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COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS díospóireacht -
Thursday, 2 Oct 2003

Vol. 1 No. 28

2002 Annual Report of Comptroller and Auditor General and Appropriation Accounts.

Chapter 7 - Department of Education and Science.

Section 7.1 - Residential Institutions Redress Scheme.

Mr. J. Dennehy (Secretary General, Department of Education and Science) called and examined.

I welcome everyone to the meeting. We are dealing with the annual report on the residential institutions redress scheme.

Witnesses should be aware that they do not enjoy absolute privilege and be apprised as follows. As and from 2 August 1998, section 10 of the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997 grants certain rights to persons identified in the course of the committee's proceedings. These rights include the right to give evidence; the right to produce or send documents to the committee; the right to appear before the committee, either in person or through a representative; the right to make a written and oral submission; the right to request the committee to direct the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents, and the right to cross-examine witnesses. For the most part, these rights may be exercised only with the consent of the committee. Persons invited to appear before the committee are made aware of these rights and any persons identified in the course of proceedings who are not present may have to be made aware of them and provided with a transcript of the relevant part of the committee's proceedings if the committee considers it appropriate in the interests of justice.

Notwithstanding this provision in legislation, I remind members of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House, or an official, either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. They are also reminded of the provision contained in Standing Order 156, that the committee shall refrain from inquiring into the merits of a policy or policies of the Government, or a Minister of the Government, or the merits of the objectives of such policy or policies.

I ask Mr. Dennehy, Secretary General, Department of Education and Science, to introduce his officials.

I am accompanied by Mr. Tom Boland, Mr. Paul Kennedy and Mr. Brian Duggan.

I welcome Mr. David Doyle, Second Secretary, Department of Finance, and ask him to introduce his officials.

Mr. David Doyle

I am accompanied byMs Ann Nolan, principal officer, and Mr. John Conlon, assistant principal, both of whom have responsibility for the education area.

I ask Mr. Purcell to introduce chapter 7.

Mr. John Purcell

Paragraph 7.1 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report reads:

Background

Approximately 29,500 people, born since 1930, were committed by the courts to industrial and reformatory schools. In addition, significant numbers, which cannot be accurately quantified by the Department of Education and Science (DOES), were committed by parents.

Widespread concern was expressed in the 1990s about the extent and effect of child abuse at institutions supervised by the State in previous decades. Such abuse included sexual, physical, emotional abuse and neglect.

The Taoiseach, in May 1999, apologised on behalf of the State to the victims of abuse and announced the establishment of a Commission to inquire into this matter (the Laffoy Commission).

The Laffoy Commission was established by legislation in 2000. The Commission operates either by affording victims an opportunity to tell their story without investigating their allegations or to have their allegations investigated.

Addressing the redress issue

In October 2000, the Minister for Education and Science (the Minister), in a memorandum to Government, outlined his general policy position in relation to redress.

The principal points made were that:

· Requiring victims to pursue claims for compensation through the courts would not be consistent with the desire, evident in the Taoiseach's apology, to face up to and deal with the issue of past child abuse

· He was of the opinion that there was a compelling case for setting up procedures outside the court system for dealing with claims from victims of abuse, in order to avoid significant delays and costs in litigation

· Victims could face great difficulties in bringing claims through the courts and it was appropriate to offer a quicker and less demanding process for the award of monetary compensation

· The Government was committed to providing the necessary funding, with a contribution from religious congregations if one could be agreed.

In addition, Judge Laffoy had, by this time, expressed concerns that victims would not co-operate with the Commission in the absence of a compensation scheme.

The Government, following consideration of the matter, agreed, in principle, to establish a redress scheme. It was envisaged that the scheme would compensate people who as children were victims of abuse while resident in institutions where the State had regulatory or supervisory functions.

Compensation would be paid on an ex-gratia basis, without establishing any liability on the part of State bodies but subject to a claimant establishing to the satisfaction of the compensation awarding body that he or she had suffered abuse and resulting damage.

In response to the Government decision the Conference of Religious in Ireland (CORI) indicated their willingness to become involved, in principle, with the Government in setting up and implementing the proposed scheme. In November 2000, the Minister and the religious congregations agreed to enter into formal discussions on the details of the congregations' participation in the compensation scheme.

In February 2001, the Government approved the drafting of the Victims of Child Abuse Compensation Tribunal Bill to provide for a compensation scheme, which would validate claims in a non-adversarial way. At that time, the Government noted that discussions were to continue between the State and the religious congregations with a view to securing agreement on a meaningful contribution to the compensation scheme in advance of the publication of the legislation.

The Bill was enacted into law, on 10 April 2002, as the Residential Institutions Redress Act, 2002 (the Act) and provides for the establishment of the Residential Institutions Redress Board (the Board) and the making of awards to persons who, as children, were resident in certain institutions and have or have had injuries that are consistent with abuse received while resident in the institutions.

In addition to claims from residents of DOES supervised institutions, former residents of certain institutions not under the supervision of the DOES can also apply for redress.

The redress scheme extended to former residents of 123 institutions regulated by the State. 87 of these were under the supervision of the DOES.

82 of the 123 institutions were managed by religious congregations represented by CORI. The remaining 41 institutions were not involved in the negotiations about a contribution nor will they benefit from any indemnity.

In January 2002, the Minister had announced that agreement, in principle, had been reached with the congregations about the level of the congregations' contribution. Further negotiations took place culminating in the approval by the Government, in June 2002, of an agreement under which the congregations would make a contribution of €128m inclusive of some past contributions. In return, the State agreed to indemnify the congregations in respect of all cases where a person would have been eligible to make a claim under the Act, with the indemnity to apply to those cases where litigation was commenced within the following six years. On 5 June 2002, an Indemnity Agreement (the Agreement) to give effect to this was signed between the Minister, the Minister for Finance and eighteen religious congregations.

The Redress Scheme

The Act provides for the making of awards to assist in the recovery of people who have injuries that are consistent with abuse received while resident as children in certain State regulated institutions. The Board has been established to determine awards while a Residential Institutions Review Committee (the Review Committee) has been established to review them.

The Board has two main functions:

· To make awards in accordance with the Act

· To make all reasonable efforts to ensure that those who were resident in the institutions listed in the Act are made aware of the Board's existence so that they may apply for redress.

In order to qualify for redress an applicant must establish, before the Board:

· His or her identity

· That he or she was resident, while under the age of 18, in one of the institutions listed in the schedule to the Act

· That he or she was abused while so resident and suffered injury

· That the injury is consistent with abuse suffered while so resident.

Applications must be made within three years of the establishment of the Board on 16 December 2002. In a case where a person, who would have qualified as an applicant, dies after 11 May 1999 the spouse or children of that person may make an application on his or her behalf. The Board may, in exceptional circumstances, extend the time limit.

The Board makes a preliminary decision as to whether an applicant is entitled to an award. It requests its medical advisers to prepare a report on the injuries received by an applicant and then makes an award in accordance with established redress bands.

If the applicant accepts the award, then he or she must agree in writing to waive any right of action against a public body or a person who has made a contribution under the Act.

An award may be paid by way of lump sum or in instalments, if an applicant requests this and the Board agrees to the request, or in circumstances where, having heard submissions, the Board directs that the award should be paid in instalments or otherwise than by way of a lump sum.

The Board may make an interim award, not exceeding €10,000, where it makes a preliminary decision that the applicant is entitled to an award, that the award is likely to exceed the amount of the interim award and is satisfied, having regard to the age or infirmity of the applicant, that the interim award is appropriate.

An applicant has one month to accept or reject an award or to submit the award to the Review Committee, which is wholly independent of the Board.

An applicant may submit any of the following matters for review:

· The rejection of an application because the criteria laid down in the Act have not been established

· The amount of an award made by the Board

· A direction by the Board that an award is to be paid in instalments, or otherwise than by way of a lump sum, to an applicant deemed incapable of managing his or her own affairs.

Objectives and Scope of the Examination

The principal objectives of the examination were to:

· Estimate the State's contingent liability arising from the establishment of the redress scheme

· Review the negotiation of the Agreement with particular reference to the information, advice and arrangements for approval of the acts of negotiation

· Review the implementation of the Agreement concluded as a result of those negotiations.

It is outside the scope of my audits to comment on policy issues. It is, however, within my remit to examine, and form a view on, the quality of information underlying key decisions in the formulation of a policy.

The scope of the examination included a review of files, including notes of meetings, legal advice, correspondence and records of decisions. Discussions were held with officials of the DOES and the Redress Board.

The Contingent Liability for Redress

The extent of the State's liability for redress is dependent upon a number of contingencies and future events. Consequently, any estimate of future liabilities arising out of the redress scheme is made in circumstances of uncertainty, particularly since the Board has not yet functioned for a full year.

The principal uncertainties inherent in any estimation of liability surround:

· The potential population of claimants

· The number of those potential claimants who will apply for redress

· The extent of any awards which depends, in turn, on the nature of abuse suffered by applicants, its impact and consequences.

The extent of costs which may arise

The liability outlined in this section is, therefore, a contingent one and can only, due to these uncertainties, be treated as a preliminary indication of the extent of the liability.

The possible cost of redress

Between the commencement of the scheme in December 2002 and the end of July 2003 the Board had received 1,662 applications. Applications have been made at a rate of approximately 50 per week to that date and 48 had been rejected as not coming within the terms of the scheme.

The ultimate cost of the scheme to the State will be a factor of the average award made, the number of valid applications and the costs. None of these can be estimated with certainty at this stage.

Level of awards

An Advisory Compensation Committee was established by the Minister in 2001 and brought together expertise from a range of disciplines, including legal, medical, psychiatric and psychological. The Committee considered the experience in other countries in the course of its deliberations. Its report "Towards Redress and Recovery", known as the Ryan Report, was presented to the Minister in January 2002 and included, inter alia, recommendations for the assessment of redress.

The Committee recommended that redress should be assessed under four headings with a weight to be attached to the different elements in accordance with Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 Weighting scale for evaluation of severity of abuse and consequential injury

Constitutive Elements of Redress

Severity of abuse

Severity of injury resulting from abuse

Medically verified Physical/psychiatric illness

Psycho-social sequelae

Loss of opportunity

Weighting

1-25

1-30

1-30

1-15

The Committee recommended that, having regard to the cumulative rating, the amount of redress should be determined in accordance with redress bands set out in Table 7.2.

Table 7.2 Amounts payable for weightings allocated

Redress Band

Total weighting for severity of abuse and injury/effects of abuse

Award payable by way of redress

V

70 or more

€200,000 to €300,000

IV

55-69

€150,000 to 200,000

III

40 - 54

€100,000 to €150,000

II

25 - 39

€50,000 to €100,000

I

Less than 25

Up to €50,000

In December 2002, the Minister, in regulations made under the Act, incorporated the recommendations of the Ryan Report into the redress scheme.

Having determined an award under these redress bands, the Board may make a further payment of up to 20% of the assessed award in exceptional circumstances and may also make a payment for medical expenses and reasonable expense incurred in the making of an application (e.g. legal fees).

Estimates of average awards

The Redress Board commenced hearings in late April 2003. Only a limited number of cases have yet been heard and it may take some time for a definitive trend to emerge. Up to the end of July, the Board had made offers in 108 settlement cases and 25 awards in hearings. Awards ranged from €10,000 to €200,400.

The average award was just over €84,000.

If allowance is made for a variation, in future awards, of 15% of the average awards made to date this would place awards in the range €71,400 to €96,600.

By way of comparison this trend is borne out by the level of average awards from three of the compensation schemes which operated in Canada where awards made were, broadly speaking, based on matrices similar to that recommended by the Ryan Report and adopted in the Irish Regulations.

The relationship between average award levels and the maximum potential award in the three Canadian schemes is set out in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3 Claims and awards in Compensation Programmes relating to Institutional Child Abuse in Canada, 1993 to 1999

Schemes

Final numberof claims

Maximumaward

Average award as % of maximum award

Nova Scotia

(3 institutions)

1,260

$120,000

26%

Ontario - Grandview

329

$60,000

62%

Ontario - St. John’s & St. Joseph’s

1,200

$108,000

31%

*The average award in Nova Scotia, 26%, includes a separate counselling award.

The trends which can be noted in the Canadian cases are:

· The average award represents something of the order of 32% of the maximum available.

· As the number of cases increases, the average award tends to fall. If only the two schemes with the higher number of applicants are considered the average award is around 28.5% of the maximum available.

This, if replicated in Ireland, would place average awards in the range €85,500 to €96,000.

The Accounting Officer pointed out that awards in army deafness cases may be a more reliable indicator of average awards than the Canadian experience. In furtherance of this view he described army deafness as very much a 'home-grown' class action which, in particular, demonstrated how the amount of awards lessens with time. Army deafness awards are finalised either by loss adjusters or through court hearings. Since redress and deafness claims are very different in nature I do not consider that any adjustment should be made, at this point, in the estimation process because:

· The scheme will only operate for three years

· Awards will be based on formulae

· The disposal of claims during the three years may be as much a factor of the timing of receipt of claims and evidence as of the nature and consequences of any alleged abuse.

Moreover, the average level of award in army deafness cases settled under the Early Settlement Scheme has not materially changed since its introduction in January 2001.

Costs

The regulations provide for the payment of reasonable costs. The awarding of costs will be a matter for the Redress Board to agree with an applicant and his/her solicitor. In the absence of agreement, costs will be decided by a Taxing Master of the High Court. For the purposes of estimating the liability, it is assumed that costs will be approximately 15% of awards.

All-in award levels

Applying this level of costs to the estimated award range calculated on the basis of determinations and to the average award actually made to date by the Redress Board yields the following estimate of the all-in cost of awards:

· The average all-in cost would be around €96,600

· If awards were at the lower end of the scale they might average approximately €82,100

· If awards were at the higher end of the scale they might average around €111,000.

Number of claimants

The ultimate number of claimants will be a factor of the potential population of claimants and the numbers who ultimately apply for redress.

In regard to the population of claimants, information is available from a number of sources:

· Litigation, where victims had commenced or threatened cases against the congregations

· The number of people who had applied to give evidence to the Investigation Committee of the Laffoy Commission

· Freedom of Information requests from former residents of institutions.

I requested the DOES to carry out an analysis of the information available on the number of potential applicants at 30 June 2003. Information was supplied to me on foot of this request, as follows:

· A set of names from the litigation cases and the FOI requests, compiled so as to eliminate duplication

· The overall results of a comparison of this set of names with the names of those who applied to give evidence to the Investigation Committee of the Laffoy Commission in order to give an up-to-date "base population" of possible applicants to the Redress Board, again eliminating duplication.

In addition, the Minister directed the Redress Board, under section 26 of the Act, to prepare a report comparing its applications at mid-July 2003 with a combined set of names, obtained by combining the FOI and litigation data. The Board had received 1,551 applications at that time.

To date, the Redress Board's experience has been that 30% of existing claimants, from former residents of institutions under the aegis of the DOES, have provided evidence without first making a FOI application. Consequently, an allowance must be made for claims which are not supported by evidence obtained under FOI. This would suggest around 778 potential applications from this source at 30 June 2003.

The analysis carried out by the Board also showed that around 6% of its applications are from former residents of non-DOES institutions. This indicates that the non-DOES claimant numbers at 30 June 2003 would have been of the order of 410.

Claimant population - Potential claims at 30 June 2003

The combination of these lists resulted in the derivation of the following base population at 30 June 2003:

Potential Redress Applications at 30 June 2003

Persons who had instituted cases or FOI requests

People who had initiated cases and made FOI requests

1,448

People who made FOI requests only

3,060

People who instituted cases only

884

5,392

People who applied to give evidence before Laffoy Investigation

Committee but not included above

270

Other Claims

Claims from DOES supervised institutions not included above

778

Claims from residents of institutions not under DOES

410

---

1,188

---

Total potential claimants at 30 June 2003

6,850

---

Further potential claims

Further potential claims are likely to arise because:

· Requests for information under FOI continue to be made at a current rate of around 180 per month

· Certain claims may be received without recourse to FOI

· The trend in claims from non-DOES cases is likely to continue at least at the existing level of 6% of all applications

· The experience in Canada has been that the actual creation of a non-confrontational redress scheme induces more victims to come forward and make claims. In the two Ontario schemes the increase in the number of claimants varied between 2.6 and 3.4 times the known likely number of claimants at the start of the schemes.

While, to date, 30% of applications to the Board are not supported by FOI based evidence it has been assumed that, given the fact that the Board is encouraging applicants to use the FOI route, the percentage of non-FOI supported cases will drop to around 20%. In estimating future potential claims under these assumptions, FOI requests have been taken as a key indicator of claims since the information supplied by the DOES is used as evidence of residency. Analysis has been carried out on the basis of two levels of requests - 86 and 140 per month, during the period July 2003 to December 2005.

An estimate based on these levels of requests would suggest that potential future claims might be of the order set out in Table 7.4.

Table 7.4 Potential further claims to December 2005

FOI requests of 86 per month

FOI requests of 140 per month

Projected claims based on assumed new FOI requests

2,580

4,200

Potential applicants from DOES institutions who do not make an FOI request

645

1,050

Potential applicants from non-DOES institutions

206

335

Estimated number of potential future claims

3,431

5,585

Total potential claimants

Combining the estimates of claimants at 30 June 2003 with that of future potential claimants would yield a possible range from 10,281 to 12,435 claims.

If a further assumption is made that around 5% of potential applicants who have instituted legal proceedings will not apply for redress and that only around 85% of the remainder will apply, then the estimates indicate that the final number of claimants could lie in the range of around 9,000 to 10,800.

These adjustments are made in an attempt to take account of the fact that the age of claimants may militate against the pursuit of redress in all cases and a certain base level of applications under FOI is for purposes of tracing relatives and gaining insight into the background, family history and circumstances of a referral to institutions regulated by the State.

It is difficult to interpret the initial relatively slow rate of applications to the Board. Only 15% of the 884 litigation cases mentioned previously have claimed to date. Assuming that all of these litigation cases will become claims and that a similar claim pattern applies to non-litigation cases it would suggest that final claims may be of the order of 10,300.

As part of the estimation process these calculations will need to be revisited by the DOES from time to time as the trends upon which they are based become clearer and if more institutions are added to those listed in the schedule to the Act.

Estimates of the contingent liability

The trends apparent in the Canadian schemes examined suggest that as the number of claimants increases the average award might be towards the lower end of a range.

This would be consistent with the fact that:

· The base population at the date of conclusion of the agreement contained a high proportion of persons who had instituted legal proceedings and were, therefore, committed to the more onerous pursuit of redress through the courts

· It also contained a segment of claimants who had opted to give evidence before the Investigation Committee of the Laffoy Commission

· Even if more recent additions to the population of potential claimants all result in claims, it may be reasonable to estimate the average award on the basis that, taken in the aggregate, additional claims, while valid and genuine, may progressively arise from persons who have coped better with the psycho-social consequences and loss of opportunity that arise from abuse.

In summary, the following assumptions appear relevant to the estimation of the State's contingent liability:

· Claim numbers may lie in the region of around 9,000 to 10,800.

· Average awards would be around €96,600, including costs, but might lie in the range €82,100 to €111,000.

· It is likely that the average award level would be higher at lower claim levels and lower in a situation where claim levels were high.

Taking account of these assumptions the contingent liability might be as follows:

· If the average award level is applied - €869m to €1.04bn

· If the awards vary as assumed with the claim numbers this results in a liability of between €887m and €1bn.

These contingent liabilities must be viewed with caution until the claim and award trend emerges in the light of the further experience of the Redress Board. Consequently, it will be important for the DOES to periodically rework the figures in order to provide the most accurate projection in the light of each new set of claim data.

Department's views on the liability

The DOES takes a more conservative view of the potential liability. It bases its estimate on the Redress Board's caseload to date. The Board is receiving applications at a rate of 50 per week and is now eight months into its operation. If it is assumed that it will continue to receive this level of applications for the next three years it implies a total caseload of 7,800. The Accounting Officer's view is that it is likely that the flow of applications will abate as time goes on, with possibly a flurry of activity in the final months before the closing date in just over two years time. Under this scenario the maximum number of applicants is, in his view, unlikely to exceed 8,000.

Allowing that the average award of just over €84,000 remains static, and taking the total number of applications at a level of 8,000, would imply a cost of awards in the order of €672m. Adding 15% for costs implies a total maximum cost in the order of €772m. However, this is likely to be an exaggerated estimate since it takes no account of diminishing numbers of cases and a diminishing average award as time goes on. The Accounting Officer stressed that the Department will keep the issue under regular review.

