There has been to some extent — I suppose it is inevitable —a certain amount of confusion in thinking in regard to defence generally, and that confusion comes not so much from any lack of appreciation by people who are dealing with the matter as from the fact that their arguments were not strictly ad idem. I think that a certain amount of that confusion may have crept into this debate in regard to the statements made about guerrilla warfare. Everybody I think will instinctively sympathise with the background to the expressions of opinion made in that regard. The suggestion that our forces should be organised for guerrilla warfare does seem to meet, and does in fact to some extent meet, many of the difficulties with which a country such as ours would be faced if the unfortunate emergency of war were to come upon us but, if one looks at it a little more closely, one finds that one cannot answer the question completely on that basis.
I should like, with the permission of the House, to deal with a few general considerations touching on this problem, always having in mind what I think some Deputies said earlier and what I said last night, that it is a mistake for anybody here to try to become an armchair general and to dictate to the staff. It is legitimate and proper that we should consider the problem broadly and comprehensively, but it is a mistake to try to go into the technical details and do the work of the staff. Subject to that qualification. I should like to expand a little on the point raised last night. It does mean a repetition of things that some of us have said on a number of occasions in this House during the past three years, but it relates fundamentally to what we want our forces for and what the aim of our Defence Force should be. When that is clarified, it follows that you can arrange for the type of organisation, equipment and all these other matters that have been mentioned.
So far as I can summarise it, we want our Defence Forces to fulfil a rôle something like this. It is impossible, as was pointed out on very many occasions before, for a country such as this to provide for absolute defence. The objective of providing a Defence Force to resist and repel any aggressor is simply beyond us. We must take a more modest view of the problem. What we can hope to do, however, is to have such a Defence Force here as will minimise the danger of interference and go a long way towards preserving the individuality, if you like, or the integrity of the country, and provide a shield for the people in that way. I think that some attempt at a definition of that policy was made as far back as 1926. It has always been the policy of successive Governments to aim at a Defence Force that, first of all, would garrison the country, provide its own local and internal security, would fill the vacuum, so to speak, and thereafter be able to provide a force of sufficient strength to deter anybody from interfering with us. That policy seems to be the only rational one and, as I have already said, was the one adopted by each successive Government from 1926 onwards.
More specifically and related to the present-day situation we have something like this: Geographically placed as we are, if the emergency of war should come there is an immediate necessity for supplying our own local protection and for garrisoning the country. Otherwise there would be a vacuum in the greater portion of this island that would be dangerous to ourselves and perhaps to others. In the emergency of war that vacuum would have to be filled in any event. It is, I think, unnecessary to argue that here now but on previous occasions in the debates on the Estimates in 1948, 1949 and 1950 we developed the point in some detail. It is obviously desirable from our point of view, seeing that the vacuum has to be filled, that we should fill it ourselves rather than that other people should do it. That is a thing that is desirable both from our own point of view and from the point of view of any friendly powers in our vicinity. If we are going to do that we must provide forces to give us internal security — forces to garrison the territory with sufficient density to fill the vacuum; forces to garrison vital installations and strategical points to afford them immediate protection; forces sufficient to deal with light or accidental interference. All these things are implied in that defence policy. Over and above that it is necessary to have forces of sufficient strength and efficiency to be able to deter an attacker; more specifically, forces of sufficient strength and efficiency to be able to put up an initial resistance of sufficient magnitude to hold an attacker, even if it is only for a very short space of time, and so impose upon him substantial delay. In other words, not only must you supply your internal security and local garrisons and such matters, but you must have defence forces of sufficient strength to be able to deter an enemy by the certainty of making it costly for him in man-power, in material and in time.
Now that objective is within the power of this State and it has been so calculated to be within its power, because it is a notorious fact, and perhaps a fortunate fact for a small country such as this, that a small force well organised will compel anyone who wishes to overwhelm it to deploy a much larger force against it. Therefore, if we have a relatively small force here properly organised, with a certain minimum amount of equipment, you have the certainty that an aggressor against you will have to employ against you considerable forces, a considerable amount of material and, to defeat you or overrun you, will require a certain time factor. All these things, of course, act as a serious deterrent.
