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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 10 Jun 1952

Vol. 132 No. 7

Committee on Finance. - Vote 56—Defence (Resumed).

By way of preface to the discussion which took place on this Estimate I should like to refer to the fact that when I resumed office 12 months ago one of my first acts was to consult the members of G.H.Q. with a view to finding out their most urgent requirements. In the case of each of the officers concerned, the reply was: "Men and munitions or warlike stores."

While I was in opposition I concerned myself with the ways and means by which the Army which, to a considerable extent, was being depleted, could be restored to its former strength and I conceived a scheme which I thought would provide that means.

I decided in that scheme to forgo what I might describe as the traditional method of seeking recruits which was, in the main, from among the unemployed. I decided to go to a new source. I felt that the new source most likely to provide the type of personnel we required would be among school-leaving young men.

Deputies of this House are as aware as I am that the most difficult period both for parents and for the young men concerned, their sons, is that period when they have left school and await the opportunity of securing their first employment. During that period they are subject to all sorts of hazards, temptations and so on. I felt that if I made an appeal, not alone to the young men but also to the parents, I might possibly secure some success. I pointed out to the parents what life in the Army would provide for their sons—that it would take them off the streets, that it would provide a means of training them into disciplined young men who, in due course, could become a credit to the nation as good citizens. At the same time, they would be built up both in body and mind, and I pointed out that, generally, as a result of the amenities which would be provided for them in the Army, their outlook would benefit. I do not mind saying that life in the Army such as I suggest for young men of the type to whom I was making the appeal, is almost the equivalent of life in a boarding-school. They are provided with all the amenities that a good boarding-school could provide— gymnasia, sports fields, games of every description, games which would go a long way towards building up the body as well as making the mind active.

I am glad to say that the appeal which I made in that regard was to a very great extent successful. We were looking for a figure of 4,500 men. I am glad to be able to say that we are almost within 1,000 of that particular mark, even though we have, for a very considerable time past, abandoned the advertising campaign.

The age which formerly prevailed was 18. I was faced with the difficulty of finding ways and means to have that age reduced. Formerly, the period of service was three years. I felt that if we abandoned that period and made it two years it would, perhaps, make it a more attractive proposition. The difficulty in regard to reducing the age to 17 years was overcome. We were able to settle that. The question of two years' service has also been settled. The Army authorities would still like to have the three-year period. They felt, naturally, that they could turn out a better soldier in three years than they could in two years. Personally, I am satisfied that, as most of these young recruits will be serving, in the main, in the infantry, two years is a satisfactory period for that type of service. It might perhaps not be absolutely sufficient for training for, say, the artillery, but even there I am satisfied that with a concentrated course we could turn out very effective soldiers in that particular arm of the service in that period of time. It does not mean that a young man is enlisted for two years. He can enlist for a period of service of two years and of six years in the Reserve. That was the scheme that I propounded and which I felt would be most attractive to the young men concerned. We still have the old period, that is, three years' service and nine years in the Reserve. Any young man who is anxious to join the Army can opt for either of these particular periods. I think it is a very fine state of affairs for the parents of a young man such as I have described that they can send their boy into the Army of the Irish nation and feel that morally, spiritually, physically and in every possible respect he will be well looked after. In addition to all the amenities which I have described as being available to him, he receives a sum of £1 18s. 6d. a week. Any young man who has any regard for his parents, who had the trouble and the expense of rearing him to the stage which he has reached, could let them have at least £1 out of that sum of £1 18s. 6d.

From that point of view, in addition to the fact that the welfare of their son is being looked after, it is a very attractive proposition. That young man is earning £1 18s. 6d., with all found—clothing, medical attention, hospitalisation and everything that it is possible to provide for him at his disposal. At the end of six months he can become what is known as a one-star private, that is, a well-trained and efficient soldier. When he has arrived at that stage he is then entitled to receive £2 5s. 6d. As a two-star private he receives £2 9s., and when he reaches the stage of three-star private, which he reaches by his own ability, intelligence and initiative, he receives £2 12s. 6d., and from that he can move into the non-commissioned rank where his wage becomes still higher.

