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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Thursday, 21 Jun 1945

Vol. 97 No. 13

Committee on Finance. - Vote 63—Army.

I move:—

That a sum not exceeding £5,467,047 be granted to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1946, for the Army and the Army Reserve (including certain Grants-in-Aid) under the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts, and for certain administrative Expenses in connection therewith; for the Expenses of the Office of the Minister for the Coordination of Defensive Measures; for Expenses in connection with the trial and detention of certain persons (No. 28 of 1939, No. 1 of 1940 and No. 16 of 1940, etc.); for certain Expenses under the Offences against the State Acts, 1939 and 1940 (No. 13 of 1939 and No. 2 of 1940) and the Air-raid Precautions Act, 1939 (No. 21 of 1939); for Reserve Medical Supplies for Civilian Hospitals; for certain Expenses of the Local Defence Force (including Grants-in-Aid) (No 28 of 1939); for Expenses in connection with the issue of Medals commemorating the 1916 Rising, etc.; for certain Expenses in connection with Blood Transfusion; for a Grant to the Irish Red Cross Society; and for Expenses in connection with the Production of certain Chemicals for Sale.

When last November the Estimate for the Army Vote for the financial year 1945-46 was being prepared, it did not seem unlikely that the emergency, so far as the Army was concerned, would last another year, and, accordingly, the Estimate was compiled and printed in the form with which Deputies have become familiar for the past four years. All the expenditure and receipts were shown under two broad sub-heads without any attempt to give details. The debit or expense sub-head for £8,411,942 provided for:— (1) An Army strength based on war establishments; (2) Pay, stores, supplies and equipment for such a force; (3) Grants, stores, supplies and equipment for the L.D.F.; (4) Stores and equipment with grants to local authorities for the A.R.P. service; (5) The expenses incurred in connection with the censorship.

Now, however, with the cessation of hostilities in Europe, it has been decided to recast the Estimate, to show expenditure under the normal pre-emergency subheads of the Army Vote, and, accordingly, a revised Estimate within the original gross total of £8,411,942 has been presented to the House.

The main basis of the revised Estimate is the average strength of the Army over the financial year 1945-46. That basis is not any particular establishment, but rather the average number of all ranks which will have to be paid and maintained during the year. Starting with the actual strength of the Army on 1st April, 1945, the Estimate proceeds on the basis of a gradual reduction in Army strengths until the figure of 12,500 is reached at the end of March, 1946. This gives an average of 22,249 all ranks over the year, consisting of:—

1,963

Officers and Chaplains

5,315

Non-Commissioned Officers

14,971

Privates

———

22,249

———

To this number must, however, be added:—

Construction Corps

1,770 All Ranks

Nurses

157

Cadets

30

–——

1,957

making a total average strength of 24,206 All Ranks, Grades and Services.

The primary charge on the Army Vote is the pay and maintenance of that force of 24,206, and that charge, distributed as it is over several sub-heads, amounts to the sum of £5,135,510, or 61.05 per cent. of the total Vote. Here are some of the details:—

Pay (Subheads A, D, E, P.2, S.2, W, X3)

£2,894,807

Allowances and Services in Cash (Subheads B, G, H, K, M)

£1,301,411

Other Services in Kind (Subheads I, K, M, X2, X3)

£939,292

Total

£5,135,510

In addition to military personnel proper, the Department employs quite a large body of civilians. Some of these are civil servants, permanent and temporary, employed at Headquarters and in the Commands, others are various types of tradesmen engaged on maintenance and other work, while still others are civilians attached to Units for various purposes. In all, the Department controls about 2,300 civilians and their salaries, wages, and allowances amount to the sum of £514,132 or 6.10 per cent. of the Vote.

The next charge on the Vote in order of importance is that for Stores. Stores held by the Army are of two distinct types according to whether they are primarily intended for warlike purposes, or are of an ordinary nature. Ordinary stores, for instance, include medicines, drugs, instruments, mechanical transport, petrol, oils, cooking equipment and engineer stores, barrack services, etc. The cost of such ordinary stores borne on this Vote is £580,505 or 6.9 per cent. of the total Vote.

