Appropriation Accounts 1929-30, Saorstát Eireann. Ordered by Dáil Eireann to be printed 18th February, 1931. Page 19, paragraph 52. "Delivery of this tank was made in March, 1929, and subsequent examination disclosed defects in the tank, the engine and the gun. The tank complete was not reported as satisfactory until the 6th August, 1930." We had an absolutely useless tank attached to the Army, a tank which I have reason to believe was not in a position to be worked by any officer then attached to the Engineering Corps or the Mechanical Transport Corps of the Army. The Minister for Defence may deny that, but we find that in the list of schools which were given here as being the schools attended by officers of the National Army, the Army Tank School, Wyoming, U.S.A., was the school to which our officers went to acquire a tank training. For the sake of the Department's efficiency, and any little bit of reputation that is left to it as an administrative unit, the Minister ought to take steps to inquire into the statement which was circulated around this State, and particularly around this city, that there was no man in the National Army who could work that tank because of the fact that it was a British tank. That is not saying that there were men in the National Army who could not work British machines of all descriptions. It was because of the technical training of the officers who were trained to use American tank machinery. But we have in the Army an engineering corps who are supposed to be efficient. We are supposed to have acquired all the essentials of a small but very effective defence force here. We had a tank twelve months some place in Dublin; nobody could fix it. For twelve months it was lying there, a white elephant, and then when it was fixed and ready for action we find that no training was given in tank warfare to any special corps of the Army. Why invest in articles of military warfare of that nature without the slightest intention of making any possible effective use of them afterwards?
Why put the people of this State to an expense of £14,800 for a machine which, if this Army is to be a home defence army, is absolutely ineffective and useless as an instrument of warfare in this country. If the Minister maintains that the Army must have a tank training that means the Army is going abroad, and the people of this State will want to know something more about that before they allow the Minister to get away with it. Another thing that strikes me in connection with that tank transaction is that it reveals a state of as hopeless inefficiency and absolutely ineffective business methods, as did the purchase of reconditioned rifles, bad bell tents and defective aeroplanes. When the Minister is sending anyone of his Department to purchase any of these articles of war surely he ought to send somebody who knows something about it. He ought to send somebody who has had practical experience of testing and of purchase. Supposing this State had to face a tremendous rebellion to-day or in twelve months time and that tank was idle, what would happen? Lost!
Then we come to another aspect of Army administration. There is a sum of £22,000 in this Estimate for battalion equipment. I confess that I am dead on that. I do not know what it is, but I would like to know. I hope the Minister will enlighten the House before he concludes the debate as to what exactly battalion equipment means and how this £22,000 is going to be spent. Assuming for a moment that this is a modern army, that we have an effective defence force, a force capable of maintaining its own against any other force, for instance of equal size; assuming this Army is being given a proper military training, one of the chief essentials of modern wars is steel helmets. I have made some inquiry into the type of steel helmet used by the National Army. I have inspected some of them. I find that an ordinary sharp stone that the Minister might pick up on any road in the Saorstát, if fired with any little bit of force, will put a dinge in the steel helmet. That means that the steel helmets are absolutely dud so far as sharpnel is concerned. It means that the steel helmets are no use whatever, and that if the balance of the helmets are like the specimens I inspected, then they are not alone absolutely ineffective, but they are positively dangerous for any soldier to use. It seems to be the old trench pattern used in the early days, slipping down under the chin and over the eyes. The Minister ought to inquire into that item to see exactly how it stands.
One of the most effective and essential weapons for modern warfare is the gas mask. As I said, since we could not get any information in the House, we have had to go elsewhere, and we find on investigation that in the National Army up to quite recently there was no supply of gas masks, except about a half a dozen per battalion for training purposes, and even the half-dozen they had for training purposes were useless. I have seen a couple of them. I have had them explained to me by a competent expert on gas masks, and he explained that they were absolutely useless because of the fact that breathing destroyed vision. In an O.K. gas mask breathing should clear oxidised gas.
The National Army gas masks are absolutely useless, and the training which the troops got in these gas masks is equally as ineffective as the administration of the Army in other ways. We find down here in the Estimate that there is no money for anti-gas stores this year. Why? If this Army is supposed to be a modern unit and up-to-date fighting machine, surely the Minister, if he has any considered policy of defence, must realise that one of the weapons in modern warfare is gas, and he must realise that, whether he signed fifteen or twenty Covenants on Disarmament in Geneva or Kellogg Pacts.
