I move the adjournment until to-morrow at 3 o'clock.
ADJOURNMENT DEBATE. - ARMY INQUIRY REPORT—
I had occasion before the Committee of Inquiry to express my own personal sense of national humiliation in respect of circumstances in which the inquiry had been called for, the grudging manner in which it was set up, and then, when it was set up, the fact that Ministers who had made very serious charges or implied very serious charges against very prominent military officers in the State did not come forward before that inquiry to substantiate those charges. The Minister who came forward, having made charges here, simply dealt before that Committee of Inquiry with what I might call the scum of our very material work for the last two years. Seeing this Report as it stands now, I feel that it is an additional national humiliation. Seeing the make-up of this Report, and realising that it is a Report of a very important matter after six weeks' examination of the subject, six weeks' cogitation by an intelligent Committee, and after two weeks in which to prepare their report as a result of the evidence that had been before them, I feel that the Report in its form and in the way in which the Committee has done its work of reporting, is humiliating nationally. The curt advice of the Executive Council that they have decided not to publish the evidence that was before the Committee is humiliating, and the further curt notice of theirs that the Chairman's reservations with regard to completeness is also not to be published, is humiliating. When the President tells us here to-day that this Report, which has been with them ten days, has not yet been considered by the Executive Council, in spite of the very important matters from the point of view of the State with which it deals, that is a further national humiliation. I think it is very discreditable that no consideration has been given to the position of the three General Officers whose cases have been dealt with in this Report, considering the Report has been with the Executive Council for ten days past.
The Report itself, no doubt, reports positively with regard to what it calls one section of officers in the Army, but if the other section that is referred to here is understood to be the General Officers against whom such serious charges have been brought, the only positive statement I find in this Report with regard to those General Officers is that contained in paragraph 14, where the Committee speak of their failure to appreciate their position as servants of the State. I want particularly to examine that, and also paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 from the point of view of the three General Officers concerned in this matter. I want to call attention to the statement at the end of paragraph 14, which speaks of two sections of Army officers. I take it one section is the Tobin group, and I am taking it the other section is meant to be General Sean McMahon, Lieutenant-General O'Sullivan, Lieutenant-General Sean O'Murthuille, and perhaps myself. I want to ask why the four, say, of us, are bracketed with what is called the Tobin group, and why we are called two sections of Army officers. The attitude of one section of officers, that is the Tobin group, in certain matters is set out in paragraphs 8 and 9. Paragraph 8 says: "That the organisation of which they were members did not regard the Army as a non-political servant of the State, but as an engine to be used if necessary, and to be kept in a condition to be used, for the purpose of obtaining personal and political objectives." Paragraph 9 says: "That they contemplated the use of the Army, so controlled, for the purpose of imposing their views upon the Civil Government." I want to know are we bracketed as a second section with the Tobin group, because there is no indication that our outlook was tinged in any way with the outlook attributed to the Tobin group in those two paragraphs, and if not, I want to know in respect of what feeling or actions of ours are we so bracketed. The President was in actual touch with the members of the Army Council in many matters, and with the Chief-of-Staff. He was in direct touch with the Adjutant-General. He was in direct touch with him when he was a co-Deputy for the Kilkenny-Carlow constituency, while he was yet an Army officer. The President has now been more closely in touch with the Army, and I want to know has he found any officer, who may have come under the influence of the Army Council, tinged in any way with the feeling and outlook indicated in paragraphs 8 and 9.
I want to call attention to the reference to "the failure of both to appreciate their positions as servants of the State." I want to say, for my part, that the three General Officers, as military officers, were absolutely obedient and absolutely subordinate to me both as Commander-in-Chief, when I was Commander-in-Chief, and Minister for Defence, when I was Minister for Defence. They fully appreciated their positions as such, and, I submit, I fully appreciated my position, both as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces and as Minister for Defence responsible to this Dáil. If I felt that, at any time of danger to our people and danger to the State here, a charge could be levelled against me that I failed to appreciate my position as a servant of the State. I would hang my head in shame. I do not believe that that charge can be levelled against me, any more than it can be levelled against any of the three officers. I do submit, when you take into consideration the duties that have been imposed upon us for the last two years, and take into consideration that in 1924 the five particular people—with their own particular and different traditions—under the authority of an Irish State here sat on a committee and investigated certain matters concerning the administration of an Irish Army—that very fact should drive home very deeply the realisation that those who were responsible for the Irish Army during the last two years—men who had stood at its birth years before— were very sensible of their position as servants of the State, and that they very loyally and effectively carried out the duties imposed upon them as such.
I want to turn to paragraphs 24, 25 and 26, and to draw particular attention to these paragraphs. I want to ask thoughtful Deputies to consider what could have been the mental processes as a result of which these paragraphs have been arrived at. I want to draw attention to the want of symmetry in them. I want them to ask themselves carefully: What is there suggested against the Chief-of-Staff by way of charge? What is there suggested against the Adjutant-General? And, what is there suggested against the Quartermaster-General? I admit this is a Report made as a result of very awkward Terms of Reference. The Terms of Reference were pretty wrong, but I would expect more symmetry in the Report of the Committee when dealing with the three officers who are dealt with in these particular paragraphs. I suggest that the thought embodied in these paragraphs is neither the thought nor the phrasing of a Justice of the Supreme Court; nor the thought or phrasing of a Justice of the High Court; nor the pretty direct thought or phrasing to which we have been accustomed in connection with the exposition of the Railway Bill by the Minister for Industry and Commerce; and I do not think that it suggests the straight or clear thinking of either the soldier or the sportsman.
We have here in paragraph 24:—
No evidence was given before us to justify a charge of muddling, mismanagement or incompetence on the part of the late Chief-of-Staff in carrying out his duties.
