As I was saying when the debate was adjourned, I am fully convinced of the value, and even of the necessity, of the principal Act. I have never denied at any time that the principle which that gave effect to was first promulgated by the late Arthur Griffith. Quite a presentable case might be made out against it, but it is not a case that I should expect to see getting much support from Deputies on the opposite side, any more than from Deputies on the Labour Benches. For that reason, I was rather surprised at some of the speeches that were delivered. It was not with feelings of great gratification and satisfaction that I was responsible for any curtailment of the powers of the best elements of our local bodies, and I might even go so far as to say that up to a certain point I do not regard the exercise of patronage by these local bodies as altogether an unmixed evil. After all, it is not for nothing that people are elected to positions of influence and authority in their own counties, and, other things being equal, I am prepared to admit that those people who, for one reason or another—because of long residence in or long association with a district, because of the extent of their holdings, because of their ability as administrators, or even because of the number and the influence of their friends and supporters—are elected to posts of honour and responsibility, are entitled to special consideration. I am even prepared to go further and to admit that the larger and more influential ratepayers, the men who are generally elected and who command considerable influence in their respective counties, the people who bear the brunt of local taxation, are entitled to consideration. They might have an equitable claim to some quid pro quo, if you will, in the shape of patronage, particularly in these days when the whole trend of Government in most European countries is in the direction of piling service upon top of service. The main essential qualification for receiving the benefit is that you should contribute little or nothing towards their upkeep. As I say, that is not a consideration I would expect to see getting very much support from the opposite Benches. It was one that weighed heavily on me before I took the responsibility of introducing the Principal Act. Having weighed up the pros and cons, it seemed to me that this overwhelming argument stands out, that our concern here as public representatives primarily is not to consider what is in the interests of the rich man's son, or of the poor man's son, or of the scion of a long-tailed family, or the parvenu, but rather to concern ourselves in providing the best possible service for the general public, for the ratepayers, large and small. Judged from that particular standpoint the original Act, in my opinion, left very little to be desired.
It proved in practice and in theory to be sound. There has been criticism of the Act; there have been objections made to the Act, and to the working of it, but I have never seen any of these objections substantiated. I would be glad if any Deputies who know of such were able to bring forward cases to substantiate the objections. Section 7 of the new Bill which is the kernel of it will, I am convinced, leave matters worse than they were before the present Act was passed. There are exceptions in local authorities but, speaking generally and frankly, we have to admit that before the principal Act was passed we had a condition of affairs in the country, with regard to local appointments, which might broadly be described as nepotism, with occasional instances of corruption. If this Bill becomes an Act I believe it will introduce a state of affairs which might more appropriately be described as corruption, with occasional instances of nepotism.
I have no sympathy with the point of view that our local bodies are hot-beds of corruption. In fact, my whole experience in local government is to the contrary, but most flocks have their black sheep, and it was the weakness of the old system that the good influence of the other members was nullified by the black sheep, even though it was only one black sheep. Like the chain which is only as strong as its weakest link, the integrity of a council is only as reliable as that of the weakest member. Section 7 of this Bill is, on first reading, somewhat obscure, but we should not allow ourselves to be deceived. I do not say it was intentional but, at all events, I may say that it was camouflage, as that section drives a coach-and-four through the principal Act. It does not matter how it will look in theory. In practice it will mean that in every case three names will have to be submitted to the local authority, because, on account of the prestige and "amour propre" of members of local bodies they will insist on getting their full pound of flesh under this Bill. They will insist in every case of having three names sent down. Undoubtedly under the Bill these three candidates must be qualified but whereas No. 1 may be 90 per cent. efficient, No. 2 70 per cent., and No. 3 30 per cent., if No. 3 happens to be a local man with local influence, No. 3 will, in the majority of cases be elected. We know that from experience under the old system. That is not the worst side of it. If on the other hand, none of the three men happens to be local, or to have local influence, we may take it that some influential or important councillors or representatives who, in the ordinary way, dominate these elections, will take very little interest in them.
They will be apathetic. In these circumstances, the pivotal man in the council is going to become the black sheep if there is such a man in that council, and we know that there are some of them left still—the man who is prepared to sell to the highest bidder, who knows how to pull the wires and get at other councillors. If he knows his job, and a great many of them do know their job very well, he will, in the great majority of cases, get his candidate elected, because most of the other councillors will vote for the candidate on whose behalf they are canvassed first. In those cases the highest bidder, generally, is not going to be the candidate with the highest qualifications. The candidate with the highest qualifications will stand on his record and refuse to stoop to the methods that the man with the weaker qualifications will resort to. The latter is the man who, as a general rule, will be prepared to move heaven and earth to get elected by hook or by crook. It is that sort of candidate that you will often have elected. I believe that, if the system proposed under this Bill were to come into operation, it would be thoroughly bad from every point of view. It would be bad from the point of view of the local bodies because it would put a premium on the worst form of canvassing, on a waste of time and on corruption. It would be bad, too, from the point of view of the candidates themselves, because it would create a situation in the future, such as we had in the past, which would make it impossible, or at all events difficult, to get the best qualified candidates to go forward. They would refuse to run the risk of being defeated by men with inferior qualifications. What would happen is that these highly qualified men would do what they did formerly, emigrate to foreign countries where their abilities would be likely to be better appreciated. The pity of the whole thing is that under this Bill you would revive the bad old tradition of the past of having inferior men coming forward and getting elected to local positions. From the point of view of the long suffering general public, the effect of the passing of this Bill would be that the public, instead of getting the best possible service, will very often get the worst from men with mere theoretical and, often-times, only mere technical qualifications.
As I stated earlier, the principal Act when it was introduced was not altogether a popular measure. I make bold to say that if I were asked which of the Acts passed during my term as Minister for Local Government and Public Health I was prepared to let my whole political career stand or fall by, I would unhesitatingly say the Local Authorities (Officers and Employees) Act, 1926. I say that in spite of the fact that when it was going through the Dáil, owing to the urgency with which it was required and for other reasons, it was necessary to agree to the amendment of several sections of it which I might have preferred to have left as they were. There were many minor points raised on this Bill before the House which I do not intend to go into because I think they have already been dealt with by some previous speakers. As well as that, I consider that the whole issue is bound up in this particular section. If this section is carried, then I say that the whole policy of having Appointments' Commissioners should be done away with and that we should revert again to the old system rather than have this half-baked measure which will please nobody and which, I am thoroughly convinced, will do more harm than good.
