When we adjourned we were dealing with the question of the F.C.A. In short the approach to the F.C.A. should generally be taken, in my view, on the basis that, firstly, you have to provide the permanent element which is necessary for the efficient functioning of the F.C.A., the Volunteer force, both in peacetime conditions and under emergency conditions. We have gone into some detail on that but that is the first necessity. Having provided that, in regard to the force itself, we must realise that this force is of very great importance and something more than a mere auxiliary to the other elements of the Defence Forces. It is not to be regarded as a mere auxiliary. It is to be regarded as an integral and indispensable element of the Defence Forces as a whole should they be called upon to discharge the role for which they are there. That being so, the approach must be to give that force the facilities which are necessary for making it effective.
In the first instance, that means a certain demand on the regular forces. The experience in other countries and the experience in this country in regard to the Volunteer force before the last emergency—and I should say it is the experience with the F.C.A. since the emergency—is that unless you provide an adequate number of regular officers, N.C.O.s and men for training purposes you will not be able to get the efficient force which is needed. With the best will in the world and with all the enthusiasm you have got in the Volunteer force it will still be unable to run itself unless these administrative and training facilities are provided. In fact, if these facilities are not provided, the impossibility for the part-time volunteers of catering for all the problems which arise both in administration and training, coupled with the feeling that they are neglected, is bound to have an adverse effect on morale; that in turn will have an adverse effect on numbers, and that will have an adverse effect on training and interest in the activities of the force. For that reason, therefore, the Minister has to consider the problem on the basis that he will have to provide a certain number of officers, N.C.O.s and men for this task, and the requirements will be considerable.
Before the war certain provisions were made, but in the light of experience they were completely inadequate for running a Volunteer force. Towards the end of 1948 in the Dublin units of the Volunteer force the conclusion was reached that to each battalion of that Volunteer force you would not only have to allot, whole-time, a certain number of regular personnel, but that you would probably have to allot in addition a certain number of instructors whole-time to the companies of that battalion. During the emergency, when calls on personnel were very great and personnel could hardly be afforded, we had the same experience: it was necessary to detach a number of whole-time personnel to organise and run the L.D.F., as it then was.
If we are serious about our defence problem and about the F.C.A., particularly as the F.C.A. is now in the position of supplying a large part of our reserve, we cannot escape from the fact that it will mean a relatively large commitment of regular personnel. Care should be taken to have it appreciated that the mission which officers, N.C.O.s and men seconded to that force are discharging is one of great and primary importance. An officer or N.C.O. employed on such duty should be made to feel that he is in every way following his profession and will have all the same advantages with regard to promotion and prospects in the Army as if he were serving on a regular staff in a regular unit. It is probably desirable that there should be a periodic turnover so that all officers and N.C.O.s will have an appreciation of the problems of both the Volunteer force and the Regular Army. On that basis we can hope to get a great distance with the training of the F.C.A.
There is another problem which must be considered: How far will the F.C.A. be merely called upon to supply a local home guard and how far will it in effect be needed to discharge a first line job? We have not thought out that problem and it should be thought out. The conclusions arrived at in the consideration of that problem will have a large bearing on how the force will be organised and on how regular personnel is to be allotted to it.
An adequate allocation of training equipment and equipment generally must be made to the F.C.A. within our resources. If the role of the F.C.A. is to be merely that of a home guard it would probably be sufficient to train them as the L.D.F. were trained during the emergency—that is, on the basis that they would have only light equipment with some general training so that they could handle any equipment, but under present circumstances in the present set-up it seems likely that this force, in one form or another, will be called upon largely to do a first line job. In a certain contingency an emergency army might have to be recruited, the members of which would come from the existing F.C.A. In that situation we would have to do something more in the training of the F.C.A. The basis of their training must be that they are first line reserve soldiers supplying some first line reserve units; in other words, some of the ideas on which the old Volunteer force was run must be applied to the F.C.A. Already, during the emergency, that was done with regard to certain city units. Specialised units and battalions were developed as well as infantry battalions. Having regard to the problem it is desirable that these men be trained as far as possible on a first line reserve basis rather than on a home guard basis. That is necessary if we are to rely on the F.C.A. as our reserve. It is desirable even if the F.C.A. is to be called upon to give whole-time soldiers, as happened during the emergency. If we are raising an emergency army the more advanced the training provided for them the better, provided that it is done effectively.