That sounds like a grudging statement to the Executive Council that they had not, unfortunately, been able to put up anything against this officer. I want it to be asked, and I want the members of the Committee to ask themselves, why that sentence did not read: "The Committee are convinced that a charge of muddling, mismanagement or incompetence on the part of the late Chief-of-Staff in carrying out his duties cannot be sustained." What would be wrong, from the point of view of any member of the Committee, if it were asked that the paragraph in the Report should be substituted by the one I have suggested? Then, even taking the grudging phraseology of paragraph 24 in respect to the late Chief-of-Staff, I want to know why, in respect to the late Quartermaster-General, and in respect to the late Adjutant-General, the two paragraphs dealing with them should not open by this statement at least: "No evidence was given before us to justify the charge of muddling, mismanagement or incompetence on the part of the late Quartermaster-General or the late Adjutant-General, as the case may be, in carrying out his duties." I want to ask these two questions particularly in connection with the three officers.
Coming to the general matter of the Report, I want to make some comment on it to show that it is misleading, to show that no person could safely form a judgment on any matter or any paragraph that is in it, as it stands at present, and in the absence of the evidence that we are told we are not to get.
Now, I want to come to paragraph 2, where it says:—
If this Report is published, the Schedule can be omitted, as some of the witnesses may not desire to have their names appear as having given evidence.
I want to ask are there perhaps others who do not want to have it known that they did not come forward as witnesses —persons who had charges to state or suggest here, and who, when they got an opportunity to come forward before this Committee did not come? I want also, in reference to that paragraph, to direct attention to the sentence which says:—
The Committee endeavoured to procure the attendance of all witnesses who seemed likely to give material assistance to them.
Would anybody understand from that sentence that no single General Officer Commanding a Command in the country was summoned before this Inquiry to give evidence? If not, who were the witnesses that were summoned? One witness who came forward was an officer who had been in direct touch with the Minister for Home Affairs at the time, behind my back and without my knowledge, and who was reporting and complaining of matters to the Minister that he had not made any complaint of either to the Chief-of-Staff or to myself. Another witness who came forward, in a very long exposition, which stopped short at the time of the Four Courts, showed that, but for the I.R.B. standing in the way of what was his military policy and proposals at the time, the Civil War would not have happened at all. Another witness came forward to show how everything should be done now and in the future. Yet, in the very rough days of January, 1923, when that officer was asked to take up the position of G.O.C. of a particular command, he put forward private and personal reasons for not doing so.
These were the types of witnesses who did come forward. Not a single G.O.C. was brought forward. You have to ask yourself what type of witness the Committee sent for in order to give them materials to assist them. In the same paragraph it says that at the outset the Committee invited the three General Officers and myself to make a statement, but that this invitation was definitely refused. The Committee might have amplified that by saying that I put it up to the Committee that certain pretty definite charges were suggested against us, and that when we had dealt with these charges, when we had seen these charges, and had an opportunity of rebutting them—in the light of these charges being either proved or rebutted—we were prepared to make every possible statement that would be of assistance to the Committee.
I submit that paragraph three is a pretty fair vindication of the officers who were in charge of the Army. I would simply like to add in reference to the sentence—
"The fact that there had not been sufficient time to allow of the development of a non-political and purely soldier type of mind in the Army"
—that, thanks to the efforts of the late Army Council, there was developed in the Army a non-political and purely soldier type of mind. I think everybody realises that when they see how the Army stood through the circumstances that gave rise to the setting up of this Committee of Inquiry. In the last sentence of that paragraph the Report says:
We believe that in all the circumstances the Army Council honestly endeavoured to deal fairly with the question of demobilisation.
I submit that they are begging the question there. The question is, did they deal fairly with it?
In paragraph 15 the statement is made:
General O Murthuile has stated to us that the I.R.B. was originally reorganised to prevent the Irregulars from getting control of it if it were left derelict, and using its name to stir up disaffection against the State.
"Originally reorganised!" I do not know what members of the Dáil are going to imply from that. I gave evidence before the Committee that I was in touch with Lieutenant-General O Murthuile seven days, I think, after the burial of General Collins, in connection with certain matters connected with the I.R.B. organisation that required to be dealt with immediately as the result of General Collins' death. I would like to draw attention to the fact that that is all that is stated in the report, as far as I could see, going through it hurriedly, with regard to General O Murthuile and the I.R.B. Nevertheless, we find in paragraph 5 a statement of the Committee:
We have already dealt with the actions of the late Quartermaster-General in connection with the reorganisation of the I.R.B.
It is not so. In paragraph 15 the so-called reorganisation of the I.R.B. is spoken of as "a disastrous error of judgment." If there was any disastrous error of judgment in it, the "error of judgment" is mine, and not that of any Army officer. It does not appear in any place in the Report that the President, Vice-President, and the Minister for Education were aware of what is called this "disastrous error of judgment" as early as June, 1923.
Paragraph 17 speaks of an Officers' Board which was originally set up to deal with these matters." Would anybody reading that Report understand that this General Officers' Board was set up after 700 old men had been demobilised through the ordinary workings of the Staff Section of the Chief-of Staff's Department? Would they realise that the responsibility of these four General Officers was to make recommendations to the Army Council, and submit names of persons whom they considered might be demobilised?
In paragraph 18 the Report says:—
The leaders of this organisation believed that they had been tricked.
I do not know whether that suggests powers of belief on the part of the Committee or powers of belief on the part of the Tobin organisation. At any rate, is that sentence written from evidence?
We come then to the letters to Major-General Tom Cullen. Will it be understood from that paragraph, that that letter is taken from my evidence, submitted to the Committee, either before Deputy McGrath made his statement in Mayo, or a certain pamphlet was published here in Dublin? Will it appear to anyone reading this Report that I, in putting in that letter, put in an introduction running into fourteen foolscap pages, explaining the circumstances that led up to this particular letter? Will it be understood that I wrote practically a sheet of foolscap explaining that letter, even down to the detail of saying where the inverted commas came from, and why the sentences included in the inverted commas were inserted in that letter? I do not know what any member of the Dáil will make out of the word "representation" in the sentence where it says—
He held no further communication with them and did not reply to the representation which was put forward on their behalf.