I have mentioned that deliberately because the first and most urgent requirements mentioned by the members of the G.H.Q. Staff were the two items to which I have referred—men and munitions or warlike stores.

Deputy Colley referred to the fact that it was suggested, I think, by a district justice from the bench that it was possible for a young man convicted of a crime to avoid sentence for the crime committed by joining the Army. I want to say in the most emphatic terms in which I can say it that that is not so. No person who is convicted of a criminal offence is accepted into the Army. Whether that is good or not, is a matter of opinion. I am satisfied that if a young man has a tendency towards criminal acts it is desirable that he should not be admitted into the Army. On the other hand, people argue that a young man who is convicted for the first time of a criminal offence ought to be given a chance and that the State ought to give an example in showing forgiveness and helping him to build anew. However that may be, I am only stating what are the facts and the facts are that no person convicted of a criminal offence is admitted to the ranks of the Army.

The second point I want to make is that the case has been made in the House that we are withdrawing labour from industries and agriculture. In reply to that I want to say that, in the main, the recruits whom we have secured for the Army have come from the cities and the towns and a very, very small minority have come from rural Ireland. There is a fallacy in that argument that we are going into competition with agriculture and industry. How can we be in competition with agriculture and industry if, on the other hand, Deputies stand up in the House and twit us with the fact that we have a list of something like 60,000 or 70,000 unemployed? One or other of these statements is wrong. We have not gone into competition with agriculture or industry for, in the first place, the appeal which I initiated was directed in the main, but not altogether, to boys of school-leaving age who would not in any case have been engaged in any industry, either agriculture or commercial industry. From that point of view, I want to emphasise the fact that that statement is a fallacy, without any foundation.

The other point which was made by the officers of G.H.Q. Staff when I interviewed them on the occasion that I have mentioned was, as I have said, munitions. Having dealt with the question of men, I then applied myself to the question of where, how and when I could do anything to secure warlike stores. Naturally, the first thing I had to inquire into was what efforts had been made up to date to secure these warlike stores. Statements have been made in this House, both by Deputy Dr. O'Higgins and Deputy MacEoin, that they had, to all intents and purposes, practically secured these supplies. Deputy Dr. O'Higgins, in referring to it, admitted that "the contract was entered definitely in the Minister's time for the Swedish supply". I said:—

"The efforts to secure supplies were made before my time."

I was giving him that credit. Deputy Dr. O'Higgins then went further and said:—

"And the agreement to supply—"

to which I said:—

"I am not so sure of that."

Deputy Dr. O'Higgins said:—

"I am perfectly certain."

I am not terribly concerned about who got the supplies as long as we got them. If we got them, that is the main thing. But, Deputy Dr. O'Higgins went on to say:—

"One of my last acts in the Minister's office was to give sanction for a mission to go to see if the type was suitable, whenever they were ready to go."

Would the Minister give the reference?

That was in the course of this debate. In the same debate, Deputy MacEoin said:—

"I am glad to know that these arms are a success. They were paid for out of the last Vote and the previous Vote."

That is not true, of course. There is no foundation whatever for that statement.

What was the position which I found? The position which I found when I got down to examining the file was, that the first move in respect to this particular type of arms was made on 20th December, 1950, and it was made as a result of information supplied by the intelligence arm of the Army which reported to the Chief of Staff that they were aware that certain types of arms were likely to be secured in Sweden. The Chief of Staff, when he examined that information, decided to acquaint the then Minister of that fact and from that particular date up to the 13th March I could find nothing in the file to show that any ministerial action was taken in the matter. I did see that the Army Intelligence apparently continued their efforts to secure information in the matter. On the 13th March, 1951, the Chief of Staff recommended that the Department of External Affairs should be asked to request the Irish Minister in Stockholm to ascertain from the Swedish Government the prospects of obtaining certain war material and, in that connection, whether missions from this country to Sweden could be facilitated. The then Minister for Defence approved of this recommendation on the 19th March, 1951. The sanction of the Minister for Finance to proceed accordingly was requested on the 28th March, 1951, and was received on the 17th May, 1951.

