Léim ar aghaidh chuig an bpríomhábhar
Gnáthamharc

COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS díospóireacht -
Thursday, 13 Oct 2005

2004 Annual Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General and Appropriation Accounts.

Vote 30 — Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources.

Chapter 11.1 — Media Lab Europe.

Mr. B. Tuohy (Secretary General, Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources) called and examined.

We have received a submission from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a partner in Media Lab Europe, which will be included as associated correspondence.

Witnesses should be aware that they do not enjoy absolute privilege before the committee. The attention of members and witnesses is drawn to the fact that as from 2 August 1998, section 10 of the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997 grants certain rights to persons identified in the course of the committee's proceedings. These rights include the right to give evidence; the right to produce or send documents to the committee; the right to appear before the committee, either in person or through a representative; the right to make a written and oral submission; the right to request the committee to direct the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents, and the right to cross-examine witnesses. For the most part, these rights may be exercised only with the consent of the committee. Persons invited to appear before the committee are made aware of these rights and any persons identified in the course of the proceedings who are not present may have to be made aware of them and provided with the transcript of the relevant part of the committee's proceedings if the committee considers it appropriate in the interests of justice.

Notwithstanding this provision in the legislation, I remind members of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House or an official by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. Members are also reminded of the provisions within Standing Order 156 that the committee shall refrain from inquiring into the merits of a policy or policies of the Government or a Minister of the Government or the merits of the objectives of such policy or policies.

I welcome Mr. Tuohy and invite him to introduce his officials.

Mr. Brendan Tuohy

I am accompanied by Ms Sara White, deputy secretary general; Mr. Kevin O'Brien, assistant principal, communications division; Mr. Mathew Collins, assistant principal, communications division; Ms Úna Nic Giolla Choille and Mr. Brendan Hogan, finance unit.

I invite the officials from the Department of Finance to introduce themselves.

Mr. Paul Byrne

I am a principal officer in the public expenditure division.

Mr. David Denny

I am a principal officer in the OMT division.

We shall open the chapter first and subsequently, if time permits, the Vote. I invite the Comptroller and Auditor General to introduce Chapter 11.1.

Chapter 11.1 of the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General reads:

11.1 Media Lab Europe

Background

Media Lab Europe (MLE) was established in May 2000 as a University level research and education centre to specialise in telecommunications and information and multimedia technologies, including the Internet and digital commerce. Contractual arrangements were outlined in a series of collaborative agreements between the Government, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and MLE. It was envisaged that MLE would become self-sustaining within the ten-year timeframe of the agreements. This was to be achieved with the initial provision of Exchequer funding and subsequently by raising sponsorship and other income. Payments totalling €24.9 million and €10.6 million were made from the Exchequer to MLE and MIT respectively between 2000 and 2003. In addition the State leased property that had cost €22.5 million to MLE at a nominal rent and undertook to pay €1.27 million per annum for seven years to the Higher Education Authority (HEA) in respect of collaborative research projects between MLE and Irish universities. Table 25 shows the flow of funds over the years 2000 to 2003.

Table 25

Year

MLE

MIT

€m

€m

2000

8.4

9.4

2001

10.2

1.2

2002

5.7

2003

0.6

Total

24.9

10.6

Project Evaluation

The Department of the Taoiseach assumed initial responsibility for the management of the project. Responsibility transferred to the Department of Public Enterprise in May 2001 and to the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources in June 2002. A Task Force chaired by the Department of the Taoiseach and comprising representatives of the Departments of Finance, Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Education and Science, Public Enterprise, the Office of Public Works and the agencies IDA Ireland, Enterprise Ireland, Forfás and the HEA oversaw the process which led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in December 1999.

Concerns expressed by Task Force members in their consideration of the MIT proposal included

·The high cost to be borne by the Exchequer

·The disproportionate risk being carried by the Exchequer

·The minimal exposure of MIT which would not provide any guarantee in the event of project under-performance or failure

·The uncertainty regarding the replication in Europe of the US model, particularly in the area of sponsorship income

·The perceived over-optimistic financial targets with MLE projected to be self financing within a timescale not experienced elsewhere

·The lack of clarity regarding the exact work and output of MLE, leading to doubts over whether the project would meet Ireland's strategic needs or those of MIT

·The absence of any in-depth evaluation which would establish the credibility of, and justification for, the project

·The degree to which the success of the project relied on the personal commitment of key personnel and the corporate commitment of MIT.

In the course of the project evaluation the financial statements of MITML (MIT's research laboratory based in Boston) for a period of three years were sought. There was no evidence available in Departmental papers that these were ever received.

In 2000 the Department of the Taoiseach stated that, as regards the financial issues and balance of risk, the terms of the arrangements had been the subject of detailed negotiations and that MIT believed that its reputation would be enormously damaged if MLE failed. Key MIT personnel had indicated that between 30% and 50% of their time and energy would be given to MLE. The Department of the Taoiseach also stated that the objectives of MLE made clear what the overall areas of activity would be. There would be co-operation between MIT and MLE in selecting areas of work and a proposed Liaison Committee would provide a means for Government to have influence, if necessary. The multimedia village environment would further shape the overall character of MLE and its activities.

Following an approach from the Department of the Taoiseach, a respected international consultant reviewed the MIT proposal. While no written report appears to have been received, his views are recorded in Departmental papers by way of reports of meetings and telephone conversations in July and August 1999. These indicate that he considered that MIT, with its unrivalled international reputation, was uniquely placed to establish a facility on the lines proposed. He felt that the project would be an important anchor for a strategy to position Ireland as a location for this expanding industry. He did not consider the detail of the proposed financial arrangements to be very important. While representing a premium of about 80% on providing an equivalent number of places in a third level setting, resources sought from the State would, in his opinion, be money well spent, given the direct and indirect benefits that would arise. This was conditional upon

·MIT and MLE being equal partners

·MLE securing a clear brand identification with MIT

·The guaranteed ongoing substantial commitment of key MIT personnel

·Access to MIT for MLE staff and students

·Clear agreements covering fundraising from the private sector — fundamentally a shared MIT/MLE approach to raising funds from a common pool of sponsors

·Partnership arrangements between Irish universities and MLE.

Following negotiations, a series of collaborative agreements involving the Government, MIT and MLE was signed in May 2000. The core undertakings by the parties were:

Government

·provide funding of €24.9 million to MLE and €10.6 million to MIT

·provide suitable premises to MLE at a nominal rent

·pay €1.27 million per annum for seven years to the HEA in respect of collaborative research projects between MLE and Irish universities

MIT

·provide management expertise and technical support

·provide access to intellectual property rights

·grant right of use of the MIT brand

·guarantee exclusivity regarding the location of any similar venture in Europe

·secure corporate sponsorship and private contributions for MLE

MLE

·make further payments totalling €11.3 million to MIT in respect of MIT's involvement in joint research programmes

·pay MIT a percentage of sponsorship moneys which it received from year three onwards.

A Liaison Committee, consisting mainly of Task Force members, was set up under the agreements to deal with policy issues arising during their implementation.

Addressing the Risks

In light of the MLE going into voluntary liquidation in February 2005, I asked the Accounting Officer if he was satisfied that an ex-ante evaluation commensurate with the scale and nature of the MLE project was carried out and, in particular, how the specific concerns expressed by members of the Task Force, were addressed in the agreements concluded.

He informed me that the MLE model represented a unique and innovative approach in the area of digital content R&D that played a key role in positioning Ireland in the global digital media industry, in line with the goal of Ireland's long-term economic development as a knowledge-based economy. He pointed out that, at the time the project was being considered, the ICT sector was expanding rapidly and digital media was seen as a key high-growth segment. The digital media market is still a strategically important market for Ireland in which to establish an enterprise presence.

Taking account of the significant potential benefits to Ireland, he stressed that the decision-making process, itself, which addressed the issue of whether to invest in MLE, should not have been excessively risk-averse and, at the same time, should have continued to emphasise the attractiveness of Ireland as a location for high-value, knowledge intensive economic activities. Public policy that is unduly conservative and reluctant to try innovative approaches to support economic progress nonetheless incurs an enormous, albeit unseen, opportunity cost in terms of economic development forgone.

With this in mind, he felt it was clear that the decision to invest in the MLE concept was made in the light of identified risks, which were set out by the Task Force. The innovative nature of the MLE approach meant that existing benchmarks were of limited value when considering the proposal. The advice received was positively supportive of the initiative subject to particular approaches being taken.

However, the unprecedented global downturn in the ICT industry since 2000 undermined the Media Lab concept at an early stage of development. This dramatic reduction in research by industry had a severe impact on MLE's ability to reach a critical mass of sponsorship. It subsequently came to light that the MIT Media Lab, the role model for MLE, is not self-financing in this new industry climate. Despite the downturn in the ICT sector worldwide, he considered that Ireland fared better than most and the sector has improved since. He stated that the Digital Hub itself has been hugely successful in attracting companies and MLE has been a contributor to that.

In acknowledging that the Task Force chaired by the Department of the Taoiseach did raise some concerns, he informed me that it was considered that, conditional on MIT's full commitment, the project had significant potential. A number of these concerns, such as costs, financial projections and project risks, impacted on the making of a decision by the Government on whether to proceed or not. The agreements, themselves, did not set out to address the management of the project per se. The concerns of the State relating to the management and implementation of the project were therefore addressed through the Liaison Committee on an on-going basis.

Project Monitoring

The Liaison Committee met for the first time in September 2000 and regularly thereafter.

The Department of the Taoiseach, in November and December 2000, outlined a reporting framework for MLE. This comprised annual budget and accounts, together with a quarterly report of outturns, both financial and non-financial, as measured against projected figures.

In general, MLE submitted the required information up to the end of 2003, though it was often late and regularly led to Liaison Committee demands for further information. However audited accounts for 2003 and quarterly reports for quarters two, three and four of 2004 do not appear to have been received.

MLE itself commissioned two external reviews in late 2001 and early 2002. These were forwarded to the Department and reviewed prior to being returned to the company. As copies were not retained these were not available for audit inspection. MLE also informed the Department in April 2003 that it was conducting a review of its relationship with MIT. This was not available either.

Liaison Committee Sub-Group Activity

As a result of concerns over MLE projections for years 2001 to 2005, a financial sub-group of the Liaison Committee was formed in November 2001 to review MLE performance and to establish an early warning system for the Liaison Committee regarding potential financial problems. The sub-group immediately questioned the basis of MLE projections, including those relating to sponsorship and other income, on which the success of the project greatly depended. Subsequent reviews highlighted MLE's failure to raise the required level of sponsorship and other income and the effects of the consequent cutbacks in expenditure. As early as December 2001, the sub-group posted warnings regarding the potential fallout in the event of shortfalls in sponsorship and other income, who would underwrite such deficits, and indeed, the viability of the project if downsized. In January 2002 the sub-group reported difficulty in accepting that MLE revenue targets of €49.3 million for 2002 to 2005 were attainable, and predicted a shortfall of between €10.1 million and €15.2 million for the period. These misgivings were repeatedly expressed throughout 2002 and were borne out by MLE results for that year — €2.7 million sponsorship and other income received as against an amount of €6.9 million projected in December 2001. The sub-group concluded that the level of shortfall in such a narrow forecasting period, fifteen months, undermined confidence in MLE submissions. In October 2003 and April 2004 it repeated concerns about the accuracy of financial information emanating from MLE, all the while highlighting the seriousness of MLE's situation.

The Department wrote to MLE in October 2003 requesting its views on whether MIT was discharging its obligations and questioning the financial sustainability of MLE. No reply appears to have been received. On foot of December 2003 returns showing sponsorship and other income received of €1.9 million against a projected €3.8 million, the sub-group carried out a Status of Business review in April 2004. The review

·noted MLE's failure to achieve any of the income projections contained in its budgets from its establishment to 2004

·predicted that MLE cash reserves would run out in early 2005

·concluded that the time lag between initial start-up and the successful generation of sponsorship and other income to a level necessary to create a viable entity was far greater than originally imagined

·stated that, while the Exchequer was the main funding source for MLE, the Board was under effective MIT control and decisions were taken without reference to the Exchequer

·noted that substantial severance payments had been made to executives at a time of serious cash constraints

·concluded that the existing MLE model was patently not viable.

Review of MLE's Strategic Plan 2004

In response to a request in February 2004 from the Liaison Committee, MLE prepared a Strategic Plan.

The plan, which was received in May 2004, acknowledged the shortfall in corporate revenue and sought additional Exchequer funding of €9 million. The Department's initial assessment of the plan was that it appeared to be predicated on a level of performance not yet seen from MLE. An action timetable was drawn up pending a review of the plan and MLE performance to date by consultants engaged by the Department.

The review carried out in June 2004, concluded that

·MLE would run out of cash in 2005 without further funding

·MLE had failed to meet any of the income forecasts contained in the original ten year indicative projections and in the budgets set out at the start of 2002 and 2003.

·The plan envisaged a further funding requirement of €9m for MLE to reach long-term sustainability. Failure to achieve any of the assumptions underlying the plan could result in a funding requirement significantly greater than this.

·No operating surplus was forecast until 2009

·The forecast growth in operating cash inflows appeared unrealistically high

·The plan provided limited information on cost assumptions and how they incorporated many of the future activities identified

·Before providing any new funding to MLE the Department should give very careful consideration to the likely benefits, and the value for money, of such new funding and the sustainability of MLE in its current form..