Another element is that one of the difficulties with the volunteer soldier is to avoid monotony. He wants to know, to experience, to feel, that he is being introduced to as many items as possible in the military field. One of the ways in which monotony in training can be avoided is to intersperse the routine, basic and essential training in small arms, minor tactics and such things, with a general introduction to more specialised matters and more specialised equipment. Although from one aspect that training may be a bit vague and may not be sufficient to make the person concerned proficient in specialised matters, it is nevertheless a help. It helps the soldier to appreciate the problem of combat over a much wider field than his own individual training; it helps him to take an interest, it is a ready means of overcoming monotony and it is something to attract people to attend parades. With that idea in mind, if the Minister provides training officers with sympathy and imagination to run the force and accommodation is available for them, then, even with the present lack of equipment, it should be possible to make enough equipment available, not only to train the force basically but also to give these interesting interludes sufficiently regularly to avoid monotony in training, to attract people to the force and to keep them interested, which is most important. It is harder to keep a volunteer active and interested than it is to recruit him. I believe that it is feasible and the Minister should consider the matter in that light.
Above all, the volunteer soldier must feel that he is as much a soldier, as important a soldier and as competent a soldier as the man who is whole-time in the Forces and I think we can give him that feeling. Even though he may never hope to get the mechanical proficiency which we hope from our permanent elements, nevertheless it is a good thing to give him that feeling and it is good for morale. The more we encourage him on that line the more proficient he will become, the more respect he will command from his regular colleagues and the further we will have gone in making the Defence Forces a whole homogeneous body.
I will finish as I started by again reminding the House that, important as all the other things are, everything depends on a proficient regular force as the nucleus on which everything else must be built, and I do not think that I can stress that point too strongly. For that reason, I have repeated arguments which we have been advancing over a period of years.
According to the ideas which have been expressed here about guerrilla warfare, we should be content merely with light equipment in the small arms category. It has also been pointed out —and indeed with a great deal of truth — that the securing of heavy equipment in sufficient quantity will be beyond us. I feel that there is either a certain amount of oversimplification there, or that there is a failure to appreciate other factors in the situation. When dealing with the question of guerrilla warfare yesterday, I tried to make the point that, whereas our forces should be trained in that sense, nevertheless, for the initial stages of hostilities, it is essential to keep them in a position to put up a more conventional resistance than merely guerrilla tactics.
In connection with this, a question arises with regard to equipment. Certain forms of light artillery, field artillery, armoured fighting vehicles of the type we have and equipment of that nature is essential and will not be completely useless if it comes to guerrilla warfare. If we are to be in a position to put up an initial resistance to deter an aggressor and to impose on him a delay in time, as I tried to outline last night, such equipment will be needed. Already we have a certain amount, and even though we might not be able to service that equipment indefinitely — and that was one of the arguments advanced against having that kind of equipment, that you would run out of ammunition quickly — I should like to make the counterpoint that, if you have that equipment and a certain amount of ammunition for it, it will make all the difference in that second phase, as I called it yesterday, the phase of organised resistance, in making that resistance reasonably effective for the limited time for which you will hope to put it up on your own. Therefore, it is important that, if we can get equipment in that intermediate class, such as field artillery, we should get it and our troops should be trained in the use of it.
As regards the other type of equipment, I agree to this extent with the arguments advanced, subject to the remarks I have already made, that we should try to have an adequate quantity of small arms and particularly of mortars which can very frequently discharge the rôle of a field piece and which, in fact, are indispensable if it comes to guerrilla warfare. Many who took part in guerrilla activities in the days round about 1919 to 1921 will recall the difference it would have made if they had had a small proportion of, say, mortars—even the old Stokes mortars of that time. It would have meant that they could have effectively attacked installations and barracks where they were debarred from any effective action for want of such weapons and we do know that at these times efforts were made to improvise such weapons. I will deal in a moment with the question of improvisation, but we can never improvise an article of that sort in any way that will compare with the standard article. Therefore, it should be a priority to get as many of that type of weapon as we can.
