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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Thursday, 14 Jun 1928

Vol. 24 No. 5

PUBLIC BUSINESS. - CONSTITUTION (AMENDMENT No. 6) BILL, 1928—SECOND STAGE.

I move that this Bill be given a Second Reading. It is an amendment of the Constitution in respect of the Seanad triennial elections. The system in the Constitution provides for registration of citizens qualified as Dáil electors who have reached the age of 30 years. The entire State is then a single Constituency, and three times the number of persons entitled to be elected can be nominated as candidates, in addition to such outgoing Senators or ex-Senators as signify their desire to be included in the list of nominations. In consequence a panel of about 80 names is likely to be on the voting paper to be supplied to the electors in a contest of this kind. In order to secure the full voting power of each elector it might conceivably be necessary to mark a ballot paper up to the 78th preference, in the case of 80 persons standing for election. The impracticability of the system was demonstrated at the last election of the Seanad, when something less than 23 per cent. of the electorate voted. The system is expensive. It entails considerable waste, considerable expense. A good deal of time and material are wasted in working out the system as it stands. The Joint Committee's recommendation, the first decision, in fact, in connection with the report which has been published, is that the present system is undesirable. This Bill carries out the recommendation of the Joint Committee. I move the Second Reading.

I would like to ask would it be possible for Amendment No. 3 to be taken before Amendment No. 1? I do not know what system is adopted in the placing of amendments of this nature in order. If Amendment No. 3 should happen to pass I would be prepared to withdraw Amendment No. 1 and that might save the time of the House. I suggest that Amendment No. 1 should be deferred until the Dáil has dealt with Amendment No. 3 in the name of Deputy de Valera.

The amendments were placed in their order of difference to the motion. Deputy Lemass's amendment to delete the word "now" and add at the end of the motion the words "this day twelve months" is a method specifically prescribed by Standing Orders and is aimed at killing the Bill.

Postponing the Bill.

It is technically postponing it, but it is, in fact, presumed to be a direct negative. The insertion of the words "twelve months" is regarded as a direct negative and as an amendment which has the effect of killing the Bill. For that reason Deputy Lemass's amendment is placed first. When there are a number of amendments—in this case there are four—aimed at deleting words, the procedure is to allow the amendment which differs most from the motion— in this case it is proposed to allow Deputy Lemass's amendment—to be moved first and on that amendments to allow all the other amendments to be discussed. The practice is to put the question that the word "now" stand part of the motion and, if that motion is carried and the word "now" stands, all the amendments fall because the House has decided against deleting the words for any purpose. If the word is deleted it enables the House to substitute other words. That procedure will be adopted in this case. If the word "now" were deleted I would put the question that the words "this day twelve months" be inserted and if that were carried I would not be able to put any of the other amendments. For that reason Deputy Lemass's amendment is put first. If, on the other hand, the debate begins on Amendment No. 3 by Deputy de Valera I would put the question that the words proposed to be deleted stand part of the Bill. If the words stand the amendment is defeated. I am prepared, if Deputy Lemass does not move his amendment, to take Deputy de Valera's amendment, but it means the exclusion, in any event that may happen in the way of a vote in this House, of Deputy Lemass's amendment should the words proposed to be deleted stand. I would not put Deputy Aiken's amendment as that amendment is not a reason against the motion for Second Reading. I shall take Deputy de Valera's amendment.

Do I understand that you intend to put the question that the word "now" stands part of the motion?

I would be glad to know under what part of the Standing Orders you are putting an amendment of that kind instead of the amendment standing on the Order Paper?

Whenever there are alternative amendments of this kind the Chair has power to put the question in the form which seems most convenient for arriving at a decision of the House. That is the only form which is satisfactory here. The House is asked to take out certain words for the purpose of putting in others. The first question is: Is the House to take out these words? If the words are taken out, the House then decides what words will be inserted. That procedure has been adopted on several occasions.

I take it that that procedure is not defined in the Standing Orders.

I do not think that particular procedure is defined in the Standing Orders, but there is power in the Chair to put a question in the form in which the Chair thinks best for the purpose of getting a decision from the House. For example, if a motion were proposed it would be in the power of the Chair to put the motion in two parts for the purpose of getting a decision from the House.

Can you inform us what section of the Standing Orders gives you discretion to put a motion in a form in which it does not appear on the Order Paper and which you consider the most suitable? This is a matter on which I would like to be informed, not being familiar with the Standing Orders. It appears to us that the amendments which appear on the Order Paper can be discussed separately. Even if the amendment postponing the Bill for twelve months were defeated the other amendments deal with different matters altogether, and if these other amendments were defeated the amendment to postpone the Bill for twelve months would still, I maintain, be debated. You will remember that the next election for the Seanad is due to take place within twelve months' time, and the purpose of that amendment would be to postpone the time for the next election of the Seanad. It could be argued that the existing method of election to the Seanad has not been given effect to. A reasonable case could be made out for postponing the Bill, an entirely different case from that which could be made out for any of the other amendments.

I am not precluding the Deputy from discussing any of the amendments. I think a case can be made for any of these amendments. Deputy Aiken later would be entitled to argue the matter of his amendment, but Deputy Lemass's amendment is to delete the word "now." Deputy de Valera's amendment is to delete all the words after the word "that," and the question will be put to the House as to whether the House desires to delete the words. The Standing Orders cannot make provision for all possible contingencies that may arise, but this is a common practice, and it is a sensible practice because it enables the House to discuss the various alternatives. The motion is, "That the Bill be now read a Second Time." The House may discuss all the alternatives, and will then come to a decision by deciding whether it wants certain words in the motion or not. Having come to that decision, it will be for the House to decide what words will be inserted. That gives the utmost liberty to everybody.

I submit that it is really curtailing the liberties of Deputies.

It may be possible to convince the House to delete the word "now" and to substitute the words "this day twelve months," whereas it might not be possible to convince the House to delete the word "now" for some other purpose. If it were possible to confine the debate to one set of arguments, these arguments might be more effective. I feel strongly that as the power you propose exercising in the matter is not defined in the Standing Orders and only exists by precedent —I am not sure even whether it is a precedent of the House——

Oh, yes, it is.

——that we ought not lightly agree to this curtailment of the liberties of Deputies. I believe a case could be made out for amendment No. 1 that would have no relation to the case that could be made out for amendments Nos. 2, 3, and 4. Similarly, a good case could be made out for amendments 2, 3, and 4 that would have no relation to the case made out for amendment No. 1. In view of the fact that the subject matter of the Bill is controversial, it is our view that no difficulty should be placed in the way of having it discussed from every possible angle.

Would the Deputy indicate what difficulty is placed in the way of having it discussed?

Discussion on amendment No. 1 would be confined to the suggestion that the Bill should be postponed for twelve months, that is to allow another election of the Seanad to take place under the old system. The discussion on amendments 3 or 4 would deal with entirely different matters, and, in so far as there would be therefore a confusion of arguments, the liberty which I possess according to Standing Orders to move an amendment similar to amendment No. 1 would be curtailed.

There is no curtailment of debate suggested in the matter. As a matter of fact, what is allowed is the utmost possible liberty of discussion on all these alternatives to the motion, and giving the House an opportunity of deciding what particular amendment is desired. If Deputy Lemass examines the matter carefully he will find that this particular procedure of dealing with the amendments is rather against the mover of the main question, because it unites against him all those who are in favour of any of the amendments on the Paper. That is the exact effect. All those who want certain words removed from the main question will unite in opposition to the main question. If they succeed in removing these words then they will have an opportunity of moving to insert whatever words they desire. There is no curtailment of the right of a Deputy to argue a case. I will take Deputy de Valera's amendment first.

I take it that every Deputy can speak on the four amendments in the one discussion, and that if I were speaking on amendment No. 3 I would not be confined to the subject matter of amendment No. 1. Will there be a separate vote on each amendment?

There may. The discussion will not be curtailed. A Deputy speaking on the amendment proposed will be at liberty to deal with the main question and with the amendments on the Paper, but when the question is put, that the words proposed to be deleted stand part of the motion, and if that question be decided affirmatively, it will, of course, decide against all the amendments. If that question is decided in the negative, then each of the following amendments can be moved.

In view of your ruling, I suggest that Amendment No. 3 should be taken first.

With regard to Amendment No. 3, there are other amendments on the Paper, of a similar nature, to other Bills. I suggest that the two questions which are raised here by Amendments 2 and 3 —in the case of No. 2, that this Bill shall not get a Second Reading until a Select Committee has reported on amendments to the Constitution as a whole, and the other, that the Bill shall not be further considered until a Select Committee of the Dáil has reported on the advisability of the abolition of the Seanad—arise properly on the Bill, but if these amendments are defeated they cannot arise on a subsequent Bill because the House will have given a decision. I would propose on this first Bill to allow a discussion which would not necessarily be confined to the subject matter of the Bill, but which might traverse the Report of the Joint Committee. I think that opportunity should be taken at this particular stage. If the House does not desire it, it need not be done. For myself I would have no objection to a discussion of these amendments and the main question covering the Joint Committee's Report, but in a subsequent Bill the question of the abolition of the Seanad or the question of the amendment of the Constitution as a whole will not arise.

May I ask in accordance with what Standing Order you make that ruling that the amendments could not be considered in respect of another Bill? That would be a very serious precedent.

On the ground that if the House decides to give a Second Reading to this Bill it will have decided inferentially that the Seanad is not to be abolished. It will also have decided that it is prepared to enter on the amendment of the Constitution without referring the general question to a Select Committee.

The House might decide to-day to reject the amendment which would involve the setting up of a committee to report on the question of the abolition of the Seanad, but it might be prepared next week, when the Amendment No. 7 Bill comes up, to pass such an amendment. It is a question of time. The fact that there is a similarity between the two Bills and the amendment is no reason why it should be taken to rule out similar amendments for all time.

The Deputy is more harsh than I am. I have not ruled them out for all time.

What is the point?

The House must get an opportunity of discussing this Report, and this first Bill is the more suitable Bill for having that Report discussed. If the House decides to give a Second Reading to the Bill the whole question cannot be argued on other Bills with regard to the abolition of the Seanad. It is a general question and it would simply duplicate the debate to an unnecessary degree.

Every Bill must be considered as a separate entity if introduced as a separate Bill. If, as suggested by Deputy O'Hanlon yesterday, all these Bills had been embodied in one measure and proposed to the House in that form your argument would have been in order. But if the President, for reasons which seem good to himself, introduces them as separate Bills, then they suffer all the disabilities of separate measures, and every amendment which would be relevant to a Bill if introduced alone must be relevant on every Bill, even though it should be one of the series. I submit that that is the natural interpretation that should be placed on the Standing Orders. A Bill has to go through five stages in the fullest possible way, and is subject to any amendment which any member of this House may see fit to introduce. I submit that you are bound by the Standing Orders and the precedent set up to take every amendment separately and to discuss every amendment which may be introduced without reference to any Bills which preceded it or comes after it.

If it should happen that we have an equal number of votes cast in favour of the amendment and an equal number against the amendment, I presume you will be giving your casting vote, as on a previous occasion, in favour of maintaining the status quo and allowing the matter to be discussed again. That would create exactly the position which we want to maintain. If and when another motion comes up we are at liberty to discuss an amendment dealing with the other motions without taking it for granted that the previous decision had no bearing on the decision which would then arise.

I submit also that a point which is very pertinent in this connection is the statement of the President himself, that he had introduced all these proposals as separate Bills on account of the fact that in the Joint Committee there was considerable divergence of opinion in regard to some of the points raised. In view of that, I think that as some people who might be prepared to oppose any of the amendments in respect to, say, Constitution (Amendment No. 7) Bill would be prepared, in view of their opposition to the general principle of the Bill, to accept some of the amendments which we propose in relation to Constitution (Amendment No. 8) Bill, you ought to permit the fullest possible discussion on every one of these Bills, particularly having regard to the statement made by the President giving his reason for introducing these Bills as separate proposals to the House.

I understood your ruling to be that you would not prevent any argument being adduced against any Bill, but that you would prevent a repetition on each Bill of the argument in favour of setting up a Select Committee to advise on the abolition of the Seanad, or the setting up of a Select Committee to inquire into the amendment of the Constitution as a whole, but that, so far as the Bills before the House were concerned, there would be the utmost liberty in regard to each Bill.

In reply to that I would suggest that this point ought to be considered: it is quite possible that a person would have strong views, say, in regard to the Constitution (Amendment No. 7) Bill, and would like to oppose that Bill, but, at the same time, so long as the amendment did not appear in the Constitution, he would not favour the abolition of the Seanad. But if the Second Reading of the Bill to amend the Constitution in relation to that particular Article were carried, his whole attitude towards the Seanad and its maintenance might change, and he might, therefore, be prepared, in connection with an amendment to another Bill, to support the reference of the whole matter back until the question of the abolition of the Seanad had been considered by a Committee of the House. There are, therefore, very strong reasons why each of these amendments should be considered separately to each one of these Bills.

I was really endeavouring, in fairness to Deputies generally, to acquaint them with the course of the debate on the Bills, and I think the procedure is now clear as to how the amendments will be put on the particular Bill now before us. I am taking Deputy de Valera's amendment No. 3 and allowing a debate on the main question and on the amendments on the Paper, and I propose to put as a question to the House that all the words after "that" in the motion stand. With regard to the further questions, it is contrary to all procedure to re-open matters already decided—to duplicate debate—and I propose on this particular Bill to allow considerable latitude on the discussion of the question of the abolition of the Seanad and the question whether the Constitution should not be amended after a different fashion and after a different procedure. But if this Bill gets a Second Reading, I do not propose to allow these matters to be again raised on other Bills.

A new point has arisen from your remarks. You said you proposed to allow a discussion to take place not merely on the amendment, but on the main question. That is going to confuse the issue still further, because a Deputy might wish to argue other points in favour of postponing this Bill until these Select Committees have been set up, or some such Select Committees, and, at the same time, have detailed objections to the actual procedure proposed in the Bill, which should be discussed separately after the amendments have been disposed of. Another point that I should like to have answered is: I take it that your ruling in this matter is not provided for in the Standing Orders at all —that it is a decision of your own as to the best method to be taken.

Will you mention the Standing Order?

Deputies must not imagine that I must mention the Standing Order for every ruling I give. The Standing Order provides that the Ceann Comhairle is the sole judge of order. That seems to cover everything that could be possibly ruled upon in the House. It was made explicit for that particular reason. The Standing Order does not provide for all kinds of things. They are left to be provided for by the order that the Ceann Comhairle is the sole judge of order, and I am deciding this particular matter by virtue of my position under the Standing Order generally.

Will you inform us at least what period of time your ruling covers? If an amendment to Constitution (Amendment No. 6) Bill cannot be considered in relation to certain other Bills, when can it again be considered? If, this day five years, the Government introduced another Bill to amend the Constitution, or some subsequent Government, can a similar amendment to that on the Order Paper be discussed then? Does your ruling only apply to the Bills on the Order Paper for to-day or does it also apply to the Bills on the Order Paper for next Wednesday?

If Deputy Lemass and I are spared to be here in our respective positions this day five years, we can argue that matter. I am not prepared to argue it now.

You said and, of course, it will be accepted, that the Ceann Comhairle is the sole judge of order, but I submit that in that matter your judgment must be strictly in accordance with the Standing Orders, which are there not only to guide this House but you in your capacity of Ceann Comhairle. To my mind, the Standing Order relevant to this matter is No. 45 which states that, "No Deputy shall re-open a discussion on a question already decided during the same Session except by the indulgence of the Dáil," etc. The really pertinent portion of the Standing Order is: "No Deputy shall re-open a discussion on a question already decided during the same Session." In relation to the Bills before us, the only question that can be decided is a question particularly and specially associated with the one Bill under discussion at that time. For instance, it could not be said that if Item No. 6 on the Order Paper had been decided——

Is the Deputy referring to Constitution (Amendment No. 6) Bill?

On item 5 on the Order Paper, that is Bill 6, to delete all words after the word "that" and to substitute the following words:—"The Bill be not further considered until a Select Committee of the Dáil has reported on the advisability of the abolition of the Seanad." That amendment appears only to No. 6 Bill. It does not appear with regard to items 6,7 or 8, or any other item on the Order Paper but to No. 5. That is the only question that would be decided by a vote on that amendment, and I contend that you cannot extend the ambit of that vote to cover amendments to any Bill on the Paper other than this one. Every Bill must be decided, and any amendment introduced which is relevant to that Bill or Title when the Bill is printed must be considered separately from any other act that was done by this Dáil. If that were not so it could be argued that no Bill to repeal an Act already passed by this Dáil could be introduced in the same session as the Act which it is proposed to repeal. I think that would lead us into a ridiculous position. There are a number of Bills here which are associated, in so far as they embody a number of decisions arrived at by one Committee, that we have to deal with each of them as if there were no other proposal on the Order Paper except itself. Otherwise it would lead to the position to which I have pointed, that it would be impossible to introduce into the Dáil a Bill to repeal a measure already enacted by the Dáil in the same session. For instance, suppose, as might happen, and as within the realms of practical possibility, the Government were to be defeated, say, on Bill No. 8 —item No. 6 on the Order Paper—and a new Government were to be formed to take office, it could not, if your decision stands, propose to repeal or reverse the decision which had been taken on the Second Reading of item No. 5 on the Order Paper.

I think, perhaps, to clear the air it would be much safer if I moved the rejection of this Bill. I do so in the first instance——

I thought the Deputy was raising a point of order.

I am moving the rejection of the Bill.

Then I think I will have to solve Deputy MacEntee's point of order before the Deputy can do that. I propose to conclude the question of order now. The consequences which Deputy MacEntee fears from the ruling which I am giving will, I think, not flow. We cannot avoid seeing things as they actually are. A Joint Committee has made a report, and following that report a number of Bills have been introduced. If the Bill now before us is given a Second Reading the House will have assented to the principle that a second House shall be elected by a particular method. When the House has assented to that principle it would be out of order on this particular set of Bills— and any point of time that may arise can be decided when it does arise— that the House should continue to discuss the question whether there should be a second House at all. I propose to take now, at once, and without further points of order, Deputy de Valera's amendment, No. 3, on the Order Paper.

Deputy O'Hanlon's intervention was so interesting that I would be prepared to give way to him if he desires to proceed with his motion.

I shall allow Deputy O'Hanlon to move Deputy Lemass's amendment, if Deputy Lemass agrees, and put the question on that amendment.

I move amendment No. 3:—

To delete all words after the word "That" and substitute the words "the Bill be not further considered until a Select Committee of the Dáil has reported on the advisability of the abolition of the Seanad."

Some time ago the Dáil resolved to set up a Select Committee of the Dáil and the Seanad to consider, and report on, the changes, if any, necessary to the Constitution and powers of and the methods of election to Seanad Eireann. We indicated at the very outset that we did not think we should set up any such Committee, but that we should consider whether we should not abolish the Seanad altogether. I think there was a vote and a division on that particular question. We voted against the setting up of that Committee for the reason I have indicated. We were defeated in that division, and the Committee was set up. We appointed from our Party two representatives nevertheless to serve on that Committee. But we did so with this object, quite clearly, I think, expressed in the Dáil, and certainly expressed in the Committee itself, that we did not believe that the Seanad could be amended so as to be a useful part of Governmental machinery, but that we served upon it for the purpose of doing what we could to make the Seanad as little harmful as possible by such amendments as we might be able to get passed in that Committee.

On several occasions when the Committee was in session there were divisions taken, and suggestions made, and we, who represented Fianna Fáil on that Committee, made it quite clear that our propositions were directed solely for the purpose of trying to make the Seanad, if it was decided by a majority here to retain it, as little harmful and as valuable, in so far as any value could be got out of it, as possible. I propose in anything I have to say this evening to follow the same lines. I think we ought to ask ourselves: "Do we want a second chamber here at all?" It is a very pertinent question.

We are spending something like £32,000 a year upon this second House. The total cost of the allowances, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman and the Senators amounts to £23,580. The total cost of the Oireachtas staff, etc., is £31,531. Now, if we allow, say, a fourth of that sum for the Seanad—I do not think it is too high a figure—it would give us something like £7,800 additional, and if we add these two items we find that the cost amounts to over £31,400 a year. We cannot afford, I hold, to spend £31,400 a year of the people's money without assuring ourselves that we are getting something very valuable in return. Let us ask ourselves the question then: "Are we getting from the second House a valuable return for that sum of money spent annually?"

The fact that it is usual to have Second Chambers, is inclined. I think, to dull our perception of that particular point. We take it for granted. Somebody begins things; people continue on because it has been done by somebody else. The fact that other countries have Second Chambers is not, at least, a sufficient reason why we should continue on the same lines. We ought to be able to satisfy ourselves that we, in this particular case, are getting good value by following such precedents. Let us look around and examine just a little the countries which have a Second Chamber and ask ourselves what is the function of these Second Chambers. What good purposes do they serve and how do they come to be in existence, particularly from the historical point of view? The American Senate is taken as a great example. If we go back through the circumstances that surrounded the making of the American Constitution we have to remember that you had thirteen rival States that were very jealous rivals in a certain sense. They were very jealous of their State power, and the suggestion of having a second House in the United States at that particular time was largely looked upon as a means of satisfying the claims of the individual States. They had in that Second Chamber an opportunity of securing equal representation for all the States, for the small States equally with the big States. If we examine any other State, any other country where there is a Second Chamber, we will find that where they are most successful they are associated not with the unitary State at all, but with the federal system. If for example, we had in this country regional autonomy; if we had a system like the Swiss Cantons and if we had our county councils largely independent themselves, there might be a good reason and a very easy way also of getting a Second Chamber here in our Governmental system by getting the county councils or the county cantons to select representatives. But we have nothing of the kind at the present moment.

We are only part of a small island. We are a concentrated unitary State in so far as the Twenty-six Counties here are concerned, and most of the arguments that are put forward in favour of the Second Chamber, and most of the circumstances that have made those Second Chambers that exist in other countries and that are functioning effectively, are absent in our particular case. Take the case of some of the unitary states. In England we know that the Second Chamber there is more or less a relic of feudalism. It has been more or less in existence for several centuries, and it was only comparatively recently that it had come at all in conflict with democracy as such. We ought not certainly have in this country a Second House simply because there is a Second House across the water. Let us come down and see where we have unitary states and democracy at the same time, and where you try to have two Chambers that will satisfy democracy. What is the result? You have very frequently clashes. You have constitutional crises of various kinds, and a good deal of hampering and clogging on legislative action. Long ago the statement by Abbé Sieyes became more or less a commonplace in the books that dealt with the subject. That statement that was made in France by the Abbé Sieyes was:

"If a Second Chamber is in agreement with the First Chamber, then it is useless; if, on the other hand, it is in opposition to the First Chamber, then it is mischievous."

That was a dilemma. I do not want to say that it was perfectly fair, but it indicates at any rate broadly the difficulties you are in the moment you try to have two Chambers that really represent the people. What is the solution for you? The usual way in which they are solved is that you take out of the province of one of the Chambers, take out of their power, in fact, to clash on vital matters with the other. That is, you make the Second Chamber an impotent body in important matters. Here in your own Constitution you have expressly taken it out of the power of the Seanad to hold up Money Bills. It is clearly realised that you could not give that power to a Second Chamber, otherwise the whole machinery of Government, by obstruction in the Second Chamber, could be brought to a standstill.

If, then, you realise that you have to deprive the Second Chamber of powers in important matters, is it not quite clear that all you can give it is subsidiary matters, and that when in important matters, in which a check would be important, that you have to get rid of the clog and the check altogether, and that, therefore, you leave it to function in comparatively minor matters?