When we consider specifically that we are unlikely to be the main objective, any interference with us will be an incidental matter. In the circumstances as we visualise them, nobody is going to come along and declare war on us and fight a war with us alone. That is a totally different situation and would perhaps require a totally different approach. What we have to consider is the question of, what I may call for want of a better word, incidental interference. In that situation you go a very long way to protect yourself, if the approach is that indicated. In fact, given a few fortunate breaks, you will go the whole way towards protecting yourself if you are able to supply that resistance which will compel an intending attacker to deploy such forces against you that it will be costly for him both in men and material and if the force which you have is of such size and efficiency as will inflict certain delay upon him and so deprive him of the advantage of surprise and swift action against his main opponents. As I said, it is in regard to some greater issue that we would be interfered with.
Perhaps it is better for the moment to take an example from the last war. It is unlikely that we would have been interfered with in any way during the last war by, say, the Axis Powers as far as we ourselves were considered. But there was at one time at any rate a certain danger that that interference would come in the course of an offensive against Britain. If the way had been wide open by this particular route for a lightning and successful attack, which fortunately was not open because of a combination of circumstances, including the sea barrier, then one has only to reflect to see that the probability of being interfered with would have been very great. In such circumstances, where there is a temptation to come in a particular way, that temptation may be removed if, on calculation, it is found that there are forces in the path which can cause delay for a sufficient length of time and so deprive the attacking forces of the advantage of surprise. That factor alone may be enough to wipe out all the other advantages in the approach.
I am labouring this merely to bring out this point, that not only will you have the advantage of the deterrent from your own point of view — it will he costly for the intending aggressor to interfere with you — but, in the specific set of circumstances you may contemplate where an attack on you is likely to be incidental to a more widespread operation, you also have the advantage that your deterrent action will deprive him of the advantage of surprise and, when that particular advantage is taken from him, he may very well find that it is not worth while interfering at all.
I have stressed that because that particular point has a bearing on the understandable arguments of people who advocate organising our forces on a purely guerrilla basis. There are really three things involved. First of all, there is the local internal security and the garrisoning of the country. Then there is the question of being able to resist an attacker initially. Thereafter, there is the question of putting up an indefinite and prolonged resistance. It is quite clear that, in the second stage, the initial resistance I have spoken about and which is so important from the point of view of discouraging anybody from interfering and also from the more general point of view which may be inferred from the remarks I have made about surprise in the course of a major operation against somebody else, we of ourselves are unlikely to be able to put up a very prolonged, organised and unpenetrated defence. Let us admit that to the people who are talking about guerrilla warfare. We are with them that far. It may very well be that you may have to fall back on operations of a guerrilla nature. Therefore, as I visualise it, if the worst came to the worst, the situation might be summarised this way. Granted that you are given time, a certain, perhaps, indefinite time, you would first have mobilisation, the garrisoning of the country and the organisation of the troops. That would continue until hostilities became an actuality. Then, apart from incidental, accidental or minor diversionary efforts, if a major effort was made against you, you would put up your main resistance and you could only hope to survive that for a limited period of time.
Now, one of two things can happen if that situation arises. The fire will spread, so to speak, and others become involved at that stage, or else one is left isolated, in which case ultimately one will be forced back to the guerrilla basis. I think that is the picture we have to face, generally speaking.
Now, when one looks at the picture in that way one sees that there is immediately a qualification to the suggestion that our forces should be organised for guerrilla warfare. If our forces are organised and dispersed initially for guerrilla warfare they will not be able to put up that particular initial resistance and it would be very easy to penetrate right through them. If that type of policy is adopted ab initio, therefore, without qualification, we must forgo the advantages we would have from a properly organised defensive policy of being able to deter an attacker, while at the same time losing the advantage of being able to hold him or pin him down for a sufficient length of time to enable one to have the advantage of the other factors to which I referred, through the compulsion of deploying initially against us heavy commitments in men and material without the compensating benefit of surprise. These particular advantages will all be lost if one merely regards one's defensive forces as a number of organised guerrilla bands.
When one follows the argument to its logical conclusion it seems, therefore, that what we have to do is to organise our forces as a defensive force capable in the initial stages of operating as a military force in the more or less conventional sense. In addition to that, our troops and reserves should be organised in such a way that they can immediately break up and, if necessary, fall back on guerrilla or cavalry tactics —if one likes to put it that way. That objective is more than ever realisable now because there is a tendency towards that type of operation even in the conventional form of war. I have expatiated on that matter in some detail in order to show that we can lean too much towards the idea of having small independent columns without adequate co-ordination and relying almost exclusively on the smaller type of equipment.
