took the Chair.
CREATION OF A NATIONAL MILITIA.
I beg to move:—
"That in the opinion of the Dáil it is expedient that the Executive Council should prepare, and as soon as may be lay before the Dáil, measures providing for the abolition of a Standing Army and for the creation of a National Militia."
In putting this motion before the Dáil I want, before putting any reasons that I wish to advance before the Dáil as to why I think the Dáil ought to accept it, and before coming to the actual provisions that I have caused to be drawn out, and have drawn out with the assistance of others, and which have been circulated in order that Deputies might have a definite and concrete proposal before them for their consideration, to deal with the actual terms of the motion itself and to show why it is that this motion should be a motion to be accepted by the Dáil here and now, and why it should not be postponed for consideration, either it or the matter which it contains, to a later date. The first reason is that if this motion were to be accepted by the Dáil, it does not mean and would not mean, that any action would be required to be taken in any violent hurry. It would require a great deal of time before any definite action could proceed. There is no question, if the Dáil were to accept this motion or the substance of it, that anything would be done in haste. The Executive Council, through the Minister for Defence, is merely required to furnish measures providing for the abolition of the Standing Army—and by that I mean the type of standing army as we now know it—and for the creation of a a National Militia. By that I do not mean that the word "Militia" should be necessarily adopted. I have merely adopted the word because it has been accepted in other countries for the type of the force I have in mind. It might be called a territorial force or a citizen force. In some countries it is called a citizen force; in others it is known as a territorial force, but it is generally referred to as Militia, and it is for that reason I use the word and not because I have any peculiar preference for the word itself over and above any other possible description. What I wish to put before the Dáil now, and all that the resolution requires, is that provision should be made and some measures should be elaborated and laid before the Dáil by the Minister.
In justification of bringing forward this motion at this particular time, I want the Dáil to work out exactly what it would mean if it were to be adopted. It would mean that the Minister would be required to draw up such a proposal. We know exactly what the legislative programme is between now and June. It is obvious that if the Minister were to accept this motion or the substance of it and were to proceed on the terms of it, no such proposal could possibly come before the Dáil before the autumn session and probably not before this time next year. That is to say, if the measures were to be adopted in any legislative proposal, that legislative proposal could not be considered before a year from the present moment and would not be adopted and passed before summer twelve months. Then a period would have to elapse in which a change would be made from one system to another. There would be no violent change; there would be no violent hurry. The thing would have to be done with care and with method. In effect it would mean before any such proposal could be carried into practical effect, if this motion were to be accepted now, at least three years would transpire. If ever such a motion at any time were to be laid before the Dáil and accepted by the Dáil, three years would have to transpire from that acceptation before the Dáil could begin to see the fruits of such acceptance. That is why I say we are dealing in this resolution not with a matter for immediate action to-morrow, but a matter in which immediate action could not proceed within much less than two years, and where we could not see definite fruits much before three years, having in mind that the preparation of the scheme, the passing of the legislative proposals embodying the scheme, the change from one system to another, and the institution in full of any new system that may be adopted. There is another reason that I want to put before the Dáil as to why this motion, if it is to be considered at all, ought to be considered now. In August, 1923, the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act came before the Dáil, and some of us then directed attention to the fact that one of the sections of that Act provided that enlistment could proceed, as it may still proceed, under the terms of that Act, for twelve years. The Minister for Defence, Deputy Mulcahy, replying to that interpretation, said that he engaged himself that no persons should be enlisted, under the terms of enlistment that were about to begin, for a period of more than eighteen months or two years, according as the exigencies of the time dictated. That is to say, in September, 1923, or thereabouts, we were led to believe that a number of re-enlistments would occur, and that these re-enlistments would be for either eighteen months or for two years. That means to say, following that up, calculating still in the terms of the pledge then given by the Minister, that new enlistments will be or should be undertaken some time this year. Obviously the Dáil ought to have an opportunity of expressing its opinion as to the type of army that is considered desirable for adoption in this country before these re-enlistments are entertained. The Minister ought to know whether it is the desire of the Dáil that the present type of Army should continue, or whether there should be some other type of army, and if the Dáil itself decide that this motion is one that should not be accepted, if the Dáil itself come to the decision that the present type of army is one that ought to be continued, I say for myself that I will faithfully and loyally abide by that decision of the Dáil, and stand by it for the rest of the term of the Dáil. But I will put forward reasons why I think another type of army would be better suited to the conditions of the country and would give relief from the heavy burden of taxation that is at present doing the country such an amount of injury. There is a third reason: it is one to which Deputy Grattan Esmonde has referred. It is that a provision of the Treaty lays down that within five years negotiations will have to take place between the Government of the Free State and the British Government with regard to Ireland providing more fully and amply for herself in regard to her defence. Obviously, I put it to the Dáil, before any such discussions or conferences can take place the Minister and the Executive Council ought to know and have cleared up what the desire of the Dáil is as regards the type of Army which this country ought to have. I believe it to be true; I am so informed, and I would like if the Minister would definitely inform us whether preparations are now being made, necessarily being made as things stand, for the adoption of the present method of defence forces and the organisation of these in such a way that if the Dáil were, in two or three years' time, to change its mind and desire a different type of Army and a different type of defence forces, it will find it very difficult to effect any radical change. It is for these reasons that I have brought forward this motion at this particular moment, firstly, because we are dealing with a period three years ahead, necessarily; secondly, because we are coming upon a period when there will be certain re-enlistments; thirdly, because of the Treaty provision that will fall due in a short time for the reconsideration of the defence provisions of the Treaty; fourthly, because I believe that the Army is now being reorganised in such a way that it will be difficult to effect a change if the Dáil does not have an opportunity to express its opinion this year.