Hence, in a case like this if you have a Second House you must realise that it is of very secondary importance. I know very well that there is in general, when you think casually on matters of this kind, a natural disposition to wish to have some check on a popular Assembly. We know how tyrannical majorities can be, how very tyrannical they can be. We know what little regard they have given when it suits them, to the rights of minorities. A citizen who is anxious for the rights of the individual citizens of the country, who is anxious for the rights of minorities, naturally wishes to put some sort of a check upon the arbitrariness of the majority in an elective assembly. But your own experience here for the last four or five years ought convince you that you cannot effectively put any sort of a check by machinery such as the Second Chamber upon the majority. In our Second Chamber at any time here in the past, in the history of the last four or five years there has not been a single occasion in which the Second House dared, if I might put it that way, to stand up against the popularly-elected Assembly. Even in cases where the right of a very large minority in the country was in question, they did not dare to do it. They never will dare to do it as long as they know that the power of the people will be behind the majority. Therefore, I say again, even in our own time, here in this House, it is proved that it would be impotent in any particular case in which the majority wanted to have its way, to hold its own view. My view is this, that there is only one way in which democracy can effectively work, and that is, not by giving up trying to have artificial machinery such as the Second House, but by trying to have the popular Assembly constituted in the best possible manner. I believe that you would achieve far more by concentrating on that and by giving to the people the best possible primary Assembly advocating the people's rights than by any means you might devise of having a Second House. If this particular test which I have referred to many times, this Oath test, which is preventing a large section of our people from being represented here, were removed, then with proportional representation you would have built up here an Assembly which would represent the people, because it would be formed and based on the proportionate rights, and minorities would receive within this House as much protection as they would be likely to receive from the body of citizens outside.

It would be a reproduction in miniature of the divisions that exist in the country and it might be taken for granted, if the periods from one Parliament to another are not too long, that any question to be decided, if this House was so constituted that there would be no barriers at the door, would be decided pretty much in the same way as if it were left to the country as a whole to decide it. When we are thinking of the Second House, instinctively our first impulse is to wish to have a check. I have tried to show that these checks in practice are not valuable. For instance, take the Constitution, which is supposed also to be a check. We see how it is ignored whenever it suits the majority. We have seen these Articles which were supposed to guarantee the rights of citizens cut off or about to be cut off in these series of Bills. The inviolability of the person and the sacredness of the home were supposed to be guaranteed. These things were set aside by the action of the Executive pleading military or some other necessity. We had it quoted many a time that the chief law was the safety of the people, and you will always get Bills of that kind whenever an Executive or the representatives of the majority in the elected Chamber feel they want them. That is what is amounts to. They will ruthlessly set aside any barriers of any kind and they will always find an excuse of one kind or another.

You might as well face that situation. I say again that we instinctively wish to have some check, but you cannot get any effective check and we might as well face that from the very beginning. There is no effective check on a majority in a popular House if it is prepared to take the bit between its teeth. The majority can say: "We represent the majority and we are going to use all the powers of the State to have our way." What is the picture that comes to people's minds of the sort of check they want? They picture a select Second Chamber, grave and reverent seigneurs, who, in no circumstances, will take anything but the view that a question has to be considered on its merits; a Chamber that would be untrammelled by any ties of party or by any considerations of party. They would be people of wide experience whose wisdom would be such that they would be able to hold up the popular clamour or desire in certain regards and they would be wise enough to be able to take a judgment which is opposed to the popular judgment, but yet they would be wise enough to keep the public in rein in order that their view of what is right should become effective.

But that is not what we are going to have. That is not what it has turned out to be in any country in the world. You cannot keep politics out of the selection of the Second Chamber. Its functions are political. How can you? Do we not know that instead of having that select Second Chamber I have talked about, in the long run what you are going to have here, as in other countries—what you have in this Second Chamber here-are men who have contributed very liberally to Party funds. You will have in it business men who represent certain dominant interests that the chief Party in the State has found useful. You will have in it, at its worst, crocked Party hacks who will be given a house of rest in it. I do not think either that you are going to get very much wisdom in such a House, or that you are going to get in such a House all that calm consideration of questions relating to the public good as it would appeal to persons who are detached altogether from Party movements.

That is my view, anyhow, and I feel, therefore, that before we agree to spend something like £31,500 a year of the people's money on maintaining such an institution, somebody ought to be able to prove to us how it is going to give us value for that expenditure. It it is the view of the majority that the Second Chamber, even though it cannot become really effective, can do some little useful work, ought we not make the machine of such a size as would be reasonable for the work that is expected of it? Why should we have a Seanad of 60 members when such a large number simply gives an opportunity to a good number of Senators to be absent practically all the time? Why should we not cut it down to a reasonable number and, if we are going to have a Second House, should we not have a mode of election which would be the simplest possible and that would give you the results you wish to have? When we settle in our own minds what are the purposes of this Second Chamber, and what we can hope to achieve by it, then our next question to decide would be to get an instrument which would effect this purpose in the best possible manner. I do not think there has been given here to these particular questions the consideration that they deserve. I heard from the Labour Benches, a few days ago, the suggestion that if they had got help on a certain occasion the Constitution would be much better than it is.

Hear, hear!

Very well, they will get it now, any help that can be given, and I hope they will work with us in it. They will get any help that can be given to make this a Constitution which will be of value to the Irish people. They will get that help at least from these Benches, and they will get it in the broadest possible way, with no considerations other than considerations for the public good in so far as it is humanly possible to get them.

We have been told that the purpose of the Seanad is to act as a brake and a check on the popular assembly. I for one, do not think there is need in this country for any such brakes or checks, because where they would want to be effective they would not be, and what they will generally be is a clog on the progress that is necessary. Remember that all agricultural communities—and we are an agricultural community—are conservative. Their fault is not being heady and getting out of hand and getting into revolutions day by day. That is not ordinarily the case, and it would not be in our country, if it were completely free, a characteristic of the agricultural community.

It is quite the reverse. Their faults are the opposite; they do not move fast enough, and I would say that if we are to have a Second House it ought not to be designed for the purpose of putting on checks and brakes so much as for trying to accelerate progress, but I do not think any propositions will be made in this House for a Second Chamber of that particular kind. Remember too, that our circumstances are peculiar. Not merely are we a conservative people in conservative conditions but we have to make the progress we want to make with a country beside us that is determined that we will not move except in the direction she wants us to move in, and that any check you may put up against the popular movement will be utilised by forces from across the water in order to keep the Irish nation where it has been for a long time, namely a slave to British interests. I do not think we ought calmly to agree to set up a House of that particular kind. As I have said, the circumstances are peculiar. Those who have a national outlook are not satisfied at the present time. They believe that there is a great deal more to be accomplished yet, and they do not want to see any machinery set up which will act as a barrier to their progress towards the goal they have in view. They are quite frank about it. As far as we are concerned that is our view, and we look with suspicion on any Second Chamber being put up which could be used to keep the Irish people in a prison. We believe they are going to be an Imperial guard and nothing more.

When the Treaty was signed and when there was a question of a Second House the idea was to give a certain section of our people—those who favoured the union and who were British Imperialists in outlook—in the Second Chamber, the dominance which they could never hope to have in a popular Chamber. Let us consider the circumstances then and now. I admit that if Nationalist Ireland at that particular time had got the settlement it wanted it could afford to be generous with the dissenting minority; it could afford at that particular time to state "Very well, you are a small section. We wish to have your help to rebuild this nation. We believe, as Thomas Davis believed, that this country will be best built up by Irishmen of all kinds joining together in doing so." But Nationalist Ireland has not been united, was not united at the Treaty, and the fact that this particular section was going to be completely submerged, and that they wanted special privileges, is a consideration that need hold no longer. Everyone knows quite well that the section for which these special privileges were intended is the strongest section in the country to-day. It is the most influential section in the country. It has the majority here in the hollow of its hand any day it likes, and I say that that balance of power which it has and which it is effectively using is quite sufficient.

It has got proportional representation in this House; there is a fairly equal division of the other parties, and I think it is reasonable in those circumstances to say that the conditions which were envisaged by those who were prepared to give them very special privileges in the Second House have gone, and that quite a different set of circumstances is with us to-day. While I would probably have been one of those who would, if they were going to be completely submerged, or were likely to be completely submerged by a united Nationalist Party in this Chamber, give them certain privileges of that particular kind, because with a united Nationalist Party they would be a very weak force indeed as far as numbers were concerned, I do not think I am called on, or that anyone else in this House is called on, to make any plea of that particular kind now. As I say, they are very well protected, they have always shown that they were able to take good care of themselves, and of their interests, and they have always attached themselves to the big battalions. They have attached themselves to-day to the big battalions here, and on that account I do not think there is any need for giving them any special privileges. The Seanad was originally designed mainly with the object of giving that particular section, the Unionists, a very large share of power in the Government of the country. When I say a large share, I mean not in the Government of the country so much as in the Second House. Now circumstances have changed, and are we going to continue that system? As I said, they have always proved themselves well able to look after themselves. They have attached themselves to the big battalions. Nationalist Ireland is largely divided as a result of the policy of that particular period, and I see in this simply an effort by the major party at the present time to give indirectly to those a strength that they are not entitled to get. This simply amounts to giving the Government Party at the present time an opportunity of retaining their strength, long after they will have lost the confidence of the majority of the people. As I have said, if you think of the purpose of a Second House as a check, then I, for one, would oppose it in the present circumstances. If you view it as a House in which the minority might get special privileges, I say there is no reason for any such thing at the present time.

When we talk sometimes of the value of the American Senate we seem to forget this, that in America quite a different form of Government obtains. You have the Executive there, not responsible to any particular House directly, as the Executive is responsible here. You have the Senate, having not merely legislative functions but executive functions and judicial functions. And above all it is a House that represents the States, as opposed, so to speak, to the people. There are none of these reasons here. It is not proposed to give the Seanad as such any executive functions or any judicial functions. It is not proposed to give anything to the Seanad here but a little suspensory check on legislation, and for this little suspensory check on legislation we are going to have a chamber of sixty men—

And women.

—and women, costing the country £31,400 at least. I have seen no case whatever made out for it. I regret that we have not got a majority in this House who would prevent it, but I do say if you are going to have a Second House at all it ought to be a Second House whose size and appurtenances generally will be commensurate with the work that it is supposed to do. There is the question of the Constitution as a whole to be considered. One of the amendments that has been put down is an amendment to postpone consideration of this Bill until the Constitution as a whole should be revised. Would it not be a much more dignified thing, if you have any regard for the Constitution at all, that, instead of amending it piecemeal like this you should set up a committee that would, in the light of the experience of the last four years and in the light of present conditions, examine the Constitution as a whole? Mind, I am talking against the Seanad and for its abolition in present conditions. I hope that nobody thinks I am talking simply as a doctrinaire who believes in single-chamber government, or anything of that kind. I can very well conceive a framework of government in which a Second House would not merely be useful but might very well be necessary. For instance, I believe that a Senate such as exists in the United States is a necessity in the conditions there. What I am talking of is the abolition of the Seanad here in our circumstances, here and now, and I think that when we are considering questions of this magnitude we ought to take advantage of the fact that we can revise that Constitution as a whole and that we ought to do it in some systematic way, not piecemeal, as it is being done now. This Constitution can be revised by means of ordinary legislation any time for the next year or two, and as we are making changes of this magnitude now, I hope that there will be before the termination of that period, some serious effort made to consider the Constitution as a whole. I think it is unreasonable to start making these changes now, when perhaps quite a different system may be evolved from the consideration that should be given to this question in a year or two. Therefore I agree with both of these suggestions that are on the Paper, the one that stands in my name, that we should consider the question of the abolition of the Seanad altogether, and the still wider suggestion contained in the amendment which is in Deputy O Ceallaigh's name, that the Constitution as a whole should be revised.

So far I have only talked in general terms as to the advisability of examining this question much more broadly than it is proposed to examine it here. I have talked about two broad questions, lightly on the advisability of revising the Constitution as a whole, and more fully on the question of the advisability of considering whether the Seanad should not be abolished altogether. As to the powers of the Seanad, nobody proposes to give any extended power; there is no suggestion that it should have over-riding powers. The powers really are comparatively meagre, certainly when you consider the setting up of a Second Chamber at all. But I do not think that anybody here wishes to extend their powers, and I think very reasonably. For my own part, I believe that the power of suspension for eighteen months is too long and could be used by a hostile Seanad for pure obstruction of the work of an Executive or of a majority to whose views they might be opposed, and I think that, as I have said, there is very little likelihood of our really requiring checks. What we require more is a spur to action. As regards the number, I made certain proposals in the Committee, with a view, as I have said, to trying to get this Chamber, if we are to have it, made a reasonable size, a size commensurate with the work it has to do. I proposed, first of all, that the number should be diminished. Is there any reason why we should have a Second House consisting of sixty members for the work that it is supposed to do? Look around and see the numbers that they have in other countries. I think they have only thirty-six in Australia, and I think that that number would be quite sufficient for us. It would give us a working House, if they did work, of some thirty, allowing, on account of illness and for other reasons, for a necessary absence of five or six, and I believe that with a working House of thirty to discharge the duties that are suggested, that number would be quite sufficient. I think you could very well reduce the number from sixty. I would prefer, for my part— and I think I voice in that respect the opinion of the Fianna Fáil Deputies at all events—to see it abolished altogether, because I do not see that it is going to perform any useful work. But if we are to have it, and if we are to use it as a check for a certain period, why not reduce the number to some reasonable figure? I think forty was originally proposed in one of the drafts that was submitted, and the reason why it was run up to sixty was the reason that I have given, to get into it a large number of representatives of a special section of the community. But that reason has gone, and there is no reason to-day why you should not reduce the number and have a working Second House.

The number I proposed in the Committee was, I think, thirty-five, because I had in mind a seven-years period, but thirty-six, the number that they have in Australia, would be quite sufficient. As I say, it would give you a margin of five or six for those who might have to be absent of necessity at any time, and that would give you a working Seanad of thirty. I do not think that it is right to give an opportunity to a large number of being nominal Senators without expecting any work from them, and, moreover, giving them allowances, because, unfortunately, there does not seem to be any means of inflicting fines on those who do not do their work and who are absent unnecessarily. I intend to put down a question to try to get a return of the attendances of Senators during the time——

And of the Dáil.

They are registered and will probably be given. The newspapers are probably interested.

On a point of order, has the Standing Order of the House which requires a Deputy to address the Chair become obsolete?

They are all obsolete.

What is the Deputy's point?

Has the Standing Order of the House that requires a Deputy to address the Chair become obsolete?

In answer to the point of order, it has not.

I would like to raise another point of order. I would like to know how many Deputies are allowed to talk at the one time, because these are five or six talking here.

I did not notice that. Deputy de Valera appeared to me to be addressing the Chair.

I may not have been looking at the Chair, but I was not aware that I was not addressing the Chair. I was talking about the numbers. The next thing I suggest is that we might work very well with 36. I was about to say that I thought perhaps 35 would suit, because I had in mind the seven-year period, but it is easier to get from 60 to 36 than it would be to get to 35. I suggest that if the House should decide to continue this Second Chamber it ought to consider the question of numbers. We could get more easily from 60 to 36 than to 35. For those who have to make the consequential arrangements, that would offer no insuperable difficulties whatever. Should the House decide to have a Second Chamber, that question of numbers should be carefully considered. As far as I know, this question of number is taken for granted, and there is no suggestion at all that it should be considered. I think there is an amendment which was designed to give the House an opportunity of considering that whole question of number.

The next question is the length of the period of office. I think that our period, wherever there has been a suggestion at all of popular election, is one of the very longest. I know that in some exceptional cases there are Senators for life, and in other cases Senators for a period of some ten years. Except in the case of Senators for life, I think that the period of 12 years is certainly the longest that I know of. That long period was designed mainly to cover over the transitional period in which it was intended to give special representation to one particular section. What would be a reasonable period of office for Senators? I would say that a reasonable period—if they are going to be elected by the representatives of this House and not elected directly by the people—would be such as would carry you over the ordinary period of an election here, so that a new House might have the opportunity of putting in representatives of its particular kind after that general election. Therefore, I think the period ought to be a little longer than the Parliamentary period of an ordinary Dáil. For that reason I think it ought to be the shortest period, because I think we will all admit that if a man thinks he has twelve years he can take very little interest in his work. He will hope that he will make up for it in the last year or two, that he can neglect the work and the business for which he was elected for a whole series of years except the first one or two, and perhaps the last one or two, the first one or two when he is a new broom sweeping things clean, and the last year or two when he is looking forward to re-election. I think, myself, that the period of six years—I had in mind seven years for another reason which I will mention afterwards—is the better period. When we come to consider this question of the period we ought to agree that about six years is quite long enough. If people do good work for six years they might retire and feel they had done their service to the country. If the people want them they can re-elect them for a longer period.

I think the electors, whoever they are, should have the opportunity at least once every six years of going over and combing out the people who are not doing their work properly. That is as far as the length of the period is concerned. The next question is whether the Seanad should go out at once, or whether it should go out partially. I think it is a valuable thing to have a continuation, to have a certain number continuing. It does happen in most Houses, and probably would happen, even if all the Senators went out together, that a sufficient number would be re-elected to maintain that continuity. Continuity is very valuable. Experience is gained which is easily passed on. But, taking all the circumstances into account, my view is that if you are going to have a Second House—as I have said, I am talking mainly on the assumption that our resolution will be defeated and that the majority are going to have their way in this matter and are going to have a Second House—I suggest to those who are prepared to face the expense of a Second House that they ought to consider not merely the numbers of it and the period of office, but also this other subsidiary question whether the Seanad should go out at once or whether it should go out at shorter periods.

I believe myself that the system of a portion of the Seanad going out is a useful one. I think that when we are considering what portion should go out we ought to bear in mind the electorate, and that if we are going to use proportional representation at all, that we ought to have such a number retiring as will give an opportunity to all parties to be fairly represented in any election that takes place. Considering the present disposition of parties, if you had, say, twelve vacancies to be filled, that would give an opportunity to all parties in this House, to the main parties, anyhow, to get representation in the twelve. A smaller number probably would tell unfairly against the smaller parties, and on that account I think that a good case could be made for not having less than twelve vacancies to be filled at any one time.

Suppose, then, you take the number constituting the Seanad at 36, and that you are to have a six-year period, you could have one-third of the Seanad retiring every two years. That would give you twelve Senators retiring every two years, and therefore if, as I hope, the Dáil, and not the Dáil and the Seanad, were to be the electorate, you might expect that these twelve would be elected in accordance with proportional representation, and that you would have the political points of view of the country represented. I say that deliberately, because this idea that you are going to get a Seanad which will not be political is a mere illusion. You may get it at the moment by nomination or by various devices. You get it at the moment, but it is not going to last. You may make up your minds, therefore, that it is going to be political, and if it is going to be political, and if you are going to retain it, it should be of the best possible type. My own view would be a type of nomination or power of election to the Seanad that would give fair representation as regards all Parties.

I am taking advantage of the ruling of the Chair that I can speak over the whole series of Bills. I agree very largely with the ruling of the Chair as regards the advisability of taking these together. There is only one point in the ruling of the Chair with which I found fault myself, and that was the ruling out of amendments to each particular Bill. I think that is a bad principle. However, I am not going to pursue that now. I propose to talk-over the whole series of Bills. The big thing, of course, in the first Bill is the electorate. I do not say that is the big question of all, but in the first Bill the question of the electorate is the one of importance.

I was one of those who was prepared to say that the elections should not be by the people as a whole, and I had two or three reasons for it. One of the reasons was, I did not want to see a Second Chamber that could be said to have the same powers and get them directly from the same authority as the first. I do not want to see a Second Chamber that would have that direct authority behind it. Where such authority exists it has generally been found in violent conflict with the first. I do not believe there should be conflicts of that kind if they can be avoided.

I was against it also on the grounds of expense and the general unwieldiness of the system, and I am not going, for one, although the Labour Party take a different point of view, to apologise for taking that view of it. I do not want to see a Second House get that authority that it will make it the people's House in the sense of being directly elected by the people. We believe that all our efforts should be concentrated on getting a proper First House that would represent the people, and not get a second edition of it that would be a rival to it as regards getting direct powers. The second reason is one of expense. I think the last election cost £40,000, and generally to take the country as a whole, as one constituency, is unwieldy. Again, when you take each feature of the Seanad as originally constituted you will see the idea of trying to give a special minority in it special privileges. That idea was to try to give them an opportunity of getting a larger representation than they could possibly get in any of the ordinary constituencies. They were able by means of that to sum up all their strength throughout the country, and that was the main purpose behind those who drafted the original proposition of making the country as a whole a single electorate. I say it is unwieldy, but then I do not think we should go to the other extreme and go away from the people altogether and give to the Second House the opportunity of practically reproducing itself. I certainly say I do not. If it is going to have certain powers, certain checks, it ought to get them somehow from the people.

I say that in so far as this House represents a section of the people—I always stressed the fact that there is a large section that is not represented —it represents them fairly, as far as I know, and by elections by this House, by a smaller machinery, you would get a much less expensive process and by one step remove a Second Chamber that could be said to derive its authority, in a sense, from this Chamber and the people. But the proposition here is of a very different kind. The proposition is to add to this House 60 voters, some of whom were nominated. Originally there were 30 nominated members in the Seanad, and they are still there, with the exception of those who have died. They are purely nominated members who got no authority whatever except the general agreement there was that there should be nomination, and you are going to throw these in with 30 others, who would be naturally anxious about that particular House. You are giving these 60 in an electorate of 150 a power which I think is unreasonable. I think if you are going to change the present system—and I have given reasons why I think it should be changed—you ought not to go to the other extreme and put in with this House 60 others, 30 of whom are nominated. If they are allowed to remain in the Seanad, even after this year there would be 15 still nominated who would have an undue influence. I say that in the present circumstances you ought not to do it, because of the fact that it is giving an unfair advantage to the dominant Party here.

I wonder whether if the Independents, who are acting independently in this House, were occasionally to be found on vital matters opposed to the present Government, there would be any suggestion of the present Executive accepting the suggestion that the Seanad should vote? I do not think there would, and I hold that the Dáil ought not to accept the proposition that the Senators should take part in this election, which gives them the power of reproducing themselves continually in that House. I think it is wrong, and of the two, expensive and all as the other is, I do not know, if I had a choice, that I would not say it would be better to face the expense than to have this proposal carried. But I regard it as a very bad choice to have to make. I would regard it as a very unfortunate thing, but you can defend an election by this House as one removed from the people. At best, the other would be a third remove, whereas the present system of nomination is a fourth or fifth remove, and has no popular sanction behind it at all.

In so far as I wanted to cover the ground as regards this particular Bill I think I have done it. I do not think the ruling of the Ceann Comhairle is likely to be so severe that if any important matter comes up in connection with this and the other Bills we will be ruled out rigidly in dealing with them. It is on that account, I believe, the Speaker's ruling has been satisfactory in so far as this section of Bills is concerned.

I think that the House ought to accept this amendment, namely, that the Bill should not be further considered until a Select Committee of the Dáil has reported on the advisability of the abolition of the Seanad. It is a question that has not been dealt with at all. It has not been considered, and at the outset I think I have given reasons when we are dealing with the Seanad why that matter ought to be taken carefully into account, and I also think that the broader thing which would take that in is the amendment which is down in Deputy O'Kelly's name, that is, we ought to consider not merely the question of the total abolition of the Seanad but the wider question which would naturally take that into its ambit—the setting up of a committee to inquire and report on the amendment of the Constitution as a whole. Personally, of the two amendments the one I would prefer would be Deputy O'Kelly's, but as the Chair has ruled that my amendment was to be put I move formally this amendment, and I hope it will receive proper consideration from all members of the House.

In accordance with the ruling of the Ceann Comhairle that it will be in order in speaking to the amendment in the name of Deputy de Valera to deal also with the other amendments which appear on the Order Paper, and also with the Bill itself, I propose to take the amendments one by one and then the Bill, and to indicate the reasons under each heading why I think this Bill should be rejected by the Dáil. I will endeavour to be as brief as possible, but I want at the same time to be clear to all Deputies. I hope to leave to someone else the honour of moving the adjournment to-night. The first amendment to this Bill which appears on the Order Paper is the one in my own name—to delete the word "now" and add at the end of the motion the words "this day twelve months." The purpose of that amendment is to postpone consideration of Constitution (Amendment No. 6) Bill for a period of twelve months from to-day. If the House would agree to that being done it would mean that the election for the Seanad which is due to take place in or around next December would take place on the old system.

