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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Thursday, 25 Jun 1925

Vol. 12 No. 14

BILLS OF DIVORCE.—MESSAGE FROM THE SEANAD.

“Gurb é slí ab fhearr, dar leis an Seanad, chun teacht ar an ní d'iarr an Dáil sa teachtaireacht uaithi dar dháta an 12adh Feabhra ná dhá Thigh an Oireachtais do ghlaca leis an rún so a leanas:—

“That in the opinion of the Seanad the object desired by the Dáil in its message of the 12th February would be best achieved by the adoption by both Houses of the Oireachtas of the following resolution:—

‘Go n-iarrtar ar an gCó-Choiste ar Bhuan-Orduithe a bhaineas le Gnó Príobháideach go gcuirfidís fé bhreithniú Buan-Orduithe breise ag regleáil an nós-imeachta a leanfar maidir le Billí Príobháideacha i dtaobh Cúrsaí Pósa, agus ortha-san Buan-Ordú no BuanOrduithe a choiscfidh go dtuigfí Billí Eadarscara a vinculo matrimonii do bheith tugtha isteach fé Bhuan-Ordú 55 agus a fhorálfidh go gcaithfar Billí den tsórt san do léigheamh den chéad uair i ngach Tigh fé leith sara ndéanfar a thuille ina dtaobh sa tSeanad.’”

‘That the Joint Committee on Standing Orders relative to Private Business be requested to submit additional Standing Orders regulating the procedure to be adopted in connection with Private Bills relating to Matrimonial Matters, including a Standing Order or Orders which will prevent Bills of Divorce a vinculo matrimonii from being deemed to have been introduced under Standing Order 55 and which will provide that such Bills must be read a first time in each House before they are further proceeded with in the Seanad.’”

I move:—

That, in the opinion of the Dáil, the object intended by the Dáil in the resolution of the 11th February, 1925, would not be achieved by the resolution adopted by the Seanad on the 12th June, 1925, and that a message to this effect be sent to the Seanad.

I might, perhaps, refer to portion of the statement which I made when introducing the original motion as showing the necessity for these Standing Orders. I am quoting from columns 157 and 158 of the Reports of 11th February. I stated:—

At the present time there are no Standing Orders in the Saorstát relating to matrimonial matters. This does not prevent the introduction of Private Bills dealing with such matters. On the contrary, it leaves it open to persons to introduce such Bills without complying with the formalities and safeguards which such Standing Orders would require. It is, therefore, essential that Standing Orders on this subject should be prepared. In order to enable the Joint Committee satisfactorily to prepare the necessary Standing Orders, it is necessary that the House should come to a decision on the question of divorce a vinculo matrimonii. On this subject there are different points of view, but I have no doubt but that I am right in saying that the majority of people of this country regard the bond of marriage as a sacramental bond which is incapable of being dissolved. I personally hold this view. I consider that the whole fabric of our social organisation is based upon the sanctity of the marriage bond and that anything that tends to weaken the binding efficacy of that bond to that extent strikes at the root of our social life. For these reasons I move the motion in the form in which it appears upon the Orders of the Day.

It may be that in the future, and possibly the near future, legislation may be introduced to confer upon the Courts jurisdiction when granting decrees of divorce a mensa et thoro, to make provision for the children of the marriage and in respect of property. Such legislation would probably have the effect of relieving the Oireachtas of all matrimonial business, but it would not obviate the necessity for some Standing Orders to provide for cases in which such decrees are given from the date of the establishment of the Saorstát down to the date when such legislation may come into effect.

The resolution adopted by the Dáil contemplated that the Standing Orders to be drawn up would prevent the introduction of Bills of divorce a vinculo matrimonii. The Seanad, on the other hand, in the message which has just been read, propose that the Standing Orders will prevent Bills of this nature from being deemed to have been introduced under Standing Order 55, and will provide that such Bills must be read a first time in each House before they are further proceeded with in the Seanad. I do not think the object of the Dáil would be achieved by the adoption of the suggestion of the Seanad, nor do I consider that suggestion a suitable alternative for the proposal put forward by the Dáil.

The matter is one of outstanding importance, and should be dealt with logically. Standing Orders constitute the machinery by which the Houses operate in considering and dealing with legislative proposals. They are a means to an end, and their form must be determined by the end in view. It therefore becomes essential at the outset to consider whether or not divorce a vinculo matrimonii will be granted in this State. Until that question has been settled you cannot properly determine the question as to the form of your Standing Orders.