Performance Review — September 2004

The Department commissioned an assessment of MLE's performance towards achieving its founding mission and objectives. This exercise was carried out in September 2004 by a consultant and was based on performance indicators supplied by MLE and high-level interviews.

MLE was considered to be a unique establishment, being different to the mainstream research and innovation infrastructure existing in Ireland. To best address the performance of MLE in relation to the creation of new knowledge, and the economic and social impact of the investment, indicators derived from its founding objectives were used. The study found that the evidence available suggested that the MIT approach to fundraising and sponsorship could not be replicated in the Irish environment. It concluded that MLE was not sustainable in its current form without significant and continued Exchequer funding.

The study assessed MLE performance against the following founding objectives

·Establishing Scientific and Technological Leadership

·Stimulating Increased Research and Development Investment

·Attracting High Quality Inward Investment and Human Capital

·Supporting Enterprise Development

·Supporting High Quality Human Capital Formation

·Collaborating with Institutions and Development Agencies

·Providing a Forum for International Exchange and Discussion.

Consultant's Findings

Working closely with its MIT connections, it was expected that MLE would fast track the build up of internet and digital media research and innovation capabilities and quickly establish an international scientific reputation for Ireland in this sector. However the consultant found that the scientific output of the laboratory could only be described as dismal with just 24 publications in international scientific literature since establishment. Productivity appeared to be very low — 15 refereed papers from 172 person years of research. Assuming MLE was not motivated towards publication of its work, it was difficult to see what alternative path towards international recognition in the world of science and technology was available or was being pursued by MLE.

It was intended that MLE would act as a stimulus for investment in R&D, attracting high levels of commercial sponsorship and winning research grants and contracts, nationally and internationally. Only 12 sponsorship agreements valued at €7 million were signed. For a laboratory of its size, and with its prestigious brand backing, this appeared to be a relatively poor outcome. There was virtually no research grant or contract income and it appeared none was being sought. Given the weakness of the sponsorship model in Ireland, it was difficult to understand why alternative sources of funding were not being more vigorously pursued.

It was expected that the MLE presence would help win additional high quality foreign investment and high skill enterprise for Ireland as well as attracting mobile, high quality human capital. However the impact of MLE under this objective appeared to be quite marginal. The company appeared to be of only peripheral value in the drive for foreign investment. It was expected that MLE would strengthen the prospects for emerging indigenous companies in digital media as well as providing a source for spin-offs and new start-ups emanating from the laboratory and its faculty. It was also hoped that MLE would engage Irish small and medium sized enterprise in its work. The study found that MLE's activities appeared to be having little or no impact on the development of existing indigenous enterprise or on the stimulation of new technology based start-ups or spin-offs from its research. There appeared to have been no collaborative projects of any kind or technology transfer agreements with either indigenous or multinational companies. There was little evidence of engagement with small firms in the Digital Hub with no migration of any MLE project into the Digital Hub and no immediate prospect of that happening.

MLE was expected to help in the training of Irish and European graduates and post graduates by providing research experience and formal academic qualifications with the MIT imprimatur. The laboratory was also expected to contribute to the teaching capabilities of Irish higher education institutions. However MLE appeared to be making little more than a token contribution to this objective with no appreciable engagement in education and training programmes of Irish third level institutions. Of serious concern was the lack of a formal degree-granting arrangement with MIT. An MIT based Masters programme was due to be introduced for the first time in 2004. It had been anticipated that the attraction of the MIT connection would bring in top students, nationally and internationally, to the laboratory.

It was expected that MLE would work co-operatively with development agencies and universities and other educational institutions in Ireland. Apart from collaboration under the HEA-funded research scheme with individual researchers in the universities, there was little evidence that MLE engaged in any significant way with either educational institutions or development agencies.

The ambition was that MLE would provide an attractive conference site that would help to bring together creative thinkers and innovators from around the world. Only eleven MLE international conferences (non-research) were held in the period under review.

Consultant's Conclusions

The consultant found that, after significant investment and more than four years of operation, the potential of this project seemed to be very far from realisation. The aggregate picture suggested that MLE was making very poor progress. The contribution of MLE in relation to its founding objectives appeared to be zero or very close to it, with little hope that it would meet its commitments in respect of these, even in the long term. The quantitative indicators pointed, in the consultant's opinion, to a flawed and largely failed entity in urgent need of remedial attention. Possible reasons underlying the laboratory's difficulties were the inappropriateness of the business model, management and governance failures and staff morale and motivation It was possible that the founding objectives were too ambitious and unrealistic in scope. It was expecting too much to have a self-funding operation at MLE in three years. As far as the Digital Hub was concerned, MLE's presence was felt to have a crucial role to play in driving ambitions for development of the Liberties area and the creation of Dublin's media zone. As indicated, MLE's contribution to these objectives had been marginal. The study also noted a negative perception regarding the quality of Board governance at MLE, including the frequency of, and attendance at, Board meetings.

Having regard to the findings of these reviews I asked the Accounting Officer if he was satisfied that the structures and arrangements put in place to oversee and monitor MLE were effective.

He replied that, in the first instance, the Chairman and the Board have responsibility for the effective and proper management of a company. The corporate governance model of MLE was unique in that the Board comprised three MIT nominations, three Government nominations and three joint nominations with the Chair being held by MIT. He pointed out that MLE was a unique arrangement based on a not-for- profit company with no shareholders and, as such, the more common governance arrangements of a semi-state commercial body would not have been appropriate and, therefore, did not apply. Oversight of MLE by the Government was the function of the Liaison Committee. The oversight role of the Liaison Committee was circumscribed by the agreements in place between the Government and MLE. In this context, there were limited actions that could be taken under the agreement but the Liaison Committee did monitor the financial performance of MLE effectively and, on foot of this, it communicated its views and sought further information and clarification from MLE. As a result of this oversight role, the Liaison Committee requested a Strategic Plan from MLE in February 2004 when it became clear that it was not performing adequately. This on-going monitoring by the Liaison Committee led in turn to a review of the business status of MLE and ultimately to the decision not to provide further funding.

Given that a key contribution from MIT related to securing corporate sponsorship and private contributions for MLE I also asked the Accounting Officer if any consideration was given to linking payments to MIT to the achievement of sponsorship targets as set out in the Memorandum of Understanding and specific deliverables.

He informed me that there is no evidence that consideration was given to linking payments to MIT to achievement of sponsorship targets. He stated that linkage to performance must be carefully considered in the early stage set-up of an entity in order to facilitate it reaching sustainability. Furthermore, the selection of performance criteria, which are based on the performance of an on-going, established entity, could be damaging in this start-up context. However, in the review that the Department undertook, and subsequent negotiations with MIT in the latter half of 2004, the linking of payments to specific deliverables was a key condition of a revised agreement.

MLE Closure

At meetings with MLE and MIT during June and July 2004 the Department conveyed its views that the business plan was low on substance and high on expectation and that MLE had produced no evidence as to how expected growth would translate into greatly increased sponsorship. MLE confirmed that cash would be exhausted by February 2005, that it had introduced pay freezes and had corrected ineffective expenditure, and cited, inter alia, recent changes in MLE management and overall improvements in the economy as the basis for strategic plan figures.

The Department

·expressed the view that Ireland had not received what it had originally expected from the contracts entered into

·asserted that MIT had not delivered on all its obligations under the contracts

·stated that there was a consistent feedback regarding a lack of engagement by MLE with the university sector

·argued that the lack of educational qualifications such as Masters and PhDs meant that MLE had become a paid work experience for students

·pointed out that MIT had continued to draw down payments from MLE despite the latter's serious financial situation

·stated that questions had been raised about the management and organisational ability at MLE.

Departmental papers indicate that MIT

·accepted that the original model for MLE was deeply flawed

·accepted that the initial business plan had failed

·accepted that MLE in its current form was unsustainable

·stated that as a freestanding activity, pure non-directed research was not viable

·would not defend the structures, the management or the way of doing business at MLE

·explained that MIT paid its faculty staff working at MITML.

However MIT re-emphasised its commitment to MLE.

The Department expressed concern at the revelation that MIT had paid its faculty staff working at MITML as the model that was sold to the Government was one that purported to be self-financing and it was the uniqueness of the model that helped get the third level institutions in Ireland reluctantly on board. The Department also asserted that it was now clear that, at the time of the agreements, MIT did not have the agreement of staff to offer their services to MLE and that, consequently, MLE had to pay for many of these fellowships on a consultancy basis.

With agreement on both sides that MLE could not continue in its current format, negotiations commenced regarding a restructured entity as a university-based research and innovation laboratory. MIT would not consider the repayment of any portion of the moneys advanced to it under the original agreements. The Department suggested a structure that altered unsatisfactory elements of the existing MLE. These centred on the areas of governance and the need for more specific commitment to academic awards and finance. The proposal did envisage further Exchequer funding.

Ultimately, negotiations failed with MIT unwilling to accept the Government terms. The Department informed MLE that it was unwilling to advance further funding and, in January 2005, it was announced that MLE would go into voluntary liquidation. I have been informed that the liquidation will be ongoing until January or February 2006. It is considered likely that, in addition to equipment, there will be a cash surplus of approximately €300,000 after liquidation. Under the terms of the agreements, this will be used for charitable, scientific or educational purposes and could be made available to the proposed National Digital Research Centre.

Compliance with Collaborative Agreements

In March 2004, a review of compliance with the agreements was carried out at the request of the Secretary General. It found that the Government had complied in the areas of finance, property and the Liaison Committee. It concluded in regard to degree-granting programmes that, aside from collaborative projects, progress on formal academic linkages with Irish universities had been slow. In respect of project review mechanisms, which allowed for changes in MLE funding arrangements in certain circumstances, it concluded that, while MLE had experienced a significant shortfall in revenue, it appeared to have adjusted its operating and capital budgets to take account of this, thus complying with the agreement.

The review found that, aside from the slow progress regarding degree-granting programmes, MLE had complied with the agreements with the exception of the late submission to the Department of required reports and documentation. In respect of MIT's agreements obligations, MLE had confirmed that gifts of €4.4 million, secured by MIT, had been received by it. No share of variable sponsorship, as set out in the agreements, had been received from MIT. MLE also confirmed that MIT had complied with personnel commitments, including the attendance of key personnel for the requisite number of days set down in the agreement.

A legal report, commissioned by the Department in November 2004, concluded that, in the event of a liquidation

·The Government had met its obligations under the agreements and no further obligations to MLE, MIT or any other body could be identified

·State exposure could arise if the Government had issued any letters of comfort or guarantees to banks, employees or third parties who had contracted with MLE. However the Department has confirmed that no such arrangements exist

·The Government was not a member of the company and was not, therefore, exposed to any potential liquidation liabilities.

I asked the Accounting Officer if he was satisfied that MIT had complied with all its obligations under the agreements concluded.

He replied that, in a legal sense, MIT had complied. A key role for MIT was to assist in getting sponsorship and this was not successful. It was disappointing that it was not possible to say that MIT took a more holistic perspective of the project. MIT's unwillingness to help fund the continuation of the project (although not required in the agreements) and its failure to participate financially with the Department in efforts to review and restructure MLE were disappointing since MIT itself supported the Strategic Plan submitted in May 2004.

Other Issues

Governance

A Departmental review of the MLE 2001 accounts highlighted an average salary cost, before PRSI, of €76,000. This was considered quite significant as, while high cost executive directors were included, so too were lower cost research scholars. During its short existence MLE employed four different Chief Executive Officers/Managing Directors. It is understood that severance packages were agreed for those who left MLE before contract completion.

I asked for details of

·staff numbers employed by MLE by year

·average salary cost per staff member by year

·annual remuneration of each Chief Executive Officer/ Managing Director and

·severance packages agreed in respect of each departing Chief Executive Officer/Managing Director.

The Accounting Officer informed me that the Department has requested this information on a number of occasions but, to date, the Company Secretary has refused to release this information.

Exclusivity

The Spanish Government contacted the Department in 2001 stating that MIT had approached it with a view to setting up a Media Lab in Spain. Following protests from the Department, the proposal appears to have been dropped. MIT denied that they had made any approach and stated that any discussions it had related to a Latin American based laboratory.

A joint MIT/Cambridge University project, partly funded by the UK Government, was not considered to be in breach of MIT/Government agreement in terms of exclusivity of operation.

Positive Outcomes

The Accounting Officer stated that there were some positive aspects to the MLE project. The interdisciplinary and demonstration ethos of MLE attracted significant international interest and the presence of MLE facilitated the growth of the Digital Hub in attracting enterprises to the area. There are approximately 50 companies located in the Digital Hub, employing over 400 people. He stated that at this stage of the Digital Hub's development, it is believed that the termination of MLE will have a negligible impact on the immediate performance of the project. However, the Government remains convinced that a high quality research and development centre, with a clearer commercial focus and educational remit, is necessary for the long-term development of a digital media industry in Ireland and particularly for the cluster based in the Digital Hub.

The collaborative research projects with students from Irish third-level institutions were also very successful. These had been independently reviewed by the HEA on behalf of the Department. The reviews had been positive and the scheme was seen as one of the successful aspects of the MLE project.

There was a very positive social benefit to the local community. There was also an on-going initiative providing children from disadvantaged areas with the opportunity to experience and to learn from digital technology.