The President, in introducing the Bill, stated that that system was impracticable, that its impracticability was demonstrated in the last election, as only 23 per cent. of the voters took sufficient interest in the election to go to the polling booths and record their preferences. It is, of course, symptomatic of the Government that they arrive at very big decisions on very slender premises. There has been only one election under the present system, and because a set of circumstances combined on that occasion to make the election a fiasco the Government jumped to the conclusion that it was the system that was wrong, and that consequently it must be abolished and another system substituted. In any other country, or with any other Government, an important series of constitutional provisions of that kind would, at least, be given a second trial before being abolished. I regret that the Deputies whom I have been endeavouring to convince in this matter are leaving the House. I hope that the Deputies on this side, who probably do agree with my arguments, will not leave. Although they know the arguments which I am going to adduce, it would be a great compliment to me if they cared to stay. If they do not, it will be necessary for Deputies of other Parties to come in and constitute a quorum. I hope they will take the hint. The President stated that the present system is both expensive and wasteful. It is undoubtedly interesting to hear the President talking about the necessity of avoiding expense and waste. It indicates a remarkable change in Government policy. We hope that that zeal to eliminate waste will be carried into other sections of the Government, and that we will be faced with another series of Bills at an early date for the purpose of eliminating all other expenses and wasteful provisions of the Constitution.

Of course the expense of electing the Seanad as well as the expense of maintaining it could have been avoided by adopting the proposition made from these Benches to abolish the Seanad altogether. If it is the expense that is worrying the President I suggest that he is taking a rather roundabout course to avoid it. Saving much greater than that which will result from the method of election could be made. A permanent saving could be made by a sudden decision of the Government to accept the amendment of Deputy de Valera. Undoubtedly the system of election is wasteful, but if it is wasteful, as distinct from being merely expensive, it is surely up to the House to pass a vote of no confidence in the Minister for Local Government, who is responsible for ensuring that there will be no waste in the manner in which elections are carried out. There was waste in the last election. It was a fiasco. The result was disastrous, but that was not due mainly to any defect in the Constitution. It could, at any rate, be argued that it was not due to any such defect. The President will remember that on the occasion of that election Republicans decided to boycott it.

I doubt that.

And as a result only 23 per cent. voted. Republicans did not vote, and only the balance of the electorate was available to go to the polling booths, and there was only a 23 per cent. vote. I admit that it is quite possible if there were another election in September that Republicans might still persist in boycotting the election, and might still demonstrate their opposition to the existence of the Seanad by refusing to have anything to do with the election. I do not wish to give away any party secrets, but it is possible that instead of boycotting the election we would decide to nominate candidates who were pledged to abolish the Seanad.

I wish to draw attention to the fact that there is not a quorum present.

Notice taken that 20 Deputies were not present. House counted and 20 Deputies being present,

The Deputy may now resume.

I take it that there is a quorum present now. For the benefit of Deputies who were not here when I started, I would like to say that the argument which I am developing is based on amendment No. 1 to the Constitution (Amendment No. 6) Bill.

Does not the Deputy think that his own colleagues might like to hear something about this also?

They are all quite as competent as I to say what I am saying. In fact, they will all probably say something in the course of the debate.

Wait and see.

No doubt the Government may be persuaded by my arguments to accept Deputy de Valera's amendment, in which case it would not be necessary for them to speak. We are endeavouring to let some glimmer of light penetrate into the regions of darkness.

However, I was endeavouring to make out that a reasonable case could be made to justify postponing the Bill for another twelve months and to allow another election under the old system to be held, because I maintain that these shoals of Bills to amend important sections of the Constitution, on the ground that one trial of the system set up by the sections has proved a failure, are not justifiable. The failure of the last election of the Seanad and the fiasco which then resulted was produced by causes other than the impracticable nature of sections of the Constitution itself. I have pointed out that one of the causes was that the elections were boycotted by Republicans and that in consequence only 23 per cent. of the voters went to the polling booths. Of course, if the next election is boycotted by Republicans it is probable that even a much smaller percentage of the total electorate will go to the polling booths, but at the same time I said, without revealing any party secrets, it was possible that the policy of the Republican Party might be changed at the next elections and instead of boycotting the Seanad elections we might put up candidates pledged to the abolition of the Seanad, and pledged, if elected, to work to terminate the farce altogether. I believe that if an election were held at which there were candidates pledged to the abolition of the Seanad there would be a one hundred per cent. vote. Every man who was capable of transporting himself to a polling booth would come out and vote for these candidates and the abolition of the Seanad.

The President also stated that the system of election is impracticable because of the size of the panel of candidates which would have to be created. Some 80 candidates, he stated, would come before the people at a certain election and the conscientious voter, presented with a list of 80 names and anxious to record his preferences, would have to decide between the comparative merits of these 80 candidates and record 79 preference votes. That would be a very difficult task. It would not be fair to ask people to decide between 80 candidates and place them in order of merit, but is it not possible to reduce the panel as we are altering the system of election to the Seanad and altering the powers of the Seanad? Could we not have preserved at least the main outlines of the present system and just devote our attention to removing the absurdities? Could we not have taken some steps which would have resulted in a reduction of the panel? We could reduce the number of Senators and reduce the number of vacancies to be filled. By doing that we would make a smaller panel possible. The Dublin Corporation, in which I think there were some 80 members, was considered unwieldy and unnecessarily talkative, like the present Seanad. It was decided to abolish it and three Commissioners were appointed in substitution for it. Could we not have just three Senators instead of 60? After all, the work they have to do is not much, and there would be some prospect of having at least two-thirds attending occasionally. The reduction in cost would be substantial and the panel which would be presented to the electors would be reasonably small.

I argued here before that the Seanad is a place or state of rest where discredited politicians repose for a time before they go—I would not like to say where they go to. The constitution of the Seanad and the system of election. I argued, offers a strong inducement to a certain class of politician who has outlived his period of utility to seek to find in the Seanad a place where he can bask in the rays of publicity at very little risk. The establishment of the Seanad for the purpose of providing a haven of refuge for such politicians is, in my opinion, extremely wasteful, and certainly expensive. If it is intended that the Seanad should serve any useful purpose, if it is intended that it should serve an effective part in the machinery of Government in this country, a different system would be necessary. What that system should be I hope to elaborate later. At present I am only dealing with Amendment No. 1. The purpose of it is to postpone the Bill for 12 months. In any case, I think before we turn down the system of electing the Seanad by the votes of the people on a restricted franchise, we ought at least give that system another chance. Every system is entitled to a second chance. Even the present Government in particular circumstances might be entitled to a second chance, although they probably would not. By taking them as an example I am weakening my own argument. However, I believe in respect of amendment No. 2 alone it can be shown that the action of the Government in introducing this Bill indicates that they have not given this subject proper and due consideration. If they had given to this question the consideration which it deserves, they would have acted in a different manner. They would have, we believe, if they were wise—which is, probably hoping for too much— abolished the Seanad altogether. They would certainly have allowed the present system a second chance in order that the particular defects in the system would have become more obvious and would be more easily remedied.

The next amendment to this Bill with which I propose to deal is one of greater importance and one on which it will be necessary to speak at somewhat greater length. It is to the effect that all words after the word "That" be deleted and the following substituted: "the Bill be not further considered, as it is the opinion of An Dáil that there should be no change in the term of office of members of Seanad Eireann until a special committee of 11 members of An Dáil, to be selected by the Selection Committee, has inquired into and reported on the amendment of the Constitution as a whole."

I submit that it is extremely desirable, apart altogether from this Bill, and any of the other Bills on the Order Paper, that a Select Committee of An Dáil should be appointed to inquire into and report upon the advisability of amending the Constitution as a whole. There are many amendments possible in the Constitution, and many amendments necessary. There are amendments which should have been effected when certain legislation was passed last year and which put the Constitution in a rather peculiar position by having it at variance with the existing law. There are amendments necessary to rectify that position.

This Constitution, as is generally known, and I think generally admitted, was imposed upon this country by an external authority. It does not represent what the majority will of the Irish people believes should be the fundamental law of this State. It represents a compromise between that will and the will of an external authority. Throughout the whole document it is possible to not where the compromise has been effected. It has been argued, and it will be maintained, if not here, where it can be questioned, at least outside, that this Dáil is free to deal with this Constitution at its will; is free to amend it; free to alter it; free, perhaps, to abolish it. If it is free to do these things, it would be at least desirable that we should give a demonstration of our freedom by proceeding to set up a Committee to consider what amendments are desirable in the document. I hope to be able to show that there are many amendments not merely desirable, but absolutely necessary, in that document. There are other amendments which I myself would not support, but which I think the Government Party should endeavour to effect, in order to be consistent with their actions on other matters.

The Articles of the Constitution which I would like to see amended, and would like to see a Select Committee of the Dáil considering, are particularly those Articles which provide for the existence of an external authority in this country, and which provide the means by which that external authority is exercised to influence our affairs. These are, no doubt, familiar to Deputies. Article 12 attempts to define that rather mysterious entity called the Oireachtas. We had debated yesterday, and on previous occasions, the question as to what exactly is the Oireachtas. The Constitution states that it shall consist of "the King and two Houses, the Chamber of Deputies (otherwise called and herein generally referred to as `Dáil Eireann') and the Seanad (otherwise called and herein generally referred to as `Seanad Eireann')". "The sole and exclusive power of making laws, for the peace, order and good government of the Irish Free State is vested in the Oireachtas," and the Oireachtas consists of the King and the two Houses referred to. Amendment of that Article is obviously possible.

There are Deputies sitting on the Cumann na nGaedheal Benches who can suggest an amendment themselves. I think there is not one of them sitting here now who does not know what particular amendment I am going to suggest—to delete the words "the King." I know that the Government are progressing in the other direction; that their policy is contrary to what that amendment would suggest; that they are even introducing a Bill into this House which gives them power to make the King Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, if they so wish. That Bill may pass. It is quite possible that his Britannic Majesty will be sitting on the Front Bench before the end of the present year answering questions about temporary postmen in Killarney. Donegal, and places like that. At the same time, I think that it should be possible to influence, if not the Government, at least their supporters on the Cumann na nGaedheal Benches, to set up the Committee suggested by the amendment, to consider whether or not it is not better to delete these Articles of the Constitution which give power to the King, instead of following their present policy of trying to get the King into this House. Article 12 of the Constitution, which states that the Oireachtas shall consist of the King and two Houses, is a perfectly good Article except for these two words "the King."

He is not here.

He is coming, I have no doubt about it.

We have not seen him yet.

You have a potential king behind you.

If the Committee contemplated by this amendment were set up, I would certainly be prepared to put that suggestion to them and to argue the case for the deletion of these words, so that the Article of the Constitution concerned would read: "The Oireachtas shall consist of two Houses, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate." Of course, they might be prepared to amend the Article further and abolish the Seanad, in which case this Article would not be necessary, because it would be obviously wasteful and useless to say that the Oireachtas shall consist of the Dáil. It would be merely another name for the Dáil. It would be necessary, therefore, to insert an Article merely saying that Dáil Eireann is the Government of the Irish Free State, and that the sole and exclusive power of making laws for the peace, order and good government of the Irish Free State is vested in the Dáil. In that last sentence there is an amendment of the other type to which I was referring—an amendment not desirable in itself, but an amendment which the Government should propose for the purpose of giving a veneer of consistency to their policy. I will read it again:—

"The sole and exclusive power of making laws for the peace, order and good government of the Irish Free State is vested in the Oireachtas."

From what source, I would like to ask, has the present Government got their authority for making laws for the peace, order and bad government of the Irish Free State? This Constitution only gives them power to make laws for good government, and it can hardly be maintained that laws which are subversive of the liberty of the citizens, laws which, as has been shown in a previous debate, are contrary to the Constitution itself, can be said to be laws designed for the peace, order and good government of the citizens of the Irish Free State. The next Article of the Constitution which I certainly think this Committee, if set up, would have to consider is, of course, the famous Article, 17. I will read it for Deputies who may have forgotten it.

Might I ask if the Deputy is deliberately passing over Article 13, as it would be a pity if he did?

I should like to point out that I am merely enumerating the amendments I would suggest for the Committee, if it were set up. Article 13 which provides that the Oireachtas shall sit in or near the City of Dublin, is surely a matter on which unity of action of the Cork Deputies could be secured and considerable pressure exercised on such a committee to recommend an alteration there. But it is hardly considered possible that I, a Deputy for the constituency in which the Oireachtas is now sitting, am going to propose an amendment to that particular Article. I am not. We, in Dublin City South, have many objectionable things, but we do not altogether object to the Oireachtas. The Article, however, which I think could be amended and should be amended is Article 17:—

"The oath to be taken by members of the Oireachtas shall be in the following form:—

I, .......... do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established, and that I will be faithful to H.M. King George V., his heirs and successors by law in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Such oath shall be taken and subscribed by every member of the Oireachtas before taking his seat therein before the representative of the Crown or some person authorised by him."

Surely it is time for the Dáil to consider the advisability of amending the Constitution by the deletion of that section. Surely it is possible to convince this House of the advisability of setting up a Select Committee to consider amendments of that nature, amendments which are serious, and amendments which are important, not like some of the trivial and frivolous amendments suggested by the Government. If it is desirable to amend the Constitution at all why not make a good job of it and clear it of those trifles about allegiance to King George and the rest of them. Make the Constitution a document which the Irish people would not be ashamed to read. If we are going to have the Constitution amended let us go about it right. Let us consider what amendments the people who sent us here want. I do not think it will be seriously maintained, not even by Deputy Byrne, that the people who sent him here want him, before he takes up his duty as their representative, to swear such an oath of allegiance.

It is not binding in law.

An empty formula, is it? The next section of the Constitution to which I would like to draw attention in order to justify me in supporting the amendment on the Order Paper in Deputy O'Kelly's name is Article 24:

"The Oireachtas shall hold at least one Session each year. The Oireachtas shall be summoned and dissolved by the representatives of the Crown in the name of the King, and subject as aforesaid Dáil Eireann shall fix the date of re-assembly of the Oireachtas and the date of the conclusion of the Session of each House: Provided that the Sessions of Seanad Eireann shall not be concluded without its own consent."

Is it not unnecessary, wasteful, useless and needless that the Oireachtas shall be summoned and dissolved by the representative of the Crown in the name of the King? Is it not possible to convince this House that a Committee of the Dáil should be set up to consider the abolition of that section of the Constitution? Would it not be more important in the national interests that a section like that should be abolished than that this trivial alteration should be made? Surely a committee representative of this House, even on which the majority of the members would be members of the majority Party here, could be persuaded that the representatives of the Irish people should come together on the mandate of the people and not because a representative of the Crown, in the name of the King, deigns to summon them. This is an amendment which I would recommend to this House and which I would recommend to the Committee, which, I expect, will be set up when this amendment is carried, namely, the deletion of that section and the substitution of another section providing that the Clerk of the Dáil shall fix the date of meeting after the election, and arrange for the assembling of the Deputies.

I should like also to direct attention to Article 41:

"As soon as any Bill shall have been passed or deemed to have been passed by both Houses, the Executive Council shall present the same to the Representative of the Crown for the signification by him, in the King's name, of the King's assent and such Representative may withhold the King's assent or reserve the Bill for the signification of the King's pleasure: Provided that the Representative of the Crown shall in the withholding of such assent to or the reservation of any Bill, act in accordance with the law practice and constitutional usage governing the like withholding of assent or reservation in the Dominion of Canada.

A Bill reserved for the signification of the King's pleasure shall not have any force unless and until within one year from the day on which it was presented to the Representative of the Crown for the King's assent, the Representative of the Crown signifies by speech or message to each of the House of the Oireachtas, or by proclamation, that it has received the assent of the King and Council.

An entry of every such speech, message or proclamation shall be made in the Journal of each House and a duplicate thereof duly attested shall be delivered to the proper officer or be kept among the records of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann)."

An amendment is possible there surely. When a Bill has passed through all these stages in this House and has received the assent of a majority of the elected Deputies of the Irish people it should be law for the Irish people and not when His Britannic Majesty or a representative of his chooses to scrawl his name across the bottom of it. If we are sent here to make laws providing for the peace, order and good government of the State we should do it on our own responsibility. We can delete that section and effect that amendment and improve the Constitution in that way by setting up this Committee and authorising them as suggested.

On a point of order, might I suggest that in the interests of the Constitution, Justice should not be sound asleep. Would you provide a couch for him?

That is not a point of order.

Article 42 reads:

As soon as may be after any law has received the King's assent——"

On a point of order according to Standing Order 46: "A Deputy who persists in irrelevance or repetition in debate and who, in the opinion of the Ceann Comhairle or the Chairman, is speaking for the purpose of obstructing business, may be directed by the Ceann Comhairle or the Chairman to discontinue his speech after the attention of the Dáil or of the Committee has been drawn to his conduct."

I venture to draw the attention of the Ceann Comhairle to the speech the Deputy is now making. He is reading Article after Article of the Constitution and I suggest he is doing so with the pure and sole object of obstruction.

I do not think that the Deputy is speaking entirely irrelevantly or that there has been any repetition so far.

Would this be the proper place to suggest a sucking-bottle for the baby to keep him quiet?

I am speaking to amendment 2 to the Constitution (Amendment No. 6) Bill, 1928, and that amendment is: "That this Bill be not further considered, as it is the opinion of An Dáil that there should be no change in the method of election until a special committee of eleven members of An Dáil, to be selected by the Selection Committee, has inquired into and reported on the amendment of the Constitution as a whole."

The desirability of setting up a Committee to report upon its advisability and upon the amendment of the Constitution as a whole is a matter on which I am speaking. I am not reading the Constitution as a whole. I am not referring to one-tenth of the Articles of the Constitution. I am indicating to the Dáil the desirability of setting up a committee, and I am reading for them certain sections of the Constitution, sections which they like to forget, but sections on which it would be possible, I believe, to get a majority of this House on a free vote to vote for their abolition, and by doing that I hope to persuade them to set up this committee for the purpose of making it possible to effect these amendments for the purpose of deleting these Articles. Article 42 is an Article similar to those I have read. Article 51 is another. It is one on which all the others probably hinge. It reads:

"The Executive Authority of the Irish Free State is hereby declared to be vested in the King and shall be exercisable in accordance with the law, practice and constitutional usage governing the exercise of the Executive Authority in the case of the Dominion of Canada by the representative of the Crown..."

The executive authority of the Irish Free State is vested in the King. That is in the Constitution. Could Deputy Byrne not suggest an amendment of the Constitution in respect of that Article? Is it not possible to recommend the setting up of a committee to try to have an alteration even of that Article?

To abolish the King?

Of abolishing the King as far as this country is concerned. I would suggest to Deputy Byrne and to the other Deputies concerned that the case which can be made for the setting up of this committee is very strong. No doubt Deputy Byrne dislikes being reminded of this section of the Constitution. No doubt the Government Party as a whole dislikes being reminded of the chains which are placed upon their liberty of action. But if we are as free as they say we are, if Article 50 has any meaning, and if this House can within a period of eight years, by law, change the Constitution, why not let us get about it before that eight-years period has expired?

Introduce a Bill.

The very thing I am suggesting.

Why do you not do it?

I am suggesting at the moment that the Deputy should do it. The Deputy was not here a while ago.

Deputy Lemass has been suggesting that for an hour and a half.

Deputies on this side of the House would be quite prepared to introduce a Bill, as the Parliamentary Secretary has suggested, but we are anxious that the combined wisdom of all the Deputies would be brought to bear on the matter before the Bill would be drafted, and we have suggested that a Select Committee of the Dáil be set up to consider the advisability of amending the Constitution as a whole. I hope that when this Committee is set up the Parliamentary Secretary will be a member of it. It would be a great loss to the Committee if the Dáil should decide not to appoint him on that Committee. When that Committee has met and reported, then, I say, would be the time to introduce a Bill, and in one Bill to effect all the necessary amendments—to delete all these Articles that I have described as objectionable, and to indicate quite clearly to all whom it may concern that the Executive Authority of the Irish Free State is vested in the Government elected by the Irish people, and that the Deputies here are the only people who have power to make laws for the people of Ireland, and that any other provision in the Constitution contrary to that must go by the board.

Article 60 deals with the appointment of the representative of the Crown. I do not propose to read it. The Deputies on the other side are, no doubt, familiar with that Article. I think it was analysed and discussed very carefully on the occasion when the last appointment was made. We do not want a representative of the Crown. I am aware that that is not a matter that can be properly discussed here now— whether or not there should be a representative of the Crown in this country. But what can be discussed here now is whether or not provision should be made in the Constitution of this State to give a representative of the British Crown any authority or functions here. I say no, and I say we should amend the Constitution by taking out those Articles. The last Article to which I intend to refer is Article 68. It provides that the judges of the Supreme Court, the High Court and all other courts established in pursuance of this Constitution shall be appointed by the representative of the Crown. I think that the administrators of justice in this country should be appointed by the elected head of the State and not be nominated by a representative of a foreign king. These are all the Articles which limit, curb and confine our national status and, so far as they are sections providing for that, we think that they should be abolished, and we think the Dáil should seriously consider the setting up of a committee to consider the steps which would have to be taken to secure their abolition, and the necessary consequential changes which would result. There are a number of other sections.

May I call attention to the fact that we have not a quorum present?

There is a quorum present.

There are only four members of the Deputy's own Party present.

Including the King.

I have already pointed out that the Deputies of my Party are conversant with the arguments I am using, but the Deputies of the Government Party are not so conversant, and they are the people we are anxious to convert. If there were a number of Deputies on this side of the House in their seats there would be no one on the other side of the House, and the only way we can make members of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party attend to their duties in the Dáil is by staying out ourselves and calling attention to the fact that there is no quorum.

Splendid tactics !

Yes, marvellous tactics.

We attended to our duties here when you were out.

The other Articles are Articles which should have been attended to by the Government if the Government were consistent in their policy. I say the amendments would be opposed by the Deputies on this side, but considering the fact that the Public Safety Act and similar Acts have passed through this House, I think such a section to the Constitution as this is an anomaly in the Constitution. We are told in the Constitution that the liberty of the person is inviolable, and no person shall be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with law. We are also told that the dwelling of each citizen is inviolable and shall not be forcibly entered except in accordance with law. We also are told that the right of free expression of opinion, as well as the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, and to form associations or unions, is guaranteed for purposes not opposed to public morality.

There are quite a number of such sections. They are all on a par with the section it is now proposed to abolish by Constitution (Amendment No. 10) Bill. They were put in there like the goods in a shop window, to give a false impression as to what is inside. The average citizen when he saw this Constitution for the first time thought——

I beg to draw attention to the fact that we have not a quorum present.

"They folded their tents like the Arabs and silently stole away."

There is a quorum present.

I suggest that the Deputy ought to be taught how to count. He has already made two false counts.

I do not think the Parliamentary Secretary for the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs ought to talk about false tots or false figures.

He can count heads.

These Articles of the Constitution, I say, were put in there so that the ordinary citizen when he saw the Constitution for the first time said: "That is a grand document." He did not see the snags. All he saw was the unctious phrases about the liberty of the citizen, the right of free speech, and all the rest of it. The necessity for the hypocrisy which existed at the time that this Constitution was drafted no longer exists, and we would be establishing the proper canons of political honesty, as the Minister for Lands and Agriculture calls them, if we were to proceed to bring the Constitution into accordance with existing conditions. Therefore, I suggest that the Government Party in its own interest and to prevent the charge of inconsistency being levelled against it, should support the amendment to set up a Committee for the purpose of examining what amendments to the Constitution are necessary and desirable.