Expenditure on warlike stores at £133,040 absorbs only 1.58 per cent. of the present Estimate. The reason for this is that owing to the end of the war in Europe, it has been deemed advisable to cancel large indents for warlike stores, and to await new developments in such stores. Much of the money, therefore, provided for warlike stores in the original Estimate has been transferred in the revised Estimate to meet commitments in regard to gratuities. The amount of £133,040 will be found under Subheads O, P, P.2, Q, and X.3.

Incidental expenses and miscellaneous minor services borne on the Army Vote are many and varied. The expenses proper to the Army consist of such items as the maintenance and hire of land, compensation in cases of motor accidents, contributions to welfare funds to provide better dining amenities for soldiers; telegrams, telephones, advertisements and funeral expenses, etc. These may be said to be proper to the Army and to be incidental to its normal activities. But, in addition to these expenses, there are a number of miscellaneous services borne by the Vote which are not directly attributable to the Army normally. These services include assistance to Civil Aviation, the expenses of the National Blood Transfusion Council, and a grant-in-aid to the Irish Red Cross Society to cover a percentage of the cost of freight of certain medical stores donated by the American Red Cross Society. The total cost of the incidental expenses and the minor miscellaneous services is £122,875 or 1.46 per cent. of the Vote. The incidental expenses proper may be said to cost £94,858 and the miscellaneous minor services £28,017.

So far I have dealt with the Army proper, and there now remains the Army Reserve, the Local Defence Force and the Air Raid Precautions Service. As regards the Reserve—that is, Class A and B and the Volunteer Force Reserve— we are only allowing in the present Estimate for the payment of the normal annual grants to those officers and men who have already been transferred to the Reserve or who may be transferred thereto during the year. The amount involved is £12,310. Provision is also made in the Estimate for the maintenance of the Local Defence Force at a cost of £256,435 or 3.05 per cent. of the Vote. The provision includes Grants-in-Aid to unit funds at £83,000; subsistence and training allowances at £142,735; and other expenses at £30,700. Here it is to be noted that the form which both the Reserve and the Local Defence Force will take in the post-emergency period is still undecided but is under active consideration.

As Deputies are already aware, it has been decided to retain the Air Raid Precautions Service, and the cost of the service in the present year is £93,885. The most of this sum, actually about £50,000, represents outstanding liabilities in respect of grants to local authorities, essential undertakers, factory owners, etc., and another £25,000 will be absorbed in the removal of shelters. This brings me to the last item, the Emergency Gratuities and Re-enlistment Bounties provided for under the new Sub-head A. (4). The three problems at present confronting the Army, the strength of the post-emergency Army, the process of demobilisation, and the resettlement of discharged officers and men, are dealt with in the White Paper, so that it only remains for me to indicate their general outlines.

The problem of the post-emergency Regular Army has been given the most intensive study by the General Staff, and though details have yet to be hammered out, the general plan of an army at least in the immediate future of about two and a half times the size of the pre-emergency Army has been approved. To reduce the Army more at this stage would not, it is considered, be wise national policy. Now many of the long-service permanent officers are due for retirement on one ground or another at the end of the emergency so that it is estimated that there will have to be recruited about 600 officers to complete the provisional post-emergency establishment. As regards other ranks, the position is similar. About 2,000 are due for discharge or transfer to the Reserve and it is estimated that it will be necessary to recruit about 6,000 other ranks to complete the provisional establishments.

A large number of patriotic young men came forward during the emergency to fill the gaps in our ranks. We are hoping that a selected number of these young soldiers will be induced to take up the Army as a career. The selection will be made according to prescribed standards of age, height, and physical fitness with, in the case of officers, an interview by a board of military officers. To the other ranks thus selected, we shall offer the following inducements to remain in the Army:—(1) Payment of the appropriate emergency gratuities; (2) pre-demobilisation leave with pay and allowances according to length of service; (3) special re-enlistment leave with pay and allowances and free travelling warrants; (4) special re-enlistment bounties varying, according to rank, from £10 in the case of a private, to £18 in that of a sergeant-major; (5) re-enlistment as far as possible in existing rank, temporary ranks being made substantive; (6) service during the emergency to count for any pension or gratuity payable under the Defence Forces (Pensions) Schemes.