The Accounting Officer bases his analysis on the claim experience of the Redress Board to date and his calculation of the likely cost of the redress scheme may indeed be valid. However, the figures produced in my calculations are estimates of the contingent liability or the liability that may arise if the potential population claim in accordance with the pattern set out in the assumptions. It is only as the claim pattern becomes clearer that the DOES will be in a position to assess the liability with a greater degree of precision.

The Agreement and its Negotiation

While internal briefing papers noted that the decision to set up the scheme was not dependent on a contribution from the congregations, the Act provided that a person, with the consent of the Minister and of the Minister for Finance, could make a contribution for awards. This was designed to provide for a situation where the State would reach agreement with the congregations on an indemnity to be provided in return for such a contribution.

Formal discussions on these matters took place throughout 2001 and the first half of 2002.

There were, broadly speaking, three phases in the negotiations.

· During the period up to October 2001, officials conducted the negotiations in the course of which the congregations made their opening offer. These negotiations reached an impasse.

· From November 2001 to January 2002, the Minister was involved in direct negotiations with the congregations, leading to the announcement that agreement, in principle, had been reached.

· Further negotiations between officials took place during the period from February to June 2002 when agreement was reached.

Negotiations to October 2001

In the period up to October 2001, the State's negotiating team comprised representatives from the DOES, the Attorney General's Office and the Department of Finance. Legal advisers accompanied the congregations' representatives.

The congregations were concerned that those negotiating on behalf of the State should have the power to bind the State and at various stages they expressed concerns about the process and how the Cabinet could be kept involved. Both sides accepted that negotiations would be on the basis that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

Key issues in the negotiations

While the negotiations covered a range of items, including issues surrounding the validation of claims, two interlinked issues were central. These were:

· The level of the congregations' contribution

· The nature of the indemnity to be provided in return.

The congregations' negotiating stance

The congregations took the view that the level of contribution required from them should be in proportion to the level of validation of allegations decided by the Government and their ability to pay. In their opinion, the contribution should also take account of:

· The fact that it was the State that had decided to proceed with this particular form of redress

· The fact that the State had set the level of validation lower than that of the Courts

· The congregations' own assessment of their liability in a Court situation.

Also, the congregations' maintained that account should be taken of the contributions made by them to the Faoiseamh Helpline and other pastoral services which had been made available to former residents of institutions. In addition, the congregations indicated that any contribution should take into account the ministry which they continue to carry out and, where appropriate, the resources of individual congregations.

In return, the congregations were seeking an indemnity against all claims by persons who would be eligible to make a claim to the Redress Board.

The State's position

The State's estimate of the liability, which would arise from the creation of a redress scheme, had developed during the period February to June 2001.

· In February, the estimated upper limit of the liability was €254m.

· By April, a DOES memorandum indicated that it would be reasonable to operate in terms of a maximum potential cost of €381m.

· In June, a further DOES memorandum stated that the liability might be as high as €508m.

The initial stance taken by the State was that the congregations should pay 50% of the cost of the scheme. The congregations responded that this went far beyond what they had envisaged.

In April 2001, officials sought Ministerial approval for an approach whereby, while a contribution of 50% would be sought, it should be subject to a maximum limit. While the opening figure sought should be €190m, representing 50% of the then estimated liability, in the event that the congregations could provide convincing reasons for resisting this approach, a lower limit of €127m could be set. If not satisfied as to the contribution, the State should be prepared to refuse to accept the participation of the congregations and should, in that case, amend the law to ensure that claimants could, even if compensated through the scheme, pursue their claims independently against the congregations.

A DOES memorandum of 30 April 2001 stated that the congregations had been given a figure of a possible 2,000 claims with a final cost in the region of €254m but that it had been stressed to the congregations that the final cost might be much higher. However, a possible capping of the contribution was not mentioned to the congregations at this time. In March 2001, the DOES had pointed out that the provision of an open-ended indemnity would have significant implications for the State and that the issue would require further detailed discussion.

The initial offer

At a meeting on 26 June 2001, the congregations outlined their proposed contribution. The offer amounted to approximately €108m, €57m in new resources and past property contributions valued at approximately €51m. The offer included:

· Cash payments of €25.4m over a five-year period

· An education trust fund of €12.7m

· Transfers of property worth €12.7m to the State

· €6.35m for counselling and other support services, some of which had already been spent

· Property, valued by the congregations at €51m, which congregations had transferred to the State for little or no consideration over the previous 10 years.

In return, the congregations wanted an indemnity against all claims in respect of institutional abuse of children up to the present.

The congregations maintained that the offer exceeded their exposure in litigation by a considerable margin. The congregations also claimed that, by establishing the scheme, the Government had increased the number of claims far beyond the number the congregations would have been required to meet in litigation.

Figures were submitted by the congregations outlining a number of possible outcomes if cases, approximately 2,500, were taken through the Courts. Various assumptions were made concerning the number of cases that would succeed and the possible range of awards and costs in such circumstances. There was an assumption that between 78% and 89% of the cases would fail.

The congregations estimated that, over a range of different liability apportionment scenarios, their exposure would lie between €21m and €106m. On the basis that each of these scenarios had an equal chance of occurring, and that the expected cost would be an average of the cost in all of the scenarios, the congregations went on to estimate their probable exposure in litigation at around €54m.

The Department's response

DOES officials, in putting the offer to the Minister, noted that the value of the offer amounted to €57m, unless the State was prepared to accept the congregations' approach and include the past property transfers. This fell far short of the State's objective of 50% with a minimum contribution of €127m. The officials noted that the property transfers had occurred without any reference to abuse compensation.

The officials emphasised that the State had no reliable information on the congregations' assets and their ability to pay. In addition, the value of the indemnity requested and the resultant cost to the State were not quantifiable.

The Minister for Finance was informed and wrote to the Minister stating that the offer was quite inadequate and left the State to bear virtually the full cost of the redress scheme.

Impasse in the negotiations

The negotiations slowed in the months following the offer by the congregations. There was some publicity which caused discord between the two sides.

A further meeting was held in October 2001. Handwritten DOES notes from this meeting indicate that a contribution of €127m was mentioned but the notes also show that the State negotiators considered past contributions to be of no value.

Following this meeting, the congregations wrote to the DOES. The letter indicated that the congregations felt that the June proposal had not been taken seriously by the State and that the leaders of the congregations were going to meet to decide on their future participation in the negotiations.

The Negotiations - November 2001 to January 2002

On 6 November, prior to the first meeting involving the Minister, the DOES wrote to the congregations. This letter marked a significant change in the stance being adopted by the State in relation to past contributions. Included among the points made in the letter were the following:

· The State would provide a permanent indemnity against litigation in cases which would come under the remit of the Redress Board.

· A package involving cash, an education trust and property transfers could form the basis for the congregations' contribution.

· The DOES would like to see the congregations contribute 50% of the cost of the redress scheme. While the State estimated the likely cost at €254m to €508m, the congregations contribution could be capped at €127m, which represented 50% of the lowest cost estimate.

· A problem existed with the proposed inclusion of past property transfers to the State, given that they occurred without reference to a redress scheme, but the issue could be re-examined in the context of the date of the State's apology.

· The congregations' proposed contribution, when past transfers are excluded, represented only 10% to 20% of the likely cost.

Negotiations took place in the period from November 2001 to January 2002. No contemporaneous records of these negotiations were available during my examination. On 12 March 2002, the DOES prepared a retrospective memorandum on the negotiations conducted by the Minister.

The memorandum, which was prepared by the Secretary General who accompanied the Minister during this phase of the negotiations, stated, inter alia, that:

· The negotiations had reached stalemate after the June offer and the congregations were also concerned about confidentiality. In the interests of seeking a final resolution, the Minister agreed to meet the congregations accompanied only by the Secretary General.

· Two meetings were held between the Minister and the Secretary General of the DOES, for the State, and the representatives of the congregations. These meetings were held on 7 November 2001 and 7 January 2002. The legal representative for the congregations attended the second meeting.

· The discussions centred on the amount of the contribution and how it was to be structured. Agreement was reached, for a contribution of €128m, and announced on 30 January 2002.

· The indemnity was only discussed to the extent that the congregations indicated that a draft they had proposed should form the basis for the final indemnity. The Minister and the Secretary General indicated that they did not have the legal expertise required to deal with this subject.

· The congregations also sought amendments to the Bill that would focus on injury rather than abuse or would give a right of reply to accused people.

· Prior to the matter going before Government, the congregations sought written assurances in relation to the proposed indemnity. However, the DOES informed the congregations it could not be recommended that the Minister be bound legally to the agreement without the formal involvement and advice of the Attorney General's Office.

The papers indicate that the Minister made an oral report to Government on the outcome of the negotiations at the end of January 2002 and this was followed by the Minister's announcement that the Government had agreed, in principle, to a set of proposals. The agreement, as announced, would see the congregations contributing €128m to the redress scheme - €38m in cash including €12.7m for an education trust, €80m in property transfers including transfers made since 11 May 1999 and €10m in counselling and other services. In return, the Government would indemnify the congregations concerned against all present and future claims arising from past child abuse which would be covered by the redress legislation.

The Negotiations - February to June 2002

Following the announcement by the Minister, on 30 January 2002, that the Government had agreed in principle to the proposals, negotiations resumed in March. At the first meeting, the congregations' representatives were accompanied by their legal representatives. Thereafter, the legal representatives attended alone. The DOES represented the State. The first two meetings had representation from the Chief State Solicitor's Office. From the third meeting, which was held in April, a representative from the Attorney General's Office joined the negotiations.

Two items dominated proceedings:

· The nature of the indemnity to be provided

· Whether or not previously transferred property could include property transferred to Non-Government Organisations (NGOs).

The nature of the indemnity

The issue of the indemnity had not been agreed in the previous discussions with the Minister. The Minister had said that the detailed terms of the indemnity could only be finalised with the involvement of the Attorney General's Office. The congregations' stance was that agreement in principle had been reached that the indemnity would cover all cases which could come within the remit of the Redress Board and that the indemnity should be open-ended.

In the preparation by the State side, for negotiation on the indemnity, it was necessary to conclude on the State's stance. The Attorney General's Office, in correspondence, noted that their understanding, when the Office was previously involved in negotiations during 2001, was that the indemnity would only extend to cases which would actually go before the Redress Board. The Minister, in a letter to the Attorney General's Office, clarified the policy objectives - that the indemnity would cover all cases which would come within the remit of the Board but that the indemnity would be time-limited.

Agreement was reached. The indemnity would cover all cases which could potentially come within the remit of the redress scheme and would operate for any related litigation which had commenced within three years of the last day for applications to the Redress Board.

The indemnity applies only in cases where the State has full control over the defence. Where a congregation or an individual wishes to adopt a course with which the State does not agree then the indemnity will not apply.

Previously transferred property

The agreement in principle provided for property previously transferred to be included as part of the congregations' contribution. The issue arose as to whether this could include property transferred to NGOs. The DOES took the view that only property transferred to the State could be accepted, as it was important that non-cash assets would be capable of being realised by the State. The Department of Finance took the same view. A note from a meeting held in April states that the Secretary General had confirmed that there was no agreement on the inclusion of properties transferred to NGOs. The congregations were adamant that the agreement reached with the Minister provided for the inclusion of such property.

The State, following further consultations, agreed to accept property transferred to the State or a public body (e.g. local authority or health board) in the period from 11 May 1999 to the date of the signing of the agreement. In addition, property previously transferred to a registered charity would be accepted, subject to a restriction on the sale or disposal of the property for a period of 25 years. The DOES would not accept the inclusion of any property transferred to a body owned or controlled by any religious congregation or other Church body. In cases where the 25-year restriction could not be provided, the congregations would replace the property with another or with cash, at their discretion.

Other adjustments agreed

Other adjustments were agreed, at this stage, including an increase in the cash element of the contribution and a corresponding reduction in the property element.

In the course of the negotiations, the congregations sought to extend the number of institutions in the schedule to the Bill, with the additional institutions (e.g. hospitals and special schools) being included without any increase in the contribution. The DOES accepted that additional institutions could be added to the schedule.

General views of the DOES on the negotiations

The Accounting Officer has pointed out that a fundamental element of Government policy in respect of the redress scheme was that the Government decided to set it up with or without a contribution from the congregations. The Government also decided to set it up notwithstanding that the final cost was not quantifiable. This in itself is not unusual in respect of Government programmes. As regards the contribution from the congregations, the Government's policy was that such a contribution was a desirable, but not an essential, element of a redress scheme. It was desirable as a factor in bringing closure to the issue of abuse for victims. Leaving them in a situation where they could sue the congregations in the courts for part of their compensation provided no such closure for them, or indeed society more generally. There was also, of course, a financial consideration - a contribution from the congregations meant that the State would not have to provide all the funding required. The objective of the negotiations was to achieve the highest possible contribution that the congregations were prepared to make. There was no capacity to coerce them into any agreement and, in all probability, if they were not part of the scheme then they would have avoided most, if not all, the costs of compensation.

Negotiations commenced and proceeded for a time on the basis of a 50/50 split of cost. However, negotiators for the State realised early on that if the congregations were to be persuaded to make a contribution they would not do so on the basis of an open-ended 50/50 split and would not do so without an indemnity. As early as April 2001 the Minister and the Minister for Finance had agreed that the State would accept a capped contribution amounting to €127m. This was not related to any proportion of likely minimum or maximum cost. The discussions continued on the basis of seeking a 50/50 contribution as a means of seeing how far the congregations could be persuaded to go.

The Accounting Officer accepted that there is a reference, in correspondence with the congregations, that €127m represented only 50% of the DOES's lowest estimate, but this was intended as underlining that it was a line below which the DOES would not go in seeking agreement. What was at issue in seeking that agreement was a contribution that could be considered by the Government to be satisfactory.

The Final Agreement

The final agreement, signed on 5 June 2002, quantified the contribution and outlined the indemnity.

Contribution

The agreed contribution of €128m to be made by the congregations to the redress scheme comprised the following:

· Cash payments amounting to €41.14m, of which €12.7m will be used by the State for educational programmes for former residents of institutions and their families.

· Transfers of real property which have been made (previously transferred property) to the State, State agencies, local authorities or voluntary organisations since 11 May 1999 to the aggregate value of €40.32m.

· Transfers of real property which are to be made to the State, or its nominees, as soon as practicable, to the aggregate value of €36.54m.

· Counselling and other support services for former residents of institutions and their families, already provided or to be provided, to the value of €10m.

The amount of past contribution included in the final agreement would be between €40.32m and €50.32m, depending on what proportion of the counselling contribution had been spent prior to the signing of the Agreement.

Indemnity

In return for the contribution, the State agreed to indemnify the contributing congregations in respect of liability in litigation which had commenced within three years of the last day for applications to the redress scheme and which would qualify to be dealt with under the Act.

Information, Advice and Approval Arrangements

In negotiating the agreement, the following information and advice would be critical to the adoption of an informed negotiating position by the State:

· Information about the possible liability, which would inform any demand in relation to the amount of a meaningful contribution by the congregations.

· The possible costs facing the congregations if all cases went to Court, as this was the figure underpinning the congregations' negotiating stance.

· Legal advice on the implications of any indemnity agreed.

Information about the Liability

Information was directly available to the DOES from a number of sources to estimate the possible liability.

Number of claimants

Information was available from the number of litigation cases, those applying to give evidence to the Investigation Committee of the Laffoy Commission and the Freedom of Information requests from former residents of institutions. In addition, information was available on a number of compensation schemes in Canada.

Litigation

It would be reasonable to assume that individuals who were prepared to pursue a case through the courts would avail of the right to seek redress.

When the Government approved the drafting of the Victims of Child Abuse Compensation Tribunal Bill in February 2001, the memorandum noted that 865 cases were pending against the State in November 2000. It had been estimated, in 1999, that the number of litigation cases would be of the order of 2,000 and, the memorandum further noted, there was nothing to indicate that this estimate would be significantly wide of the mark.

In June 2001, the congregations had based the calculation of their exposure in the courts on a likely 2,500 cases and in June 2002, the congregations notified the State that there were 2,551 cases where court proceedings had been issued, or litigation was threatened, in respect of alleged abuse at institutions covered by the Agreement. The State was named as co-defendant in 2,460 of these cases.

Laffoy Commission

The Commission comprises two committees:

· A committee to investigate allegations of abuse (the Investigation Committee) before which individuals and institutions implicated in allegations of abuse would have full legal rights available to them, including the right to cross-examine witnesses. The committee will produce a report identifying institutions where abuse took place and, possibly, naming perpetrators. The committee may report on individual complaints but will not name individual victims.

· A committee which gives victims an opportunity to tell their story (the Confidential Committee) but which does not investigate any allegations.

The Ryan Report, published in January 2002, noted that there had been 1,957 requests to give evidence to the Investigation Committee of the Commission and 1,192 requests to give evidence to the Confidential Committee. 1,375 former residents of Industrial and Reformatory institutions made 1,695 of the requests to the Investigation Committee with the balance coming from people who attended other schools and institutions.

While details of the complainants to the Confidential Committee are not available, if the same ratios applied, approximately 835 former residents of Industrial and Reformatory institutions would have made requests to this Committee giving a total of just over 2,200.

Freedom of Information

The DOES had, from the coming into force of the Freedom of Information Act, 1997 (FOI), received requests from former residents of institutions for personal information from the Department records.

There had been 62 FOI requests to the end of May 1999. The Taoiseach's apology and increasing publicity surrounding the issue, both on TV and in the print media, appeared to trigger an increase in the number of requests. The number had grown to 386 by the end of 1999, 1,020 at the end of 2000, 2,245 at the end of 2001 and 2,840 by the end of May 2002.

While individuals may seek information for reasons other than to obtain evidence to support a claim in litigation or to the Redress Board, it is plausible to suggest that there will be a strong correlation between the number of FOI requests and applications for redress.

Amount of awards

Information was available on award levels as follows:

· Experience in the courts of award levels in a major case involving abuse in a family setting

· The Ryan Report recommendations.

Use of the information

During the initial phase of the negotiations, the State was seeking a contribution of approximately 50% of the possible liability. In order to pursue this demand, a best estimate of the liability, using the available information, should have been available at all times.

Claimant numbers

The overall information available on potential claimants included the list of litigants, the FOI requests and those applying to give evidence before the Investigation Committee of the Laffoy Commission.

During the course of the negotiations the State agreed with the congregations that additional institutions could be included. This would also impact on estimates of claimant numbers.

While the Department produced estimates at various points it based them only on the number of litigation cases and the likely number of claimants in excess of this, which might arise due to the creation of the non-confrontational compensation scheme. The earliest estimates had put the potential claimants at 2,000. By November 2001 the DOES was estimating that the number of claimants was likely to exceed 3,000 and might rise to 4,000. By June 2002 it was being estimated that the number of claimants could be 5,200 or more.

As a consequence of basing estimates solely on litigation cases the trend in FOI requests was not fully taken into account. By the end of 2001 FOI requests were being made at the rate of approximately 100 per month. This trend continued during the first half of 2002 and it would have been reasonable to assume that the trend provided some indication of the likely effect of the compensation scheme on claimant numbers.

The experience in Canadian schemes suggests that more claimants are likely to pursue a claim in a nonconfrontational compensation scheme, than would through the courts.

In any event, once the decision was taken, in November 2001, to cap the contribution demanded from the congregations it effectively meant that the contribution being sought, assuming a 50:50 liability split, was based on the equivalent of 2,000 claims.

Cost of awards

Estimates were informed by the results of a leading law case. The memorandum to Government, in February 2001, noted that in this case the damages to victims of abuse in a family setting were agreed at €190,000 each, by the State, in a settlement. This figure was used as a basis for estimating the likely award based on an assumption that approximately one third of awards would be in the region of the €190,000 and that average awards in the other cases might be around €51,000 with costs around 25% of awards.

The Ryan Report, which was presented to the Minister in January 2002, was not available to inform liability estimation in the earlier part of the negotiation process.

The evidence from Canada suggests that average awards in a compensation scheme are likely to fall with increases in the number of claimants and that the working estimate used at all stages by the State may be slightly high.

Implications for the liability

As additional information comes to hand it would be reasonable to expect that the full range of potential costs, including the lower estimate, would be revised. In fact, no revision of the lower estimate of the potential cost, €254m, was made, at any stage, despite evidence that the minimum number of claimants was likely to be greater than the 2,000 upon which the estimate was based.

When the State agreed, in November 2001, to cap the congregations' contribution at €127m, this represented 50% of the lowest estimated cost.

However, by this time the Department was estimating that the number of claimants would probably exceed 3,000. Using the Department's estimate of the average award this have would put the minimum liability at €381m.