I intend to say very little more with respect to that particular amendment. There are two other amendments which I want to discuss, and then I want to discuss the main question itself. I think that such Deputies as those who cannot be persuaded to reject this Bill for the reasons I give in respect of amendment No. 1, could be persuaded to reject it in respect of the reasons I gave in relation to amendment No. 2, and if there are any Deputies present still prepared to vote for the Bill despite the arguments which I have advanced, I am prepared to deal with them in respect of amendments 3 and 4. Amendment 3 reads:—

"That the Bill be not further considered until a Select Committee of the Dáil has reported on the advisability of the abolition of the Seanad." Now, the advisability of abolishing the Seanad has been discussed here before. On that occasion we pointed out that the Seanad was expensive, useless and unnecessary. I hope on this occasion to elaborate that statement.

It is common knowledge, of course, that the Seanad is expensive. When we consider the matter of expense we have to consider not merely the outlay but the return. When we consider that we do spend an average of some £50,000 a year on the Seanad we have got to ask ourselves: "Do we get from the Seanad £50,000 worth of value, fifty thousand shillings worth of value, or even five shillings worth of value?" If we are not getting £50,000 worth of value from the Seanad, why should we continue to spend £50,000 a year to maintain it? It was a body, as Deputy de Valera pointed out, set up to give to a particular class in this country the political power which they could not get if they had to go before the people and get the people's votes. The Seanad was set up for the purpose of putting representatives of that class in a privileged position. It was set up for the purpose of ensuring that they could influence the national policy, that they could affect the course of legislation. If it is the purpose of this Dáil to continue to maintain such a privileged section in this country, then of course, it is useless to argue. But I think that the purpose which was behind the establishment of the Seanad was not clearly perceived when it was first constituted. It is only now that people are beginning to realise what exactly was intended and, therefore, we believe that now it is more possible than heretofore to secure a majority vote in this House for its abolition. It is expensive. It is more expensive than many much more useful parts of the machinery of government.

Perhaps Deputy Lemass would give way to me for a moment? I would like to call attention to the number present in the House.

I desire to enter a protest against the efforts that are being made to bring ridicule on the assembly of the people. There has been nothing but ridicule attempted for the last hour and a half.

Can the Chair hear any Deputy after a question has been asked regarding whether or not there is a quorum in the House?

The Deputy's colleagues are standing behind in the Division Lobby and they should be asked to take their seats.

Deputy Byrne will please sit down. When Deputy Byrne was speaking there was a quorum present.

I have said that the Seanad is expensive. I say that it is useless. I say it will not cease to be useless when Deputy Byrne goes there.

Thank you.

At the same time probably it will be a trifle better than it is now.

Thank you.

The constitution of the body, the limitation on its powers, the part it plays in the machinery of government, are such that no serious reason can be advanced for retaining it; no serious reason can certainly be advanced to show that we should pay more to maintain the Seanad than, according to the Estimates, we are prepared this year to pay for the relief of abnormal unemployment in this country. The cost of the Seanad is, of course, a matter which does not greatly concern Deputies opposite. They are used to thinking in millions, talking and dreaming of millions. A mere £50,000 a year is nothing to them. Such a trifling saving would , in ordinary circumstances, be beneath their notice. But we must remember that the main argument advanced by the President in introducing this Bill was that it was going to prevent certain waste and ensure a certain economy. The main argument in favour of abolishing the present system of electing that body and substituting another for it is that the other system would be cheaper. That, in itself, is, as I said, indicative of the short-sighted view which the Government takes of all matters. If economy was their real purpose, if they were anxious to save the money of the taxpayers, and put that money to some better use, they would do as we suggest, abolish the Seanad altogether.

If it was their intention to make the Seanad a more useful body than it now is, if for example, it was intended to provide that the members of it, instead of wasting their time in this building talking about laws that should not really concern them, were employed attending to the gardens around the building, and making them nicer for ordinary Deputies to exercise in, then some argument might be advanced in favour of spending this money on them. But to keep them there, to preserve them as a sort of relic of antiquity, to look upon as something that is an asset to the nation, is just pure humbug. No case can be made out whatever for the retention of the Seanad. If such a case could be made out then why not approve of this amendment, set up this Committee and make the case there? If the Government is not afraid that the members of its own Party might disagree with them on this issue they need not be the least bit afraid that such a committee, as is suggested in the amendment, will not be, at the outset, favourable to their view. It would be a committee appointed by the Selection Committee and would, of course, be representative of the Dáil, and the majority Party in the Dáil would have a majority on that Committee. It would be able to put in print in deliberate form the arguments which they have, if any, in favour of the retention of the Seanad as at present constituted. Deputy de Valera dealt with the amendment that stands in his name and I do not propose to occupy the time of the Dáil unnecessarily in further discussing it. I will pass to amendment No. 4: "That the Bill be not further considered as it is the opinion of An Dáil that the electors of Seanad Eireann should be members of Dáil Eireann alone." This Bill provides that the Seanad electors shall be members of the Seanad and Dáil voting together. The amendment is intended to provide that the electors of the Seanad shall be members of Dáil Eireann alone. The purpose of such amendment is to ensure that if we must have a Seanad it will be a body that will be subordinate to this House, held tight in the grip of this body and unable to wriggle unless this body so permits it. We are in favour, of course, of the abolition of the Seanad, but if there is to be a Second House let it be a Second House under our thumb. Let it be a group of individuals who dare not let a squeak out of them except when we lift our fingers to give them breath to do it.

A penny-in-the-slot machine.

That would do all right, although it would be waste of a penny to let them squeak at all. We think members of this Dáil who are anxious to preserve the powers of this House unimpaired should support this amendment, and should ask the Government to withdraw this Bill, and to re-introduce it, if they consider it necessary, in a form that will provide that the members of the Seanad will be elected by members of the Dáil, and consequently will be subordinate and inferior in every respect to the members of the Dáil. The amendments on the Paper all deal with different points, and if there is any difficulty in the mind of any Deputy opposite concerning this matter, or if there is any Deputy whose difficulty in respect of this Bill is of a nature not covered by any of these amendments, we hope during the course of the debate they will make the difficulty clear, so that we will be able to resolve it for them. We give Deputies an opportunity here of stating their views first as to why this Bill should be rushed at this stage, prior to a Seanad election; why a Seanad election under the old system should not be allowed to proceed this year in order to make certain that this system is unworkable before it is abolished. We give Deputies here an opportunity of expressing their views on this system of patching up the Constitution by periodical amendment. This system of taking a piece out here, sticking a piece in there, and altering a piece somewhere else, is producing a top-heavy construction that is bound to topple over of its own accord sooner or later. If Deputies were building a house they would not put one brick in here, another somewhere else, and take a brick out of the corner and stick it on the top of the chimney or something of that kind. They would get an architect and would plan out the house carefully in advance, working along definite lines, knowing the edifice they wanted to construct, placing every brick in its place with the ultimate purpose of producing that edifice. Therefore, we suggest, instead of piecemeal amendment of the Constitution, that a Committee of the Dail should be set up to consider the Constitution as a whole and to report here as to the amendments to the Constitution as a whole which they consider should be effected. I have indicated to the Dáil what Deputies on this side of the House would be prepared to submit to that Committee. I have read the sections of the Constitution which I think should be abolished, abolished because they are in conflict with general nationalist principles. I have indicated the sections of the Constitution which should be abolished because they are meaningless in the light of the Government's policy. I have shown. I hope clearly, that there is no case which can be established against the suggestion in the amendment, that the Constitution as a whole should be examined, and as a whole should be amended, so that in one action we would effect all the changes that are necessary. I would remind Deputies that their power to alter the Constitution by law is for a very limited period, and that that period is fast running out. After the conclusion of eight years from the date on which the Constitution was enacted it will not be possible to alter the document, except by a very complicated and very expensive arrangement. The suggestion made here, therefore, is that the amendments are rather urgently required. Amendment should be made in accordance with a definite plan. We have given the particular side of the case as to why there should or should not be a Seanad.

We have here given you an opportunity of stating the case as to why there should or should not be a Seanad. We have indicated as our view that these Bills should not be proceeded with, because there should not be in this country, with its 3,000,000 population, a duplication of the governing body at a prohibitive cost. We have given you an opportunity of indicating your views on the proposition that no power should be given to Senators to have a say as to who should or who should not be members of their body, a suggestion that the only electors to the Seanad should be the members of the Dáil. I think it would be a preposterous suggestion that members of the Seanad should be given power, as Deputy de Valera says, to reproduce themselves—to vote their successors into office. Speaking on the main question—the Bill to amend the Constitution by deleting the provisions therein as to the persons entitled to vote at elections of members of the Seanad, etc.—I have only to say that no Deputy with any self-respect, with any respect for democratic rights, should support this Bill. A strong case can be made out for a popular election to the Seanad. That case would be very strong if the Seanad was necessary, was a body that served any useful purpose.

We are not strong enough to carry the abolition of the Seanad. We are anxious, therefore to make it as harmless as possible. We do not believe that it would be in the best interests of the people to give any chance to members of the Seanad to claim that they speak on behalf of the people as their direct representatives. There is some danger that if we had a popular election to the Seanad you would make it a live and a serious body. We do not want that. If there must be a Seanad it should be a body subordinate to this House, and therefore a body elected by this House. For these reasons, and for reasons which will be advanced by other members of this Party, I ask the Dáil to reject this Bill.

My arguments will be directed mostly to the main question. We are opposing this Bill entirely because it proposes to take from the people the power to return persons to sit in the Seanad, the power of voting directly on the question as to who should sit in the Seanad. The President, in his very brief speech recommending the Second Reading of this measure, pointed out that it was being introduced because the present system of election was, in his opinion, a failure, and had proved to be a failure on the last occasion. He spoke of the fact that only 25 per cent. of the electors voted. Now, Deputy Lemass drew attention to what is well known to have been the case: that at least one Party in the State at the time which, if they did not actually boycott the election, certainly took no interest in it; and there was another reason, too. Anybody who remembers that election will recollect that the day was a most inclement one, and one on which people who were not specially interested in the election did not care to turn out. As I said during the First Reading of the Bill, I do not know whether the President would, in case a constituency at a Dáil election polled only 25 per cent. of its electors, put up a case for abolishing that system of election for the Dáil. If not, I do not see why he should drag in here that argument of the small number of people who voted.

I am just wondering whether the President has not at the back of his mind some other reason for changing the system of election which he has not yet disclosed to the House. I remember that Cumann na nGaedheal, at the time of the last election, circulated a leaflet far and wide through the country containing the names of twenty-six candidates which it specially recommended to the electorate. I remember seeing the list. Of that twenty-six specially recommended by Cumann na nGaedheal only four happened to be returned, and only one of these four happened to be directly connected with the organisation which issued the list. I wonder if the President has, as one of his reasons for wishing to change the method of election, at the back of his mind the memory of what happened on the last occasion, that the right people were not returned, and if he thinks that it is just possible that if there was another popular election that the right people, from his point of view, again might not be returned. I am throwing that out as one of the reasons that may be in the minds of the Government Party for introducing this new system.

As I said on the First Reading, I am not surprised, knowing the mentality of the Government Party, that they should be anxious to devise some other system rather than to refer this question direct to the people. But I confess, on the other hand, that I am not quite clear as to where the Fianna Fáil Party stands in the matter. Deputy Lemass opened his speech with what I considered a strong defence of the present system of election. He specially pleaded for a second chance for the present system, and there I am with him. He pointed out that for many reasons the system of popular election did not get a fair trial on the last occasion, and said that it was entitled at least to another trial. But when I heard Deputy Lemass say that, and when I heard him stress the point especially, as he did on several occasions when he was speaking for his Party as a whole, I certainly cannot understand the action of the members of the Fianna Fáil Party on the Joint Committee, an action which has been defended by Deputy de Valera in his speech. One of the first motions that was passed by that Joint Committee was a motion proposed by Deputy Tierney, of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party, "That election for the Seanad by direct vote of the people is undesirable." Deputy de Valera said a good deal in the course of his speech by way of objection to the nominated element in the Seanad, but yet we find the representative of his Party voting for the nominated element in this particular instance, voting with the Government Party in the first instance, and with the nominated element in the Seanad against the representatives of the Labour Party, and the elected Senators.

took the Chair.

Might I make that point clear? Just as here, before the particular considerations were entered upon in the Committee there was a general discussion over the whole range of the subject at issue, excluding one subject which I was particularly anxious about, namely, the abolition of the Seanad, which was held to be outside the terms of reference of the Committee. We indicated fairly clearly at the outset what our general attitude was. We indicated that we believed that there should be election by the Dáil and, just as here, if there was going to be a vote as to whether the Dáil or the electors were to do it, I would vote for the Dáil. So the first step that it was necessary to take for that was a decision that the question of popular election was undesirable. My point of view was that I believed that the Dáil was the proper body. Other people believed that the Seanad and the Dáil were the proper people, and in order to get the question down to an issue I voted for that, believing that I would be supported by the majority of the members. Once you understand that the thing is quite consistent.

Reading over the report of the Committee as to the methods of election which should follow, having disposed of the present system, it is only afterwards that that comes up, as far as the Report of the Committee is concerned.

For the reasons that I have stated, that the business began in the Joint Committee with a general survey of the whole situation. We spent the first sitting at least, if not the first two sittings, talking generally about our views, and I certainly indicated at the very outset my view as regards the abolition of the Seanad, and also the view that the system of a joint body of electors should be replaced by a system of election by the Dáil. When you have that, you will remember that these were questions submitted by the Chairman and agreed upon by the Committee in the order in which they came up for decision.

But the position is that the policy of election by the people is undesirable.

Mr. O'CONNELL

I am taking the decisions in the order in which they appear. I take it, reading the Report of the Joint Committee, that one of the first things decided was that the election of the Seanad by the direct vote of the people was undesirable, and the Deputy's Party is represented there as voting with the Chairman of the Seanad, and with Deputy Tierney, Senators Douglas and Jameson for; against Deputy Morrissey, Senators O'Farrell and O'Hanlon who were elected by the people, and, I think, Senator Bennett, too, but I am not sure. Certainly, Senators O'Farrell and O'Hanlon were. I stress that because both Deputy de Valera and Deputy Lemass have made the point quite strongly, and I am with them in this, that the main objection to the Seanad is that it gives a particular class—I am quoting Deputy Lemass's own words—a power which they would not get if they had to go before the people for their votes.

Mr. O'CONNELL

I am quoting Deputy Lemass—the class which is nominated. He said it gives that class a power which they would not get if they had to go before the people for their votes. That was the argument of Deputy Lemass, and I am quoting it to show that, I think, the Fianna Fáil Party took a wrong step, in the first instance, in supporting this motion, that election by the people was undesirable. If that is their point of view, I think they took a wrong step right at the beginning when they said that election to the Seanad by the direct votes of the people was undesirable. This Bill is one of the consequences that has flowed from that decision—to abolish the direct vote. My main objection to this Bill is because it abolishes the direct vote of the people. I believe that if there is to be a Seanad—on that point I am not prepared to express an opinion at the moment, because I think it is a matter on which a decision should not and could not be taken without much inquiry—I am much in the position of Deputy de Valera himself, who says he is not a doctrinaire supporter of unicameral government—I agree with him to this extent that we ought to have such a body that it will render useful service, and I believe that we can get such a body. There is a better chance, in any case, of getting such a body by the direct votes of the people than by a vote of the Dáil and Seanad or even of the Dáil itself.

Deputy de Valera objects to the Seanad being made a resting place for discredited politicians. I suggest that there is no surer way of getting discredited politicians into the Seanad than by adopting the system of election set out here in the Bill or even the system which the Deputy himself seems to advocate, the system of election direct by the Dáil. It is for that reason that I am objecting to a Second Reading being given to this Bill, and I will vote against it. As to the amendments, I do not wish to say much. With regard to amendment No. 2, I do think there is something to be said for the proposal that if there are going to be Constitutional changes they ought to be made after a full examination has been made by all Parties in the House of the Constitution itself as a whole. I do not know where we are going to stop with these amendments. The American Constitution is over 150 years old. During all that period, I believe they have only made something like 18 amendments to it.

How long were they making it at first?

Mr. O'CONNELL

Well, even if we spent another year or two over the making of our Constitution here, what of it? I suppose we will be considering the eighteenth amendment to the Constitution one of these days. I think that a full consideration of the Constitution as a whole by all Parties in the House should be given before all this sheaf of amendments to it was introduced. I do not see any great urgency or any great necessity for introducing all these amendments at this stage.

There is only one immediate object in view so far as I can understand, and that is the question of the election of the Seanad. That election might very well get a trial in the new conditions which have arisen since the last election before proceeding to upset the whole arrangement. I do not believe that the object which the President and his Party propose to secure will be secured by this method. I do not think in any case that the prestige or usefulness of the Seanad will be improved under the new system of election, and I propose to vote against the Bill.

When the Government started to wreck this Constitution, for which, in the first instance, they wrecked the country, we were told so many million pounds went up in smoke to save the Constitution, but now, lo and behold! the Constitution should be torn up in order to save it. What useful purpose is the Seanad serving at the present day? The sum of £32,000 a year is being expended on it. That sum represents about the amount of the arrears of Land Commission annuities in Co. Cork, so that if the Seanad was not there all these arrears could be wiped out in one year, thus giving a chance to the unfortunate people who have to pay these old age pensioners to get on their feet and do something for their country. I see that the Minister for Justice is now awake.

He will probably be going to sleep again.

I suppose we will have to get a lounge for you or bring in your bed in future.

Or hear some irrelevant speech.

I suggest that we are getting absolutely no value for the £30,000 odd that we are spending on the Seanad. Some of the members there at present were not elected at all. I do not believe there is anyone here who would dare to stand up and suggest that a gentleman like Lord Glenavy would be elected.

The Deputy cannot refer to the personnel of the Seanad in that particular way. The question is whether we should have a Second House, and not whether we ought to have the present Seanad.

I cannot see that the Seanad is serving any useful purpose whatever. It was intended the first day for the purpose of preventing the Irish people working out their freedom. That is done by the Executive Council, and they do not want a Second House to help them in that object. The Executive Council have started to tear up the Constitution and the Seanad. Deputy Lemass alluded to Article 13 of the Constitution, and he pointed out that was an Article which, in his opinion, should be dealt with instead of wasting time in trying to keep in this country a Seanad which was absolutely useless for the purpose for which it was intended in the first instance. I made a suggestion to the House a short time ago, to which the President and other members took very strong objection. I think that Article 13 interferes with our right in Cork—that is, our right to have this Assembly moved down to Cork off and on. I am not surprised at a body in Dublin coming together and bringing in a special Article to ensure that the Dáil would always meet in Dublin. Then we have those Articles in the Constitution which deal with the King of England and the the King of England's representative here. There is the Article which says: "It shall consist of the King and two Houses." If they are going to absolutely tear up the Constitution as regards election to one House, why not abolish the Article which is costing the people £28,000 odd a year for a representative of England's King? If you are going to make changes in the Constitution by altering the method of election to the Seanad, as we are told, for the purpose of saving money, or, in other words, that this election by the Dáil of fossils is for the purpose of saving money, then you should begin by abolishing the Article concerning the King's representative here. I suggest that in the present condition of the country, this piece of an island where they have to borrow £10,000,000 every second year in order to pay those thousands, and where we had to go to those who sent us here in the first instance—John Bull—for a loan, and to our second cousins the Americans for the second loan——

Who does the Deputy say sent us here? Who sent the Deputy here?

I was sent here by the Irish people. But I do not believe there are other members who were sent here by the same source.

They were all sent here by the same source. The Deputy will not be allowed to go on with that kind of argument. This House derives from the people and nowhere else. I want the Deputy to admit that before he continues his speech.

I suppose it was elected by the present people of Ireland.

This House derives from the people.

It is just as well some people should remember they are not in a county council chamber, whether in Cork or elsewhere.

I am very glad to hear we were sent here by the Irish people, but I suggest that if we want to economise, the best way of saving money is by getting rid of useless appendages, and you have two useless appendages here in this country which are costing the people a vast amount of money. You have first a portion of the Legislature, the King's representative, who is costing about £28,000 a year. Any Government, any Executive Council, which would have any respect for the people who sent them here, would not expend £28,000 odd on one man. Then you have what we are concerned with at present—the Seanad. This Bill which has been introduced has been defined as an attempt to see that one House at least will not be elected by the people, that one House which is costing the country something more than £31,000 a year is not going to be elected by the people. We have the number who voted at the last General Election held up before us. We were not responsible for this unwieldy Constitution which it is now sought to rectify.

It would be better if those who seek to amend it would unite the fragment of Ireland that is left by abolishing those unnecessary clauses of the Constitution which nobody believes in except perhaps the few Unionist members here—the clause which contains the solemn oath to the King of England, a so-called solemn oath which nobody takes without laughing at the idea of it. If they want to amend the Constitution let them start at that, and try to unite at least those who stood together from 1916 to 1922, and they will be doing better work for Ireland than by ensuring that there is going to be over here in another room in this building an assembly of discredited politicians who dare not go before the people, and who know it. I do not know what the Executive Council hope to gain by this Bill. I suggest that they should send these discredited politicians whom they hope to continue to patronise in the Second House into an asylum or some place of that description. These people would be better off, or less of a nuisance, in an asylum than over across the way interfering with the laws of the people.

I suggest that this Bill should be deferred, at least, until the Select Committee has reported on the advisability of abolishing the Second Chamber. That Second Chamber is of no use, and nobody is better aware of its uselessness than Deputies on the opposite Benches. Nobody is better aware of the present condition of the country than members of the Executive Council.

Might I call your attention, sir, to the fact that there is no quorum present?

This is the second time on which the House has been counted on this matter, and I presume there is no interest being taken in it. Accordingly I move: "That the question be now put."

I am not now prepared to accept that motion.

Notice taken that 20 Deputies were not present. House counted, and 20 Deputies being present,

Deputy Corry may now proceed.

Why is the President so much afraid of arguments being put up against his Bill? I have just alluded to the uselessness of a Second Chamber, particularly the one to be elected by members of the Dáil and by the fossils across the way.

The Deputy must not refer to members of the other House as fossils. We ought to maintain in our proceedings the ordinary courtesies that obtain between man and man.

I am not referring to that House as it stands at present, but as it will be constituted when the President is done with it.

The Deputy must not repeat that remark.

If we are going to have a Second Chamber I suggest that it should, at least, be elected by the people. The people should, at least, have a voice in its election. Recently we had two general elections, and I suppose the results have so put the wind up the Government Party that they expect they will not get any members into the Seanad at the next election. Perhaps it is, and I believe it is, as Deputy Lemass has stated, because they know that if our Party went before the country and put forward candidates pledged to abolish the Seanad, which is very unpopular with the people, who do not wish to see £31,000 expended on it, every single one of these candidates would be elected. No one knows better than the Executive Council how great is the unpopularity of the Seanad with the ordinary people who have to pay the piper. The Seanad is an absolutely useless body which was established in the first instance to secure that the Irish people should never succeed in changing its Constitution. The Seanad was established as a clog on legislation and to prevent the Irish people, or this House if ever we got a majority here, from getting rid of the declaration of allegiance and getting rid of the King, to whose representative we are paying £28,000 a year.

Why did you take the oath to him?

The Deputy is now repeating an argument which he used before.

I suggest that if Article 12 were gone into changes would be made in it. My reason for repeating that is because I hope that members opposite will see the wisdom of what I am putting up to them, the wisdom of saving at least £60,000 a year to unfortunate people who are not able to pay their way and who are compelled to pay for such luxuries. This is introduced in order to get people who are slaving from morning till night to pay for that. At a fair last Monday people were not able to sell their cattle, but when I come up here I find that we are continuing to pay £28,500 a year to a representative of a King, and we are continuing a Seanad which is a place of rest for some gentlemen in their old age. I do not see any use in carrying on on those lines. I hope the people opposite will see the wisdom of that. After all, they must have some interest in the country, and they have to go before the people again. When they do so, they will have to answer for this unnatural expenditure to unfortunate people who are unable to pay their way. If we are going to serve any useful purpose here, if Deputies are going to serve any useful purpose to those who send them here, I consider that the switching off of power from the people and taking away their rights to elect their representatives, as laid down in the Constitution, plainly means that this House no longer trusts the people to elect anybody. The argument used by Ministers to the effect that only a certain percentage voted at the last Seanad election really shows that the people do not want the Seanad, but if we are to have a Seanad let it be one elected by the people or at least, by the elected representatives of the people.

