and quality in beef and in food products generally will yield economic as well as health benefits.

The purchase for destruct scheme ended on 25 July 2001 and the SPS scheme ended on 31 March 2002. The BSE testing costs for all male animals and for female animals born after 1 January 2002 have been transferred to the industry since 14 February 2003. The Government's contribution to the cost of rendering and destruction of meat and bonemeal has been progressively reduced.

The measures to protect consumers and to control and eradicate the disease will continue. We will continue to review these measures to ensure the maximum efficiency and effectiveness in the use of public funds while at the same time giving the first priority to the protection of public health and responding to consumer concerns as well as ensuring that the decline in the level of the disease continues.

Just to clarify a detail, what does the Department believe were the origins of the 1999 born cases in view of the banning of meat and bonemeal which was considered to be the main cause of the disease in the first instance? The report of the Comptroller and Auditor General and Mr. Malone is that it is not completely determined what other contributory factors there may be. Nevertheless, have you any hypothesis about what caused the disease?

Mr. Malone

These cases - I refer to them briefly in my presentation - were a surprise and a disappointment. In our view they do not go against the overall trend. We have done a fairly detailed investigation of these two particular cases and we have not arrived at a point where we can make definitive conclusions but there are two aspects we would focus on. First, there is some evidence of residual feed on both farms. This is animal feed that could have remained on the farm. Second, there is some evidence of adjacent illegal knackeries, that is, places where——

Is it storage of dead cattle?

Mr. Malone

——dead cattle would be brought. I have to be careful because we are not totally at the end of our investigations and we have not arrived at definitive conclusions.

What did Mr. Malone call them?

Mr. Malone

Illegal knackeries.

Illegal knackeries.

My other question to Mr. Malone is of a more general nature. One of the remits outlined by the Department is to achieve the highest level of food safety, animal health and welfare and plant health, all of which are obviously designed to secure human health. One of the remits of the Comptroller and Auditor General's audit was to look at the Department's research into the origins of BSE, the threat to human health and the Department's management and eradication of BSE. I notice in the recommendations of the committee in July 1999 there are five or six key recommendations which are very practical - the burial of BSE suspect animals on farms should cease, mandatory post-mortem examinations and so on. Has the Department of Agriculture and Food learned something more profound as a result of the catastrophic development of this disease? Have we learned anything about the management of animals in modern farm practice? Is it not the case that there is an increasing trend of pushing animals beyond their natural production levels, in terms of meat and milk, by high levels of protein, intensive housing to an acute degree so far as some species are concerned, the widespread use of drugs and so on? Anybody like myself who was reared during the 1950s and 1960s before this massive intensification would know instinctively, or from more experience, that these methods would lead to serious health breakdowns. Is it not the reality that the two catastrophic epidemics, foot and mouth and BSE, have to be related fundamentally to these factory farming methods, which promote pathogens rather than animal health because of the conditions? I am somewhat disappointed that the research aspect of the Department does not deal with those fundamental questions. For those who would dismiss this analysis as being totally impractical, because of cost, I point to the figures you gave in 2001 and 2002 of a total cost of €400 million dealing with the effects of BSE alone which the taxpayer will have to fund and the farmers are paying for in a different way. Does Mr. Malone agree that we need to look at the whole issue of farming methods rather more radically and fundamentally than dealing with the surface level of BSE, in order to ensure there is not a repeat of this or even new diseases that can result from the completely unnatural way many animals are treated in modern farming?

Mr. Malone

Deputy Higgins has raised a number of questions, some of which are specific. I shall address some of the specific questions first. The approach to this disease has been primarily from a food safety point of view and every control we have put in place has started with the consumer. I will not go into too much detail but everything is designed to put in the different layers of controls. If the first layer fails, there is a second layer. The examples I would give are controls on rendering, the ban on the feeding of meat and bonemeal, the exclusion of certain parts of the carcasses from the food chain and the surveillance system which gives information.

On that point, are public health specialists involved?

Mr. Malone

Yes. There are two sub-committees, one under the control of the Department of Health and Children and the other under the control of the Food Safety Authority, both focused on BSE and BSE related issues——

By public health specialists.

Mr. Malone

——and carried out by public health specialists. We work closely with the Department of Health and Children and the Food Safety Authority on this issue. It is also the case that this issue is handled by Commissioner Byrne in Brussels whose remit is consumer affairs. Much attention has been devoted to this issue at EU level, international level and at ministerial level. Several Council of Ministers meetings have been devoted to this issue and regular reports are given to the Council of Ministers. There are also a number of scientific committees. A scientific committee in Brussels is devoted to it.

The second issue touched on is the actual science, that is the background of the disease. It is fair to say, and Mr. Purcell set this out clearly, that we have learned about this as time has progressed. The first case has been described as being in 1989 and the view at that stage was that banning meat and bonemeal was the simple control. What we learned, particularly in relation to 1996 with the new variant CJD, was that there was such a thing as cross-contamination. By cross-contamination I mean that very small particles of dust in a feeding mill can cross-contaminate feed that would not normally have meat and bonemeal in it for feeding to ruminants.

The second aspect that came to notice was the fact that there was an assumption that for a large animal to go down with BSE, a fairly massive dose of infected material was needed but it was learned that a small amount of infected material can cause an animal to go down.

The third phase was that we did not have the rapid tests that could test the large volumes referred to. These tests did not become available until 2000 and in fact the first test was developed in Ireland. The Enfer test was developed in collaboration with our veterinary research laboratory. When those tests became available, thousands of samples could be tested and background information obtained on levels. Prior to that, it depended on individual brains from animals being brought in and subjected to laboratory analysis. That was an important development.

We have monitored the science aspect very closely. We have liaised closely with the United Kingdom, which has a much larger number of cases than Ireland. We have participated in various scientific committees in the European Union and carried out modest, but important, research projects involving the veterinary laboratories and University College Dublin. We have taken the scientific aspects very seriously because if the nature of the disease is not understood, we are limited in attempting to deal with it.

On the broad question Deputy Higgins raised about farming methods, it is fair to say that intensive farming per se has come under focus generally at EU level, not just in relation to BSE - BSE is part of it - but in terms of the whole environmental aspect, the nitrates issue, for example, the use of antibiotics and the banning of certain antibiotics in feeds. A whole range of issues have come up from intensive farming.

The Deputy asked in particular about the lessons we have learned. We have learned a number of lessons. First, if a new disease like this emerges, we should try to find out as much as we possibly can about the science of it, and BSE was a new disease. Second, we learned, and this is a point in relation to the feeding of animals, that feeding large quantities of meat and bonemeal that had been produced at low temperatures - that was particularly the case in the UK - to animals that were essentially herbivores was not a good idea.

That was theoretically understood by the Soil Association in Britain. Two years before BSE emerged it banned the feeding of intense proteins on organic farms because it had theoretically deduced that there would be very serious consequences. Feeding meat to vegetarian creatures has been disastrous. Can we not learn for the future with regard to general farming practices?

Mr. Malone

I believe we have. We have learned this particular lesson, for a start. Also, there is a range of instruments in place now to assist what would be broadly called environmentally friendly farming. A much more rigorous approach is taken now in relation to the use of antibiotics in feed, for example. On the issue the Deputy touched on about the welfare of animals, there is a limit to the amount of stress an animal should be subjected to, so we have learned a lot of lessons. We have also learned lessons in relation to the application of controls in that we cannot take the implementation of controls in this area for granted. We learned a lot in relation to the use of animal feed and in particular we learned that animal feed is part of the food chain. The food chain does not actually start in the food processing plant. It starts on the farm but, more importantly, what is used on the farm and the inputs on the farm are now part of the food chain. We have learned that lesson and we now apply a zero tolerance approach to the use of meat and bonemeal, and the animal feed industry would acknowledge that fact.

What is the overall cost of the scheme to date? The report states that it was a cost of €400 million to the Exchequer. I am aware we got approximately €208 million in one form or another from the EU, which would bring the figure up to approximately €600 million, and I am sure there are other benefits from the EU also. What was the final cost taking everything into account?

Mr. Malone

If we take everything into account it is certainly——

Are we talking about €1 billion?

Mr. Malone

Perhaps I will take the actual costs first. The actual costs are what the Deputy has set out. They are in excess of €600 million but there were other costs, particularly from 2000 when consumers lost confidence in beef and markets collapsed, particularly in the countries with large populations. That meant that we lost those markets. We also lost international markets so there was a cost on producers through reduced prices or reduced market opportunities for beef. There have been some modest costs on the dairy industry, although that industry has not suffered to the same degree. Obviously there have been some benefits for the pigmeat and the poultry industries because poultry consumption has increased, as has pigmeat consumption.

Including the supports to which I referred, what is Mr. Malone's estimate of the final cost?

Mr. Malone

It is heading towards €1 billion.

That is what I suspected. In relation to what Deputy Higgins said, does Mr. Malone believe that €2.4 million, given that the final cost was €1 billion, was an insubstantial sum to put into research, irrespective of the research that was carried out in the United Kingdom and elsewhere? It seems a paltry sum in terms of the disaster that struck the industry, and particularly the Exchequer.

Mr. Malone

At one level, yes. First, we knew the UK was carrying out very large-scale experiments, particularly in relation to the transmission of the disease on which it was spending tens of millions of pounds. There was not much point in us replicating those experiments but we kept in close contact so that if findings became available, we knew about them. That is my first point.