If that is the type of problem we have to face, then it is obvious that the forces we require must be built up out of the three components that we have at our disposal — the Regular Army, a First Line Reserve and the F.C.A. In order to organise these forces, it will be necessary to have on mobilisation a certain disposable force right from the start. Because that force will be required immediately it will have to be composed largely of Regular Army personnel brought up to unit and formation strength with First Line Reserve personnel. Certain points and certain installations will have to be garrisoned and it is in that personnel that one will find the cadres for the embodiment of one's reserve units straight away. Now, all this will simply lead me to a repetition of the arguments that have already been given in such detail and I do not propose to give again all the reasons why we want a certain minimum Regular Army.
I come now to the importance of the First Line Reserve. The ideal First Line Reserve consists, of course, of the soldier who has served a number of years — or even for one year — in the regular forces, the soldier who is completely conditioned to military life and military activity and who can take his place in his unit and function there without any further training. There is obviously a limit to the number of men that can be found for that type of Reserve. That Reserve is an essential component of our forces since such a Reserve enables one to work effectively with a smaller peacetime Army than would otherwise be necessary. By having such a Reserve one's peacetime Regular Army units can be kept under strength, and on mobilisation the vacancies that exist in them can be filled immediately by trained personnel from the First Line Reserve, which gives one the advantage straight away of having a strong Regular Army disposable and ready at a moment's notice, an important consideration in all this matter
Unfortunately, that type of First Line Reserve is limited of necessity. It is difficult to draw material conclusions from the data we have as to that Reserve. I think, however, I am justified in making this general observation. From the figures it looks as if —I admit this may be no more than a coincidence — the size of the First Line, which corresponds roughly to the A Reserve prior to the war, will not greatly exceed in numbers the size of the standing Army. According to all calculations on paper, it should exceed it. One should be able to get considerably greater forces for the First Line Reserve from the outflow from the Regular Army provided the strength of the Army is maintained. In practice it seems as if we have never been able to do much better than have approximately the same number in the First Line Reserve. I am speaking now of the period for which figures are available.
At the moment the First Line Reserve is actually much less than it should be and that is a rather disturbing factor. In order to maintain that Reserve there must be a certain outflow from the Regular Army. That outflow will be ensured to some extent so long as a certain percentage of regular soldiers keep coming out after a few years' service. In addition to that, it is vitally important that we should maintain the strength of the Regular Army, because if the strength diminishes the outflow will diminish pro rata and one's First Line Reserve will diminish.
Some of us voiced a warning some years ago as to the dangers resulting from a policy of keeping the Army under establishment, thereby inducing a deficiency in the First Line Reserve. Judging by the figures, I think that fear was fairly well-grounded but, be that as it may, it is important that one's regular forces should be kept up to establishment. I commend to the Minister's attention the desirability of keeping the First Line Reserve up to establishment. To a large extent that is beyond his control.
As I say, it is conditioned by the flow from the Regular Army which, in turn, is conditioned by (a) terms of service in the Regular Army, and (b) strength of the Regular Army. However, it is an important element in the forces and should not be neglected. Remember this, that it is on the combination of that First Line Reserve and of the Regular Army that you will mobilise. We had the experience that I outlined in detail in 1948, 1949 and again, perhaps, in 1950. We had the experience, fortunately, that it actually worked out because of other factors on the last occasion. We had the experience of knowing that even with an effective Regular Army of 14,000, as it was in 1940 — a then Regular Army to which, during a period of, roughly, from six to nine months had been grafted a First Line Reserve —that even on that nucleus the task of meeting commitments in 1940 was very nearly beyond us.
The First Line Reserve is going to be the immediate available material which is going to give us a regular force so that it can supply immediate needs — essential garrisons, cadres on which to build up your other reserves and, perhaps, organise another army as we did in the past, supply certain tactical forces that will be available for immediate use so that at the critical stage of mobilisation you will not be completely without shelter. To secure all these things — the maintenance and the efficiency of the First Line Reserve, the standard of the First Line Reserve and the strength of the First Line Reserve — is of considerable importance for the Minister for Defence.