A little item which appeared in the journal of the American Engineering Society of December might give the Minister's Department cause to think if they could only realise its bearing on this State of ours and on its Army. Since the signing of the Kellogg Pact more money has been spent on gas and on the production of new poison gas, and more money has been voted by the different States in the race for premier place in armaments on the provision of modern gas protective devices than had been voted during the four years previous to the signing of the Kellogg Pact. Yet here in this State we have no money whatsoever provided for anti-gas training.
Going back to the gas training which the Army received, certainly a few men were put through the field with gas masks on. But that is not a training in gas warfare. Gas warfare training is not given to the National Army, and I want definitely to tell the Deputies here that not only is no effective gas warfare training given, but not even is there training given in the smoke clouds used for giving the troops an idea of what gas warfare would be like in modern circumstances.
In other words, so far as we have gone in these Estimates, we find that whereas there have been increases in items of a non-essential character, there have been consistent decreases in the amount of money asked for in the only effective weapons of modern warfare—gas, mechanical transport and air. Another little item in connecnection with the training of the Army with which I have great fault to find is this: Not alone is the Army receiving no training in gas warfare, but as a whole they are being given no training whatsoever in modern trench warfare, and modern trench warfare, as the Minister knows, is one of the items which is very likely to be useful to this country in the case of hostilities, because, as he says, he has to get an Army which can stand up and fight, not an Army which is a small collection of toy soldiers. We have been sending men abroad for training in America and England, and we also afford the soldiers here an opportunity for engaging in mimic warfare. That has not been done. Playing at war, playing at being soldiers is all it is. Certainly they have got instruction in how to shoot, they have got instruction in how to fix bayonets, and how to round up Republicans, but the Army should have a greater object than that. The object of the Army should be the defence of the State against all external enemies, and it has not got the training necessary for that.
We come now to the sub-head, barrack maintenance. We find here £19,410. That is an increase of £110 for kit and rifle racks. We were told that the Minister was gradually reducing the Army through reasons of economy, and that many posts had been evacuated. It seems, therefore, to me that the money spent on kit and rifle racks in the few barracks we have left is out of all proportion. It must be that some of the Army have got out of hand somewhere and wrecked the barracks and the racks. Surely on no grounds could this figure of £19,410 be substantiated unless there had been a considerable number of breakages. Kit and rifle racks are things that could not break unless there had been pressure and unless there had been deliberate destruction. I would like to hear some more from the Minister about kit and rifle racks before he concludes the debate.
We find that a sum of £3,000 is put down for furniture. That is an increase of £1,000. We had a pretty big Army here for the last nine years, and, particularly, for two of the nine years, and during the time that that Army was in process of formation there was no stint and no economy practised. There was no definite attempt to save money on anything so long as the objects were achieved. I am perfectly certain from a visit to a few places that the barracks which we still maintain are quite well enough equipped at present with furniture and there ought to be in the Army supply stores sufficient bedding to do the 5,000 troops we have left in the standing Army at the present moment. That is a very unsatisfactory item and I do not think that the Dáil should pass it without hearing some more information on this matter from the Minister.
In sub-head X, there is an item of £100 asked for training for civilian occupation. That is another little item about which I would like to hear something. Where is that training given, how is it given and to whom is it given? We know nothing at all about these matters. The Dáil is kept in ignorance the same as if it were a group of children or of wild people who had no right to know what is done with the money. The Dáil and the country have a right to know and the Minister must give a satisfactory explanation of these items if he is to satisfy the people of this State that they are getting the value he says they are getting out of this Army and out of this Estimate which runs into close on two millions a year.
Coming to sub-head Y, the office of the Minister, I find there is a staff there of 223 costing £53,640, to run an Army of 5,000 men and a reserve of about 16,000. I have never had an opportunity except on one occasion to get a look at the inside of the Parkgate Street headquarters, but I am perfectly satisfied that that staff of 223 could not be substantiated on inquiry. It is a staff for which there is absolutely no need. At the very least a cut of fifty per cent. could be made in that staff and the Army would lose none of its efficiency. The Minister ought to make some inquiry as to the possibility of reducing this staff. Take that staff in comparison with the General Headquarters Staff in other armies and in other countries, in their Departments of Defence, and it must be admitted that it is quite absurd.