Are you speaking for your Party?

I consider it should be elected by the people.

He is speaking to the amendment.

The Deputy has no Party.

Why did you vote otherwise in the Select Committee?

Might I ask what Party the Deputy represents here? I understood that his Party was dissolved or absorbed.

I am asking the Deputy a question, and he does not answer it. Are you speaking for your Party when you say that the Seanad should be elected by the votes of the people?

I consider I am, and I consider further that any interruptions from a member——

Deputy de Valera put forward the opposite view.

Let Deputy Corry continue.

Mr. HOGAN

There are a great many leaders in that Party.

Deputy Corry on the amendment, not on the interrupters.

What can I do with the interrupters? Would somebody send away for a soothing bottle for the Deputy? I consider that this Bill should be referred back to a Select Committee of members of the House and that that is the only way out of it. I consider that if the members of the House got to work on this Bill it would result in the abolition of the Seanad. I believe that if a Select Committee of members of the House went into the matter in the morning, there would be such pressure brought to bear on them in their own constituencies against the continuance of this luxury, that they would abolish the Seanad, and abolish it very definitely. I do not see that this Seanad is serving any useful purpose whatever, and I hope that when a division will be taken here it will result in the total abolition of this millstone of £31,800 which is hanging around the necks of the people, for a body which is serving no useful purpose whatever.

I rise to oppose this Bill, because I believe it is a very undemocratic measure, and that, if passed into law, it will be looked upon by the people, and rightly so, as a piece of retrograde legislation. My principal reason for opposing this Bill is that it takes from the people the right of popular election. We have heard recently a lot in this House about the will of the people. We have heard that very often from the Government Benches. We have also heard you, A Chinn Comhairle, a short time ago, in speaking to Deputy Corry, refer to the fact of this House being elected by the popular vote of the Irish people. This measure has taken from the Irish people the right to elect Senators. Some considerable time ago, when the Dublin Corporation and the Cork Corporation were abolished, we of the Labour Party protested most strenuously against the methods adopted, because we believed the right was taken from the people to elect members of the Corporation, as they had hitherto done. In that plea we were supported by members of other parties, and I must say that I was greatly surprised when I found that a majority of this Committee, which had been set up by the Dáil to inquire into the methods of election to the Seanad, were in favour of the Seanad being elected, not by the people but by another body.

In my opinion the Seanad ought not to be allowed to vote when electing new Senators, because, as Deputy de Valera has pointed out very clearly, quite a large number of these Senators were not elected by the people. They were nominated. They are not there by the will of the people and therefore I hold that they should not have a voice in the election of new Senators when the next election takes place. As far as Deputies here are concerned, I believe we have not a mandate from the people to elect Senators. We were elected here ourselves by the people, but I hold that the people, in sending us here, did not give us a mandate to elect Senators. The President, in introducing this measure, gave as one of his principal reasons for the Bill the fact of the small vote at the last election. It will be agreed that there were a great many causes why such a small vote took place at the election in September, 1925. In the first place, a very big percentage of the people decided that they would not vote at that election. In the second place, it was an exceptionally bad day on which the election was held. I do not see that that is a legitimate reason why a Bill of this description should be introduced. Deputy O'Connell has pointed to the fact that the Cumann na nGaedheal Party at the last election issued handbills asking the electorate to support twenty-six candidates, and he mentioned that out of the twenty-six candidates only four were elected. Possibly that may be one of the reasons why the Bill is being introduced. Again, the fact has to be taken into consideration that the retiring Senators were Senators who were nominated, and the possibility was that a very big percentage of these Senators would not be returned. I think the fact that there was such a small vote at the last Seanad election is a very poor excuse for introducing this Bill.

Perhaps I might refer casually to the Constitution in another country. I understand that under the Russian Constitution unless fifty per cent. of the people vote at a particular election, that election is cancelled and there is a second election, and the second election is held to be legal irrespective of how many persons voted. Deputy J.J. Byrne interjected "Oh!" when I referred to Russia. Surely it cannot be held that the Government are adopting Russian methods in introducing this Bill. If we introduced a Bill of this nature it would be said that we were turning Bolshevists and were adopting Russian methods, but yet that is the principal reason the President gave for introducing the Bill. There is no getting away from the fact that there was a lot of abuses at the last election. I myself tried to draw attention to certain abuses that did occur at that election, that that is any reason why we should abolish the method of election.

As one who took part in that election, as agent for the eight Labour candidates, I might say that from my experience of the election I would like to see the people having a vote in regard to the election of Senators. I believe that if this Committee, which sat and considered the matter decided that there should be one constituency for Leinster, another for Connacht, another for Munster, and a fourth for the three Ulster counties, it would be a far better method than the Bill which is now introduced to do away with the system of popular election. Another abuse which occurred at the last election was the fact that no personating agents were allowed into the booths. The fact that such a small percentage voted in some constituencies should not be taken as proof that the whole system of election was a failure. I might say that, personally, I am under the impression that we should have only a One-Chamber Government, but I believe that as long as there is a Second Chamber Labour should be represented in it as strongly as possible.

Although I say that, my own personal opinion is that there should be only One-Chamber Government. As you are aware, under the old system Senators were to be elected for twelve years. The lifetime of the Dáil is only five years, and I do not see why the people should be called upon to elect Senators for a period of twelve years. I believe that if this Bill is passed—I hope it will not be, but possibly with the Government's majority it will be—that a shorter period will be inserted. As I said, my principal reason for opposing the Bill is that I think it is most undemocratic, because it takes away from the people a right which they hitherto possessed in regard to elections.

I am surprised to find that the President thinks that too much time is being given up to consideration of this important matter. I think that it affords an opportunity to every Party in the House to state the best that is in them in order to try to solve the problem of providing the Saorstát with the best type of Second Chamber—if they are convinced that a Second Chamber is necessary—that will suit the requirements of the people and that will be best in the national interests. In other countries when this question is being discussed in a Parliamentary Assembly it is discussed in an entirely different atmosphere. First and foremost, the Government Party, I presume, would take at least sufficient interest in the subject to give forth some of that learning that they assure us is to be our gift on this side of the House, if we are patient to listen. It would also be carried on in an atmosphere where the traditions and the history of the Second Chamber itself would have an important influence on the opinions of the members of the Lower Chamber, because in other countries the Senate has had a long and historic association with the affairs of the country, and a certain tradition has grown up in connection with Senates. They represent a certain privileged class, and the roots of these Senates were laid very far back in history, where at some time or another they took a prominent part in delivering the people from the oppression of kings, and they also secured their position, no doubt, by reason of their interests as landed proprietors in these countries. The Senates, therefore, in these countries deserve consideration. It is well known that during that period the Senate has made important contributions to the law and the institutions and life of the country. It has become actually a part of the machinery, and even, as in England, when it is found that perhaps this powerful institution is not the best type of Chamber, is not best suited to new circumstances, and when the whole strength of the Lower Chamber, with the population behind it, strives to effect the necessary changes in order to bring it into conformity with their wishes, the Upper Chamber is well able to look after itself, because it has this tradition and this reputation behind it, and it has all those classes whose interests it has looked after during long periods of the country's history to back it up.

I have no doubt that in the course of time the Seanad in this country, if it continues, may get an equally large volume of public opinion behind it. It will probably represent certain interests which will look to the Seanad rather than to the Dáil for support and advancement of particular interests, but at the present time we are more or less starting on an epoch in our country's history where we have to deal with a Chamber, the circumstances in connection with the setting up of which and the powers of which are not very clearly understood by the people. The people know the Seanad is there. They do not know its precise power. During the last election most of the candidates that they were asked to vote for were quite unknown to the people, and therefore whatever touch this House has with the people, and whatever claim it may have to speak for them, I think that the Upper Chamber, both by reason of the fact that it is entirely new and that the people have not yet become accustomed to its position in the State, has not any considerable volume of support behind it. The Article of the Constitution which deals with the selection of candidates for the Seanad states that it "shall be composed of citizens who shall be proposed on the grounds that they have done honour to the nation by reason of useful public service, or that because of special qualifications or attainments they represent important aspects of the nation's life."

Now, that is an Article which is capable of very wide interpretation indeed. But in the long run the interpretation of it does not lie with the man in the street. Public opinion, when you have a new institution like this, is largely formed by what they read in the Press, and they are told constantly by the Press that a particular type of individual is the right one for the Seanad, that the person who has done useful public service and who represents the important aspect of the nation's life is always, by some strange coincidence, a person who belongs to a certain peculiar and exclusive class. He would not, for example, except in very rare circumstances, belong to the old Sinn Féin movement, because if he happened to belong to the old Sinn Féin movement, and if he had the good fortune to get into politics or to remain in them—if it is a good fortune—if he left them, he would then, of course, be a discarded politician; he would be in a different position to those people who recently had not taken any prominent interest in the affairs of the country, but who now, in that sense of security and stability for which they had been sighing, are about to come forward and organise themselves. These people have all these interests behind them, and the Press, as I have said, give out a certain thing, and with a great degree of being successful in convincing the ordinary man in the country that the only type of person who is fit to be a candidate for the Seanad is one who represents that small, exclusive class.

Now, whether it is that the Article is capable of a very wide interpretation, and that there is a possibility of its being interpreted differently in the future, and that therefore the Committee which was set up on this matter did not go into the question more fully, or whether it is the case that the whole question of the determination of who shall or shall not be a candidate for the Seanad, will be postponed until such time as the panel is set up, I do not know. What I know is that that panel, as far as one can foresee, will, unless the Government Party show some signs of national spirit and desire for unity—

I wish to call attention to the fact that there is not a quorum present.

Might I draw attention to the fact that the Deputy has actually ordered a certain member out of the House?

I must first see whether there is a quorum present.

Notice taken that twenty Deputies were not present. House counted and twenty Deputies found to be present.

Might I draw attention to the fact that the Deputy who raised the point has now just left the House shouting for another Deputy to come on?

There is not a quorum present now. Ring the bell.

No question can be raised until a quorum is present.

Notice taken that twenty Deputies were not present. House counted and twenty Deputies found to be present.

I claim to move: "That the question be now put."

Before you put the question, may I point out to you——

I am given the function under the Standing Orders to accept or reject a claim to move that the question be now put. It is for the Ceann Comhairle to decide that, and no point of order can be raised upon it.

It is not exactly a point of order——

DEPUTIES

"Order, order."

If the Ceann Comhairle accepts the motion, "That the question be now put," it must proceed. The Deputy will have to allow the Ceann Comhairle to make a decision. This is the second time the Ceann Comhairle has been asked to receive a motion that the question be now put. The Standing Order says:

"... A Deputy may claim to move `That the question be now put,' and unless it shall appear to the Ceann Comhairle that such a motion is an infringement of the rights of a minority, or that the question has not been adequately discussed, or that the motion is otherwise an abuse of these Standing Orders, the question, `That the question be now put,' shall be put forthwith, and decided without amendment or debate."

May I submit a question to you——

No point of order can arise on this matter. It is a matter for the decision of the Ceann Comhairle, and no point of order can be raised upon it. I am deciding, in the circumstances which have arisen under my own eyes, to allow the question, "That the question be now put," to be moved.

In reference to that——

DEPUTIES

"Order, order," and "Sit down."

The Deputy must not raise any point of order on that. The question is moved, "That the question be now put," and it must be put forthwith, without amendment or debate.

Might I ask a question?

DEPUTIES

"Order, order."

I shall hear Deputy de Valera's question.

I want to get clear on the position. If the question is put in a case like that, does it mean that the rights of a mover of a motion or an amendment go by the board?

It means definitely that, what is naturally expected, those who move a motion will have an opportunity to reply, is simply cut off. I suggest in the circumstances that it is most unfair, because this is a most important question. A number of matters have been raised in the debate which I, for one, would like to answer. The calling out has been largely due to the fact that the Government Benches have been empty. (Deputies: "No, no.") There is no reason why we should necessarily keep a House for you.

That question must be discussed separately. Circumstances have arisen under my own eyes which cause me to accept the motion, "That the question be now put." The main question before the House was——

The Constitution rests ——

DEPUTIES

"Order, order,""Sit down," and "Chair."

We protest against your ruling, and we will not permit the business to proceed.

The main question is——

It is most unfair. It is an abuse of the powers of the Chair.

The main question is——

You are very well showing yourself up.

Question put—"That the question be now put."

I think the motion is carried.

DEPUTIES

Votáil. (Cries of "Order, order," and interruption.)

You shot and murdered for years to put the Constitution through, and now you are going to tear it up within two hours. (Cries of "Order, order," and interruption.)

The decision of the Ceann Comhairle is in direct violation of the Standing Orders. There has been no discussion, as the speeches were all from one side of the House.

A DEPUTY

Shut up.

Order, order. The Deputy can raise that question afterwards in the proper way.

There is no reply only British bayonets.

I call on Deputy MacEntee to withdraw.

DEPUTIES

Sit down.

You are not helping matters.

Anyway, the game is being shown up. That is all we care.

Question again put—"That the question be now put."
The Dáil divided: Tá, 71; Níl. 51.

  • William P. Aird.
  • Ernest Henry Alton.
  • James Walter Beckett.
  • George Cecil Bennett.
  • Ernest Blythe.
  • Séamus A. Bourke.
  • Michael Brennan.
  • Seán Brodrick.
  • Alfred Byrne.
  • John Joseph Byrne.
  • Edmund Carey.
  • Mrs. Margt. Collins-O'Driscoll.
  • Martin Conlan.
  • Michael P. Connolly.
  • Bryan Ricco Cooper.
  • William T. Cosgrave.
  • Sir James Craig.
  • James Crowley.
  • John Daly.
  • Michael Davis.
  • Eugene Doherty.
  • James N. Dolan.
  • Peadar Seán Doyle.
  • Edmund John Duggan.
  • James Dwyer.
  • Barry M. Egan.
  • Osmond Thos. Grattan Esmonde.
  • Desmond Fitzgerald.
  • James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
  • John Good.
  • Denis J. Gorey.
  • Alexander Haslett.
  • John J. Hassett.
  • Michael R. Heffernan.
  • Michael Joseph Hennessy.
  • Thomas Hennessy.
  • John Hennigan.
  • Mark Henry.
  • Patrick Hogan (Galway).
  • Richard Holohan.
  • Michael Jordan.
  • Patrick Michael Kelly.
  • Myles Keogh.
  • Hugh Alexander Law.
  • Patrick Leonard.
  • Finian Lynch.
  • Arthur Patrick Mathews.
  • Martin McDonogh.
  • Michael Og McFadden.
  • Richard Mulcahy.
  • James E. Murphy.
  • James Sproule Myles.
  • John Thomas Nolan.
  • Bartholomew O'Connor.
  • John F. O'Hanlon.
  • Daniel O'Leary.
  • Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
  • John J. O'Reilly.
  • Gearoid O'Sullivan.
  • John Marcus O'Sullivan.
  • Patrick Reynolds.
  • Vincent Rice.
  • Martin Roddy.
  • Timothy Sheehy (West Cork).
  • William Edward Thrift.
  • Michael Tierney.
  • Daniel Vaughan.
  • John White.
  • Vincent Joseph White.
  • George Wolfe.
  • Jasper Travers Wolfe.

Níl

  • Frank Aiken.
  • Denis Allen.
  • Richard Anthony.
  • Neal Blaney.
  • Gerald Boland.
  • Patrick Boland.
  • Seán Brady.
  • Robert Briscoe.
  • Daniel Buckley.
  • Frank Carney.
  • Frank Carty.
  • Archie J. Cassidy.
  • James Colbert.
  • Eamon Cooney.
  • Martin John Corry.
  • William Davin.
  • Thomas Derrig.
  • Eamon de Valera.
  • James Everett.
  • Frank Fahy.
  • Hugo Flinn.
  • Andrew Fogarty.
  • Patrick J. Gorry.
  • Seán Hayes.
  • Patrick Hogan (Clare).
  • Patrick Houlihan.
  • Stephen Jordan.
  • Michael Joseph Kennedy.
  • William R. Kent.
  • James Joseph Killane.
  • Mark Killilea.
  • Michael Kilroy.
  • Seán F. Lemass.
  • Patrick John Little.
  • Ben Maguire.
  • Seán MacEntee.
  • Séamus Moore.
  • Daniel Morrissey.
  • Thomas J. O'Connell.
  • Patrick Joseph O'Dowd.
  • Seán T. O'Kelly.
  • William O'Leary.
  • Matthew O'Reilly.
  • Thomas O'Reilly.
  • James Ryan.
  • Martin Sexton.
  • Timothy Sheehy (Tipperary).
  • Patrick Smith.
  • John Tubridy.
  • Richard Walsh.
  • Francis C. Ward.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and P. S. Doyle; Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Allen.
Question declared carried.

The main question is: "That the Bill be now read a second time," to which an amendment has been moved by Deputy de Valera: "To delete all the words after the word `That,' and substitute the words: `the Bill be not further considered until a Select Committee of the Dáil has reported on the advisability of the abolition of the Seanad.' " I am now putting the question: "That the words proposed to be deleted stand part of the motion."

No question can be raised when I am putting the question.

Can I not raise a point of order?

DEPUTIES

"Sit down."

Order, order. Deputies must allow me. The position is that while the Ceann Comhairle is putting the question no point of order can be raised. I have given the result of the last division, and no point of order can be raised about that.

It is in relation to the business. When this particular motion has been put, will we be at liberty——

I will solve that when this motion has been put.

Question put: "That the words proposed to be deleted stand part of the motion."

I take it that this is a division on the main motion?

It is a division on the question, "That the words proposed to be deleted stand part of the motion." The main question is: "That the Bill be now read a second time." The amendment proposed is:

To delete all the words after the word "That" and substitute the words "the Bill be not further considered until a Select Committee of the Dáil has reported on the advisability of the abolition of the Seanad."

I am now putting the question: "That the words proposed to be deleted stand part of the motion."

Question put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 70; Níl, 53.

  • William P. Aird.
  • Ernest Henry Alton.
  • James Walter Beckett.
  • George Cecil Bennett.
  • Ernest Blythe.
  • Séamus A. Bourke.
  • Michael Brennan.
  • Seán Brodrick.
  • Alfred Byrne.
  • John Joseph Byrne.
  • Edmund Carey.
  • Mrs. Margt. Collins-O'Driscoll.
  • Martin Conlan.
  • Michael P. Connolly.
  • Bryan Ricco Cooper.
  • William T. Cosgrave.
  • Sir James Craig.
  • James Crowley.
  • John Daly.
  • Michael Davis.
  • Eugene Doherty.
  • James N. Dolan.
  • Peadar Seán Doyle.
  • Edmund John Duggan.
  • James Dwyer.
  • Barry M. Egan.
  • Osmond Thos. Grattan Esmonde.
  • Desmond Fitzgerald.
  • James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
  • John Good.
  • Denis J. Gorey.
  • Alexander Haslett.
  • John J. Hassett.
  • Michael R. Heffernan.
  • Michael Joseph Hennessy.
  • Thomas Hennessy.
  • John Hennigan.
  • Mark Henry.
  • Patrick Hogan (Galway).
  • Richard Holohan.
  • Michael Jordan.
  • Patrick Michael Kelly.
  • Myles Keogh.
  • Hugh Alexander Law.
  • Patrick Leonard.
  • Finian Lynch.
  • Arthur Patrick Mathews.
  • Martin McDonogh.
  • Michael Og McFadden.
  • Richard Mulcahy.
  • James E. Murphy.
  • James Sproule Myles.
  • John Thomas Nolan.
  • Bartholomew O'Connor.
  • Daniel O'Leary.
  • Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
  • John J. O'Reilly.
  • Gearoid O'Sullivan.
  • John Marcus O'Sullivan.
  • Patrick Reynolds.
  • Vincent Rice.
  • Martin Roddy.
  • Timothy Sheehy (West Cork).
  • William Edward Thrift.
  • Michael Tierney.
  • Daniel Vaughan.
  • John White.
  • Vincent Joseph White.
  • George Wolfe.
  • Jasper Travers Wolfe.

Níl

  • Frank Aiken.
  • Denis Allen.
  • Richard Anthony.
  • Neal Blaney.
  • Gerald Boland.
  • Patrick Boland.
  • Seán Brady.
  • Robert Briscoe.
  • Daniel Buckley.
  • Frank Carney.
  • Frank Carty.
  • Archie J. Cassidy.
  • James Colbert.
  • Hugh Colohan.
  • Eamon Cooney.
  • Martin John Corry.
  • William Davin.
  • Thomas Derrig.
  • Eamon de Valera.
  • James Everett.
  • Frank Fahy.
  • Hugo Flinn.
  • Andrew Fogarty.
  • Patrick J. Gorry.
  • Seán Hayes.
  • Patrick Hogan (Clare).
  • Patrick Houlihan.
  • Stephen Jordan.
  • Michael Joseph Kennedy.
  • William R. Kent.
  • James Joseph Killane.
  • Mark Killilea.
  • Michael Kilroy.
  • Seán F. Lemass.
  • Patrick John Little.
  • Ben Maguire.
  • Seán MacEntee.
  • Séamus Moore.
  • Daniel Morrissey.
  • Thomas J. O'Connell.
  • Patrick Joseph O'Dowd.
  • John F. O'Hanlon.
  • Seán T. O'Kelly.
  • William O'Leary.
  • Matthew O'Reilly.
  • Thomas O'Reilly.
  • James Ryan.
  • Martin Sexton.
  • Timothy Sheehy (Tipperary).
  • Patrick Smith.
  • John Tubridy.
  • Richard Walsh.
  • Francis C. Ward.
Tellers: Tá: Deputies Duggan and P. Doyle; Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Allen.
Question declared carried.

The main question, therefore, is unamended and the question now is: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time." No further amendment can be proposed, nor can any further amendments be discussed.

I beg to move "That the question be now put."

What are you afraid to discuss?

I will not now accept the motion "That the question be now put." On the main question, "That the Bill be now read a Second Time," the debate must be confined to the Bill and to the Report of the Committee and, as I said at the beginning, I will not allow to be discussed in connection with this matter the question of the abolition of the Seanad or the amendment of the Constitution.

In order to anticipate the motion, "That the question be now put," might I protest on behalf of our body here and, I hope, on behalf of other members of the House who do not want to see the rights of any minority in the House infringed by the use of a majority vote here? I protest, on an important measure like this, against the question, "That the question be now put," being brought up from the other side. The reason given was that we did not keep a House.

The Deputy cannot discuss this matter now. The situation is that Standing Order 52 provides that the Chair may or may not give leave to move the motion, "That the question be now put." The right to claim to move the motion, "That the question be now put," is clearly set forth in the Standing Orders. The decision reached by the House on the motion. "That the question be now put," has been put into operation and the main motion can now be discussed. I understand the Deputy wanted to raise the question of the Government moving in the matter. That cannot be raised because a decision on it has been reached.

That is not the point I wish to raise. I want to draw the attention of the Ceann Comhairle to a matter to which I could not draw his attention when this question, "That the question be now put," was raised. Seeing that members on the other side are prepared every five minutes to propose "that the question be now put," I want, in anticipation, to represent to the Chair a certain fact which, perhaps, the Chair has not taken into account. We are not supposed to keep a House here for members on the opposite Benches if they wish to leave——

On a point of order. Is the speech that the Deputy is now making in order?