He stated that presently it is not possible to ascribe a monetary value to the research work that was being undertaken in MLE at the date of closure. However, this was not to say that the relevant intellectual properties arising from MLE do not have value. At present, Enterprise Ireland is assessing approximately twelve items of intellectual property.

Lessons Learned

The Accounting Officer stated that it is important that the termination of the MLE project should not suggest a public policy that is adverse to innovation and measured risk-taking. Instead, Ireland must continue to work towards a public policy framework that is conducive to innovation and risk-taking in order to ensure that Ireland continues to be an attractive location of new enterprise development, foreign investment, and value-creating industries.

In the context of a project such as MLE, which is fundamentally a concept to promote multi-disciplinary research, development and innovation in this case in the digital media sector, it is clear that appropriate project evaluation is critical. The evaluation process needs to be rigorous. However, an evaluation process must be flexible and relevant where unique and ground-breaking proposals are being considered. In this light, a clear business strategy for the project is necessary in order to test its robustness. All parties should be expected to have some financial commitments in a project and the rewards should be linked to the risks taken.

At a broader level, governance, in terms of accountability, reporting, and strategic decision-taking, is critical. These governance structures should be appropriate to the type of project and while not necessarily a semi-state company governance structure, they should ensure that there is clear accountability and good governance. Finally, performance is central to the delivery of these publicly funded projects and, as such, payments should be linked to particular performance milestones or metrics.

Mr. John Purcell

Chapter 11.1 sets out the circumstances leading up to the establishment of Media Lab Europe in May 2000 and its performance over the next four and a half years before it went into liquidation earlier this year. The operation of the company was governed by a series of collaborative agreements involving the Government, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the company itself. On foot of these agreements, the State made payments totalling €35.5 million, that is, €10.6 million directly to MIT and €24.9 million to the company. It also made a property which had cost €22.5 million available to the company for its operations at a nominal rent. For MIT's part, it was to provide management expertise and technical support, as well as helping to secure sponsorship and private contributions for the venture. It was envisaged that the level of sponsorship would grow as Media Lab Europe's reputation and output increased with the expectation that the company would become self-sufficient in due course.

The nature of the work to be undertaken by the company, variously called blue sky or non-directive research, meant that it was an inherently high risk venture. This was recognised by those on the State task force and concern was expressed by members of that body about the disproportionate risk to be borne by the Exchequer. However, despite this concern and other misgivings outlined on pages 84 and 85 of my report, it was ultimately decided to go ahead with the project in view of the potential benefits that would accrue to the economy. Unfortunately, the initial period of operations coincided with a severe downturn in the technology market, with a consequential negative effect on attracting sponsorship for research. In this regard, the liaison committee monitoring the project on behalf of the State noted at an early stage that the company was not achieving its funding targets.

Over the following two years or so it became clear to the committee that the company's financial projections of sponsorship were consistently over-optimistic. By the end of 2003 serious questions were being raised about the financial sustainability of the company and these led to a demand for a strategic plan. Once this was received, the Department appointed financial consultants in May 2004 to review the plan and later commissioned an expert in the field to carry out an assessment of the company's performance against its funding objectives. The financial review confirmed that the company would be unable to implement a strategic plan without significant further funding from the State, was highly critical of the company's performance and very pessimistic about its prospects.

In the light of these findings, the State engaged with MIT in an attempt to come up with an agreed formula for financing and redirecting the research effort but the negotiations came to nought as agreement could not be reached on a mutually acceptable business model. As I understand it, the liquidation which is ongoing will yield a small surplus. The value, if any, of intellectual property rights is unclear.

It would be very easy to look back at this failed venture and conclude with hindsight that it was never a runner, but that would be over-simplistic. There are risks associated with innovative projects and it is always difficult to balance outcomes that cannot be confidently predicted against clear risks of failure or under-achievement. I would like to make a few observations on this score.

There are very few golden rules when it comes to testing the robustness of ground-breaking projects of this sort where it is not feasible to draw up a conventional supporting business case and we are often left, as the Department was in this case, in a take it or leave it situation. That said, it is usually possible to reduce the risk, although only to a certain degree, but having done so, the next step is to manage the risk with which one is left. To do so, it appears one must, at a minimum, obtain a firm commitment from the other party, underpinned by it putting its money where its mouth is. That did not happen in this case. In fact, MIT was guaranteed substantial payments, regardless of the outcome of the project.

The other point I would make is that the contractual arrangements must be such that the funding body is put in a position where it can have an appropriate measure of control or oversight to enable it reshape the project and, if necessary, stop the financing in the event of serious under-performance. Again, in this case, the Department, despite being aware of the difficulties at an early stage, found that it could not make a meaningful intervention until all the money had been paid over and its support was needed for the project's continued existence.

Will Mr. Tuohy make his opening statement on chapter 11?

Mr. Tuohy

I have given a detailed statement and will give a summary, if that is agreeable.

Mr. Tuohy

The Media Lab Europe model represented a unique, innovative and world class approach in the area of digital content research and development. It would play a key role in positioning Ireland in the global digital media industry, in line with the goal of Ireland's long-term economic development as a knowledge based economy. It is sometimes difficult to appreciate the sheer scale of the information communications and technology sector and its importance in providing employment in Ireland. Latest figures report that the Irish ICT sector as a whole employed over 80,000 people in 2002. Moreover, the sector's turnover in 2002 was €49 billion or over one fifth of that of the whole economy.

Digital media represents a new generation of economic development based on knowledge, skills and creativity. Ireland is in transition from a low cost, manufacturing centre to a high value, knowledge based economy. Therefore, the digital media market is a strategically important one for Ireland in which to establish a strong enterprise presence. It is estimated that the global market for digital media products and services will be in the order of $700 billion before the end of this decade. A report released just two weeks ago by PricewaterhouseCoopers in Dublin forecasts that the global video games and digital music markets each will be worth about $55 billion by 2009. Taking account of the significant potential benefits to Ireland, it was important that the decision making process itself which addressed the issue of whether to invest in MLE should not have been excessively risk averse and, at the same time, should have continued to emphasise the attractiveness of Ireland as a location for high value, knowledge intensive economic activities.

It is important to recognise that public policy that is unduly conservative and reluctant to try innovative approaches to support economic progress nonetheless incurs an enormous, albeit unseen, opportunity cost in terms of economic development forgone. It was in this context that the Government took the decision in November 1999 to invest €35.5 million to establish Media Lab Europe. That decision was based on a deliberative process lasting over nine months which involved key public policy stakeholders covering communications, education, enterprise and finance policy areas, including the industrial development agencies, in an ad hoc steering group, as well as the views of external sources.

The broad consensus was that Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT — MIT Media Lab in particular — was a world leading facility with an unrivalled international reputation that could make a significant contribution to Ireland's efforts to position itself in the global digital media industry. In return for the State's investment of €35 million, MIT Media Lab was contributing its organisational and fund-raising expertise, international reputation and brand, access to its intellectual property and partnership exclusivity in Europe for ten years. It was recognised from the start, however, that the MLE proposal was not risk free for both parties. The State investment was at risk if the project did not succeed. Similarly, MIT's international reputation or brand would be damaged, with implications for its future ability to raise corporate funding for research and development. On balance, the Government made a decision to invest having regard to the long-term economic and employment benefits outweighing the potential risks of an unsuccessful project.

The unprecedented global downturn in the ICT industry occurred in the period after early 2000. The scale of that downturn undermined the Media Lab model at an early stage of its development in Dublin and it became increasingly difficult to attract corporate sponsorship for research and development. It is worth recalling the scale of the downturn. Large ICT manufacturers and service providers sharply curtailed their research and development activities in the face of financial challenges from 2000 onwards. The severity of the slowdown in the ICT industry is illustrated by OECD figures indicating that shipments of ICT equipment declined by more than 30%. The value of ICT venture capital investment declined by over 50% in the 2000-01 period. This gives an indication of the reduction in available funding for new and innovative projects. The crisis in the technology sector is reflected in an almost 70% reduction in the value of the Nasdaq Stock Exchange between 2000 and 2001. The priority for many ICT companies became survival as opposed to exploring new growth opportunities.

In addition, the business attitude to the model of non-directed research changed during the 2000 to 2004 period. It may have been accelerated by the economic downturn. As companies attempted to correct their financial position, corporate research and development focused more and more on the commercialisation of research. Unfortunately, Media Lab Europe failed to adapt sufficiently quickly to the new environment. By late 2001, just over one year into MLE's operations, the Government liaison committee had expressed concerns about the finances of MLE. However, it was clear to the Department by 2003 that MLE was significantly under-performing. Corporate income was significantly below projections. It is disappointing that MLE appeared not to display the ability to work its way quickly enough through the difficult environment, even though this would have meant a re-evaluation of the basic business model of the organisation and probably a new strategic direction. However, its strategic plan was based on certain assumptions, including revenue growth in the order of 32%, a rate that it had never achieved previously.

The Department was also disappointed with the level of MIT's commitment to MLE, particularly its unwillingness to commit finances to a restructured company. The new strategic plan required €9 million over three years in Government funding. In contrast, MIT would receive payments of over €11 million in the period 2004 to 2010, having already received almost €22 million since the foundation of MLE. Furthermore, a financial analysis of the strategic plan suggested that the Government funding requirement could be as high as €35 million if the optimistic assumptions for revenue were not met. In the latter part of 2004 the State attempted to negotiate a restructuring of MLE to place it on a long-term viable path. It was disappointing MIT did not show a willingness to agree to key issues for the Government, including commercially driven research and a commitment of MIT funding for MLE.

In any company, the chairman and board have responsibility for its effective and proper management. Oversight of MLE by the Government was the function of the liaison committee. The oversight role of the liaison committee was circumscribed by the agreements in place between the Government and MLE. In this context, there were limited actions that could be taken under the agreement but the liaison committee did monitor the financial performance of MLE which led ultimately to the decision not to provide further funding.

There were some positive aspects to the MLE project. The lab attracted significant international interest and the presence of MLE facilitated the early growth of the digital hub. There are now approximately 50 companies located there. A number of collaborative research projects with students from Irish third level institutions were also successful. There was a positive social benefit to the local community with the establishment of the Intel clubhouse in the grounds of MLE.

It is important that the closure of MLE should not suggest a public policy that is adverse to innovation and measured risk-taking. A public policy framework that is conducive to innovation and risk-taking is necessary to ensure Ireland continues to be an attractive location for new enterprise and foreign investment. In the context of a project such as MLE which is fundamentally a concept to promote multi-disciplinary research, development and innovation in the digital media sector, it is clear appropriate project evaluation is critical. The evaluation process must be rigorous but also flexible and relevant where unique and ground-breaking proposals are being considered. In this light, a clear business strategy for the project is necessary to test its robustness. All parties should be expected to have some financial commitments in a project and the rewards should be linked to the risks taken.

At a broader level, governance, in terms of accountability, reporting and strategic decision-making, is critical. Appropriate governance structures should be put in place to ensure the management, performance and direction of a project are in line with objectives of public policy and the environment in which it must operate. Performance is central to delivery of these publicly funded projects and, as such, payments should be linked to particular performance milestones or metrics.

May we publish the statement?

Mr. Tuohy

Yes.

The wider statement circulated or just the summary.

Mr. Tuohy

Both, if the committee wishes.

To ensure everything relevant is in the public domain, does the committee agree to the publication of the submission from Massachusetts Institute of Technology? Agreed. Deputy Hayes is the first questioner, followed by Deputy Ardagh.

Where did the concept of Media Lab Europe originate?

Mr. Tuohy

It came from a number of groups in place at the time, from the Information Society Commission and others. Generally, there was an idea that this would be an important area for the economy and that we needed to get into it. We did not have a tradition in it and it was evolving and developing. Looking around the world, people wondered who was doing this type of thing. Media Lab and MIT came to the fore as two of the few which were doing this. MIT has a strong track record. In its statement to the committee it outlines its reputation, Nobel laureates and so forth. Nobody would dispute its pre-eminence in the engineering and technology sector worldwide.

There was a feeling that with this being such an important area and with our track record in software technology and creativity, which is where this comes together, it was an area in which we needed to get involved. The second consideration was broadly the need for innovation which was going to be very important for the economy in the future. The economy grew by 70% in the 1990s and the productivity within this was phenomenal by any standards. However, where were we going to grow in the next decade if we could not get into some of these spaces?

We were also challenged by what was taking place. Media Lab was in discussions with Asia and India. It subsequently set up a laboratory there. MIT was in discussions with Cambridge in the United Kingdom and set up a laboratory there also. It was not the same as Media Lab Europe but a broad one on innovation and competitiveness. The Asian laboratory closed before ours did and the MIT Cambridge laboratory in which the British Government invested over £65 million was earlier this year seeking another £29 million to keep going. In other words, the same problems that occurred with MLE occurred in other jurisdictions.

In the late 1990s everybody was looking at the technology sector as the big growth area. I gave the figures for how it turned within 12 months. There was a 67% drop in the Nasdaq. It was a huge change which nobody could have predicted. However, the model of getting people into the country interested in establishing a leadership position was one we had used in the past. We did it in financial services when we set up the IFSC. We also did it in electronics, software, pharmaceuticals and now in bio-pharmaceuticals. We have always chosen areas but this was one that, unfortunately and due to a set of circumstances outlined by both the Comptroller and Auditor General and me, did not work out as well as it could have.

To whom was it first presented? Where is the first presentation for the Media Lab Europe concept?