From that date until I began to prosecute my inquiries, no action of any kind was taken and on the 5th July—I had been in office from, I think, the 14th June—as a result of the inquiries which I was making, I confirmed the decision to send a mission to Sweden and at the same time agreed that contracts could be arranged by the mission while in Sweden, subject to certain conditions. The sanction of the Minister for Finance to proceed on the revised basis was obtained on the 14th July, 1951, and the mission was empowered to purchase arms on the spot if the arms, in their opinion, were of a suitable type. Now it was easy to give that permission because the officers who were on that mission were all experts in regard to the question of arms. I want to give this in its historical correctness to show that so far as statements made in the debates are concerned, they are not facts, that the facts are as I have related them. Again of course I want to point out that so far as I am concerned, the very fact that we have secured arms at all, is sufficiently satisfying.

Somebody stated in the course of the debate — I think it was Deputy McQuillan — that there was a rumour abroad that these sources of supply were likely to dry up. I think there is no likelihood of these sources drying up. If we are able to provide the money to secure the supplies, I think they will be available. Someone also in the course of the debate suggested that some of the supplies that we were purchasing were obsolete. No obsolescent equipment has been purchased or ordered. All the stores are of the most modern type — sub-machine-guns, anti-aircraft guns, grenades and mortars. Deliveries to date, even as late as Saturday the 31st May, are valued at between £400,000 and £500,000. It is anticipated that deliveries to the total amount provided for in the Estimates will be made during the year. In fact, it may well be that a Supplementary Estimate may be necessary so that the statements that we were either purchasing obsolete or obsolescent arms or that the sources of supply were likely to dry up, are not correct. We hope as a matter of fact to secure still further supplies in addition to the weapons we have already secured.

The next question which I regard as being very important, is that of civil defence. Quite a number of Deputies discussed the question of civil defence, and I think rightly so, inasmuch as civil defence is in the main concerned with the protection of the public. Therefore it should have a prominent place in any discussion or debate which takes place on an Estimate for the Department of Defence. Civil defence officers have carried out extensive surveys of their areas. They have selected key personnel and personnel who are willing to be trained as instructors. They have examined the position of local supplies of equipment required for the services and have checked up on the equipment remaining from the A.R.P. schemes during the 1939-45 organisation. They have recently been asked to plan and divide out their areas on the basis of the most recent information as to the organisation of a civil defence service. This planning will include the selection of buildings or sites to be earmarked for civil defence controls and depots, after a complete survey has been made of all the possible targets in the area. The duties of civil defence officers are the preparation of civil defence plans, the recruiting and training of personnel, the purchase, storage, maintenance, issue and control of equipment and such other defence duties as may be assigned to them by the local authorities and by the direction of the Minister for Defence. Civil defence officers are appointed by local authorities subject to the approval by the Minister for Defence of the appointments.

By the county managers. The local authority has no say in that.

I think it was Deputy Collins who referred to certain people who, he had been informed, had been sent away on certain courses, and that a civil defence school had been opened. He asked what kind of training would be given at the school. Three types of training will be given. The first will be a course for the various officials of local authorities who will be involved in the organisation and administration of local schemes. The second will be a course for persons to be trained as general instructors, instructors who can give the necessary basic training in anti-gas precautions, fire fighting, decontamination and the civil defence aspects of atomic and biological warfare. Thirdly, a course will be given for persons who will train the rescue services. The training will be realistic and will be with the actual type of equipment which will be used in the operation of the service. For example, buildings will be set on fire and the fire squads will be trained to extinguish the fires. Rescue squads will be trained to rescue live persons from the heart of the debris of the demolished houses. A special training range has been constructed to enable this realistic training to be given. The types of training mentioned are only some of those which will be given.