I do not know what this has relevance to. The Chair is bound to give a decision, and a particular decision has been given. I do not know if the Deputy wants, in the circumstances that arose, some general information with regard to the question of the closure. I might give that to him if he desires getting it, although it is not quite in order.

On a point of order also. I presume if the Deputy is allowed to make a statement now on this matter of the closure that we will be allowed to reply.

I would not raise this matter if it were possible to discuss the question, when it is raised on the other side, that "the question be now put." If I had permission to make a statement then, I would not raise it now, but as the Standing Order expressly forbids any speech on that particular question I want to bring now to the attention of the Chair, on the only opportunity I have of doing so, the fact that we on this side are not supposed to keep a House for the members of the Government Party. If they want to keep their Benches empty we are not supposed to keep twenty Deputies here.

We had more than the Deputy had at any time during the sitting, and the Deputy knows it.

That is not so.

You know it well.

That is not the point.

The very idea of the closure, as the Deputy will realise, necessarily precludes debate. But with regard to the question of a quorum, it is not for me to say whose duty it is to keep a quorum.

The application to have the closure put was made here twice this evening. On one occasion it was the second time that a count was called for. On the second occasion it was when the Chief Whip of the Opposition Party directly ordered about seven of his Party from the House, and when he did not succeed in emptying the House in that particular way, he actually left himself, calling another Deputy by name.

In those circumstances I asked for the closure, and I think that the dignity of the House and everything else demanded that I should do so.

I might remind the Deputy that notice was given to you, sir, that in view of the fact that the House was not desirous of hearing the speeches made there was——

Oh, I see. There was a previous arrangement.

Let us get clear about this——

The cat is out of the bag again.

I am prepared to hear Deputy de Valera with a great deal of patience, but I warn Deputy Flinn that I am not prepared to hear his peculiar type of insolence with any patience whatever. I will hear the leader of the main Opposition Party on a point of order, but I will hear no insolence from Deputy Flinn.

No, but you will take it from the President.

I want to hear nothing else from Deputy Flinn on this matter. Do I understand that Deputy O'Hanlon wants to speak on this? If objection is taken to the granting by the Chair of permission to move the closure there is a way of taking objection to that. There is only one way. I do not want the matter debated now. I do not know how it can be debated, and I do not know that Deputy O'Hanlon could usefully add anything without, perhaps, getting us into further debate.

If the Minister got a firing squad on the job he might be able to do something.

I must say that I do not understand why the procedure in this House is such as to leave one under the impression that there are no Parties in the House except the Government Party and the Fianna Fáil Party. I attempted at an earlier stage to move the rejection of this Bill. I was not doing it for obstructionist purposes. I was going to move the rejection of this Bill, not for the purpose of abolishing the Seanad, not for the purpose of obstructing the House, but for the purpose of suggesting another means which could be devised, I believe, without altering the present articles in the Constitution that it is proposed to alter in this Bill.

What is the Deputy proposing to do now?

What I want to complain of is this, that I am going to be closured and precluded from making a statement. I think this is most unfair, and on behalf of those who are neither members of Fianna Fáil nor of Cumann na nGaedheal I protest against the House being treated in that way— that no private Deputy will get an opportunity of discussing the main question on this Bill before the closure is put.

The closure is not now being accepted.

The closure has been accepted.

No, not on the main question.

Will I be in order in speaking against the closure?

There is no closure.

The Deputy can speak to the Bill.

I want respectfully to put before you the Standing Order that you quoted for us, under which you say you are bound to accept the closure. Might I respectfully put it to you?

I did not say that I was bound to accept it.

I understood you to say that, but you did accept it anyhow. I am referring to a past closure that was accepted. Might I ask permission to relate this to future efforts to put the closure on the House so that it will, perhaps, be in keeping with your previous ruling this afternoon? I will not read the whole of the Standing Order, but it says: "and unless it shall appear to the Ceann Comhairle that such a motion is an infringement of the rights of a minority, or that the question has not been adequately discussed...." In my opinion an important debate was in progress, one of the most important that is likely to take place in this assembly, and there were very few speakers on that important debate. We place our trust in the Ceann Comhairle when he is elected on condition that he shall be, above all things, the guardian of the rights of the minority. The majority needs someone to look after their rights, too, but above all the Ceann Comhairle is to be the guardian of the rights of the minority in the House, because the Ceann Comhairle, or anybody else who is used to public assemblies, knows that majorities are often very unmerciful. I have experience of different assemblies and I have known what majorities can do and what minorities can suffer. I have known it for a long time, and I have known, when we got a chairman who had that idea of his duties to look after and to protect the rights of the minority, how grateful we were to him. Might I say, with all sense of responsibility, that as a result of what happened in the last ten minutes, I feel that I can have no trust in the Ceann Comhairle.

The Deputy cannot raise that matter in this way. He must do it by motion.

If it happens again——

The Deputy cannot raise it now.

All I say is that your action has not been the action of one man in whom we can have trust, as a minority.

If the Deputy wants to criticise the action of the Ceann Comhairle he must put down a motion. That motion could be debated and a decision of the House taken on it. The Deputy cannot discuss it in this particular way. The question before the House is that the Constitution (Amendment No. 6) Bill be read the Second Time.

I can say, for one, at any rate, that if ever there was any likelihood of my having respect for you as Chairman I have lost it all for what you have done in the last ten minutes. You have acted as the instrument of the majority.

The Deputy must not continue in that particular way. The Deputy knows that if he wants to discuss the question of how the Ceann Comhairle carries out his duties he can do it. If a responsible Party in this House puts down a motion dealing with the particular closure that has just been given, or any other challenge of the actions of the Ceann Comhairle, I have no doubt that time will be given to discuss the motion, and the majority of the House will decide it. There is no other way in which it can be discussed.

And the majority will support you.

That would be closured, too.

There is no other scheme for deciding it.

Grin and bear it.

There is no other way to decide it—none whatever.

All I can say——

The Deputy ought to say no more.

——is that I think you are doing nothing else but acting as the tool of the majority.

The Deputy can contest the matter in the proper way. Deputy O'Hanlon.

I move: "That the Bill be not read a second time," and I do so for several reasons. The first reason is that by taking away from the people the right of electing Senators the Bill proposes to encroach on the rights of the people. Another reason is that this Bill, which proposes to alter Articles 14 and 32 of the Constitution, is repugnant to Article 30 and Article 2. Article 2 of the Constitution reads:—

All powers of government and all authority, legislative, executive, and judicial in Ireland, are derived from the people of Ireland, and the same shall be exercised in the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) through the organisation established by or under, and in accord, with the Constitution.

One of the organisations established in connection with the Constitution is the Seanad, and one of the qualifications of Senators, according to Article 30, is that:

Seanad Eireann shall be composed of citizens who shall be proposed on the grounds that they have done honour to the nation by reason of useful public service or that, because of special qualifications or attainments, they represent important aspects of the nation's life.

"Important aspects of the nation's life." Who are going to be the judges of people in Ireland who occupy important positions and deal with important aspects of the nation's life? I say it is the people who should decide that and not this House. Before proceeding with a general discussion against this Bill I think I would be in order in detailing how this whole matter arose. In the first instance a resolution came from the Seanad asking that a joint Committee be set up for the purpose of considering and reporting on changes, if any, necessary in the Constitution, and the powers and methods of election to Seanad Eireann. It was suggested that a committee of five nominated by the Seanad and five by the Dáil should deal with the question. That was passed. This House decided to fall in with the views of the Seanad. When that Committee was being set up and when Parties in this House were asked to nominate representatives on it it was found that there was no room on this Committee, as far as the Dáil was concerned, for members elected as Independent members. Although the group known as the Independents nominated a member to sit on this Committee I understand they were told that there was no room for the Independent group, and that consequently they could not get representation on it. I make no complaint on this head because I happened to be the nominee of that group, but I do make a complaint, because the most important group, so far as the Senate election was concerned, was the group that were not affiliated to any political organisation, and of all the Parties in the House that should have got representation the Independent group was the most important. I also find as a cause of complaint against the way the Committee worked, that notwithstanding the fact that the Independent group was refused representation, one of the principal Parties who nominated two men on this Committee put on a gentleman who only gave three attendances out of eleven on this very important question. That is what I call a dog-in-the-manger policy, neither giving representation to a group that was entitled to it from their very character——

Is the Deputy referring to Deputy Ruttledge?

Because Deputy Ruttledge was ill any time he was absent.

As a matter of fact Deputy Ruttledge had more than three attendances. I think it is not right that there should be put on this important Committee, to the exclusion of others, a Deputy who only attended three times, and on these three occasions the matters discussed were not very important. Having dealt with what is perhaps the personal side, I will now deal with the Bill itself. I must say that I cannot reconcile the attitude of the representatives of the principal Opposition Party in the House in this Committee with their attitude in the House. The first point discussed was that the election of the Seanad by a direct vote of the people was undesirable. Deputy O'Connell has dealt with that, and I do not want to labour it further than to say that one would imagine that the Fianna Fáil Party would have voted in the negative, but they voted in favour of the motion, that election to the Seanad by direct vote of the people was undesirable. I make no further comment on that than to say that it is not in keeping with their attitude in this House on the question of the constitution of the Seanad. Coming to the question of who should be the people to elect Senators, and whether it is going to be an improvement to elect Senators by the joint vote of the Dáil and Seanad, or by the vote of the Dáil, as against the vote of the people, I, for one, think that no argument can be produced to show that it is desirable that we should substitute for the people a body which whether in this House or in the other House, or in both Houses together, will fulfil the idea underlying the Constitution as against the other method.

Objection has been raised to the old system simply because, as the President put it, only something like 25 per cent. of the electors turned up. Now, that is not a very good reason for changing the method of election, and I do not believe it is the real reason. Deputy O'Connell referred to the fact that the day of the last Seanad election was very inclement. I do not think that even that was the cause of the small percentage of voters. I say that if there was a small percentage of voters in the last Seanad election, it was largely due to the manner in which the electorate were informed, or were not informed, that an election was taking place. I have heard it stated that the holding of the election cost a lot of money. If it did, whatever money was expended was certainly not spent in advertising the fact that an election was on. It is not a bit surprising to me, having regard to the way in which the election was conducted, to learn that only 25 per cent. of the electorate thought it worth their while to turn out.

There was another reason, I think, given by the President as to why a change should be made. It was that on the ballot paper for the last Seanad election there was something like 50 names, that this proved rather confusing to the people, and that the people really did not know what they were doing. It was confusing, no doubt, on the basis of proportional representation by the single transferable vote. I am going to make a suggestion now, but I daresay it is too late to do so. If I had had an opportunity of serving on the Joint Committee, as I thought I would have, I would have put another scheme before the Committee, which might or might not have been passed. However, I have the opportunity of dealing with it now. What I suggest is this: that if instead of the people voting for the Seanad by the single transferable vote, the election were held on the principle of the single non-transferable vote, there would be no confusion in the minds of the electorate, and there would be no necessity for making a change of one word in the two Articles of the Constitution that we are now dealing with. There is no doubt but that the result of such an election, carried out on the principle that I advocate, would be this: that the voters would have elected people whom they believed conformed to the Article of the Constitution, which says:—

Seanad Eireann shall be composed of citizens who shall be proposed on the grounds that they have done honour to the nation, by reason of useful public service or that, because of special qualifications or attainments, they represent important aspects of the Nation's life.

If the election was held on the system of the single non-transferable vote, what would happen is this: a ballot paper is handed to the elector on which there may be any number of names, but there is one particular person so far as one particular elector is concerned that he or she, as the case may be, wants to have elected as a Senator. When the elector had put a cross or a mark before the name of that particular person he would have felt that he had done his duty and had voted for one person to the Seanad who fulfilled the qualifications set out in Article 30 of the Constitution. Under the system that was in vogue at the last Seanad election, the elector was obliged to read down a ballot paper on which there were 50 names. From that ballot paper he selected 10, 12, 14, or 15 names, and in order to vote for them he had to put the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and so on, before these names in the order of his choice. What happened was that the elector got lost after marking the first two or three names.

What I am suggesting is not an experiment. I tried and tested it myself in the case of the last Dáil election. Had that election been carried out under the system that I now advocate, it would have resulted in the composition of this House being almost identical with what it is now. There are two exceptions. There would have been one less in the present Labour Party, and one more in the then Farmers' Party. If Deputies look over the list they will find that in actual fact that would have been a fairer thing than what occurred. The figures speak for themselves. The matter may appear strange, but it is nevertheless a fact. If the voters had marked their ballot papers for the last Dáil election under the system that I am advocating, the result would have been as I have stated. I think myself it would have been a fairer and more equitable result than what we have at the present moment.

I think the principal Opposition Party, if I may say so, have used this Bill, as I suppose they will use the other Bills, for the purpose of killing time. I do not know whether that is their sole object. I do not know that their object is really to abolish the Seanad. I honestly believe it is a choice with them of coming in with a kind of two-edged weapon. That is to say, their position is this: "We do not want the Seanad abolished, but if we say we do we will be beaten on it, and what we would like is to have the Seanad elected by the Dáil only, for the simple reason that if it is elected by the Dáil only we will get a larger proportion of Senators elected than we would if we went to the people." That is my view of the outlook of the principal Opposition Party, and I believe I am correct in stating it. I do not think it is fair to use the Seanad in this way, or to use the machinery of this House in this way. I wish to disassociate myself in every way, although I may not appear to do so, from any idea of merely raising questions on this Bill for obstructionist purposes.

Deputy de Valera said that we cannot get a Seanad that is not political. I do not agree with him. I believe from the performances I have seen in this House—I am not speaking of this Party particularly, but speaking generally— and from what the people have read about this House, that the first thing the electors would do if they got an opportunity of electing a Seanad this year would be to take good care that the men they elected to the Seanad would not be of any political colour or associated with the political parties in this House at the moment.

Would the Deputy tell us one Senator that has no politics?

I am talking about the Seanad to be elected. I am not talking about the Senators who were elected. I think that if the people got the opportunity they would certainly see that the Senators they elected would fulfil the conditions laid down in the Constitution; that they were men who had done credit to the nation and men who had no politics. These are the men who would get the votes. I objected at the start to the manner in which this whole question for a change in the Constitution, in order to alter the mode of election to the Seanad, has been brought before this House, and am still of the opinion that the recommendations of the Joint Committee should have been incorporated in one Bill. I believe that if that had been done it would have led to a more intelligent debate, and also that it would have saved time. There are other phases of this change which are to come before the House in other Bills. I will probably oppose some of them, but this is the main one.

I would ask Deputies who have not already made up their minds on this question to consider carefully the suggestion that I have made: that we should not take the election of Senators at the next Seanad election out of the hands of the people.

We need not go to the people with the same system as before, and we can use the single non-transferable vote. If we do so, and the people are properly informed when the election is on, you will get the election carried out in a more satisfactory way, and you will get the personnel of the Seanad exactly as it should be in accordance with Article 30 of the Constitution. There are other objections which I have to certain proposed amendments, on which I will speak at another time. I hope the Dáil will consider this question, and that it will get fair discussion and consideration.

Deputy O'Hanlon thinks that the attitude of our Party in the House has not been consistent with their attitude on the Committee. He also thinks the Seanad should be elected by the people as they were before. I claim that our attitude here has been perfectly consistent. I do not believe that anyone in the House, with the exception of some of the Independents, would accept the reasons Deputy O'Hanlon advanced for the 25 per cent. vote in the last Seanad election. The fact is the people of Ireland did not want the Seanad, and they showed that when only 25 per cent. of the people turned out to vote. We are not wishing to destroy the Seanad, but to make it truly representative of the views of the majority of the Irish people. Seeing there is going to be a Seanad and that we cannot abolish it, the next best thing to do was not to put the people to the trouble of voting for a thing they did not want, but to let those directly represented here have the right of electing——

Did Deputy Boland's Party get more than 25 per cent. of the electors to vote for them?

Mr. BOLAND

Of the total electors we did not.

Still you think you represent the people?

Mr. BOLAND

We represent their views on this question. Seeing that only 25 per cent. of the total electorate was all that voted in the last Seanad election——

Your Party was out of it the last time.

Mr. BOLAND

They will be out of it the next time, too. They have no use for the Seanad. I did not closely study the report of the Committee, but I remember that the Labour representative on the Committee said that Deputy de Valera was quite logical, that what he wanted was to destroy the Seanad so that it would not become a sort of close preserve for the majority. Seeing that there is going to be a Seanad, it is better to have its members elected by the Dáil only than to have persons who are not elected by the people nominated for the Seanad, and have people like the legal assessor to the Covenanters some years ago, and people of that kidney, coming down here and having a vote for the Seanad. I do not see how that is democratic. As we are to have a Seanad, it will be better to have the elections carried out as cheaply as possible. The people do not care whether there is a Seanad or not, and, in fact, they would prefer not to have it. Deputy O'Hanlon thinks that if we went to the country again our Party would not have as many representatives in this House after the election.

I did not say that. I said that if the Seanad went to the country, and you had a single transferable vote, you would not have any politicians elected.

Mr. BOLAND

That is a different matter. I am sorry I misunderstood the Deputy. I would like to know what type of non-political persons can be got. The only non-political people I know are the people who back Cumann na nGaedheal. I met in my constituency a couple of weeks ago two Cumann na nGaedheal organisers who were down looking for non-political candidates for the local elections. I can assure Deputy O'Hanlon the only real non-political people he will get are members of Cumann na nGaedheal.

Most of the non-political people are people who represent important aspects of the national life.

Mr. BOLAND

And the reason the people I have been speaking of are non-political is they have not the head for politics, and, therefore, they are members of Cumann na nGaedheal. I do not want it to go unchallenged that our Party is standing for an undemocratic election to the Seanad. They stand for election to the Seanad, on the testimony of a Labour member of the Committee, by the method of direct election by this House as one of the surest ways of killing this fossilised institution.

Will the Deputy quote anything the Labour representative said?

Mr. BOLAND

I am not in a position to do so. If I am saying anything the Labour representative did not say, I will withdraw it. My recollection is the Labour representative said that Deputy de Valera was quite logical in his attitude in wishing to have election by the Dáil and not by the people direct, as that would be the surest way of killing it.

Will the Deputy produce the shorthand notes?

Mr. BOLAND

I have not got the Deputy's confidential documents.

Seeing that we, are going to have a Seanad whether we like it or not, would not the most democratic way be the best way of electing it?

Mr. BOLAND

I say that if the people's will were really represented, and if you had a referendum, you could find out the people's will on any question such as that we are discussing, but seeing that you cannot have it we have to take the fact that only 25 per cent. of the people voted in the last Seanad election, and our reading of that fact is that people did not want the Seanad. Deputy O'Hanlon and others have different ideas. As we cannot abolish the Seanad, and as we are not going to have a referendum, we are going to make that institution as unpopular as possible.

As harmless as possible.

Why not propose that the Seanad elect themselves and that will make it more unpopular?

Mr. BOLAND

It might, but it would be absolutely undemocratic. This House alone, except a proportion of the Seanad elected by the people, should have the right to elect. The nominated people should not have the right. We want the Seanad more democratic, not because we want any more in it, although we may shove a few of our retired politicians into it, but we have not decided on that point yet. I regret very much that Deputy O'Hanlon did not get his chance of putting his proposal before the Committe. I remember when the suggestion to put him on the Committee was put forward we thought that the Government Party, which always got the support of the Independents, would give away and allow a member of the Independent Group to get on, but they were ungrateful and ungracious enough not to give way and we would not give way.

Is the Deputy classing Deputy O'Hanlon with the non-politicians?

Mr. BOLAND

I am not. I think in most divisions he has supported the Government, but on some occasions he did show his independence, unlike some of his neighbours. I am not a good hand for holding up the House, but I did not get up for that purpose any more than Deputy O'Hanlon did. I simply got up to reply to the last point, and I think I have done it fairly well.

I presume I may conclude now.

Táim in aghaidh an Bhille seo agus isé an fáth go bhfuilim in a aghaidh gurab é mo thuairim nach ceart an Seanad do choimeád beo. Is dó liom bo mb'fhearr an Seanad do chur chun bháis. Nílim deimhnighthe im' intinn fhéin cad is fearr do dhéanamh i dtaobh rialú na tíre seo. Dá' mba rud é go raibh an tír uilig faoi aon Rialtas amháin, dá mbeadh gach contae agus gach dream sa tír, agus go háirithe an dream i dTuaisceart na hEireann, faoi'n Rialtas chéanna, b'fhéidir go mba mhaith an rud é dhá Thigh do bheith againn—ceann aca mar Dháil Eireann agus an ceann eile mar Sheanad Eireann. Ach caithfear cóiriú éigin eile do bheith againn

Notice taken that twenty Deputies were not present. House counted, twenty Deputies being present.

Go dtí go mbéidh an tír faoi aon Rialtas amháin agus seans againn cóiriú nua do cheapadh, b'fhéarr liom gan ach aon Tigh amháin a bheith againn. Dubhairt cúpla Teachta annso iniú gurab é an fáth go bhfuil an dara Tigh ann go dtugann sé seans do dhream beag áirithe, dream tachtach san tír, páirt do thógaint i rialú na tíre, páirt nách mbeadh aca ach a bé sin. Ba mhaith liom an dream san d'fheiceáil ag tógaint páirt mhór i rialú na tíre. Ní duine mé go mba mhaith leis an dream láidir sin d'fheiceáil caithte amach as gach rud a bhaineas le rialú na tíre. Ba mhaith liom iad d'fheiceáil ag tógaint na páirte is cóir dóibh i rialú na tíre, do réir an méid aca atá acu. Ba mhaith liom iad d'fheiceál sa Tigh seo nó i dTigh éigin eile; ach niór mhaith liom iad d'fheiceáil ró-láidir nó ag tógaint páirte níos láidre ná mar atá tuillte aca do réir an méid díobh atá sa tír. Is dó liom gur mar san atá an scéal ins an dara Tigh fé láthair. Tá páirt ró-láidir aca sa tír i láthair na huaire agus deirim nach ceart san. Deirim go mbeadh an scéal ceart go leor dá mbeadh an tír uilig faoi aon Rialtas amháin; ach ní hamlaidh atá.

Ba mhaith leis an Rialtas anso atharú do dhéanamh ar an slí ina dtoghtar Seanad Eireann, agus cuireann siad ós ár gcomhair Bille chun Bunreacht na tíre do leasú. In san Bhille atá romhainn anois—Uimhir 6—tá siad ag iarraidh leasuithe do dhéanamh ar dhá airtiogal den Bhunreacht. Níor mhaith liom masla do chun ar an Seanad. Ach ba mhaith liom go dtuigfeadh an tír nach rud foghanta é an Seanad a bheith againn; agus gurbh' fhéidir an obair do dhéanamh agus do dhéanamh i gceart in aon Tigh amháin. Deirimíd-ne nach rud foghanta an Seanad agus deirimíd fós gur fearr gan na daoine a bheidh ina Seanadóirí feasta a bheith á dtoghadh ag na daoine—isé sin go mbeidh sé inar gcumas deire do chur leis an Seanad ar fad.

Mar adubhras cheana, bfhearr liom an Seanad do ghlana amach ach ós rud é nach bhfuil an comhacht againne ar an dtaobh so den Tigh é sin do dhéanamh; ós rud é nach féidir linn deire do chur leis an Seanad nó an Bunreacht do leasú mar ba mhaith linn is é rud a shocruigh na teachtairí uainne ar an gCó-choiste ná a nguthanna do thabhairt ar son na tairisginte seo: an togha do bheith fé na Teachtaí Dála.

Níor glacadh leis an dtairisgint sin ach glacadh le tairisgint go mbeadh baill Dháil Eireann agus baill Sheanad Eireann i dteanta chéile mar thoghthóirí chun an Seanad do thogha. Ní maith liom an módh san, ach níor eirigh linn an módh ina dtoghfar na Seanadóirí nua do shocrú mar ba mhian linn. Ní maith liomsa agus ní maith leis na daoine ar an dtaobh so den Tigh go mbeadh aoinne taobh amuigh den Dáil in án a rá, ná ní maith liom go mbeadh Seanadóir ar bith in án a rá go bhfuil sé ag labhairt ar son mhuintir Shaorstát Eireann. Ní dheachaidh a bhfurmhór ós cóir na ndaoine agus ar an abhar san, níl aon cheart aca a rá go labhrann siad in ainm na ndaoine sa tír seo. Is amhlaidh is fearr an scéal a bheith agus ba mhaith liom iad a choinneáil mar san.