Sub-head Y.2 deals with Army reserves. We find on examination of the military strength of the Irish Free State that 8 of the population are included in the Army and reserve. We find that we have about 23,000 of those. I remember reading at one time a statement by Field Marshal Earl Roberts of the British Army—and we have a great admiration for the British Army in many respects. On his authority it was stated that reserves of the type that we have in this State, and on which we are spending a lot of money, can never produce soldiers trained to stand the strain of modern war. Before the Minister embarked on this question of an Army reserve he should have taken more time to inquire into the advisability of spending money on a type of force which, to my mind, will be absolutely ineffective.
Let us consider the standing Army we have, which is there to prevent rebellion and all that stuff, and let us consider also that that Army is not getting a modern military training in the strict sense of the word. Surely thirty days a year could not be sufficient to train any man into being an effective or efficient soldier? He may have had previous experience of the Army. That experience, so far as we can judge by the figures relating to demobilisation, was confined to the Civil War period, when guerilla fighting was the modus operandi. That, probably, will not be the case in the future, and the Minister should take a little more time before he embarks on a scheme of Army reserves and a volunteer corps.
In Cork City we are to have a reserve of artillery. The posters are fine, and the appearance of the soldier on the poster is very nice. The advertising campaign is very effective so far as appearances go. I wonder would it be possible to find out what percentage of the money expended on this volunteer reserve and the Officers' Training Corps went in advertising? This advertsing campaign seems to have cost a lot of money, and I do not think it is worth it.
At the end of the Estimate we find a refund of £500 in respect of civil aviation. At the very top of the Estimate we find that there was £10 granted by way of assistance to civil aviation. We are going to get £500 back for an expenditure of £10. The Minister should give us some information as to the assistance given to civil aviation. What assistance could £10 bring about? Is that sum a measure of the Minister's appreciation of the development which civil aviation should make in this country?
On a prior occasion I was told, when I asked a question with regard to pilots' licences, that it was a matter for the Department of Industry and Commerce. Surely the Minister should have some interest in this matter, and he should be able to inform the House how and in what way civil aviation is being assisted? What could be done for £10 that would be worth anything at all? If the Minister could run other services at a cost in proportion to the assistance which he is giving to civil aviation the people of the State would indeed be very grateful to him.
There is one item in connection with Army administration with which I have not dealt, and that is the Air Force. For about two months I have been endeavouring to elicit information with regard to our air service. Any student of modern history or modern warfare will admit that the most effective and efficient system of warfare is that carried on in the air. The Minister may smile, but this is an important matter. He may not smile some day if a British bombing plane comes over here and blows him up. The air service is the most efficient and effective method of warfare. All foreign countries that find it necessary to join in the race of armaments have increased their air votes since the Kellogg Pact was signed.
In the Irish Free State we find the air service, which has been in existence since 1922, is composed of seventeen pilots, five observers and ninety-one mechanics. We have twenty-one planes, of which fourteen are effective. That was the position on 26th March. The fact is that we have not a complete crew for the planes we possess. We have not got sufficiently trained pilots to man each one of the planes we have. Surely, after nine years of effort, there should be something more gratifying to record than the fact that we have more planes than pilots. In a small State like this every plane should be made use of, and every pilot should be made an effective instrument of war. If the Air Force is to be taken seriously as a unit of national defence that should be the position. We have on the reserve one pilot, one observer and seven fitters. If, to-morrow morning, there was an international conflict we would have exactly eighteen pilots for our planes, and only fourteen of the planes can fight. That is a very disgraceful state of affairs for the only effective instrument of war in our possession.
Coming back to the planes, we have very little information in regard to them; that is why I am so anxious about them. The only type of plane I have seen advertised as having been purchased by the Free State was a heavy bombing plane. The only one I have seen photographed on its arrival here was a heavy bombing plane. Even one with an elementary knowledge of war and aerial defence will realise that bombing planes in the Irish Free State air force are absolutely a farce. If the Minister intends to make the Air Force effective he should realise that single-seater fighters, which can rise quickly at the enemy and demoralise and destroy him, are more effective than the heavy machines which cost twice as much. The people are entitled to know what the bombing planes are for. Are they to be used for the purpose of bombing towns and villages in the State or are they to be used for the purpose of invading England? We are entitled to get some definite information about this unit of the Army around which there has been such a cloak of secrecy for the last eight years. The only way we can get information is by questions and we do not often get an opportunity of hearing satisfactory answers.