There are other reasons why I think the matter presses urgently for immediate consideration. The outstanding reason is the question of economy. I need not draw the attention of the Dáil to the fact that there is an increasing amount of discussion as to the necessity for relief from taxation somewhere. It is a fact at the present moment that money, instead of coming into the country, is flowing out of the country. If there will be in the immediate future, as we believe there will be, a fundamental reduction of taxation in Great Britain, that tendency of money to go out of the country rather than to remain in the country, much less to come into the country, is bound to increase, and consequently many persons, alive to the actual state of affairs in commerce to-day, have urged that there should be a structural and a radical reduction in taxation. That, I think, is a matter on which there can be a certain amount of agreement. I think it can be taken as correct that the abnormal unemployment at the present time is very largely due to the fact that there is abnormal taxation. Ministers, when they are confronted by the proposal that taxation should be reduced, always make a very effective and proper reply. The President the other day, when he was asked in Cork city whether there would be some reduction in Income Tax, whether there would be a wholesale reduction of Income Tax on moneys earned in Ireland, at once turned on his questioners with a very effective retort. He said that the persons putting forward any such proposal had upon them the responsibility of showing where the money could be saved, and I think that that was a very effective and very proper reply, that it is not right for persons to make broad claims that taxation should be reduced unless they are in a position to say—"Here and there are places where that money could be saved." I am suggesting, and I will show later on, that money lost by a remission of income tax on incomes earned in Ireland could be saved by the adoption of the general principle laid down in this resolution. But it is a matter of agreement; I think the Minister for Defence himself would be inclined to agree with me; I feel pretty sure that the Minister for Finance would be inclined to agree with me, that as one looks over the whole field of administration, the proper place to begin economy is the Army. I say that there would be agreement as to that; I claim that there has been agreement as to that; I claim that the Executive Council have already adopted that principle; that during the past twelve months they have made their most effective economics in regard to the defence forces. It was not so very long ago when we had an Army of something like 50,000 men. It has been cut down drastically, and, if I am correctly informed, I believe the position to be to-day that the Army does not consist of more than something round about 15,000 men, possibly something under that figure. That I accept as an intimation by the Executive Council that they agree with me—whether they would continue to agree as to the future adoption of that principle I am not now going to say—that the Army is the most effective place where a reduction can be made. I am only now urging that the principle that has been accepted should be continued, that we should go on reducing the standing force from 15,000, steadily, not violently, not with any unnecessary haste, until we reached a period of about 5,000, and that the difference might then be made good by the creation of a Territorial or Militia or Citizen force on a system that the Minister could devise, after consultation with his chief officials, but of which I have put forward an example in the document that has been circulated to Deputies. Here again I want to repeat what I have already said, and I cannot repeat it too often, because I desire to give it special emphasis. It is that whatever is to be done in the way of a change in the defence forces of this country by the adoption of a new method of organisation and the adoption of a new principle of procedure, the changes will have to be made very slowly and very steadily.
That question of economy I consider to be the chief argument in favour of this scheme. It is the reason that has been the motive behind all Governments that have adopted this particular type of army defence force. I have had an opportunity of reading the debates in several of the sister States of the Commonwealth since the war, and in them all it has been said, over and over again, that modern States cannot afford standing armies, that standing armies are an expensive form of defence, and that all that is required is a small nucleus round which a militia or territorial or citizen force could be grouped, and the motive of economy in every case has brought about a change from the standing army type of defence force to the militia type of defence force. It is the motive for economy that I desire to emphasise here this evening; but there is a chance an objection would be made, and I am sure there are Deputies to whose minds that objection had already occurred. They will say that Ireland needs a defence force because of any possible recurrence of Irregular warfare—that she needs a strong defence force of the standing army type, because of that possibility. Of course, if the Minister brings forward that argument I can only refer him to the statements by his colleagues, and notably several times by the Minister for Finance, who expressed his conviction that Ireland had seen the end of civil warfare. I believe myself it is perfectly true that Ireland has seen the end of civil warfare.