Second, we have experts in this area and they have attended both the scientific veterinary committee in Brussels and specialised committees on certain aspects, and that has kept them up to date with research. A good deal of research is taking place, say, in the United States, Germany and in various research institutes. Quite a lot of work has gone into this area, as well as research in the human area. For example, we have provided material which is very important because at a particular stage a number of countries either did not have BSE or perhaps claimed not to have it so the question arose as to where they would get BSE infected material. There were large supplies in the UK but there were also supplies here so we helped with that. However, I point in particular to a dramatic development, the development of the rapid test. Prior to 2000 there was no screening available. That was done, obviously, by private enterprise in this country but with the support of our veterinary research laboratory and, in fact, it could not have been developed if the expertise and particularly the raw material had not been available. Picking a figure of €2.4 million is not the full story.

The report says that we were due to get back 70% of the compensation costs from the EU. However, at the end of 2001 we had only received €43 million out of €126 million, roughly half our entitlement. Does Mr. Malone have an up to date figure? Has the situation improved?

Mr. Malone

Yes. I can give figures for 2001 and 2002 under a number of different headings. There is a lag effect. That is how the EU pays compensation money. It might be paid the following year. Take the example of slaughter and depopulation. We spent a gross sum of €31.7 million in 2001 and got receipts of €12.4 million. In 2002, however, our receipts had increased to €28.6 million under that heading.

The 70% was received in that instance.

Mr. Malone

Yes. On certain occasions we carry out slaughter for veterinary or control reasons which would not always attract 70% recoupment from Brussels. We also get recoupment for testing. In 2002 we received €8.3 million for testing. The reason it was paid in 2002 was that the testing was only up and running in 2001 and the payment came in 2002. To give an accurate presentation of this, we are not failing to draw down the 70% for the depopulation. It is just the timing of the payments.

Mr. Malone could give us a list of the payments.

Mr. Malone

Yes. I can also give the committee, which is important, the level of recoupment on the purchase for destruct scheme and the SPS scheme, which involved substantial moneys as well. We will set it out on a page because the figures fall into a number of different headings.

Did the Department over-react in this instance? By and large, we had quality herds and eradicated them throughout the country at the first sign of BSE. We slaughtered and then allowed people to buy in more animals. In buying in animals, was there a possibility, as was suggested to me, that certain people could be affected a second time? My second question arises from that and relates to the quality of the cattle we have now. A change of policy seems to have taken place in France whereby if an animal is affected, it does not necessarily mean the rest of the herd will be slaughtered. From the data that is available at present, it does not appear to be having a dramatic impact in terms of a rise in the incidence of BSE. We have brought trauma to farmers who have been devastated to see their quality cattle being taken away and slaughtered. While they are compensated financially, they can never replace the quality of the cattle they originally had and, in fact, will be buying inferior quality animals.

Mr. Malone

That is an important issue. Depopulation costs a great deal of money overall. It is also traumatic for the farmer when one removes animals. The animals could be the result of 20 or 30 years of building up genetic quality in a herd. Often these are high yielding dairy herds. There are a number of reasons for depopulating. Not every country pursues the depopulation policy but we believe it has served us well, particularly at a time when we did not know everything about the disease. It provides a good perception from the point of view of the consumer that all the animals in a herd have been removed. We have reviewed this policy on an ongoing basis. Probably the most compelling reason is a trading one. The Deputy is right that the French have reviewed the situation. As we understand it, the French are simply exempting calves born after a certain date but are, in effect, removing the adult animals.

Our difficulty is that Ireland is a trading country. We export huge amounts of beef and dairy products and there are particular certification requirements for those markets. In essence, the certification requires that the product comes from a herd which never had BSE. The only way to achieve that is to remove the herd. The alternative is to leave the herd with the farmer but that means his product must be segregated in some way and excluded from certain markets. That is particularly a problem in the dairy sector because there are specific requirements, particularly in relation to baby food. There is a large baby food industry in this country and it is understandable that it would have extremely precise certification requirements which we must be able to meet.

The bottom line is that this is under ongoing review. We would not carry out the policy if we did not feel it was the right thing to do and that we can get to a point where we do not undermine our position or the position of the individual farmer. Although it is traumatic to remove the herd, it might be more traumatic for the farmer if he is left with the herd and no market outlets. The issue will be kept under strong focus in the period ahead.

Have the results in France been reviewed? The cost has been astronomical. While one must balance trade against the cost, has anybody analysed the results from the initiatives in France?

Mr. Malone

To a degree we have. We are looking at their certification system but the French have a huge domestic population for their product. We do not have that advantage. Nine out of every ten animals we produce has to leave this country in some shape or form, hopefully in a processed form. The same applies to dairy products. Over 70% of our product is exported. The UK has not pursued a depopulation policy but it has not exported beef for the best part of almost two decades.

Does Mr. Malone have any concerns about the quality of the herd as a result of depopulation?

Mr. Malone

Not really. First, it is a good chance for a herd owner to enhance the quality of the herd. The problem that arises is not that they bring in inferior quality but, unknowingly, they can bring in other diseases, although they are not in the same category as BSE. Johnes disease is one example. It had not previously been a problem in this country. The advice we give farmers if they are going abroad to bring in herds, and go for high quality or high yielding pedigree animals, is that they do all the checks and protect themselves from these diseases. I do not believe quality is the problem. However, some of them have possibly contributed, unknowingly, to other diseases coming into the country.

Mr. Carey, are you happy there was value for money in the level of inspections and with the necessity for €1 billion being spent?

We are never happy when €1 billion is spent but we have no reservations about the actions of the Department of Agriculture and Food in this area.

You have no reservations.

I share the confidence expressed in the report of Mr. Purcell, the Comptroller and Auditor General. I have had a long association with the Department, both as a farmer and a public representative. Since the terrible outbreak of BSE in 1996, apart from a few blips, the Department of Agriculture and Food has by and large handled the matter as well as can be expected. It is true that BSE was quite unknown and if we had known then as much as we know about it now certain things wouldhave been done differently, but that is another story.

To put the matter in context, while there is no doubt that the taxpayer has paid substantial sums, on a per capita basis it is nothing compared to what farmers have paid. I can say as a practising farmer that no disease has ever cost the agricultural community as much as BSE. The effects of the disease will continue to be felt for a generation because in certain instances no recovery is apparent.

I am somewhat worried about the importation of animal feed because it appears that on a number of occasions, despite all the checks, meat and bonemeal contaminated the imported tonnages. It could be argued that it was discovered because the inspection system is so good, but that is a bit like the importation of illegal drugs - we always have to ask how many got through that we did not know about. Given what Mr. Malone has told us, that the most minute amounts of meat and bonemeal can contaminate a huge tonnage thereby infecting animals, will he give an undertaking that the system has been tightened up concerning, for instance, animals found on farms where feed processors have sold the feed? We should be told categorically that extensive checks have been made on those farms. We know how this disease works so it would be nothing short of a disaster if negative results arose in six or seven years time because of imported feed. Farmers are very concerned about the matter, as is everyone else. Mr. Malone should indicate how the procedures have been tightened up because I am amazed that it can get through.

Mr. Malone

There are a number of different layers to the control system. Firstly, it is about ensuring that there is proper control of the rendering industry, and we have greatly scaled up our controls there. Facilities in the rendering industry have been modernised to combine time, pressure and temperature which, it is accepted, will deactivate the BSE agent. That system is applied in all the rendering plants in the country. Secondly, we have a total exclusion of meat and bonemeal from animal feed.

Does that include poultry and pigs?

Mr Malone

Yes, poultry and pigs are not allowed. Thirdly, we have a system whereby we check imports of animal feed, mainly corn gluten and other products like that. The bone spicule test is very precise and can pick up small particles of bone. There have been instances when we have found four or five bone particles and when that occurred we seized the product and either returned it or destroyed it.

We are also carrying out checks on farms and the Deputy's point is well made, namely that this, in many ways, is the first layer of control. We envisage carrying out approximately 5,000 checks. A team of people is dedicated to doing this so it is something we take very seriously. Equally, we must depend on the common sense and goodwill of the farming community because we cannot police every single farm. However, any farmer who deliberately or carelessly tries to get his hands on meat and bonemeal is, in effect, shooting himself in the foot because if it is the wrong kind of meat and bonemeal he will have a problem further down the line. We see this as a critical element of the control system. As I have already described, we have taken various layers of control to attack the problem systematically.

Are any legal cases pending against feed importers?

Mr. Malone

There are no legal cases against feed importers but, to date, there have been five prosecutions over breaches of controls.

A number of infected animals have been found that were four and five years old. Will Mr. Malone explain how deeply the investigation went on the cohort herds from which those animals came? Unless we get to the bottom of that, there will always be a question mark about how successful the eradication programme is. That is hugely important. I assume that a great deal of time and effort has been put into finding out the background story on those farms and everything relating to the cohort herd that came into contact with them.

Mr. Malone

Obviously, we carry out a check on the farm to see if we can identify a possible source. One of the advantages of depopulation is that it enables us to test all the animals, so we test the entire herd. We have found a number of cases in cohort animals which provide some information concerning animals of roughly the same age, so that we may be able to identify a source. We have learned that a category of animal born around 1994 and 1995 seems at the moment to be giving a large number of the positive cases that have emerged.

The two 1999 cases drew a lot of attention but, equally, we have been somewhat surprised by the number of very old cases. For example, in 2002 we had 43 cases in animals of ten years plus, and we had 136 cases in animals of eight years plus. We are beginning to see that if we have stabilised the situation after 1996, in essence what we are dealing with, to a large degree, are the older cases washing out of the system.

