I will. Now let me deal with the position of the Tariff Commission as at present constituted, with the restrictions referred to. What are the restrictions? Deputy Davin points to one—I presume that is the meaning of the intervention—that they can only discuss things brought before them by interested parties. The case Deputy Lemass was making was that all manufacturers would not come before the Tariff Commission on account of the restrictions imposed on the Commission. That is not an argument against the Commission not being able to do things on its own initiative. The Deputy has in mind manufacturers who want to come, but who will not come because of some fancied restrictions either in regard to powers or something else of the Commission. Where are the restrictions on the Commission? I am taking positive matters spoken of by Deputies on the motion and the amendment, which are supposed to indicate by implication a deficiency in the Tariff Commission.
Let me examine both the motion and the amendment from that point of view. "The Tariff Commission is unsuitable for dealing expeditiously with applications." That is the time point again. On that I refer to what I said, that there are eleven outstanding applications at the moment. The case made in regard to delay caused in the hearing of any of these applications is that owing to the fact that the Tariff Commission, as at present constituted, is unsuitable to deal with them, and that, in so far as it is unsuitable, it can be remedied by making the Commissioners whole-time officials. The Tariff Commission, being unsuitable, should be replaced by a Commission consisting of five members, who should have a knowledge of "agricultural and industrial conditions, of whom one should be a qualified accountant." It has been generally agreed in the House that the difference between five and three is inconsiderable. I think even Deputy Lemass himself said that appointing five instead of three could never be really a matter for serious consideration if it was found that the three appointed could not cover the scope of the various applications that came before them. I want the contention proved, if it is going to be decided, that the question of five as opposed to three is really an important matter. As regards the point that one should be a qualified accountant, in so far as accountants are required for the work of the Commission, they are feed and brought in to help the Commission. On many applications they have been brought in to help the Commission, and no defect arises from the fact that one of the Commissioners in person is not a qualified accountant.
As a matter of fact, I believe that at least two of the Commissioners could do as good work, except in minute detail, in the matter of accountancy as any qualified accountant. The motion states that the Commissioners should have a knowledge of agricultural and industrial conditions. The three officials appointed on the Tariff Commission are the nominees of the Minister for Finance, the Minister for Agriculture, and the Minister for Industry and Commerce. Is it by implication suggested that the people who have been appointed are not aware of the agricultural and industrial conditions of the country? We have heard it said that they are civil servants living sheltered lives and away from the ordinary things that affect the people of this country. There is just one point that one must attend to in considering this. As regards the three officials who have been appointed, can it be said of two of them that they have lived sheltered lives for any great period up to the present, or that they are not acquainted with conditions as ordinarily lived in Ireland? Can it be said of the two men who are the nominees of the Minister for Finance and of the Minister for Industry and Commerce that they in fact have led sheltered lives—even if the term "sheltered life" can be applied to civil servants—and know nothing of what is going on in the country or of the hardships that people have to contend with? These are to be appointed by the Executive Council with the approval of the Dáil.
Those who were in the Dáil when the matter of the Tariff Commission was brought forward will recollect that an amendment was moved to have the three people on the Tariff Commission nominated by the Executive Council. I forget what was the reason upon which the amendment was opposed, but I think it was very much the same reason that is now put forward, that by having this an executive act of the whole Government there would be what has been called uniformity of policy in regard to their appointment. There is one answer to that point, and it is this: that all the Ministers of the Government at the moment are members of the Executive Council. The Tariff Commissioners have to be the nominees of three Ministers. Is it likely that any of the Ministers would make an appointment of an important type like this or act in a way that would be contrary to what has been called the policy of the Executive Council?