And the Government is introducing the Treason Bill.
Even the incitement of the Treason Bill will not induce the young men of this country to go back upon a thing that has revolted every decent sense in the country. There are, as the Minister for Justice has frequently reminded us, dumps in various parts of the country. I do not know that these dumps will not be referred to as the reason why we should not change from the modern type of defence, but if they are, I would anticipate that argument and say, if the weapons are to be taken out of those dumps after having been there for the past eighteen months, and if I were to be presented with the alternative of being either at the muzzle-end or the breach-end of one of those guns, that I do not know which I would consider the more dangerous.
I know which end you would be at.
Well, I do not know which end would be the more dangerous, but I would say that I do not believe that the weapons in these dumps are to be put to much effective use in the future. I do believe, apart from that, that the people of this country are not going to see any return to civil war, and I do not think there is any of the Ministers who think there is any chance or likelihood of such an event. Some of us know very well that in 1921 the country was tired of warfare. It took a very great deal to get many of those who went out in the Irregular campaign the following year to bring them there, and if effective measures had been taken at the beginning of that year we would never have seen civil warfare at all. I am not speaking now as an optimist in the matter. I endeavour to look at this matter with the fullest possible realism.
I do not wish to say an unfair thing, but I am bound to say as to those who, as I have heard, have argued that the possibility of civil warfare should be quite sufficient to deter our making any change in the form of our defence forces, that I could never convince myself that that argument was as sincere as those who adduced it would like us to believe. I do not think any Minister believes that we are going to see any return to civil warfare in this country. I think we ought to be able to take our decision unclouded by any consideration of that kind. There may be an element of doubt in the matter. One Deputy said to me there is an element of doubt, but he expressed his conviction that we would not see civil war and that, therefore, we might make the change that this resolution proposes. He concluded by saying: "We will not know for certain for another couple of years." I would like to point out to that Deputy and to the Dáil that this resolution, as I have already stated, is thinking of two or three years hence. If this resolution were to be adopted to-morrow, it could not be put into practical effect to-morrow, or into practical effect for another couple of years, possibly three years. In the meantime, preparations could be made, and, if Deputy Johnson is going to suggest that the Treason and Sedition Bill that we have just been considering is going to cause a recrudescence of Irregular warfare, why then the Treason and Sedition Bill will cause that recrudescence long before the Minister will have prepared the scheme, and the Dáil will be able to consider that scheme in the full light of any consequences of any Bill that we may consider this session.
Another reason that I would like to place before the Dáil as to why I think that this motion should be accepted, is this, and it is really the final consideration in all matters of this kind, as to the type of army that best suits the conditions of the Saorstát. We have had discussions here with regard to fiscal matters. We have discussed protection and we have discussed free trade. When that matter was under discussion I ventured to suggest that there was only one argument that we ought to consider in connection with that legislative proposal. It was: what is the type of fiscal economy that best suits the condition of this country, irrespective of what happens in other countries? I bring that argument forward to support this present resolution. If we keep a standing army, if the decision is that we shall have a standing army of 15,000 or 20,000 men, I ask the Dáil for what purpose will we want these men? What are we going to protect ourselves against? I heard the Minister for Defence say earlier to-day that he desired that we should be protected against all-comers. It is desirable that we should be protected against all-comers, but I think that we should have some clear information, if we are asked to keep a force of such an expensive character and such a large establishment as a standing army, what those all-comers may be. Under modern conditions of warfare I think that if any people were going to prosecute offensive tacties against this country, that they would be conducted not in this country but from another country.
In less than five years there is not a city in the Saorstát that could not be bombed by aerial warfare controlled by wireless from another country if it desired to do so. I urge that there is no real reason why we should keep an expensive establishment in the country when we could find much better uses for the money in other ways. I have already dealt with all possible arguments in regard to dangers from outside sources. I have already dealt with possible dangers from inside sources. Now I come to the actual proposal that I will put before the Dáil. As to the possible method of such an organisation I will show that in any event there will be a standing force of 5,000 men, an efficient force kept at a high standard of efficiency, and with such a force it should be possible to stop the beginning of any trouble that might be likely to occur within this country. And so I put it to the Minister if he opposes this motion, if he believes that the correct method of organising the defence forces is by the expensive establishment of a standing army, that it is due to him to show what cause exists and is likely to exist for such forces. I believe myself that a standing army is unnecessary, and I urge the Dáil to consider that the moneys expended at the present moment on such a force might be much more profitably expended in other ways. I believe, all questions considered and weighed in, I am correct in saying that, officers and men considered, £5 per man per week represents the expenses of a standing army. That is too expensive and costly. I can only say, in the alternative proposals I have put before the Dáil, I have accepted that figure, and if I have accepted the figure in my proposals then I am accepting it that that is the correct figure of the cost of the present force. That is to say, that every soldier walking the streets represents an average of £250 a year. £250 a year capitalised is £5,000. Every soldier walking the streets represents at an average a capitalised sum of £5,000. That £5,000 capitalised could be brought in under the credits of this country for other purposes. The Minister might know exactly how many houses might be built, and exactly what amount of good work could be done by economies of that kind.