To the officers selected as suitable, we are offering: (1) Confirmation, if possible, in existing ranks, or if not possible, in a lower rank but at the highest scale of pay appropriate to that rank. (2) Service during the emergency to count for pension under the Defence Forces (Pensions) Schemes.

I suggest that these inducements are generous, and it is hoped they will have the desired effect of attracting suitable men to take up the Army as a definite occupation. As soon as the regulations dealing with the recruitment of officers and other ranks for the post-emergency Army have been promulgated, the applications for commissions or re-enlistment will be dealt with immediately. This will take some little time, after which the process of demobilising the remainder—about 20,000 all ranks—will commence. This process will be carried out in stages and by categories. It is not intended that the rate of demobilisation should exceed an average of about 2,000 a month, so that, allowing for the recruitment for the regular Army, the whole process will be extended over a period of 13 or 14 months. There is, therefore, no intention whatsoever of throwing a large body of men at any one time on the labour market. Moreover, the demobilisation will be effected by priorities, as follows:—

1. Men with employment or desiring to resume their studies will be the first to be released.

2. Men who desire to be released from Army service, whether they have or have not employment, will be released in a second class.

3. Single men who, having completed their engagements, are eligible for pensions, will constitute a third class.

4. Married men similarly circumstanced will form a fourth class.

5. Men willing to serve but unsuitable for retention in the Army will be the last to be demobilised.

The demobilisation of the third, fourth and fifth categories will be the subject of constant discussions with the Department of Industry and Commerce and, during the first year of demobilisation, no soldier will be forced to take his discharge unless he is unsuitable for retention or that no vacancy exists for him in the establishment.

This brings us to the third problem —what plans have been made for the resettlement in civilian life of men who desire to leave the Army or who, eventually, will be found to be surplus to requirements? The plans may be summarised thus:—

1. The payments of gratuities to all persons with, at least, one year's service during the emergency.

2. The granting of special marks for Army service and of concessions regarding age limits to members of the forces who qualify as candidates for professional, technical or similar posts in the Civil Service or in the employment of local authorities.

3. Special limited examinations for posts in the Civil Service as junior executive or clerical officers.

In addition to the gratuity to which an officer or a soldier may be entitled, he will be also entitled to pre-demobilisation leave, with full pay and allowances. If he has served between one and a half and two and a half years he will get 14 days' leave and 21 days if his service is two and a half years or more. Gratuity coupled with pre-demobilisation leave, therefore, means in effect that if a man has served the 72 periods, he will have nearly eight months on pay and allowances to make up his mind about the future and to see what he will be able to do. Moreover, we are taking special precautions to see that the gratuity given is spent to the best advantage. The gratuity will not be paid direct but, in the case of soldiers, will be lodged to their credit in a post office deposit account and, in the case of officers, either to a private bank account or to a post office account. Again, in regard to soldiers, that portion of the gratuity which is made up of marriage allowance will be paid not to the soldier but to the soldier's wife, and it will be paid in weekly instalments, equalling the old marriage allowance, until that portion of the gratuity has been exhausted. We are taking these precautions in the interests of the soldiers and not for administrative or any other convenience. We know too well that many soldiers would not prepare for the proverbial rainy day if the money were given direct into their hands and we are, therefore, adopting these special precautions to protect the soldiers and their families.

The second plan for re-settlement consists in the granting of concessions to discharged personnel who qualify as candidates for professional, technical or similar posts in the Civil Service or with local authorities. Subject to certain over-riding maxima, such qualified candidates will be credited with extra marks for each year of service and, in respect of age, again subject to certain over-riding maxima, such candidates will be allowed to deduct from their age their period of aggregate Army service during the emergency up to a limit of six years. These concessions will secure that candidates for professional, technical or similar posts in the Civil Service or with local authorities will not, in relation to their civilian colleagues, be at a disadvantage when competing with them for public appointments.