With regard to that particular matter, if that contention be seriously put forward, then a much better answer has been given by Deputy Law in answer to Deputy Derrig. You are not appointing people and saying to them on this matter: "Remember you are for tariffs, or you are against tariffs, and when any question of the application of a tariff for a particular industry comes forward you are to vote for unless there is an overwhelming majority against, and you are to vote against unless there is an overwhelming majority for." There is no question of policy in the appointment of the people who are to serve on the Tariff Commission. There is, however, the question of the appointment of three impartial people who are not going to report for or against tariffs but are going to pass decisions upon certain matters put to them in the Schedule to the Tariff Commission Act. Once that report goes before the Executive Council, whether the Executive Council decides favourably or unfavourably upon it, or whether it decides to postpone a decision on it, the report becomes a public document and has to be put before this House eventually. On that document the members of the Dáil have to pass judgment and give a decision. Therefore, there is no question of policy with regard to the appointment of these three individuals. In so far as there is any question of responsibility the Ministers concerned may put up recommendations, but responsibility for their acceptance has to be shared by the entire Executive Council. Therefore, in so far as that point has been made, it is worthless.
The motion states that the members are to be appointed by the Executive Council with the approval of the Dáil, and to hold office for a stated period. We are told that if a term is put to the appointment that then the people appointed will be free from political pressure and will be more or less in a judicial capacity and free to act as though they were, properly speaking, in a judicial capacity. In order to do away with any good that might flow from an appointment for a stated period, the appointments are to be made with the approval of the Dáil. The approval of the Dáil, as we have been recently told in regard to another motion, is only given here on party lines, and that approval can never be looked for in an impartial way. What the motion means, according to the interpretation of the Party who put it forward, is that the Tariff Commission Act should be so amended as to provide that the Tariff Commissioners should be nominated subject to political pressure and should really, in fact, be enthusiasts for a particular line—that is, enthusiasts for tariffs. That is what the motion means when one comes down to an examination of what Deputy Lemass had in his mind.
The members of the Commission are to be appointed with the approval of the Dáil. What that means is this: that we are to have names canvassed and put up for submission to the Dáil. On a question such as this, you would have a debate on the names put forward. Each man's history would be gone into, as well as his possible views on this, that and every possible application for a tariff that is likely to come forward. His whole history would be raked up, and the question would be debated as to how far he would be likely to be subjected to pressure on this, that and the other type of application. After a wrangle of that sort had gone on in regard to the individuals whose names had come before the House, if you succeeded in getting five people to take on the duty of Tariff Commissioner, would you be likely to get unprejudiced reports hereafter from these Commissioners?
The motion also suggested that the Commission "should have power to investigate the conditions existing in any industry in regard to its need for protection against foreign competition, and should make recommendations to the Executive Council as to how the benefits derived from the measure of protection afforded to any trade can be shared by the consumers." There are two points in this: "The Commissioners should have power to investigate the conditions existing in any industry." That, I presume, is the same as is meant by Deputy O'Connell's amendment, part 1, that the Commission may "on its own initiative investigate the position of any industry." Deputy O'Connell's amendment adds to that: "or on the suggestion or proposal put forward by the Minister for Industry and Commerce, or the Minister for Agriculture." With regard to these two Ministers, the Minister for Finance has repeated that that was a proposition that had been considered. Why no progress has been made with regard to that proposition is because neither of the two Ministers has felt the need for having these powers. There have not been a sufficient number of applications coming to their notice to go before the Tariff Commission as at present constituted, and until a sufficient number comes it is quite undesirable to give either of the two Ministers power to bring cases before the Tariff Commission. What would be the result? If there were sufficient applications which could not come before the Tariff Commission, by reason of the fact that they were not from people sufficiently representative under the Act to bring them, the Departments might feel there was a sufficient number of cases of that type, then there would be some reason for making this case, which would be considered when the time came, but at the moment there is no demand and no reason for a change. What is the result? Surely the result is obvious to everyone? Day by day there would be questions in the House to the Minister for Lands and Agriculture and the Minister for Industry and Commerce as to whether the needs of such industries for protection are to be brought forward, and if not why not? No one in this country, no group of manufactures would take the responsibility for putting forward proposals if they could put such pressure on Ministers in the Dáil as to make them father proposals, where they could, so to speak, be given a trial run, and if the Commissioners turned down the application the manufactures could come in on the second line, saying that the case had not been properly presented, and should go before the Tariff Commission themselves. Would there be ever any application put forward by interested manufacturers if there was a way of approach to the Tariff Commission through any Minister in this House, and if that Minister could be moved to bring forward the proposal simply by the kind of pressure that can be put on, whether by way of a Parliamentary question or a debate in this House?