For purposes of the calculation of the contribution no allowance was made for adjustment on the basis of any increase in numbers after the agreement of a scheme. The Canadian experience was that the number of applicants might increase by a multiple of approximately three times the known number of likely applicants at the start of a compensation scheme.

While the DOES did not carry out detailed analysis of the information on known likely applicants, the underestimation of the likely minimum cost of the scheme could have been identified by using the Department's own estimate of the likely cost of awards and its information from any one, or a combination, of the available sources for identification of potential applicants.

· An estimated 2,200 former residents of Industrial and Reform institutions applied to give evidence to the Laffoy Commission.

· In June 2001 the congregations estimated the number of litigation cases at approximately 2,500.

· There were 2,840 FOI requests at the end of May 2002.

Using a more conservative multiple than that suggested by the Canadian schemes and assuming only a doubling of any one of these figures would have indicated that the minimum number of applicants might be in the region of 4,400 to 5,700. Even without combining the populations and eliminating overlaps, using the DOES's estimate of the average cost of an award of €127,000 would have put the likely minimum liability in the range of almost €560m to €720m.

The DOES has stressed that, once the decision to cap the demand was taken, no relationship was made thereafter between the contribution and the minimum cost of the scheme. Consequently, minimum cost levels were not a factor in the ultimate negotiations of the congregations contribution.

Information about the Congregations' Exposure in Litigation

In the course of the negotiations, the congregations asserted that any contribution should not exceed their exposure if all the cases were to go before the courts.

· In June 2001, the congregations said that their best estimate of their likely exposure in litigation was €54m with their highest estimate at €108m.

· On 30 May 2002, a DOES document prepared for discussion with the Minister in advance of the proposal going to Government stated that the congregations estimate of their exposure in the courts might be correct. Plaintiffs could face formidable legal obstacles. On the other hand, the document points out, it could be expected that the courts might take a benign view of plaintiffs in many cases and juries might be sympathetic and the costs for all concerned could be much greater than the congregations anticipated.

· While the DOES made no detailed assessment of the congregations' figures or of the likely apportionment of liability by the courts, the Government, in considering the agreement, noted that its approval reflected the understanding of evidence which could be produced in any court proceedings as to liability by the State. Subsequently the Secretary General of the DOES provided the Secretary General to the Government with the available information which the DOES had on the issue of State liability.

Legal Advice

Participation in negotiations

While the teams of negotiators were meeting, in the series of meetings which reached an impasse in October 2001, the State's team included representation from the Office of the Attorney General.

However, from October 2001 to April 2002, the Office of the Attorney General was not represented at meetings with the congregations and had no contact with those negotiating on behalf of the State. The Accounting Officer has pointed out that there were only two meetings between officials and the congregations in the period. Neither meeting focused in detail on legal issues and the first on 13 March 2002 specifically agreed to refer the matter of the indemnity to a group comprising the solicitors for the congregations and representatives of the Attorney General's Office and the Department.

In order to be in a position to offer further advice, following the oral report of the Minister to the Cabinet and the announcement of the agreement in principle, in January 2002, the Office of the Attorney General sought information on the detailed negotiations, including the extent of the indemnity. A letter requesting information was sent to the Minister by the Attorney General on 31 January 2002 and this letter was followed by a further letter from his office on 1 February 2002. As no reply had been received by 13 March 2002, the Attorney General advised the Department that his Office could not participate in negotiations or offer legal advice in the absence of the requested information. As the negotiation details had not been documented the Secretary General prepared a retrospective memorandum on the negotiations conducted by the Minister up to that point.

On 13 April 2002, the Minister wrote to the Attorney General outlining the policy approach he proposed to adopt in the further negotiations in relation to the indemnity. He proposed that the indemnity should extend to all the persons who could apply for redress and that the period should not be any longer than 10 years.

Senior Counsel's Opinion

The Office of the Attorney General sought advice from Senior Counsel in late May 2002 on the terms of the Indemnity Agreement.

The Senior Counsel addressed the issue of cases which go to court and where a congregation (or an individual) has an established constitutional right to defend his or her good name and advised that while the intent to indemnify was clear he was not sure that indemnity of every party could be compelled or assured in circumstances where there are individually named defendants who are separately represented and whose interests might not converge with the interests of the congregations.

He raised the question of the risk of a substantial award in a case, perhaps due to the way in which the congregation conducted the defence, and the possible implications for other cases including those which might have gone to the Redress Board.

Attorney General's advice/observations to Government (June 2002)

The Attorney General, in June 2002, noted that the draft Indemnity Agreement reflected the policy position adopted by the Minister in relation to the extent and breadth of the indemnity. He pointed out that an estimate of the doubling of the number of cases to 5,200, based on the number of litigation cases, might be conservative and pointed out that the highest estimate of the liability, €508m, was based on an estimated 4,000 claims. In addition, he pointed out that the contribution of €128m might be regarded as insufficient and highlighted the lack of a mechanism for increasing the contribution from the congregations if the number of cases increased greatly.

In relation to the defence of litigation to which the indemnity applied the Attorney General pointed out that the State would have to be mindful of possible subsequent defamation proceedings, numerous actions having been undertaken in Canada by individual members of congregations on the basis that the resolution of a claim by way of payment to the claimant was damaging to the reputation of the individual referred to in the claim. The Attorney General suggested a related amendment to the agreement and the relevant clause was amended to incorporate the change.

Approval Arrangements

The lines of communication during the negotiations were that memoranda were sent to the Secretary General for discussion with, and direction from, the Minister. Approval was sought from the Government at certain stages.

Key milestones in the supervision of the negotiation process were:

· Government approval for the redress legislation in February 2001

· Ministerial approval for the negotiating approach in April 2001

· Consideration of the congregations' offer in June 2001

· Direct Ministerial involvement from November 2001 leading to the announcement of the agreement in principle

· Ministerial clarification of the extent of the indemnity in April 2002

· Briefing in advance of approval for the Agreement in May 2002

· Government approval for the Agreement in June 2002.

Implementation of the Agreement

The DOES has established the Residential Institutions Redress Unit. The responsibilities of the unit include overseeing the implementation of the Agreement. The following progress has been made in collecting the contribution agreed and bringing any funds to account.

Cash Payments

The Agreement stipulated that the cash payments should be made as follows:

· €12,654,000 to be paid on execution of the Agreement

· The balance to be paid in four equal instalments (€7,121,500 each instalment) on 5 September 2002, 5 December 2002, 5 February 2003 and 5 May 2003.

The Congregations duly made the payments as stipulated.

Application of the proceeds

Up to 5 June 2003, the total value of the funds was €41.77m. This was made up of contributions from the congregations of €41.14m and interest of €0.63m. The contributions and interest are held in two funds as set out in Table 7.5.

Table 7.5 Investment and deposit of contributions

Investment/Deposit

Redress Fund €m

Educational Fund €m

Total €m

National Treasury Management Agency (Exchequer Notes)

23.91

12.86

36.77

Paymaster General

5.00

-

5.00

Total

28.91

12.86

41.77

Strictly, under the Act, the part of the proceeds pertaining to awards to be made by way of redress should be lodged in an account with the Paymaster General. In fact, only €5m has been so lodged. The remainder was invested directly in Government securities through the National Treasury Management Agency. I will be auditing this account, in due course, after it has been prepared and presented for audit.

Transfers of Property

There are two categories of property provided for in the Agreement:

· Property transferred between 11 May 1999 and the date of the Agreement (previously transferred property)

· Property to be transferred in the future (future property transfers).

Previously transferred property

The Agreement stipulated that property previously transferred to the State, State agencies, local authorities or voluntary organisations providing health or social services could be included in the contributions.

In May 2002 the Congregations supplied the State with a schedule of 37 properties which the Congregations claimed had been transferred after 11 May 1999. The valuations, as of the date of transfer, submitted by the Congregations put an aggregate value of €40.97m on the properties.

The recipients of the property, which the Congregations claimed to have transferred since 11 May 1999, are set out in Table 7.6.

Transferee

Properties

Congregation Valuation €

DOES

11

10.24m

Voluntary Organisations

18

22.12m

Local Authorities

4

6.98m

Health Boards

1

0.12m

Unidentified

3

1.51m

Total

37

40.97m

The Agreement set a target of €40.32m under this category.

The DOES put a process in train to review the schedule to determine if the properties represented qualifying properties under the terms of the agreement. Discussions are ongoing with the legal representatives of the Congregations.

The key validation steps required for these properties are:

· Determining whether the properties qualify, in principle, under the Agreement

· Agreeing the value of the properties

· Determining the value of any previous State grants in respect of these properties

· Confirming that property transferred to voluntary bodies will not be alienated for at least 25 years

· Taking account of any consideration paid

· Confirming good and marketable title.

Qualifying properties

The DOES sought to establish that the properties listed had been transferred to a qualifying body during the designated period. Arising from this the DOES has informed me that it has rejected, or is likely to reject, eight properties, valued by the congregations at €8.11m. Two further properties, valued at €0.76m, have been transferred to the schedule of future property transfers.

Valuation

The congregations submitted professional valuations for each property. The DOES selected a sample of 10 properties for valuation by the Valuation Office. Prior to the valuations being carried out the DOES had rejected two properties in the sample as not qualifying under the terms of the Agreement and the Valuation Office did not value two further properties, as it did not have maps of the sites.

For one property, a site of 7.4 acres in Co Galway, there was a major difference between the valuation of €3.5m submitted by the Congregations and the value of €1.85m per the Valuation Office. In the event that agreement cannot be reached, either party can apply to have the matter determined by an independent valuer.

In the remaining five cases, the opinion of the Valuation Office was that the valuations submitted were reasonable.

Grants or other payments provided by the State

The Agreement stipulates that a valuation of any property must take account of any grants or other payments provided by the State. The State has not yet accepted, in principle, any of these properties. Consequently, it has yet to investigate and determine whether, and to what extent, any such grants have been paid.

Restriction on transfer or alienation of a property

The implementation of this provision has given rise to difficulties. The religious congregations do not appear to be in a position to provide evidence that there is a legal 25-year restriction on the transfer or alienation of properties previously transferred to voluntary organisations. In order to address this issue, the Congregations have obtained letters from the transferees stating that they will not further alienate or transfer properties without the consent in writing of the Minister for Finance. The matter has been referred to the Chief State Solicitor's Office for its observations.

Properties previously transferred where the State paid consideration at the time of transfer

Where property was transferred below open market value, the difference between the consideration paid and the open market value at the date of transfer should be taken into account when assessing the value of the contribution.

There were three previously transferred properties which the State had purchased for consideration. The Congregations claimed that the consideration paid was below the open market value and claimed credit for the difference. The State has rejected two of these properties as not qualifying under the terms of the Agreement. The DOES took the view that the difference between the consideration paid and the open market value could not, in the circumstances, be considered as a contribution under the scheme.

The first of these properties was a 5.5 acre playing field purchased in 2000 by a Vocational Education Committee from a congregation. A condition of sale was that, in the event of the VEC disposing of the lands within 10 years, the congregation would receive 50% of any increase in price. The DOES rejected the property as not qualifying under the terms of the agreement.

The second property was in Dublin. A religious order had sold a convent and an adjoining residence to a voluntary housing association for €6.98m in 2000. An independent valuation put the open market value of the site at the time of the sale at €10.2m. The congregations claimed credit for the difference. The contract of sale included a restrictive covenant in favour of the order recognising the fact that the property was being sold for less than open market value and entitling the order to 25% of the proceeds in the event of the property being sold within 21 years for any purpose other than for social or affordable housing.

The aggregate credit sought by the congregations for these two properties was €4.62m.

The third property where the State paid consideration was a property in Co Mayo, which a religious order had sold to the Western Health Board for €275,000 in November 1999. The sale included a restrictive covenant that the property was to remain in community use for the benefit of locals. The valuers for the order put the loss of market value due to this covenant at €125,000. The DOES is seeking further information from the congregations' legal representatives about this property.

Good and marketable title

The State has not yet accepted any of the previously transferred properties. Consequently, the matter of the title has not yet been clarified.

Summary

To date the State has not accepted any of the properties listed as previously transferred property on the schedule provided by the Congregations. The DOES says that this is mainly due to deficiencies in the information supplied by the Congregations' and has raised the matter with the Congregations' legal representatives.

The following is the DOES's position at the end of June 2003:

· One property, valuation €0.57m is likely to qualify under the terms of the Agreement

· A further twelve properties, with an aggregate valuation of €17.29m are likely to qualify if the State is satisfied that undertakings about the 25-year restriction are legally enforceable. There is disagreement about the valuation of one of these properties

· Further details are being sought by the DOES in regard to ten properties with a total valuation of €8.89m

· Two properties, with an aggregate valuation of €0.76m, have been transferred to the schedule of future property transfers

· The DOES has rejected, or is likely to reject, ten properties with an aggregate valuation of €12.73m

· The congregations have withdrawn two properties, valuation €0.73m.

Future property transfers

In May 2002, the Congregations provided the State with a schedule of 43 properties to be transferred. The valuations submitted by the Congregations put an aggregate valuation of €38.74m, as of the date of the agreement, on 42 of the properties. No valuation was submitted for one property which is the subject of a Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO). Two properties were transferred from the schedule of previously transferred property bringing the total to 45 properties with an aggregate valuation of €39.5m, excluding the unvalued property which is the subject of a CPO.

The Agreement set a target of €36.54m under this heading.

The DOES reviewed this schedule to determine if the properties being offered were qualifying properties under the terms of the agreement. Discussions are ongoing with the legal representatives of the Congregations.

The principal considerations in the review are:

· Determining whether the properties offered will be of use or benefit to the State

· Agreeing the value of the properties

· Determining the value of any State grants

· Confirming good and marketable title.

Use or benefit to the State

The State had nine months under the Agreement in which to refuse to accept a property if in its reasonable opinion it will be of no use or benefit to the State. This period was subsequently extended to 30 April 2003.

The DOES circulated details of the properties to Government Departments to identify Departments or State agencies that could benefit from a transfer. Those that expressed an interest were provided with details of the property. Many of the properties were already being used by Health Boards and the Boards indicated their interest in acquiring a fee simple interest in those properties.

The DOES has rejected eight properties, with an aggregate value of €9.85m, taking the view that the properties will be of no use or benefit to the State. Decisions are pending on five further properties. The total value of four of these properties is €10.18m while no valuation has yet been supplied for the remaining property.

By the end of June 2003, the DOES had accepted 32 of the properties offered, conditional on good and marketable title being established and their valuation being agreed. Subject to this, these properties will be transferred to public bodies as set out in Table 7.7.

Table 7.7 Property transfers accepted in principle by DOES

Transferee

Properties

Congregation Valuation €m

Eastern Regional Health Authority

3

1.97

Southern Health Board

19

12.24

South-Eastern Health Board

5

1.80

Mid West Health Board

2

0.61

Office of Public Works

1

1.20

DOES

2

1.65

Total

32

19.47

Valuation

The congregations submitted professional valuations for properties. The DOES has requested the transferees to treat the transfer of a property in the same way a prudent purchaser would. The transferees have been requested to obtain an independent valuation of the property. The DOES will seek a copy of all independent valuations.

By the end of May 2003, ten of the Southern Health Board properties had been valued by the Valuation Office. The aggregate valuation given by the Valuation Office was €2,600,000 while the aggregate valuation according to the Congregations was €2,666,600.

At 23 July 2003, the DOES had not received any other independent valuations.

Grants or other payments provided by the State

The DOES has written to the Health Boards, who are the transferees for a number of the properties to be transferred, requesting them to inform it if any grants have been paid in respect of the properties being transferred.

Good and marketable Title

The DOES takes the view that it is the responsibility of the transferee to establish that a transferor holds a good title to a property.

Summary

To date, the State has accepted, in principle, 32 properties, subject to good and marketable title and agreement about the valuations of the properties. The aggregate value attributed to these properties by the Congregations is €19.47m.

The DOES has rejected eight properties with an aggregate value of €9.85m.

Decisions are pending on four further properties whose aggregate value is €10.18m and a fifth property for which no valuation has been submitted.

Replacement Properties

The agreement stipulates that, in the event of the State refusing to accept a property, the congregations have the right to replace it with cash or other property at the congregations discretion. Replacement properties are to be valued at the date of the Agreement. The Agreement does not stipulate the timeframe within which the Congregations must offer a replacement property or cash.

The Agreement also provides that if the aggregate value of the properties contributed by the congregations falls short of the aggregate value of the properties which they have committed to provide, then the contributing congregations will be entitled to make up the shortfall in cash or property as soon as possible but not later that 6 months from the date the shortfall is ascertained and notified in writing to the congregations by the State.

As the State has rejected a number of properties, the aggregate value of the remaining properties is likely to fall short of the value which the Congregations have committed to provide.

The DOES prepared a schedule of locations where it wishes to acquire sites for the development of primary and post-primary school facilities. This schedule of sites was sent to the legal representatives of the congregations in October 2002 and subsequently updated to include a number of properties being sought by Health Boards. There are currently 21 locations and properties on the list. The Congregations have been asked to focus further offers of property on these areas.

Arising from this, the DOES was offered, and has accepted, land for school building development inCo. Kerry. The value attributed to this site by the congregations is €2.6m. The DOES is of the view that further properties may be offered arising from the schedule. The congregations have also submitted a list of 14 alternative properties. The Department is considering this list.

Counselling and other Support Services

The Agreement states that the Congregations contribution shall include counselling and other support services for former residents of institutions and their families, already provided or to be provided, to the value of €10m.

Previously delivered counselling

In 1997, CORI established an organisation called Faoiseamh with the aim of providing a confidential listening service and face-to-face counselling for adults who, as children were abused by religious or diocesan clergy. Under the Agreement, the Congregations may spend money on counselling and other support services other than through Faoiseamh.

Claims for contributions to date per the Congregations

In the course of the negotiations the congregations stated that much of the €10m contribution related to counselling and other services which had already been provided. The DOES wrote to the legal representatives for the congregations on 10 March 2003 requesting them to forward a further report detailing expenditure incurred in respect of counselling and support services for former residents of institutions and their families.

A reply from the congregations' legal representatives in March 2003 stated that the amount spent on counselling and other support services to that time was just over €11m. The information supplied, however, did not indicate the precise amount attributable to the provision of counselling and support services to former residents of the institutions and their families. The DOES, therefore, sought clarification.

Further letters on behalf of the congregations in May and June 2003 stated that in addition to contributions to Faoiseamh of €4.53m to date, there was also a further €7.1m of qualifying expenditure for counselling and other support services.

The Department continues to seek evidence from the legal representatives for the Congregations that the expenditure claimed has, in fact, been spent on providing counselling and other support services for those envisaged in the Agreement.

In regard to the service generally, the congregations maintain that they are committed to the continuation of counselling services for as long as they are required.

The Agreement allocates €12.7m of the cash contribution to be used by the State for educational programmes for former residents of institutions and their families.

Administration of a scheme

The overall administration of the fund will be by the DOES and the initial administrative costs were met by the Department. The fund, including investment income, was valued at €12.86m at 5 June 2003.

The DOES stated that it was not possible, within the time constraints to develop a scheme for the 2002-2003 academic year.

The National Office for Victims of Abuse (NOVA) has been approached to establish if it would be prepared to administer an application process on behalf of the DOES. An ad-hoc committee was formed comprising one representative each from Further Education Section of the DOES and NOVA, one representative from each of the four support groups affiliated to NOVA, the Adult Education Officer at City of Dublin VEC and the Education Facilitator at NOVA. The committee was to develop an application process and Framework Document in order to have a grant scheme in operation for the forthcoming academic year.

Following a number of meetings the ad-hoc committee has advised on how the fund should be administered and developed a draft application form together with a document entitled criteria for eligibility.

In order to include those victim support groups that operate outside the umbrella of NOVA, individual victims and other interested parties, the committee decided to circulate a copy of the draft documents and invite observations in writing. This exercise covered both Ireland and the UK-based Outreach centres.

The Department's initial proposal was to issue payments for the 2003-2004 academic year through the City of Dublin VEC. However, victim support groups have expressed concern about this procedure and the Department is to examine the possibility of setting up an Education Trust with a view to having the Trust in operation for 2004.

Section 7.1 records the results of my examination of the redress scheme established by the Government to compensate persons who suffered abuse as children in residential institutions, including the agreement concluded with the religious congregations for a contribution towards the cost of the awards made. The principal objectives of the examination are listed in the report. However, it might be no harm to repeat them. The first objective was to estimate the State's potential financial liability arising from the redress scheme; the second, to review the negotiation of the agreement with the religious orders to establish if proper use had been made of the available information and appropriate approval arrangements were in place, and the third, to review the implementation of the agreement concluded.