The second plan, obviously, only concerns those men who leave the Army with professional or technical qualifications, such as engineers and doctors, but the third relates to those young men who responded to the Government's call and went direct from school into the Army. Many of these patriotic young men went straight into the Army after obtaining the intermediate, leaving or primary certificates. It is for these mainly that the third plan of limited examinations for posts as junior executive and clerical officers in the Civil Service has been designed. That, however, does not mean that such certificates will be a necessary condition for such candidates, because the examinations will be open to all ex-officers and soldiers, and the candidates best qualified will receive the posts. The number of such limited competitions to be held will, naturally, depend on post-emergency conditions, including the rate of demobilisation, but the age limits will be fixed so as to give full opportunity to compete to ex-members of the forces.

The plans just described will, it must be admitted, create employment for only a small fraction of those to be demobilised and, consequently, a very large proportion will have to seek a livelihood in the ordinary industrial and commercial markets. The Government, in its plans, has shown its goodwill to the men who have served their country so faithfully and so well, and it will, of course, do all in its power by its post-emergency plans to stimulate a demand for labour.

The Government's good will is manifest and it is now for the trade unions and employers to show it in the same way. Take, for instance, the case of men who have been receiving additional pay in the Army in respect of qualifications as tradesmen. This pay is not granted unless the men have passed various trade tests. Many of those to be demobilised have acquired their proficiency from training under skilled craftsmen, developed by special technical courses, and, as a result, they have become fully qualified tradesmen, no less skilled than many an apprentice trained wholly in civil life. These men, on demobilisation, will not be able to follow their occupations unless they are admitted as members of the appropriate union, and I would, therefore, most earnestly appeal to the unions to give sympathetic, practical consideration to the claims on behalf of those men which have already been put forward by the Department of Industry and Commerce. The unions may fear that the admission of such men may tend to lower the standard of qualification for membership but I am assured that their training has been so intensive that there is little fear of any such a thing happening. Already, at least one union has agreed to admit these men, and I trust the good example will be gradually followed.

This brings me to the function of employers in helping demobilised men to resettle in civilian life, and, first, to the position of men who left their employment to answer their country's call. Under the Defence Forces Acts, such men are, so far as is reasonably practicable, entitled to their former employment on demobilisation, and I want employers to interpret the phrase "reasonably practicable" in the widest possible manner so as not to leave men out of work one hour more than is necessary. These will on demobilisation be fully instructed as to their rights of reinstatement. I shall not, however, as Minister for Defence, hesitate to intervene as a matter of public policy in any case where there exists what is considered to be a definite injustice done to the ex-soldier. But I do not want to rely on statutory rights. I want matters put on a higher plane. Those men have deserved well of their country, and I want employers to show their appreciation of that fact by regarding it as a public as well as a statutory duty to do all in their power to reinstate their former employees in the occupations they left in order to respond to the nation's call. I have had a number of favourable replies to the letter that I personally addressed to employers throughout the country.

But there will be still a residue—a residue of men who have no professional, technical or trades qualifications —of men who will not be absorbed by the civil service or by local authorities —of men who have no former employment to go back to—of men who are ineligible for or unwilling to be retained in Army Service. Their re-settlement in civil life is a special problem in itself. It is the same problem as that of young men leaving school with high hopes and willing hands but without any definite prospect of employment. Their absorption in gainful employment is dependent on economic conditions over which we have little control. As far as we have that control the Government will use it to the fullest by creating conditions which will stimulate the demand for labour. In so far as those demands exist or will be created, I appeal to employers to give preference to the men who have served in the Forces. It is their duty to do so because as a nation we are indebted to those men, and it is to their benefit to do so because their fitness, training, discipline, and adaptability should prove an asset to any employer.

If employers want—as I hope they will want—ex-members of the Forces, then my own Department and that of the Minister for Industry and Commerce will co-operate to the fullest extent in making available particulars of such men to employers and in getting the men required into contact with them. In order to give such men every chance to tide over any period of unemployment we are taking steps to provide that all demobilised N.C.O.s and men will be credited with a contribution under the Unemployment Insurance Acts in respect of each week or portion of a week of full time service during the emergency. We are doing this although in the normal course soldiers are not credited with Unemployment Insurance during their service.

As far as the present Estimate is concerned, it provides £700,000 for deferred pay, £1,488,250 for gratuities and £75,000 for re-enlistment bounties. It is estimated that the total cost of the resettlement plans will be about £4,000,000—gratuities absorbing about £2,500,000, deferred credits £800,000 and unemployment benefit £270,000. I suggest that this provision is as generous as can be made within the narrow limits of the State's financial resources.