Again, there is the question of antiarmour. One of the big advantages which any force which would get in against you and one of the big obstacles to any success in guerrilla warfare is the armoured vehicle, and, where guerrilla warfare is concerned, the light armoured vehicle particularly would need something to deal with it. Again, people who had experience in the days I mentioned will appreciate the weight of what I am saying. For that reason, the provision of things like anti-tank grenades, anti-tank mines, portable and, if you like, hideable articles, should be a priority. What is more, these articles are equally essential and important for infantry and other troops operating in the more conventional or regular manner, so that for any phase of our defence activities the provision of such material is essential.
I would put the provision of such equipment as mortars, anti-tank weapons of a light type and similar articles as the first priority, always assuming that we have an adequate quantity of small arms. Thereafter, you want a lighter form of equipment, which I think would have been termed heavy by some of the people who spoke, for your forces such as certain field artillery and so forth. We will leave it to the staff to work out the priorities.
The point is that if and in so far as we can get such equipment, it should be got and time should not be lost in getting it while it can be got, because, as I mentioned previously, the time factor is uncertain. Two and a half or three years ago, a number of nations were committing themselves to five-year plans and there were indications that, at the end of that five years' period, the situation might be critical. There is no very great reason for changing that estimate, but we are three years nearer the end of the five years, so that from now on and particularly any time after the next two years, unless there is a radical change in the situation, there is an indication of the need to be prudent. If we can get in such equipment, we should get it now and carefully make out our priorities in getting it.
The Minister and the Department have been correct in their approach to that, but, in getting that lighter form of equipment, we should not neglect the opportunity of getting such heavier forms as we can get. They will be essential in one stage of the operations, anyway, and need not be a total loss in any sense. The argument that suggests, that because you will run out of ammunition eventually, because we do not manufacture it here or even because it is not manufactured, is not as telling as it appears to be at first sight. Fortunately, ammunition of that nature lasts a considerable period of time, as we know. You can still get ammunition of relatively great age and it is still serviceable. The important thing is to try to get enough to carry you at least over what I described as "the second phase" yesterday. There is another corollary in regard to equipment, the attention to spares. It is important to get as many spares as you can. Provided you can get some spares — I would not say even an adequate supply of spares — and sufficient ammunition to put up a resistance for a certain length of time anyway, you are justified in purchasing them, in present circumstances, for our defence insurance, notwithstanding the fact that the particular type made, either in the approximate future or even already, has gone out of production and even if you will be denied supplies at a later stage.
I can take a case in point. We have certain artillery at the moment from before the war which I think is not being manufactured now and for which ammunition is not being manufactured. Nevertheless, we have in stock sufficient ammunition for that equipment to contribute to the second phase that I mentioned for a considerable period of time and that ammunition will remain serviceable, with care, for a considerable number of years longer. That is to be by no means despised.
The next point I want to make is simple. Let us get that equipment if we can get it. Let us get it in the greatest quantities that we can get it in. I think I am safe in saying that, because it is practically impossible to get our requirements. We should attend to the matter of spares, but we should not be deterred by that argument I have referred to, because on analysis when you relate it to the defence end it is not as weighty as it appears at first to be.
By the way, when I was talking about this yesterday, a remark was made subsequently, in defence of guerrilla warfare, that if you maintain an ordinary force in peace time they will be bombed out originally and never get deployed. The answer is that there will be a lot in that argument if we were to contemplate that we were to be attacked for some reason by one other country, that it would be between that country and ourselves, that it would be an isolated war in which we would be on one side and the attacking country on the other. That possibility is extremely unlikely. The one we have to consider is the one I mentioned yesterday, where there is interference that is largely incidental to something on a much bigger scale. In that case you can hope to get time to disperse your force. When I talked about initial assistance and the Regular Army and what I might call the permanent mobile force, I was not suggesting that you keep them completely concentrated. That is a matter for the Staff, who know how to use them. The point is to have them immediately available and to be able to put up an organised resistance, as against a guerrilla hit-and-run resistance, where they could be committed definitely and where it will be possible to have them mobilised and dispersed with as much protection for them as for guerrilla elements in the initial stages.