We find in connection with the air force that the number of crashes during the last seven years has been considerable. There were sixteen crashes involving the total destruction of the planes and in about the same number of cases the crashes resulted in partial destruction. The figure seems to me to be abnormally high. There were sixteen crashes and five fatalities in connection with an air force of eighteen men. The Minister ought to take some steps to abolish the Air Force altogether and not put the people of the State to the expense of buying planes. If an attack were made on this country our Air Force would be absolutely ineffective for the purpose of defence. The Air Force that we have is all right for toying round with and crashing.
If the Minister had listened carefully, as I am sure he did, at the Imperial War Council in London, he should have heard something about fairy planes and fairy fox planes, small scout machines which are a million times more effective and much less expensive than the big bombing type of planes now used in the Free State. As the army officers stated in their manifesto last November there seems to be no considered policy whatever in defence. It strikes me that since we have ceded the maritime defence of this State and ceded also the air defence of this State to Great Britain, we might as well cede the ground defence and save £1,400,000, which could be used for purposes for which it is badly needed, to provide employment in industrial undertakings or something of that nature, and not continue this farce, because it is a farce. Again, in connection with the administration of the Air Force, we find that in the purchase of planes since 1922 the amount expended has been something like £85,000 on new planes and £55,000 on spare parts. Does the Minister not see something absurd in that? Does his Department not see something absolutely ridiculous in spending £55,000 on parts to £85,000 on brand new planes, most of which are gone, and that the number of effective fighting machines of all types in the service in March, 1931, is 14? With the amount of spare parts purchased for this Army Air Defence Force since 1922 there should be enough spare parts in Baldonnel to manufacture new planes without going to England for any more. It is very unsatisfactory.
Then we come to the question of the efficiency of the Air Force, and whether it is recognised as a service of the Army at all. We had public recruiting appeals for University Officers' Training Corps; we had public recruiting appeals for the ordinary type of service in the Army, but for this one effective method that we have of defending these shores and the one effective unit of a modern war on which we should concentrate all available attention, we find that the officer commanding the Air Force is permitted to attest such suitable applicants as present themselves for enlistment, and in addition power is given to transfer to the corps men from other units whose qualifications would seem to make them suitable for it. That is the only way in which this little Air Force of 18 pilots and six observers can be brought to anything like a decent strength.
There was no public recruiting campaign for suitable types of men, and no attempt even in the Army for the past seven or eight years to get men for that service who might be considered suitable, so that it might be made an efficient unit and not the laughing stock that it is. I asked a question on the 26th March as to whether any scheme to recruit mechanics and boy apprentices was under consideration. We have been for eight years with an Air Force as a unit of the Army, and that force has been without mechanics. The Minister may attempt to gloss over these points. Out of the total Vote for the Army only about one-fiftieth of the amount is spent on the Air Service. If the Minister's Department and if the Council of National Defence cannot see something wrong with that, then they are absolutely unfit to be in charge of this State, and the Executive Council should sit up and take notice of it.
Another little item, but a very significant one, was the answer given to a question I asked on the 26th March as to what steps, if any, had been taken to implement Article 7 of the Treaty of 1921 in respect of annex I.E. and 3. The answer was: "No steps have been taken to implement Article 7 of the Treaty in respect of annex I.E. or 3 thereof." No steps have been taken yet in that connection, and we find aviation in this country in the retrograde position in which it is, the absolute laughing stock of every civilised nation in Europe, the absolute limit in inefficiency on the part of the Department supposed to be in control. No attempt whatsoever has been made since this Treaty of 1921 was signed to clarify the position with regard to the proposed air convention between the British and the Irish Free State Governments. How long is the Minister going to allow that to continue before he wakes up? The people of this State, after nine years, do not know where they stand in relation to that Treaty of 1921. The people of the State are entitled to know where they stand and before any more war-like speeches are made, and before any more propagandist appeals to the people are made, the Minister ought to explain to the people what their future commitments will be. We want to know where we stand in regard to this air convention. We want to know, after nine years, what arrangements will be made whereby the Free State Government will have control over the air. We want to know if that is not possible, why it is not possible? We want to know that before any further attempt is made to delude the people into believing that we are a sovereign and independent State. We have a Treaty signed in 1921 not yet clarified, with portions of it not yet elucidated and with arrangements in it not yet made. Surely, it is time that some action was taken in that connection.