In the light of comment in the media and elsewhere, perhaps it is important to point out that the report does not express an opinion on the merits of policy issues surrounding the scheme of redress or the nature of the agreement with the religious congregations on the amount of their contribution. However, in line with public financial procedures, I have a role in establishing if an Accounting Officer - the Civil Service head of a Department - has ensured all relevant financial considerations were taken fully into account and, where necessary, brought to the attention of Ministers in the preparation and implementation of policy proposals relating to expenditure or income for which he or she is Accounting Officer. It is self-evident that being aware of the indicative cost of policy proposals or, where appropriate, the range of possible costs is a prerequisite to prudent decision-making by Government. The report addresses this issue.

To turn to the first of the audit objectives, that is, the potential financial liability, trying to estimate the extent of the State's liability for redress is dependent on a number of contingencies and future events. Consequently, any estimate of the potential liability is made in circumstances of uncertainty such as an unknown number of successful applicants for redress, the level of awards and the extent of expenses, in particular legal costs.

By using the data available on the number of claims to the redress board, the incidence of litigation commenced or threatened against the congregations, freedom of information requests and the level of applicants to give evidence to the Laffoy investigation committee, we came up with an estimate of the potential claimant base at something around 10,000. By applying this number to the estimated average award and taking account of experience of similar schemes in Canada, an indicative figure can be derived for the possible cost of compensation, to which legal costs have to be added. In the absence of reliable data at this stage on the level of costs being allowed by the redress board, a figure of 15% of awards was used. That was the general basis for the calculation of the potential financial liability. There were some adjustments reflecting technical and other refinements. These are set out in the body of the report.

According to our calculations, the bottom line is that the ultimate cost could lie somewhere between €869 million and €1 billion. In the light of the obsession with the headline "€1 billion", it is important to reiterate what I stated in the report, that the calculations are estimates of the contingent liability, that is, the liability that may arise, if the potential population claim in accordance with the pattern set out in the assumptions. To be absolutely clear, the computed figures must be viewed with caution until the claim and award trend emerges in the light of further experience of the redress board and also the courts.

As I stated in the report, the Department of Education and Science takes a more conservative view of the potential financial liability. The Accounting Officer is of the view that the maximum number of applicants is unlikely to exceed 8,000. Using the average award of €84,000, plus a figure of 15% for legal costs, this puts a ceiling of €772 million on the potential liability. He believes - I am sure he will elaborate - that the final liability will be somewhat less than this. He could well be right but, again, we will not be able to get a clearer picture until the pattern of claiming and awards settles down.

Turning to the second point, the negotiation of the agreement was the culmination of meetings between the two sides from the beginning of 2001 up to June 2002. In broad terms, there were three phases in the negotiations. During the period up to October 2001 officials conducted the negotiations in the course of which the congregations made their opening offer which they deemed to be worth €108 million. These negotiations reached an impasse.

The next phase covered the period November 2001 to January 2002 during which there were two meetings with the congregations involving only the Minister and the Secretary General of the Department on the State side. The outcome of these meetings was an announcement on 30 January 2002 that the Government had agreed, in principle, to proposals that would see the congregations contribute €128 million to the redress scheme comprising cash, past and future property transfers and counselling services. In return, the Government would indemnify the congregations concerned against all present and future claims arising from past child abuse covered by the redress legislation.

The third phase of the negotiations covered the period February to June 2002 when the main issues were the nature of the indemnity to be provided and whether property previously transferred by the congregations to NGOs could be reckoned as part of the contribution.

Let me make just a few observations on the negotiations. First, as I saw it, the Department did not appear to carry out any detailed analysis of the State's potential financial liability to support it in its dealings with the congregations. When it indicated in November 2001 that it would be prepared to accept 50% of the lowest cost estimate of €254 million as the capped contribution, the information available at the time suggests that this was an underestimation of the likely minimum cost of the scheme. Second, it had no way of knowing the financial standing of the various congregations, which clearly put it at a disadvantage in trying to push for a larger contribution. Third, no effort was made to stress test the congregations' assessment of their financial exposure in litigation which was closely tied to the amount they were willing to pay. Fourth, the papers suggest that the Attorney General's office was not kept fully informed of the detailed negotiations during the period November 2001 to April 2002.

It is difficult to gauge whether any of these matters would have made any difference to the nature of the final agreement but it is fair to say greater diligence in these areas would have, at least, added extra rigour to the State's negotiating stance. We can only speculate as to whether it would have led to a more favourable outcome. The Accounting Officer makes the point that the objective of the negotiations was to achieve the highest possible contribution that the congregations were prepared to make. He states there was no capacity to coerce them into any agreement and that, in all probability, if they were not part of the scheme, they would have avoided most, if not all, of the cost of the compensation.

Turning to the implementation of the agreement, the cash element has been met by the congregations. A sum of €41.14 million has been paid over as agreed. At the date of finalising my report the State had not accepted any of the properties listed as previously transferred property in the schedule provided by the congregations. Further information was being sought from their legal representatives. As regards future property transfers, at the same date the State had accepted, in principle, 32 properties subject to a good and marketable title and agreement about their valuation.

The agreement stipulates that in the event of the State refusing to accept the property, the congregations have the right to replace it with cash or other property at their discretion. It does not stipulate the timeframe within which they must offer a replacement property or cash. Although the Department has been proactive in this area, including preparing a schedule of locations where it wishes to acquire sites for schools, it is likely to be a long drawn out process.

To tidy up the two last elements of the agreement, part of the congregations' contribution was the equivalent of €10 million worth of counselling and other support services for former residents of institutions and their families. The value of counselling already provided can be taken into account as per the agreement. The congregations hold that they have already provided such services to a value in excess of €10 million. The Department is continuing to seek evidence of this from their legal representatives.

The agreement provided that €12.7 million of the cash contribution would be allocated to an education fund which would be used for educational programmes for former residents of institutions and their families. There is yet to be agreement between the interested parties on the arrangements for using the money for the intended purposes.

I should say my staff received extensive co-operation from the Department in doing this work and putting the report together. It is only fair that this should be recorded.

Thank you, Mr. Purcell. Mr. Dennehy, you may now make a brief opening statement. May we publish your statement?

Thank you.

I welcome the opportunity to meet the Committee of Public Accounts to discuss with its members chapter 7.1 of the 2002 annual report which deals with the residential institutions redress scheme. At page 72, the Comptroller and Auditor General outlines the considerations which informed Government policy in respect of past child abuse, particularly abuse in institutions regulated by public bodies, although owned, for the most part, by religious orders. There was enormous concern in society generally about this issue in the late 1990s and it was this which gave rise to Government initiatives with three elements - the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, counselling and the redress scheme.

In deciding to set up a redress scheme the Government was motivated by a combination of legal, social and humanitarian considerations. It was apparent to it that the religious congregations which ran the institutions were only prepared to adopt a legal strategy. It was not prepared to do so and decided that a compensation scheme should be set up without delay. It also considered that the fairest scheme from the victims' viewpoint and the only one likely to be successful in removing the issue of child abuse from the courts was to provide for victims of abuse awards comparable with High Court damages.

For a number of reasons, including financial, it was considered a desirable policy outcome that the congregations which owned and managed the institutions should contribute to the scheme. The Government had already decided that a redress scheme would be established, regardless of any contribution. The congregations indicated early on that they wished to make a meaningful contribution. The Government had no capacity to force them to contribute any particular sum. Therefore, the outcome had, to a large extent, to depend on the congregations' own sense of duty and fairness. In the event, after long negotiations and one refused offer, the congregations proposed a sum of €128 million. This sum was not based on any apportionment of liability or any portion of the likely costs of the scheme. The Government considered that it was appropriate in all the circumstances.

The report of the Comptroller and Auditor General does not adequately deal with the alternatives to participation by the congregations in the redress scheme or likely outcomes if there was no such scheme. The only alternative to the agreement would have required the State and/or the victims to sue the congregations through the courts. This course of action would have resulted in victims having to face traumatic cross-examination by lawyers. It would have taken many years for the courts to finish and having gone through that trauma, the likelihood was that many of the cases would have failed in the courts because of a lapse of time since the abuse had occurred. At all times the concerns for the victims had priority in the Government's considerations.

In addition to the concern for the victims, from a legal perspective, it was pointed out that because much of the congregations' property was tied up in trusts, there would have been serious difficulties in forcing them to pay compensation. Congregations are not like companies. For instance, they may not have liability for the illegal acts of individual members of their congregations.

In addition, the legal fees would have been enormous and if any portion of liability had fallen on the State, even if it was only 1% liability, victims would have been entitled to recover the full 100% of their damages against the State. I am advised that this arises because of the laws relating to co-defendants. In order to recover the difference, the State would have had to separately sue the religious, thereby starting another batch of thousands of court cases with no guarantee of success at the end and further huge legal bills.

The reality is that, given the law relating to co-defendants in litigation, we were advised that the State, in all probability, would have picked up the entire cost of the litigation. Any hope of recovery of anything from the congregations would then have depended on successfully suing them in the High Court for a contribution. This, as a course of action, would have been fraught with complexity, delay, cost and uncertainty. In that context, an enforceable agreement to pay €128 million had much to recommend it.

At no time, then or now, has it been possible to estimate with any degree of certainty the likely cost of the scheme. The Department made a number of estimates at key decision points, each of which had to be heavily qualified. The Department is of the opinion that the Comptroller and Auditor General's report overstates the likely cost. Based on the information currently available to us, we do not believe the overall amount paid by the redress board will exceed the higher end of the original estimate of €508 million. To date, the board has received approximately 2,000 applications and continues to receive applications at a rate of approximately 50 per week. I understand it has made settlements or offered awards in approximately 20 cases, with the average payment being approximately €80,745.

The Comptroller and Auditor General's report suggests that the number of cases will be greatly in excess of the number that the Government expects. This belief is based on a complex series of assumptions and predictions but recognises that, as the Comptroller and Attorney General said, any estimate of future liabilities arising from the redress scheme is made in circumstances of uncertainty.

The reality is that no one knows. It is too soon to say and any attempt has to be based on surmise and conjecture. Nine months into the three year scheme a pattern appears to be emerging of approximately 50 applications a week and a falling average of award amounts. Even since the Comptroller and Auditor General conducted his inquiries, the average award has fallen from a sum of €84,500 to €80,745. This is consistent with his view - one shared by the Department - that as the number of cases rises, the average award will fall.

At all key stages of the process leading to the Government decision to enter into the indemnity relevant Ministers, the Attorney General, Departments and Offices were involved and/or consulted. I am satisfied that appropriate legal advice was made available to the Minister and the Department by the Office of the Attorney General at all key stages of the process. I am very grateful to the Office of the Attorney General for the enormous support it gave during the entire process.

Thank you, Mr. Dennehy. Did the Department use all sources of information available to it in calculating the liability to the State under the redress scheme?

Yes, we did. For example, a range of issues were raised in relation to people who had applied to appear before the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, FOI cases and so on. We looked at all of these and examined them in great detail - not on our own but in working with our colleagues in the Department of Finance, the Attorney General's office and elsewhere. At this stage, as an aside, I caution about looking too deeply at or taking too much certainty from the level of FOI cases because it is very broad and wide and applies to a lot of people who, for example, were not in any of the institutions.

The lowest figure for the average number of claims was 2,000 while the average court award agreed at the time was €127,000. This results in a total figure of €254 million. It is quite extraordinary that you did not base your calculations on information available through FOI requests, the Laffoy commission and the redress board prior to the agreement.

At that stage we would not have had all of the figures from the commission. The only certainty was the number of litigation cases——

In the courts.

——in the courts.

That is by way of clarification. At the time the average court award was €127,000 which, if you multiply it by 2,000, gives a total of €254 million. This, in effect, gives a baseline in terms of what was finally agreed. It is quite extraordinary that information available through FOI requests was not used and that information available through considerable inquiries by the redress board was also excluded. Why was this?

All of that material and documentation was made available to the Minister and the Government. At that stage the only certainty was the number of litigation cases actually before the courts.

There was a huge amount of information available. Why was it not used in the calculation?

In the calculation of what?

Of the agreed settlement, the figure arrived at.

In the early days, in consultation with our colleagues in the Department of Finance and other Departments with which we were dealing, at no stage was the indemnity tied specifically to a portion of the overall cost. While we set out, as a negotiating stance, the aim of achieving a 50-50 settlement, as early as April 2001 an agreement was reached between the Ministers for Finance and Education and Science, which at that stage was drawn to the attention of the Attorney General, that the bottom line for the State would be €100 million, regardless of the overall cost of the scheme.

It seems quite extraordinary that different figures emerged in each of the three phases of the deal.

This was as new information was emerging, of which we made the Government aware at all times. At no stage was the figure of €100 million tied to what the eventual overall cost of the scheme would be.

Every additional 1,000 claimants would represent a figure of €127 million, based on an average figure of €127,000 per court award. Is that correct?

What documents does Mr. Dennehy feel he is in a position to furnish to the committee? There is an answer to a parliamentary question which states seven documents were provided but that there were 150 documents relating to this. We have powers to send for papers and so on. How many of those documents does Mr. Dennehy feel might be furnished to the committee?

We would be anxious to furnish anything we could to the committee. Mr. Boland may answer this question.

Mr. Thomas Boland

Obviously, we will co-operate. We have released a substantial number of documents under the FOI legislation. I am not sure from where the figure of seven documents comes. The documents we would not be able to release are Government memoranda and those which provide legal advice. Otherwise, in principle, I cannot see a particular difficulty in releasing documents to the committee.

Can I take it they will be furnished?

Mr. Boland

I think so.

In his opening statement Mr. Dennehy said, "At no time, then or now, is it possible to estimate with any degree of certainty the likely cost of the scheme." Is it not the case that the Department has made several attempts to make an estimate? In February 2001 it estimated the likely cost at €254 million. In April it was estimated at €381 million and by June, €508 million. A year later a figure of €772 million was floating around. If it is not possible to estimate, why is the Department constantly estimating and revising upwards?

We are involved in constantly trying to provide the best possible information that it is within our power to provide for our Minister and, through him, the Government. However, at this point there is no certainty nor will there be for a number of years, until the final payment is made through the redress board. At any given time one could approach the matter in half a dozen ways and come up with different estimations.

Every time we do we come up with a higher figure.

The Comptroller and Auditor General has come up with a higher figure again, which is heavily qualified throughout that entire section of his report.

In his opening statement Mr. Dennehy seems very certain about the fact that when the religious congregations offered to pay €128 million, it was deemed to be appropriate. On what basis was it deemed to be appropriate? What questions did the Department ask about the assets held by the religious congregations, their ability to pay and the likely percentage it was going to be of the overall cost of the scheme? If Mr. Dennehy knew that amount was appropriate and has no idea what the overall end figure is going to be, how can he be so certain and make such a statement?

When I say it was deemed to be appropriate, I mean it was deemed to be appropriate by the Government. The Minister for Education and Science took a proposal to Government following an agreement he had reached with the Minister for Finance, as I understand it, in consultation with the Attorney General. The advice of the Minister for Education and Science was that this was as far as the religious would go. The Government made a decision which was conveyed to us. That is what I mean when I say it was deemed to be appropriate. It was not our decision but the Government's.

I will put aside the figures for the moment. I may return to them later in relation to the property portfolios.

Mr. Dennehy attended meetings with the then Minister for Education and Science, Deputy Woods, and the religious congregations and their legal representatives between November 2001 and January 2002. Why was the Government side so sparsely represented? Why did no representative of the Office of the Attorney General attend those meetings to keep an eye on the State's potential legal liability in relation to this issue and why did no representative of the Department of Finance attend the meetings to make sure the State's financial liability could be met now and in the future? Can Mr. Dennehy explain why no contemporaneous notes were taken at the meetings and only a subsequent memo was put in place to explain what had happened? Is that standard practice in the Department of Education and Science for meetings of this type? Could it have been as a result of a complaint by the religious congregations in June 2001 of a breach of confidentiality that conditions were put on subsequent meetings regarding who should attend on the Government side, how the meetings should be recorded and whether accounts could be acquired under the freedom of information legislation?

An extensive range of meetings were held from 10 November 2000 to 16 September 2001. Following intensive discussions involving officials and the churches, the congregations became suspicious of the fact that details of some of the negotiations were leaking to the media. That was not the main reason, or even the reason, the two subsequent meetings between the Minister and the congregations took place. The advice we got from our people who were negotiating with the religious was that the discussions had reached stalemate, that they were not going to advance any further, that the congregations were not prepared to make any higher offer and that it appeared that, perhaps, they were not going to become involved in the indemnity deal.

The Minister made a policy decision that he would meet the congregations but this was not to discuss the detail. I can assure the Deputy, because I was there, that he did not discuss the detail. He agreed to meet the congregations to ask them a number of questions on policy related issues and process - on where they were going and where the issue was going from there.

The discussions at the first meeting were very short. The Minister was simply putting it up to the congregations that if they were not willing to come into the redress scheme and make a contribution to it, the Government was going to press ahead on its own. They were sent away to think about this. There was no legal adviser present at that meeting on the religious side.

At the next meeting - the second meeting - the congregations brought a legal adviser with them. We were not aware of the fact that this person was coming. The reason it appears was that at the meeting the congregations raised the question of the indemnity - a document which had been supplied to the negotiating officials many months earlier - but the Minister refused point blank to discuss with them its terms in any way. He said he could only do so if he had the official legal arm of the State present with him. The purpose of the meeting was not to discuss the detail but to explore the circumstances whereby the congregations would come into the scheme with the detail to be worked out sufficiently by officials from the Government side with the congregations with the required legal presence.

I do not find it very credible that the detail was not discussed at these meetings. After the religious congregations had made their original proposal in June 2001, there was stalemate in the process. Handwritten notes from Mr. Dennehy's officials at a meeting in October 2001 rejected the idea subsequently included in the indemnity agreement.

In some cases.

In October 2001 there was stalemate with departmental officials disagreeing with what was being proposed.

Subsequent to this, the two meetings held in November 2001 and January 2002 resulted in a Government statement in January 2002 in which all the details were agreed. Either the details were discussed and agreed at the meetings or they were not.

Correct. Perhaps the Deputy misunderstood me. When I mentioned the fact that the detail had not been discussed, I was talking primarily about the form or the detail of the indemnity. The detail was discussed in relation to the sum of money involved - €128 million. The religious congregations gave a breakdown of what they were prepared to offer, which was an improvement on the situation at the meeting with officials in September to the extent that they were now offering €128 million, whereas it was a lower figure earlier on. They were also offering that property would be transferred from a period beginning in 1999 rather than ten years previously. This was put on the table by them but the Minister did not discuss it with them in any detail. He agreed to use his good offices to put the deal to the Government, which he did.

In relation to the process in which we are engaged, there were some comments in Mr. Dennehy's opening statement for which I would like an explanation. He said the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General did not deal with alternatives. I am curious to know the reason he thinks it is the role of the Comptroller and Auditor General or this committee to come up with alternatives for the Department. The Comptroller and Auditor General's report outlines the restrictions on his office in not being able to comment on policy issues. This is also true of the committee. However, it is within the remit of the Comptroller and Auditor General to examine and form a view on the quality of information underlying key decisions in the formulation of policies.

It has been suggested in recent days that, even in producing the report, the Comptroller and Auditor General might be straying beyond his responsibilities. Even the current Minister for Education and Science has commented on this. I am anxious to know if Mr. Dennehy, as Secretary General, is happy with this process and whether we are engaged in a proper exercise of asking the necessary questions about an issue that is of major concern in political life and throughout the country.

I have absolutely no difficulty with it. As I said, I want to help the committee in any way that it is possible for me or any of the officers of the Department to do. I give the Deputy that absolute guarantee.

In relation to alternatives, the reason I raised that matter in my opening remarks was to point out that there were alternatives to the approach taken by the Comptroller and Auditor General. It was to give more balance to the situation.

I shall ask further questions later.

First, I wish to make an observation. I have said to the Chairman that I am slightly uneasy about the tone taken on this issue, particularly in recent days, and also some of the headlines written, of which I have a few cuttings. I am concerned to find the issue, which is associated with so much pain and suffering, coupled with lists of public buildings and contracts. It smacks of the way in which the blood contamination issue was treated at the outset. It seems, as someone said during the week, it was all right for us to apologise because it cost nothing but when it comes down to paying the bill, we should take a different approach. As a Government Member, I appreciate that comments on taking steps to protect the public purse are par for the course for us. We are expected to do this but we cannot treat the issue purely on a value for money basis. Therefore, I am concerned about some of the comments made, although they are beyond our control.