This particular disease will not disappear overnight and we never envisaged that it would. We feel, however, that we are now beginning to see encouraging trends, particularly since the middle of last year and, equally, since the beginning of this year. Looking at the figures, the reduction is of the order of 30% which, in any man's language, is significant. If that continues, and hopefully it will, it will give us great encouragement.

I have one more question, Chairman.

Deputy Curran wants to contribute.

The Departments of Agriculture and Food and Finance are making a huge mistake this year by placing the cost of rendering on farmers. If we continue down this road, we will have no farmers, or certainly no winter fatteners. The disease levy was doubled to €5.08 and An Bord Bia got €1.90. Where an animal over 30 months fetched €20.29, the vet's fees amounted to €4.75, insurance totalled €1.90 and the IFA levy was 90 cent. It cost the farmer €15 to get the animal to the factory. If the same animal was sold today, another €13 would be added to it because that is what rendering costs. The processor will not accept it. The Department is after withdrawing the subsidy.

It now costs €62.81 to sell an animal. I have been farming for many years and until recently one would sell four animals for that price. For every ten animals one sells, one must sell one animal to pay for the fees. That cannot continue. The Department, the renderers and the farmers should carry the load on the rendering side between them.

Mr. Malone

I understand the point made by Deputy Connaughton. This has been a very difficult experience for farmers. I fully accept that. It has damaged their markets and has made life more difficult for them but it must be looked at in context. Both the national and the European taxpayer stepped in to a considerable extent when the market collapsed in 2000, and the figures have been set out. This is regarded as a State aid and there is a direction from the European Union that we must get out of this. Other member states are doing the same.

In 2003 the State will devote €149 million to this heading of expenditure. It is not that the State is withdrawing from this area. We will fund depopulation. We subsidise the collection of fallen animals and we fund testing. A range of costs fall, and will continue to fall, on the Exchequer. Beef consumption in Europe is back to the pre-2000 level. That is an important point. This is seen as a waste or a product from the industry which cannot be put into the human food chain. It is dealt with in the same way as waste from any other industry. I accept the point made which has also been made very forcibly by the farm organisations.

In regard to meat and bonemeal stocks, there are 170,000 tonnes in storage and the costs of disposing of such stocks are huge. You stated the stock pile will continue to rise. At present there is no method to dispose of the carcasses of animals which test positive for BSE and, therefore, they are being held indefinitely in cold storage. How many carcasses are held in cold storage and where are they located?

Mr. Malone

In regard to the stocks of meat and bonemeal we have almost 200,000 tonnes in storage. We will keep that product there until we have the wherewithal to dispose of it. The stocks are not building up. That is one important development. Since the State got out of purchasing the meat and bonemeal - this is an important lesson - the renderers now have——

Have stocks gone down because in 2001 there were 170,000 tonnes?

Mr. Malone

The stocks are roughly the same; they are not increasing. The meat and bonemeal produced this year is not being stored.

Deputy Connaughton's point in relation to the State subsidy is relevant. The added costs——

Mr. Malone

It definitely puts costs back on the industry but there will not be an accumulation of meat and bonemeal. We will just have the current stocks.

The reality is that there are a number of carcasses in cold storage. It is a huge problem and it would appear there is no solution to it in terms of how the carcasses will be got rid of and how they will be rendered.

Mr. Malone

There are 600 carcasses in cold storage in Tipperary. As the members will know, the problem was that we had been burying carcasses on-farm but we changed that policy. Our approach will be to continue to cold store them until an option for their disposal arises. In other countries, these carcasses are rendered in the same way as specified risk material. We do not have that option at the moment, so pending that——

What does specified risk material include?

Mr. Malone

Parts of the animal are regarded as having the potential for BSE infectivity. That includes the brain and the spinal cord in the main and other parts of the——

At one time there were stocks in cold storage in a boat off the coast of Ireland. Is that still the case?

Mr. Malone

Those were stocks of intervention beef. We did not reach the point of having to place meat and bonemeal in a boat offshore.

Looking at the report from the Comptroller and Auditor General, one might conclude that the incidence of BSE is on the increase but putting it into context, it is probably because a far greater number of animals are being tested than ever before. I suppose Mr. Malone will argue quite rightly that there is an end in sight and that the trend is downwards, particularly as the age profile of the animals goes up. To put it bluntly, the disease is dying with the animals given their age profile. I am from Dublin and not a farmer or from rural Ireland like some of my colleagues, so I do not have the same insight. When an animal is diagnosed as having BSE, what is the procedure?

Mr. Malone

There can be a number of situations. An animal may be diagnosed under what is called "passive surveillance". The Department is notified and the local veterinary office goes to the farm. The animal is put down and the head is taken away. The brain is brought to the veterinary research laboratory and an examination is carried out. The result is either positive or negative. If the result is positive, a restriction order is placed on the herd - in effect, the herd number is frozen. The Department then sends out a valuer who values the herd. We agree a price with the farmer but, in some cases, arbitration is required. The herd is then destroyed and tested.

A situation could then arise where a positive result would appear on the active surveillance test. That test is then confirmed in our veterinary laboratory and, in effect, the same procedure starts again.

Page 83, table 27 indicates a figure of 10,992 tests. Do they relate to the herds that would have been tested and slaughtered following the finding of BSE?

Mr. Malone

The final figure for 2002 is 18,000.

I can only work from the figures before me. Does the figure of 10,992 refer to the number of animals that were killed from herds where BSE was detected? Is it the case that having slaughtered 10,992 animals, two positive cases were found? The figures indicate that under the category of active surveillance almost 325,000 animals were tested of which there were 143 positive cases. It appears that the small sample of 10,992 had a lower incidence of positive results than the larger sample. This questions the value of slaughtering entire herds. The figures presented in this report indicate that the incidence of BSE has dropped below the average.

Mr. Malone

That is a fair point if one addresses it from that point of view but, as I explained earlier, it is not the full story. There is the additional question of certification requirements and our position in international markets. We know from dealing with some of our customers abroad that they value this total depopulation policy. It costs money.

It is costing a fortune.

Mr. Malone

It costs a fortune, in money and resources. It is stressful on the farmer and it can destroy 20 or 25 years of hard work in building up a high quality herd. It is not something we do lightly and if we could we would stop doing it. However, the danger is if we stop we could end up with fairly serious trading problems in the dairy area, but possibly not in the beef area.

Does that mean that the destruction of herds is more because of marketing than disease eradication?

Mr. Malone

Yes. In the United Kingdom there is no policy of depopulating entire herds. There has been a huge number of cases there but the trend is downwards. Depopulation provides some advantages. I accept that entire herds do not have to be depopulated for reasons of considering the cohorts. It is mainly a certification argument at this point.

You mentioned that the 170,000 tonnes of meat and bonemeal in storage was not getting larger. What is to be done with it? At one stage it was considered to have some value and benefit but it is now a waste product. What can be done with it?

Mr. Malone

For a number of years we have been shipping out meat and bonemeal for destruction abroad. Ultimately it will be shipped abroad, mainly to Germany or the United Kingdom where in some instances it is burned for generating energy.

Presumably over time it is cheaper to pay for its export than maintain it in storage.

Mr. Malone

Yes. The storage costs are not massive. It is something we would prefer not to be doing. Equally, we reached the point that approximately 150,000 tonnes of meat and bonemeal was produced every year. A five year accumulation produces 700,000 or 800,000 tonnes. That is not tenable.

You referred to 600 frozen carcasses in County Tipperary. What do other countries do with them?

Mr. Malone

They render them in the same way as other products.

Is it done in rendering facilities?

Mr. Malone

In facilities that would be designated for what is called SRM, or specified risk material. There are a number of SRM plants in the country. It is an issue to be addressed with the EPA.

What is the cost per tonne of exporting meat and bonemeal?

Mr. Malone

Initially it was very expensive. I understand at one stage it was £300 per tonne, which was then reduced to €300 per tonne. It has probably been reduced to €250 per tonne and should be further reduced. There was excess supply at a particular point, but there are facilities in Germany and the United Kingdom that can take this product. It is expensive because of the transport costs.

Is there a subsidy for SRM?

Mr. Malone

SRM was never subsidised.

I thank you for the information you have provided. How many cattle have been processed under the purchase for destruction scheme and the special purchase scheme?

Mr. Malone

I understand we slaughtered 278,000 cattle under the purchase for destruction scheme and 135,000 under the special purchase scheme.

Over 400,000 cattle have been destroyed.

Mr. Malone

Yes.

They were not for human consumption.

Mr. Malone

That is correct.

What happened to the cattle?

Mr. Malone

They were slaughtered and their carcasses were rendered into meat and bonemeal, which was shipped abroad for destruction.

Was it stored?

Mr. Malone

No.

Why was it shipped abroad?

Mr. Malone

It was an EU scheme. The EU paid us a certain amount of money up front, but it would only pay the final amount once the meat and bonemeal was destroyed. There was a compelling argument for us to destroy it. We are in the final stages of destroying it.

At present is every animal over 30 months tested under the surveillance system? This will establish if they have BSE or will enter the food chain. However, you cannot make any certification about the herd from which they came. You say that our trading partners require certification that every animal leaving the country is BSE free and that this can be done. How do you overcome the problem of being unable to certify the herd?

Mr. Malone

We overcome that by depopulation. When a herd is depopulated it is given a new identity and a new herd number. That is, in effect, the nub of the argument for the depopulation policy.

I do not follow that. If an animal goes to a factory and is tested positive the herd is not depopulated.

Mr. Malone

The herd is depopulated if the animal is tested positive.

What happens if the animal is not tested positive? Some 99% of animals are tested negative and they go for onward sale to the food chain. There is no certification of the herd to which the cow belonged.