I have gone through this Estimate, and I have attempted to show the Minister that in many respects the Army of this State is sadly lacking. It is either an Army or it is not. It is either intended for serious defensive purposes or it is not. It is either intended for serious offensive purposes or it is not. The sooner we know whether it is or not the better. The sooner the Minister answers this challenge in the statement of the Army officers—that there is no considered policy of national defence—the better, not alone for the people of this State, but also for the people outside this State, for the people in England, for the people in control of British war administration at the present moment, because we find a very serious and very disquieting article, entitled "The Politician's View of the Problem of Defence," in the current issue of "An t-Oglach," the official organ of the Free State Army. Various reasons have been given, and various insinuations have been made, as to the identity of the author of this article. Some have put it down to the Minister for Finance, and some have suggested that it was written by the Minister for Defence. Whoever wrote it, it appears in the quarterly official publication of the National Army, "An t-Oglach," and it was evidently written by somebody responsible. The terms of that article are very serious and disquieting for the people of this State. The article says that "the Army must be prepared in the last resort to fight for their rights, even when a military struggle may in itself be hopeless." That is quite right. I hope that if there is a military struggle of this type and if the Army has to fight for its rights, that the Minister will not succumb, in the face of hopeless military odds, as he did once before. I hope the Minister's mind and the mind of the Executive Council will be made up. I shall quote the next paragraph of this article at length because of its importance:—
"Some people in this country are unable to think of any assailant of the Saorstát other than England. But so long at least as the British Commonwealth holds together, we have no reason whatever to fear an unprovoked British attack. On the other hand, our membership of the Commonwealth, as well as our proximity to Great Britain, ensures that no outside country which is not either already at war with Great Britain or seeking a pretext for war with Great Britain will attack the Saorstát. The position, therefore, is that we shall be faced with a war situation here only if, and when. Great Britain is engaged in a conflict with another State or States—I might even say with a European State or States."
In other words, the only war situation which can be visualised by the writer of this article is a situation in which England would be involved in conflict with a European State or States. The writer goes on to deal with the possibility of war with the United States of America. He rules that out, and says that the only war we need fear is a war between our Eastern neighbour and a European enemy. He proceeds:—
"There are possibilities in the situation on the Continent which most students of international affairs regard as disturbing, and if war broke out between certain European combinations the British might become involved."
In a statement made in recent times, it was laid down that in the event of these islands being attacked, this country would, of course, have to get into the conflict—in other words, if Britain were involved in a war, this country would become involved. The article goes on:—
"If England were at war with a European State, whether singly or in alliance with others, nothing could enable the Saorstát to escape the consequences of the struggle. In that case Ireland might be subject to air raids of a serious kind."
We have an Air Force of 21 planes, 14 of which are effective, and only about 3 of which were efficient for repelling attack. Here, in the official journal of the Army, is absolute confirmation of the statement issued by the Army officers last November, in which they charged that the Minister had no policy of national defence. Here it is definitely stated in an article which is ascribed to the Minister for Defence or to the Minister for Finance, that in the event of Britain being involved in war we could not escape the consequences and might be subject to serious air raids. It is not a question of "might be." It is a definite certainty, and we have nothing to prevent these air raids—absolutely nothing. Then the justification for the Army follows:—
"If we had no Army, or only a very small Army, it is certain that large numbers of British troops of various kinds would be thrown into the Saorstát. Their commander would be the real ruler of this country for the duration of the war, and neither the people not the Government would be able to make any effective stand for national rights. On the other hand, if our Army were sufficient in size, or capable of sufficiently rapid expansion, there would most probably be no influx of British troops at all."
Army or no army it is only a probability that there would be no influx of British troops. Under the Treaty, the British have a right to come in here in time of war or strained relations and to demand facilities. We may be sure that the word "reasonable" is not before that word "facilities." They will get those facilities. The article proceeds:—
"Equipment in addition to any that we should have in stock might have to be provided but, doubtless, the British would be willing to supply it if assured that there was no danger of our using it against them."
Those are significant words. Then he goes on to say:—
"If we had no adequate defence force of our own, the result would in such a juncture be that Ireland would be held and ruled by British forces as if it were part of England and if the continental powers were victorious, they would treat the Saorstát worse than they would treat England."