Mr. Tuohy

I believe a committee was set up. As it was not under my Department at the time, I was not directly involved. I was a member of a committee of officials from different Departments but that was in 1999. There was a nine month period of discussions. The Information Society Commission made inputs, as did the different agencies. It was a series of discussions. The Department of the Taoiseach took the lead in pulling it together and involving the different agencies and Departments — the Department of Education and Science, the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, IDA, Enterprise Ireland, the HEA and ourselves. The Department considered it an interesting idea and that was how it originated. That is how many ideas originate — they are talked around the system.

Who made the decision to proceed with it?

Mr. Tuohy

MIT Media Lab made a proposal to the Department of the Taoiseach.

Therefore, it emanated from the Department of the Taoiseach.

Mr. Tuohy

No, it originated with MIT making a proposal to the Department of the Taoiseach. The Department had a co-ordinating role. It also had responsibility for information society issues. This was broadly seen in that space.

Therefore, the decision to proceed was taken by the Department of the Taoiseach.

Mr. Tuohy

The decision to proceed was taken by the Government. This went to the Government, as the Comptroller and Auditor General says in his report. A steering committee was set up involving all the different Departments and agencies. There was a nine month period of debate and discussion. It is clear from the Comptroller and Auditor General's report that the pros and cons were clearly put. There was a huge upside if it worked out right and a downside, particularly a financial downside, if it did not. One weighs up the two sides and decides.

This was such a hugely important sector for the economy and an important sector to get into. Time has shown that as an economy we have moved in this space very well. I can give the committee a list of the companies which have come into the country, and the digital hub, since that time. This was put to Government in the normal way over a period of time. It was thought that Media Lab Europe would be one part of this but within the broader area of the digital hub which is about a nine acre site in the Liberties. This would be a major part in the old Guinness hop store.

It was in difficulty several times in its lifetime. How many reports were received?

Mr. Tuohy

I have a list I can go through.

I want to know how many reports were received, when the trouble was flagged and why the matter dragged on.

Mr. Tuohy

I will go through the list quickly, if that is okay.

In February 1999 the first proposal was received from MIT. In March-April 1999 the ad hoc steering committee was set up. In April 1999 the first draft memorandum of understanding, MOU, was prepared. In May-June 1999 discussions took place between the steering group and MIT. In July 1999 the Government made its first decision indicating a willingness, in principle, to establish MLE but a lot of other issues needed to be negotiated.

In the summer of 1999 we continued to appoint our own international advisers and a steering group. From September to November 1999 a series of meetings between the steering group and MIT took place. A Government decision was taken on 30 November to proceed with MLE on the basis of an MOU to establish a task force and to broadly consider this concept of the digital hub in that context. From December 1999 to May 2000 a series of legal contracts had to be drawn up. This, effectively, took seven months to complete.

In February 2000 there was a Government decision to approve funding for MLE. On 11 May 2000 the collaborative agreements were signed. The Government liaison committee met for the first time after the summer of 2000. Responsibility transferred to the Department of Public Enterprise in May 2001. MLE commissioned an external review in late 2001 which was made available. The financial group and the Government liaison group were concerned about some of the income figures not coming up to the level expected.

At what stage was that?

Mr. Tuohy

December 2001. They were the first indications. One must position this in the context of what was happening in the markets at the time, which I outlined. In early 2002 MLE conducted a second review of itself. Responsibility transferred to the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources in June 2002. In April 2003 MLE conducted a review of its relationship with MIT to make sure MIT was doing what it said it would do. In October 2003 we asked MLE whether MIT was discharging its obligations and questioned the financial sustainability of MLE. This had come from the Government liaison committee to the Department. In late 2003 we were getting more worried about the projections not being met. In early 2004 more information was received and we specifically requested a strategic plan — effectively, a revival plan to see where the company was going. We received this in May 2004 but were not happy with what we had been given. I outlined some of the concerns we had about some of the assumptions made in it. We were looking at growth rates which had never been achieved and we were not prepared to accept this. We were not prepared to accept the MIT commitment.

We got into a series of discussions. We commissioned an external evaluation of the plan by financial advisers and had a review done of the quality of the work done in Media Lab, that is, the Tom Higgins's review which we made available to it and is referred to the Comptroller and Auditor General's report. We entered final discussions in late 2004 and put various proposals but MIT was not prepared to move on certain issues. We were also not prepared to move. It was not a shareholding company but a company formed by agreement between three parties which the members decided to put into voluntary liquidation.

What was the role of the Department of Finance? Did it have any input? Normally it decides whether projects can or cannot go ahead. At what stage did it get involved?

Mr. Tuohy

The Department of Finance was involved from day one as part of the Government liaison committee.

It allowed all this to go ahead.

Mr. Tuohy

To be fair to the Department of Finance, a Government decision was taken to allow the project to go ahead. On the revenue issue, I have explained the background to what happened in the markets which was unprecedented. The revenue stream did not come up to size. The type of research which would normally have been expected to be done was not being done. Commitments were given in the contract. I used the phrase in the submission to the Comptroller and Auditor General. It was not like a normal State company into which one could go to do things. We did not have that level of control.

Would Mr. Byrne like to comment on the role of the Department of Finance?

Mr. Byrne

I reiterate what the Secretary General said. The Department of Finance was involved from an earlier stage in the run-up to the decision by the Government. We would have raised a number of concerns, all of which would have been put on the table. After the decision was taken, MLE was established. The Secretary General mentioned the establishment of the liaison committee, on which we were represented. Clearly, we would have been actively involved with our colleagues in the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources in raising issues, expressing concerns and insisting on various uncertainties being clarified in the presentation of a strategic plan and so forth. We raised issues in an appropriate way throughout.

Who was on the board?

Mr. Tuohy

There were nine people on the board, three of whom were nominated by MIT, three by the Government, while three were jointly agreed. There were slight changes over time.

MIT had control of the board.

Mr. Tuohy

MIT had the chair, which was part of the agreement from day one. The chairman, Mr. Nicholas Negroponte, was from MIT. He was also the founder of MIT Media Lab in the United States. On the Irish side, there were a number of eminent people, as were the joint appointees who were international.

Who were the members of the initial board?

Mr. Tuohy

The MIT nominees included Mr. Nicholas Negroponte, MIT; Professor Larry Bacow, head of MIT, and Mr. Bob Metcalfe, founder of 3Com and ex-MIT. The Government nominees included Ms Ann Riordan, ex-Microsoft — some members would know her as she headed up the Irish Microsoft operation — Mr. Danny O'Hare, former president of DCU, and Mr. Denis O'Brien, ex-Esat at the time. The joint nominees included Mr. Kjeld Kristiansen, the head of Lego, and Ms Carly Fiorina who was head of Hewlett Packard but has since retired.

There were changes to the board at different stages. Bono from U2 was appointed and subsequently replaced by Mr. David Evans, the Edge, from U2. Mr. Matti Packalén was appointed. He is well known in Finland and became co-chair in August 2004 with Mr. Nicholas Negroponte. Professor Phil Clay replaced Professor Larry Bacow. When Professor Bacow retired from MIT, Professor Clay was chancellor. Professor Bill Mitchell who was dean of the engineering and architecture faculty at MIT was brought on board, representing MIT as a nominee.

On corporate funding, it gave a commitment to raise so much money. I found that it was also fundraising for itself. Will Mr. Tuohy clarify this?

Mr. Tuohy

There was a commitment given in the contract, or the legal agreement, that it would assist with fundraising. Obviously, it was also fundraising for MIT.

At the same time.

Mr. Tuohy

Yes, but it would not have had access to considerable European funding. There were some companies funding MIT and I think it saw an opportunity where Media Lab Europe would draw on companies in Europe. What happened subsequently was that there was a downturn.

There are two points to remember about MIT as it also states in its own submission. It is very committed to non-directive research, in other words, blue sky research. In its submission to this committee it quotes one of its eminent physicists, a Nobel laureate, that innovation comes from non-directive research. What happened in the 2000-2001 period was that businesses moved back out of that space and stated they needed to commercialise what they had and were merely surviving. That was the environment.

It gave a commitment to assist with fundraising. There were no specific targets set as to what it would do, a matter about which it was very strong, as the committee will see in the contracts, but there was little fundraising. The initial fundraising to which it refers in its own document centred on two donations — Mr. Denis O'Brien put up £2 million on day one, while Eircom also put in some money. Other companies and organisations then got involved. The committee can see this in the accounts but it did not match what had been projected.

When it came to looking at the strategy in 2004, given its history, we were not prepared to sign off on future projections of approximately 30% compound aggregate growth rates for revenue when it did not have a track record of achieving such rates. There are two elements: the initial stage and the subsequent negotiation of the new contract. From our point of view, having built on our own experience, we were clear that we were not prepared to sign off on certain issues.

Was a view from the Irish universities sought?

Mr. Tuohy

Yes. A view was also sought from the Department of Education and Science and the HEA. Some were very vociferous in stating the money should go to Irish universities. On the other hand, when we put aside €1.25 million for collaborative projects with Irish universities, they turned out exceptionally well. An evaluation done by the HEA was very positive.

To put the matter in context, at the time one was effectively trying to take a quantum leap. It is difficult to build an international reputation in this space. I can remember being involved on some of the visits made to the United States with IDA Ireland. As soon as Media Lab announced it was going to set up in Ireland, there was huge interest among many multinational companies in Ireland. It had a huge beacon effect. This is not captured in Dr. Higgins's evaluation because he was not asked to do this but one must contextualise the matter, that one is fighting for international foreign direct investment and that, within this, one must take different initiatives, some of which will work out, while some will not. One positive outcome was that people said if MIT was doing something, it must be of interest. There were a number of groups which came through MLE to see what was going on and wished to be part of it, but when it came to putting money into it, the model and market changed. In a different environment it may well have worked successfully.

Was it the right decision to go ahead with MLE at the time? Subject to the lessons learned on governance and risk management matters outlined by the Comptroller and Auditor General, would Mr. Tuohy go ahead with an analogous project today?

Mr. Tuohy

As the Deputy is aware, I am not allowed to comment on policy matters. If I may talk around them, at the time one was looking at an evolving global market and nobody disputed the potential. At the same time nobody knew the abyss that lay ahead in 2000 when the technology bubble burst. In the past we have been successful in being ahead of the curve; as a country, we have been able to take initiatives and opportunities and get ahead of the posse. In other areas — maybe in this one also — that is what we were looking at. We saw the space and bearing in mind the risks a decision was taken, as the Deputy will see in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report.

We are putting a national digital research centre in its place. We have a competition running and are down to two consortia of universities and colleges. Therefore, we still think it is an important area in which there is significant potential but we are doing it in a different way due to the lessons we have learned.

That is interesting. Did Mr. Tuohy find that the demise of MLE resulted in a void that was badly in need of being filled and to some extent is the national digital research centre an alternative to or replacement for it?

Mr. Tuohy

If one looks at the funding going into, for example, Science Foundation Ireland and the PRTLI in third level colleges and the work being done by Forfás and others, there is a recognition that this is an important area for the economy. There is also a clear recognition that we need to begin to commercialise more of the research. We felt a need to move from some of the blue sky thinking, the importance of which I do not diminish, to develop the equally important side of commercialisation. There was a feeling across the system that there was a need for something and what we put together was put out to tender. There were six applicants and the process was narrowed down. An international panel, being run through the HEA, is evaluating the bids. All, or certainly most, of the colleges — the universities and institutes of technology — were involved in applying and there is a recognition that this is important, not only from the economic point of view but equally from the point of view of the role of technology in community and society. We either sit back and leave it roll over us or we take a proactive role.

One of the major positive aspects of MLE, of which anybody who visited would have been aware, was the considerable engagement with the local community. In the clubhouse model the students and postgraduates of MLE as well as students from other colleges were providing evening tuition for young people from the inner city. There were amazing positive stories. Only last week one of the young people concerned from the Liberties said he would not have gone to college only for what had happened in that space. That is also included in the brief for the new group. It is not just about the economic side, there is also the social side.

Mr. Tuohy is coming to the advantages which have accrued as a result of MLE being in place. Would the digital hub have come about without it? What effect has the digital hub had on digital technology in general and, in particular, the Dublin 8 area where there are massive social and economic disadvantages?

Mr. Tuohy

The digital hub would not have come about. Even with the downturn, it is full. There are over 50 companies involved which are employing over 400 people. It involves a huge education and outreach agenda, with which many members will be familiar as they have visited the facility. It is about regenerating an area and using the digital backdrop to that to see what can be done through the use of modern technologies. I have been there a number of times on my own and with the Minister and have seen the skills the young people are developing just from being exposed to this. Some were on a third level campus for the first time when they joined Media Lab. The brightest students were working with children from the area, which was the concept of engagement.

On the economic side, Media Lab was multidisciplinary, which is important, given the research in which we are trying to engage. Disciplines from one area are applied in others. This year's Nobel laureates in economics are mathematicians and physicists. We need to get away from the idea of working in boxes and adopt a multidisciplinary approach. The second aspect is a strong emphasis on creativity. The Irish have a strong track record in this space but matching this with digital technologies and establishing a leadership position is important. That will come from the NDRC, the new body, which will build on the Media Lab experience.

The price is high at €35.5 million. Did the State get value for this in the long term?