Nuair a bhí an togha ar siúl thug muintir na tíre le tuigsin dúinn nach dteastuíonn an Seanad uatha; agus mór thugadar a nguthanna ar a shon. Bhí togha ann tuairim trí blíana o shoin. Cuireadh a lán fógraí ar gach páipéar sa tír. Caitheadh a lán airgid ar fhógraí i ngach contae, agus i ngach paróiste. Na páipéirí laethúla, bhí siad lán o thús go deireadh le h-achuingí ag iarraidh ar na daoine dul amach agus a ngothanna do thabhairt. Do labhair muintir Chumann na nGaedheal agus do labhair an t-Uachtarán agus d'iarr siad ar na daoine suim do chur san togha agus a nguthanna do thabhairt ar son na n-iarrathóir a bhí ainmnithe acu. Tar éis an méid sin airgid do chaitheamh agus tar éis na horáidí sin go léir do thabhairt ar feadh na míosa roimh an togha, ní tháinig chun a ngothanna do thabhairt sa Togha ach 23%. Taisbeánann san gur cuma leis na daoine Seanad Eireann ann no as. Taisbeánann sé nach gcuireann siad aon tsuim ann, agus nár mhaith leo a leithéid a bheith ann.

Sin an bhrí a bhainim-se as an scéal agus sin an bhrí a bhaineann mo cháirde as. Sé ar dtuairim láidir go bhfuilmíd ag labhairt ar son mhuintir na tíre agus ag nochtadh barúla na ndaoine go fíor nuair adeirimíd gur fearr agus gur ceart an Seanad do ghlana chun siúil ar fad, agus gan ach aon Tigh amháin do bheith ann go dtí go mbeidh seans ag muintir na tíre go léir gach rud a bhaineas leis an mBunreacht do leasú do réir a dtola fein. Nuair a bhéas lán-toil ag na daoine chun Bunreacht do chuma, gan spléachas d'éinne, bh'fhéidir go mba mhaith an rud é an dara Tigh a bheith ann. B'fhéidir go mba mhaith an rud don tír a leithéid a bheith ann; ach táim-se deimhnitheach nach ar mhaithe leis an tír é a leithéid a bheith ann fé láthair. Ní theastuíonn sé o mhuintir na tíre.

Is dó liom gur féidir liom a rá go bhfuil muintir na tíre sásta ná fuil cead ag leath de sna Seanadóirí atá ann fá láthair a rá go labhrann siad ar son furmhór na ndaoine. Níor bhféidir leo dul isteach san Tigh sin ná i dTigh ar bith eile dá mbeadh ortha guthanna na ndaoine d'fháil.

I wonder would I be in order in suggesting that those in charge of the corpse hand round the snuff?

Nuair a bhí cupla Teachta ag labhairt iniú—An Teachta O hAnnluain duine acu— dubhairt siad nach raibh na Teachtaí ar an dtaobh so den Tigh ar aon intinn ar an gceist seo. Nuair a cuireadh ar bun an Chó-Choiste ar Chó-Dheanamh Seanad Eireann bhí teachtairí againne air. Dubhradar rudaí áirithe annsin agus thugadar a nguthanna ar son tairisginte áirithe a bhí ós cóir an Choiste. Do labhair duine no beirt de sna teachtairí annso agus, in a dhiaidh sin, dubhairt cúpla Teachta ná rabhadar ar aon fhocal nuair a labhradar ag an Chó-Choiste agus nuair a labhradar annso. B'fhéidir gur fíor é sin, ar shlí.

Bhí ortha guthanna a thabhairt ar tairisgintí a bhí ós comhair an Choiste. Chuireadar i dtuigsint don Choiste gurab é an rún a bhí in a n-intinn, agus in ar n-intinn, ná deire do chur leis an Seanad. D'iarr siad cead tairisgint no rún mar sin do chur os cóir an Choiste. Dá mba rud é go dtiocfadh leo rún marsin do chur ós cóir an Choiste dhéanfaidís é ach do rialuigh Cathaoirleach an Choiste ná raibh sé de chead an cheist sin do phlé ag an gCoiste. Mar gheall ar sin, ní raibh de chead aca ach na rudaí do bhí ós cóir an Choiste do phlé. Ní raibh cead acu rún do chur isteach ag moladh don Dáil deire do chur leis an Seanad. Rinneadar a ndícheall chun gach comhacht a bhí ag an Seanad do laigheadú. Dhein Teachtairí a bhí againn ar an gCoiste gach rud gurab féidir leó chun a chur i dtuigsint don tír nach rud fóghanta an Seanad, agus do dhineadar a ndícheall pé comhacht a bhí ag an Seanad as togha na ndaoine do bhaint de.

Tá cuid de sna Seanadóirí agus tá cead aca ós na daoinibh bheith ann. Ní theastuíonn uainn an ceart sin do bheith ag aon Seanadóir. Ní theastuíonn uainn go mbeadh sé de chomhacht ag aon dream sa tír seo cur isteach ar dhéanamh dlí go dtí go mbeidh sé de chead ag muinntir na hEireann a Bhunreacht fhéin do cheapa. Sin é an fáth gur thug na Teachtairí a bhí againn a nguthanna ar son rún áirithe a bhí as cóir an ChoChoiste. Sin é an fáth go bhfuil sé de chead ag Teachtaí annso a rádh gur thug muinntir Fianna Fáil a bhí ar an gCó-Choiste a nguthanna ar rudaí áirithe agus gur labhradar annso ina gcoinne. Samhluíonn sé do chuid de sna Teachtaí a léigh tuarasgabháil an Chó-Choiste go ndéarnadar sin, ach níl aon léigheas air.

Nuair a labhrann Teachtaí annso ar na Billí atá os cóir na Dála, níl aon cheangailt ortha labhairt ar son tairisginte áirithe. Dubhairt an Ceann Comhairle, i dtosach na díosbóireachta, gur féidir leis na Teachtaí labhairt gan aon cheangal a bheith ortha. Mar gheall ar sin, is féidir le Teachtaí labhairt annso ar na rudaí atá ins an mBille agus a chur i dtuigsint den Dáil an rún atá in a n-inntin agus cad a dhéanfaidís leis an Seanad dá mbeadh an comhacht acu.

Is truagh liom ná fuil an Teachta O Annluain annso. Ach dá mbeadh sé annso b'fhéidir ná dtuigfeadh sé cad tá agam a rá. B'fhéidir nách fiú aon rud a rá mar sin. Níor mhaith liom é a bheith in a aigne go bhfuilimíd ag iarraidh an Seanad do bhrise agus an Bunreacht do bhrise gan fáth. Is dóigh linn gur féidir linn leasú do chur isteach annso a dhéanfaidh maitheas don Bhunreacht agus don Seanad féin. Ní chun aimsir do chailliúint atáimíd ag cainnt annso. Is féidir liom sin a rá le fírinne. Go dtí seo, níor labhras ar an gceist seo agus níor lot mé aon aimsir. Nach n-aontuíonn an tAire Iascaigh leis sin?

Cad tá agat á dhéanamh anois?

Bhí rud agam le rá agus níor thógas ró-fhada chun é rá

Rud gan ciall.

Sin é an tuarim atá agat-sa. D'fhéadfainn an rud céanna a rá mar gheall ort-sa, dá mbeithfeá ag cainnt. Níl ann ach tuairim, agus is féidir le gach Theachta an tuairim chéanna do bheith aige ar gach chainnteoir eile. Ná fuil an ceart agam a Leas-Chinn Comhairle?

Bhí leas-rún agam fhéin ach is dó ná fuil cead agam labhairt faoi, mar ghcall ar an rialú a thug an Ceann Comhairle. Ach dá mbeadh Coimisiún curtha ar bun chun scrúdú do dhéanamh ar na rudaí ins an mBunreacht ná oibrigh go maith go dtí seo, d'fhéadfaimís a thuigsint cad iad na rudaí atá ins an mBunreacht gur féidir linn leasú—sé sin tar éis an méid eolais atá againn ar an mBunreacht ar feadh cúig no sé mblian. Ba mhaith an rud don tír Coiste dá leithéid sin do chur ar bun. Dhéinfheadh sé maitheas ní hamháin do lucht poilitíochta na tíre ach don tír go léir scrúdú beacht, iomlán a dhéanamh ar an mBunreacht do réir mar atá ceartuithe ag teastáil air. Pé scéal é, tá ceartuithe in easba air.

O cuireadh an Bunreacht ar bun, do glacadh le cúig leasuithe. Tá cúig Achtanna curtha tríd an Oireachtais chun an Bunreacht do leasú agus an bhliain seo—agus níl a leath di caithe fós—tá deich leasuithe curtha ós ar gcóir; sin deich leasuithe laistigh de shé mhí. Má deireann an Rialtas go bhfuil ortha cuid den Bhunreacht do scrúdú, má deireann siad go bhfuil deich leasuithe ag teastáil i leathbhliain, is dóigh liom gur mithid an Bunreacht go léir do scrúdú agus iarracht do dhéanamh é do leasú chó tapaidh agus is féidir, i dtreo agus go mbeidh sé oiriúnach don tír. Trí bliana o shoin, cuireadh Acht i bhfeidhm ag leasú an Bunreacht chun an méid aimsire a tabharfar do mhuinntir an tSeanaid do laigheadú. Sin é an chéad leasú a dineadh. Anuiridh, do dineadh trí leasuithe ar an mBunreacht. B'fhéidir ná rabhadar rótháchtach, ach, in aon chuma, leasuithe a b'ea iad. I mbliana, tá deich leasuithe curtha ós ar gcóir agus tá leasuithe eile déanta ar an mBunreacht nár cuireadh aon Acht tríd an Dáil mar gheall ortha. Is dóigh liom go mba mhaith an rud—táim in dáiríribh—ar son na tíre, Coiste do chur ar bun a mbeadh Teachtaí o gach páirtí chun Bunreacht do scrúdú o bhun agus é leasú do réir an eolais atá againn anois. Ba mhaith liom go nglacfhadh an Dáil leis sin. Rud ciallmhar isea é. Ar aon chuma, nílim i bhfabhar an Bhille seo. Ní dóigh liom gur cóir an Seanad do bheith ann in aon chor. Ní dóigh liom gur cóir an Bunreacht do leasú ar an slí seo agus tá súil agam ná tabharfaidh an Dáil an dara léigheamh don Bhille seo.

One of the difficulties we have—I think the members of the Ministry will take me as speaking quite sincerely when I make that point—is that we have heard so little from the Front Bench. We have had a very brief, almost contemptuously brief, introduction of this Bill by the Minister. Surely we were entitled to expect that the Ministry which was responsible for initiating a whole series of constitutional amendments, which were intended to fit into a new scheme of things to produce a better world here for the people, something more than throwing half a sheet of paper without explanation, without justification, without reason or without excuse—we were entitled to expect some more respectful treatment of this—which we have been taught to believe and measure in what it has cost in money and in lives —great institution of the Constitution; that responsible Ministers, who have stood over it at so great a cost to others, would have justified it in some better manner. I am one of those who have been taunted at one time or another with not being sufficiently unconstitutional. I am one of those who took a very definite and a very deliberate responsibility in attempting to bring to an end a ghastly condition of affairs, which seemed to be growing static in this country, of open division, of mutual sterilisation of effort, of the destruction of each other's work and purpose for Ireland. I did my best. I did recommend people to use the particular instrument for all that was worth in it, and I did point out that within the corners of that Constitution, bad as it was, there were instrumentalities, functions, and powers which, if they are exercised by a united people here in the South could be made, if not what we hoped to find, the foundation of a new fighting ground for an advance back to the position which was thrown away, the position of working as one country and as one people for the full, open, and international recognition of the right, as one country and as one people, to function as a great human individuality in this world, bearing responsibility or service to no man, bearing responsibility or service to no power under that of the God Who created that larger human individuality, and setting it within our four seas and upon this our land, called it Ireland. I have told people that. I have told people, who on platforms and in the Press, and among their personal friends in their own country and internationally, have proclaimed the impossibility of the use for the purpose of Ireland of constitutional action within this Constitution——

The Deputy is wandering from the Bill.

The Leas-Cheann Comhairle should not butt in.

And I have persuaded, and effectually persuaded, many to take the great risk of using for Ireland this instrument to the limit of its contained powers. Here you have power, there you have power. Here is the fulcrum; there the lever. Bring these two together and put behind them the people of this country. Use the written word of this thing to the full limit of its power and you can build upon it. And they believed me. What am I to say to them now? What in decency can I say or what in honour can I say to those whom I persuaded that this instrument could be used? That there was power and vitality and reality within the powers laid down in this Constitution; that if they did come and try to function within them and try and build upon it a better thing they could do it. What am I to say to those in face of the fifteen Constitutional amendment Bills, ten of them thrown at us in four or five days, to tear up that instrument, to tear out of that instrument the heart and purpose of it, and to smash the very instrument which I told them if they used they could use to the benefit of Ireland and for the development in Ireland of a Constitution which was worthy of their name? I have to tell them that I have reckoned without my hosts; that I reckoned without conceiving the lowest limits of faithlessness and treachery, of deliberate and gross dishonesty, of a reckless tearing up of laws for party purposes that were possible to those who let this country run red with blood and poured out the treasures of this country to maintain the very Constitution which in these ten Bills they have scarified.

The Deputy I think will now have to deal with the Constitution (Amendment No. 6) Bill.

I think I have made clear the broad principle and spirit in which I for one approach the details of this measure. We are accustomed to be told—I am very glad the Minister for Local Government is here——

Is it not a fact that these Constitution Bills that are introduced now are brought in to give effect to the majority recommendations of a Committee consisting of representatives of the Dáil and Seanad and every Party set up to consider these matters?

Is that a point of order?

It is a relevant question.

On a point of order, is the Minister entitled to ask a question in the middle of another Deputy's speech?

If the Deputy gives way he may do so.

I have the greatest possible pleasure in giving way in every single case when any member of the Government Party or the Opposition or the Independent Benches desires to ask a question, make an explanation, or suggest some subject of discussion or line of argument which I may have omitted——

Hear, hear.

The answer to the question is——

In the affirmative.

——that the election to the Seanad by direct vote by the people is undesirable was passed by five to four——

And you were in the majority too.

If it will interest my —I had better not call him—co-respondent——

Brass hat.

——Deputy O'Hanlon knows that though he was not there that Senator O'Hanlon voted upon the side which he wanted in the matter.

One of the clan.

How did Deputy Ruttledge vote?

I do not want to be discourteous to any Deputy. We have a standard, a very high standard, of courtesy which naturally a Minister who answers an interruption in this House by telling the Deputy to put a sock in it would not understand.

That is one home.

Naturally he would not understand that.

Having said that perhaps the Deputy will proceed to deal with the Bill.

He would not understand that.

No, he would not; the Deputy whose father said he was neither a sailor nor a fisherman.

I am sorry I did not hear the courteous Minister.

He never wore the uniform of a sailor.

I am not interested in all this.

The Chair is. If the Deputy will speak to the Bill there will not be so many interruptions.

The first difficulty I find in detailing this matter is that we have already passed a Bill, or passed the First Reading, or agreed, after debate, to allow the introduction of a Bill in which the word "Oireachtas" was so used that it included the King. But I find that in this Bill, if we take these two together—and I do not think anyone will be so foolish as to suggest that we must not consider at least the mutual inconsistency of these measures —that though the King can be subjected to the kind of interruption which I get from the Minister for Fisheries, while he may be a member of the Executive Council, he is the only man who, being a member of the Executive Council, is regarded as unfit to vote for a Senator. Now, that is a very remarkable fact——

"The electors shall be members of Dáil Eireann and members of Seanad Eireann." But the members of the Oireachtas can be members of the Executive Council. Now we have had lessons in the elementary drafting of Bills by a Minister of this House who has behind him the whole technical staff and organisation of this House for the purpose of drafting Bills, and I am perfectly sure that we have never drafted a Bill so silly, so insulting—I have nothing to say for George as against William, nothing whatever——

Or Mary Kate?

I do not see the slightest reason——

There is nothing in the Bill about either George or William.

I beg your pardon.

He has shown his affection for William.

The difficulty is this: that we have to consider these Bills as falling roughly into a scheme. I mean that they must have some relation, and while I am not suggesting that we should consider their consistency or that we should go into any deep ramification to find their inconsistency— that obviously inconsistent thing—we are supposed to pass all these things,— or are we supposed to?—and they will not fit in, because I am perfectly sure that no Deputy of this House would suggest that you should invite the King to be a member of the Executive Council——

There is nothing in this Bill about the King being a member of the Executive Council.

The King is Deputy Flinn in this case.

I want to ask one question: Did you not rule the other day that the Minister for Local Government on the Second Reading of the Local Authorities (Officers and Employees) Bill was in order in discussing the details of the Bill before him?

I did, and I am not now objecting to Deputy Flinn discussing anything that is in this Bill.

In initiating this discussion to-day the Ceann Comhairle said he would not object to any speakers dealing with any matter that arises on the Report of the Committee set up to consider alterations of the Constitution as affecting the Seanad— that the Bills were to be taken as a series and that they could be discussed as such.

Before he left the Chair, the Ceann Comhairle ruled that the discussion should be confined to the main question, that is, "that the Bill be read a Second Time," and to the Report of the Committee. So long as Deputy Flinn confines himself to the Report of the Committee or to this particular Bill he will be quite relevant. Neither Deputy Flinn nor any other Deputy can discuss any Bill except the Bill which is now under discussion by the House.

The Report is a coherent whole. It is obvious that if, say, for instance, the last four words of Clause 10 were removed a considerable and definite change would have to be made in the middle portion of Clause 7. These Bills are consistent in this matter and they have to be considered as part of a coherent whole, for this reason, that they are part of a very difficult, very complicated and, let me pay the compliment to my opponents, a very ingenious machinery by which a single change is made by a series of necessarily co-related and inter-connected steps. Personally, I must say that I admire immensely the ingenuity with which they have been dove-tailed into one another, and I have not, I tell you perfectly frankly, been able to understand the purpose of any individual Bill, without going back and taking into account the corresponding changes which were caused and necessitated by the introduction of that Bill, and the changes which that Bill made in the existing structure, enabling another later Bill to be introduced. I mean when you consider that nine separate Bills have had to be introduced——

More than nine.

Oh, but one of them is separate—that nine separate Bills have had to be introduced, for no other purpose but to alter the method of election to the Seanad. It is obviously impossible for us to discuss in rigidly watertight compartments any one of these measures. Personally, I can tell you frankly—and I have a certain amount of experience in reading Acts—that I cannot understand the purpose of a good many of these individual Bills, except in their definite and necessary relation to the others. When I find laid down in one of these particular Bills something which it is impossible to do, if I understand the plain meaning of the Constitution, as defined by the President, for Party purposes and in order to pass one of these Bills—when I find things in this Bill which are utterly inconsistent with that, I find it very difficult to see how I can discuss this particular measure without going back and saying to myself: "Have I misunderstood? Is it possible the potter's hand shook, and that these impeccable and perfect people, these people who can make no mistakes, these people who draft Bills ex cathedra, have gone wrong? Have I got to face as a horrible, an almost inconceivable possibility, that they have erred?” Does it come to this, that in fact two Bills, part of the necessary sequel, and part of an inter-connected and co-related machinery, simply will not fit together? I am an engineer, and I have been accustomed to put together and to take apart machinery. I cannot discuss and I cannot judge the value of any single wheel in that machine unless I know in what it is meshing, what its purpose is, what is the kind of work, the duration of the work, its intensity and the relative maximum and minimum variation of the total work which will be thrown on to it.

You would want to put some screws into it.

I do not want to digress——

No doubt at all about that.

I think you will agree with me that no engineer has a right— we are coming now to a specific design —to put into any single cog of a wheel which is part of a whole machine, any more material of any quality or any strength or flexibility other than will fit in with the whole machine.

Hear, hear!

So long as we have full agreement on that point I am satisfied.

That is very satisfactory.

Engineering design might be defined as the proper specific use, the economic use, of material. One of the reasons why I suggest that we should not go to the further expense of printing and publishing, or otherwise using, this Bill——

What does the Deputy cost per diem to the State by reason of the nonsense we all have to listen to?

If the Deputy is prepared to co-operate with me in this motion——

I am not prepared to co-operate with you in anything.

I do not think so. It is a non-co-operative State. I was going to suggest that we set up a Committee with power to send for persons and papers and which would examine and report to this House on the exact value to Ireland of every member of this Dáil. I would be most happy to move that.

Is the Deputy in order in discussing the matters he is now discussing and that have no relevance to the Bill before us?

He knows very well he is only acting.

I am trying to explain a matter here in connection with this Bill which is due to what seems to be a passable stumble or an error, a little forgetfulness, on the part of the inspired drafters of Bills. Two Bills have been offered to the House, one of which declares that the King may be a member of this House and a member of the Executive Council and may be a member of the Seanad.

And the Cork Corporation.

But of the whole sixty members of the Seanad and the 152 members of the Dáil he is the one man who is picked out as being incapable and unworthy to elect this Dáil. That is an amazing statement, and I am perfectly sure the Minister for Local Government and Public Health never intended any such thing.

May I draw attention to Standing Order 46 in order to know whether the Deputy is in order?

I suggest to Deputy Flinn that, having made a statement a second time, he might now go on to deal with the Bill.

I have been interrupted by the courteous Minister opposite, by Deputy Wolfe and various other Deputies, including Deputy Davin.

I suggested to the Deputy ten minutes ago that if he were to confine himself to the Bill he would be subject to less interruption.

Leas-Cheann Comhairle, do be fair. There does seem to be a tendency to look for trouble with me.

Deputy Wolfe should have put his thumb down.

So long as we agree, that is all I want. I only want to get agreement on this point. I am not going to stress it and I am not going to argue. There is a question that arises on these two Bills. There is this very extraordinary fact in relation to this Bill, that this Dáil may think it has a choice in this matter. This sovereign assembly of the Dáil thinks it is free to pass that Bill or any other Bill it likes in relation to the Seanad. Now, the actual position is this: that it has no choice whatever. The Seanad has got the grip complete. You have got to accept the existing conditions if the Seanad chooses to impose them on you. You have got to accept the existing conditions with the £40,000 waste that the President speaks of. You have got to subject yourselves to that blackmail or you have to give to the Seanad, as it now exists, terms which are more satisfactory to the Seanad than the existing terms. I want you to get that.

Due to the laziness, the idleness, the lack of provision, the incapacity to read their own Constitution, or their deliberate connivance, they have put the Dáil in the position in which the Seanad can choose. There is no machinery except the operation of the Public Safety Act. The Public Safety Act could do it. It tells you what the extraordinary powers of that instrument are. There is no instrument but the Public Safety Act which will enable you to impose your will upon the Seanad in relation to the next election. They have got you. Whatever legislation you pass they hold it up under the Constitution, and in spite of you they can hold it up so long that they can compel you to spend the £40,000. They can compel you to go to the country.

Is that in the Bill?

Will the Deputy point it out to me?

This Bill is to be read in relation to the Constitution.

The whole Constitution?

It has a relation to this. Here is the proposition. We want to pass that Bill.

Hear, hear!

The Seanad is in this condition——

Will the Deputy show me where what he has stated is in this Bill?

I am suggesting that we cannot pass this Bill against the Seanad. We cannot do what we want to do here. We cannot do it, as the Seanad has got the grip, and I took the trouble of publicly and deliberately warning the Government and this House of what was going to happen.