That article presupposes that we have a defence force here, an efficient defence force, and it takes it for granted that that force is capable of rapid development and extension in any eventuality that might arise. Yet we have no munition factory, and we have to import any supplies we want from Britain. We have not even made any attempt in the engineering line to train our troops in the art of pontoon bridge building. We have not made any attempt to train on a national scale the Army in the art of barbed wire entanglements which can be run up in five minutes. We have not made any attempt to make the air force an effective unit of national defence. We have given no gas training to the soldiers. We have not supplied effective steel helmets in case of war. The article presupposes that we have a national defence force which is efficient. We have not, and the statement issued by the Army officers last November, that the organisation and system upon which it is administered, are so defective that it is doubtful whether it is capable of being made in any circumstances a useful instrument of national defence, is borne out by the experience we have had when looking through the Estimates, the statements made in this article, and the answers of the Minister for Defence to the questions I put to him with regard to the Air Force. It is time we knew where we were in regard to this Estimate. It is time this £1,400,000 to be expended on the creation of an efficient Defence Force was scrapped.
Whether we like it or not, one way or another, if the British desire to utilise this country in time of war they can do so. Since we are co-equal members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, since we proceed with heads up, hands up and all the rest, into the British Empire, why pass this Estimate for £1,400,000 for an Army which is ineffective? It is ineffective, and I challenge the Minister for Defence to deny it. As an instrument of modern warfare this Army is absolutely useless. These officers of the National Army—Seán McEoin, T. Fitzpatrick, T. E. Gay and R. E. McCorley—knew what they were talking about when they issued that statement last November. They were not amateurs. They were not fellows who play around with the question. They had made a study of it and they knew what they were talking about when they stated that the organisation and system on which the National Defence Force was based was ineffective. No reply has been made to that, and no attempt has been made to explain why that statement was made. No attempt was made when introducing the Vote to give any idea of what the Imperial Defence Conference in London decided. Are we not entitled to that? Are the people of this State not entitled to know what they are committed to? Is the Dáil not entitled to know if there is any considered policy of national defence, whether an Air Force with eighteen machines, fourteen of which are effective, is the only instrument we have of national defence under this Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, or whether there is some secret Treaty between the Irish Free State and the British Government with regard to air defence, by which squadrons of British planes will be at our disposal in time of war? The Dáil is entitled to know that and to know what the country is paying for. The men who signed that statement have not withdrawn it, and the Minister has only feebly contradicted it. He has not dealt with the points in extenso as they should be dealt with, and as they deserve to be dealt with.
I think that anyone who reads the statement of the Army officers, who gets a copy of "An t-Óglách," the official publication of the National Army, and who takes it in conjunction with the statement of the Army officers issued last November, cannot help admitting that we will be inevitably involved in any war in which Britain may find herself involved. Our interests are so entwined with British interests at present, that if a worldwide campaign of aggression, led by the British Government, were directed against, for instance, the most likely State to be attacked, namely, the Soviet Union—is there any way in which we could have a guarantee that this State of ours could be saved from the consequences of that action on the part of the British War Department? There is not. We are told that in time of war this State must give reasonable facilities to the British troops and navy. I suggested that since we have ceded our naval and air rights of national defence, we should also cede our ground rights. There were men in this country who defended it long before a regular Army was established, and there will be men who will do it again against any foreign aggression, and who will not need a regular Army to do it.
The Minister will probably gloss over these points, but the people will ask themselves why they are being taxed to maintain an Army which is ineffective, and which, if we are to judge by the contradictory statements of members of the Executive Council, is, on the one hand, not intended to fight anyone, and, on the other hand, is intended to participate in any war in which Britain may find itself involved. It is not a remote possibility that Britain may be involved in a war. In that regard, one of the most significant signs is the reorganisation of the Rumanian fleet and naval bases by a British admiral. Another significant sign is the secret mobilisation order sent to veterinary surgeons all over Great Britain asking, whether in the event of war, they would be prepared for service abroad. Another sign is the secret treaty between Britain and the Little Entente in the East.
Surely the Minister will not say that my statement to the effect that there is a possibility of war between Britain and another State is not based on fact? The Minister, however, as Deputies know, does not keep himself abreast of the times. If there is a possibility of war between Britain and another power the Free State comes into it and has got to bear the consequences. This army journal has stated definitely that in the event of war we may be faced with air raids. I challenge the Minister to deal with the points I have mentioned and to prove, if he can, to the satisfaction of the Dáil that we have an effective fighting unit in the Army at present under his control. I declare that we have not and that he is guilty of culpable neglect in regard to the only effective weapon of modern war which this army could use I declare that he is guilty of neglect in not ensuring that a national policy of defence was embarked on by the State. I state definitely that if this army were the army of any other country and if this statement were made by a group of officers of the responsibility of the officers who signed it, the Minister for Defence would be arraigned for high treason in any State in any corner of the globe.