I have already said that the post-emergency regular Army will be about two and a half times the size of the pre-emergency Army. That figure does not, of course, include reserves. The old reserves on which we depended to reinforce the regular Army and to serve with that Army as a nucleus for the expansion of the force in a period of emergency were the reserve of officers, class A and B, and Volunteer reserve. With this reserve we are confronted with much the same problem as in the case of the permanent force. Many of the reserve are due for retirement or are unwilling to extend their existing engagements so that some inducements must be offered to stimulate recruitment. This problem is the subject of anxious consideration, but final decisions have not yet been reached. As soon as they have been reached, the terms will be promulgated and this will be done simultaneously with the publication of the terms for the regular Army. Intimately bound up with the question of the reserve is the future of that magnificent patriotic body of men in the Local Defence Force. We have decided not to disband this force but to retain it on a territorial basis as a second-line reserve of the Army. For that purpose the force will be reorganised, but until that is done, I appeal to all officers and men of the force to carry on and not to lose interest in their work.

As regards the Air-Raid Precautions service, it has been decided to retain the service in a modified form, but that form has not yet been determined. Meanwhile, there has been a gradual release from training and the more onerous duties of the service. Arrangements are also being made with local authorities to remove cowls from street lights and the surface raid shelters from streets.

To sum up, therefore, the present gross Estimate for £8,411,942 is made up as follows:—

Pay and Maintenance of the Army

£5,135,510 or 61.05%

of the Vote.

Pay of Civilians

514,132 or 6.10%

,, ,, ,,

Reservists' Grants

12,310 or 0.15%

,, ,, ,,

Ordinary Stores

580,505 or 6.90%

,, ,, ,,

Warlike Stores

133,040 or 1.58%

,, ,, ,,

Incidental and Minor Services

122,875 or 1.46%

,, ,, ,,

Gratuities

1,488,250 or 17.70%

,, ,, ,,

Re-Enlistment Bounties

75,000 or 0.89%

,, ,, ,,

Local Defence Force

256,435 or 3.05%

,, ,, ,,

Air Raid Precautions Service

93,885 or 1.12%

,, ,, ,,

That makes a total of

£8,411,942

During the past four years, on the occasion of presenting the annual Estimate, I have reported to this House on the discipline, training, fitness and morale of the Army and of the other Emergency Services covered by the Army Vote. I have dealt with other matters on this occasion because of their immediate relevancy, but I should say that the forces have continued to live up to the high standards set before them, and have fully maintained the traditions of the past. Now it only remains for me, as Minister for Defence, to express the Government's and the country's gratitude to all the forces and services which have helped us through this emergency. The sacrifices and steadfastness of the men comprising these forces and services have been all that any country could desire, and the country as a whole owes a deep debt of gratitude to them.

I move:—

That the Estimate be referred back for reconsideration.

Listening to the Minister for Defence reading out that statement of details of Army expenditure I felt like a person living in an entirely unreal world, in a world where people play about with words in order to distract attention from awkward facts. I felt I was listening to a person who had not made up his mind whether he was preparing for peace or for war, a person who had been playing the game of war so long under peace conditions that he did not know what kind of a world might be before him to-morrow.

But in the course of that statement there was one declaration of policy slipped in of an immensely serious kind to the people of this country, to the soldiers themselves and to the taxpayers. Without any reason advanced, without any facts being given, without any arguments being framed, we were told, in a happy-go-lucky, casual manner, that the strength of the post-war Army in this country would be 2½ times the strength of the pre-war Army. And why?—No why given. What is the reason?—No reason given. Either there is or there is not a reason. If there is a reason for increasing the strength of the Army in times to come to 2½ times the pre-war strength, there should be some reason advanced. Does the Minister imagine that we are all such feckless, irresponsible representatives of the people that, happy-go-lucky, when the bell rings, and bang goes the money, we will not even ask where or the reason why?