Finally, I would like the Dáil quite briefly to consider the conditions that prevail in other countries. I am not going to stress this. I think if any Deputy suggested that we ought not to consider too carefully or too closely the conditions that prevail in other countries, and the kind of Army that prevails in other countries, until we knew the conditions that prevailed in those other countries, he would be essentially just and correct. It is very easy to get statistics put before the Dáil about other countries, without being aware of the conditions in those countries. This evening in laying the matter before the Dáil, I do not want to press on the attention of the House that other countries do this, and other countries do that, but I consider the right way we should deal with the matter is to consider our own circumstances and conditions, and having attentively surveyed them, to come to a decision which we would judge in our wisdom to be right for our own country.
Nevertheless, it is perfectly true that every country but one has the type of defence force that I advocate in this resolution. There is only one country that I have been able to discover that keeps a standing army, and that country is Great Britain, and Great Britain does it for the reason that it is right and proper for herself. She has to keep her regular army, for she has to have regular forces for sending around to different parts of her Empire, but that condition does not prevail in other countries.
Every European country to-day has under a compulsory form, which I do not advocate, the type of army, the type of defence force, that I am advocating in this resolution. Every one of our sister States in the Commonwealth has that type of defence force, though I do not want to stress what other countries have done until we know the conditions in those other countries. I say that if there is a concensus of opinion of this kind, and if, with different conditions and circumstances, they have come to this decision, then the retort that we need not consider what other countries do until we know their conditions loses some of its value, because the decision has been the same, although the conditions are very widely different. For those reasons I urge the Dáil to consider this resolution, and ask the Executive Council to prepare, and as soon as may be, lay before the Dáil measures providing for the abolition of the standing army, that is to say, the army as it is at present organised, and to provide for the creation of a national militia, whether it be called militia, territorial force, or citizen force.
In considering this resolution I have felt that it would not have been right or correct if a resolution in broad general terms had been put before the Dáil without being backed up by some detailed and substantive scheme. I, therefore, with others who have special competence in the matter, have drawn up such a scheme, copies of which have been circulated to Deputies. I want to make it perfectly clear that this scheme is not put before the Dáil as if it were a scheme that ought to be adopted. I am putting it before the Dáil as a possible scheme that could be adopted, just to show that the general terms of the resolution can be brought to fruition in some definite and concrete form. Under the scheme of organisation the defence forces of the Saorstát would consist of three parts: (1) a standing force, (2) a militia force, (3) a reserve force. I deal with each of those in turn. The standing force, it is suggested, might consist of about 5,500, and where it is reduced to small numbers like that, not only is it possible to effect very considerable economies, but it is possible to take care to make a force of excellent quality. It would require that, because the functions of the standing force would be responsible. They have been outlined by me in this memorandum under the several heads. The scheme would require (a) organising, training and administering the militia forces which would form the bulk of the defence forces of the Saorstát; (b) commanding and handling the whole defence forces in a competent manner, and (c) providing specially trained technical men that it would not be possible to secure at short notice. I only have suggested that it should consist of a certain number of men without descending to practical details. The actual constitution of such a force has been considered and is laid before the Dáil in this memorandum. It is stated it should consist of the following force:—
|
(1) |
General Staff: Adminis trative, Instructional, and Inspecting, being mainly Officers and N.C.O.'s |
200 |
|
(2) |
Infantry, six battalions, comprising, say |
3,000 |
|
(3) |
A Machine Gun Battalion of picked men |
400 |
|
(4) |
An Air Force |
300 |
|
(5) |
Armoured Car Corps |
300 |
|
(6) |
Signal Corps |
250 |
|
(7) |
Engineer Detachment |
300 |
|
(8) |
Motor Transport |
250 |
|
(9) |
Horse Transport: Re mounts, Veterinary |
250 |
|
(10) |
Medical Corps |
150 |
|
(11) |
Ordnance Corps |
150 |
It will be found by those familiar with the subject that this would be a well-constructed, coherent force amounting to 5,550 men. On that I wish to comment that an unusually large proportion of these would be officers, and especially N.C.O.'s. Indeed, it would be desirable that upon occasion every man should be competent to be at least a corporal, in order thus to provide solid cadres for a much larger force.