Mr. Malone

Perhaps I am not explaining it clearly. It is a general certification requirement, not so much for the European market but for certain third country markets, particularly the Russian market, where we sold 80,000 tonnes of beef last year. The certificate for that market contains a statement that the animals come from herds in which there has never been a BSE case. There is no problem with the 99% of herds that do not have BSE but we have depopulated the more than 1,000 herds that have had BSE. If we had not done so, it would be a nightmare because the herds and their milk would be excluded from the Russian market. Many of the dairy co-operatives were not keen on taking their milk, regardless of certification.

I am happy that Mr. Malone clarified it is not a certification to say the herd is BSE-free and that a case has never been found in the herd. It is a different issue.

Mr. Malone

That is an important distinction.

When he referred to that, I assume he was talking about the other issue. What is the age profile of the national herd? How many cows are aged over four? They are a higher risk given that the younger animals are a low risk. If Mr. Malone does not have the information, he might forward it to the committee. I presume there has been a significant change in the age profile.

Mr. Malone

There are probably 750,000 older animals out there.

Belonging to farmers who did not avail of the purchase to destruct scheme.

Mr. Malone

The scheme was a market instrument to remove healthy young steers and bullocks.

There are still old cows in the national herd.

Mr. Malone

There are still old cows, approximately 750,000 animals.

My question is related to Deputy Higgins's initial question. Was a connection established between the two 1999 cases? Will the findings of the investigation into the cases be made public so that farmers will be made aware of what they considered to be insignificant practices, which led to incidences of the disease? Although there has only been a small number of cases, it is an alarming trend that animals so young should test positive for BSE.

Mr. Malone

Yes. We have not completed our investigation but when we have, we will copy it to the committee if that helps. To be clear in terms of the age of the animals, there have been younger cases going back in time. The animals in these cases were 45 months but the youngest case in this country was 42 months. What causes a problem is the fact that the animals were born in 1999. That was what alarmed us so greatly, not the age of the animals. We do not have evidence of a connection between the two cases, even though they were reasonably close geographically.

That is what I thought.

Mr. Malone

Other than that, there does not seem to be a connection.

Only two incidences of the disease were found among the almost 11,000 animals slaughtered. It is extraordinary that there must still be the policy to certify that exported meat comes from BSE-free herds.

Mr. Malone

BSE is a disease in individual animals. We have argued this, particularly with the third countries that take our products. They place a value on depopulation. If we felt we could change the certification and renegotiate it, we would. It is a particular problem in the dairying area and the co-operatives that purchase milk value the certification.

For example, Australia exports to third countries and the Far East similar to Ireland but only checks its cattle once a year and sometimes only when they are about to be exported. How can Australia export to these countries when such tight restrictions are imposed on Ireland?

Mr. Malone

All this becomes a problem when the first BSE case is discovered. Australia and New Zealand have not had BSE.

But they do not test.

Mr. Malone

The EU has categorised European and non-European countries. Most countries carry out some surveillance. If Ireland did not have BSE, this would not be a problem. This is under ongoing review because it costs so much.

If we did not find the disease, it would not be a problem.

Mr. Malone

Correct but that is not good either. If a country has the disease, it is better off finding it. That was part of the problem in 2000.

I visited a cattle ranch in Australia where the practice was that a thousand weanlings were rounded up for export to the Far East and it was the first time they were ever in a yard or seen by the herdowner. I do not know what test was carried out. I asked the herdowner and he said they would be tested the following day and shipped the day after.

But they lived on grass, not meat and bonemeal.

It is economy of scales.

If the farmer never saw them, he was not feeding them meat and bonemeal.

That is a good point. Having banned the feeding of meat and bonemeal to ruminants, will we reach the stage where the policy of testing for exports will be reviewed?

Mr. Malone

Yes, we reviewed depopulation in the past few weeks to see whether there was another way to tackle this. This is an issue of concern to the committee but it is also an issue for farmers and farm organisations. We are conscious of the argument and it comes down to striking a balance. The difficulty is that if one stops this policy, one must be sure one is certainly no worse off than before one started. For instance, the Food Safety Authority would have a view on it because it has a BSE committee. The Department of Health and Children also has a CJD committee. They all have a view on this and our problem is that we must take into account the difficulties the farmer has, the cost, the marketing elements and the public perception. There is an issue of public confidence in controls. It is a question of striking a balance.

What percentage is the public perception?

Mr. Malone

It is an important percentage.

With regard to herd depopulation and compensation, are many cases that went to arbitration outstanding?

Mr. Malone

The arbitration is used every so often but we do not have a backlog of cases. We do not have a problem of cases hanging around because it serves everybody to get it sorted out quickly.

What is the timescale involved from notification to conclusion?

Mr. Malone

Generally a couple of weeks.

Time is moving on and I have questions on the later chapters but I will finish my contribution on this with three brief questions.

On the rendering controversy that is about to break out, I have a huge sympathy with small farmers on this issue. Given the huge difficulties they have had in recent years, it would be unfair if another imposition were to be placed on them. This is especially the case given the interesting analysis in the Irish Farmers’ Journal in February which showed dramatically how little of the reward goes to farmers. It gave one example of an animal that makes a farmer €595 and is worth €1,600 when it reaches a top supermarket. Obviously huge profits are being made in between but not for the farmer. The Department should seek to transfer the cost of rendering to those who make the massive profits, and they are not small farmers.

In late 2000 the European Union banned the feeding of processed animal proteins to animals and that included processed poultry feed as well. Apparently large numbers of chickens over whose diet we have no control are imported from outside the EU to this country. There is a suggestion that the chicken that arrives here in carcass form from where it was reared outside the EU has been fed meat and bonemeal or even fed its brothers and sisters in some type of meal or other processed form. Has the Department any concerns about what might be imported and has it taken any measures in that regard because of the dangers that might accrue?

I am disappointed other members did not touch on the point I raised at the beginning. It has emerged that the BSE disaster has cost us €1 billion not to speak of the human trauma for the farming community and the greater costs in other ways. I am sorry other members did not tease out a bit more why BSE was allowed to develop because of the unnatural practices of feeding vegetarian creatures meat. I appeal to Mr. Malone to have the Department examine this issue more seriously. We are talking mainly about BSE in beef, but there is a huge animal welfare issue as far as poultry and chicken farms, the intensive development of pig farms, and the way sows are kept in stalls in an unnatural and cruel environment are concerned.

Will the Department examine seriously the possibility of encouraging and leading a move by the farming community to more organic based and natural methods which may perhaps be more costly in one sense but can spare us the appalling costs of the intensive practices that have caused BSE? If we go in that direction, we can then produce good, wholesome, healthy and locally produced and consumed produce, which would be a major improvement on what happens at present.

Is much meat and bonemeal used in pet foods? I see that no licence has been granted for its use.

Mr. Malone

A number of points were made. To be clear on the issue of the €1 billion, it would be the total cost, not just the cost to the Exchequer. We added together the cost to the Exchequer, loss of markets, costs to farmers and all that.

The actual cost to the Exchequer would have been €600 million.

Mr. Malone

Yes.

That is the figure to date.

Mr. Malone

That is correct. On the cost of rendering and the situation of small farmers, it gets down to resources and the amount of money the Department has. We had €28 million this year for that heading and that has been spent. It is not an insignificant sum. The Irish and European taxpayers have been generous on this issue.

On the issue of imported products, there is a total ban on the feeding of meat and bonemeal to pigs, poultry and cattle. Regarding products imported from outside the EU, the Union stipulates and we know that the standards, especially in the slaughtering plants that supply poultry for import to this country, are very high. They could very well have been fed meat and bonemeal. That is possible, but the important issue is that the products from imported animals, especially those imported chickens, are not allowed into the animal feed chain.

They go into us. We are eating them. It is very nice to protect the animals but, naturally, we would like a little protection as well.

Mr. Malone

I do not think there is a public health risk. There is an obligation on everyone to ensure that the product is fit for human consumption. If it is not, it should not be allowed into the country, the European Union or into circulation. A range of requirements is set out. Products coming into this country are traded internationally. They are sold to many other countries as well and we are not unique.

The Chairman asked if meat and bonemeal goes into pet food in this country. It does not.

It is not used at all.

Mr. Malone

No.

Regarding the Enfer test, it appears that this organisation had a monopoly on this test. Is it satisfactory that all testing is done by one agency? Is there any independent verification of its results? Is it a fully private operation?

Are people doing the testing and producing the results connected with organisations interested in developing proposals for incinerating the meat and bonemeal? If so, there could be a potential conflict of interest and the Department would have to be careful about that.

On the cost of €1 billion, not all of which was borne by the Exchequer, I am aware there was a national spirit of goodwill to assist in that regard. This was with the aim of preserving the good name of the Irish food industry. Is there any evidence to show that this investment resulted in increased market or prices? Was there a payback to the Exchequer? Had we not done it, would matters have continued anyway? There is always a risk. Did we do it to be absolutely certain or did it lead to an improvement in the income of farmers?

Mr. Malone

As far as I am aware, there are three approved tests. We have an open tender system. The firm the Deputy named was the successful one but we use another firm for a certain amount of testing. I do not know about and am unsure if it is appropriate for me to comment on the potential conflict of interest. Our dealings with Enfer are straight up and they relate only to it. It is a tender process. This field will get quite crowded.

Is it done by tender?

Mr. Malone

It is done by tender and the tests must be validated. They must be accepted internationally.

In regard to value for money, if we had not taken this action, we would not have a beef industry.