The Minister was spoiled by the fact that for five years, on account of war conditions near our shores, he was never asked a question about the Army; he got what he wanted; he was not asked the reason why. But, when the Minister makes a pronouncement of that kind with regard to the future, we are entitled to expect some responsible outlook in a man holding Ministerial position. It is certainly definite indication of irresponsibility to come along with such a statement and to advance no reason. As far as that thin end of the wedge on future policy has slipped into an Estimate covering a period which ends on the 31st March next, I want to challenge it and I say that the Minister is unreasonable to the House and that the House would be unreasonable with the people outside if they were to subscribe to such a declaration of policy without thrashing it out properly and without getting somebody to come and give a reason why our military expenditure post-war should be considerably more than two and a half times that of pre-war.

There are other things in the Minister's statement that are advanced in just the same glib manner, without any explanation, any reason, or any justification for asking for the money, in so far as it refers to the future. The Minister tells us that air-raid precaution services, and the couple of hundred thousand pounds per annum that that represents, are to remain post-war —post-war, when there is not a military bomber or plane flying in the whole civilised world. Does the Minister think that the people of this country, the people living down the lanes, who are paying for all this kind of thing in their tea, their bread, their sugar and butter, get money so easily that they can chuck it away without knowing why, that they can spend money without any reason being advanced as to why it is spent?

Is it not about time that the Minister realised that the function of a Minister for Defence or Minister for War in any country in introducing an Estimate is not just to read out how he proposes to spend money? Any Tom, Dick or Harry off the streets could walk in and read out how it is proposed that the money should be expended. It is a Minister's function to give the reason why it is to be expended. One would expect from the Minister for Defence, facing a post-war situation, that we would get some little hint or some little outline as to what is our post-war military policy or defence policy. Spending money is not a policy. Spending money without stating the reason why is not a defence policy. The Minister knows as well as I do that we are an island people and that if we are to have any kind of defence policy in the future it has got to be based on defence of the seas around us, defence of the skies over our head and of the land under our feet. If we were really approaching this matter seriously and learning any lesson from the past, learning any lesson from the tragedies elsewhere, we would realise that unless even the most powerful army in the world, if it is standing on an island, is well protected both on sky and sea, it would be as well if it never existed.

The whole question of approaching our future defences in a realistic way will have to be undertaken some fine day by some Minister who will face up to the facts bravely and put the situation clearly to Parliament and ask for the approval of Parliament. This is a happy-go-lucky clerical style of presenting the Estimate, saying what is wanted without saying why, merely presenting a bill, ringing a bell and saying, "pay that". Those days should be gone. It may be just a shade too early to face up to an open discussion on the whole question of the adequate future defence of this three-quarters of an island, but the Minister or, if not the Minister, certainly his staff, know that the defence of three-quarters of an island by a land force alone is too fantastically absurd to be considered by reasonable people in the year 1945.

If the Minister, instead of having a land force, as he says he hopes to have post-war, 2½ times the size of our pre-war land force, were saying: "We will have a smaller land force than we had pre-war, but the extra money that a force 2½ times that size would cost will be devoted to developing some sort of naval protection or some kind of aerial smokescreen protection", then he would be beginning to approach things in a realistic manner instead of in a thoroughly casual and irresponsible manner. In my opinion, it is possibly a little bit too early to go into all that, but it is also a little bit too early to attempt to commit either the Dáil or the country to a post-war Army 2½ times the size of our pre-war Army. If the Minister can project his mind backwards into normal times of peace, and even is courageous enough to hope that such times will come again, then he will see how nonsensical it is to talk of a land Army 2½ times as great as we had some years ago. Does the Minister remember a few years ago, in normal times of peace, when there was an Army in this country costing only a fraction of what it cost, say, in 1937, and we had Deputy de Valera, as he was then, and Deputy Traynor, as he was then, sitting here, and every one of them shaking the roof off this building by thundering against the cost of that Army in times of peace, and the cruelty to the taxpayers of having to keep an Army of that size and cost with the whole world at peace?