I did at one time consider asking the Executive Council for leave to have the Tariff Commission Act amended so as to enable my own Department to put forward proposals with regard to a change, by way of increasing or decreasing tariffs already put on, because I thought at one time it was necessary that the Department should have that power in order to see that the tariff policy was given a proper chance. The tariff policy has shown that certain tariffs would be given a proper chance, and if the Department now saw that certain additions or certain subtractions should be made to those originally put on, without the examination that the Tariff Commission can now give, then the Department should have that power. Again, I do not see that that power is necessary. On any occasion on which some changes are required on any tariff put on during the last three or four years it has always been possible to get the parties interested—the manufacturers—to make application themselves. There is a further point in regard to applications made either by the Minister for Industry and Commerce or the Minister for Agriculture. What is going to happen eventually? Let us conceive a case in which the Minister for Agriculture or the Minister for Industry and Commerce say with regard to a particular industry non-existent in the country that it has a good chance if only tariff could be established. The Minister goes before the Tariff Commission. In the first place he is not likely to make a good case, as there is no one there to be examined as to actual costs. All Departments can put up would be estimates from other countries, showing how factories of a particular type are working. These estimates could be queried and there is no one to give guarantees as there is in the case of a manufacturer already in the country, with regard to industries already existing, that costs will be kept to a certain point, or that conditions will be kept to a certain standard. In the end, if the Minister succeeds in getting the application favourably reported on by the Tariff Commission, what is the next step? If he reveals that publicly one knows what will follow. Immediately there will be a rush to dump into the country the particular article that is hereafter to be protected. The Minister's application having been heard secretly by the Commission and having got a favourable report, is it the Minister's position that he should have to hawk that tariff round the country—outside this country possibly—looking for someone to come in and found a factory on the basis that if a factory be established hereafter then certain conditions will be attached to it. If that sort of policy is to be adopted, and if that is the line of approach people consider necessary, let us wait until the case is made that the power is necessary, that it is essential that it be placed in the hands of the two Ministers before insisting on it.
There is the further point that the Tariff Commission should be allowed to examine proposals on its own initiative. That may be a power necessary to give a Tariff Commission hereafter-Is it proposed, when there are eleven applications with regard to existing industries in the country pending before the Tariff Commission, that we should complicate their task, and lengthen the time they will take in their consideration by saying to them: "In addition to the eleven concrete proposals now pending before you, you are to take a roving commission and examine into anything, into industries generally, have power to call certain people before you in any business, bring them forward, examine their books, subject them to an inquisition," and, at the end, say to these unwilling people: "You are going to have a tariff." On Friday, the Minister for Finance spoke of the inadequacy of that, even if it is considered an equitable type of procedure. Does one believe, in cases where manufacturers are unwilling to go before the Commission and give evidence, that one is going to get co-operation from them on forced appearance, necessary to get the very intimate and technical details that one must get before a tariff on anything can be properly considered? We are told, as a side-line from this, that certain people will not appear before the Tariff Commission as at present constituted, because it is not alone protection they want, but prohibition of imports, plus some further guarantee with regard to foreign capital coming in. Any application of that sort can be made now to the Tariff Commission. An application which really ends in prohibition can be made. An application which is to have attached to it a further application with regard to the prohibition of foreign capital can be made to the Tariff Commission. If the applicants desire to have their case heard secretly, so that the matter of seeking prohibition or some impediment to be placed on the influx of foreign capital, that can be heard, at the Commissioners' discretion, in camera. The Commission may report that a tariff amounting to prohibition should be imposed. It is for the Dáil afterwards to say whether that does in fact amount to prohibition. Prohibition can be enforced by the will of this House. The very wide terms of the last paragraph of the Schedule are:
Such other economic, industrial and administrative aspects of the application as appear to the Commission to be relevant to the determination of the merits and demerits of the application.
If there is any decision given by the Tariff Commission with regard to the necessity of preventing foreign capital coming in that would crush out the people at present engaged in a particular industry, that report can be received under the terms of the present Act, and it is for this House to consider that report when it appears. We are asked to have the Tariff Commission allowed to make recommendations: "as to how the benefits derived from the measure of protection afforded to any trade can be shared by the consumers." Obviously that is a matter for the Dáil. The Tariff Commissioners are expected to report a certain number of things; one of the things is the effect which the granting in whole or in part of the concessions asked for in the application would be likely to have on consumers of the goods produced by the industry in respect of which the application is made, and the cost of living.