With regard to enlistment in the standing forces, it could be for either 1, 2 or 3 years. There are certain considerations in that regard that have been detailed here, that could be entered into much more fully, the considerations being that the longer enlistment would ensure a certain number of men to give greater solidity, and the shorter enlistment would ensure a larger number of men passing through such a force and thus provide a substantial reserve. With regard to location, it is suggested that the standing force should not be scattered in a number of small posts, but that it should be distributed in about a half dozen centres. The effect of this would be enough permanent troops in each centre to enable the officers and staffs to acquire practice in handling bodies of a fair size, and to combine the several types of forces. In this way all officers would have experience at all times of handling bodies of, roughly, 1,000 men of different arms and function. Therefore, when at certain times of the year, the militia force was called up, officers would have the capacity to learn how to handle very much larger forces, amounting to several thousands at a time.
That deals with the first section of the Defence Forces of the Saorstát under the General Draft Scheme that I am drawing up. I have entitled the second section "The Militia Force," and I would like to repeat what I said earlier, that I attach no peculiar value to the word "militia." South Africa used the word "citizen forces" to describe this section of its armed forces. This standing force would be supplemented by a militia force. The militia force would naturally considerably outnumber the standing force. The units of the militia force would be required to undergo an annual training period of, say, one month in their recruit year and a fortnight in any subsequent year. In the case of units recruited in large towns, half the recruit-training period could be carried out by means of weekly drills, leaving only a fortnight to be performed in camp. It is unnecessary to enter into details of such training. The methods adopted in other countries would be studied on the spot, and should be so studied before determining such details. But it will be seen that, inasmuch as the General Staff— Administrative, Instructional and Inspecting—would be whole-time officers of the standing force, there would be no opportunity for lack of efficiency in such training. I want to emphasise at this point that practically all the specially trained persons of the defence forces of the Saorstát would belong to the standing forces. It stands to reason that you cannot rely upon territorial troops for special engineering work, for air force work, or special staff work. Those are permanent forces of the standing forces. The only persons affected by the type of organisation I am bringing before the Dáil are those who constitute the ordinary infantry. The constitution of the militia force would naturally be somewhat different from that of the standing force. It would, for example, be necessary to provide for a larger proportion of infantry, which would be organised in battalions. The number of men from the militia force to assist and augment the specially trained technical units of the nucleus of the standing force would by necessity be in a much smaller proportion.
Now, I pass to the question of enlistment in the second section. Enlistment in the militia force should be for not less than two or three years, as a shorter period would result in the men being insufficiently trained.
Re-enlistment, upon the expiration of the man's enlistment period, might be permitted in either the standing force or the militia force, from year to year, as thought advisable.
When any member of the militia force was not under training, his arms and equipment would be kept in depôts at the centres of the standing force.
I already dealt with the argument that might be raised against me as to possible Irregular activity. It is the case that even if there were to be such Irregular activities in the future, the number of men available to the State would not be less than the number of men available at the present moment. If an emergency arose there would be available the standing force of 5,500. There would thus be available, at any moment in case of need:—In summer, the standing force, plus countrymen in training; in winter, the standing force, plus townsmen in training.
There would be no danger of the militia force falling below the required strength. It would be a paid force; and not only would the same conditions apply as apply to the present army, but a number of desirable men would be available, who would be glad to undertake training for their country's defence who are not now able or disposed to become whole-time professional soldiers.
Now I come to a matter of very great importance in this scheme, and that is the number of men who would be required for the second section of the defence forces of the Saorstát. I have laid it down at 25,000 men. There would be in the defence forces 5,000 men in the standing nucleus and 25,000 available in the territorial additions. All that includes the third section of the defence forces of the Saorstát and the reserve. The actual difference between the present method of organisation and the method laid down in this scheme is this: that whereas the present scheme consists of 15,000 men and a reserve, but no territorial addition, the proposed scheme would consist of 5,000 men as a standing force, instead of 15,000, with a territorial addition of 25,000, and also a reserve. Such actually is the scheme of organisation that could be adopted. It is put forward as a possible scheme. The proposition is put forward after careful thought. It is right that any proposition put forward like this should of necessity show what the comparative costs are. These comparative costs have been worked out for the present army and for the scheme proposed here. I have taken an allowance, as I said before, of £5 per man-week. If that is thought excessive, then the alternative I offer to the Dáil has the advantage of a better price. I have accepted that cost as the cost on which I would base the entire cost of the alternative now proposed—£5 per man-week, all in all.
The defence forces of the Saorstát would cost the following figures:—The standing force £1,433,000, the militia force £500,000, giving a total of something a little under £2,000,000 per annum. If Deputies will turn to the current Estimates they will find that the cost of the army for the financial year now closing was estimated at £4,000,000. The alternative put forward here, if adopted, would cost £2,000,000, making a total saving of £2,000,000 to the Exchequer. That saving would be effected under practically all the sub-heads of the Estimates, but under some sub-heads more than others. This proposal existed in notes in my possession for the last two or three months. That particular section by which an economy of £2,000,000 per annum could be effected was before me when last Tuesday week I read in the daily press of a proposal made in Cork city that all income tax on incomes accruing within the Saorstát should be remitted. The figures that were put forward show, with whatever authority, that if such income tax were remitted the total cost to the Exchequer would be £2,000,000. When the proposition was put to President Cosgrave he said to the proposer, "Will you show me exactly where that £2,000,000 can be saved"? The proposer did not answer that, but I suggest that here is where the £2,000,000 might be saved.