Does he remember that? Can he project his mind back so far? Can he visualise the possibility of what he calls the post-war world being a world where we will not be vying with one another in marching and counter-marching, rivalling one another by the magnificence of our expenditure on arms and armaments and warlike stores; where we will begin to think of the two-legged human beings who live in the back streets and the back lanes and the remote rural parts of the country, and begin to think how much we can save on armaments and warlike stores towards making their lives even barely livable? If, in the post-war situation, there is a good case and a sound reason for a vastly increased Army as against our requirements before the war, then I suggest that we wait until that time comes, and then we will listen to arguments, if not from the present Minister, from some Minister who is prepared to make a case for doubling and more than doubling the expenditure on arms, armaments and armies. But I would ask the Minister not to presume that, by shoving a remark in like that when he is reading a litany of the proposed expenditure for the next nine months, it is going to be taken as the accepted policy of this Parliament or of this country.

The Minister went to great lengths to read out the contents of this White Paper which deals with demobilisation and all the rest. I wonder are we ever going to get any consistency between the statements and the policies preached by any two Ministers of that Government in the same month. Quite obviously; from this demobilisation White paper and the statement just read out by the Minister, we are proceeding to demobilise, to reduce the strength of our Army, to reduce our purchases, to cancel our contracts. Of course, the only justification for reducing the Army, for cancelling our contracts for warlike stores, etc., is that the danger is past or passing. But when a few votes were wanted for a political purpose a week or two ago we had another Minister of that Government trying to play bogeyman on the public once again; trying to play on their nerves, to stampede the nervous woman, and, by that kind of thunderous nonsense of which he is a master, to proclaim to his audience and to the people generally that real physical danger was there for us if we showed any lack of confidence in the Government. If there are around us the real physical dangers that that Minister portrayed, then it is simply criminal to talk about demobilising our Army or cancelling our contracts for warlike stores. I leave it between the two of them to decide which of them is uttering the truth and which of them is uttering noisy nonsense; which of them is trying to play honest and which is playing the rogue. But both of them cannot be honest with the people; either one or the other is playing the rogue. The Minister can decide which, in collaboration with his colleague. But let us take those demobilisation plans as being seriously intended. This White Paper deals with financial grants and devotes certain pages to wordy references to the re-settlement of soldiers in civilian life. As far as the financial grants go they are generous, but it is the easiest thing in the world to be generous with other people's money. It is the easiest thing in the world to throw money around if you have control of enough of it, but I should like to see some evidence in that White Paper of serious consideration of the re-settlement of the ex-soldier in employment.

I read that paper. I studied it. I was an Army officer. I saw men walking out of barracks. I met a soldier I knew, with his wife and children, leaving Portobello in civilian clothes, and I asked him where he was going. He said: "Sir, when I come to the tram-track it does not matter to me whether I turn right or left." He was a homeless man. He had nowhere to go. Whatever gratuity he had in his trouser pockets was going to be salted off him in paying for board and lodgings for his wife and family. He had previously been in Army quarters. Seeing a period of demobilisation coming many months ago I asked the Minister what he was doing with regard to finding houses or homes for those men when they leave barracks. I got the reply: "That is a matter for the local boards." The Minister knows this much, if he is grown up at all, that the absentee can never get consideration from local boards. If the Minister gets in touch with his colleague in Local Government he will find that the allocation of houses is a strictly mathematical process. You cannot allow sentiment or anything else to enter into it. I know that myself, because I am the officer who deals with it in one county. The houses are allocated strictly on the conditions under which the applicant who is in If you have an applicant who is in Army quarters in Portobello or at the Curragh and you have another applicant living in a condemned house or a very poor house in the locality, do you think any Army medical officer will condemn the Army quarters and say that the official quarters in our Army are unfit for human habitation? Except that is done, where or how is the soldier to get a house under present regulations? Did the Minister, before giving that reply to me, discuss the matter with the Minister for Local Government? If he does, he will learn within one minute that the chance or prospect of any Army man getting a house for his family is hopeless until he comes out of the Army and lives in a condemned house, in some lean-to mud cabin against a ditch and, when he is two years a resident, applies for a cottage.

That was also so with army men. The British army spent their funds building houses all over this country for ex-service men. You have the Soldiers' and Sailors' Trust buildings. A foreign army here in Ireland spent its money so that the demobilised sailors and soldiers got residences. Even though it was a foreign army under a foreign Parliament, you had not the Minister getting up in Westminster and cold-bloodedly and casually saying that it was a matter for the local boards. You had him facing up to the responsibility and to the facts; you had him facing up to his colleague the Minister for Local Government, learning the position and realising that, if homes were to be found for demobilised soldiers, then homes had to be built for them. That is so far as the housing side goes.