I want to ask, would it be a breach of confidence on my part, if I brought out a pamphlet saying what I did in that matter? Would it be within the limits of the Standing Orders, if I brought what I had to say on this matter in here, and read it in debate or as portion of a statement of any kind?
In paragraph 20 the discipline of the Army is spoken of as "fairly satisfactory." Yet you are told—
"there appears to have been a steady improvement both in discipline and efficiency from the formation of the Army down to the present date."
What is discipline? Does it not differ for different people, for different countries, for different circumstances and for different stages of development? In paragraph 21 you are told, because of certain things, that slackness and indiscipline arose. In respect of what, and amongst whom? And in paragraph 22 we are told—
"The existence of secret societies, factions and political organisations undoubtedly did affect discipline among officers."
As far as I know, the Committee found out that there was an organisation called the I.R.A. and that there was an organisation called the I.R.B.— that they were two what might be called secret societies. But is the ordinary member of the Dáil or the ordinary person in the street who reads this sentence in a position to realise that after six weeks' examination of the situation the Committee found that there were two organisations?
In paragraph 25, in respect of the Quartermaster General, there is a very very mean sentence:—
"No other charge relevant to our Inquiry was made against him."
The late Quartermaster-General has been made the butt of lie and rumour to a very considerable extent, and by the tongues of people placed in very high and very low places. And if no other charge relevant to the Inquiry was made against him, why is that sentence put in here? And as it is put in here, what are the charges, if any, that were made against the Quartermaster-General and that were not relevant to the Inquiry? The Quartermaster-General himself, in my recollection, in his statement, drew attention to a large number of those things, and the Committee, to my recollection, told him that he should not worry about them.
Now, in respect to the Adjutant-General, in an attempt to make a case against him, three disciplinary cases were trumped up. In addition to the Kenmare case and the Mayo case, there was a third, the Limerick case. Why is it not mentioned here? Is it because the Limerick case happened to come into my hands personally, and that some letters of mine on the file would show the way in which I was prepared to deal with the case?
With regard to paragraph 27:—
"General Mulcahy accepted full responsibility for the decision to drop the Kenmare case."
Would anybody understand that the Kenmare case, in the circumstances, was sent to the late Attorney-General for decision, and that he gave his decision in a long statement as the result of his examination—that there was no shred of evidence against Major-Gen-eral O'Daly, who, it was alleged, was mixed up in this case, and that there was no shred of evidence against the second officer, and that there was only a shadow of evidence against the third? And it will not appear that the parties who had a grievance in this particular case were advised that there were not sufficient grounds for the State to take up a prosecution, and that, if they considered well of it, they had the Law Courts to go to in this particular case.
As regards paragraph 28, will anybody reading that paragraph understand in the first place that the three members of the Executive Council I mentioned—the President, Vice-President, and the Minister for Education—were as early as June, 1923, aware of what we had done with regard to the I.R.B.? And with regard to the second portion will it be apparent from the Report that my introduction to the Tobin group was as a result of a letter from the President? And will they have any idea from that Report that the President, the late Minister for Industry and Commerce, and perhaps the Minister for Home Affairs, knew as much about the Tobin group as I did?
I make those comments to show that the Report is misleading, and that those members of the Dáil and the public who want to know what was behind or something of what was behind the recent happenings with regard to the Army, and who want to know that in the interests of the public service, can only know it by an examination of the evidence and by an examination of what additional statements the Chairman has to make.
There is one comment I should like to make with regard to the Chairman's statement, and I would refer you again to paragraph 18 and to the letter to Major-General Tom Cullen. The Chairman suggested to me in examination or cross-examination that that letter was written by me in order to affect my return at the General Election of August, 1923. He suggested that I wrote that letter to those officers to keep them off my track while that election was on. It gives me some inkling as to the mentality of the Chairman. But, nevertheless, I say that what the Chairman has written should be known here, because whatever lessons have to be learned as the result of our actions or our inactions, or as the result of our judgment or want of judgment during the last couple of years, it is to the benefit of the State that they should be learned.
I realise that the evidence cannot be prepared for printing, cannot be printed, cannot be gone over in proof, cannot be circulated, cannot be digested and discussed here in the Dáil, for some time. It is three months since the three officers concerned, particularly in this Report, have been removed from their positions in circumstances that we do not require to detail. I take that Report when conscientiously and critically examined as a complete vindication of those officers, and I want to face the practical point at once of their positions. I feel that after a careful consideration of this Report the members of the Dáil will be satisfied that they can consider the question of the position and the removal of those three officers from their positions, on that Report, without waiting to see the evidence. Therefore, while prepared to press in every possible way for the printing and circulation of the evidence, I am proposing to press right away for the doing of justice to the three officers.