Regarding Deputy Boyle's final question on the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, I consider that the Comptroller and Auditor General's role is crucial to the running of this committee. We could not work without him. I welcome his report and the facts and figures contained therein. I am only concerned that it is being shanghaied or used for narrow political purposes because the victims have to be to the forefront of our mind. While we must deal with the financial aspects, the victims must be dealt with in a humane fashion. I am not allowed to stray into policy matters but, in this instance, there must be a linkage because obviously there is a conflict between some of the facts and figures given by my namesake, the Secretary General, and the Comptroller and Auditor General, on which we will have to touch.

Let me go back to the basic conflict. While Mr. Dennehy has anticipated many of my questions on which I worked last night and the night before, I will ask some of them in order that we can tease them out. The first and most critical one is whether a policy decision was made that the State would compensate confirmed victims of abuse, regardless of whether there were contributions from other sources and regardless of the number of the cases which might emerge. There seemed to have been a suggestion that we might not compensate if the bill rose too high. Was that the basic premise from which Mr. Dennehy was working, that regardless of the involvement of others, the State would compensate the victims?

Yes. The decision to set up the scheme initially was made without any reference to the congregations and was not contingent on their involvement. It is very important to indicate this because there are times when it appears people think the opposite was the case. I want to make it absolutely clear that the decision to set up the scheme, in the first instance, was made without any reference to the congregations and was not contingent on their involvement. The Government looked at the broader picture and decided that it had a moral and societal duty to pay early compensation to those injured by past abuse. As I said, this decision was taken without regard to the involvement or otherwise in the scheme of the congregations which, for the most part, were involved in running the institutions.

Deputy Boyle challenged the idea that the Comptroller and Auditor General should be asked for alternatives. The State had put away 29,500 young people. Could Mr. Dennehy outline possible alternatives then available? We are aware of the events at Kincora in the North and two bad cases in the United Kingdom where a different approach was taken and no compensation tribunal was set up. I presume one of the options would be to let the people concerned pursue their individual cases through the courts. Were these possible alternatives examined because there seem to be suggestions that we might have saved money by not becoming directly involved?

A very wide range of alternatives were certainly examined, particularly in relation to the various forms of litigation in which the victims could have engaged and, in turn, the State to try to recoup money from the religious. It might also be worth saying that initially the Government decided that some kind of redress scheme would follow on the work of the Laffoy commission. That was one way of ensuring certainty. However, in July 2000 the chairperson of the commission informed the Minister of her concern that the solicitors for the survivors would not co-operate with the commission unless the Government made a decision, in principle, and without delay set up a compensation scheme. At the time we were of the view that the collapse of the commission due to non-participation by survivors was a strong or real possibility.

I will ask Mr. Dennehy about that later. The Comptroller and Auditor General accepts that there was no analysis of the State's liability, to which Mr. Dennehy referred. The Chairman referred to the use of a baseline for assessment. Was this a moveable feast? We were told it was one figure in January, another in April and yet another in June - I presume on the basis that further cases were being brought forward. On what information were the three figures based? Was it the number applying at that point in time?

They were based primarily on the numbers applying in litigation and the awards being made by the courts. They were based primarily on the number of cases down for hearing in the courts at any given time.

How big a factor was the Civil Liability Act of 1961, I think, which brought into being the option of suing a second party in making the decision to go ahead and compensate?

Would you mind, Chairman, if I asked for legal advice on this?

Certainly.

Mr. Boland

This relates to the issue of the alternatives available to the Government. To some extent, it could have been seen to be between a rock and a hard place. The key alternative available to it, short of an administrative compensation scheme, was to allow the courts deal with the issue. Apart altogether from what the Comptroller and Auditor General referred to as the humanitarian and social issues involved for the people concerned, there was also the fact that going down the legal route would have cost a great deal more and certainly would not necessarily have led to a situation where the congregations would have paid more. The reality is that in any litigation the State would have been co-defendant with the particular religious congregation. Assuming that a victim of abuse won an award in such an action, the Civil Liability Act in a situation where there were co-defendants would have allowed the successful plaintiff to proceed against any one of them. An intelligent lawyer - there are many intelligent lawyers involved - would clearly have advised his or her client to move against the co-defendant who was easiest to attack and had the deepest pockets. By far the easiest mark, if I can use that word in the context of litigation, was the State which is probably seen as having endless and limitless pockets. In relation to the congregations, a person trying to execute a judgment against them would have faced a lot of difficulties, not least the fact that their assets, by and large, were tied up in charitable trusts, the objects of which had nothing to do with compensating people for abuse.

Our advice was that it was most likely, in the context of litigation, that the lawyers for a successful plaintiff would execute the judgment against the State and then say to it, "Now you go and get as much as you can from the congregations; that it is none of our business." As was referred to by the Secretary General, this would almost certainly have involved years of litigation and a lot of additional costs. The reality, from our point of view, was that the only main alternative to an administrative scheme was access to the courts. In that scenario it was more likely than not that the congregations would still have paid nothing.

Mr. Boland anticipated my next question of what was the next step anticipated by the Department, which I was also going to pose to the Secretary General but I appreciate now that it is not his job to come up with alternatives. Looking at it through his or her eyes, the victim could have taken the case to court and won against the religious which could then have said they had no property. In Canada, at least one of the orders filed for bankruptcy. If we want to be critical, we should probably ask this question of the State.

I want to bring forward the point of view of the victim. Does Mr. Dennehy feel, with all the knowledge he gained, that almost all of the applicants would have faced insurmountable obstacles in taking cases because of the Statute of Limitations time restriction? In a recent Supreme Court case a witness was told they need not attend a hearing because of their age. Bearing this in mind, does Mr. Dennehy think, in his judgment, that between the principles of natural justice and the question of liability, most of the cases would have been thrown out?

Certainly, the legal advice we were getting was that quite a number probably would have been because of the lapse of time. In addition, the Government made a decision on humanitarian grounds that the early establishment of a compensation scheme would reduce the level of stress and trauma suffered by many of those involved. A protracted court case for many - for example, those who were elderly and in poor health - was not a desirable way forward or option for the Government.

We are all agreed there had to be involvement by CORI, although I know some of the orders were not involved. Obviously, the figures were changing as the discussions proceeded and are still changing, as indicated in the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General. When Mr. Dennehy discussed the matter with the congregations, the base figure was between 2,000 and 3,000 applicants and various transactions were done. Bearing this in mind, does he see any merit in the argument - I appreciate that we do not yet know the end game figure - that we should go back to those very responsible, morally driven people in CORI to say we got the figures wrong? I presume they were arguing on the premise that it was going to be the lowest figure and they came up with this one. Does Mr. Dennehy see any rational reason for going back and asking them to renegotiate the figures in the agreement bearing in mind that the actual figures are now treble those discussed?

In making the decision on the agreement the Government was aware of the fact that the numbers were rising and that the cost would certainly be far in excess of the earlier or original estimation. A Government decision was taken based on all of the available facts, including strong advice from our own office, the Department of Finance and the Attorney General's office on the possible eventual liability and number of cases involved. Based on all of this information and for the reasons we have outlined, many of which members have outlined, the Government made a decision that it would do a deal with the congregations and accept a sum of €128 million towards the eventual cost of the redress scheme, whether it be €1 billion, €700 million or €500 million. It was €128 million over and above what it would have had if the churches had decided not to opt in. Obviously, at this stage it is a matter for the Government but the view of the then Minister and the Government was that was as far as the religious would go.

I appreciate that the matters involving property owned by the congregations are very complex, as we can see in the transactions the Department is attempting to make on the question of title and ownership. One of the criticisms levelled at Mr. Dennehy, through the media at least and perhaps elsewhere, is that no assessment was made of the property portfolio or the financial standing of the orders involved. Was any attempt made to find out what they might have available?

To my knowledge, no attempt was made to assess the financial situation of individual orders. In my view, that was not an approach the Government wanted at the time. In relation to the property portfolio, as has been mentioned by Mr. Boland and me in my introductory remarks, an enormous amount of the properties of the religious are tied up in trusts. Our legal advice is that the State could not forcibly acquire any of these properties; it would have to be done voluntarily. In fact, some of them could not be voluntarily handed over because of the nature of the trusts.

We are arguing about the numbers that might be involved and the figures produced, some of which are included in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, such as those on page 90. Would Mr. Dennehy accept that all of them are guesstimates? Was the same simple mathematical formula used by the Department, that is, multiply the number of cases by the average award being made? Was that formula used or was it much more complicated than this?

We had statisticians and others working with us in looking at them. At one point the Deputy mentioned there was conflict between the Comptroller and Auditor General and me on the figure. That was not the case. We would have had a difference of opinion in relation to how the eventual figure would be reached but we both agree——

I accept that but, unfortunately, it is not understood by those reporting on the matter. That is the problem.

I understand that it is not. The sensational headline of €1 billion is fine but at the end of the day, as the Deputy and the Comptroller and Auditor General have said, we are simply not sure what the eventual outcome or figure will be and will not know for some time. It will be possible in another six months to take another in-depth look at the number of cases and perhaps again six months after that but until we reach the end of the road in the life of the redress scheme, we really will not know the final or eventual outcome.

Regardless of this, Mr. Dennehy is saying "case closed - end of story" on the figure of €128 million. He does not see any logic in renegotiating.

I will go a little further. The Government decided that it was "case closed".

Does the Comptroller and Auditor General wish to comment?

Mr. Purcell

I agree with what the Accounting Officer says. There can be misinterpretations of what is contained in the report. I think, possibly, the Accounting Officer also fell into that trap, unwittingly, because he spoke about the Comptroller and Auditor General's report overstating "the likely total cost."

Earlier this year, at the request of the committee, I undertook to try to come up with a contingent liability figure. We used all of our sources of information which we felt were valid in order to come up with the potential cost in respect of which there are so many uncertainties.

The Accounting Officer mentioned freedom of information requests; that it might be unreliable to use those figures but in the spirit of co-operation with the Department in carrying out this examination, it sampled the freedom of information requests received, I think, over a ten week period. Out of this sample it appeared that about 70% of the requests were made through solicitors.

In calculating or trying to come up with a figure for the total potential cost to the State, it was borne in mind that solicitors do not do this for the good of their health. They tend to have something else in mind. Also, we should take into account the fact that the redress board recommended that people should use the freedom of information avenue in order to establish residency which obviously would be important in going before it.

I have a personal aversion to the word "guesstimates" which suggests people take figures off the top of their heads. As the Accounting Officer said, the Department employed statisticians and so on. Within my own office we have a certain amount of professional expertise in doing this kind of work. They were estimates based on the best knowledge available at any one time. Perhaps I am just being a little prickly about this but I do not like the word "guesstimates" in relation to the work we carry out nor, I suggest, would the Accounting Officer.

Obviously, Chairman, I will withdraw that word if it casts any reflection on the professionalism of those involved but the word "assumption" is used nine or ten times throughout the report. To me, that is something very similar. It is an assumption that something will happen. It is not stated as a figure; it is an assumption. That is the reason I am saying——

It is based on a professional assumption.

Yes, but it is still an assumption. It is based on an assumption that certain things will happen. That is what led me into using such unprofessional terminology - the word "guesstimate".

From the figures, the difference between the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Secretary General is not vast.

No, we are not arguing that point.

On that matter, did the Comptroller and Auditor General adopt the accounting principles of prudence and conservatism in arriving at his estimate of the contingent liability?

Mr. Purcell

As I said, we are used to doing this. It is part of our everyday work in coming up with notes to particular accounts regarding contingent liability but we have to look at what contingent liability means. It means that something is dependent on a lot of things happening. In that context, it is always going to be an outside figure. I can assure the committee that we did use a professional approach in coming up with these figures.

I have three or four questions for Mr. Dennehy. First, let me make the observation that regardless of whether it is 10,000 cases or, as Mr. Dennehy believes, 8,000 cases, or a matter of the difference between €1 billion or his figure of €772 million, either way, we are talking about a huge pay-out. I will not say the difference between the two is insignificant as far as the taxpayer is concerned but the ordinary person on the street finds it so hard to understand this deal.

Mr. Dennehy said the Department had statisticians working on its behalf. The Comptroller and Auditor General also had his professional people working on the matter, yet when the Department met the religious congregations, according to Mr. Dennehy, it had no idea, no benchmark as to their ability or inability to pay. Does he not think that was a strange way to do business, given that the Department had to know, as each month went by, that the number of cases recorded on its computer system was increasing dramatically? I understand there are about 50 new cases each week. Why did the Department not use all of the best professional help available to it to try to ascertain a benchmark as to what the religious authorities would have been able to pay?

Like most of the others at this table, under no circumstances would I want the religious congregations to be placed in a state of bankruptcy. We have too much regard for them to do so. However, it was an unusual deal. If I picked Mr. Dennehy up correctly, the religious authorities seemed to say they were not going to go any further. At the same time the Government seemed to think that they might not go anywhere at all. That is strange because one would have assumed that the religious congregations would need and want to be involved. As a negotiating ploy, they could hardly have gone to the Department and said that if it did not behave a little better, they would not pay at all. Could Mr. Dennehy give any indication to the committee and the public as to the reason the Department did not try to get some indication from the religious orders as to where they stood in regard to their ability to pay?

I only give the figure of 8,000 as one possible example, not the definitive one. We are not saying the number will ultimately reach 8,000. We have not said that at any stage. We are still of the view that it will probably be lower.

But it has been said that could be the number.

We are saying it is one possibility but I could just as easily have said 7,000 or 9,000 and either figure could be right or wrong. I gave the figure as one example in the report, on which my reply to the Comptroller and Auditor General was very carefully written.

It is not the indemnity and the deal that are costing the money but the redress scheme set up and established by the Government, independently of the congregations initially. In other words, the Government made a decision that, regardless of whether the congregations were in or out, for all of the reasons I mentioned - humanitarian, legal and social; we could give a long list - it was going to compensate the people concerned for past abuse. That is what is costing €1 billion.

Separate to this but also linked was the indemnity, which was worked out following discussions with the religious congregations on the basis that they were willing to make a contribution to the cost of the scheme. The negotiations were long and protracted. At the end of the day, it was the firm judgment that they had gone as far as they would go and no further. If they were then forced into a situation where they would not be involved, individual claimants would have been forced to take legal action against them in the courts. The decision was taken by the Government that €128 million - approximately £100 million at the time - was the figure it would be prepared to accept.

I think it was found in a Canadian court case, in similar circumstances, that the state bore responsibility for 70% of the claim and the religious orders, 30%. Can we have a comment on this?

I have some knowledge but not a huge amount. We have had a lot of discussion with our Canadian colleagues about this. What happened was that the federal government in Canada had for some time been in negotiations with the various religious orders in relation to their possible contribution to an administrative compensation scheme. Pending its conclusion, the federal government made a decision in October 2001 that it would initially carry 70% of the award and that 30% would be borne by the churches. However, in February 2002 it reached an agreement with one of the churches - it may have reached others since but I am aware of this one - the Anglican Church, which agreed to pay €25 million in compensation as it was responsible for operating the institution which gave rise to 17.5% of the claims. By coincidence, the total cost of claims in Canada was also reckoned to be about €1 billion, of which the Anglican Church was deemed to have been responsible for about €175 million. My information is that the figure was in euro rather than Canadian dollars. Of this amount, the Anglican Church agreed to pay €25 million. That is the only agreement, of which I am aware, reached to date in Canada.

I have one other question before handing over to my colleagues.

There is something else which can be added to clarify the Canadian situation.

Mr. Boland

On the specific question of the legal position in Canada, there is certainly one case, Blackwater v. Plint - a 1998-99 case in the Supreme Court of British Columbia - in which the decision was that the state was 75% liable as opposed to a figure of 25% for the congregation. I think the figure of 70% has been used elsewhere. It was a 75%-25% split. Not wishing to be controversial, if one looks at our estimate, the Department's estimate and the Government's estimate of the cost of compensation at €500 million odd and the contribution of the congregations, it is close enough to 25% also.

Deputy Conaughton

If one looks at the other proposals, it is far out of kilter, even at 25%.

Mr. Boland

That was the Comptroller and Auditor General's figure.

Take, for instance, the Secretary General's figure of €772 million.

Mr. Boland

Again, the agreement reached in Canada between the Anglican Church and the federal government ended in a situation where the church would pay something like 14% of the estimated cost of the compensation scheme, which is not that far removed from the proportion for which €128 million accounts of the figure of €1 billion, which we consider to be too high.

This committee is concerned about value for money. In regard to the negotiations, we heard a former Attorney General say very openly yesterday that he did not feel part of them. How can this be true, given that a number of meetings, or at least one other, were attended by a legal person from the religious congregations, although it appeared that on the Department side no such person was available? Is that not very unusual?

As law-abiding people, we depend on the Freedom of Information Act. While the negotiations were about complex issues, they involved a huge amount of public money. Can we have an undertaking that under the Freedom of Information Act any ordinary citizen will be able to get a record of what happened at the meetings?

I am informed we have records of most of them.

Are there records of all the meetings which under the Freedom of Information Act a citizen is entitled to get? Will a citizen be able to apply for and get the information?

I understand there are probably a limited number of meetings at which minutes were not kept. I will have to check.

Why should that be? Why should there be meetings at which minutes were not kept?

I attend quite a number of meetings at which minutes are not kept. If nothing substantive was agreed, there was no major difference of opinion, or no advance was made on the situation from a previous meeting, minutes might not be necessary. I do not know because I was not at the particular meetings.

It may be no harm to indicate, in regard to those meetings and any comments made to the media or by Ministers, that I am not getting involved. However, I do want to indicate that, apart from almost daily contact with Mr. Boland and others within the Department, the Attorney General's office was formally represented at meetings on 10 and 22 November 2000, 7 and 21 February 2001, 6 and 22 March 2001, 4 and 30 April 2001, 10 May 2001, 5 and 26 June 2001 and 16 September 2001. This was followed by a period during which no negotiations took place. While negotiations had ceased, there was other work being done, for example, on the redress Bill which was going through the Houses.

Two meetings, which have been referred to and to which I will come back, then took place which the Minister had with the religious congregations. Subsequent to this, there were two meetings at official level, involving officials from the Departments of Finance and Education and Science, at which the Attorney General's office was not represented. They dealt mainly with process and procedure - where to go from there, who should be asked to do what, who should look after the indemnity and so on. As I understand it - I was not at the meetings - from the reports I got, one of the meetings was taken up almost totally with an initial examination of some of the property transfers. There was somebody from the Chief State Solicitor's office, an expert in conveyancing, present at the meeting.

The Attorney General's office was represented at all of the meetings held on 19 and 23 April, 1 and 8 May, and 16 May when I understand a crucial and long meeting took place in the Department of Finance in relation to finalising the package that finally went to Government. It is important to indicate this.

Therefore, the Secretary General is saying there were only two meetings——

At which there was no legal person present on the State side. They were two informal policy-type meetings. As I said - there are different views on this - neither the Minister nor the Government was bound or tied by anything discussed.

Does the Secretary General believe the Attorney General should have been present at those two meetings?

No. They were policy meetings involving the Minister. Ministers are involved continually, all week, every week, in such meetings, and they do not have people from the Attorney General's office present. They were not meetings involving negotiations but meetings of policy. In my view - certainly in the view of the Minister - it was not necessary for the Attorney General's office to be represented.

On that point, there were a series of meetings in 2001 when the Attorney General's office was represented and the discussions stalled. It was not represented at the two meetings that were critical in breaking the logjam. The Attorney General wrote to the Minister for Education and Science on 31 January requesting information which was obviously of importance because he wrote a supplemental letter on 1 February, to which the Minister did not reply. On 13 March the Attorney General advised the Department that his office could not participate in negotiations, or offer legal advice, in the absence of the requested information. This puts a construction on it that the Attorney General considered it to be a serious matter. It is very unusual for an Attorney General, who is not just law officer to the Government but individual Departments, to wash his hands of something as important as this. Is that a fair statement?

There were two key issues, on which the Minister had to decide. They concerned the cases which had to be covered and the period for which the indemnity would apply. It was in this context - raising those issues and a few others - that the Attorney General wrote to the Minister on 31 January and 12 March. During this period there was a lot of internal discussion in the Department to decide the policy approach to be adopted. Obviously, this took some time to formulate. In the interim there was very detailed communication on the issues between officials from our Department and the Attorney General's office. The Minister then wrote a formal letter to the Attorney General setting out the issues and replying to his questions. During this period there was regular contact between the two offices at official level and substantive communication from Mr. Boland, on behalf of the Department, to people in the Attorney General's office, dated, I think, 13 March. Mr. Boland may be able to clarify this better because he was in touch with the Attorney General's office during that period.