The question of equipment leads to the question of improvisation, with which I might deal very shortly. I am all for it and I have advocated it here as far as possible; but let us not be blind to the limitations of the potentialities. Unfortunately, we have not got here the requisite basic industries necessary for improvisation of the type that has been advocated. Some of us have pleaded for that for a number of years. I myself have stressed the importance of a basic chemical industry here. We are talking about defence in the narrow sense, but it must all be conditioned by the broader questions of providing food, organisation for the civil population, and those other big things. As part of that bigger aspect of defence, I have been advocating here for a number of years the setting up of a basic chemical industry — related to our basic industry, agriculture. I do not propose to delay on that now. If we had got that we would be in a position to improvise in the matter of explosives and even propellants. Unfortunately, we have not got it. The amount of improvisation we can do will be very modest, according to our experience during the last war. We succeeded in being able to produce a certain quantity of second-class demolition explosives. To produce them took a number of years and it was only at the end of the war that we were in a position to produce that explosive. In order to do it, it took all the activities of the Emergency Research Bureau, with certain elements in the Army collaborating. We had to build a factory and make the raw materials and then make the explosives. These are problems which cannot be solved overnight. I agree that there is a good deal in the suggestion that we should improvise, but it is more important that if we are going to improvise we should be in a position to do so and it is too late when you want the improvision to have to start to improvise to produce the raw material.
That is the kind of difficulty that has to be faced. It goes into a much wider field than I can discuss here on this Estimate, but I have raised it elsewhere. Before the war, we realised the need to have these industries. In fact Government Departments had got to the stage where they were about to place a contract — if my memory serves me right — for a chemical nitration fixation plant. The plant was to come from Czechoslovakia, but then the crisis in Europe came and it could not be obtained. There were also proposals for an ammunition factory. Both fell through when the war came, as it was not possible. After the war, we might have been able to get some plant — I do not know — and some of us have tried to press that these matters be considered, but in fact over the last four or five years they have not been considered. I am afraid the chances of getting equipment for the necessary factories now are relatively remote. It would take time and the importation of the equipment necessary for these factories is a very questionable matter now.
In regard to the small arms factory that has been mentioned, let us not forget there are such questions as that of the steel of a specialised kind, and of brass and chemicals and the handling of chemicals for it. That cannot be done overnight. I would like to see a factory set up, but the first requisite is in the industrial sphere, where you can provide the materials for that ammunition factory. If it can be done, I am all for it, but I am afraid that at this moment the chances of being able to set up an ammunition factory here are not very rosy.
Improvisation is a good thing where it is necessary, but I think it is a better thing if we can minimise the need for improvisation by preparation. We can minimise that need in two ways. One is by getting all the standard equipment we can, getting all the right sort. I think every Deputy in the House would want to do that, and I know the Minister is doing it. Secondly, let us think out now what we might be able to improvise and try to prepare for that improvisation. I know that during the last war we did try to improvise, but we did relatively little. It involved setting up a factory to make our own raw materials before we started making weapons at all. Deputy Dillon mentioned the phosphorus incendiary grenade, the Molotov Cocktail. The fact is that actually in 1941 we in this country knew how to do it. Just about this time in 1941, as far as the "know-how" is concerned, we were able to do it. When we examined the problem we found that the real trouble was that we had not the materials. Starting at that date, we had, first of all, to carry out the preliminary research not on the making of the weapon but on the making of the raw materials. The Emergency Scientific Research Bureau directed and conducted that work with the help of Army personnel, who were working with them. That preliminary research on how to make phosphorus and the other components of that incendiary was later followed by a preliminary research on how to make the chlorate for the explosive. We had to go through the pilot plant stage, and then build a factory for full production. We made the phosphorus and the other components for the grenades, but we were not in production for a matter of years. If we were to do that again, the same thing would happen unless we had here an industry which would provide these materials.