The President said here to-day that the Executive Council had not considered this Report. I feel that they should have considered it before this. But I feel also, in the circumstances, that it may not be any harm now. I ask the President and the Executive Council to realise that those three officers have been taken from their positions for political reasons, whether those political reasons are wide political reasons or narrow, whether they are matters of policy or matters of personality. I ask them to realise and to admit that they were taken from their positions for political reasons, and I ask them to admit the great importance of keeping the Army out of politics and of not creating a situation here that every new administration that comes into office shall interfere with the personnel of the Army. I want them to leave the consideration of the restoration, or otherwise, of these three officers to their commissions and positions, to the Dáil. I propose, sir, to bring forward three motions here, somewhat to the effect: "That this Dáil considers it proper and in the interests of the State that those three officers be restored to the commissions and positions they were taken from in the Army." I would propose to make these three separate motions, so that the late Chief-of-Staff, the late Adjutant-General, and the late Quartermaster-General, would have their cases dealt with on their own particular merits by the Dáil here. I would appeal to the President, as I say, and to the Executive Council, to leave this matter to the Dáil, as a whole, in order that it may be dealt with in as wide and national a spirit as possible, in order that you may avoid a position in which it can be said that these officers were either kept out of their positions or were restored to their positions from a Cumann na nGaedheal point of view, from a political party point of view, or from the narrower point of view of, say, the desire of the President personally himself or of the Minister for Justice himself, or of the late Minister for Industry and Commerce himself, or of me personally. On consideration, I feel that that line of action will commend itself generally. Recently, in the opening of our Law Courts, we heard reference to the great love of justice that is a tradition in this country. I suggest that, in all the circumstances of the past three months, the reputation of the Government for justice and for dignity is bound up in the way in which they treat this particular matter. I want to emphasise the fact, too, that I have never dealt with this matter inside the Party. In the meeting that took place on the 11th March—the meeting that was spoken of—my intervention was simply to state the conditions on which I was prepared to tender my resignation as Minister for Defence. I left it to such time as it would come to the Dáil to discuss and debate the matter. I have not discussed the matter inside Party circles. As a matter of fact, I have not attended Party meetings since, and I would say here, for the benefit of members of the Party, that I consider that by my doing so I am, and have been, best discharging my duty of loyalty to that Party, both as a political party and likewise to the individual members of it, who have, as members of the Party, borne such very serious responsibilities since their election as members of this Dáil in 1922. That is all I wish to say at this particular stage.
I do not want to go into the matter with any fullness, but I want to say that I think it is quite wrong to approach this matter from the point of view of the officers concerned. This report is a report of the Army Inquiry Committee to the Executive Council. The Executive Council has submitted it, in its wisdom, to the Dáil. What its purpose was in doing that, I do not know. It has submitted a report of the Army Inquiry Committee made to the Executive Council, to the Dáil—an emasculated and partial report. In submitting the report to us, they tell us they are only submitting part of it. Now, the meaning and purpose of that I cannot understand. When this matter was raised, in the early stages, a question arose as to the form of the Committee, the constitution of the Committee, and the responsibility of the Committee. I, for one, urged that it was not the kind of Committee that ought to be set up for the purpose—that it was a Committee to be appointed by the Executive Council and to report to the Executive Council, and that it was within their discretion whether they should submit that report to the Dáil or not.
I want the Dáil to bear in mind that this was an Inquiry into the administration of the Army by the Executive Council. The Executive Council was responsible for the administration of the Army, and it was the Executive Council that, in fact, was on trial, not the chief officers of the Army, or any officers of the Army. The report, in so far as it contains anything in relation to the state of the Army, is a report upon the administration of the Army by the Executive Council, which acts as a collective body and is responsible as a collective body to the Dáil. It was said that that particular form of Committee was to be set up, firstly, because a report was wanted within a fortnight. It took two months. Secondly, it was said it was to be set up in this form, because it was to have a Chairman and members who were competent to produce a report in reasonable time and in intelligent form. You have the report. If a Dáil Committee would not have been able to do as well as that, then I have little hope of the Dáil.
But the Executive Council has submitted this report, such as it is, and it says that there are certain reservations in the Chairman's report which it thinks well not to publish, and it has decided not to publish the Chairman's report. Not a simple individual private member of the Committee but the actual Chairman of the Committee, has sent in reservations, as addenda, and the Executive Council says it does not propose to publish, and has decided against publishing—though it has not considered the report—the Chairman's reservations. Why anything was submitted to the Dáil I cannot understand. The report having been submitted, inevitably invites the Dáil to say it cannot consider this report until it has had the complete report. We have reference to the Kenmare case, and the Mayo case, in the report, but we have no information what those cases are or what they mean. Therefore, we cannot consider this report with any sense of intelligence at all.
I submit that so far as the Report is understandable without these reservations, it attempts to minimise the condition that was found in the Army. It attempts to minimise the seriousness of the case that they found according to the evidence, and at the same time it suggests that there are more serious things behind that they have not touched upon. It exonerates the Chief-of-Staff, or rather, as Deputy Mulcahy pointed out, no evidence was submitted to justify the charge of muddling, mismanagement and incompetence on the part of the late Chief-of-Staff in carrying out his duties.
So far as the Dáil is concerned, whatever the Executive Council may say, we have no right to think of any alleged muddling and mismanagement on the part of that officer. If there was any charge of muddling, mismanagement and incompetence, it was a charge against the political heads of that Department of the State, and we must beware—I suggest it to the Dáil for very serious consideration—of expecting, or asking officers of Departments to be directly answerable to the Dáil. Whoever is responsible, it is the political head, and I am afraid that Deputy Mulcahy, in his suggestion, is allowing his mind to run in the direction which put the Army Council into the Defence Forces Bill, and which placed them in a position of exceptional strength in relation to the Dáil.
The Ministers and Secretaries Bill.
I beg your pardon, it is the Ministers and Secretaries Bill. The Dáil must look to the Executive Council as responsible. If it is to condemn anybody, it is the Minister, and if the Minister is a member of the Executive Council, it has to condemn the Executive Council. We shall be making a fatal mistake if we allow ourselves to be discussing the merits of individual officers in the Army because a Report which the Executive Council itself called for in regard to the administration of one of its Departments has been made public. This Report has been made public. It has been presented to the Dáil, and it can only result in a demand for fuller information. Presumably, it has been presented to the Dáil for a purpose. That purpose cannot be fulfilled until much more information is given to us than is presented in this emasculated report.