So far we have dealt with two elements in our Defence Forces, the First Line of Reserve and the Regular Army. We now come to the other. An Forsa Cosanta Aitiúil, which, let me hasten to say, is an equally important part of our forces. It will be a major part of our forces and will, because of its very nature, require, perhaps, even more attention than the other elements. That particular force has been the subject of a good deal of talk. I wonder are we completely clear about it now? By the way, I should like to say now that I agree with much of what Deputy O'Higgins, the former Minister, said in regard to that. I would like the Minister to take heed of one phrase in his speech where he pointed out the difficulty of getting regular personnel to appreciate the importance of that force. There are certain historical reasons and other reasons for that, but I think there is something in that point. As a member of a voluntary force before the war myself, I felt that the potentialities and the importance of such a force were not sufficiently realised. Then afterwards, I must confess, seeing it from the other side as a whole-time soldier, one was inclined to concentrate on what appeared to be the more immediate problems and to put the L.D.F. second in priority. That was a very natural temptation for what I shall call the regular outlook.
There has been a warning voice in that regard here and I think that matter has to be constantly borne in mind. In saying that there is no question of any imputation that there has been any neglect or lack of interest in the F.C.A. It is just some psychological factor in the machine, if you like, but it is a thing to be guarded against.
I pointed out as far back as 1948 that if that force is to be a success facilities must be provided, and these facilities not only mean training facilities and accommodation but they mean administrative facilities, and that, of necessity, a certain proportion of the regular whole-time personnel will be absorbed in the running of that force, both from the training and administrative point of view. I remember in 1948 making a point which seems to have been substantiated by later events. I made it on the basis of experience gained as a member of a voluntary force before the war. It was this: that there is a maximum to the size of the volunteer force which you can maintain. You cannot maintain a greater force and that maximum is set or fixed by the size of your regular cadres which, in turn, is conditioned by the size of the regular army. I said in 1948—and I still feel—that effectively to administer the F.C.A. means that a certain minimum number of regular officers, N.C.O.s and men must be conallotted to that force and must be considered as fulfilling a mission in every way as honourable and as important as those of any other personnel in the Defence Forces.
Incidentally we have to get back again to another argument, and that is why a certain minimum is set to the effective strength of the Regular Army. It all comes back to this when one analyses it: that if you do not provide it with a skeleton there will be nothing to hold up the body. If I seem constantly to be harping on that point it is because nearly all the avenues lead one to that conclusion. The question is whether you are going to have an effective defence force and an effective F.C.A. If you are going to have that, a sine qua non is to have an effective regular force not below the minimum calculated for establishment.
Now, in regard to the F.C.A., some of us have felt — I find that the point was made on the Estimate in 1950— that there is a certain amount of confusion in regard to the rôle of the F.C.A. Perhaps it would be well to trace back a little its origin and history, because I think the Minister will have to give the question of this force a little further thought for this reason. The original intention or proposal of the staff was that you would have your Regular Army and First Line Reserve. They visualised bringing up that First Line Reserve so as to give you an effective mobile Army on mobilisation. After that it is considered, and it is a necessity of modern warfare, that a local defence force is needed. A rough analogy could be made and, in fact, was made in the House between active service units during the Black and Tan days and the local Volunteers of those days. If we have a defence force, even in the sense we have been talking about in the discussion on this Estimate, we need behind it a local defence force. I mean something in the nature of a home guard who will be part-time soldiers even during war — a group who will garrison their own towns, villages and factories on a part-time basis, going on with their civilian duties during the day. A local defence force in that sense is necessary and will be necessary, and that is one of the gaps that will be filled by our F.C.A. Incidentally, that was the original concept of the L.S.F. and the L.D.F. However, we have gradually adopted the view, over the past three years, that we will ask our L.D.F. to do something more: that they should be a reserve of the Regular Army. I wonder if we have quite thought out that problem. If another emergency should come, having mobilised the Regular Army and the First Line Reserve as we have, we will still be very deficient in numbers. We can visualise one or two things to meet that situation. There will be another drive to have an emergency Army if a war emergency comes.
