I think that an application would have to go in at some stage. There may be a question of an invitation. The main question about the existing League of Nations, for which we are asking the House to vote money is this, that the League is obviously coming to an end. We have persisted to the end in the League of Nations. By reason of that we have a share of the final expenses to pay, and that is the purpose for which this money is intended. There will probably be a meeting to dispose of the property and so on of the League, possibly to hand it over to the new organisation, and to dissolve the organisation of the League as such.
Deputy MacEoin seemed to think that it was my duty on this occasion to go over the whole ground of the history of the League, to point out the good things it had done and possibly the faults which made it finally an ineffective instrument for the maintenance of world peace. The trouble there is in getting an organisation of that kind to work is clear to everybody. It is all right when it is only a question of small nations, but the moment the big nations are involved, if they become aggressors and do not obey the law, then, of course, it requires tremendous force to bring them to heel, to bring them to book. But, as an organisation primarily intended to maintain peace, the decision to use it as an instrument of war, as it has to be used for the enforcement of peace, is one which prevents much enthusiasm on the part of member States. When Japan, as a great Power, attacked China in violation of the Covenant of the League, war would have had to be made on Japan to undo that aggression. At least so it appeared to the great Powers, but at the time the great Powers were not willing to undertake the obligations. A combination of the small States would have been helpless in the matter. It would have required overwhelming force, applied definitely at the point, to save China and to prevent the aggression of Japan.
It was, I think, when I was President of the Council, that that happened, and in it I certainly saw the end of the League. It was quite clear that when one great Power could do that, another great Power, when it was going to be tempted, would feel that the League would be equally ineffective. That happened, in my opinion, in the case of Abyssinia. Then, of course, confidence in the League had practically disappeared among the various members. The League was beginning gradually to shape itself into an alliance of certain Powers against others. At that point we indicated very clearly what our attitude was going to be, that we were not going to be parties to action by the League when it was developing in that particular way. That is the primary difficulty: to prevent aggression by a great Power means a great war, and you have, so to speak, in order to avoid war, to enter upon war.
There is no use in a League of Nations until all who are in the League make up their minds that they will combine and actually go to war to maintain the principles of the League. It is no inconsistency for the League to go to war on an occasion like that. It is a very different type of war from war between, say, an aggressor State and a State that is simply defending itself. It is what I would call a police war. Steps would have to be taken in advance, of course, to minimise the size of that war. That is the other matter which presents very great difficulty. How are you going to get a situation in which the League will have sufficient force at its command immediately, practically to overwhelm any one of the member States that attempts to break the law? We maintain the ordinary municipal law in the community by having power available to the Executive which is so great that the ordinary citizen or group of individuals cannot stand up against it. If they could, you would not be able to maintain the law. It is the same internationally.
Unless there is immediately available for the organ of the League, which is there to maintain peace and to see that the law is kept, a force which is overwhelmingly greater than that of any individual who may be about to break the law, then an effective organisation for the maintenance of peace is not there. That is extremely difficult, also, to bring about and that is why, on one occasion when I was speaking on this matter, I suggested that, in my view, we will not have nearly arrived at an effective League until we have something that is very nearly like a confederation of the nations. I think that ultimately we will have to get to that stage. I know there are difficulties and dangers in that, too, but we will have to get to that stage before we will have in a League of Nations a really effective means for the maintenance of peace.
I pointed out that it is the great nations that are the trouble in this, and it is the problem of the great nations that is the real problem. They realise that they must come in and, because they realise that they will have to bear the principal part of the burden, they want to have the principal part of the power, too. Consequently, in all these organisations being projected — and in the present one — for the maintenance of peace, there is a tendency to give to the great Powers an overwhelming influence, which generally means, in the long run, that if they keep together all goes well but, when they want to quarrel, then the whole purpose for which the League was established goes to pieces. If one of them feels sufficiently strong to be able to indulge its ambitions, whatever they may be, then you have the others in a position in which the machinery of the League as a whole cannot be used, because votoes can be employed to prevent the machinery of the League being operated in such a case.
I have not, as I have said, studied yet very closely the charter of the new United Nations but, from the preliminary look through it that I have had, I am not at all convinced that it is going to be really more effective than the old one was and — I have given the reasons for it—I do think that the smaller nations will not have in the new organisation the influence that they had in the old.
Deputy Blowick has spoken about our trying to get the small nations together. When the old League was working the small nations did come together very frequently to try to maintain their own rights under the League. It was a very common experience for us to have meetings with the representatives of a number of the Northern European States and some other States. As a matter of fact, we worked in close contact with the smaller European States and I have not the slightest doubt that if we all were members of a new organisation of this kind, we would also be brought together by our natural interests in order to maintain the rights of the small nations against the strong. But, as was pointed out by Deputy Dillon, the small nations alone could do nothing. They would not be sufficiently powerful as a league, separately, to be really effective but, wherever their vote comes in, they can be fairly effective by coming together and deciding upon a common programme and, when there are matters that affect the interests of the small States, they naturally do that. I do not think that, at this stage, however, we would gain very much by going into that wide field but, of course, the question naturally will engage our attention more and more now that the position is getting from the fluid into a more solid state, and in all probability, at a later stage, will come before the House.
As I say, it is extremely difficult to get anything like an effective league. The present charter, in my opinion—I have said it a couple of times—is not, from the small nations' point of view, as good as the old. From the point of view of being effective for peace, I do not think it is any better.