The Tariff Commissioners must report on that, and it is not for them to report on safeguards. They may advise as to safeguards and machinery, but it is for this House, when it has heard the Tariff Commission's report on the item in the Schedule, to make up its mind whether or not there is machinery by which the benefits may be passed on to the consumer.
It is for it to insist on that machinery being established and on seeing that the benefit is passed on to the consumer in cases where it seems to be desirable that it should be passed on. We are asked to insist that for the purposes of this inquiry the Commission should be empowered to enforce the attendances of witnesses and to examine them on oath. That power is already there. Finally, we are told that the Commission shall report to the Executive Council, which shall publish such reports within three months of their presentation, if so requested by the Commission. The Chairman of the Commission said, and in so saying he was only following out a statement that has been made in this House, namely, that once their report is made it has to become, some time afterwards, a public document. We are asked to put a term on that period of three months. Supposing the Executive Council, as a result of accepting a report of the Commission, considers that the machinery would be difficult to set up and that it would take a longer time than three months to set it up, are we going to have the report of the Commission revealed and allow dumping, about which Deputies on the opposite benches talk so much?
There is to be a safeguard of three months if the Commission so require. Why leave it to the Commission? Deputies, by the ordinary process of putting down a question, can ascertain whether a report has been submitted, whether a report has been accepted, and, if a long period seems to have elapsed between the presentation of a report to the Executive Council and the submission of a report from the Executive to the House, there is the ordinary means of questioning in order to ascertain the reason of the delay, and Deputies can bring forward a motion to insist on the report being submitted. The amendment has, I think, many points of similarity with the motion. It wants to provide that the members of the Commission shall devote their whole time to the work.
On that point specific assurances have been given that if a case can be made out that as the Commissioners hold only part-time appointments, they are holding up the consideration of applications, the Minister for Finance is ready to consider the appointment of whole-time members or, at any rate, he has approached the point of making it definite that the Tariff Commission work is the first and primary occupation of the people at present on it, and that if they cannot give their first time to the most important part of their work, they will have to be changed for others who can do so. Until, however, a case is made that these people, being only part-time Commissioners, are holding up the work of the Commission, it is better to leave them as they are particularly when you consider this further fact. If there is not on the Tariff Commission a representative of the Ministry of Finance, a representative of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, every report of the Commission when received will have to be considered by people who occupy the principal posts in those Ministries, because these are the Departments that would ordinarily be called on to report upon documents of the sort received from outside bodies.
Instead of making up time by insisting that these people shall give their whole time to that duty you are only interposing a second examination of the matter. First, there will be consideration by the Tariff Commission, and, secondly, by the principal officials of the Ministries concerned, and, after that, by the Executive Council, so that, that proposal is not going to speed up the question of tariff reform in this country. A further point is that the Commission, on the submission of proposals by or to the Minister for Industry and Commerce or the Minister for Lands and Agriculture, or on its own initiative, should have power to investigate the position of an industry. With that I have dealt. The second point is one about which Deputy Cooper had a certain grievence, namely, that the Tariff Commission should be asked to report upon the probable effect of methods of assisting and protecting any industry by methods other than customs duties.
That is not, I submit, a matter for the Tariff Commission. If there are industries which require help by any means, other than customs duties, such, for instance, as the imposition of prohibition, it is not a matter for the Tariff Commission, and to add that duty to it is to give it a task that is unending and which would definitely stop, for a considerable length of time, its consideration of a simpler problem, the imposition of a tariff. It is right and proper that there should be somebody ready to report on other methods of helping industry other than the imposition of customs duties. There is one branch in my own Department which has that duty, and it is for it to consider any proposals that come before it and make recommendations. It is for the Executive Council to consider such recommendations with regard to any method of protecting industry other than customs duties, such, for instance, as bounties. The subsidy with regard to sugar beet, for instance, was dealt with in a way different to that in regard to tariffs.