So far as the resettlement side goes, that document there is a sham. Leaving out the money part of it, what are you doing? You are giving a preference mark for service; competitive examinations for local official vacancies, for the Civil Service and for the Gárda. What does that preference mark amount to? A man, we will say, left school five years ago and did five years' soldiering. His brother left school five years ago and did five years' grinding. What use is your preference mark if there is any honesty in the examiners? You know very well that you could not give sufficient preference. If you were serious about that, you would have reserved so many vacancies and walked them right into them— not have a sham competitive examination, a make-believe that you were doing something for these people for whom you are really doing nothing. Whatever you did, there is a sentence in this document which took it all back. This says, after dealing with preference marks: "The existing practice of granting an over-riding preference for a competent knowledge of Irish will, however, not be disturbed."

At the risk of being accused once again of being anti-Irish, as the father of five children, four of whom wear the Fáinne, I say that as long as you keep that clause there you are not giving a fair crack of the whip to the soldier who served for the last five years, and has forgotten any Irish he had. If there are two men of the same age, one of whom joined the Gaelic League five years ago and the other joined the Gaelic Army five years ago, which of them will get any job that is going, as long as that overriding preference for the man with a competent knowledge of Irish is there in a regulation? If we are to look after the future of our Army men about to be demobilised, we should face up to the matter realistically and not be twiddling about with words. This document should be framed in the interests of doing the best we can for the ex-soldier, whether he speaks Irish or French or Yiddish. If you are going to give it with one hand and take it away with the other, the whole thing is a sham. Outside this bit of preference that you give with one hand and take back with the next, what are you doing? Are you facing up to anything in a courageous way?

In the past, when an Army had to be demobilised in this country, the Minister for Defence stood up seriously to his responsibility towards the soldier about to be demobilised so far as employment went. In conjunction with his colleagues in the Executive Council, he laid it down that, if there was any employment in any works subsidised or even partially subsidised out of public funds, a certain percentage—I think it was one-third—of the men employed would have to come from ex-Army men. That one regulation was worth everything that is in this White Paper. But probably it would be unpopular. There will probably be 20 non-Army men up for a job against one Army man—20 votes to 1. It would be doing the right thing by the ex-Army men, but it would not be universally unpopular.

That is the precedent that is in the Minister's Department. Surely some word of explanation is required when you are facing up to the prospect of demobilising a big Army and resettling men in civilian life; some word of explanation is due to the Dáil and to the soldier as to why that precedent is entirely forgotten. Is the ex-Army man just to take his place at the back of the queue, lining up at the labour exchange, sleeping in the open, eating very little, and hoping for the best, or are all these pious sentiments which are expressed by the Minister to be incorporated in regulations? Is Government money to be spent on public works without any proviso that even 1 per cent. of the men employed must be taken from ex-Army men? Are all these pious phrases just going to end up as so many phrases; nothing material going to come out of them? Just as the Minister will not, or did not, face up to formulating any policy, giving any reason why the Army should be big or small, in the same way he side-stepped facing up in any really worthy manner to making provision for the soldier after his discharge, either as regards housing or employment or anything else, beyond just sticking so much money in the Post Office, as if the Post Office was a kind of fire-proof safe that could not be opened by the soldier.

It would save a lot of time and expense to give the money straight to the soldier. If he cannot be relied on to handle money, it is no precaution to put it into the Post Office or into a bank account for him. If it is put into the bank, he can write a cheque for it and is entitled to get the whole lot from the bank. It is only playing about with a rather serious subject. There is a question of the advisability in every case of handing out an abnormal and unusually large sum of money, certainly very much larger than the individual in question ever handled or was given in his life. It might be better, in certain cases, if there were some really serious work done for the welfare of the soldier after he leaves the Army, if a scheme had been worked out ot give him so much money in cash and back him for so much money in any business or industry or purchase he was inclined to make which would be a help to him in his future.

I move to report progress.

Progress reported; Committee to sit again to-morrow.
The Dáil adjourned at 9 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. on Friday, 22nd June.
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