Accepting these figures, and the figures have been worked out with rather more care than possibly the others were, as a comparison I have drawn up a table which I think is a fairly striking one. I have taken the various sister states of the Commonwealth, other than Great Britain, their populations, their standing forces, their available forces, and the cost of their defence forces. This is what we get. Canada, with a population of eight and three-quarter millions, has a standing force of 3,500, a total available force of 120,000, at a cost, in Irish money, of £2,250,000. South Africa has a white population of one and a half millions. She has a standing force, known as a citizen force, of 1,750, a total available force of 135,000, at a cost to the South African Exchequer of £935,000. Australia has a population of five and three-quarter millions, has a standing force of 3,000, a total available force of 118,000, at a cost of £2,000,000. New Zealand has a population of one and a quarter millions, a standing force of 500, a total available force of 36,500, at a cost of £500,000. Canada, with nearly three times our population, has an army that costs £2,000,000 per annum less than ours. Australia, with nearly twice our population, has an army that costs her £2,000,000 per annum less than ours. The total strength for all these States, with a population of seventeen and a quarter millions, of the standing forces is 8,750, with a total available force of 309,500, at a total cost of £5,500,000. That means that populations totalling seventeen and a quarter millions, dealing with different circumstances, in different parts of the world, spend very little more than fifty per cent. more than we spend with our population of three and one-quarter millions. The figures are I think, fairly striking and conclusive.
I urge on the Dáil that it is time Deputies gave consideration to the form our permanent forces should take, and what type of army we should have. I urge on the Dáil that our condition does not require a standing army of a costly nature. Whatever else may be urged, at any other time, the present moment is one in which drastic economy must be made, if there is to be any revival of commerce and trade, and any end of the present problem of unemployment. In conclusion I ask the Dáil to remember that in considering this proposal it is not considering something that is going to be brought into effect to-morrow. If this resolution were to be accepted, or the substance of it, a change could not be effected before the end of three years. A change could hardly be effected before two years from now, because you are dealing with the preparation of a scheme, the passing of legislative proposals, and the adoption of an entirely new institution—a change from one type to another—by slow and gradual measures. Inasmuch as we are dealing with a period so far ahead, and dealing with circumstances that are pressing, I urge on the Dáil that this resolution should be accepted, and that the Minister be desired to lay proposals before it for its consideration this year, or at the beginning of next year. In this resolution we are not asked to commit ourselves to anything finally. We are merely asked to request the Minister. to go into this matter carefully, and, after due consultation with his advisers, to place proposals before the Dáil for its consideration.
I second the motion, although I must say that the wording of the motion is liable to misinterpretation. As described by Deputy Figgis, the motion is, I think, one which should commend itself to the Dáil and to the Minister, and I hope the Minister will accept it. There are, as I have said, in the actual resolution certain words which might be changed. The phrase, "the abolition of a Standing Army and the creation of a National Militia" is apt to be misinterpreted, but the intention of the motion has been fully explained by Deputy Figgis. What he meant by "Standing Army" was an army such as we find in Great Britain at the present time. I would certainly prefer that the defence forces of the country should be called an Army than that they should be a force known as a "National Militia."
As regards the general motion, I think it has been clearly explained by Deputy Figgis. We discussed this evening a Defence Forces Bill, prolonging for another year the present arrangement with regard to the Army. That, I think, was inevitable, under the circumstances, but at the same time it will mean a great loss of money to the State—a great waste of money— within the next twelve months, in view of the unnecessarily large number of soldiers at present in the Army who serve no useful purpose. I do not refer to the officers, who are learning their jobs, or to the technical side of the Army which, far from wishing to see decreased, I hope will be increased in the future. But we have several thousands of ordinary privates and non-commissioned officers who are actually doing nothing at the present time and who are of very little use to the country. Some such scheme as that which was outlined by Deputy Figgis should be considered by the Minister when he comes to draw up his final Army Bill.