I am not in a position to speak for the Seanad, but I think I can speak for this House and for the vast majority of the citizens of this country. Their attitude is expressed in the resolution passed by this House on the 11th February, and nothing has happened since to change my view that facilities for divorce a vinculo matrimonii would not and ought not to be granted. If the House is in agreement with me on the foregoing, I would ask it to approach the question of Standing Orders from that point of view. If it is not intended to grant divorce, surely the proper form of Standing Order is one which will prevent the introduction of such Bills.

There are at least two objections, I think serious objections, to the alternative course suggested by the Seanad. It proposes to make provision for such Bills, and to that extent implies that the Bills may be dealt with and relief granted. This will undoubtedly encourage persons to promote such Bills and to incur considerable expense in so doing. It seems to me to be wrong to encourage or countenance such expense if there is no intention of granting relief, and this is the first ground on which I think this House should refuse to accept the suggestion put forward by the Seanad.

The second objection is more serious. Under the Standing Orders contemplated by the Seanad a Bill for divorce a vinculo matrimonii may be introduced in either House. Having failed to deal with Bills of this nature on principle, the Houses will be forced to deal with them individually. This will or may involve the discussion and consideration of the particular facts of each individual case with all its unsavoury details. I do not suggest that the House should refuse to consider or discuss any subject, however unsavoury, when the occasion really demands it. I do, however, suggest that to do so when there is no intention of granting relief would be an unjustifiable waste of public time, and would serve no useful purpose either in the Oireachtas or in the country.

I desire to say just one word as to the nature and effect of Standing Orders. I have already referred to them as part of the machinery of legislation. They are rules of procedure which may be changed at any time by simple resolution. It has been alleged that the Seanad proposal has the advantage that if in the future a complete change should come over the country, and both Houses, by a majority, were prepared to deal with and pass Bills of divorce, their powers to deal with them would not have been prevented. It is only necessary to consider the matter for a moment to see that there is no substance in this argument. If in the future both Houses of the Oireachtas are prepared to pass such Bills, I do not apprehend that they will have much difficulty in changing the Standing Orders for the purpose. A simple resolution passed by both Houses is all that is necessary.

I am not able to say whether this motion does express the opinion of the Dáil, as contained in the resolution of the 11th February. I do not know whether the object intended by the Dáil in that resolution could or could not be achieved by the adoption of this resolution from the Seanad; but I am confirmed in my view that the method of achieving the end which the President seeks, and which I am prepared to support, is a bad one; that whatever it may do regarding the effecting of a purpose, it is striking at Parliamentary rights, the rights of Deputies, and as I think, the rights of citizens in approaching the law-making authority. The proposal of the President, which was adopted by the Dáil and which he re-affirms here to-day is that an officer of the two Houses shall be given the discretion of saying whether any Deputy or any citizen shall be entitled to approach the law-making authority in regard to certain matters of legislation. I say that that is putting an obstacle in the way of members of the Oireachtas doing their duty, and it is putting an obstacle in the way of citizens approaching the law-making authority.

I think that the Seanad proposal would meet all the practical requirements of the case. I admit that it will not meet the case of those who say that the House has no right, that it should be deprived of the right if it has it, to legislate upon a matter of the Sacraments. The President has referred to the sanctity of the marriage bond, and in pursuance of the contention that the marriage bond is indissoluble he seeks to make it impossible for the legislature to consider a proposal to alter the legal status of married persons. I submit that the whole contention is not in regard to the dissolution of the marriage bond, but in the alteration of the legal status of married persons. I argued on the introduction of the original motion that it was a matter which affected an insignificant number of persons, and was a social matter, a matter mainly of property rights that was affected in the views of those who were seeking the dissolution of the legal marriage. But my main consideration in discussing this question is as to the rights of Deputies, the power of the legislature, and the rights of citizens to approach the legislature through their Deputies. The President has argued that Standing Orders are the means to an end, and the mere machinery; that is perfectly right, and that is what I desire to emphasise, the machinery for facilitating the passing or the consideration of legislative proposals, not as a means of preventing the discussion of legislative proposals.

We have no right to consider this matter of Private Bill legislation as something essentially different from public legislation. As far as we are concerned as a legislature, we are dealing with legislation, and it is purely a matter of convenience that we say that a certain procedure shall be followed in respect of private matters, matters for the particular interest or benefit of any person, or other matters of a much wider and more public interest. It is purely a matter of convenience that we choose to have a separate set of Standing Orders to deal with private matters as distinct from public matters, and I want to impress upon the House that we have not to consider this matter in the light of Private Bill legislation as distinct from public legislation. I think I am right in saying that it has been an axiom of law in these countries for several centuries that the citizen has the right to approach the law-making authority, to go past the Executive for the time being to the law-making authority, and the Dáil and Seanad, the Oireachtas, is the law-making authority. We are here acting as Deputies for the citizens, and they approach the law-making authority, which is the collective body known as the Oireachtas, through the Deputies. We are Deputies for the citizens, and I hold that we must maintain this right to propose legislation upon any matter.