Mr. Tuohy

This can only be seen in the perspective of the overall economy. The ICT sector, including the digital hub, is worth €50 billion to the economy. MLE's role was positive at a difficult time. We were still sending positive signals. Many companies which set up in Ireland visited the MLE premises, including Yahoo, Google and others. The founders of Google cited MLE as one of the reasons their company came to Ireland. The sum of €35 million must be placed in the context of overall economic development.

I refer to the issue of governance. At page 93 of the report the Comptroller and Auditor General states:

I asked for details of staff numbers employed by MLE by year, average salary cost per staff member by year, annual remuneration of each chief executive officer/managing director and severance packages agreed in respect of each departing chief executive officer/managing director. The Accounting Officer informed me that the Department had requested this information on a number of occasions but, to date, the company secretary has refused to release this information.

I thought it was incumbent on all State entities under audit to give the Comptroller and Auditor General the information he requests. Why has this been left hanging?

Mr. Tuohy

It is not through lack of effort on my own part, even up to yesterday. I again telephoned the lawyers. I also spoke to them last Friday and wrote to them last Monday. I asked for the liquidator to bring it to the attention of members. The Comptroller and Auditor General has powers and I discussed this issue with his office. I pointed out we were having difficulties getting this information. If we had it, we would have made it available. We will pursue it but we did everything we could.

What action is the Comptroller and Auditor General taking on this matter?

Mr. Purcell

My remit does not extend to private companies and, as the Accounting Officer said, this was not a semi-State company. It was an unusual kind of animal but I would have thought that when the activities of such a company are being funded, there would be a degree of transparency about its operations. This was part of the problem with governance and so on. The information was not sought out of a prurient interest to see what people were earning. I wanted to establish value for money in the micro sense. There were four chief executives but I could be wrong. However, that is a high turnover, even in the ICT industry. People were coming and going and I thought in the interests of public accountability for the taxpayer, it would be useful to know this but I had to act through the Department which, having taken it over, had funded this company to a large degree. It seemed very strange.

Is Mr. Tuohy following up his inquiries?

Mr. Tuohy

I will continue at it. Any support the Comptroller and Auditor General gives will be very welcome. We made it clear to the lawyers that we were appearing before the committee today and I said, inevitably, I would be asked this question. It is an obvious one which stands out from the report. Normally in the public service any information the Comptroller and Auditor General asks for is given to him. It is in our interests to make this available. I cannot understand why it is not being made available. Some of the information on the first CEO who retired early is available in the accounts for 2002 or 2003 but I am totally in favour of the principle of people making such information available. I will continue to pursue it and will report back to the committee, if the Deputy wishes.

Yes.

In the letter from MIT one of the reasons given for its failure is it was not able to develop an MLE degree granting programme with Trinity College Dublin. What discussions took place regarding MIT and MLE forming an alliance with Trinity College in order that degrees could be awarded which might have helped the sustainability of MLE?

Mr. Tuohy

There is nothing on the file. I checked this after receiving the letter from MIT and with people who were involved at the time. MIT stated it had recommended an affiliation with one university up front. That is not mentioned in any of the negotiating documents from day one. I spoke to people involved because I was not directly involved at the start. During the negotiations and, latterly, when the company was up and running, there were discussions about having an MIT qualification. MIT qualifications have a cachet, whether it is a masters or PhD. Part of the problem with which MIT was faced was if people could get a cheaper version of their qualifications in Dublin, it would undermine its programme in the United States. That is the way its representatives were looking at it. During the discussions, they said students would have to spend time in the United States to gain the qualification. We made the point to them that they had facilities that enabled people to spend time on campus at MIT in short bursts and, therefore, they did not live on campus for two or three years. Options would have been open but we did not find a willingness on the part of MIT to go beyond exploring the idea. The Deputy will see from the documentation that we tried to address the issue and get MIT to grant qualifications on its own or in conjunction with Irish universities.

Page 88 of the report refers to liaison committee sub-group activity. A number of points are listed, the fourth of which states, "The review stated that, while the Exchequer was the main funding source for MLE, the board was under effective MIT control and decisions were taken without reference to the Exchequer". It is stated the arrangement whereby MLE was subject to a board, as well as being answerable to a separate Government liaison committee, proved to be ineffective and did little to facilitate direct and effective communication between MLE, the Department and MIT. This dual oversight structure proved to be a dysfunctional arrangement which ultimately did not serve MLE or the stakeholders well. The liaison committee is giving out about MIT, while MIT is giving out about the liaison committee. Obviously, they were not the best of friends and did not work well together.

Mr. Tuohy

There was tension between the Government liaison committee and MIT throughout the process. Because of the strategy being pursued, the Government liaison committee was very circumscribed in its role. This was not a normal State company. It did not have shareholdings; it was done by agreement. The board was in place and MIT had the chair. It changed its strategy a number of times to try to deal with the situation as it found it. It maintained the principle, and still does in its submission, of non-directive research. It refers to the importance of this throughout the submission. As it evolved, we found it was not raising funding. The Government liaison committee stated it was not raising revenue as predicted through the policy of non-directive research and that the issue should be examined, including the issue of the degrees and so on.

In August 2004 Mr. Matti Packalén from Finland was appointed co-chair. The reason was to deal with the Government's concerns and those of the Government liaison committee about the functioning of the board because we wanted to see changes taking place. We were circumscribed by the contracts in place. However, we tried to move within this and drive change. MIT reiterates in its submission that it does not favour directive research, but non-directive research. We are saying this model has not worked. If one examines MIT Media Lab today in Boston, more than 85% of it is funded by government, whereas the position was the reverse at the end of the last decade. In that sense, companies have changed the way they do things.

The lead Department in the project was the Department of the Taoiseach. Mr. Tuohy's Department was set up in its present form after the 2002 general election and part of its brief was to take over responsibility for Media Lab Europe.

Mr. Tuohy

We had taken over in 2001 as the Department of Public Enterprise.

Was there a carry-over to the new Department? Did the Department of the Taoiseach relinquish responsibility in 2001?

Mr. Tuohy

It was handed over to the Department of Public Enterprise in May 2001. It transferred to the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources after the formation of the current Government.

Was it fully within the remit of either the Department of Public Enterprise or the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources during 2002? Mr. Tuohy will be aware that the first reference to Media Lab Europe was contained in the Comptroller and Auditor General's 2002 report?

Mr. Tuohy

It was done under the Department of the Taoiseach.

It referred, in particular, to the lack of performance indicators for the project. Was that a valid criticism at the time and what did the Department do subsequently to ensure such indicators were put in place?

Mr. Tuohy

If one examines the history of what happened and the series of meetings with MLE, on the one hand, and MIT, on the other, it was not just about performance indicators at that stage, it was about survival. The revenue stream was not what it should have been, after which there was a massive market downturn. Following the work done by the Government liaison committee, particularly on that issue, we subsequently dealt with the first strategy. There was the strategic plan in May 2004 which was turned down. When we examined the business plan in 2003, indicators had been specifically included in the submission.

The final sentence in Mr. Tuohy's submission reads, "Finally, performance is central to the delivery of these publicly-funded projects and, as such, payments should be linked to particular performance milestones or metrics". Is he saying this should be the case, or that it has been the case?

Mr. Tuohy

I am saying it should be the case. That is a summary of the longer statement. It strikes me in retrospect that when one pays out something, it should be linked to deliverables. That is not what happened in this case, for different reasons. The Comptroller and Auditor General reached a similar conclusion, namely, that people must have a commitment to whatever they are involved in. That it should be a financial commitment was a sticking point for us with MIT. We said it had taken the revenue from the Government, to which it was entitled under the contract. However, it was not prepared to put any of the money back into restructuring MLE. What I am trying to say is that payment should be based on delivery.

In regard to fund-raising, rather than being based on best effort, the percentage should be linked to how much one raises. One can commit all one wants, but if one does not deliver the funds, there will be a problem.

To what degree does Mr. Tuohy believe lessons were learned from the warning signs in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report of 2002 prior to the closure of Media Lab? I do not think any lessons have been learned.

Mr. Tuohy

We would not have done what we did if we had not taken these actions. It is not easy to close anything in any environment. It is much more courageous to take a decision to close something rather than let it continue. Within the controls available to us, we tried to put a structure in place for that to happen. We pushed through the strategic plan. The indicators to which the Deputy referred were included. There was a survival issue, together with a haemorrhaging of cash. It was burning cash at the rate of approximately €500,000 a month.

Monitoring performance depends on the quality of information available. The whole saga appears to have been underlined by the lack of proper information being given to the Government. When it was run by the Department of the Taoiseach, reports on project monitoring were produced in November-December 2000. MLE commissioned two external reviews in 2001 and 2002 which were forwarded to either the Department of the Taoiseach or Mr. Tuohy's Department.

Mr. Tuohy

The 2002 report was forwarded to my Department.

According to this year's report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, they were forwarded to the Department. They were handed back and copies were not taken. Why was the information not retained?

Mr. Tuohy

I do not know. There were ongoing discussions. It had done some work and commissioned external reviews of itself and what it was doing. The Department and the Government liaison committee were trying to get the board to take responsibility for the strategic direction of the company. The studies carried out over a number of years will indicate that there was some hope at the beginning — it was at an embryonic stage to which there was a commitment. Once the revenue stream was not coming in on target, the bells began to ring. That is when the Department and the Government liaison committee began to push the board to take certain directions.

The difference between the aspirations and practice of the project was the problem. I still do not understand why reports were received by the Department and handed back without any copies being kept, why no memos of the interactions were made and why opinions have not been recorded anywhere.

Mr. Tuohy

The Deputy will see the work that was done. This was a continuous process with the Government liaison committee. We have all the minutes of the meetings which have been made available to the Comptroller and Auditor General. These issues would have been discussed at the various meetings.

There was a subsequent report from MLE on the relationship with MIT. We do not seem to know whether the Department received a copy of that report, saw it or reacted to it as the report was not available to the Comptroller and Auditor General either.

Mr. Tuohy

That was included. I remember it was included in the appendix to its——

Not according to page 87 of the report.

Mr. Tuohy

Which page?

Page 87, which deals with project monitoring. I refer to the third paragraph.

Mr. Tuohy

There were ongoing discussions through the Government liaison committee with the MLE personnel who used to come before the committee. This was an ongoing process, not just a once-off report. There was a series of ongoing and robust discussions. That was the process. This was not a State company. The Comptroller and Auditor General made the point that it was differently structured from any of the State companies with which we deal. Therefore, we were much more circumscribed in the way we could deal with it. Access to information and the failure to receive it presented a difficulty, as can be seen in the report and from our comments.

I argue that a lack of access to that report has led to the discrepancies between what the Department states in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report and the response we received today from MIT. I do not know if Mr. Tuohy has had a chance to go through it. We have only recently received the correspondence. In areas such as the feasibility of the original model, the collaboration between MLE and Irish universities and the operation of Media Lab Europe, MIT seems to indicate that bullet points in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report are directly at variance with what the Department is stating.

Mr. Tuohy

Does the Deputy wish to go through it?

On the issue of feasibility, the Department states MIT agreed that the original model from MLE was flawed while MLE's perspective is that it does not believe the model or the company's objectives were unrealistic. That is just one example of the type of comment made in the correspondence.

Mr. Tuohy

To go back to what I said, MIT states private funding for non-directive research is a viable model. We do not think it is. Until recent years MIT was funded primarily by the private sector, by investment from companies. That has changed dramatically. MIT is mainly state funded in the United States now. The blue sky thinking that has been talked about which was done by companies in the late 1990s is no longer being done. The government is providing more funding in the United States and this is the general experience. It must be remembered that this happened with Media Lab Asia also. It was an MIT lab with the Indian Government. It too collapsed, before Media Lab Europe. The same issue was involved in that collapse.

How would Mr. Tuohy react to a comment from the report that it subsequently came to light that MIT Media Lab, the role model for MLE, is not self-financing in this new industry climate? This would indicate that the degree of prior research was quite poor.

Mr. Tuohy

No. It subsequently came to light to light that the model had changed in the United States. The model at the time it was being sold to the Government was the one in place at the time. It states in the IT submission that it had been funded by private sector corporate sponsors for many years, but subsequent to the downturn in the technology sector funding was provided much more by the Government. We see this in the model for MIT today. That is the issue. MIT still states it believes in non-directive research.

I have one last question to do with governance which has to do with curiosity more than anything else. Some people seem to be members of the board because of their status in life rather than because of any knowledge of information technology. I am curious about the inclusion of Mr. Paul Hewson and his subsequent replacement by Mr. Dave Evans. Were they Government, MIT or agreed nominees? What was their average attendance at board meetings? Is that type of information available?

Mr. Tuohy

I do not have the board's attendance list with me. I believe they were joint nominees. MLE was not just about technology but also about creativity. Without making it personal, some of the individuals would be more knowledgable on business strategy in this area, whether to do with Ipods, Itunes or music downloading. They, U2 being a good example, were the first in many of these areas. They have been very successful in the music technology area. I imagine that was part of the reason they were selected.

It is fine people have backgrounds with experience that would be useful. However, was the Government and MIT confident that they could participate fully in the running of a business project such as this in terms of commitment and attendance at board meetings?

Mr. Tuohy

I can honestly say I saw Mr. Dave Evans at conferences and meetings at MIT and Media Lab Europe a number of times. As to the number of meetings he attended, I do not know because we did not attend the board meetings. It would be unfair to cast comments on an individual.