I am in favour of this suggestion not only from the point of view of economy but also from the point of view of efficiency. Under the present system, although I am sure officers and men are doing their best to acquire efficiency, the Army is not in a position to defend the country adequately, and it is not in a position, if the system be continued in its present form, to make it possible at the end of the next year and a half to fulfil the intentions of Article 6 of the Treaty. Some such scheme as that which has been outlined by the Deputy will be essential if we are at the end of next year to fulfil what the signatories to the Treaty and those who ratified the Treaty had in mind when the Treaty was accepted for this country—that at the end of five years from the signing of the Treaty, this country should be in a position to take over its own defence from the British Imperial forces. It is very important, I think, that we should get away from the idea, which has up to the present prevailed, that the Army is simply an armed police force for the purpose of suppressing Deputy Miss Mary MacSwiney. It is a great expense to the taxpayers that Miss Mary MacSwiney should cost £4,000,000 in order to be suppressed. We should get away from the idea that the only object of the Army is to suppress internal trouble. In fact, that is not the object of any army. That is the object of a police force. Such a scheme as has been outlined, although I do not agree with all its details—the details are largely for the Minister to consider—would tend towards the elasticity of the army and the possible development of the army into a force capable of defending the country against external aggression.
I remember a phrase used, I think, by the Minister's predecessor, Deputy Mulcahy, that the army was not the army of a party but was the army of the Irish people and stood for independence. It is very important that the army should not develop by stagnation into the army of a class or the army of a caste, but should be, as its name in the Irish language implies, a body organised and disciplined for the defence of the country. That is impossible so long as the army is confined to a small number of permanent warriors such as exist in England and such as is described in this motion as a "standing army."
The motion is not a very serious one and I do not think the Minister should be very much alarmed by it. It does not suggest that he should produce this army immediately. It only suggests that he should prepare and "as soon as may be" lay before the Dáil such a proposal. He has got plenty of time to do it. But I think the Dáil should suggest that that is the line upon which the army should develop; that there should be a small nucleus of experts and trained officers, and that at the same time a wider field should be allowed to recruiting amongst the general mass of the population, in order that the young men of the country should have an opportunity of learning how to defend their country. I hope the Minister will accept this motion, which I second.
There are five words in this motion that make it possible for almost any of us to vote for it. Those words are: "as soon as may be." In the words of the song, it is a case of "It may be for years and it may be for ever."
The words referred to by the Deputy are the words of the Ceann Comhairle.
Then my opposition to the motion, as originally drafted by Deputy Figgis, is stronger. Though I agree with a great deal of what Deputy Fiiggis has said, though I agree that it is the duty of every man to learn how to defend his country, I cannot think that under existing conditions in this country that is a practical proposal. Deputy Figgis follows in illustrious footsteps. The last man I found advocating the principle of a national militia was Lord Roberts. Lord Roberts and Deputy Figgis—par nobile fratrum ! I only saw the memorandum, which has been supplied in connection with this motion, just now, and I did not hear all of what Deputy Figgis said. There are one or two remarkable gaps in this memorandum. It is not clearly stated whether service in this militia is to be compulsory or voluntary. In every national militia that I know, service is compulsory, or there is the element of compulsion, sometimes by ballot. I think, from internal evidence, that the memorandum was drawn up intending service in this force to be compulsory, and that then the word “compulsion” was dropped out, because somebody suggested that it would not be expedient to suggest conscription in this country after an interval of only about 8 years. If your service is to be compulsory, there are great difficulties. How are you going to call up men who have a conscientious objection to the Saorstát——
There is no objection to fighting.
But there are many different ideas as to the kind of fighting that is desirable. One of the dangers I foresee in adopting this scheme is that if, for instance, the North Mayo National Militia—I mention North Mayo because that constituency is unrepresented—come up to Athlone for training, and at the end of the training period express a desire to take their rifles home with them, how are you going to deal with them?
The Treason Bill.
You can, of course, always shoot them down, but I do not think that is entirely desirable under this scheme. On the other hand, if service in this militia is to be voluntary, we have to face two difficulties. One is, you will never get training completed if you are going to have men coming in all the time. You can train men very much more quickly if you get them all together at once. I think Deputy Professor Thrift will agree with me that any form of instruction becomes impossible if you have new men coming into the class all the time and have to start from the beginning again and again.
The alternative then is to enlist a certain number, and possibly to say:—"We will call you up when you are wanted." That principle is adopted in the British territorial forces, and in no other body that I know of—I am not sure that it is not adopted in the Swiss militia. I think the experience as shown in this country by the old militia was that the kind of man who will let himself in for a liability to be called up at a time that may suit the Government is not the best type of man. You will not get the man with steady employment or with a farm of his own to undertake a liability like that. You will get a few idealists like Deputy Figgis who will rejoice in the opportunity of serving their country, but you will not get 25,000 of them. What you will get will be the men out of work, and even they will prefer to be enlisted straight off, and feel that they were provided for, rather than waiting about without a job for some indefinite call that may come in the future. That is the first point I wish to make, that we should know whether service is to be compulsory or voluntary, and if it is compulsory, you should know how it is to be enforced. The second point is: how is a national militia—to take Deputy Figgis's name—to be officered? Where are the N.C.O.'s to be found? You cannot train officers in a month. You cannot train N.C.O.'s in a month. Deputy Figgis has provided 200 administrative officers and N.C.O.'s as a permanent force to instruct the militia. It is a low proportion to say that in modern armies there is one officer and one senior N.C.O.—a sergeant at least, or a sergeant-major—to every fifty men. Therefore, this force of 25,000 men would require at least 500 officers and at least 500 senior N.C.O.'s. I see no machinery in this memorandum for producing them. Two hundred is the outside where you need one thousand. That is including the whole of the general staff. One officer to fifty is a low proportion. The proportion is nearer one to thirty, and that is with trained troops, not men with a month's training who are then called up for a week or a fortnight as a refresher course.