I do not know what course can be adopted for the purpose of having a debate on the Report itself; but it seems to me that the suggested course which Deputy Mulcahy throws out is one which can only be taken up if it is in the form of a vote of censure upon the Ministry for its action in dimissing, or asking for the resignation of, certain high military officers. It can only be in that form, and I would urgently ask the Dáil not to allow a direct discussion upon the question of whether or not any officers of a Department are to be replaced in their positions, but that it should be wholly and solely a question of the administration of these Departments by the heads of these Departments, and by the Executive Council.
It is not my intention to discuss this document at all. I need hardly say that my attitude towards the Inquiry is well known now; but I thought at least that my attendance before the Inquiry, on an invitation from them, would have been recorded and that the statement I made to them, or at least some of the main portion of it, would have been recorded. I attended there and stated, as I did in the Dáil, that I would not enter the Inquiry and make charges that I could not definitely back up with the necessary evidence, and that evidence was the evidence of the actual officers concerned. I will only deal with one point which concerns me that was made in the statement by Deputy Mulcahy. He said that the attitude of some Ministers—I imagine he referred to me—was one that he could not understand, in view of those Ministers having made statements here in the Dáil and then failing to attend the Committee of Inquiry to substantiate them.
I want to tell the Deputy that he and others with him took very good care that I would not attend the Inquiry by the very action for which the officers he is speaking of were called upon to resign, when a very determined effort—I say it deliberately —was made to start a blaze in this country that probably would never have been put out. I refer to the raid in Parnell Street. It was for that action, and that action only, that the officers were asked to send in their resignations. It had nothing to do with the charges made by me here in the Dáil, and it had nothing to do with the charges made before the Committee. It is all very fine at this hour of the day, when he and those with him have failed in the effort to cause trouble, to state coolly that the charges have not been proved against them, and it is all very well to come before the Dáil and leave it to the Dáil to say that those officers shall get back to the positions that they held.
As a matter of explanation, I would like to say that Deputy McGrath was not the only Minister referred to.
I have something to say on that, but I understand there will be time given to discuss this whole Report. I will say something on that portion of it then. At the moment I would like to draw attention to paragraph 2 of the Report, to which reference has already been made by Deputy Mulcahy. I would like to back him up in that matter. The Report says:—"The Committee endeavoured to procure the attendance of all witnesses who seemed likely to give material assistance to them." I was asked if I could get the officers concerned to give evidence that would help the Committee. The Committee asked me if I would help them. I said I would and that I would give the names of officers who I believed took no sides and would be able to throw a good deal of light on the situation, conditional on my getting a guarantee of indemnity for those officers. I was promised that guarantee of indemnity. I was written to and told that those officers had got the indemnity, but, benefiting by my past experiences, I asked for that in writing, and I got it in writing. I am sorry I have not it with me, but it simply meant that there was a guarantee given to them that they would not be criminally prosecuted if they gave evidence. That was the guarantee given by the Executive Council.
Then they expected the officers in the Army to come forward and give evidence, knowing that there was no indemnity there for them. The only indemnity they gave them was that they would not be criminally prosecuted. I see absolutely no reference in the Report to what one might call "documentary evidence." And documents must have been produced. I say definitely, if documents were produced, one document would have proved who the mutineers were. That document has already got publication in another form.
On a point of explanation, I would like to say that there is no document published in any of the pamphlets that have been issued or any of the statements already issued by Deputy McGrath that I had not Previously placed before the Army Committee of Inquiry. It is only just in keeping with what the Report leaves unsaid as a whole that it does not mention that. Much of the material that I personally put in was fully documented, and no documents were kept back that referred in any way to the matters into which the Committee were inquiring.
If I might interrupt just for a moment—I would not have intervened, but Deputy Mulcahy stood up to make an explanation. I believe Deputy Davin put a question to me here, before the Inquiry was set up, as to whether some sort of indemnity would not be given to the officers if they attended this Inquiry. I think I gave him a very safe answer at the time, and I do not think that I improved on that answer in any communication I had with the Committee of Inquiry. I put this, I believe, to the Army Committee of Inquiry: "Do you want an indemnity to such an effect that an officer giving evidence there has got to be promoted to the top, and on every occasion when any question of indemnity respecting him is to be given, has he got to step up?" That was my answer, and I certainly do repudiate any attempt at misleading or giving wrong guidance or leading any officer to believe that he was going to get anything that we could not deliver. I made that clear to the Army Inquiry.
Just before finishing, I want to say that the findings of the Committee, which are contained from paragraph 5 to paragraph 13, refer in the main to the officers who were classed as mutineers. I think I could say nothing to that. The evidence on which it is founded could only be of the one type, because of the failure of the officers themselves to appear before the Inquiry. There is, however, one paragraph that, before closing, I would like to draw your attention to, and that is paragraph 6. I would be very anxious to see the evidence on which that paragraph 6 is based. That paragraph says:—
"That the organisation which brought about, and many members of which joined in the late mutiny, was in existence, at least in embryo, before the outbreak of the Civil War, and that many of the officers who mutinied and of those who encouraged and abetted them had become a problem to General Collins before his death in August, 1922."
I would like to see the evidence on which that was based. Again, I am at a disadvantage because of the fact that I did not give evidence or get the officers to come there and give evidence. However, the problem that confronted General Collins before his death was the then G.H.Q. It was because of G.H.Q. that he had to leave Merrion Street and go into the Army —because of the way in which G.H.Q. were acting at the time. That is well-known to the members of the Executive Council.