Being Dublin based, they were more likely to attend. I would have more of a concern with regard to someone, for example, the chancellor of MIT being based in Massachusetts, being able to regularly attend board meetings.

Mr. Tuohy

Phil Clay was a regular attender of meetings.

The Secretary General seems to be making the case that what we are looking at here is something that had a significant potential benefit for the economy. He makes the point that as time passed we found out there were problems with the system and that some people tried to address them. He seems to point out that in the whole scheme of things, despite the amount of money we spent during the years on information technology, etc., there were some good aspects to it. He suggests that while some mistakes could have been avoided, it was not the big disaster some have painted. Is it not true, however, that before any of this started, a task force set up in 1999 made it clear that there were serious problems with the project before it got off the ground? Let us forget about the years from 2001 to 2004 and go back to 1999. When the Comptroller and Auditor General's report asked whether the task force had concerns, the task force mentioned the justification for the project, the absence of any in-depth evaluation of the credibility of the project, the outputs of the project, the lack of clarity on the outputs and the exact work to be carried out, the risk, the high cost and large exposure of the Exchequer, the minimal exposure of MIT, the degree on which the success of the project depended on the personal and corporate commitment of MIT, the funding, the uncertainty in the area of sponsorship income and over-optimistic financial targets in order for MLE to become self-financing. This was before the fact. Who from the Department was on that task force? Was Mr. Tuohy a member?

Mr. Tuohy

I was.

The Secretary General is, therefore, one of those who identified the problems before they occurred.

Mr. Tuohy

The Deputy is looking at one side of an equation.

I am looking at the Comptroller and Auditor General's report and making an analysis that all the problems that have occurred were flagged before MLE was set up. If we go to Mr. Higgins's report of 2004, it is similar. In the 1999 report from the task force words such as "dismal", "surprisingly weak", "inexplicably dismal", "mediocre", "flaky", "not sufficiently industry focused", "very mediocre" and "disappointing" are used. There is a notion that the problems were flagged in 2001 and continued to be flagged as funding continued through 2003. Even though efforts were made to improve the situation because MIT had control of the board, nothing could be done. Is it not true that all of these problems were flagged in 1999 by the Secretary General and others but this was ignored by the Taoiseach's office?

Mr. Tuohy

The committee looked at both the downside and the upside of this matter. The proposal was put to the Government. It is quite clear from the Comptroller and Auditor General's report that the Government was aware of the risk involved but nobody predicted the massive downturn in the technology sector. Of all the issues, this was the single biggest trigger of the ripple effect afterwards. Any evaluation of a project sets out the strengths and weaknesses, as well as the opportunities and threats and this was done. The Deputy has read out all the negatives but there are also many positives listed, about which I talked. A sense of balance is needed. There was a risk, about which nobody was under any illusion.

The Secretary General has referred to the positive aspects but I must return to Mr. Higgins's analysis and the net result. Contributors described MLE's contribution to date on the development of indigenous enterprise as being none to minimal. Under the heading of "supporting high quality human capital formation", the report states the education contribution of the laboratory is, to all intents and purposes, zero or very close to it. It states the performance of MLE as against its founding objectives offers little reason for satisfaction; in fact, for virtually all of these, the contribution of MLE seems to be zero or very close to it. This is a stark observation with regard to the benefits or lack of them.

I refer to the risk-taking, on which everything seems to be balanced. The Comptroller and Auditor General highlighted one of the key issues. He acknowledged that generally there was a risk attached to this area. The reason for the current situation is that the risk was not managed properly and that the risk to the Government was not reduced at the outset.

With regard to funding of the project, we systematically shut ourselves out. A particular project was funded but at that same moment we ruled ourselves out of any future decision-making process. A hell of a risk has been taken with public money. In 1999 the Department's task force identified this as the main area of concern but it was not acted upon. Deputy Boyle referred to the 2002 report, I referred to the 1999 report and the Comptroller and Auditor General made his report today. The same theme is identified in all of the reports but the Government has ignored it on each occasion. It has cost the Exchequer and the public €30 million. I do not buy this idea that this is an area of high risk and for that reason we should not regard this as a complete disaster but look at the overall spend. We were utterly naive to enter into this contract or deal the way we did.

Mr. Tuohy

I do not accept the Deputy's analysis of the risk issue and its management. The pros and cons were put to the Government because that is part of the Department's job and was part of the task force's job at the time. However, it is up to the Government to decide what is an acceptable risk and that is the way it operates. I am not allowed to comment on policy matters, as the Deputy will be aware, but I am allowed to give the committee the context in which it happened.

What was to play for in this instance, bearing in mind the economy and the opportunities for this space, was huge. I suggest the Deputy study the review done by Mr. Higgins which was very specific from the academic point of view. The response to that study from MIT and Media Lab Europe was that the space they occupied was not just a traditional academic setting; in other words, finding indicators to deal with issues such as innovation and blue sky research was very difficult. Deputy Boyle raised the issue of performance indicators. It is very difficult to find effective indicators in that space. The report must be read in the context in which it was written.

On the question of referee-type papers, MIT subsequently in its submission cited 140 papers as being refereed. These are issues which may be disputed and debated.

The Secretary General referred to the Government process. I refer him to another report. When the task force reported to the Department of the Taoiseach, one of its responses, mentioned in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, was to hire a consultant who reported back before the agreement was signed with MIT. In the opinion of the consultant, MIT could deliver the facility along the lines proposed but this should be conditional on a number of conditions, including a full commitment by MIT, securing brand identification for MLE, substantial commitment of MLE staff, collaboration between MIT and MLE staff and students and clear agreements covering fundraising. The consultant did not consider the proposed financial arrangement to be important, despite the fact that the cost of providing the number of places was 80% higher than in a third level setting. Had the Department any concerns that some of the issues raised by the task force had not been dealt with by the consultant?

Mr. Tuohy

The consultant's report dealt with this project as being in a rapidly growing sector, as being very important for the economy and as offering significant opportunities. At the time we were trying to jump into the space. The link with MIT was a brand recognition issue because a brand cannot be bought and built up in a short space of time.

The Department and the Secretary General were excluded from this decision. He had made his report and the task force had made the problems clear. Effectively, some of these were completely ignored and the Department of the Taoiseach went ahead, hired a consultant and signed an agreement which was identified as being flawed from the start.

Deputy Tuohy

The task force considerations were brought to the attention of the Government in weighing up the balance in making the decision. This is very clear from the Comptroller and Auditor General's report. The Government was made fully aware and balanced the information. It is legitimate for it to make a decision on that basis.

Why did the State not retain control and oversight having spent so much money?

Mr. Tuohy

It was not a State company; it was set up as a separate entity. MIT had a very different philosophy about research. I suggest the Deputy read the MIT submission.

If the State passes over €20 million of €30 million, why would it preclude itself from making interventions?

Mr. Tuohy

This was a contract negotiated with the other party who had something to offer and an agreement resulted. I do not believe it would have agreed to that arrangement.

Deputy Ardagh asked Mr. Tuohy a question which he did not answer. I will ask it again. Would he enter into a similar agreement or contract, considering what has happened, what the Comptroller and Auditor General has reported, what the task force decided in 1999 and what Deputy Boyle and Mr. Higgins have referred to?

Mr. Tuohy

The environment has changed dramatically in the context of both the economic and the technological environments. We have learned from the experience of dealing with MIT and the Comptroller and Auditor General's comments. It would not be the same contract now. The new contract we were about to negotiate with MIT would have been different. In short, the answer is no.

I do not intend to go over the same ground again but will summarise briefly up to the point where I wish to begin. This project was evaluated in one form or another in 1999 and the pros and cons and risks were identified and a decision was made to proceed with it. It was always known from the beginning that there were risks associated with it. The Comptroller and Auditor General has stated a financial sub-group of the liaison committee was formed at the end of 2001 to review the Media Lab performance. Media Lab was up and running for a year and a half at that stage. Because of the risk element involved with MLE, should not a mechanism for this financial review and monitoring not have been put in place at a much earlier stage? It was recognised as a higher than normal risk. Surely a year and a half into its life was too late to look at what was happening. Mr. Tuohy referred to the global downturn and the 70% reduction in the Nasdaq index between 2000 and 2001. In light of that, was it not then too late to establish a financial sub-group of the liaison committee? I am merely talking about managing this project.

Mr. Tuohy

The agreements were signed in mid-2000 and the financial group was up and running by September 2000. It must be remembered that once the go-ahead was given and the agreements signed, it took time to set up the establishment. I am trying to pull the dates now. It is not possible to just get researchers off the trees. These people needed to be recruited. It took a period of time from when the agreements were signed until it was up and running.

I agree; that is precisely the point. Mr. Tuohy said the people needed to be recruited. Surely consideration needed to be given to how long it was taking to recruit, the number of people involved, the salaries etc. This is the type of information that did not become available. We do not have figures for staff or salaries. We have one figure for 2001, which indicates an average of €76,000. Starting this at the time it was done was probably too late. Should we not have known what was going on from day one? The model must have existed. It must have had a business plan to recruit a particular size workforce etc. It is not just all on the sponsorship and income side but also on the expenditure side. Given what was perceived to be high risk at what was recognised as a volatile time for this market, financial controls did not seem to be in place.

Mr. Tuohy

The Government liaison committee was set up in September 2000 and the financial sub-group was set up in autumn 2001. During that period——

It was established in November, which was nearly winter.

Mr. Tuohy

Yes, November 2001. We set up a board first. This arises in the case of MIT as well. It is not possible to double-guess on a board. It was only setting up at the time and as soon as the Government liaison committee began to look at the financials, it set up the financial sub-group. Whether one would do that at the very start or whether one would give it a period to set up and then monitor it, in hindsight maybe the Deputy is right. Maybe it should have been done earlier, but at the same time any company or organisation such as this needs to be given the opportunity to set up.

The financial sub-group of the liaison committee met in November 2001 and reported in December 2001, January 2002, etc. Throughout it indicated the model and plan as originally envisaged were not being adhered to. At that point, which was probably the first we saw, did Media Lab produce a revised business plan or did it adhere to its original plan?

Mr. Tuohy

It had external reviews that were done and were talked about. As part of that it was looking at what sort of model it needed going forward because the environment in which it found itself was not returning the revenue streams at which it was looking. The board of Media Lab was concerned, obviously, that it wanted to get this and there was a lot of work put into getting a level of certainty around what type of strategy it was pursuing. The Government through the Government liaison committee was expressing its concerns about not just the financials but about the direction. We subsequently, as the Deputy knows, looked for the strategy and the strategic plan but it was already working on material itself and it was grappling with where in that space it needed to be. I explained the backdrop and the context in which this happened.

In other words, internally within Media Lab, either at board level or within the company, it was still working to its original plan despite coming nowhere near its targets. Was it doing so in a comfort zone knowing there was funding available from the Department?

Mr. Tuohy

It knew the legal arrangements. However, at the same time it would be unfair to say there was not a sense of urgency there.

That is my reading at the moment.

Mr. Tuohy

It would be probably unfair to say that. An organisation is only as good as its management. The Comptroller and Auditor General referred earlier to the fact that the first director left in 2001, I think. Then there was an acting director for a period of approximately 12 months and then there was another director. It, therefore, had issues about the management. It was obviously concerned about the type of people it wanted to run the show and to deliver. The management and then the board were the hands-on people dealing with this. The Government liaison committee expressed its concerns, asked for specific information and called in these people. Again because it was not a traditional State company our ability to intervene in that was limited.

In some ways it is somewhat unfair to ask these questions in hindsight, but we keep coming back to the point. Mr. Tuohy mentioned that it was a private company and the State was unable to intervene. Was the legal arrangement, which established it, a weakness in the project?

Mr. Tuohy

MIT Media Lab was set up in a similar vein and this organisation was modelled on that. This was to allow for what it talked about in its own submission as the concept of inquiry, the importance of innovation etc. It did not believe it would be possible to have that outside that space. It was very similar to the arrangement it made with Cambridge University in the UK or what Media Lab Asia did with the Indian Government. That was the model it had. As to whether it could sell that model today in other countries, I do not know, but I think it would be very difficult. That was at a time when there was a real belief that market was going skywards and there were huge opportunities. Maybe in that environment being in there and having something in place was very important. However, some of the issues the Deputy talks about——

I take the point that during that period some companies folded. However, many other companies made strategic decisions that saw them survive and grow. Concerns were expressed before Media Lab Europe was set up. A risk was taken and there was ongoing monitoring. There seems to have been reluctance or an inability to change its business plan to survive. I do not know whether it was in some sort of comfort zone. I am disappointed that Mr. Tuohy was unable to answer Deputy Ardagh's questions about staff, salaries etc. The company appeared to ignore the input of the State. A conflict seems to have existed that should not have. Does Mr. Tuohy agree that is what comes across in this report?

Mr. Tuohy

I could not disagree with that. Part of our concern, as I have expressed here and in my own submission, was at that sense of urgency and that sense of rapidly working its way through in a changing environment. The Deputy is right. This was a sector that was changing very dramatically and——

Eighteen months is a long time in that sector.

Mr. Tuohy

Absolutely it is a lifetime in that business. Maybe the issue the Deputy raised is relevant. The company may have felt it had a revenue stream from the Government that would take it through the period. Part of it was that it never really reached critical mass either. This thing happened so quickly after its start. To be fair to the people involved, no matter what happened, as stated by MIT in its submission, this was such a seismic shift in the environment that it would have been very difficult in any sense to deal with it. I suppose the Deputy is asking whether it could have done better.