Mr. Boland

The key problem for the Attorney General's office - being professionals, it was a reasonable one from their point of view - was that they did not wish to attend meetings which were discussing in detail an indemnity agreement without firm instructions as to what ministerial policy was. In other words, as lawyers, they do not make up policy but they wanted to know what it was. There was nothing especially sinister about them not attending the meetings. That was the reason they said they could not attend, unless they knew the course of action we wanted them to take. The two issues the Secretary General mentioned, the extent of the indemnity and the period for which it would continue, were two of the main policy issues.

Is Mr. Boland saying it is the reason they did not go along to the two meetings?

Mr. Boland

No, I am saying it is the reason they did not go along to the two meetings with officials. The meetings were held in February and March and were not ones with the Minister. There were two meetings with officials, on 13 March and 12 April, which officials of the Attorney General's office did not attend. The officials - I was on the official team——

That was during the interregnum when the Department had not replied to the letter. Is that correct?

Mr. Boland

Correct. They were waiting for a reply to the letter with instructions from the Minister on two key policy issues before they would attend meetings to discuss the detail. The first meeting on 13 March took the decision that we would not discuss the issue of the detail of the indemnity until such time as we could assemble the legal teams from the congregations, the Department and the Attorney General's office. The indemnity was not discussed in detail.

When was discussion started on the detail of the indemnity?

Mr. Boland

It would have been at the meeting of 19 April, the first meeting officials of the Attorney General's office would have attended.

Was the detail of the indemnity discussed for the first time on 19 April 2002?

Mr. Boland

That is my recollection. The indemnity would have been——

Is it correct that the Cabinet had agreed to it, in principle, the previous January but did not know what the terms were?

Mr. Boland

Correct. In broad outline, it would have known what the congregations were looking for - a very broad indemnity. The objective then was to try to pare it back to something to which the Government would ultimately be prepared to agree.

Who furnished the draft? Mr. Dennehy mentioned that the document had been supplied. Who supplied it?

The first draft was provided by the legal team for the congregations.

When was that done?

Mr. Boland

I think I can answer that. At an early stage of the negotiations a draft was provided by the congregations, probably some time in early 2001. It was never really discussed in the course of the discussions because we never got to the point where we could talk about an indemnity.

When was it revived?

Mr. Boland

It was revived around March-April. Again, perhaps pre-empting the question, it was supplied by Arthur Cox on behalf of the congregations.

Therefore, all the Cabinet could reasonably have been told was that the principle of an indemnity was in contemplation but that no terms had been worked out.

Mr. Boland

I think that is accurate.

I am reasonably familiar with Department of Finance financial procedures attaching to an indemnity. Under the heading C8 - contingent liabilities - the Department sets out a number of conditions that must be met, one of which is:

In the absence of specific legislation covering the issue of a particular indemnity, any letter issued should indicate clearly that the assurance contained therein is not an unqualified promise to pay but rather an undertaking by the Minister concerned to take the appropriate steps to seek the necessary authority of the Oireachtas to ensure payment. The advice of the Department of Finance, and where necessary the Attorney General, should be sought on the actual form of words used.

Does Mr. Doyle recall this?

Mr. David Doyle

I do not. I cannot see it in my memory banks but it sounds familiar.

It sounds like it was written by the Department rather than by me.

Mr. Doyle

It does. Does the Deputy have a particular point?

I am curious to know of the involvement of Mr. Doyle's Department in the indemnity. To the layman, that condition seems to imply the indemnity required legislation and the approval of the Oireachtas.

Mr. Doyle

Yes. Subject to correction by my colleagues from the Department of Education and Science, I think the legislation was encompassed by the redress Act. I cannot quote it chapter and verse. Mr. Boland would be an expert on it.

The redress Act was passed the previous year.

Mr. Doyle

In 2002, before the great event that year.

Did it specifically include reference to the terms of the indemnity?

Mr. Doyle

I am not familiar with the details of it. I would prefer if my colleagues from the Department of Education and Science answered.

Mr. Boland

I just happen to be a legal expert on this. I might need a few minutes but the Act was passed on 10 April 2002. If the committee would like to move on, I will look for the precise reference.

The legislation was enacted on 10 April. On what date in April did the Department start discussions on the indemnity?

Mr. Boland

On 19 April.

Therefore, one week after the legislation was enacted we started to discuss the terms of the indemnity.

Mr. Boland

The Act - I will find the reference - gave a more general power to give an indemnity, the actual terms of which were never incorporated in the legislation. It is the power to give the indemnity that is at issue.

I appreciate that but in the procedures laid down by the Department of Finance it seems clear that the approval of the Oireachtas is required. What was given was approval in principle. We did not know what the terms were and did not start to discuss them until nine days later. Were the terms ever debated in the House? Did Mr. Dennehy accompany his Minister to debate them in the House?

I did not but they were debated in the House.

When did that happen?

I have some detail. I did not accompany the Minister but as to the terms of the indemnity——

It is the terms in which I am interested. I am not talking about the general indemnity.

I do not know.

Does Mr. Dennehy know whether the terms of the indemnity were debated in the House?

I do not know. We can check.

Let us put it this way. If work only started on 19 April - the House dissolved about four or four and a half weeks in advance of the general election on 17 May - when would the terms have been debated in the House? Does Mr. Dennehy know if they were debated in the House? They were not debated in the House. Is that the answer?

I am not giving that answer. Certainly, the indemnity was discussed in the House. I do not know about the detail, how detailed the debate was. I was not in the House.

Can we have a documentary reference for when the terms were discussed in the House?

When an indemnity generally was discussed——

I am talking about the terms of the indemnity, not an indemnity.

The Deputy has asked me that question a number of times. I do not know when the terms of the indemnity were discussed in the House.

I put it to Mr. Dennehy that they were not discussed.

Fine; I did not know about that requirement. All of the discussions that took place in relation to the indemnity involved, not alone the Department of Education and Science but also the Department of Finance and the Attorney General's office. All of the key meetings after the date of 19 April——

I do not wish to put Mr. Dennehy in an awkward position but I think we have established that the Department only started to work on the terms of the indemnity on 19 April.

I did not start working on them at any stage. To be certain I was not misleading the committee, I would have to talk to Mr. Boland about that.

I am talking to Mr. Dennehy, as the representative of the Department. The Department did not start to discuss the terms of the indemnity until 19 April and if we had a general election on 17 or 18 May, the House must have risen four weeks earlier. Did we discuss the terms during the two weeks before the House rose?

That is definitely a political issue. It is not one in which I can get directly involved. I am not aware of any debate taking place in the House in relation to the terms of the indemnity.

There was none.

Nor have I seen the Department of Finance document to which the Deputy refers. I am not in a position to answer the question he is asking.

No doubt, Mr. Dennehy will send us a note if, after our meeting, he finds out that the terms were debated in the House.

I will, of course.

We will take a look at it when it comes. There was a 50:50 recommendation from the Department of Finance. Was Mr. Doyle disappointed this was rejected or were his officials actively involved in promoting it? What can he tell the committee about the reason it was abandoned?

Mr. Doyle

Let me comment on the previous discussion. As I understand it, the legislation provides for the indemnity, for which the Department of Finance instructions would be sufficient cover. It would have been on that basis that the Attorney General's office would have confirmed that the legislation was in place to facilitate it.

In relation to the indemnity, the whole question of the scale of the contribution and the extent of the exposure were heavily influenced by the total policy context in which the process evolved. I do not want to go over ground covered extensively - in other places also - but a series of policy decisions were made that determined the context in which the whole issue of redress would be settled and the nature of the process and its implications for the State, the congregations and the victims.

The 50:50 approach was an issue that evolved in official discussions as to the appropriate approach to adopt to discussions with the congregations. There were a number of official discussions in which officials of my Department were involved with officials of Mr. Dennehy's Department and a representative of the Attorney General's office. There was an examination of the total policy context in which we had arrived at this point around spring 2001.

The Government had decided from a policy point of view that there would be a redress scheme for which there would be a low burden of proof. On the church side, the congregations were asserting that because of the policy decision to proceed with a low burden of proof approach rather than the higher standard of proof required in a court setting, the scale of the scheme being put in place involved a level of compensation that would be hugely ahead of their estimate of their exposure from a court based process. For policy reasons, the Government decided that it did not wish to go down the court based route - for the many reasons Mr. Dennehy and others have outlined.

Officials reviewed all of the pros and cons, the implications for the State and the victims and concluded that, in the light of policy and the social and value context, not simply in punt or euro terms but the overall value context of the reaction of society and the political process, that the negotiating strategy for the discussions should be based on putting it to the congregations that the ensuing level of costs should be apportioned 50-50 between the two sides, subject to a cap which the negotiators agreed should be initially put at a certain figure. That figure was £150 million, subject to a floor amount, an absolute minimum of £100 million or €128 million, which is what emerged. The other aspect was that if the congregations agreed to make such a contribution, an indemnity would be accorded in return. That was a policy decision.

The 50-50 ratio was put on the table as a negotiating strategy which attempted to assert with the congregations that the scale of the State's exposure would be no more than 50%, as would theirs. Behind this negotiating strategy was an acceptance that the State carried a major degree of culpability for the manner in which the situation in the affected institutions had evolved, whether it was through the decades long inadequate transfer of resources, the decades long failure to ensure staff in the institutions were properly trained, and the failure on some occasions to adequately inspect the institutions. While I do not have access to the files, I have read references in the debate on the Bill made by the Minister of the day that there was a possible failure to act on complaints made and rejection without adequate investigation. This occurred many decades ago.

Was the 50-50 agreement fair? Was it just a negotiating pitch?

Mr. Doyle

It was a negotiating approach. My own feeling at the time it was suggested and when it was put to the Minister for Finance for consideration around the end of April 2001 was that, in the light of the series of issues surrounding our share of responsibility for what had happened, it would have been an amazing outcome if it had been secured.

What would have been regarded as a pragmatic and reasonable outcome in the circumstances?

Mr. Doyle

I would have to answer by reviewing the nature of the congregations' reaction to the case put to them. I was not involved in the negotiations but on reviewing the papers it is clear that they asserted very strongly that in a court based process the degree of their exposure would have been quite limited. They would have put up a strenuous and vigorous legal defence, of either the individuals accused of various acts or their employers or their own congregations.

Does Mr. Doyle think that, apart from the legality which the committee has traced and understands, they could have sustained that position, politically and morally?

Mr. Doyle

I am sorry, I am neither a politician nor a moralist. My personal judgment was that if one had gone down the road of resorting to a process for every single allegation made by the victims during these decades of neglect, it would have resulted in many years of litigation, as others have stated. Having looked at some of the papers, my view was, in respect of the judgment that many victims would have had extreme difficulty in asserting in a court process the veracity of what had happened to them, given the passage of time and the probable lack of independent witnesses, that the congregations' assertion in relation to the possible outcome of a whole series of court cases was probably fairly close to the mark. From a policy point of view, no Minister of the Government wanted to see a process emerge where the victims would be subject to harrowing treatment in the courts.

Is Mr. Doyle saying he is satisfied with the dropping of the 50-50 formula, of any proportionality in the formula?

Mr. Doyle

I do not think the Department of Finance is ever happy when it sees money going walkabout.

Was Mr. Doyle happy in this case?

Mr. Doyle

In this case I was satisfied that the negotiating mandate officials from the Departments of Finance and Education and Science and the Office of the Attorney General sought from both policymakers, the Minister for Education and Science and the Minister for Finance, was appropriate. In the total context which I have outlined for the committee, I was satisfied.

Officials from the Department of Finance were not involved at all stages. Was Mr. Doyle happy about this?

Mr. Doyle

Officials of the Department were involved at all stages up to the breakdown of the negotiations in autumn 2001, at which point the offer from the congregations' side was significantly shy of the minimum threshold that policy had determined was €128 million or £100 million. I would not be surprised if a Minister sought to settle a policy matter at a high level under his or her own authority and with the support of the Government for a particular process without the full panoply of attending officials. I am not surprised when any Minister chooses to try to break a logjam.

If the full panoply was diminished, was Mr. Doyle happy that there was no representation from the Department of Finance?

Mr. Doyle

I will answer that question by reference to the outcome of the discussions. The outcome, as approved by the Government and announced by the Minister for Education and Science on 30 January 2002, was that a contribution would be made. I wish to make a comment. The legislation prescribed in 2002 provided for a contribution, not a fixed or compulsory contribution but a voluntary one.

Why did the Minister for Finance write to the Minister for Education and Science pointing to his unhappiness with the figure, at a time when he thought the total amount was approximately €258 million? He was unhappy with the sum of €128 million. Why was he unhappy if Mr. Doyle was reasonably content?

Mr. Doyle

Let me finish my point about whether I was happy that officials from the Department of Finance were not involved in the discussions. I was referring to the fact that I would assess this by reference to the outcome - a contribution of €128 million made up of cash and property and an indemnity. This was the outcome the Ministers for Finance and Education and Science, with their appropriate authority, had mandated the negotiating team to secure. The outcome of the discussions between the Minister for Education and Science and Mr. Dennehy and the congregations was in line with the negotiating strategy. To the extent that was the case, I can say I was happy with the outcome. If I was asked whether I would have preferred if officials had been present, I would say, as I indicated earlier, that Mr. John Conlon was dealing with the Department of Education and Science Vote and, therefore, we could not go to every single meeting.

I wish to return to the matter of the cap and the floor. Did I misunderstand Mr. Doyle? What does he mean by "the cap and the floor"? He was happy with the outcome, although he was aware by the time it went to Cabinet that the numbers were rising before his eyes. I ask him to tell the committee again about the cap on the floor.

Mr. Doyle

The cap and the floor - a range from £150 million to £100 million - was accepted by the policy process as being appropriate in the context of the nature of the State's exposure to——

Was it a cap on the State's contribution?

Mr. Doyle

No; it was a cap on the congregations' contribution in respect of the outcome of the redress process.

Which the State would settle for approximately £150 million.

Mr. Doyle

The Department would begin by looking for £150 million and settle for £100 million.

What was the extent of the liability at that stage, as estimated by the Department?

Mr. Doyle

Figures were on the table in April 2001 for a cost range of approximately £200 million.

Mr. Doyle

It was an indicative figure at that point in time.

The figure was £381 million in April, according to the Comptroller and Auditor General's report.

Mr. Doyle

There was a maximum potential cost of £300 million at that point.

Therefore, the Department was getting its 50%, approximately.

Mr. Doyle

From an initial negotiating point of view, that was the mandate officials sought. It was aimed at securing a figure of about 50%.

How could the Department have been satisfied with the outcome which came one year later when the figures had risen dramatically, as was known at the time it was approved by the Cabinet?

Mr. Doyle

The figures had risen. The Cabinet and the policy-making process had considered the totality of the emerging situation. Taking into consideration the victims and the policy response, it was felt a contribution from the congregations towards the cost of the compensation process was better than no contribution in a situation where the Government would have had to foot the entire bill on its own and then seek to recover through the courts a legally adjudged contribution in each and every case from the congregations.

Why did the Minister for Finance write a letter stating his unhappiness with the amount of €128 million?

Mr. Doyle

On the previous point, if it had been the case that the State had proceeded with an open-ended redress scheme on the basis it would counter sue the congregations for their share in terms of culpability, the scheme would have collapsed in a barrage of legalese. The congregations would have been exposed to an unknown quantity and would have insisted on due process on their legal right to defend and scrutinise each and every case and subject claims to a process that would have brought the whole matter to a halt.

The Minister for Finance wrote to the Minister for Education and Science in June 2001. At the time the offer from the church was minuscule - it was not €128 million but approximately €40 million. That was the context in which the Minister for Finance wrote to the Minister for Education and Science to encourage him to hold out for a much higher figure.

Is Mr. Doyle saying to the committee that, given the position the Department was in, irrespective of the length of this piece of string, as long as it achieved the figure of the order fixed in April 2001, it would have been satisfied with the outcome?

Mr. Doyle

I am not saying the Department was happy. That was the policy decision that had emerged. One cannot separate the whole question of costs from the policy issues that arose right throughout the process. There are a series of issues which, I understand, I should not mention at this committee but they should be reflected upon in assessing the scale of the potential exposure. If the committee wishes, I can articulate them.

The committee will inevitably deal with them when it hears the detail. Mr. Doyle is not saying the Department of Finance was happy. Was it unhappy with what had transpired?

Mr. Doyle

The Department was satisfied that the compromise outcome that had been reached was consistent with overall Government policy. The decision to accept the offer and the many decisions made about the context in which the offer had been put on the table had to do with policy issues. I have not met too many who would say the Department of Finance was satisfied about any exposure.

At what stage was it consistent with Government policy - as it evolved or in April 2001?

Mr. Doyle

As it evolved. I invite the committee to consider the series of policy issues that reflected the official input into the process as part of the negotiations. The Government and the Legislature decided to put the redress scheme in place. Policy dictated the nature of the process, that court rules would not apply and that there would be a low burden of proof. It dictated that, in the public interest, the State would own up to its share of culpability; that the option of suing individual members of congregations——

I apologise for interrupting Mr. Doyle but my colleagues are becoming restless. I suggest that we return to the detail, the importance of which I accept. To whom did Mr. Doyle think the indemnity applied?

Mr. Doyle

The congregations and members being accused of wrongdoing. That was my layman's understanding. I will leave it to others to comment on the precise legal definition.

How would Mr. Dennehy describe it?

As many as 18 congregations signed up to the indemnity deal. However, the agreement will only have financial implications in cases that go to court. For a case to qualify, it must commence within six years of the commencement of the Residential Institutions Redress Act 2002. It was intended that the redress board would provide compensation for most, if not all, of the claimants. It is the Department's belief that the number of cases which will benefit from the indemnity will be minuscule.

I refer Mr. Dennehy to page 86 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report. In the preparation by the State's side for negotiations on the indemnity, it was necessary to conclude on the State's stance. In correspondence the Attorney General's office noted that it was its understanding, when previously involved in negotiations during 2001, that the indemnity would only extend to cases which would actually go before the redress board. In a letter to the Attorney General's office the Minister clarified the policy objectives that while the indemnity would cover all cases which would come within the remit of the board, it would be time limited. It appears that even the Attorney General thought that it only related to cases that would go before the redress board.

The Deputy raised that point earlier. It was a policy issue on which the Attorney General was awaiting directions from the Minister for Education and Science.

Was it not extraordinarily important? The only reasonable inference is that when the Attorney General's officials were involved, they ensured the indemnity would be restricted to cases that would go before the redress board. The situation now is that the State is liable on both sides of the equation for costs in the case of anyone who comes along at any stage and goes down to the Four Courts.

They must come within the terms of the scheme and be eligible to appear before the redress board.

They are all eligible but the issue is whether they will go.

The Deputy is correct. It was a policy decision, not one that we took. It might be helpful to ask Mr. Boland to elaborate on this point.

Mr. Boland

I cannot add much more. It is a policy issue. The objective of the redress board is to take all of the qualifying cases out of the courts. Qualifying cases involve those who were in institutional care for which the State had regulatory and supervisory responsibility. Any applicant to the scheme can go right through the process and still carry forward his or her case in the courts or he or she may go directly to the courts without going through the scheme.

The issue was precisely which cases would benefit from the indemnity. The congregations wanted the widest possible indemnity. As I understand it, they were looking for a limitless indemnity for all time in respect of all cases that could have occurred up to the date of its signing. It was ultimately agreed that qualifying cases were those that could go before the redress board where litigation commenced within six years of the date of the indemnity, the date of the Act. They were policy decisions made by the Minister. As we discussed, in part, they had to do with the delay in responding and giving directions to the Attorney General as to exactly what was being negotiated.

Mr. Dennehy, does that not highlight in a dramatic manner the reason the Attorney General or representatives of his office ought to have been present at the meeting at which those policy changes were made? That is a remarkably wide remit and a remarkable change in terms of the potential or contingent liability for the State.

I regard policy as a matter for the Minister for Education and Science and the Government, based obviously on the advice of the Attorney General.

Is Mr. Dennehy still saying the Attorney General was only excluded from a couple of meetings that did not matter too much?

What I am saying is that officers of the Attorney General's office were not present. I would not use the word "excluded". It is semantics.

Mr. Dennehy used that word.

They were not present at two meetings, that did not deal with the indemnity, other than it was noted that a document had been supplied by the religious for consideration.

Did not the terms of the indemnity derive from the policy decision? Has that not been established by these hearings?

The terms of the indemnity derived from the entire process, not just those two meetings. It could not possibly have derived from them.

I contend that it manifestly did. I remind Mr. Dennehy that the negotiations had broken down and failed in September that year——

On the question of money.