I do not propose to deal in detail with the whole matter covered in this report. There will be another opportunity. There are one or two misconceptions which may arise from the speeches that have been delivered, and which, as General Mulcahy says, should not be allowed 24 hours' start. First, it is an absolute misconception if anybody in the country or in the Dáil imagines that General Mulcahy, and the officers who were associated with him, were not absolutely candid with the Committee, and put before it all the evidence at their disposal. Every document that has since been quoted by Deputy McGrath in his speeches, or in the pamphlet issued by General Tobin, was in our hands before these things happened. I do not think we thought them of sufficient importance to insert in the report. But it is the case unquestionably, and every member of the Committee knows it. Now, I come to paragraphs 24, 25 and 26, which Deputy Mulcahy takes exception to. He calls paragraph 24 a grudging statement, and he proceeded to give the form in which he thought we should have framed it. Now, every report of a Committee of five must inevitably be a combination of a number of views, and it cannot be as forceful, possibly, as the work of one man. But in practice I see very little difference between General Mulcahy's formula and the report of the Committee. What difference there is arises from the difficulty with which we were confronted and to which none of the previous speakers appear to have given sufficient weight. That was, that we were called on to investigate charges and there was really nobody to make those charges. The case for the prosecution, if I might put it so, was never formulated. On the other hand, the case for the defence was put as strongly as possible, with the assistance of counsel and solicitors, who had been given copies of every statement. That being so, I should say that we could not put it stronger than to say that no evidence was put before us to justify a charge of muddling, incompetence and mismanagement. It represents the facts of the case. There was no evidence, and consequently General MacMahon had no charge to answer.
Then we come to paragraph 25, to which Deputy Mulcahy takes exception. He wanted to know what charge there was against the late Quartermaster-General there. He knows what charge there was; he heard all the evidence; he knows that charges were brought against the Quartermaster-General's Department, not in relation to discipline in the Army, but in relation to its general conduct. But that had absolutely nothing to do with us. For a moment I was inclined to follow that line of inquiry, because I thought the charges against his Department might have affected the mutiny in some way or other, but I soon became satisfied they did nothing of the sort. What we were appointed for was to investigate the cause that led up to, and created, the mutiny. We were not told to investigate the whole conduct and administration of the Army for two years; that would be a task, not for six weeks, but rather for six months, and anyone who desired to do it properly and to give it proper attention would be obliged to resign his membership of the Dáil. These charges, such as they were, were not very serious. I say that at once. I do not know any Army in which there are not grumblings against the Quartermaster-General's Department. I do not say whether there was any substance in them, but whether or not they had nothing to do with our inquiry; they were not relevant to our inquiry, and nothing relevant to our inquiry was brought against the Quartermaster-General's Department. That is a plain statement of the facts, and no more. Before I leave that point, may I say we intended these paragraphs 24, 25 and 26—at least I did—to acquit these officers of the charge of "muddling, mismanagement or incompetence." And if General Mulcahy has taken exception to our wording, and if he is attacking the Committee on this ground and then follows it up by saying that the effect of the three paragraphs is a complete vindication of the officers, he cannot have it both ways. I venture to think that on the whole we convey the meaning we intended to convey, although other individuals might wish to frame the sentences differently. I say on the whole these paragraphs are not unfair, and reflect the facts of the case perfectly.
I come now to the last point that should be dealt with. Deputy Mulcahy complained that none of the G.O.C.'s was summoned to give evidence. If General Mulcahy, or any other officer, wished any of the G.O.C.'s to be summoned they had only to ask and it would have been done. They did make application through their counsel in the case of one officer, and he was at once summoned. Wherever any persons gave the slightest indication that we could get any information from any individual officer or officers of the Army we sent for them. And dealing with Deputy McGrath's point that officers could not be expected to come in and give evidence, by far the greatest portion of the evidence came from officers serving, or ex-officers. We sought evidence wherever we could find it bearing on the case. And it was never suggested by General Mulcahy through his counsel to us that the G.O.C.'s were witnesses who could give valuable evidence, and without that suggestion I candidly admit I was reluctant to call them, as I was reluctant to call the present Chief-of-Staff, the present Quartermaster-General and the present Adjutant-General, because I am concerned with the welfare of the Army, and the discipline of the Army, and I do not believe any army can maintain discipline if it sees its higher officers called before civilian committees to be examined and cross-examined by members of those committees and by counsel. Unless it was absolutely necessary in the interests of justice to secure the attendance of these officers I was reluctant to see them called. These are the points I think it desirable to be made now.
When I was asked to go on this inquiry I did not think it would be pleasant work, and it has not been pleasant work. I did not think we could please everybody, and I think we have not pleased anybody, and therefore I venture to ask the Dáil and the country to believe that this Report is neither a whitewashing nor flattering report, but is an honest presentation of the facts as they appear to us.
I am glad of the attitude taken up by Deputy McGrath and Deputy Mulcahy. I must say I cannot understand the attitude of the Executive Council at all in presenting this Report in this form, consisting of three or four pages, to the Dáil, including the decision of the Executive Council, that the evidence is not to be published. The President tells us that the Executive Council had not at all considered the Report, and that, although they had not considered the Report, they apparently have considered the evidence, and the evidence is not to be published. Both Deputy McGrath and Deputy General Mulcahy seemed to want the publication of the evidence, and I must say from my point of view, and I think it will be the point of view of Deputies generally in this House, who know very little of what brought about the Army crisis, and have learned very little since then, that the evidence must be put before the public. I cannot understand at all how we could be expected at any time to come here and discuss this Report without the evidence. What do we find? Deputy Mulcahy presents his point of view, and Deputy McGrath presents his point of view, and somebody else presents the point of view of the Executive Council, and the body of Deputies not having seen any of the evidence, not knowing anything whatever about the facts, will be asked to judge between the conflicting statements of the respective parties interested in this Report. And what about the people of the Country? Where will they stand in all this muddle? Deputy Mulcahy intends, he says, to introduce a Motion here which will amount, I believe, to a vote of censure upon the Executive Council. How does Deputy Mulcahy think he is to get a fair decision or opinion from this House on the conduct of officers in the past in the Army, if we have to listen to what he has to say, and what others have to say without any opportunities of knowing what evidence was advanced by these respective parties before the Committee.
