In raising this Military matter, which is also a civil matter, I trust I will not be accused of making a wanton attack on the Army Authorities for they represent one of the very few Departments of Government for which I have a profound respect. The matter arises in this way. Three weeks ago, or less, this Dáil passed a resolution sanctioning the establishment of Emergency Courts by the Army Authorities, subject to certain restrictions. Now the important thing here in which the Dáil was then concerned, and should be concerned now, is the fundamental principle that this Dáil must control the liberty of the citizen, and that that principle must be applied, even in time of war, and more particularly where you are dealing with civilians. What has happened is this, that acting upon what I conceive to be a misinterpretation of the resolution of this Dáil, the Army Council has issued a Proclamation in the Press whereby they purport to take power to sentence people to death for certain offences. Now I venture to assert that the greater number of Members of this Dáil who heard the debate on this question at the end of September had clearly in mind that what was being done and what was intended was this, that whenever the Military Authorities deemed it necessary to take power to impose the death sentence, they would before assuming that power, bring before this Dáil, and lay on the table of this Dáil for four days, the Regulations governing the exercise of this power. This is the interpretation, I venture to say, in which the matter was generally understood. It is obvious that the Army Authorities have placed a different interpretation upon it. Now the resolution provided first of all for the setting up of Military Courts, and secondly, for the enquiry by such Military Courts into the cases of persons charged with certain offences, and one of the offences was the breach of any General Order or Regulation made by the Army Council. That resolution of this Dáil never intended to create offences which did not exist before, and the Dáil will observe that the Military Authorities are not claiming to act under any law at all unless it be the resolution of this Dáil. There is no other law justifying them in the measure they propose to adopt. The resolution, therefore, sets out vaguely and generally, certain things which the Military consider they must have special power to deal with. One of them was unlawful possession of any property, looting, arson, destruction, seizure, unlawful possession, or removal of, or damage to, any public or private property. That cannot be intended as a definition of crime. If you are going to make regulations that a man may not have some particular seditious literature, you will say so in your Regulation, but no Parliament that ever existed could have intended to make provision in such general terms as these and then say "we thereby have defined an offence." They do not thus define any offence. They merely describe generally a certain class of things for which Military Courts would be required and then they proceed to say that Regulations would be made. That phrase about the regulations appeared in the fourth of the four paragraphs. Apparently it has been assumed that because things like looting and unlawful possession of property are mentioned in separate clauses, therefore you need no regulations to deal with it. Now the Military Authorities have issued a Proclamation in which they themselves say they have issued regulations which have not been on the table of the Dáil. The Military Authorities recognise that they could not bring up people for sentences before their Military Tribunals until they had made regulations on the matter. I have not seen these regulations, neither have members of the Dáil generally. Therefore, I take it, they do not define the class of property which you are to have to expose yourself to trial by one of these courts. But the Military say they made regulations on the 2nd October, 1922, providing for the trial of civilians charged by these courts. And then they give the penalties, including death, as being the sequel of these sentences, and they state that these regulations made by the Army Council on the 2nd October, shall come into force and apply on the 15th October. Now the wording of this thing is bad. I admit that; the wording of the resolution of the Dáil is bad, but I do not think that any interpretation of the wording would justify the view taken by the Military Authorities, that because certain things described generally in this Resolution by the Dáil, certain things which had to be indicated, therefore, it meant that it was going to give the right to the Military Authorities to make regulations outside this House, under which people might be sentenced to death. Note, these offences are offences only by virtue of these resolutions, and this resolution provides that a breach of any order or regulation made by the Army Council is to be a subject matter for enquiry by these Courts. Now, in the resolution passed by the Dáil, you have these words:—They recite these various offences established by these courts, and so forth, and then they say "Now this Dáil being of opinion that the doing by or under the Authority of the Army Council of the several matters aforesaid is a matter of military necessity doth hereby ratify and approve of the sanction given by the Government and of the doing by or under the Authority of the Army Council of all or any of the acts and matters aforesaid. Provided, however, that as regards such general order or regulation as aforesaid the same shall specify the maximum penalty which may be inflicted for any breach thereof and shall be laid on the table of this Dáil and shall take effect on the expiration of four days thereafter during which the Dáil shall be in session unless this Dáil shall have previously passed a resolution disallowing the same."
Now that can only have meant—that if the Military found it necessary to lay down that certain things were punished by their special courts with death, they would bring the regulations down to this Dáil and lay them on the table so that everybody could see them four days before putting the regulations into force. And I may call the attention of the Minister for Defence to the fact that the actual wording of his own proclamation makes it clear that the phrase dealing with the breach of the regulations and the phrase therefore requiring the regulations to be laid on the table of this Dáil applies to any regulations made by the Army Council. The resolution says so in so many words. "A breach of any general order made by the Army Council" is the express wording in the regulation. These are the words in the recital. Now the operative part of these regulations come into force only after they have been four days on the table of the Dáil. The Military admit they have made regulations in their own Proclamation. If this Resolution be against them then there are their own words. A breach of the regulations cannot be committed until the regulations lie on the table of this Dáil.