It helped to retain and sustain markets.

Mr. Malone

It helped to retain the beef industry. Consumption in Europe is back to where it was. We sold approximately 250,000 tonnes of beef to the British market last year. We will probably sell more this year. We are selling in every member state in Europe. We have problems outside Europe, but if we had not taken this action, the industry would not——

I agree with that, but it would have been much better if it never happened.

Mr. Malone

Yes.

Will Mr. Malone send the committee the response to the two investigations? I thank Mr. Malone for what has been a very open debate on a very difficult time in the history of Irish agriculture. It is important to put the facts on the table.

Due to time constraints, I propose to begin subheads 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 for discussion.

Paragraph 8.2 reads:

FEOGA Guarantee Expenditure - Ewe Premium Scheme

Under the Ewe Premium Scheme, farmers holding a Ewe Premium quota are entitled to receive payments on the number of eligible ewes applied for, up to the limit of that quota, subject to their compliance with the terms and conditions of the scheme.

The scheme is operated in Ireland by the Department of Agriculture Food and Rural Development on behalf of the EU, which funds the scheme. The EU determines the rules regarding eligibility, rates and timing of payments, etc. and has also set down control procedures which the Department is obliged to follow to ensure that payments are only made for eligible sheep.

The Department paid €59.08m under the 2001 scheme to 37,692 applicants in respect of 4,066,802 sheep.

All applications for Ewe Premium are subject to administrative controls. In addition a selection of applicants flocks are physically inspected. Farmers are also obliged to maintain flock registers and details of ewes purchased and sold to provide documentary evidence as to numbers of ewes which they own and these may also be inspected by the Department, particularly if there is doubt following the physical inspections as to the numbers of sheep eligible for payment. The flocks which are physically inspected each year are selected following a risk analysis of the applications for premia. EU rules require that a minimum of 10% of flocks be physically inspected each year.

Farmers are penalised if found to have claimed for more than the eligible number of animals in their possession. A sliding scale is in operation in relation to penalties. For flocks of over 20 ewes the penalties vary from the actual amount over-claimed where the discrepancies are less than 5% to the disallowance of the total premium claimed where the discrepancy is greater than 20%. Slightly different rates of disallowance apply for flocks of under 20 ewes. Applicants found to have made false declarations are excluded from the scheme for one year if found to have done so through serious negligence, and for two years if found to have done so intentionally.

The EU carries out various audits each year on an ongoing basis to ensure that EU schemes including the Ewe Premium Scheme, have been administered by the Department in accordance with EU standards, and if deficiencies are found it may impose penalties on the Department.

Following the discovery of a Foot and Mouth infected animal in the Cooley area of County Louth in March 2001, a cull of all farm animals in the area was undertaken to prevent the spread of the disease. The culling exercise presented an opportunity to the Department to ascertain and verify the number of sheep owned by farmers in the area and to compare these numbers to the numbers on which ewe premia had been claimed. Such an exercise was commenced by the Department in March 2001.

Following the cull, an interim assessment of Ewe Premium applications in Cooley in April 2001 relating to 37,165 sheep, indicated that the number of ewes on which premia had been applied for was 6,625 greater than the total number of ewes culled that were entitled to premia.

The interim assessment indicated that of the 257 farmers who had applied for ewe premia in the Cooley area, 107 had deficits. Of these 51 had deficits of 20% or more accounting for 5,848 of the difference of 6,625, while the remaining 56 had deficits of less than 20% accounting for the remaining 777 difference. These 107 cases were investigated by the Department.

The Accounting Officer supplied me with the following information in relation to the investigation and the administration of the scheme generally:

· Up to the end of July 2002 investigations were completed in 92 cases. 27 were excluded from the scheme for two years, 7 were excluded for one year and 2 had their claim disallowed in full. A further 35 had their claims reduced, while 21 were paid in full. Investigations have not been completed in another 14 cases and one applicant has died and probate is awaited.

· 24 cases are being investigated by the Gardaí and Department officials have provided the Gardaí with statements and are assisting the investigation. The Department has been informed that a file is being prepared by the Gardaí for submission to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

· A detailed breakdown of the 71 cases on whom penalties have been imposed is shown in Table 36.

Table 36 - Cases in which Penalties were imposed

No. of applicants

Number of Ewes claimed

Amount claimed €

Penalties Imposed

Penalties as % of amounts claimed

Amount Paid after Penalties

14

2,992

47,055

1,479

0% to 10%

45,576

12

1,643

25,839

3,329

10% to 20%

22,510

7

603

9,483

2,446

20% to 30%

7,037

2

140

2,056

765

30% to 40%

1,291

2

75

1,180

1,180

100%

Nil

7

511

8,036

8,036

100% - one year exclusion

Nil

27

2,504

39,380

39,380

100% -two year exclusion

Nil

71

8,468

133,029

56,615

76,414

· The Accounting Officer supplied the following details in relation to the level of serious irregularity detected from Departmental checks and inspections carried out in previous years, of cases where the sheep deficits exceeded 20% of the numbers claimed and where the full amounts of the premia claimed were disallowed:

Table 37 - Cases in which Premia were disallowed

Number of Applicants

One year exclusion

Two year exclusion

Deficit greaterthan 20% Full claim disallowed

1999

43,704

80

98

61

2000

41,209

97

101

81

2001

38,630

135

118

72

As to whether there were particular circumstances existing in the Cooley area which might account for the high rate of excess claims, relative to the rates indicated as a result of Departmental inspections, the Accounting Officer stated that Cooley was the only area in Ireland in which mountain commonage land straddles the border.

He went on to state that following the Cooley findings the Department had carried out detailed checks of ewes on commonages in Counties Kerry, Galway, Mayo, Sligo and Kildare. The overall level of non-compliance found following these checks was generally in line with normal inspection findings.

· As to whether, in view of the Cooley findings, he was satisfied that the checks, inspections and penalty regime in place were generally effective in detecting excess claims and were a sufficient deterrent against non-compliance with the scheme rules, the Accounting Officer stated that all applications for premia were subject to administrative controls, and that under EU Regulations a minimum of 10% must be selected for on-farm inspection using risk analysis. The percentage of applications subjected to on-farm inspection in Ireland had, apart from the exceptional situation in 2001, always exceeded the minimum 10% and stood at 14% in 2002. In addition, extensive use was made of risk analysis in selecting cases for on-farm inspection. Well in excess of 70% of on-farm inspections were unannounced except in mountain commonage areas where a maximum of 48 hours notice (as provided for in EU Regulations) was given, because of the difficulty in assembling sheep for inspection in these areas. All controls both administrative and on-farm inspections were carried out during the 100-day retention period.

· The application and retention periods for the scheme were the same on both sides of the border, and where appropriate, simultaneous inspections were carried out.

· The Department was satisfied that the checks, inspections and penalty regime in place were generally effective and that the introduction of individual sheep tagging in 2001 would further enhance compliance. From the experience gained in 2001 in checking supporting documentation, greater emphasis would be put on authenticating supporting documentation in cases where it was believed that the applicant had made an intentional false declaration.

· While the European Commission has been kept informed of the findings in Cooley and of the control arrangements applied generally in 2001, it had not reviewed the findings to date. However a final report would be made to the Commission when processing of all remaining Cooley cases had been completed.

· There had been no negative findings and consequently no financial corrections following European Commission audits on the implementation of the Ewe Premium Scheme in Ireland over the past 5 years.

Paragraph 8.3 reads:

Interest Payments under the Prompt Payment of Accounts Act, 1997

The Prompt Payment of Accounts Act, 1997, obliges public bodies to pay their suppliers on time. Invoices must be paid within the period stated in the related contract or, if a contract does not apply, within 45 days. The Act also obliges bodies to pay interest where payments are not made within the time limits specified in the Act.

Penalty interest payments totalling €707,735 were incurred in 2001 by the Department under the Act. The penalties were incurred by most divisions of the Department and were in respect of some 3,469 invoices totalling €73,316,268, which represented approximately 25% of the value of all payments falling within the terms of the Act. The average payment delay in excess of the 45 day statutory limit was 38 days.

I enquired from the Accounting Officer as to the reasons for incurring such a significant amount of penalty interest and if he was satisfied that the payment of the interest could not have been reasonably avoided. I also enquired if the late payments were due in any way to deficiencies in the processing of payments and if so had such deficiencies been corrected, and if he was satisfied as to the ability of the Department to comply with the Act in future.

The Accounting Officer informed me that the following exceptional factors impacted on the Departments payment systems in 2001:

· The outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Co. Louth required the implementation of a wide range of emergency measures. In addition to the exceptional payments directly arising from these measures, many staff members were diverted to control duties relating to the disease outbreak and this unavoidably disrupted the normal processing of payments in many divisions of the Department.

· The introduction at short notice of a number of new and large schemes in 2001, and the reopening of beef intervention in September 2001, due to major difficulties being experienced in the beef market. In particular, the Purchase for Destruction Scheme was introduced in January 2001 with only two weeks notice. It took some time to put adequate staff in place to operate the scheme, which proved to be very complex to operate and consequently presented many difficulties in the timely authorisation of payments. The complexity and scale of the scheme gave rise to the need for detailed veterinary control documents, which generated many queries before payment could be authorised by a limited number of staff. The value of invoices under this scheme amounted to some €36.6m, with many individual invoices for substantial amounts. Invoices for sums in excess of €300,000 were not uncommon and consequently significant interest penalties were incurred for relatively small delays in processing payments.