Incidentally it may be of interest to the House to know that that Army factory though, fortunately it was never required to produce material for use in warfare, was actually able to supply the match industry of this country with essential raw materials at a time when supplies of these materials were cut off. I make that point in some detail for the reason that I think the Minister should consider the question of technical advice. I think that even the Army itself has not been alive to the necessity for what I will call certain "technical planning" here. I think it is time the Minister had somebody to advise him like the way in which he had the advice of the Emergency Scientific Research bureau, where representatives from the Army who had a certain technical training and ability to co-operate on the scientific side, were able to work with the best people in the country who could know these things — keeping abreast of developments as they then occurred and trying to see how we could, from our own resources, meet the problems which might arise. I think it would be a good thing for the Department of Defence to have some such advisory body, backed up by a small element in the Defence Force itself, for planning in that particular line.
During that whole period to which I have referred we had the question, say, of making smoke grenades and where we should make them. There was the question of making the body of the grenades and getting a firm here to do them. The making of the grenades at the shops in Inchicore was also a question of time and planning. If that planning had been done pre-war, production would have been much quicker. We are not asking a great deal when we ask that these problems be examined and a certain amount of blue print work done. There is no use in saying that you are going to produce an anti-tank grenade comparable with the standard one. There is the problem of the fuse, of which we are aware. With our limited resources there are some things which we simply cannot meet but there are other things which we can. I will content myself, without going into further detail now, by suggesting that the Minister should have that aspect of the matter examined and, in general, the whole question of the technical corps and technical departments in the Army. I think that is a matter that should get more attention than it has got heretofore, particularly in the light of modern war.
I have not touched on the broader aspects of defence — the tie-up with the regional organisation, local government, and so forth. I dealt with it on previous occasions and our views are on record. I commend them to the Minister.
By way of shortening the debate, I should like to say that I was looking through the records of the House for some time past. I find that, in Volume 110, on the 14th and 15th April, 1948, the Estimate of this Department was under discussion and that, between Ministers who had experience pre-war and during the war, and some of us who had some specialised experience, we have pretty well put on record the history of our experiences in those days. If any Deputy is interested in learning the facts he will find them there. In all the controversies that arose in subsequent years on the discussion of this Estimate, these facts were never challenged and were repeated as a challenge. In Volume 114 there is some interesting information also which arose on the discussion of the Defence Estimate in 1949 and, incidentally, a statement of some of the developments in the world at that time makes rather interesting reading. In Volume 119 we see that the Defence Forces Bill came up for discussion, and on about the 18th or 19th April, 1950, in Volume 120, there was another comprehensive debate on this subject, during which all these matters were gone into.
I mention these views now because I should like the Minister, if he can find the time — I think his staff should be able to find the time — to go into the points raised by Deputies on both sides of the House in these debates during these years — debates which were more general and detailed than were customary before the war. A number of ideas were put forward in these debates — ideas which should be sifted and which would be important for the future.
Civil Defence was dealt with in the debates which I have mentioned. I shall content myself now by pointing out how important civil defence is and how utterly essential to any defence organisation it is to have an adequate civil defence organisation. It is not atomic bombs that we have to fear in this city or in this country. A conventional fire raid would be enough to cause as much devastation in this city as any atomic bomb, having regard to the organisation we would have if it came. Much leeway has to be made up in that respect. It is time we realised that the planning and organisation of civil defence, particularly in our cities, is a major problem.
Evacuation, regional organisation, and so forth, have all been discussed in this House on previous occasions. I want to draw attention to the points that were made in other debates on the Defence Estimate and to reiterate that these points are important and urgent —perhaps more so to-day than at the time they were made. I will leave the matter at that.
On a former occasion in this House, and in Committee, I discussed and advocated certain views with regard to ex-officers in the service — taking them back, and so forth. I want to avoid repetition and I know that the Minister is aware of the case which was put to him by a number of Deputies. I urge him very strongly to consider what was said in the House, and in Committee, and to consider the representations which were made to him. The question of insurance and pensions in respect of personnel arises on the pensions Estimate. I think it is best to leave that matter over to the next Estimate.
With these general remarks I want to repeat, so to speak, all that I have urged on the Minister's predecessors. I want to urge on the present Minister for Defence everything that I urged on the previous Minister for Defence when I was speaking from the bench on which Deputy S. Collins is now sitting. I want to urge it on the present Minister with the same urgency as I urged it on his predecessor. I do not want to create a scare and there are hopes that war may not come but nevertheless it may come and prudence demands that we should be ready.