The Deputy will have to deal with the system of election dealt with in this Bill.

I am putting the point deliberately to the Dáil that they have no power whatever, and that they cannot pass the Bill, or that they can only pass it by permission. The Seanad can hold it up. You have a choice between the existing system and the Bill.

Is the Deputy in order in using threatening language of this kind?

As a matter of fact, I have been rather hurting my throat, so I am very glad to come down to a lower and more moderate key. The case which the President put was, "We have an existing condition which is bad. Here is a Bill which will remedy it." What I want the House to know is that we cannot pass that Bill, that some other power can oppose that condition.

I suggest to the Deputy that he should deal with this Bill as it is and, when the position he fears arises, it can be dealt with by the House, if it arises at all. I suggest that the Deputy should deal with the Bill. He has been wandering from it since he started.

It does arise. Another interesting point of this Bill—and I should say it is unique in the history of legislative folly—is that the man who is going out, ex hypothesi, must have ceased to be a member before he can be elected, and he votes for himself in the period of transition. That is a very remarkable thing. No man in this House is more willing than I am to pay a generous tribute of admiration to the amazing imaginative capacity of my friends opposite, but certainly it strains a man's imagination to conceive what happens with 20 members of the Seanad going out, and these 20 members, in the transition moment arising between being members of the Seanad and ceasing to be members of the Seanad, are in a position to vote whether they shall or shall not be members of the Seanad. Imagine a man being in a position to vote for himself. Try to fit that in with what we were told about this Bill. One of the reasons why a panel has been set up which does not allow outgoing Senators to be automatically on it is because it is contended that if they cannot get anybody in the Dáil or the Seanad to propose them, they have not much chance of being elected. But what are the 20 men doing about this? They can vote for themselves. They can propose themselves.

took the Chair.

And second themselves.

They can elect themselves.

I will tell you. If he will sit quiet I will try to inform the Minister. There are 20 going out.

Nineteen.

It will take some working out.

Yes, but if you would not interrupt me. If you would wait——

I would like to draw attention to the fact that Deputy Esmonde appears to be reading a novel.

Deputy Esmonde reading a novel? Will the Deputy tell me what he is reading, if he is reading?

I maintain that I am the only member in the House in order; I am reading a book dealing with the election of Second Chambers, and my opinions are expressed exactly in this book. As far as the Bill before the House is concerned the opinion of this authority states that it cannot be hoped that a body which is almost a duplicate of the lower Chamber will play any important part in, or make any useful contribution to, the political life of the country.

Would it be in order to move that the book be laid on the Table of the House so that we might have information as to what is in it?

It is not an official document.

Deputy Esmonde, who never will be a Grattan, having ceased his speech, I will explain to the Minister for Local Government. There are 152 members in this House and 60 members in the Seanad, making 212.

I suggest that the Deputy be provided with a blackboard so that the House could follow his figures.

I am going to suggest that Deputy Heffernan be provided with some intelligence, and that he be provided with a character that will make him refuse to serve under a master who says he is bankrupt.

The Deputy must not make reflections on Deputy Heffernan's character, or on any Deputy's character. He must withdraw the insinuation against Deputy Heffernan's character.

I withdraw. We have 20 members to be elected. We have 212 votes, and 20 into 212 gives something about 10. Twenty members resigning from the Seanad can elect two of themselves without the help of anybody else, no matter who they are. Will they do that? Who will they elect? What happened in the case of the last election? I think I am correct in saying that practically every nominated man who looked at the electorate was thrown out. Are they going to allow that? Are they going to allow these twenty good men to be without nomination? They are already canvassing other people. Do you think that they neglected to canvass themselves? Mr. Augustine Birrell, speaking of a related House, said that the House of Lords "shares with the other lower animals the instinct of self preservation." Does anybody doubt that sixty votes in this electorate of 212 are going to be there for the perpetuation of whatever the Seanad stands for? But what does it stand for? Servility to all that is evil. That has been its record. It has had an opportunity, when this country was faced with one of the most serious and most dangerous crises, when it looked as if we were going to be thrown back into the melting pot again, to give this country a pause, a moment to think, a moment to co-ordinate and to consider. No, not by a word and not by a line, not by the lifting of a finger or the moving of hair, did that assembly stand between the people and the threat of danger that was born in the souls of very little men.

Sixty of them are going to vote for themselves. Twenty of them who are going out are going to nominate themselves. We may be entirely ignorant; we may be mis-reading the inspired brevities which are offered to us here; we may not be taking out of these words the golden meanings which the amazing skill and ability of Ministers opposite have so carefully hidden; we may be making mistakes, but the plain meaning in the English language is that these twenty gentlemen—"I come to bury Cæsar, not to praise him"—are going to vote for themselves, and the Seanad, too, will be like its prototype, the House of Lords, and will perform for Ireland, or for England in Ireland, the same purpose that the House of Lords perform for a governing class in England. They will vote for themselves; they will share with the other lower animals the instinct of self-preservation.

Deputy O'Hanlon has returned. I can understand Deputy O'Hanlon's position. I very often can, perhaps better than most people in the House, because I, too, accept his definition of independence—that control over one's mind that enables one intelligently and on evidence to change it. Deputy O'Hanlon finds it difficult to understand the position of this Party in the face of what happened in the Committee. Well, there are more things in heaven and on earth than are known to his philosophy. Deputy O'Hanlon will recognise that the date of this Report is not the present date, and that between these times these Bills, for instance, have occurred. A white light has been thrown upon the reckless Bolshevism of the minds of our constitutionalists, and it is necessary for wise men—and we are very wise—to walk warily where they are liable to find the very instruments of their protection used to stab them in the back whenever it suits a Party majority, who profess to honour the Constitution, to do so. I have no faith whatever——

A DEPUTY

Hear, hear.

That is the ribald laughter that speaks the vacant mind. I have no faith whatever in the idea of special selection. I believe that there is an awful lot in human nature evil. I believe that we are all human.

Deputy Wolfe is only a lawyer, and no lawyer is human.

I am speaking as an Irishman. I cannot speak for aliens.

I am extremely sorry, but I cannot hear what the Deputy says.

I am speaking as an Irishman. You can speak for aliens.

Demosthenes also carried a pebble in his mouth. This emotion is overcoming me. I have no faith in the principle of special selection. I do not think that by merely nominating men of a particular age or of particular wealth, or anything of that kind, you can get any better candidates. I had the experience, some years ago, of belonging to two separate societies, one of which was made up practically entirely of the proletariat——

On a point of order. I submit that the Deputy is not keeping to the matter that is before the House.

I am going to illustrate a point. The point which I have in mind is the actual personnel of the Seanad, and their qualifications to elect to the Seanad. The other society consisted of people who were cultivated— what is conventionally known as educated, which is a very different term from what I call "cultivated"—and I heard, over a period of five years, practically the same thing discussed in these two bodies almost concurrently. I can say that after a period of five years of intimate experience of these men I never did detect any evidence, any feeling or belief, that mere cultivation, or culture, produced any increase of intelligence. That is the point I am putting up here. You are deliberately putting as against fourteen hundred thousand to seventeen hundred thousand electors, for the purpose of electing a sovereign Dáil, as part of the electorate sixty selected men. Now, these men have not been selected, either upon the same franchise or by the same qualifications. It is no fault of theirs that they are a hybrid collection. Some of them were nominated by the King, through the President; some of them were nominated by the President, through the President; and some of them were elected by the people. You have three entirely different standards of relation to the people, of responsibility to the people, and of capacity to speak for the people in those cases. In the one case it reaches probably nearly three per cent. of capacity. That would be the highest. I should say the highest term in percentage that you could put of the right of any Senator, as at present elected—I do not want to go into calculations, but I will do if you like— would be in the case of Senator Toal, which would be about three per cent. Well, you fade off from there in geometrical progression until I should say that the members of the Seanad who were nominated by the King, through the President, were not capable——

I want to challenge the point, sir, that any present member of the Seanad was nominated by the King, through the President. I would again suggest that the Deputy is quite irrelevant.

I am expecting him to come to the point, but he does not.

I would like very much if the Minister would deal with that specific issue which I have raised. I may be wrong, but there is no man living more willing to admit an error than I am.

The Deputy is generally wrong and irrelevant.

Is the Minister for Local Government the Ceann Comhairle at present? Is it his duty to decide that a Deputy is irrelevant?

The Minister has on a number of occasions interrupted Deputy Flinn in the course of his speech. I would suggest that whatever the Minister has to say on the matter he should put it in a coherent form and deliver it as a speech. Then we could have a discussion.

There was one interruption by me of Deputy Flinn, and it was to draw the attention of the House, as against his statement on the matter, to the fact that the Bills before the House are the outcome of a majority report of a committee set up by the Dáil and Seanad. The only other interruption on my part was to call the attention of the Chair to the fact that Deputy Flinn was not discussing the matter before the House, and in fact, in my opinion, he was attempting to waste the time of the House.

Which is equivalent to an insult to your intelligence, A Chinn Comhairle.

I am glad that Deputy Cooney is so anxious about respect for the Chair. The Minister has put a point of order which he is entitled to put.

Is the Minister to decide points of relevancy?

I have made statements which may be wrong. Homer sometimes nods. If the Minister is capable of drafting a Bill which has the obvious inconsistency which I have pointed out in another Bill which has been forced through by the same majority, he, too, is capable of making a mistake, and I am prepared to meet him on that basis. He is capable of erring, and—it is an enormous admission—I am capable of erring. I have said in effect that certain members of the Seanad were nominated by the King through the President, and I have said that certain members of the Seanad were nominated by the President himself. I have said that certain members of the Seanad were elected by those people——

Again, sir, on a point of order, I would appeal to you that the Deputy is irrelevant. He is repeating himself, and I submit that the majority in this House requires the protection of the Chair against a deliberate wasting of the time of the House on the part of the Deputy.

Why not you take the Chair?

The Deputy has been asked to come to the point. We are not discussing the constitution of the present Seanad, but rather a particular proposal on which there may be some reference to the present Seanad. We are not concerned with an inquiry into the constitution of the present Seanad. The Deputy has been asked for the second or third time to come to the question before us.

Bear with me for a moment.

The House has been bearing with the Deputy since 9 o'clock and he has not yet come to a single point.

Before the Deputy proceeds any further, I want to explain the position with regard to a mistake which the Deputy has made.

The Deputy cannot do that.

I rise to a point of order——

What is the point?

A mis-statement has been made by the Deputy that I want to correct.

It is not a point of order to correct a mis-statement.

I do not think it is fair to let it go from this House that some members of the Seanad have been nominated by the King through the President.

The Minister has dealt with that.

With every possible respect, the Minister has not dealt with that. The Minister challenged a statement of mine, and I frankly admit that I might be in error. The only reason I had for repeating myself was that there might be no question on the subject. When some Minister does condescend to speak on this question and does step down from the impudent isolation with which Ministers insult the House by throwing a Constitutional amendment at it unexplained, I would ask him to give an explanation to the House. What I have asked is that the Minister would explain to my ignorance, innocence, and ingenuousness what his wisdom, experience, and ability can read into that Bill which I cannot read into it. He knows how these men were nominated.

Everybody does.

I do not. I have made a statement. I may be wrong, but I am asking the Minister to explain it, and I am entitled to do that. I will give way to Deputy Gorey if he wants to. As far as I understand it, there was an understanding, an agreement, in relation to certain members who were to be nominated. I may be wrong.

It does not matter. It is not relevant to this particular point.

I will leave it at this: we are bringing down sixty members who have various qualifications, and we are entitled to have a full explanation of the whole relation of every single one of those men to the people before we allow them to vote for a House which is capable of holding up one of those amendments for twenty months against the will of this House—"at which the electors shall be members of Dáil Eireann and Seanad Eireann voting on the principle of proportional representation." What is the object of proportional representation by secret ballot? Why is this election to be one in which we will not say who we are voting for? Why when some of the old gang are either elected or sent back to fill key positions and to dominate the legislative machinery of the country as two or three clever men amongst them have been—I take off my hat to their ability —is no one in this country going to be able to know who his elected representative voted for? Why is it going to be kept secret? Are we ashamed of what we are going to do? Why should it be a secret ballot? Why should any one of us be ashamed to take the responsibility of saying that we have deliberately and of our own choice chosen and put back into key positions in this State men whom the ordinary people in this country would no more elect than they would elect Beelzebub?

I would submit again that the Deputy is irrelevant and wasting the time of the House.

The Deputy seems to me not to be particularly relevant. He seems to be examining the constitution of the present Seanad rather than discussing the matter before us.

The difficulty in connection with this Bill was frankly faced by the President when he said they had drafted these Bills in a particular way —that is my impression—and that the discussion should be confined to the particular point. Necessarily in drafting a short Bill, a Bill of one explanatory and one operative clause, the whole principle, or dozen principles, must be contained in the clause. It is contained in the words between the word "word" down to the words "Regulated by law." That declares that by secret ballot we must elect. If you had an ordinary election for the Seanad at the present moment you would get a vote which would not be 25 per cent. Very well, the people would know who they voted for. A man would know whether he voted for Deputy Gorey or for me, but now he will not know who either Deputy Gorey or I vote for, as he is entitled to know. There are key men who represent interests in this country which are definitely anti-nationalist, and which are backed by large resources of finance and organisation, who are in the Seanad as part of the understanding by which certain names were recommended.

The Deputy can leave that point; he has already dealt with it.

I do not want to take up the time of the House. I am really very tired, and nothing but a keen sense of duty has caused me to keep addressing the House. I want to ask that the Minister for Local Government will give an answer——

I move that the question be now put.

The Minister for Local Government claims to move that the question be now put. I suggest that since this debate has gone on since before 4 o'clock the President should be allowed now to conclude, if that meets with the wishes of the House. Otherwise, I would be prepared to accept from the Minister the motion "That the question be now put." The question now is whether the President should be allowed to conclude.

I suggest that you cannot put that motion of the Minister unless there has been a sufficient discussion of the proposal now before the House.

Might I point out that there are amendments appearing on the Order Paper in the names of at least two Deputies who have not yet got the opportunity of speaking.

The Deputies who have spoken in the debate include one Deputy who has an amendment on the Order Paper. That amendment has already been discussed in my hearing. This matter has been debated since before 4 o'clock, and in my judgment it is not infringing the rights of the minority to accept a motion that the question be now put.

I thought the question you put was whether the President should be allowed to conclude.

I want to know whether the House is agreed that the President should conclude. If objection be taken that cannot be done.

I wish to make a statement on that particular motion. It will be very brief.

The Deputy can take objection, but cannot make a statement.

The next objection we will have will be a motion to remove you.

I will be glad to hear that discussed.

My point in reference to this is that, as mover of the amendment, I would ordinarily have an opportunity of replying to certain points that were raised in the debate.

I do not think so.

That would be according to the custom which up to this has been accepted.

The Deputy is mistaken. That does not apply to the mover of an amendment.

On previous occasions where there were amendments the mover of an amendment had the opportunity of concluding the debate.

No. It was the mover of the main question, as the Deputy will remember.

That is not my recollection.

The position is quite clear. Deputy de Valera as the mover of an amendment has no right to speak a second time on the amendment.

I would ordinarily have the right to speak at least on the main question apart from the amendment. I understood the other procedure to which I have referred has been adopted so as to get over the difficulty that instead of the mover of an amendment having to speak to the original motion he could speak in conclusion on the amendment. However, I think it is only fair where you have a series of amendments rolled into one that I should have the opportunity of speaking on the main question which I did not deal with in detail at all. The members on the opposite side have not contributed a word to this debate.

Is the Deputy in order?

The procedure simply is this: That the Chair has a certain discretion and that discretion it is the duty of the Chair to exercise.

On a point of order——

I cannot hear the point of order.

Debate by caucus and the Chair.

None of those on the other side spoke in this debate at all.

They are not capable of explaining their corrupt and shameful bargain.

Deputy Boland will appreciate that it is not for the Chair to decide that Deputies must speak.

There has been discussion by one Party, but the Government Party that brought in the Bills have not discussed them at all.

They are afraid to defend them.

What is now before the House is: That the question be now put.

Question put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 72; Níl, 53.

  • William P. Aird.
  • Ernest Henry Alton.
  • James Walter Beckett.
  • George Cecil Bennett.
  • Ernest Blythe.
  • Séamus A. Bourke.
  • Michael Brennan.
  • Seán Brodrick.
  • Alfred Byrne.
  • John Joseph Byrne.
  • Edmund Carey.
  • Mrs. Margaret Collins-O'Driscoll.
  • Martin Conlan.
  • Michael P. Connolly.
  • Bryan Ricco Cooper.
  • William T. Cosgrave.
  • Sir James Craig.
  • James Crowley.
  • John Daly.
  • Michael Davis.
  • Eugene Doherty.
  • James N. Dolan.
  • Peadar Seán Doyle.
  • Edmund John Duggan.
  • James Dwyer.
  • Barry M. Egan.
  • Osmond Thomas Grattan Esmonde.
  • Desmond Fitzgerald.
  • James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
  • John Good.
  • John Marcus O'Sullivan.
  • Patrick Reynolds.
  • Vincent Rice.
  • Martin Roddy.
  • Timothy Sheehy (West Cork).
  • William Edward Thrift.
  • D. J. Gorey.
  • Alexander Haslett.
  • John J. Hassett.
  • Michael R. Heffernan.
  • Michael Joseph Hennessy.
  • Thomas Hennessy.
  • John Hennigan.
  • Mark Henry.
  • Patrick Hogan (Galway).
  • Richard Holohan.
  • Michael Jordan.
  • Patrick Michael Kelly.
  • Myles Keogh.
  • Hugh Alexander Law.
  • Patrick Leonard.
  • Finian Lynch.
  • Arthur Patrick Mathews.
  • Martin McDonogh.
  • Michael Og McFadden.
  • Richard Mulcahy.
  • James E. Murphy.
  • James Sproule Myles.
  • John Thomas Nolan.
  • Bartholomew O'Connor.
  • Timothy Joseph O'Donovan.
  • John F. O'Hanlon.
  • Daniel O'Leary.
  • Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
  • John J. O'Reilly.
  • Gearoid O'Sullivan.
  • Michael Tierney.
  • Daniel Vaughan.
  • John White.
  • Vincent Joseph White.
  • George Wolfe.
  • Jasper Travers Wolfe.

Níl

  • Frank Aiken.
  • Denis Allen.
  • Richard Anthony.
  • Neal Blaney.
  • Gerald Boland.
  • Patrick Boland.
  • Seán Brady.
  • Robert Briscoe.
  • Henry Broderick.
  • Daniel Buckley.
  • Frank Carney.
  • Frank Carty.
  • Archie J. Cassidy.
  • Patrick Clancy.
  • James Coburn.
  • James Colbert.
  • Eamon Cooney.
  • Martin John Corry.
  • Thomas Derrig.
  • Eamon de Valera.
  • James Everett.
  • Frank Fahy.
  • Hugo Flinn.
  • Andrew Fogarty.
  • Patrick J. Gorry.
  • Seán Hayes.
  • Patrick Hogan (Clare).
  • Patrick Houlihan.
  • Stephen Jordan.
  • Michael Joseph Kennedy.
  • William R. Kent.
  • James Joseph Killane.
  • Mark Killilea.
  • Michael Kilroy.
  • Seán F. Lemass.
  • Patrick John Little.
  • Ben. Maguire.
  • Seán MacEntee.
  • Séamus Moore.
  • Daniel Morrissey.
  • Thomas J. O'Connell.
  • Patrick Joseph O'Dowd.
  • Seán T. O'Kelly.
  • William O'Leary.
  • Matthew O'Reilly.
  • Thomas O'Reilly.
  • James Ryan.
  • Martin Sexton.
  • Timothy Sheehy (Tipp.).
  • Patrick Smith.
  • John Tubridy.
  • Richard Walsh.
  • Francis C. Ward.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and P. Doyle. Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Allen.
Motion declared carried.
Question: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time"—put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 71; Níl, 54.

  • William P. Aird.
  • Ernest Henry Alton.
  • James Walter Beckett.
  • George Cecil Bennett.
  • Ernest Blythe.
  • Séamus A. Bourke.
  • Michael Brennan.
  • Seán Brodrick.
  • Alfred Byrne.
  • John Joseph Byrne.
  • Edmund Carey.
  • Mrs. Margaret Collins-O'Driscoll.
  • Martin Conlan.
  • Michael P. Connolly.
  • Bryan Ricco Cooper.
  • William T. Cosgrave.
  • Sir James Craig.
  • James Crowley.
  • John Daly.
  • Michael Davis.
  • Eugene Doherty.
  • James N. Dolan.
  • Peadar Seán Doyle.
  • Edmund John Duggan.
  • James Dwyer.
  • Barry M. Egan.
  • John Thomas Nolan.
  • Bartholcmew O'Connor.
  • Timothy Joseph O'Donovan.
  • Daniel O'Leary.
  • Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
  • John J. O'Reilly.
  • Gearoid O'Sullivan.
  • John Marcus O'Sullivan.
  • Patrick Reynolds.
  • Vincent Rice.
  • Osmond Thomas Grattan Esmonde.
  • Desmond Fitzgerald.
  • James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
  • John Good.
  • Denis J. Gorey.
  • Alexander Haslett.
  • John J. Hassett.
  • Michael R. Heffernan.
  • Michael Joseph Hennessy.
  • Thomas Hennessy.
  • John Hennigan.
  • Mark Henry.
  • Patrick Hogan (Galway).
  • Richard Holohan.
  • Michael Jordan.
  • Patrick Michael Kelly.
  • Myles Keogh.
  • Hugh Alexander Law.
  • Patrick Leonard.
  • Finian Lynch.
  • Arthur Patrick Mathews.
  • Martin McDonogh.
  • Michael Og McFadden.
  • Richard Mulcahy.
  • James E. Murphy.
  • James Sproule Myles.
  • Martin Roddy.
  • Timothy Sheehy (West Cork).
  • William Edward Thrift.
  • Michael Tierney.
  • Daniel Vaughan.
  • John White.
  • Vincent Joseph White.
  • George Wolfe.
  • Jasper Travers Wolfe.

Níl

  • Frank Aiken.
  • Denis Allen.
  • Richard Anthony.
  • Neal Blaney.
  • Gerald Boland.
  • Patrick Boland.
  • Seán Brady.
  • Robert Briscoe.
  • Henry Broderick.
  • Daniel Buckley.
  • Frank Carney.
  • Frank Carty.
  • Archie J. Cassidy.
  • Patrick Clancy.
  • James Coburn.
  • James Colbert.
  • Eamon Cooney.
  • Martin John Corry.
  • Thomas Derrig.
  • Eamon de Valera.
  • James Everett.
  • Frank Fahy.
  • Hugo Flinn.
  • Andrew Fogarty.
  • Patrick J. Gorry.
  • Seán Hayes.
  • Patrick Hogan (Clare).
  • Patrick Houlihan.
  • Stephen Jordan.
  • Michael Joseph Kennedy.
  • William R. Kent.
  • James Joseph Killane.
  • Mark Killilea.
  • Michael Kilroy.
  • Seán F. Lemass.
  • Patrick John Little.
  • Ben. Maguire.
  • Seán MacEntee.
  • Séamus Moore.
  • Daniel Morrissey.
  • Thomas J. O'Connell.
  • Patrick Joseph O'Dowd.
  • John F. O'Hanlon.
  • Seán T. O'Kelly.
  • William O'Leary.
  • Matthew O'Reilly.
  • Thomas O'Reilly.
  • James Ryan.
  • Martin Sexton.
  • Timothy Sheehy (Tipp.).
  • Patrick Smith.
  • John Tubridy.
  • Richard Walsh.
  • Francis C. Ward.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and P. Doyle. Níl: Deputies Allen and G. Boland.
Motion declared carried.
Committee Stage fixed for Wednesday, 20th June.
The Dáil adjourned at 10.30 p.m. to 10.30 a.m. on Friday, 15th June.
Barr
Roinn