If that situation arises we will have to maintain, as we did last time, a very much greater standing Army than the sum of our First Line Reserve, as at present, and the Regular Army, which is a good deal less than 20,000 in number at the moment. If we do that, it seems to indicate that we will have another emergency Army recruited and grafted on to the existing mobilised force. Large numbers for that emergency Army will come from the present F.C.A. force. That is all the more reason, therefore, why the training given to this force at the present time should be the most general and the most efficient kind which we can possibly provide. The probability is that if we only continue training the F.C.A. personnel on the present basis, we will have a situation comparable with that existing during the last war — a situation in which we have an emergency Army, and an L.D.F. force a lot of whom have already been trained in their own areas, less such persons who volunteered and joined the permanent force. That is what is likely to happen if we do nothing more about the situation.
However, there is another possibility and it would, perhaps, be the more prudent course to follow; it would give greater efficiency, smoother working, smoother mobilisation, and save time if and when a crisis should come. I suggest that that course would be to consider now whether, within the framework of the F.C.A., we could not develop a further element of the First Line Reserve; in other words, whether we could not consider having certain F.C.A. battalions, which could be mobilised to do their part in conjunction with the regular force, leaving other units for local protection. Of course, that would mean supplying substantial cadres.
I do not think I should labour that point any further for the simple reason that I would be going into technical details which would prove a little bit dangerous for us here; they are matters for the General Staff to consider, and matters for careful consideration in view of all the factors involved. I will just make this general suggestion: There is still a gap in regard to the First Line Reserve. While we allow that, we will not be able to provide quickly the Army which will be necessary if an emergency should come. It has already been decided that we will not take the steps that other countries have taken to fill the existing gap.
In this country we have a force which is already organised. That force, with some adjustments, could be made to provide, not only the local home guard, which it was originally contemplated it would provide, but also the balance which is required in the First Line Reserve, in the sense in which I have used that term. That is a problem that should be considered, and it would have this great advantage: we would be calling on the very best elements in the country — a force which is already there and which, in my view, is the most promising thing we have had in this country or that we are likely to have. I make that point for the Minister's consideration. It was made in one form or another in the past.
If we are serious about the defence of our country, that problem should at least be examined and some definite conclusions reached and some definite policies pursued. However, it does seem that, merely recruiting the F.C.A. as a local defence force or as a home guard to operate on a part-time basis, even in times of emergency and to have a force equivalent to our Regular Army plus its present First Line Reserve only, would inevitably result in a repetition of the 1940 emergency. It would mean a chaotic drive to expand the Regular Army by the means which we then adopted. Perhaps the Minister would consider that point.
I am speaking now as one who had experience of and was in fact a member of one of the predecessors to the F.C.A. force. Between the years 1934 and 1936, we had the problems which the F.C.A. have now to face, and the conditions in our force were similar to those operating in the present body. As a result of that experience, I would urge on the Minister to see that the F.C.A. force gets active encouragement at all times. It is an extremely difficult force for the personnel of the Regular Army to handle. It is not attractive to them because it takes up some of their week-ends and some of their nights; it does not appeal to them because its personnel are not whole-time soldiers; if the money would only allow it, the idea would be to have a standing Army at full strength and efficiency and to cut out all the rest; that is the natural view of the whole-time soldier in regard to the F.C.A.
On the other hand, the importance of this force is, in many respects, a first priority. With that in mind, there should be a constant insistence on encouraging the force and giving it facilities. To provide these facilities, training officers and administrative officers would have to be made available and their posts with the F.C.A. force should be regarded as posts of importance. The higher commands in the F.C.A. force which will be exercised by regular officers, detailed for that purpose, should be regarded as important commands and should carry appropriate ranks. The officers tackling the work should be made to think that they are not, so to speak, being put into a back-water, but that they are engaged in a very important aspect of national defence. Their chances of promotion should be in no way prejudiced but enhanced. There should be a change-over of personnel periodically so as to ensure that all permanent officers would have an appreciation of the potentialities and difficulties of that force as well as of the regular problem and the more orthodox side of the picture. That is important from the point of view of the L.D.F., and it is important from the point of view of the Regular Army. The adequate supply of other ranks, N.C.O.s for training and N.C.O.s for administration and the provision of training facilities in weapons are exceedingly difficult problems and they are cropping up every day in different forms, but must be solved. Having regard to our particular circumstances, we have largely to rely for efficiency and effectiveness in the end on these voluntary soldiers who will have a considerable amount of ability. Since that is the picture, these elements should be provided. I would like to lend my voice strongly to what has been said by Deputies on all sides of the House and to what has been said in that regard by Dr. O'Higgins. I move to report progress.