· At the start of 2001, a scheme to support the rendering industry was introduced following the ban on the feeding of processed animal proteins to farmed animals. Implementation of this scheme put a strain on an already stretched Department, and it took time to put procedures in place to efficiently process payments, which was also hampered by staff turnover.

· The Department introduced a new accounts system in July, which increased workloads in line divisions and in the Accounts Division. The new system necessitated the production of a separate payment authorisation for each invoice whereas in the old system many invoices could be processed on one such authorisation. The new system also gave rise to delays in processing payments as staff familiarised themselves with it.

The Accounting Officer pointed out that the late interest paid by the Department in 2001 was mostly incurred in the second and third quarters of 2001 while the Department was responding to the difficulties presented by the above events. Efforts had been made to expedite payments and the levels of interest incurred has also been the subject of detailed ongoing management review which has led to a steady reduction in such interest payments.

He stated that the difficulties which resulted in late payment penalties continued at a declining level into the early months of 2002 and had now been largely resolved, and that all Divisions had been advised of the need to ensure strict compliance with the Act.

Paragraph 8.4 reads:

Ballaghaderreen Fire Case Settlement

I referred in my Annual Report for 1999 to the Department's involvement in litigation since 1992 arising from a fire, which broke out at a cold store in Ballaghaderreen, Co. Roscommon in January 1992. About seven thousand tonnes of intervention beef with an approximate value of €25.2m, which had been stored there on behalf of the Minister for Agriculture, Food and Rural Development was completely destroyed.

Intervention beef is the property of the EU, but the Department, as the intervention agent in Ireland for the EU, is responsible for its safe custody and is obliged to compensate the EU for any loss, which may occur. Thus, the Minister was obliged to refund €25.2m to the EU in respect of the beef destroyed. The cost of the refund was added to the Department's ongoing borrowings from which it funds all FEOGA expenditure until EU funds are drawn down. Further costs sustained involved clean-up expenses of €1m. The Commission has proposed a further correction of €11.4m to convert the intervention price for carcase weight into boneless yield. This arises from the retrospective application of a regulation introduced in 1993, one year after the fire.

Since 1990 the Department had insured against the risk of financial loss in regard to intervention beef, through a broker based in Ireland. However, following the fire, the principal insurers repudiated liability and initiated legal proceedings to establish that they were not on cover. A complex series of legal issues relating to liability, value and jurisdiction gave rise to 16 independent High Court actions involving over 70 insurers and brokers based in Ireland and abroad.

Without prejudice settlement negotiations between the legal representatives of the Department and of all parties to the litigation commenced in October 2001. In April 2002 a written settlement was concluded by agreement between all of the parties. Following advice received from the Department's legal counsel and the Attorney General, and consideration by the Government, the Minister decided to accept the settlement, under which:

· The insurers and brokers pay the Minister €21.93m in respect of the destroyed beef.

· All legal actions between all parties will be struck out by joint request.

· All parties to litigation will bear their own costs.

In addition to the compensation paid to the EU and the clean-up costs at the site, the Department has to date incurred loan interest costs of €15.5m. Legal fees amounting to €2.9m had been paid up to July 2002 but this is likely to increase substantially when the final fees have been determined. Negotiations with the EU in relation to the revaluation of the beef have not yet been concluded, but the Department may incur an extra cost of up to €11.4m in this regard.

Mr. Purcell

Section 8.2 of the report refers to an unexpected outcome thrown up by the foot and mouth crisis in 2001. As a result of the discovery of an infected animal in March 2001 in the Cooley area of County Louth, a cull of all farm animals in the area was undertaken to prevent the spread of the disease. The cull presented the Department with an opportunity to ascertain and verify the numbers of sheep owned by farmers in the area and compare them to the numbers on which ewe premiums had been claimed. The exercise produced interesting numbers, to say the least. Although 37,165 eligible sheep had been claimed for, 6,625 less had been culled. Some farmers had more sheep than they claimed for, some had fewer sheep - I am quoting the Accounting Officer on his penultimate appearance before the committee - and some had no sheep. The Department has now completed its investigation of the 107 cases in which there were discrepancies. I understand from the Accounting Officer's opening statement that he will refer to those, so I will not duplicate it.

My concern was that if the Cooley experience was replicated elsewhere it would cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Department's inspection regime, hence the possible knock-on effect of financial penalties by the EU who fund the scheme. I sought the views of the Accounting Officer in the matter and he was satisfied that the level of over-claiming detected in the Cooley area was exceptional due to the fact that it is the only area in which mountain commonage straddles the Border. Detailed checks on ewes on other commonages in Kerry, Galway, Mayo, Sligo and Kildare had established levels of non-compliance that were generally in line with normal findings from inspections. In regard to the effectiveness of the inspection regime generally, he pointed to the introduction of individual sheep tagging in 2001 as a major step forward in enhancing compliance.

I do not know how the EU will view the outcome of this exercise. I understand that a final report is being prepared for submission to the Commission, so we will not know until it has considered the report. However, we know that there have been no negative findings and, consequently, no financial corrections following Commission audits of the implementation of the ewe premium scheme in Ireland over the past five years. I hope that is a good omen.

Section 8.3 deals with penalty interest incurred by the Department in 2001 to a value of more than €700,000, because of a failure to meet the 45 day deadline set out in the Prompt Payment of Accounts Act 1997. The penalties were incurred on late payments, originating in most divisions of the Department. It involved almost 3,500 invoices, representing approximately 25% of the value of all payments covered by the Act.

I found the scale of the penalty payments surprising. This expenditure of taxpayers' money on the face of it could have been avoided and for that reason I sought the Accounting Officer's views. The exceptional circumstances cited by him that gave rise to the excessive penalty interest are set out in pages 97 and 98 of the report, which I will not repeat.

The problem extended into 2002, albeit on a lesser scale. Some €157,000 in penalty interest was incurred in that year. The signs are that the Department has come to grips with the problem. Bearing in mind new regulations that came into force in August 2002, which reduced the timeframe for payment of invoices from 45 to 30 days, it is imperative the Department keeps its foot on the pedal if recurrence is to be prevented.

Chapter 8.4 merely provides an update on the financial fall-out from a fire in a cold store in Ballaghaderreen in 1992, when approximately 7,000 tonnes of intervention beef valued at €25 million was destroyed. As recorded in earlier reports, the principal insurers repudiated liability and extensive legal proceedings were initiated on all sides. The good news is that an out of court settlement involving all the parties was concluded in April 2002, under which the Department was to be paid €22 million. That has since been paid. The bad news is that under the terms of the settlement, all parties bear their own legal costs. I know this is something close to the hearts of members of the committee. In the case of the Department these are substantial, amounting to €3.9 million.

The dispute with the EU on the valuation of the beef still has not been resolved. If this goes against the Department, it would probably incur an extra cost of approximately €11 million. In determining the final cost to the Department, this would have to be added to interest costs of €15.5 million incurred in financing the shortfall from the EU since 1992 and clean-up expenses of €1 million, together with a settlement loss of €3 million and the aforementioned costs of €3.9 million. It has been a costly experience for the Department.

Perhaps the Secretary General will give a brief response to the three matters.

Mr. Malone

As the Comptroller and Auditor General set out the data on the ewe premium schemes I will not repeat it. I want to emphasise that we applied penalties in 83 cases, of which 24 were paid in full. Some 24 are excluded from the scheme for two years, 12 for one year and ten had the claim disallowed in full. Currently 24 cases are being investigated by the gardaí. Department officials have provided the gardaí with statements and they are assisting the investigation. Our information is that a file is being prepared by the gardaí for submission to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

We carried out a fairly wide-ranging exercise to see if the problem was replicated elsewhere. We found that the level of non-compliance was generally in line with the normal trend. We have sent the final report on the situation in the Cooley area to the European Commission. We have no indication that there will be negative findings on that heading.

Sheep identification was referred to. The European Union is introducing a harmonised approach in that area. The elements set out in its proposals are the elements we apply here at the moment.

The prompt payments was a serious issue. We accept that the level of interest payment, particularly in 2001, was a serious issue. The explanation is that there was an exceptional combination of events that probably never happened before and, I hope, will not happen again.

The main factors were the purchase for destruction scheme, the special purchase scheme and the foot and mouth outbreak. We also introduced a new accounts system, which has brought us added value but which had some teething problems. With regard to some of the schemes where the invoices were big, we were left with the choice of paying within the deadline or carrying out additional checks. In some cases it can be better to carry out additional checks.

This is a matter we take seriously and the level was down to €6,100 in the fourth quarter of 2002 from a high of €300,000 in the third quarter of 2001. The figure to date for the first quarter of 2003 is slightly over €1,300. We are keeping our foot on the pedal.

The Comptroller and Auditor General has set out the position regarding Ballaghaderreen. This was a long running and difficult episode and it took much effort on our part to bring the matter to a conclusion. It was a complex case involving a number of insurance companies, 16 High Court actions and more than 70 parties. Reference was made to legal costs. We hired a firm of private solicitors and we pursued the case vigorously. Had we not done so we probably would not have achieved the conclusion we did. There certainly were costs. The settlement was approved by the Government. In our view and in the view of the Government and the legal advisers we got the best deal we could. Had we gone to court, and we do not know when that might have been, we might not have got as good an outcome. Legal costs do not merely consist of payments to lawyers. We had to hire loss adjusters and IT expertise. We learned a number of lessons, particularly regarding the placing of insurance, and the effect of those lessons will be in place for a number of years.

Mr. Malone has said the overall level of non-compliance found following these checks was, generally, in line with the normal trend. What percentage is the normal trend?