Let us forget for a moment the particular question of divorce. It is equally true to say that theft is a sin. Many times it is alleged that certain legislative proposals are confiscatory, are theft in other words. It is a very short step from this proposal to throw upon an official of the House the responsibility, shall I say the privilege, of declaring whether a particular legislative proposal brought in by a Deputy or a Senator, as the case may be, is in order, if he deems it to involve the sin of theft. It is necessary to state clearly how this matter strikes me. Last year there was passed an Indemnity Act. At present there is lying under sentence of death a man for the crime of murder—not merely the crime of murder—in this case crime and sin are words that fit one into the other. Had that offence, or crime or sin, been committed—assuming guilt—in certain circumstances before a given date set forth in the Indemnity Act, it was quite possible, under the provisions of that Act, that the civil authority would have declared that that sin was not a crime, was not a civil offence, that it had never been committed, that it was never believed to have been a crime, because it was done in special circumstances. It is a matter of civil legislation affecting what was believed to be the well-being of the State as a civil institution. The Oireachtas, wisely or unwisely, passed an Act practically indemnifying persons from risk of prosecution for many offences—sins shall I say—which were and would have been deemed to be crimes, committed in other circumstances and at other times.

This is not so far from the subject under discussion as it may seem, inasmuch as it shows that in respect to civil affairs the legislature has been free to legislate and to remove from the individuals concerned the onus of guilt, without saying anything at all about the sinfulness or otherwise of the act. We have not been precluded hitherto from legislating in respect of crime, in respect of offences against order and good government. I maintain that we are committing a very grave wrong to the principle of popular and representative Government if we deprive the citizens of the right to approach the law-making authority through Deputies on any subject whatsoever. I think Deputies would be bound, if they have any regard for maintaining their rights and privileges, to introduce legislation to maintain that right, not as Private Bill legislation, but as public legislation. They would be bound to force the legislature to declare itself as to whether a Deputy is to be deprived of his right as a public representative. I ask the Dáil not to consider this matter as Private Bill legislation, as distinct from public legislation, but as law-making, irrespective of how many or how few people it involves.

It is on these grounds that I believe the Ministry is making a very grave mistake in standing by the resolution of last February. Far better would it be to propose an amendment to the Constitution making it impossible to introduce legislation dealing with divorce. It would be infinitely better to do that than to try to rob Deputies of their rights through a Standing Order dealing with Private Bill legislation. On these grounds I oppose the motion, although I must say it is a difficult motion to oppose, inasmuch as, if one opposed the original motion by speech, it is impossible to understand whether the resolution from the Seanad does give effect to the object intended by the Dáil in that resolution. Of course, it will be quite understood that in this matter I am speaking wholly and solely for myself, and I am opposing it on the constitutional ground of the right of the legislature to legislate.

Deputy Johnson states that the Standing Orders are the machinery for facilitating legislation. I admit that they are the machinery for facilitating legislation. They facilitate legislative proposals which the Oireachtas intend to pass, but not those that they do not intend to pass.

Nobody is to know that until the proposal has been laid before the House.

In this proposal I think, as I have said, I am interpreting the views of the House and of the country. If that contention is wrong, I have no case for presenting the resolution. I do not subscribe to Deputy Johnson's contention that we are depriving citizens of the right to come here. They have no right to come here on this subject. They have no right to come here if they infringe certain regulations that we lay down. For example, a man who places himself outside the law, who infringes the law, has he got the right to come here and present a petition to have this House review the decision of the court? I hold that he has not.

Nobody is contending anything of the kind.

He may be satisfied that he has a cause of complaint. It is conceivable that some citizen might, in one way or another, be convicted though innocent, but we are not holding for such a case as that. The right of presenting petitions here is a questionable right. It is a right which must be viewed in all the circumstances.

I hope the President will not misunderstand me. I did not refer to the presentation of petitions. I referred to approaching the law-making authority—and in using that term I spoke quite clearly, understanding exactly what I was saying—by means of Deputies. We are here as Deputies for the people, and we approach the law-making authority as Deputies. An individual Deputy approaches the Oireachtas, through the regular machinery, and has a right to do that. I am not speaking of petitions.

We are prepared to admit that right. We are prepared to lay down certain regulations governing it, and this is one of them: that on this the feeling of the country and the Oireachtas is such that the right is not to be exercised in respect to this particular matter—a divorce a vinculo matrimonii.

Question put and declared carried.
Message ordered to be sent to the Seanad accordingly.
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