I will conclude on this point. The idea behind Media Lab was that it was not to be just an entity in its own right. Mr. Tuohy talked about the wider implications etc. I feel the Department would have done what it could to ensure its survival. It is certainly my view that Media Lab did not play ball. It went off and did its own thing. It did not seem to want outside interference. It felt it knew why it existed and had its income stream from the State but did not go anywhere. Earlier Mr. Tuohy said the arrangement with MIT and Media Lab was very positive for foreign direct investment in the industry here. Are there any negative implications of the project having now ceased?

Mr. Tuohy

I think two things came out of it. When I said it was very important, it was seen as a flagship or beacon project. It was a sign that we were still in business and making progress, despite the downturn. It is very positive that the hub itself is basically full, even though the last few years were quite rough. While we expected some negative feedback, some of the comments we heard were really positive. People said it was great that a Government was prepared to stop something that was not working. There has been a reaction in the opposite direction, paradoxically. People have said it took courage to halt something that was not working.

This is a most serious situation. The Committee of Public Accounts which is trying to examine whether the taxpayer got value for tens of millions of its euro is being denied critical information that would allow it to make such a judgment. Not only does the committee have to consider the overall value of the project, but it also has to examine specifically the breakdown of how taxpayer's funds were spent on it. The only way to judge after the event whether value for money was achieved is to reflect on how much was received by those who were involved in putting the project together. However, the committee is not being given the information it needs on the number of staff and their salaries, not to mention details of the golden handshakes of three or four chief executive officers. The secretary of a company financed entirely by the taxpayer has demonstrated audacity and arrogance by denying the committee the information in question. Something has to be done about this. The matter needs to be pursued further after this meeting has ended. Who is the secretary? Was the decision in question taken by resolution of the board that was established and agreed? I suspect it was taken to facilitate a cover-up of a massive rip-off of taxpayer's funds, in terms of what certain people were given.

Mr. Tuohy

Is the Deputy seeking the name of the——

Yes. I want to know on whose authority the secretary was acting in refusing to——

Mr. Tuohy

We can make the correspondence available to the Deputy. I think it has already been made available to the Comptroller and Auditor General. William Fry and Company is the group of solicitors acting as the company secretariat. I spoke to the person involved last Friday and again on Monday. The Department wrote to the person in question on Monday. I hasten to add this is not the first time the Department has raised the issue. When I was notified about today's meeting, I made the point that it was inevitable that this question would be asked. I wanted to be in a position to make the information available to the committee. It is the Department's intention, if it receives it, to make it fully available. It has never refused to make information available to the committee or the Comptroller and Auditor General. The Department has raised the matter with William Fry and Company. It has made the point that it has certain expectations, especially as the Exchequer has been the major provider of funds in this instance. Its expectations are also based on a point of principle. If one examines any of the normal State companies, one will find the Department insists that the full all-in package is provided as part of the company accounts in the annual report. We have a principle of openness and transparency in that regard. I can see no reason there would not be a similar facility in this instance.

On whose authority is the group of solicitors acting? I appreciate the project has come to an end, but is the board still in existence, for example?

Mr. Tuohy

It was a voluntary liquidation. Our legal advice is that the liquidator is Mr. John Coulston of Ernst & Young. The company secretary is William Fry and Solicitors — Mr. Barry Cahir is the guy we have dealt with there. I presume the people I have mentioned are representing their organisations rather than operating as individuals. We can certainly follow up on this aspect of the matter immediately after today's meeting — I will personally do so. I will liaise with the committee and the Comptroller and Auditor General to see whether we can do anything else to get the information. I share the Deputy's concern about making this information available.

I am happy to hear it. It is not a matter of whether we can get the information — we must get it. It would be unprecedented for the manner in which tens of millions of taxpayers' euro was spent by an entity which has been described as a private entity to be shrouded in secrecy. I will move on from that aspect of the matter because we are running short of time.

Three Departments were responsible for the project in quick succession. The Department of the Taoiseach was in charge of it before responsibility was given to the then Department of Public Enterprise. I am tempted to suggest that responsibility was then given to the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources as a symbolic gesture because the project was all at sea. Does the fact that the project was passed between the various Departments mean it lacked coherency and continuity in policy and direction?

Mr. Tuohy

The Department of Public Enterprise does not exist any more. Its functions in respect of communications, etc., were transferred to the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources. Therefore, it is really two Departments. The Media Lab Europe project was established by the Department of the Taoiseach and responsibility for it was transferred to the then Department of Public Enterprise in 2001. When the Government took office, the functions of that Department were split. The functions in question are now being dealt with in the current Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources. While the Department has a different title, the functions have not shifted. Responsibility for the matter was moved from the Department of the Taoiseach to the former Department of Public Enterprise which subsequently became the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources.

What was the rationale behind the decision to transfer responsibility for the project from the Department of the Taoiseach, apart from the fact that it might have been becoming a hot potato?

Mr. Tuohy

It is not unusual for the Department of the Taoiseach to develop new initiatives which are subsequently taken up by other Departments. Such initiatives can pertain to a range of issues on the social or economic side. It is not unusual in any Government — not just in Ireland, but in other countries also — for Taoisigh to pull together the agencies involved. This was a large project that involved a number of agencies.

It is incredible that the committee has been denied information on the number of staff, etc. Can Mr. Tuohy outline to lay people — the bulk of taxpayers — the concrete things done during the years in which Media Lab Europe was in existence? Did people go to work in a particular location? What did they do when they found themselves in the workplace to merit the expenditure of tens of millions of taxpayers' euro?

Mr. Tuohy

To be fair, many very good individuals were involved. Anybody who visited the Media Lab Europe offices will be aware that there was huge passion and commitment. There were a number of groups which were looking at the spaces around technology and the broad issues. I will quickly go through some of them, if it is of use to the Deputy. One of the groups dealt with adaptive speech interfaces, exploring new ways for humans to interact with complex systems, including the use of multiple co-ordinated parallel modalities with an emphasis on speech and language, used together with more traditional tools such as keyboards. Another group, called MindGames, dealt with issues such as the provision of technologies to help people suffering from attention deficit disorder. One of the group's projects which was pursued by two guys doing a PhD about young people in therapy involved the use of mobile phones. When a game would pop up on the phones of such young people at certain times of the day, they would have to feed in details of their condition such as their mood, etc. Such information was picked up and transmitted to their therapists in order that when they went to meet them, they had that information.

Many of the groups were using technology to explore human potential. The motivation behind what was being done was very powerful and good. A great deal of the work that was done, to be fair to those involved, was very good. I think a great deal of creative work was done on the technology side, for example, about the role of technology in new forms of education and new pedagogies. One of the senior researchers involved in such matters was an Irish woman who is blind since birth. The project leader in question who has a PhD from Stanford University was dealing with palpable technologies, or palpable machines, as I think they are called. She was working in the field of haptics, or the science of touch and feel, to help to make technology available to blind people.

To be fair to many of those involved in Media Lab Europe, including researchers, I should mention the many bright, committed and passionate people from Ireland and other countries. I would not say for one minute that they were not hard-working. If one went to their offices at 11 p.m., one would find people still at work. I would not like the committee to feel the mainly young people who worked there did not give their all — they did. They also brought something to the Irish academic side by demonstrating their technologies. We do not have a tradition of this in Irish academia, although we have a tradition of publishing papers. That was one of the issues which arose when the conflict took place between Media Lab Europe and the traditional academics. Academics traditionally publish in learned journals, but much of what they did in Media Lab Europe involved the demonstration of technologies. It held an open day every month which was attended by hundreds of people at which researchers demonstrated their technology. This was a much more practical and pragmatic approach and a number of interesting patents were filed. I was proud of some of the things being done in the company by many people from Ireland and abroad, as would anyone who visited Media Lab Europe. I am not critical of much of what it did. The venture was at the forefront and recognised as such.

While I am not critical of the ordinary people who worked in Media Lab Europe, criticism is appropriate at other levels. The board was dominated by commercial interests from information technology multinational companies and the mobile phone and music industries. Were these interests subject to any restriction in terms of the use of any discovery or technology being developed in Media Lab Europe for commercial gain by companies with which they were associated?

Mr. Tuohy

MIT operated as a collective intellectual property based on the idea of undirected research. Whatever was produced was available. While one can argue the rights and wrongs of the model, it involved people putting money into a collective pot and were given access to or could license, albeit not exclusively, any of the intellectual property to emerge from the project. If ten companies invested money, they would be given access to everything to emerge from the venture. Media Lab Europe had access to the intellectual property of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Boston. Given that intellectual property could not be used without first licensing it, the Deputy's fear was not realised and I would be amazed if it had because all valuable developments are patented and licensed and the licensing was available.

Based on the Secretary General's comments on the venture's finances, when at one point he stated MIT was to receive payments of more than €11 million during the period 2004 to 2010 having already received almost €22 million since the foundation of Media Lab Europe, I am tempted to sum up the venture as being all give by the State and taxpayers and all take by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Incidentally, I am fascinated to note from the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General that in 2001 MIT displayed a tendency towards commercial promiscuity while supposedly in an exclusive relationship with the State by going behind our back and approaching the Spanish Government to develop a similar relationship with it. With apologies to the popular vernacular phrase, I would say it was "taking the MIT" as far as Ireland was concerned and fooling us by behaving in a cavalier fashion towards taxpayers here.

Mr. Tuohy

Ultimately, no such relationship developed. We were approached by the Spanish Government. As the Deputy is aware, we have good liaison with all governments — that is the way the system operates. We raised the issue as soon as it was mooted and it was killed off immediately. MIT subsequently stated in its submission that it did not attempt to set up a media lab in Spain and that the Spanish Government had approached it about the possibility of establishing a Spanish media lab. I am not aware of the detail but nothing got off the ground. Exclusivity was very important to us and we monitored it. To use the Deputy's terminology, MIT was not allowed to be promiscuous.

Members of Dáil Éireann and this committee are supportive of State involvement in cutting edge technology. I have been critical of the Government on other frondeurs, if one likes, such as the failure to take measures to recuperate our natural resources — oil and gas, etc. Surely the lesson to be learned is that regardless of in which activities the State involves itself, it must maintain control and ensure democratic accountability of whatever structures are established.

Mr. Tuohy

The Comptroller and Auditor General asked the Department what lessons it had learned from this venture and I outlined these in my submission. The Department has learned from Media Lab Europe. We were involved in the risky environment of technology and a seismic shift occurred just after the venture was set up. We would have had problems in such circumstances irrespective of what we did, how well the venture was structured or what control the Government exercised over it. There were ideological or philosophical differences between us and MIT about the research agenda and the questions of directive versus non-directive research and blue sky versus greater commercialisation. Ultimately, we could not agree a strategy and the Government was not prepared to continue funding the venture. As I stated, it is sometimes much easier to continue funding projects than to call a halt. That was the position until we reached a limit. I still believe that, overall and given the context, Media Lab Europe has been a positive experience in the broad economic sense I described to Deputy Ardagh. Specific lessons are to be learned from the project and I take on board some of Deputy Joe Higgins's points.

Did Mr. Tuohy agree with the decision to liquidate the company?

Mr. Tuohy

The decision to liquidate was made by the members when the Department made clear it would not provide further funding. It was not, therefore, a Government decision but a decision of the members.

I am aware of that but my question is whether the Department agreed with the decision. Did the withdrawal of the State's financial contribution leave the company with no option but to liquidate?

Mr. Tuohy

As I stated, the company went into voluntary liquidation because it could see that its immediate revenue stream would be insufficient to keep it afloat. It, therefore, made the decision well in advance of the money running out. When the Government indicated it was not prepared to continue to provide funding, members of the board of Media Lab Europe made their decision. It was not a Government decision.

I realise that is the case. What was the Department's position on the closure? Mr. Tuohy appeared to indicate to Deputy Ardagh that, based on a certain evaluation of the position, the €35 million had not been wasted, had beneficial effects on the economy and could be viewed as good value for money. That appeared to be the drift of Mr. Tuohy's reply to the Deputy.

Mr. Tuohy

I put the issue in context and stand over it because the figures speak for themselves. It is easy to focus on the money spent but very difficult to measure the tangibles which occurred in the broader economy. It is difficult to place a value on some of the new concepts around demonstration, multi-disciplinary research and so forth.

On that basis, could a case be made for investing a further €35 million in the company rather than liquidating it?

Mr. Tuohy

Possibly, but the issue was one not only of money but also structures. As I outlined in the document, we examined various options open to us but we also wanted certain elements included in any new deal. We wanted a financial commitment from MIT, more directive research and greater emphasis on commercialisation but MIT was not prepared to move in that direction.

If we focus on the objectives of the project from the start, clearly, the primary aim was to develop intellectual property through non-directive research. There were also secondary objectives, about which I refer Mr. Tuohy to the consultants report. One such secondary objective appeared to be that the project would deliver research grant or contract income. The consultants report states that not alone was no contract or research income forthcoming but none was sought. Another objective to which Mr. Tuohy referred, such as in the case of Google, was that the existence of Media Lab Europe would encourage inward investment. The consultant stated the effect was quite marginal in respect of high quality foreign investment. A further objective was to strengthen the prospects for emerging indigenous companies. The consultant said there was no impact on the development of existing indigenous enterprise or on the stimulation of new technology based start-ups as spin-offs from its research.