——and that it was the two meetings that cracked them open again. This broadened the remit and created the additional liability. It is clear from the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General that the Attorney General thought that the indemnity would be restricted to cases that would actually - the word used - go before the redress board. Is that not correct?

Mr. Boland

I do not have the correspondence with me but that is correct. As the Secretary General says, it was ultimately a matter of policy for the Minister and finally the Government in June to decide to what exactly the indemnity would apply.

To clarify matters for the committee, the indemnity was not discussed at those meetings, although the issue was raised but the Minister absolutely refused to discuss it. We did not have a copy with us, nor did we see one at the meetings. It had been given to officials at earlier meetings and they continued the discussion.

While I have more questions, I will defer to my colleagues.

I will start with the easier questions and address Mr. Dennehy. The two key meetings in November 2001 and January 2002 were attended by Mr. Dennehy, the Minister and representatives of CORI. How long did they last?

Speaking from memory - I am not certain - the first meeting was very short - perhaps 20 minutes. The second probably lasted 45 to 50 minutes. They were both relatively short. At the first the Minister put it to the congregations that they were either in or out and to be in they would have to at least reach a level of €128 million. At the next they came back, put the offer of €128 million to the Minister and supplied a breakdown but he did not discuss the offer in detail with them. He said he would take it away and examine it and then if he considered it appropriate, he would use his good offices to recommend it to Government, in principle, subject to the details being negotiated by officials. That is what transpired at the meetings.

Mr. Dennehy has said he took no notes at the meetings. At the first meeting did any representative of CORI take notes?

I do not know.

At the second meeting I presume the Arthur Cox representative was a solicitor. Was the solicitor taking notes?

Again, I do not know. At the second meeting there was a senior counsel representing Arthur Cox. I am not sure; he may have been taking notes, I do not know. It was made very clear by the Minister at both meetings that he was not agreeing to anything, nor was he binding anybody else to any form of agreement. He was perfectly willing to listen to the case and accept the document provided, which I regarded as a summary of the issues the congregations wished to raise.

The implication of what is being said is that these two meetings at a high level effectively broke the negotiations logjam. Is that correct?

It would be correct to say that prior to those two meetings, the congregations had not even come close to the sum of money that the Ministers for Education and Science and Finance and the Government regarded as the bottom line. Following the first meeting, the congregations returned willing to go the extra mile and put forward a proposal for the payment of €128 million, including properties and so on.

Is it not clear that prior to the November meeting, what really broke the logjam was the letter sent from the Department of Education and Science on 6 November to CORI as recorded on page 85 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report? Was that not crucial in breaking the logjam? Is it not a fact, based on the contents of the letter, that the Department totally reversed engines and made major concessions on its negotiating position? For example, the letter stated the State would be willing to provide a permanent indemnity against litigation in cases which would come under the remit of the redress board. It outlined the nature of the package the State would accept, which was in line with what the religious orders were requesting. It stated the contribution could be capped at €127 million. This was a written offer by the Department to the religious orders. It went on to state on the problem of previously transferred property, against which the Department had always held out, the matter was now to be conceded, back to the date of the Taoiseach's apology. In what seems to be the only critical comment it went on to state that if past transfers were excluded, the contribution envisaged from the religious orders would be of the order of 10% to 20% of the liability.

This is the key letter in the negotiating process. What was the process that gave Mr. Dennehy the mandate to make those concessions? I presume the letter was issued under Mr. Dennehy's signature.

No, it did not.

Who signed it?

I understand it was signed by the assistant secretary responsible for the area at the time.

For months the Department had held out. There was no agreement to include any previous transfers of property. It wanted a 50:50 contribution. The question of the indemnity was not being conceded. Then on 6 November hands were folded. It was very easy for the Minister afterwards to build on this because most of what the religious orders wanted had been conceded in the letter. What was the negotiating mandate?

There is a difference between a negotiating stance and a mandate. The mandate would come from the agreement, which Mr. Doyle and I have mentioned, reached between the Ministers for Finance and Education and Science in April 2001 on what was the bottom line they would accept by way of a deal with the congregations.

Did Mr. Dennehy have that mandate right through the summer until the negotiations broke down in October? What was the process which gave him the new mandate to authorise the letter which I presume he authorised? Did the Minister authorise it?

I do not know; I will have to check. I understand from Mr. Boland, who was present, that the Minister did authorise the letter.

The Minister authorised it.

Did Mr. Dennehy see it? Did it go from the assistant secretary to the Minister or cross Mr. Dennehy's desk?

I probably did see it. I am not 100% sure but I probably did see it, yes.

Would Mr. Dennehy agree that it was crucial?

Would he agree that an agreement was subsequently drawn on the basis of the concessions made therein?

Yes. At that stage the congregations had not agreed. As I understand it, the first time they said they would agree to the payment of €127 million or €128 million was at the second meeting with the then Minister in January.

The mandate to which Mr. Dennehy refers in April existed throughout the meetings but yet there was a breakdown in negotiations.

There was a decision taken by the negotiating team, which involved the Departments of Finance and Education and Science and the Office of the Attorney General, obviously to hold out for as long as it could for as much as it could. Then a time was reached when it became clear - certainly this was the judgment - that the congregations were not going to pay any more.

Let us take the question of the indemnity as conceded in the letter. The offer was made from the Department that a permanent indemnity against litigation in cases which would come under the remit of the redress board would be given. What was the mandate and who was involved in the discussions before the offer was made?

I will have to refer Mr. Boland, if I may.

Mr. Boland

The issue of the indemnity was always an integral part and recognised as such of any agreement that would be reached with the congregations and was flagged to the respective Ministers and the Attorney General in April 2001 when the negotiating strategy was developed. The precise extent of the indemnity was not agreed at that stage and was not agreed until 2002 but the fact that there would be an indemnity was seen as an inevitability. Otherwise, from the congregations' point of view, they would be making a contribution - if they were to make a contribution - with no guarantees. They would make a contribution and could still be sued. It was highly unlikely anybody with any financial prudence would do so. Therefore, the indemnity was always an issue.

I agree. However, Mr. Boland may recall answering Deputy Rabbitte's line of questioning. It was established that sometime in spring 2003 the issue arose as to what category of case the indemnity would apply. This was pursued to the point where he seemed to indicate there was a change of policy in spring 2003 which widened the remit of the indemnity. However, based on this letter, as recorded by the Comptroller and Auditor General, that concession had been made in the letter of 6 November. It proposed that an indemnity would be given to all persons who would come within the remit of the redress board.

To come within the remit of the redress board does not mean a person needs to go to the board for compensation: he or she could go to the court. However, someone who comes within the remit of the board has an indemnity. The Attorney General seems to be complaining, by way of letter, that he had no policy authorisation in spring 2003. However on 6 November 2002 the Department of Education and Science, in a letter to the religious orders, signed by an assistant secretary, signed off by the Minister and seen by the Secretary General, made precisely this policy concession. How can Mr. Boland explain the two issues?

Mr. Boland

It was always a fact that there would be an indemnity, in respect of which there was no change of policy. It was always accepted that there would be an indemnity. On the precise terms, there were issues still to be determined in detail, even at the date of the letter in November.

With respect——

Mr. Boland

If I may, the statement was quite broad: the indemnity would cover cases which came within the remit of the redress board.

That is right.

Mr. Boland

For instance, it did not state for how long the indemnity would apply.

We have all been involved to some degree in negotiations, although not at this high level perhaps. As soon as one side puts its position in writing, it does not move off the table. On 6 November it was put in writing that the indemnity would apply to all cases which would come within the remit of the redress board. Subsequent correspondence seems to indicate that the Office of the Attorney General was surprised by this and was looking for clarification on the issue in spring 2003.

I come back to my original question, which, with respect, was not fully answered. What was the negotiating mandate and who was involved in formulating the policy which allowed the Department of Education and Science to make this very significant concession in writing which I accept is not time limited? I do not have a copy of the text of the letter; I only have the Comptroller and Auditor General's summary which I presume is accurate. However, it indicates that the scope of the indemnity being offered by the Department would cover anybody who would come within the remit of the board, regardless of whether they went to it for compensation. Is that not right?

Mr. Purcell

Clearly, this is a very important point. It might be appropriate to refer to one sentence in the letter: "In return, the participating congregations would receive a permanent State indemnity against any and all litigation in cases which come under the remit of the redress board".

That is as clear as crystal. Why was there controversy in the spring? Before the letter was written offering the indemnity, had the Office of the Attorney General been left out of the loop?

Mr. Boland

No.

In that case, what is its complaint?

Mr. Boland

In a way it is unfair to characterise the Office of the Attorney General's question as showing surprise. It wanted very clear directions from the Minister as to the way he, in particular, and the Government wanted to go in relation to the indemnity. However, an indemnity - a fairly broad ranging indemnity - was always a reality in the negotiations and was known to the Office of the Attorney General as an essential quid pro quo for any contributions the congregations would make.

I am not in disagreement. However, if that was what was being proposed, the sentence in the letter would have stated the State would be prepared to give an indemnity. The letter has now been accurately quoted by the Comptroller and Auditor General. It actually went into the nature and scope of the indemnity and the fact that it would apply to all victims who would come within the remit of the redress board.

Mr. Boland

Yes.

That was a major policy concession, which moved from the principle to the actual details of the indemnity scheme. Certainly, there were other details which needed to be completed. At that point if the representatives of the Attorney General had sight of the letter or been involved in the policy considerations which gave rise to the drafting of the letter, they could not logically have taken up the position they took in spring 2003.

Mr. Boland

I do not know if the Office of the Attorney General has seen the letter or saw it before its letter of 2003 but, as I understand it, the reality is it was not a major policy change, as the Deputy characterises it. It was very consistent with the policy approach taken all along.

I will return to this matter which I have pursued as far as it is possible for me to make progress on it at this stage.

Another element of the letter was that property previously transferred would be taken into account in building up the contribution from CORI. From the summaries of the previous negotiations it is clear that the bottom line for the Department of Education and Science was that no property previously transferred would be taken into account. However, in a letter, again without a negotiating process, an offer was made that property previously transferred might now be taken into account back to the date of the Taoiseach's apology in 1999. As that was not firmly put, the date looks as though it was negotiable but the suggestion was made that that would be the effective date. What was the mandate for this change?

Mr. Boland

In some respects, what was happening was that the Minister, through the assistant secretary who wrote the letter, was, as the Deputy said, seeking to break the logjam by setting out a possible way forward for the negotiations. There was no agreement to anything. These were ideas that could be explored in discussions. It was not intended to be binding in any way on anybody but I absolutely agree with the Deputy that it was a crucial letter in breaking the logjam in respect of the negotiations which had stalled at that time. It was only a set of possible ways forward for further discussions.

With respect, that is not the way it reads.

Mr. Boland

That was the intention.

That may be so.

Mr. Boland

What page are we looking at, by the way?

Page 85, the second paragraph, under the subheading, "The Negotiations November 2001 to January 2002." Mr. Boland will see that the first comment of the Comptroller and Auditor General is: "This letter marked a significant change in the stance being adopted by the State in relation to past contributions." He goes on to list the offers made by the Department which attracted the attention of CORI once more as it was prepared to meet the Minister shortly afterwards. This is the key negotiation. The letter did not state, "Lads, I was thinking last night. Maybe you would like to look at a couple of ideas that I jotted down on the back of an envelope." That was not the way it was presented. It contained concessions offered by the Department of Education and Science to break a negotiating logjam. I am not saying this should not happen - that is the way the world works. However, from where did the policy authorisation come to position the Department to make such offers?

We are now discussing the issue of past property contributions. Based on previous correspondence, the bottom line for the Department was that it would take property from that day on but would not give credit for property transferred in the past. However, at this point it changed. Did the Minister make this concession unilaterally? Was it checked with the Department of Finance? Did it have the authorisation of the Government? Was there a Cabinet decision? We need to know about these issues.

Mr. Boland

When it refers to a significant change, it was undoubtedly a significant change from the point of view of the congregations because they had not been told this before but these proposals had been discussed among the officials. To that extent, therefore, it was not a significant change in a negotiating position but it was a position that had not previously been declared to the congregations, obviously in the interests of getting as much of a contribution from them as possible. A conclusion was reached at that point that something major needed to be done if they were not to walk away from the negotiations completely. That is what was done. However, the change was of most significance to the congregations rather than within the process, if members understand what I am saying. The process contemplated these things being done at a much earlier stage.

Was the offer of €127 million authorised by the Department of Finance prior to the issuing of the letter?

Mr. Boland

Absolutely. Mr. Doyle dealt with that matter comprehensively a little while ago. In fact, the State's bottom line was determined in April 2001 at 50:50, if it could be achieved, in the realisation that it was highly unlikely, with a cap of £150 million but with an absolute baseline of £100 million. Therefore, the answer is yes, it had been very definitely agreed.

Mr. Doyle dealt with the range. However, when the Department of Education and Science decided to offer a specific figure to the congregations, did it have clearance from the Department of Finance which it would normally require before issuing the letter?

Mr. Boland

I am not too sure.

We know that the Department of Finance frequently mandates Departments to operate within a range but the money still cannot be spent without authorisation of the precise figure.

Mr. Boland

I am not too sure if the precise letter was seen by the Department of Finance; it probably was not. I do not think there was any question but that the figure of £100 million would be acceptable to the Department of Finance.

I do not understand the process within the Department of Education and Science in approaching the negotiations. There seems to have been a cross-party group of negotiators from the Departments of Education and Science and Finance and legal representatives. Was that the negotiating team?

Mr. Boland

Yes.

Was the negotiating team called together to discuss the draft of the letter or was it issued unilaterally from the Department of Education and Science?

Mr. Boland

I do not recall. What I do recall is that the letter and its contents were entirely consistent with the policy that had been set down. I do not recall if, in fact, the letter had been the subject of discussion between the Departments and the Office of the Attorney General. I do not think anything significant hangs on it to that extent.

It is curious. The last comment in the letter seems to be critical: "The congregations' proposed contribution, when past transfers are excluded, represented only 10% to 20% of the likely cost." Was that a reference to the figure of €127 million or €57 million?

Mr. Boland

I think the figure of €57 million.

At this point in the negotiations, based on the schedule of the Department's estimates, the figure had moved to in excess of €500 million. When the Department got its negotiating mandate, the estimate was €254 million to €255 million. Despite this increase, the Department was operating under the same guidelines as in April 2001. It was basing its estimate on what would be a reasonable monetary contribution from the religious orders on figures that were out of date.

Something my colleague, Mr. Doyle, and I have tried to explain is that at no stage were we tying other than as a negotiating stance and that we were aiming to get as much as we possibly could. The Government had decided that, regardless of the amount offered by the congregations and whether they participated, and of the cost of the scheme, it was going ahead with the redress scheme. Obviously, as the Deputy rightly said, as time passed, we raised the level of our potential exposure and the potential cost of the scheme but the policy decision had been taken a long time before, in 2001, that if the congregations were to become involved and pay a sum up to £100 million, that would be acceptable as a policy option, regardless of the cost of the scheme.

All of the various estimates of contingent liability, both by the Department of Education and Science and the Comptroller and Auditor General, are estimates of the liability arising from the redress board and the payments made in compensation. Has the Department estimated the possible contingent liability arising from the indemnity? This is not included in the Comptroller and Auditor General's sensational figure of €1 billion, about which Mr. Dennehy talked or his own sensational figure of €750 million. What about the indemnity? Surely, this has a monetary cost that should have been factored in.

To the best of my knowledge, nobody is considering using or invoking the indemnity. We are of the view that the number who may be involved will be minuscule or very small.

On what does Mr. Dennehy base that?

Mr. Boland

It is the same pool who would be called on - those who were abused in childhood in institutions. Therefore, they either go through the redress board process or go to the courts but it is the same pool. If the scheme is successful, the overwhelming majority should go through the redress scheme, in which case it will cost either €1 billion or €500 million. We expect a small number to go the courts but they are part of the same pool. Therefore, the expectation is that it will not significantly affect either estimate.

The more likely scenario is that they will start at the redress board, be awarded a sum of money in compensation and will have one month to either accept or reject it. Their solicitors will advise some of them to reject it and they will then go to court.

Mr. Boland

We are nine months into the scheme and that has not happened as yet but obviously it is up to individuals and their solicitors to decide.

Awards are being made.

Mr. Boland said it was always the Department's position that there would be a very wide indemnity. This does not seem to have been stated anywhere until it was mentioned in the letter of 6 November.

Mr. Boland

It would have been stated. There is a memorandum on the negotiating position to be adopted in April 2001 when the cap of £150 million - then £100 million - was decided upon. As far as I recall, this also addressed the fact that an indemnity would be required. That is my recollection.

The letter from the Office of the Attorney General, to which Deputy Rabbitte referred, mentioned on page 86 of the report, states that its understanding when involved was that its remit would only cover those who would go before the board.

Mr. Boland

I do not know precisely what understanding the Office of the Attorney General had. All I know is that the precise details of the nature and extent of the indemnity were never worked out in great detail and not agreed with the congregations until the discussions in which the Office of the Attorney General was involved were held. Ultimately, the extent of the indemnity was a policy issue for the Minister rather than the Office of the Attorney General.

I will allow other Members to contribute, although I have other issues to which I would like to return.

I want to follow up on the point Deputy Noonan mentioned. He pointed to different views on the scope of the indemnity. As far as the Attorney General was concerned, it related to those who would go before the board, whereas the letter of 6 November referred to cases which would come within the remit of the board, which is a different issue. Mr. Boland has confirmed that in the past nine months no such cases have gone to court. Up to now the difference has been academic, even though potentially there could be a significant difference. However, in view of the fact that the redress board payments and the matrix of how awards are calculated are based on a particular level that will be expected to go to court, does the Department believe a large number will go directly to court? If this is not the case, am I right in saying the difference will not ultimately be material or significant?

The Deputy has described it perfectly. The situation is that right now with the evidence available to us we are of the view that people will continue to avail of the redress board rather than go to the courts.

Is this because of the difficulties they would have with evidence, etc?

With the Chairman's indulgence, I ask the Comptroller and Auditor General to reread the letter which he read somewhat too quickly for me.

He only read one sentence from a long letter.

Perhaps he will read the relevant sentence.

Mr. Purcell

This relates to the indemnity. I will also read the previous sentence to place the matter in context. The letter reads:

We are also prepared to recommend that final agreement should allow for a situation where the cost of the scheme is greater than we anticipate by capping the congregations' contribution at a figure of the order of £100 million, a figure based on the lower of our estimates of overall cost. In return, the participating congregations would receive a permanent State indemnity against any and all litigation in cases, which come under the remit of the redress board.

I thank the Comptroller and Auditor General. I am a lay person, not a solicitor. Am I hearing and understanding properly? Are we saying that in the letter of 6 November the State was offering a permanent indemnity and that when it was signed, it was limited to cases in which litigation commenced within a six year period? Am I explaining this correctly?

Mr. Boland

Not quite, because once the indemnity applies to a case, it is permanent and continues forever. Subsequent negotiations established the permanent indemnity would only apply to those cases which would come within the remit of the scheme and in which proceedings commenced within a period of six years.

In other words, the additional provision about commencing proceedings within a period of six years, not contained in the letter of 6 November, from the point of view of the taxpayer, represented a tightening of the indemnity as the negotiations continued.

Mr. Boland

Correct.

That is the first time I have heard that today. I am very pleased that Mr. Boland read the letter because I had not seen it before. We have now established that, through detailed negotiations, the terms of the indemnity were, in this case and possibly several others, tightened to the advantage of the taxpayer. The indemnity agreement, a copy of which we have all been given, was signed on 5 June 2000. I am very pleased to highlight this because I do not think it has come out so far. It is important. If other improvements, from the point of view of the taxpayer, were made during the negotiations, we would be very happy to reveal them through further discussion.

Mr. Boland

Will I do so?

I would be very happy for Mr. Boland to do so.

Mr. Boland

There are just three or four key instances. There were a number of key objectives for the Office of the Attorney General and the Department in the discussions, one of which was that any case to which the indemnity would be applied would go to a court hearing and that the State would have complete control over the running of the case. Thus, in the event that the congregations wanted to have control, the indemnity would cease to apply. In addition, under the terms of the indemnity, the congregations are obliged to co-operate in every way and give all information to the State in respect of any case that goes to a hearing.

We have discussed the extent of the indemnity which applies for a six year period. The final indemnity also provided for a process of arbitration in the event of any breakdowns between the parties that could not be resolved by agreement. It also stipulated that past transfers to so-called non-governmental organisations or charities would only be accepted by the State in so far as they provided for a restriction on being sold for a period of 25 years. They could not be sold without the consent of the Minister for Finance. There was also a condition that transfers would only be accepted in the event that the body which benefited was not connected with the Catholic Church. The actual amount of cash was increased by €3 million in the course of the negotiations.