That is how I see things. I do not know how the matter may appear to other Deputies, but that is how it appears to me. I made a statement when this matter was before the Dáil that the Executive Council was really in the dock. The Executive Council were collectively responsible, as Deputy Johnson has said, and the Executive Council established this Committee to report to itself. It has reported to itself. Is the Executive Council satisfied with this Report? We do not know. They have not considered it, we are told, but whether the Executive Council is satisfied or not this House cannot be satisfied with this Report unless the evidence is presented on which the Report is based, and by the Report I mean the full Report, and not half the Report.
I must say I cannot imagine how the Deputies who sat on this Committee— knowing them individually—got their points of view expressed so concisely. I cannot understand that, I admit. They made an extraordinary effort, but I submit to the Dáil very seriously that it is absolutely useless for us to attempt at any period or on any occasion to discuss this Report unless the evidence on which it is based is Presented to us, and unless ample time is given to the Dáil for its consideration. If the Executive Council expects that we are to consider this Report without such evidence as that which was given before the Committee being in our hands, I say that the Army Inquiry will, after discussion in this House, be a greater muddle than ever, and that after wasted misspent days, the protest in the country will be so loud that the Executive Council, whether it likes it or not, will have to go back upon its apparent decision and publish the full evidence that was submitted to the Committee.
There are one or two points I would like to bring before the Dáil in connection with this Report. I am limiting myself, and do limit myself from the start, by stating that as a member of the Executive Council I intend to abide by the introductory Note prefacing this document, and consequently in any remarks I have to make here to-night I do not intend to draw upon any evidence that was given before me as a member of the Committee of Inquiry. Certain questions have been asked and certain answers have been given. I think I could answer the points put up by Deputy General Mulcahy, in general, by stating that if the Report be considered as a whole—what is stated in the Report considered as a whole, and no attempt made to read into it things that are not in the Report and no insistence on omissions from the Report which various Deputies may think should have been included—the Report will be much easier to understand. Let me take one point. Deputy General Mulcahy alludes to paragraphs 8 and 9, in which two sections found within the Army are bracketed and—Section 14 brackets two sections in the Army— desires to know if these two paragraphs, which specifically in the Report refer to the I.R.B. organisation, are to be taken as referring to the other organisation. Now that is unnecessary. Why should there be any attempt to go outside the plain words of a very plain, though a very highly condensed Report. There is no innuendo in the Report. Any findings that there are, are stated quite clearly and simply, and there is no necessity to get back to two paragraphs which refer to one organisation and bring them down and make them have reference to a second. A second question was asked on paragraph 14 as to "the failure of both to appreciate their position as servants of the State." That seems to have been linked up with the previous bracketing of paragraphs 8 and 9, which are supposed to be brought down and imported into paragraph 14. Paragraph 14 is, on the face of it, a finding as far as Deputy General Mulcahy's question is concerned. It is a finding that the I.R.B. did not appreciate their position as servants of the State. Now there is a direct and a definite reference in paragraph 14 to both the I.R.A. and the I.R.B., and so much can be taken from it, but no importation of paragraphs 8 and 9 should be made with regard to paragraph 14.
The three paragraphs—24, 25 and 26— have been much criticised. Attention has been called to what has been described as the lack of symmetry. I do not know what that means in this connection. Paragraphs 24 and 25 are highly symmetrical, I hold. Paragraph 26 rather goes beyond anything stated in paragraphs 24 and 25, and the reason is obvious. The three paragraphs, it must be remembered, deal with the matters set up under sub-head (c) of the division of the Terms of Reference made on page 5. When Deputy Cooper says that he regards these three paragraphs as an acquittal of the three officers mentioned. I agree with him, but I agree with a difference. They are an acquittal in so far as any charges under the third head of the Terms of Reference, as divided on page 5, are concerned. They are an acquittal as far as that paragraph goes, and only so far. That again will be obvious on a careful reading of the report, because inasmuch as the three officers concerned were members of the Army Council, and are more generally referred to as Heads of the Army, certain other findings, not an acquittal, are made with regards to these three in other relevant paragraphs in the report. With regard to these three paragraphs, this is the wording of paragraph 24: "No evidence was given before us to justify a charge of muddling, mismanagement or incompetence on the part of the late Chief-of-Staff in carrying out his duties." Deputy General Mulcahy says that is grudging. I think he used the word "mean" in regard to it.
"Mean" with regard to the second sentence in paragraph 25.
The adjective "grudging" was used with regard to paragraph 24, and he now says that the word mean is to be taken as applying to the second sentence in paragraph 25. The suggestion was made that paragraph 24 should have read "A charge of muddling, mismanagement, or incompetence cannot be sustained." That is getting into the region of prophecy.
No.
I submit that the wording of this paragraph is the same as saying that the charge has not been sustained. Can one go beyond that in dealing with evidence put before us on a specific matter? specific charges were made, and we say that evidence has not been given to sustain these charges. The charge has not been sustained. If the paragraph could be put more clearly, I cannot see any other formula, but it expresses my views and Deputy Cooper's, and I am sure also Deputy Gorey's. The word "mean," then, has been applied to the second sentence in paragraph 25, which reads: "No other charge relevant to our Inquiry was made against him." Is it argued that we should have put in here a synopsis or a summary of the charges that did appear against the Quartermaster-General in relation to all his duties in his many positions from the time when he first entered the Army until his dismissal recently from it?
Did such charges appear?
Charges with regard to his Quartermastering did appear. Under our terms of reference we were bound definitely by one paragraph in them: "To report upon the facts and matters which have caused or led up to the late mutiny." The other sub-heads were merely supplementary and explanatory of the first main head in the terms of reference given to us. "No other charge relevant to our Inquiry was made against him (Quartermaster-General)." Were we to have gone into a long exposition of the charges that had been made or which were referred to in our Inquiry, the Report would really have made as great a bulk as the evidence. The paragraph dealing with the Adjutant-General is out of keeping, as far as unity goes, with the paragraphs referring to the two other Generals. That is because specific charges were made against the Adjutant-General having direct reference to what led up to the recent mutiny. That is referred to in detail. It was thought better to refer in detail to this Kenmare case, of which a great deal had been made, and of which I cannot believe Deputy Johnson was so innocent as not to know anything of the facts.