Mr. Malone

Maybe if I give the Deputy two sets of figures. The number of one year exclusions in 2000 was 105, the number of one year exclusions in 2001 was 187——

Does Mr. Malone have the number of animals?

Mr. Malone

I have the number of applications.

But not the number of animals.

Mr. Malone

It is calculated by application rather than by animal. One can have applications disallowed in total. The size of flock can vary dramatically.

The Comptroller and Auditor General's report had precise figures.

We know a terrible trauma was inflicted on the community in Cooley by the foot and mouth disaster and I do not want to add to that. However, this is something we see with increasing regularity and in different ways. Some weeks ago the Comptroller and Auditor General reported to us that he had found that doctors in the general medical service were treating thousands of ghosts who had long since "shuffled off this mortal coil" while taxpayers were still paying annual fees to the tune of tens of millions of euro for them. We are now hearing about the 6,000 phantom ewes of Cooley. This represents a remarkable 17.8% of the herd in Cooley. I take the point about commonage straddling the Border but the little map in my diary shows a border of less than ten miles between Warrenpoint and Dundalk while the entire Border stretches for hundreds of miles. There may not be commonage straddling the whole Border but many farms do and there is a continuum of land.

This is a matter of great concern and it is why I ask the Secretary General about percentages. Nearly one in five ewes in Cooley is a phantom. If that were replicated nationally, or even in all Border areas, it would be a huge charge on the taxpayer. We need more clarification on that matter.

Mr. Malone

This was an issue of serious concern to the committee when I was here last year and we have reviewed our controls and procedures. This is a difficult scheme to police. We carry out more than the mandatory level of inspections. It is required that we carry out 10% but we carried out more than 14%. In fact, in 2001 the figure was as high as 27%.

The figures for the percentage penalised might give a clearer picture of the situation. In 1999 it was 1.4%, in 2000 it was 1.7% and in 2001 it was 2.3%. Within the 2.3% one had the Cooley factor. Is it important to say what has happened in 2001. In that year we introduced individual sheep tagging. This was one of the problems identified when I appeared here last year. That has greatly strengthened our hand from the point of view of control. The preliminary figures for 2002 indicate a significant reduction in the level of non-compliance.

You are saying there was a very loose system. It may not be the farmers' fault. There was no control system in place and tagging appears to be a solution to that major problem.

Mr. Malone

Yes. I feel we have dealt with this situation. We have also given detailed reports to the EU Commission. I cannot speak with absolute certainty but we have not received any negative feedback.

The figures, reports and investigations have been well documented. Could Mr. Malone give us a layman's explanation of how sheep tagging works? He says the main elements proposed by Europe, including the sheep tagging identification system, were introduced in 2001. Are all sheep given a tag at birth or when they are first moved? Rural Deputies like myself hear continual complaints from sheep farmers. In layman's English, what exactly happens?

Mr. Malone

A farmer must first keep a register. He keeps an account of the sheep he has, which is a fundamental piece of information. He then must identify the sheep individually on first movement if he has lambs moving off the farm and he must have all his sheep identified by 15 December in any year. There are two stages to tagging. The sheep going off the farm must be individually identified and then the entire flock.

Does Mr. Malone mean tagged?

Mr. Malone

Yes. The farmer must compile a register and do a reconciliation at the end of the year. Farm organisations have complained about this. This is an important scheme in terms of the controls. It is also important for every flock owner from the point of view of information regarding how many animals he started with, how many were born during the year and the final number.

Is it being implemented?

Mr. Malone

Yes, compliance is quite good as is the quality of the registers. We are seeing value in 2002 from the controls introduced by this scheme.

Are you happy with the controls in Northern Ireland given the situation which arose 18 months ago where flocks from the UK were crossing the Border?

Mr. Malone

Yes, we have changed that system. We previously operated an all-island approach but ceased that system following the foot and mouth disease experience.

So no sheep from unknown sources are appearing at factories anymore?

Mr. Malone

No. I have no reason to believe the controls in place are not being implemented.

On the system of sheep tagging and the register to which Mr. Malone referred, is that ahead of systems across the rest of Europe?

Mr. Malone

At the moment, yes. Different systems operate in different member states but the European Commission has drawn up proposals for a harmonised system. The system is slightly more ambitious and we have some reservations about it. It envisages a centralised database and introduces an electronic element which will, at one level, give a great deal of value but we must measure its cost in terms of installing expensive identification in animals which could be slaughtered at six months old.

I take it from that answer that Mr. Malone is reasonably confident no problem exists with the European Commission?

Mr. Malone

We are hoping that they will move towards a system more like ours.

Are there any other questions on this matter? We will move on now to deal with interest payments.

I will not make any intervention on that matter. I agree with the Comptroller and Auditor General that it was remarkably high for that year. Explanations have been given and what is important is that it be minimised. The Secretary General appeared to indicate that that is now the case.

I listened to Mr. Malone's explanation and he made a comment with regard to non-payment of some invoices within the 45 days. He said they were substantial and it was often better to make sure what one was paying was right. Does Mr. Malone have any value of the money he would have saved on the process he adopted?

Mr. Malone

This became an issue in the purchase for destruction scheme where we had two weeks notice to set it up. Some of the individual invoices were for several hundreds of thousands of pounds.

Were savings made by taking time to go through them?

Mr. Malone

We might have avoided some disallowances from the European Union had we made some of the payments earlier. I cannot be absolute on this. There could be situations where one rushes out to payment and later discovers that payment should not have been made because everything had not been checked.

That is what I am trying to find out. Has such information been compiled?

Mr. Malone

I do not have that information to hand. It was generally understood that we had to do what was necessary in relation to the outbreak of foot and mouth disease. Expenditure was incurred in that area and we had to deal with it. What is important is that this is regularly reviewed at our management committees. We are on target for this quarter. The Comptroller and Auditor General is right in saying we should not be incurring this expenditure.

Mr. Purcell

I would like to clarify a point for members. One does not have to pay the invoice within the 30 days as currently stands if there is a dispute. Once one has a dispute with the amount invoiced there is a procedure in place to deal with it.

Mr. Malone

That is fair comment. I was referring to internal checks such as animal slaughtered, etc. The presentation of an invoice is the commencement of a very long process.

How effective is the computer system? Are you happy with the length of time it took to install and does it meet your expectations?

Mr. Malone

Yes, it is providing us with valuable information. It is a complex system but it gives us valuable management information and is enabling us to control our payments more tightly.

The checks and balances are all right.

Mr. Malone

Yes. It is a modern system.

What was the average exception?

Mr. Malone

We are only exceeding the 45-day period in a minority of cases.

What level of interest is paid on late payments?

Mr. Malone

It is 0.029% per day.

Some farmers are glad to get it.

Mr. Malone

It is a requirement of the legislation and we are complying fully with it. That is a surprise to some of our clients.

It is an extra payment.

On No. 8.4, it would appear that the net cost to the State will be €34 million, taking the refund to the EU into account. A sum of €11.4 million has yet to be paid. Do you see that figure increasing?

Mr. Malone

One has to look at this in the context of what we could insure the beef for. It was worth €25 million and we got €22 million. The argument with the European Commission is not yet concluded. It is our view that the Commission grossed up the value of this product after the event, bearing in mind that the real value of this product - it was frozen - would have been €11 million or €12 million if it had been placed on the market.

The cost has quadrupled.

Mr. Malone

Yes. That was the market value of the product. The intervention value was €25 million. Once one freezes beef its value depreciates dramatically. That was the way the regulation worked. We deliberately took the figure in regard to interest costs onto ourselves. We consulted about this with the Department of Finance and that was done for tactical reasons. We tried to put everything possible into our claim. We could not have insured for the €11 million because we did not know the situation at the time. It was applied retrospectively and no insurance company would accept that. We reached a point where we had to make a choice on whether €22 million was the best settlement we could get.

From the insurance companies?

Mr. Malone

A number of different insurance companies were involved. We took this seriously. We hired a private firm of solicitors who specialise in this area. That is something unusual for the State to do. In our view this was the right thing to do.

Have any lessons been learned and could something like this happen again?

Mr. Malone

The lessons learned are: the lowest tender is not always the best tender; one has to be absolutely clear about what one is getting in terms of insurance; we must ensure we have information on the broker's ability as well as the insurance company's ability; the practice in the insurance industry may be of multiple layering of the placing of risk. We got a firm of insurance brokers to carry out a review of the way we placed insurance. We put the changes in place and they have been in place for a number of years now.

Was there any fall back on any of those at that time?

Mr. Malone

The difficulty we had was we had placed this with a broker and then there was a difficulty as to which insurance company was liable. They were all denying liability. We had a big problem then about jurisdiction. Some of them did not want the court proceedings to be held in this country so we had to bring that issue to court. We were dealing with 16 different court cases so the whole thing became very complex and very confused. The bottom line was that none of them wanted to voluntarily face up to this.

I congratulate you. You did very well to get that amount of money paid to you.

I think this is an extraordinary episode. My conclusion is that more than the meat got burned in the Ballaghaderreen fire and that the bankers, the lawyers and the insurers all burned the taxpayer quite badly. There are sharp questions that need to be asked and answered. There were 70 different insurers and brokers and the principal insurers repudiated liability, but why were the contracts so vague that they were enabled to do that? Surely a contract for such a large amount of material should have been watertight so that they could not get out of it? The €2.9 million paid to the lawyers coming as a result of faulty contracts or certainly ones that were not watertight is quite galling to taxpayers. The loan interest of €15.5 million mystifies me, Secretary General. That is 61% of the value of the meat or at least the original estimate of the value of the meat. This is an extraordinary amount. I cannot understand how a situation like that can be allowed to arise. I have had occasion in the Dáil previously to raise the Nítrigin Éireann Teoranta saga where the banks made an absolute killing on that State entity and this seems to be a similar situation. Why was that money not paid off at an earlier point so that the bankers were not taking their pounds of flesh also? The net effect is that the taxpayer lost over the insurers underpaying what they should have paid, the lawyers taking their cut and the bankers taking 61% of the value. I cannot understand it.