All in all, it appears that, while the agreement, in principle, was announced on 30 January 2002, by the time the indemnity was signed on 5 June, significant improvements, a substantial tightening up and major benefits for the taxpayer in terms of value for money and ultimate exposure of the Exchequer had been achieved during the detailed negotiations. I am very pleased to hear that they were not one-way traffic. Listening to the discussion, one would assume that with each day and month and analysis of the issue the State's liability was getting bigger and bigger and exposure higher and higher. I am very pleased that in the negotiation of the legal indemnity the opposite was the case.

I return to the issue of the redress board and the legislation under which it was established. I gather that Mr. Doyle of the Department of Finance made it clear - Mr. Boland has just confirmed this - that the legislation we passed immediately before the Dáil broke up for the general election in April 2002 enabled a contribution to be made by the congregations and the indemnity agreement to be drawn up. However, the establishment of the redress board was not contingent or dependent upon either of these factors. Its establishment and the payment of compensation were wholly unconnected to the issue of whether there was ever going to be a contribution from the congregations.

Whether there was ever an indemnity agreement, the liability for the payment of compensation to the victims of abuse arose from the Taoiseach's apology and the people, through the Government, putting their money where their mouths were and giving a commitment to the redress board. Am I correct in saying this?

That is something we have been saying and I am glad to re-emphasise it. From the outset, the putting in place of the redress board was not contingent on any contribution from the congregations, or on their involvement.

Returning to the agreement reached with the religious orders and the sum of €128 million agreed, Mr. Dennehy's statement encapsulates the issue. It states, "The Government considered that this sum of €128 million was appropriate in all the circumstances." Thus, whether the Department of Finance was happy or unhappy is not the point. What matters is whether a Department considered the deal "appropriate", as Mr. Dennehy said.

There is confusion. I, therefore, ask the committee to refer to page 85 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report. This has to do with Mr. Dennehy's memorandum, which was correct. However, we are talking about the two meetings that took place on 7 November and 7 January. The report notes, "The discussion centred on the amount of the contribution and how it was to be structured." We heard from the Secretary General that the figure of £100 million was referred to in the letter of 6 November. Therefore, it would not have been a new item in the January discussions. The next sentence reads, "Agreement was reached for a contribution of €128 million and announced on 3 January 2002." Can Mr. Dennehy confirm whether that agreement was reached by the Government or by the Minister and himself at the meeting?

By the Government.

Reading the report, as presented, it has been assumed that we are talking about the meetings. The same paragraph refers to the discussion centring on the contribution and notes in a following sentence that agreement was reached. One could be forgiven for thinking that it was reached at the meeting that Mr. Dennehy attended when patently that is not the reality. Effectively, the Minister was a conduit bringing back information from the meeting for the Government to approve at a meeting. A press release was issued after that Government meeting.

The former Minister made it very clear to the congregations in discussions that he would bring to Government the proposals they had put on the table for consideration. That is what he did.

Yes. The Secretary General can understand from the way this is presented on page 85 that somebody might mistakenly conclude that the agreement was reached during those discussions. I am happy he has confirmed that this is not the case.

I wish to raise another point of information with the Secretary General. I refer to page 92 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report. The Secretary General has referred to two meetings which took place between officials and the congregations on 13 March and 12 April 2003. I ask that a copy of the minutes be made available to the committee as urgently as possible in order that we can cast our judgment on the relevance or otherwise of the absence of representatives of the Office of the Attorney General having learned what actually happened at the meetings. While the Secretary General has given us a brief description, we would like to form our own conclusion as to whether the absence of officials of the Office of the Attorney General from the meetings was relevant.

Mr. Dennehy makes it very clear in all of his presentations that there was no connection between the figure of €128 million and the estimated ultimate liability that would have to be met through the redress board. Am I correct in saying this? I am referring to page 91 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report. I am satisfied that Mr. Dennehy has outlined the position. It is clear the Government wanted an appropriate contribution and if it had waited to negotiate a contribution based on a percentage of the final figure, we would not have gone through that process for several years and would not have a figure. It had to decide on a monetary figure as opposed to a percentage of final figure. Anyone would have known early on that that was going to be the position.

Under the heading "Implications for liability", the second paragraph states that when the State agreed in November 2001 to cap the congregations' contributions at €127 million, this represented 50% of the lower estimated cost. As I understand everything said to us, that figure was not linked to the estimated cost of what might ultimately happen at the redress board. That sentence gives the impression that that it was in some way linked to the estimated cost of the likely outcome, which it was not.

Mr. Boland

The Secretary General is correct but at the time the figure would have been compared to the then estimated cost. The agenda moved on and ultimately the figure of €127 million became absolute in the sense that it was the figure the Government decided was appropriate in all the circumstances.

When I read that sentence for the first time, I felt a more appropriate word would have been "coincided" - it coincided with 50% of the lower estimated cost. There is an impression among the public that this figure must have been connected in some way to a percentage of the final cost. The third paragraph on page 91 states that, in any event, once a decision was taken in November 2001 to cap the contribution demanded from the congregations, it effectively meant that the contribution being sought, assuming a 50-50 split, was based on 2,000 claims. There is a view which we do not want to perpetuate that the figure being sought was in some way linked to a percentage or proportion of the potential cost of the claims. Mr. Dennehy is saying firmly that that is not a fair way to describe it.

As I said, the decision was that the redress board would be set up. The scheme would have been put in place, regardless of the contributions from the congregations. What is stated in the report in terms of the way it is described and the context in which it is described is not inaccurate. From the outset the decision of the Government conveyed to the negotiating team was that, regardless of whether there was a contribution, there would be a redress scheme.

I sought an opportunity for us, as members of the committee, to tease out in private session these issues with the Comptroller and Auditor General before we brought you in in order that we could fully appreciate and understand this matter but I was not afforded that opportunity. Therefore, I have to put my questions directly to you in public. I could have sorted out some of these issues but I was not afforded an opportunity to go through them in private session. That is the reason we are doing it this way.

I made the point in private session that if the Deputy wanted time——

I was not given the opportunity to ask questions.

When I asked the Deputy if he wanted time to discuss the document, he said, "Definitely not."

With all due respect to my colleague, there was a misunderstanding.

I did ask to be allowed to put those questions.

There was the standard discussion on procedure. That was broken slightly today in that there was one Government speaker in the first five. We are not arguing that point but there is a misunderstanding about how we should handle this. It is not the Chairman's fault but a general issue.

Mr. Purcell

I was glad to hear Mr. Boland say the ground had changed somewhat because it clarified matters. Originally, the idea was that there would be a 50% contribution and that the 50% contribution which represented half of the estimated lowest liability at the time. It is the prerogative of Government and policymakers to change and, undoubtedly, it did change, as is stated right through the report. In going through it forensically, taking particular sentences without seeing them in context, one is in danger of falling into the trap into which some commentators fell in relation to the so-called €1 billion cost. That said, it is important that in coming to policy decisions in these areas the policymakers and, ultimately, the Government have the fullest possible information available to them. Whether they make decisions to accept €5 or €128 million as in this case, it is purely a policy decision and nothing with which I should have any truck. In making such decisions, no matter what ones they make, it is my contention that the information available to them should be absolutely up to date and as comprehensive as possible. That is the point that has been made in the report.

Mr. Dennehy's opening comment was that the original intention had been that it would be 50-50 but that this had moved as time passed. Was the original intention that it would be 50-50 or were there always caveats? I am hearing this morning that this was a negotiated stance.

The original intention was that there would be a scheme in which the congregations offered to participate. Therefore, the original negotiating stance was that we would aim for 50-50. The decision was made at the time to cap this at €100 million. The policy decision was made from which we moved forward, even though it was obvious the costs of the scheme were beginning to grow. At that stage the policy decision, ultimately taken by the Government, was to accept the sum of €128 million.

There was confusion and I think I see what happened. From the Comptroller and Auditor General's viewpoint, what was in front of him appeared to be a negotiating stance rather than a policy position, even from day one. The negotiating stance may have been confused with the policy position, that they were looking for 50-50. Mr. Dennehy appears to be saying it was a negotiating stance, rather than a policy position.

One has to be quite clear. Deputy Fleming is ascribing confusion to a lot of people. I am not at all confused.

In the interests of fairness, I will not discuss the make-up as we have nearly completed this aspect of the report. The Secretary General has announced that approximately 200 cases have now been dealt with in hearings——

——by the redress board by way of settlements or awards, the phrase used in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report. He referred to 108 settlements and 25 awards with an average settlement of €84,000. They are the figures.

The average has dropped.

That is the point to which I am coming. Assuming that 133 case represent less than 1%, if there are 10,000 cases eventually, it is nearly impossible to reach any conclusion on what the cost is likely to be. While I know 50% more have gone through the system since this work was completed and that awards are coming down, we are——

Three years from now we might know the total cost with some degree of accuracy.

That is not realistic.

I would like to hear a comment from the Comptroller and Auditor General on my last point. Judging from his report, he spent a lot of energy considering what had happened in Canada, where there was a 70-30 split in liability between the church and the state. It is clear, however, from what has been said to us, that here there is joint and several liability and that any person is free to pursue the State for 100% of the award, even where it has little responsibility. I know the Army deafness cases went through the courts but the system developed here was an attempt to mirror the court awards while removing the chance for barristers and others in the legal profession to add the normal mark-up. The Comptroller and Auditor General dismissed this in his report as not being a valid comparison. As an Irish comparison, it is the most valid. I remember reading headlines not too long ago that the Army deafness claims would cost the Exchequer €2 billion. In the end, however, the figure was only a fraction of this, due to successful negotiations involving the Department of Defence and others. Is it not possible to do the same in this case? As we see the numbers of cases increase, the average settlement decreases - perhaps that is a better indication of how matters might turn out than the original estimates. I know there is no black and white answer to this.

Mr. Purcell

No, there is not. The Deputy could be right but I stress that those estimates of liability for the Army deafness claims certainly did not come from me. I never put my name to any of them. It is difficult at this stage to see where matters will go. I was surprised that, of the many cases of litigation going through the courts, more did not go through the redress board. I do not know what is happening but when I was preparing this report, quite a small percentage of cases were taken to the board. It could be that people are waiting to see the level of awards. I agree that as time passes and the number of claims grows, there can be a tendency for the general level to decrease. There are so many variables that there must be a caveat. The Deputy could be right, as could everybody in the room. I tried to apply a certain professional rigour to doing this job. That is all anybody can do.

The Comptroller and Auditor General is probably right about the cases before the courts. It is also our opinion that some people are holding off until they see the level of awards. Another view we hold, which again is conjecture, is that the level of awards will drop substantially as the numbers of cases grow because the less serious cases are often dealt with further along in the process.

Given that there is a potential liability through the redress board which will become a real liability, people are of the view that in some way the indemnity deal is costing the Exchequer money. In fact, it has resulted in the payment of €128 million to the Exchequer. Had we not signed it, the Exchequer would be €128 million worse off. The taxpayer will be €128 million better off when it all comes in - there is a cash option available in the event of a dispute about property.

If the congregations had not participated and the redress scheme went ahead as the Government had said it would, that money would not be available to us.

Would it be regarded as a reasonable and fair deal by the religious congregations if they did not have to pay anything?

I have answered that question before, as have others: the Government ultimately had to make a judgment on what it regarded as being fair and acceptable. The negotiators were firmly of the view that the churches were not prepared to go any further.

I said I was worried about this being used in a way we had not intended, although I do not blame anybody for repeating what he or she sees written. The Chairman wondered - as Chairman, he was expected to make a comment - why, if so much information was available, it was not used by the Minister. While I appreciate that there was a question mark over the use of information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, what other information might have been available but yet was not used? I do not know who will answer this question - perhaps the Comptroller and Auditor General - but was there much more information that could have been used? I accept that there had to be some caveat on the FOI source because it could repeat itself.

Mr. Purcell

We started to consider matters from a different angle, almost taking a lateral view, rather than considering what was happening at the redress board because it was so early in its proceedings that it was difficult to establish any pattern. As I said, we received a lot of co-operation from the Department, facilitating us in what we were doing and enabling us to see the people who had initiated cases against the congregations, had made freedom of information requests and had applied to give evidence to the Laffoy commission. The Department facilitated us, even to the extent of the Minister making a direction under a section of the Act to obtain information which would help us.

Therefore, there has been no cover-up, as some say.

Mr. Purcell

I have no problem with repeating this. The Department could not have been more helpful, to the extent that it requested the Minister to make an order under section 26 of the Act to prepare a report comparing the applications to the redress board at mid-July 2003 with a set of names obtained by combining FOI and litigation data. That was useful because our intention was to eliminate duplicates and so on.

I am asking this question because if we are to ask the reason the Minister did not use more information, the implication is that if we had, we might have gone for double the amount of money. I am not sure what the Chairman meant in his opening remarks by the question - what other information could the Minister have used? I am not defending the Minister but the public will wonder why he did not draw on this information. From what I have heard from the Comptroller and Auditor General, the only issue that might be debated is the question of the use that was made of material obtained through FOI requests. Was there any other material that the Minister did not use?

At the risk of being facetious, I will say we are not prophets, nor did we have a crystal ball. As the Comptroller and Auditor General knows, we examined this issue within the Department from every possible angle, with statisticians and others working in consultation with the Department of Finance and other Departments. What we did was not perfect but we gave it our best shot. It is a very inexact science. We do not know how this will pan out from the point of view of costs to the State.

Mr. Doyle

As an observer of the process, I must point out that while various exercises can be carried out, the only exercise that would give a rational assessment of the potential outcome would be to review in detail the nature of the allegations made - among the claims that have gone to the redress board - assess their veracity and the nature of the damage perpetrated on the individuals involved, listen to professional evaluation of such damage and satisfy oneself that the sample was completely representative. On this basis one would have a fair and rational scientific assessment of the potential average settlement, having gone through a fairly rigorous and detailed process, but I do not believe this would be possible as the confidential details are with the redress board and the professional evaluation is in progress.

As to the potential population affected, I do not know how anybody could assess the number who were victims of abuse, in one form or another, since the reference year - I believe 1940. This emphasises the point made by the Comptroller and Auditor General that it is not possible to assess the extent of liability with any certainty. Any estimate would have to be qualified in the absence of the precise process I outlined, whereby one would undertake a representative, clinical, critical, forensic examination of each claim, get a representative sample and multiply it by a clearly predicted population.

Having established a formula, whether it is 50:50, 60:40 or 70:30, surely it should have been pressed?

Mr. Doyle

One could adhere to a formula if one was satisfied of getting a satisfactory outcome. The position reached was that the congregations - I am repeating myself - had asserted convincingly to the negotiating team that they saw their liability as strictly confined in relation to the normal standards of proof in court and that their degree of exposure was limited. On that basis, they refused to put a significant contribution on the table. Their earlier offer of €40 million was rejected. It was my view that the contribution which had emerged was better than none.

Although this meeting has taken far longer than we had anticipated, further sessions will be needed to investigate this matter more fully. I wish to make a couple of brief points.

In relation to the figure of €128 million, is it being suggested that the extra €1 million over the previous figure of €127 million represented a significant advance? It appears that only the cash payment of €41.14 million has been made to date.

In relation to the property aspect, the situation appears to be that some properties are not being accepted, there is agreement on future transfers and disagreements about valuations. As I understand from the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, only one replacement property in County Kerry has been signed off on to the value of €2.6 million.

To date, therefore, out of the figure of €128 million, the value received by the State is €44 million. There appears to be no time mechanism for the future transfer of property. Evidently, the Government and the congregations can play a perennial game of property snap, in which the congregations offer a property and the Department decides to accept or reject it. There does not appear to be a time mechanism as to when the cash or property option comes into play. On this basis, payment of the remainder of the money may be very protracted.

My final point relates to the question as to whether a ratio should have been put in place. There seems to have been a fear on the State side that, because children and young adults in the institutions were wards of the State, 100% liability would eventually attach to the State. An argument could and should have been made - questions must be asked as to the reason this was not done - that many of the children and young adults concerned had been placed in institutions, not for reasons of physical safety or because of any law-breaking but because of the moral discomfort society felt at the time. That attitude was engendered by many of the religious institutions. This aspect should have been debated when the agreement was being put in place.

In answer to the Deputy's question in relation to the properties, all of the cash payments - €41 million - from the religious orders have been made at this stage. In relation to the properties, we have made considerable progress since the Comptroller and Auditor General's report. Of the properties to be transferred, since the date of signing on 5 June, we have now accepted 34 at a total value of €22.6 million. We are in the final stages, with some still to be transferred but all have been accepted, in principle. A number have been rejected while others are subject to ongoing negotiation. We are seeking additional information on some others.

It is important to note that there are approximately 82 properties involved. In the conveyancing of a private house even the slightest legal difficulties could cause a delay of at least one year. This work has been in progress for a little over a year. Each of the 82 properties has to be dealt with separately and there are extremely complex situations in relation to past transfers of some of them. The bottom line is that this process will not continue indefinitely. We have the option of invoking arbitration if we are not being dealt with satisfactorily. We also have the option of seeking the cost value of the properties at the date of signing the agreement. Accordingly, the State will not be at a loss if there is a delay in transferring a property.

The overall situation is that we have made some progress, although it has been slower than I would have liked. We are somewhat disappointed with the pace. However, much more has happened in recent times. We have people working full time on the matter, with whom we are in constant contact. We hope to have made substantial progress on many of the properties within a couple of months.

I spoke of the need to look at the situation through the eyes of the victims. I did not understand Deputy Boyle's comment with regard to the 29,500 children sent by the courts into the institutions concerned. Was he suggesting that they should have been treated in some way differently because of this? I did not understand his point.

There are thousands unaccounted for, according to the Comptroller and Auditor General's report. People went into the institutions for different reasons.

It appeared to me that a case was being made for different treatment. Of the 29,500 children sent by the courts, a substantial number were mistreated and abused and should be treated accordingly. The historical circumstances as to the reason they were sent to institutions some 30 or 40 years ago are not of great interest to me. The fact is that they were abused, we are liable and should deal with the matter on that basis.

The Comptroller and Auditor General referred to a sum of over €10 million being provided for counselling services. There was a reference to the effect that the religious congregations had dealt with this. What does that mean?

Mr. Purcell

Included in the contribution of €128 million there is an amount of €10 million for counselling services. However, this can be accounted for, wholly or partly, by the value of services provided by the religious congregations in the past for victims and those associated with them. At this stage, as I understand it, matters may have moved on somewhat since the report was prepared. The church stated it had provided counselling services worth in excess of €11 million——

Is that within the €41 million rubric?

Mr. Purcell

No, the sum of €41 million has been paid over. The figure of €10 million with which we are dealing may be described as cash, or cash in kind, in the sense that, according to the congregations, it has already been delivered. The Department is trying to validate this with their legal representatives. They also claim that they have an ongoing commitment to the provision of counselling services as part of their normal ministry.

Does that also apply to the €12.7 million education fund?

Mr. Purcell

No. The sum of €12.7 million is part of the €41 million and has been set aside for the purpose of providing additional special educational facilities for the individuals concerned or their offspring.

I have been approached by people who were dropped from the VTOS scheme and had understood there was money available to provide educational opportunities for the survivors of abuse.

There is. It has been the subject of negotiations between the Department, the four support groups affiliated to the National Office for Victim Abuse and their educational facilitator. We have developed an application process and Framework Document to enable the people concerned to be helped. Application forms are available through NOVA or any of the victim support groups and outreach centres in the United Kingdom. We have to finalise the procedure for transferring funding from the NTMA through the Department to the agencies which will be involved in running the scheme. We are coming to an arrangement with the vocational education committees to provide teaching programmes, where requested and necessary. We are in discussions with our colleagues in the Department of Finance and have also had discussions with the Comptroller and Auditor General about the transfer of funds from the NTMA, where it is currently lodged, to the victims.

With regard to the 123 institutions under the remit of the redress scheme, is the number likely to increase?

Mr. Boland

There is capacity within the legislation for the Minister to make an order extending the scheme. No decision has been made, one way or another, in that regard. It is possible that institutions will be added to the list. To some extent, it depends on the claims history, in terms of claims being made against institutions not already listed.

Today we have heard the evidence of the Secretary General of the Department of Education and Science, Mr. John Dennehy. Having regard to the level of public interest in this debate and the issues uncovered in the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Committee of Public Accounts Committee will meet in private session to reflect on the evidence and consider how it should proceed in this matter.

The witness withdrew.

The committee adjourned at 3.30 p.m. until11 a.m. on Thursday, 16 October 2003.
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