This memorandum has borrowed the Canadian system without borrowing the keynote of that system, and that is the Royal Military College at Kingston. Officers are trained there for the militia. They do a course, not of a week, not of a month, not of a year, but of five years, and that is a very highly efficient establishment. There is no provision for that in this memorandum, and no provision for the cost of it. In the same way in Australia, officers are trained at courses lasting. I think, four years. The officers in the New Zealand forces are trained in the same establishment by arrangement with the Australian Government. I am not sure about South Africa. There is apparently no provision for the training of officers and senior N.C.O's in this memorandum at all.
The next thing is the period for training. Deputy Figgis proposes that this militia should be called up for a month at first, and subsequently for a fortnight. You can dismiss the fortnight. I know something about militia training. When you get men coming straight from civil life, you spend that fortnight learning them what they learned before. You do not advance in your instruction. How can you train a soldier in a month? I do not know what experience Deputy Figgis has had, but I should say it was impossible. Certainly you cannot train a man to be an expert shot and to use his rifle properly in a month. That is a thing which requires at least six months, unless you are going to dispense rifle and erect ranges over the country and allow men to go out and do musketry in the evening, as is done under the Swiss system. I am afraid if you do that there might sometimes be a little confusion about the target, and they might take a running target rather than the one put up for them.
Seriously, a soldier cannot be made in a month unless he has some previous knowledge. Under the Australian system the boys are given military training at school. The Australian boy at, I think, sixteen years, goes into a cadet corps compulsorily and does four years' cadet training before he goes into the Australian national militia. There is no provision for that in this scheme. That involves the element of compulsion. Therefore, we would have a force imperfectly trained, able to form fours and march about the barrack square; not trained in musketry, not trained in work in the open country—a force which, in my opinion, would be useless and dangerous and also insufficient. How many men would there be to call on in a sudden emergency? Remember, if you want to call out the whole militia you have got to get them to mobilisation centres which are to be about half-a-dozen. You have got to issue equipment. They would not be available possibly for a week. You have only got for an emergency 5,000 of the present force—that is excluding non-combatants—5,000 fighting men at the outside and that portion of the force that was in training. It is not quite clear from the memorandum whether you are going to take in 25,000 per year or whether they are to be spread over three years. We will assume the former. There is only a proportion of the 25,000 men doing training. They do a month's training. That would only give a little over 2,000 men in training for a certain emergency, that the State will be able to lay its hand on by denuding every garrison, by giving up the whole of the rest of the country, if a disturbance breaks out in Dublin. The margin of safety is too low.
There are other points. There is the cost of travelling. The cost of travelling has not been considered. If you are going to have all the arms in half-a-dozen centres you have to pay for travelling to these centres. Assuming that the centres are the principal military centres at present—Dublin, The Curragh, Cork, Limerick, Waterford, Athlone—you have got to bring men from Tirconaill to Athlone. That is not a cheap proposition, even if the unified railways do give preferential rates. The whole thing is full of pitfalls that nobody but the man who has some technical knowledge can possibly see.
There are one or two things the Minister can do. I would like to put them to him now. Firstly, there is the question of the want of a reserve. At present we are dangerously weak in reserves and the Minister should, if possible, try to ensure that every new recruit taken into the army undertakes liability, not only to serve two years, but to serve in the reserve for a period of at least six years. Any pension that is given should be contingent on the pensioner undertaking liability for terms of service. That gives us some means of expansion. We also need to expand in officers, and I think it would be a very desirable thing if the Minister would consider the possibility of starting an officers' training corps in the two universities—both in the National and in Trinity—a voluntary officers' training corps. Nobody need join if they do not like, but a certain number of people who, at any rate, knew the rudiments of their duty could be made very useful. I have some experience of British officers' training, and the members of these corps were more useful than the raw men who had to learn the job from the beginning. These two things, I think, could be done, and if the Minister would also, as I said earlier this evening on another Bill, look into the question of guards, I think by reducing the number of such guards he could also reduce the strength of the army. I do not think that we could permanently contemplate an army on the present strength, but we ought to try to build up an army by extensions and otherwise in case of necessity.
I move the adjournment of the Dáil until 3 o'clock to-morrow.
The debate on Deputy Figgis's motion is adjourned until Friday next.
The Dáil adjourned at 8.25 p.m. until Thursday, 19th February, at 3 p.m.