An additional objective was the training of Irish and European graduates and postgraduates by providing research experience. The conclusion is that it made little more than a token contribution to this objective. A further secondary objective was that there would be beneficial co-operation with development agencies in universities. The consultant's conclusion is that there is little evidence that MLE engaged in any significant way with either educational institutes or the development agencies.

There was even a consideration that the site would be an attractive conference centre. The conclusion is that only 11 MLE international conferences, which were non-research conferences, were held in the period under review. According to the consultant, on any fair evaluation of the project, it failed completely on all secondary objectives. If we are making a case for it we must make the case on the primary objective. Would Mr. Tuohy agree with that?

Mr. Tuohy

I will not argue with the consultant. He has his view. I will go back to the example of Google. The founders of Google were very specific when they came to Dublin. They said part of the reason they came here was MLE, which they visited. I am only going on what they said. I was in the United States with the IDA as part of my normal job and we met different businesses and foreign direct investment multinationals. It is definite the existence of MLE was positive at a time when there was a significant downturn in the sector. Companies were asking what was going on here and it brought an interest in Ireland. Whether it is Yahoo, Amazon, the Microsoft research and development centres, Xilinx, Dell Engineering or any of the companies that have come here in recent years and developed, one cannot show the cause and effect between any one of these things but I am saying this was a positive rather than a negative at the time.

When one considers the venture capital market in Ireland, in 1999 a record £223 million was invested in private equity here, of which 84% were high-tech investments. Irish venture capital firms invested £208 million in 2000. By 2001 that had dropped to £124 million. Some of the venture capital companies considered that MLE was a positive encouragement from their point of view in terms of getting people interested.

All the evaluations of the projects we funded with the HEA as part of the university links scheme are positive. The researchers there collaborated with students. I saw some of the projects in operation. Every year I saw demonstrations by different students. They were most positive. It is difficult to measure this scheme other than by going there and seeing them in operation. They are not as tangible as the cash that is outlaid.

Would Mr. Tuohy agree there is a difference of opinion between him and the consultant on how effectively the secondary objectives were achieved? However, I accept they are secondary objectives. Media Lab Europe was not established in the Liberties as a magnet for inward investment, it was established as a focus for blue skies research, as Mr. Tuohy put it, which would lead to the development of intellectual property. That was the primary purpose.

Mr. Tuohy

Part of its purpose was also to link in with the community and on that side it was very successful.

Mr. Tuohy mentioned that there were social objectives and that these were achieved to some degree.

Mr. Tuohy

That was very successful. I am sure any of the Deputies who visited it would agree. There is no doubt that internationally there has been a shift from blue skies thinking and research, especially after that downturn. The industry is now much more oriented towards commercialisation, which is at the opposite end of the chain to blue skies thinking.

I wish to focus on the extent to which the primary objective was achieved. According to page 89 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, the consultant concluded that the scientific output of the laboratory could be only described as dismal, with just 24 publications in international scientific literature since its establishment. Productivity appeared to be very low. A total of 15 refereed papers was produced from 172 person years of research. Assuming MLE was not motivated towards publication of its work, it was difficult to see what alternative path was available or was being pursued by it towards international recognition in the world of science and technology. Mr. Tuohy dealt partly with that point. He said it demonstrated its technology as an alternative to publishing papers. The consultant's report may have been somewhat out of date. MIT claims additional refereed papers were produced over the period.

However, for the benefit of the committee, can Mr. Tuohy tell us, in the terms described here, what was the output of Media Lab Europe in terms of refereed papers and publications in international scientific literature? Will Mr. Tuohy first define the terms, for the purposes of all the lay people here, among whom I include myself? What is a "refereed paper" and what is a "person year" of research?

Mr. Tuohy

It is easier to do the second one. A "person year" of research is per head. It relates to one person working per year.

There were 172 years of work if only one person was doing the work.

Mr. Tuohy

Absolutely. One just divides that by the number of researchers that were there. That is the first thing. Refereed papers are not just newspaper articles. They have been refereed by people who certify that they are acceptable academic papers. That is standard in academia. One of the issues is that the consultant we used had done a lot of work for the HEA. He is a very reputable consultant. However, MIT claims it produced 21 refereed journal articles, 59 refereed full papers for conferences, and 62 refereed shorter papers, giving a total of 142 refereed works, which is more than the 24 cited in the report. I must defer to MIT on some of this. Nobody would question the reputation of MIT.

What I said at the outset is that this was a different type of research. It was practical in the sense that it was demonstrable research, rather than just refereed papers and we must measure MLE on that. We were conscious of that when we were doing the evaluation. We did not have another technique. That is the process used by the HEA to assess performance regarding academic papers here. One of the issues that has been raised several times is the performance indicators that would be used for something of this type that is innovative and creative. The performance indicators generally follow after the event so it is not easy.

I take the point Mr. Tuohy is making. Increasingly, in this House, when money is spent we try to measure it against output. My line of questioning is to establish the output. Did Mr. Purcell come across anything that would enable us to measure output?

Mr. Purcell

No, not really. I read the consultant's report which was carried out with the full co-operation of MLE and it is surprising at this stage that new figures are being thrown into the equation. It is a particularly difficult area in which to specify output. One would expect there would be a level of intellectual property in the case of patents taken out and developed into real applications as a result of this kind of research. However, there does not appear to be much evidence of that. I do not know because, again, the company is in liquidation and I am not quite clear about the extent, if any, of intellectual property on which a value could be put.

Mr. Tuohy

From my knowledge, 12 applications for patents have been filed. To be fair, this is a high number by any standard. We do not have a long tradition in this country of the universities filing a great number of applications. Twelve are from this organisation, and concern a range of products. We have been having discussions with the liquidator and Enterprise Ireland with regard to maintaining these patents pro tempore such that we will see what happens in respect of them. We are conscious that these developments do not happen overnight; one is lucky to have one good one in a lifetime. One has to pay to maintain a patent and decide whether it is worth maintaining.

Our figures point to 12 applications. As one knows, it is very difficult to put a value on intellectual property until somebody commercialises it. The commercialisation of research that is funded is a broader issue for the economy.

What is the position on the liquidator?

Mr. Tuohy

The liquidator became involved in February this year.

Has he drawn up a schedule of assets?

Mr. Tuohy

That is still in progress. There is still money available for any outstanding liabilities. It is a voluntary liquidation.

Has the intellectual property been valued as——

Mr. Tuohy

That will form part of the assets. We are obviously keeping a close eye on this issue to ensure we can protect whatever results from this process.

Is the State a creditor or was there a grant-in-aid?

Mr. Tuohy

We provided funding. The company was set up by way of sets of agreements between the Department, MIT and Media Lab Europe. There is no shareholding.

If there are realisable assets and some intellectual property has been patented that can be commercialised and which appears to have serious value, is the State positioned to be a beneficiary?

Mr. Tuohy

The plan was that anything left after the liquidation would pass to another charitable entity. MIT accepted this and I believe the new body which will replace it will take over responsibility. The building did not move, it was always in State ownership. That is covered because of the charity. There are issues associated with this in that the assets must pass to a charity in the same sphere. I do not have the legal documentation in front of me but the agreement was that the assets would pass to such an organisation. Our hope is responsibility for the assets will pass to the new NDRC.

On the point raised by the Secretary General, is he aware that the liquidator stated in an interview with The Irish Times earlier this year that the intellectual property and patents arising from MLE were worthless?

Mr. Tuohy

That could be the liquidator's view. I looked at them also because we were keen to hold them. I presume the liquidator has a certain view of life that——

Who has control of the patents now?

Mr. Tuohy

They are filed in the name of MLE. There were 12 applications made but I do not know the current position thereon — I do not have the figures in front of me. However, in our discussions with Enterprise Ireland which is well used to dealing with the patents issue we decided to determine which were valuable. The overall package is such that the assets would pass to the new entity. This is what we are hoping will happen. There is a facility for this on foot of the wind-up covered in the initial contract.

In his report the Comptroller and Auditor General makes reference to the fact that, under the terms of the agreement, the assets are to be used for charitable and scientific purposes, etc., after the liquidation. That ordinarily means a liquidator would literally liquidate and sell off the various assets. Must the patents be sold to some other entity? Could a private individual buy them or is the agreement such that there is an automatic transfer of the patents to the State?

Mr. Tuohy

The liquidator decides. Under the existing contract, the assets can pass to another body. Presumably, they will be treated as assets. The issue the Deputy——

The Secretary General stated they could pass to another body. I presume the liquidator will want to maximise the return. Bearing this in mind, is he obliged to pass on the patents or can he set them out to the market to see what it will provide?

Mr. Tuohy

I will have to check that.

Does the Secretary General understand my specific point?

Mr. Tuohy

I will have to check it out. It is a legal issue concerning liquidation. I am thankful that we do not find ourselves in the aforementioned position too often. However, we have legal advisers.

Mr. Purcell

Let me pick up on a few points. I accept what the Accounting Officer says in the broader sense of the term "value for money". One must ask — this is hypothetical — whether value could have been attained at a smaller price to the taxpayer — that is really what we are saying. On the question of value, usually money talks in these matters. I note that the original contributors and sponsors did not really stay engaged with MLE, even when circumstances were beginning to improve. Practically all of them did not renew their sponsorship. That tells its own story.

On salaries and outgoings, there was a suggestion that MLE was being used by very bright students — they were indeed very bright according to the testimony of the Accounting Officer. It was stated the work almost involved paid work experience for certain students. I do not know whether that is true or whether they are included in the €76,000 average thrown into the pot at one stage. It is important to obtain these details to satisfy ourselves that taxpayers' moneys were used prudently.

On what the Accounting Officer said on the decision to go down this road, it was said the decision was a Government one on foot of Government policy, that the eyes of those concerned were wide open and that it was a matter for Government. It is not a matter for the civil servants, provided that the information put before the Government is correct, and it is certainly not a matter for me. However, if one adopts a policy such as that, one must ensure one is not hamstrung by the contractual arrangements. In a certain sense, what has emerged is that the State — it is unfair to place responsibility solely on the Department because there was a task force and liaison committee operating across Departments — certainly viewed itself as being hamstrung.

In a sense, one could say MIT might have put the gun to the head of the State in this matter by asking whether it was going ahead, by telling those concerned they had to make a decision and by outlining the terms under which it was willing to proceed. The State was in that position but it would have been reasonable for it to incorporate review milestones into the agreement rather than being locked in for the whole amount for four years, regardless of what happened. That is important in regard to any future agreements because part of this process is about learning lessons. I am just supplementing some of the lessons the Accounting Officer has said we have learned from these matters.

We must also ensure the main funding party in these arrangements has the required access to the necessary records to satisfy itself on the use of funds. This echos what members have said at this meeting. I had already included it in my own notes as worthy of mention. We must be careful in any project evaluation because there is a built-in optimism bias. That is well recorded, whether the project is infrastructural or otherwise. One must discount for that bias but that is not always done in the information furnished to Government. In most cases with which I have dealt as Comptroller and Auditor General and before, when matters of sponsorship are added to the equation those levels are not met. They are invariably over-enthusiastic and optimistic.

Media Lab Asia was mentioned today. Although it was a very different project, there were some similarities in the arrangements MIT made there and with the Irish Government. Its collapse in India was a cause célèbre because India regards itself as the coming Asian tiger in these matters. The reports there suggested the Government felt it was investing but getting very little in return and pulled out two years later. The project ran there between 2001 and 2003.

The comments that characterised that episode could be transferred to the Irish environment; for example, the project was full of lofty goals rather than specific objectives. Media Lab Asia and Media Lab Europe were in competition with MIT for corporate sponsorship. When Media Lab Asia approached potential sponsors they said they were already involved in an arrangement with MIT.

The main feature we share with Media Lab Asia is that the corporate funding failed to materialise. In fact no funding materialised in India. We at least received something in the region of €7 million. I may be wrong about the figure but we did receive something. That may help provide a context for our earlier discussion.

I will not dispose of chapter 11.1 today. We are not in a position to conclude it for several reasons, first, the Comptroller and Auditor General did not have access to the documentation we believe is necessary for the committee to make a fully informed judgment.

The MIT submission arrived yesterday afternoon and we did not have sufficient time to examine it critically. Even though we included it on today's agenda with chapter 11.1, members need more time to reflect on the contradictions between what is in the consultant's report as reflected in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report and the MIT submission.

Mr. Tuohy indicated he has a difference of opinion with MIT on some of the submissions made in the correspondence to which I referred. I would appreciate if Mr. Tuohy's Department could correspond with us setting out its differences of opinion with MIT's submission, in the normal way we take written submissions from Departments after meetings. For those reasons, and finally because we heard today a great deal on which we need to reflect, much of it disturbing, particularly about access to documents, we will not rush in to dispose of this chapter.

The word should go out, however, whether to solicitors or accountants or anybody else, that this committee intends to access all necessary documents to discharge its functions. We fully support the Comptroller and Auditor General, whose powers come directly from the Constitution, when he goes to seek such documentation. We expect he will receive every co-operation and assistance not only from Departments, which always co-operate, but also from people in the private sector.

The committee adjourned at 2.45 p.m until 2.00 p.m. on Wednesday, 19 October 2005.

Barr
Roinn