I think that where there is a serious or a well-established principle, like the Statute of Limitations, the assumption should be that that principle was not set up without good reason. The assumption should be, so to speak, that it embodies a great deal of practical wisdom. Assume, if you like, viewing the question in an abstract manner, as regards the debt between individual and individual that there is a lot to be said against that particular statute. After all it can be pointed out—the Minister will have no difficulty in pointing it out—that not merely in the relations between the State and individuals, but in the relations between individual creditor and debtor, there are cases where the operation of the Statute of Limitations prevents his getting money that in the ordinary sense was owed to him. It is clear to everybody that there are innumerable cases of that kind, but for a long time past it has been the practice—and that practice, as I say, is embodied in the Statute of Limitations—to recognise the fact that a great deal more damage would be done to the economy of the State and even very often to justice itself, unless some limitation were fixed beyond which debts cannot be claimed for. We must take it for granted that it is not without reason that such an obvious departure from the ordinary strict rules governing the relations of debtor and creditor should have been adopted. I think everybody will admit that it is only right that if a person has a claim against another he should, within a reasonable time, put forward that claim, that if it is possible for an individual to go back beyond a period of five or six years, you may have very often a greater offence against justice, and you certainly will not have that settled frame of mind in business circles which it is desirable to have. It is obvious that that is not the result of mere theoretical thinking, but the practical working of the system of creditor and debtor, of exchange, that has led to the building up of this particular principle and to its adoption.
What do we propose to do to-day?
We propose to scrap that principle, even though there is no fraud whatsoever in the relation between one particular creditor and one particular debtor—the State and the State's debtor. We are going on behalf of the State, which has, it must be confessed, rather considerable powers, and which, as everybody knows, has very great machinery for finding out what is due to it, and for collecting its debts, to scrap this principle, and to leave it untouched as far as the relations between ordinary debtor and creditor are concerned. That is unwise. You can always in the case of any principles that have behind them the practical wisdom of generations put up a case, an individual case, basing on it a demand for the removal of the principle. There is practically no wise principle of administration which would not have a fatal ending if that type of reasoning were applied to it. Naturally, if you have a principle such as the Statute of Limitations applied to State debts, it is inevitable that there will be cases in which the State will lose, but what the House has to consider is whether the sum that you will get by revoking the Statute of Limitations, in practice, as you are doing—there is no question of fraud— is not a dear price to pay for your violation of the principle. By doing that you create a general feeling of insecurity. I leave out of account the other aspect of the matter which was raised by Deputy Costello in his speech in connection with the Budget statement, the impracticability, for most people, of going back and getting satisfactory evidence for a number of years. There is the fact also that if they do establish their claim against the Revenue Commissioners it will be as a result of an extremely costly operation for which they cannot get reimbursement from the Revenue Commissioners. Very often it will be cheaper for individuals to pay down what is asked rather than defend themselves. The only reason that, very often, will induce them to defend themselves is the feeling that if they do not do so they may be assessed in the following year for a much bigger sum.
They are, therefore, in this extraordinary dilemma, that if they defend themselves and make a good case it may be dropped by the Revenue Commissioners, and, as Deputy Costello pointed out, they will then get no reimbursement for the immense cost that they have been put to in connection with an entirely unsustainable claim, or else if they do pay up they may feel that by doing so the Revenue Commissioners may say in the following year: "This man paid up rather easily last year, so that we must have assessed him at too low a figure; we will try him with a higher demand this time." Is that situation not likely to give rise to a feeling of insecurity? We have had occasion to protest against many measures of the Government as being liable to increase that feeling of insecurity. This is one of many examples. I admit that from the Treasury point of view there is an immediate gain of about £50,000. That, I think, was the figure given by the Minister for Finance. There is that immediate gain also in the case of the private individual who has a debt against another. In the case of property that he has allowed to pass into the hands of the other, it would be a great advantage to him if he were allowed to claim beyond the six years at present permitted by the law. But, as I have said, the apparent wisdom of generations has frowned upon that sort of claim. So far as property is concerned, the State, which regulates the details of these matters, has put its machinery at the disposal of an individual to collect debts that are a certain number of years out of date, but the State for a long time has determined that it is not in the interests of the State or in the interests of the community, or even in the interests of justice, that an individual should be permitted to sue after the lapse of a certain number of years. Now, what is not allowed to the individual is apparently to be allowed to the State, as if the State had not a much more powerful machine at its disposal than the individual.
That is one side of the case. The other side of the case has been put by Deputy Costello—I do not intend to enlarge upon it—namely, that there is no corresponding right given to the individual. Even if he had that right, I doubt whether, as the law stands at present, it would be worth his while trying to get anything back against the powerful machinery of the Revenue Department. Let it be recognised that the individual is pretty helpless at present against that Governmental machine. He is now going to be made still more helpless because of the extreme difficulty of giving evidence in regard to matters that go back over a long number of years. After he has gone to a lot of trouble and expense, the Revenue Commissioners may drop their claim, but they will make no return to him for his out-of-pocket expenses. Under this proposal there will be an immediate gain to the Revenue, but it is a gain that I suggest is very dearly bought by upsetting an established principle.