I know of rumours, and that is all I know.
That is quite sufficient.
For some people.
Not for the Committee at any rate. The Committee has made a finding on what they held to be the facts. Only in one section of the evidence put before them did they go on suspicion, and that was the point on which suspicion had been elevated to the region of proof by the action of men who organised secret societies. Those who dabble in secret societies must be prepared to bear the consequences. Then there was the Mayo case.
I know nothing about the Mayo case either.
I submit that these three paragraphs, which are so much criticised for lack of symmetry, have at least been explained now and that there is a definite acquittal known to everybody of these three officers. The matters referred to in the third sub-division in the terms of reference is made under paragraph 5. With regard to page 4, towards the bottom, where the statement is made that "The Committee endeavoured to procure the attendance of all witnesses who seemed likely to give material assistance to them," Deputy General Mulcahy detailed certain witnesses called before the Committee, and asked, seeing that these men—apparently the argument runs—were summoned, why were not the General Officers Commanding summoned? The answer to that has been given by Deputy Cooper. No request was made, as far as I remember, for their attendance. It was certainly not pressed. It was not made out to us that the case would be incomplete without their attendance, and there was not at any time any refusal to summon any witnesses whose presence was declared to be necessary for the purpose of the Inquiry. And of the three officers to whom Deputy General Mulcahy referred in general and rather vague terms, not one was summoned.
With regard to two of them, I am perfectly certain that their approach to the Committee was by a letter stating that they thought that they had evidence of certain facts to lay before the Committee which would be useful. The case of the third officer was a complicated case. He appeared in two capacities. He appeared in one capacity in the course of certain Army duty, and as such he was summoned in the ordinary course. In the other capacity he again appeared, submitting, first of all, that he had certain facts and matters to put before us which would be useful to our inquiry, so that there was no attempt to keep out withnesses who were indicated to us as necessary by one side, and the calling of witnesses on the other side.
Deputy McGrath referred to the group of officers for whom he had first stated that he was the spokesman and who afterwards did not appear, and we are now told two facts with regard to these. He stated that he would give the names of people who could give facts useful to us. I would like to know if he did submit names, and, if so, was there a single case in which a man alleged to be useful was not summoned? His answer, I suppose, is given in his second statement, that the guarantee of indemnity was not enough. Numerous letters were sent to Deputy McGrath with regard to his attendance, and the attendance of the officers whom he represented. The indemnity guaranteed was given to him in writing, and again I simply make this statement, that there was no objection taken, either in writing or verbally, before the Committee, that the guarantee was not sufficiently complete. If that objection had been made —if Deputy McGrath had made any allegation of the sort—an attempt might have been made to get the guarantee enlarged.
On a point of order, it is on record that I stated that the guarantee given was of no value.
I cannot go into the evidence again. I am willing to withdraw the statement. I am willing to accept Deputy McGrath's version of that. I asked that other question: Did we refuse to summon any witnesses stated by him to be necessary for our inquiry?
Certainly not. I gave no names in view of that.
A few other statements were made, but there is one to which I must make reference, the statement in Paragraph 18: "The leaders of this organisation believed that they had been tricked by the late Minister for Defence, when, after entering into negotiations with them and giving them a written assurance" (in the terms that followed) "he held no further communications with them." I think I understood Deputy General Mulcahy to question if that is a finding of the Committee, that they had in fact been tricked. There is no such finding, but there is this: there is a statement that they believed they had been tricked, and there is certain evidence given there to show that their belief was not unreasonable. There is a finding to that extent, and for that purpose that letter was given. Any other questions I have asked may, I think, be referred to again when the various motions come before the Dáil. There is just one other matter with reference to Deputy Johnson's criticism of the Report of the Committee. He criticised it in two ways: first, that it was stated that it would take two weeks, and that it has now taken two months, and that mere statement, coming from a Deputy who objects to this Report as not containing all the matter on which people could form a correct view—that is supposed to be a correct statement of this time period set on the work of the Committee. When the two weeks period was put as an estimate on the work of the Committee were there any factors present in the President's mind which actually did not come into operation? Was it then a fact that it was considered not merely likely, but certain, that Deputy McGrath, and the officers represented by General Tobin, would come before the Committee of Inquiry? Is it fair to criticise the deliberations of the Committee for lasting two months because the President having in mind certain witnesses coming before them to state the case, for the prosecution, as Deputy Cooper put it, failed to come before the Committee?
I suggest it would have taken much longer if they had come. Deputy Mulcahy expressed his grave doubts of the President's optimism when he made it, and I supported that view.
The suggestion cannot be allowed by anybody cognisant of the facts. The delay that occurred in the Committee, and there was a delay, occurred in the first three weeks, when there was no evidence coming before the Committee at all, and when it seemed the Committee would have to go before the Executive Council and present a report that no statements by way of evidence had been given whatsoever.
I do not want the Minister to run away with the idea that I am complaining of the delay. Not in the slightest. I expected that it would take even longer than the time it has taken.
Well, I have not been able to assure myself that it was meant as a compliment. We are also told that the Committee was to include two persons competent legally, and for that reason a better report was expected, and Deputy Johnson then made the remark that if a Dáil Committee could not produce a better report he would think little of the Dáil. It has to be borne in mind that it was a Committee, the majority of the members of which were members of the Dáil, and it was a Committee on which the President invited the assistance of Deputy Johnson, an assistance and guidance which was present at the deliberations on the Report of the Broadcasting Committee. Does Deputy Johnson think that that was a model report?
The Dáil adjourned at 11 o'clock until 3 o'clock on Wednesday, June 18th.