It would appear that in the whole episode the gross take was up to €60 million. It is nearly five times the initial investment of the beef. I live quite near Ballaghaderreen and it was a major environmental hazard at that time. It was an outrageous incident.

Mr. Malone

We have learned a lot of hard lessons from this episode. It is not something that you expect to happen that a cold store with 7,000 tonnes of intervention beef would go on fire but it happened. The difficulty about the insurance was that we had gone for the proposal for accepting the lowest tender. We accepted it in good faith. There appeared to be a problem that around the time of the fire the broker was in the process of moving it from one lead insurer to another so that was where our problems started as to which insurer was the lead insurer. Both potential lead insurers denied liability and in fact attempted to bring the State to court to deny the liability. We became the defendant in some of the proceedings. That is the point I was anxious to convey about the lessons we have learned and the importance of a watertight contract. Insurance is a difficult area; expertise is needed. It is much more complex than insuring a private car. It should not have happened but it did.

The cost of lawyers' fees at €2.9 million was raised by the Deputy. We had to make a choice because there was a danger that this was going to drag on. There was probably a view on the part of the insurance companies that we would never really try and conclude this matter. We took a conscious decision to acquire the services of a private firm and I admit those services were expensive, but had we not done so, we probably would not have got the settlement we received. Within that cost is the hire of loss adjusters and IT expertise so it is not just totally lawyers' fees. I know that legal advice is expensive.

The loan interest was a technical decision taken between ourselves and the Department of Finance. We put this bill down in the books as borrowings. We did that for a tactical reason, to keep the pressure on the insurance company. Maybe with the benefit of hindsight we should not have done so. Had we paid it off then it might have sent them a message that the State was not going to pursue the case.

So in actual fact, Secretary General, you really got €5 million which would have been the return to the State? If that was a tactic to secure the insurance, in reality the problems with insurance did not just cost the difference between what they paid, about €21 million and €25 million but it also cost us €16 million in interest charges. Is that correct?

Mr. Malone

Yes. The real problem is that this dragged on for ten years. If we had known this was going to drag on for ten years we would have taken a different approach. When we started this in 1992 we were satisfied that we had a valid policy but the thing dragged along. The insurance companies used every device for a period to ensure that we did not get them into court.

Many of them were shareholders in the banks that were milking all the taxes and interest.

Mr. Malone

That was State borrowing and that is where that figure arose. With the benefit of hindsight it might have been better had we paid it and not incurred the interest. There was a judgment to be made as to whether the insurance companies would make the settlement that they then made. This was very difficult.

You are saying it was a real problem of the insurance company not having a typed up contract?

Mr. Malone

First, there was no insurance company prepared to face up to this and say it was our policy. We ended up chopping and changing.

On a minor point, Mr. Malone, you mentioned that the broker was changing between insurance companies at the time. That really was the crux of the problem, as you said. Was the Department aware that this change between insurance companies was to take place or was this happening behind the Department's back?

Mr. Malone

In effect, it was happening behind our back. We did not know about it and we discovered it when the fire occurred.

In other words the broker was acting completely in his own interests?

Mr. Malone

Yes.

Ten years on, and I suppose this is the real worry, how if at all do Government Departments deal with brokers and insurance companies? From a practical point of view, what do you do now regarding brokers?

Mr. Malone

We do not automatically accept the lowest tender now. We assess the ability of the broker; we ask to see the policy; we get professional advice; and we ensure the policy is appropriate to the kind of risk we are placing. Insuring intervention beef is an unusual enough exercise in itself and there was an element, I think, that what had happened was that the person that had got this business was also insuring other kinds of beef and intervention beef is different.

Is that broker still in existence?

Mr. Malone

That broker is still in existence.

Mr. Malone is quite clearly saying this problem arose out of his decision to change from one company to the other.

Mr. Malone

It caused a difficulty. Whether I would go so far as to say that was the sole part of the problem, I do not know.

However, it was a major contributory part.

Mr. Malone

It was a major contributor, yes.

Did that broker have what we would refer to as professional indemnity insurance?

Mr. Malone

He had €5 million and I think that the low level of this indemnity was one of the issues in the case.

Did Mr. Malone get it?

Mr. Malone

He was part of the settlement. At one stage we had to make a decision whether to just go after the broker. If we thought we would solve this by going after the broker we would have done that. We would not have got our €20 million plus had we gone after the broker.

I presume one of the other criteria in future is to look for brokers with more than €5 million in professional indemnity insurance.

Mr. Malone

Yes.

This has been a major learning curve on indemnity and insurance in general in similar cases.

Mr Purcell

I would like to clarify a point for Deputy Curran. The State would normally carry its own insurance so it does not really arise in Departments generally. The Minister for Agriculture and Food is acting as the intervention agency in this particular matter. When he is acting in that capacity it is obviously prudent and, I imagine, required to have insurance. Perhaps the Accounting Officer can clarify that further.

Mr. Malone

I think at a certain stage the State carried its own risk. What happened then was obviously the volumes of intervention beef got so big that there was a conscious decision. It could be argued that had the State been carrying its own risk in this incidence——

It would have been cheaper.

Mr. Malone

——it might have been cheaper. I do not know. I think given the exposure and the way Mr. Purcell has described the Minister acting as agent, it is probably prudent to have insurance.

Once it is frozen the value of stock depreciates considerably. It is amazing that the cover does not drop. The State is paying a higher premium to cover stock with a lower value. If a claim were made, the stock would be over-insured, would it not?

Mr. Malone

Yes, that could be the case. We are insuring against a theoretical value. We all know what happened——

The cash value would be less than half. It decreased from €25 million to €11 million. A higher premium is being paid for no gain.

Mr. Malone

No, but the difficulty is when we had to recoup the money to Brussels, they wanted the full book value.

Can we agree to note the Vote?

What about the other sections.

Does the Deputy have any particular concerns on the Vote?

Yes, I have three short questions relating to page 249 of the auditor's report. In the REP scheme in the year under review, there was a provision of €170 million and an outturn of €129. I know Mr. Malone has said that the outbreak of foot and mouth disease caused the reduction. Did that pick up again in 2002? In J6, €300,000 was provided for the school milk scheme but only €138,000 utilised. How does that scheme operate? There is a provision of €3 million for installation aid for young trained farmers, but only €1.7 million was drawn down. Farmers might point to the paperwork and bureaucracy as a reason for the low draw-down on that and the REP scheme. Mr. Malone said poor documentation was supplied by the applicants. Have payments under that scheme improved? Have the problems with the poor documentation been resolved? In 2002, the following year, will there be a significant increase in payments under that scheme?

Mr. Malone

In relation to the REPS, undoubtedly the foot and mouth disease knocked it out of its stride in 2001 and the same was true of the installation aid, because the inspections——

Could not take place.

Mr. Malone

——could not take place. The scheme picked up in 2002. We spent €170 million in 2002. This is a demand-led scheme. The farm organisations have made no secret of the fact that they would like an increased level of payment. There is a certain amount of documentation associated with it, but it is a scheme where we pay money upfront as the Deputy knows. The main demand from the farm organisations will be an enhanced level of payment and that is a different issue.

The same point is true for the installation aid. The installation aid has actually picked up and this year there is a good level of demand for it. The school milk scheme is a scheme which, in effect, provides a supply of subsidised milk, essentially for children at primary level. The uptake in the scheme is quite low for a variety of reasons, but mainly because there is a lot of inconvenience. Someone has to take charge of the job in the school and the uptake probably is not as good as it should be. I think we are the only member state or one of the few member states that actually applies it. It is an EU scheme.

Is it available to all primary schools?

Mr. Malone

Yes, if they wanted to use it.

Is that widely publicised? I would imagine there is a lack of knowledge about it.

Mr. Malone

It was very widely publicised when it was brought in in the 1980s.

The children were not born then or perhaps even their parents were not born then.

Mr. Malone

I think all the schools know about it.

The teachers.

Deputy Fleming's point is a good one.

Every school board of management should again be notified of this scheme. The teachers might not want the trouble, but if the boards of management knew about it, they could discuss it.

I have been on a school's board of management for six or seven years and I have never heard of it.

I am on a board of management and I have never heard of it.

We should raise the awareness of the scheme, which would be appreciated by many schools. Leader, INTERREG, and the PEACE programme are covered in M6. Has the funding come in from the EU for that scheme?

Mr. Malone

That is now operated by a different Department, which has responsibility for rural development.

I see there was an overrun.

Mr. Malone

We were between one Leader scheme and another and it ran ahead of schedule.

Will there be any changes in the funding of the Leader programme in future?

Mr. Malone

Not that I am aware of. We do not have responsibility for it any more. I think it is a measure we have availed of to the full and it has run reasonably smoothly.

Is it agreed that we note the Vote? Agreed.

I thank the Comptroller and Auditor General and his team for their excellent work as always. I thank the Secretary General of the Department and his team for contributing to a very good debate.

The next meeting will deal with Votes 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the Department of Education and Science.

The witness withdrew.

The committee adjourned at 1.48 p.m. until11 a.m. on Wednesday, 12 March 2003.
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