I beg to move:—
To delete sub-section (2) and to substitute in lieu thereof as follows:—
(2) This Section applies to women who are mothers of, or responsible for the domestic care of a child or children under the age of sixteen years.
This is an amendment designed to relieve from responsibilities those people who might reasonably be expected to be relieved and whom we should think of as being entitled to relief. That is to say, the Section entitled to be relieved of a liability shall be women who are mothers of, or responsible for, the domestic care of a child or children under the age of sixteen years. If this is carried, it will secure that these people who, it is urged, should be allowed to look after their domestic responsibilities should do so. But it will not relieve the unmarried woman who has not this responsibility, and who is quite capable of serving efficiently as a juror. It will not relieve these women simply because they desire to be relieved. If Deputy Duggan's contention is to be accepted, why does he not move as one of the amendments that no woman shall be allowed to serve on a jury? The Section, as it stands, as I have already said, imposes upon women the obligation of serving on juries. But what class of woman? Those women whose husbands desire to be relieved of the obligation and secure excision from the Jurors' Lists and the Electors' Lists. Then the obligation is imposed upon the woman. You cannot consistently say that women should not be allowed to serve on juries, and put forward a proposition which imposes on them the liability to serve on juries, provided their husbands have done certain things or failed to do certain things. I want to exempt from liability the mothers of children, and those who have the care of children, and unless you are going absolutely to remove women from the obligation and alter the law with respect to women, then I can understand your argument. I take it this is implied; the woman that will want to serve on juries will be a particular type of woman and you are going to put them upon the list. Are they going to make efficient jurors?
Will Deputy Duggan say that his experience is that that particular type of person is going to make an efficient juror? Is that particular type of woman going to conform to the theory of the jury system that the even citizen, the peers of the prisoner or the disputant shall decide the case? You are practically saying that the neurotic women shall serve on juries because they may desire to serve on juries, and you are going to leave to that particular type of women the responsibility for deciding very grave issues. I say they are not the type of women that you should urge or even allow to serve on juries to the exclusion of normal women. I am asking, in this amendment, that women who are mothers of children shall be exempted, but so long as you are inviting women and making provision for women to serve on juries, I submit that it is not good policy to leave that service to those who specifically express their desire on the one hand, or who are negligent of their rights of exemption. You will, under the Section as it stands, impose upon certain women the obligation. You will allow the keen public woman who is capable and efficient and aware of her rights and public interests, but is not desirous of serving the public interest. She will claim exemption and leave on the list the careless and those who specifically desire to serve. No, I say that is not fulfilling the intention of the jury system which provides for a case being tried by the average man. You are selecting women, and that, I think, is not serving the intentions, and I suggest that the whole question should be reconsidered.