A.R.P. training is being related to the various types of attack which might be made and to the measures by which local authorities and the people themselves can be trained and equipped to deal with the results of attack. The types of attack against which measures will be required include high explosives, guided missiles, automatic bombs, radiological and biological warfare, incendiary bombs, etc. Local authorities, of course, can only take such steps to deal with the results of these forms of attack as may be practicable.

Deputy Gallagher stated that nothing had happened so far as Dublin is concerned. It is not correct to say that nothing has happened, because as far as Dublin is concerned the civil defence officer has surveyed his area. He has arranged for the training of instructors on the first course in the civil defence school to commence on the 16th June. He has made a tentative division of his area into operational sections and has inquired into the position regarding stores held. He has had a number of discussions with the Department of Defence on particular problems affecting Dublin. The Department of Defence has not yet received any request to meet the civil defence committee for Dublin, but any such meeting can be arranged and the Department would be very willing to discuss the position with the committee. The Department is in touch with all local authorities and city and county managers, and all communications regarding duties to be undertaken or arrangements to be made by civil defence officers are addressed to the local authorities and the managers.

A complaint was made that a number of ex-Army officers were available but that civil defence officers appointed had not served in the Army. In reply to that I would say that civil defence officers are appointed by local authorities. Generally these appointments are made from among the existing staffs of local authorities but without replacement; that is, civil defence becomes an additional duty of an existing officer. In a number of instances, however, whole-time appointments were necessary. The Department is aware that a considerable number of the civil defence officers have had either Army service or service in some of the emergency services.

Some Deputy asked what type of protection will civil defence afford to the people. Civil defence embraces arrangements for the warning of impending air-raids, the provision of shelters, the issue of anti-gas respirators, fire fighting, the rescue of persons trapped after raids, the treatment of casualties, the rehousing and rehabilitation of the homeless. The arrangements also include the protection of vital industries and the organisation of methods to secure alternative functioning of essential services. These are the principal matters. The auxiliary matters include decontamination, clearance of roads and demolished buildings, burial of the dead, and other tasks of that kind.

I was also asked what kind of equipment have we got for civil defence. We have a quantity of equipment for operating personnel; for example, steel helmets and service respirators. We have also a quantity of requisites to deal with casualties; for example, stretchers, splints, bandages and instruments. We have 180 fire-fighting pumps distributed throughout the country. The local authorities are allowed to use these pumps for peacetime purposes as it helps to keep them in working order. The new types of equipment we are looking for include a new respirator for general civilian use and war-time fire appliances as well as monitoring instruments for dealing with radio activity. All these types are not yet in general production and we shall have to wait our turn. We hope at least to get, initially, prototypes for training purposes. The supply position in America and in England is being very closely watched. We will not purchase any equipment that is likely to be described as obsolete or out of date. The only new equipment so far obtained comprises three rescue lorries with full equipment, an additional set of rescue equipment and a mobile gas van for local anti-gas training.

I was also asked why the public are not being made aware of civil defence. In that respect, direct appeals to the public and general publicity are not considered desirable until there is at least a nucleus of trained instructors throughout the country. It is not desired to be put in the position that persons have volunteered for civil defence service and are waiting for a long period without any arrangements being made for their training. We have largely completed our own central training arrangements and are now concentrating on the building up of a local training organisation.

I was also asked what particular method of evacuation is contemplated. The final plan has not yet been evolved, but more than likely it will be on the lines of the arrangements made during the 1939-45 organisation, namely, arrangements for a planned pre-emergency evacuation and further arrangements to cope with evacuation problems occurring during or immediately after an attack.

I was also asked what is the general plan for co-ordinating the Red Cross, civil defence and the Army. The Red Cross functions in relation to civil defence and the Army have been settled with the society for some considerable time. The first function of the society is to organise voluntary aid divisions consisting of personnel who would be prepared in time of hostilities to become subject to military law and to act as auxiliaries of the Army Medical Corps. The second function is to organise first aid divisions consisting of members who for various reasons would not be prepared to assist the Defence Forces. The functions of the first aid divisions will be to assist the civil defence services either by performing nursing and first aid duties or by joining different branches of the civil defence organisation. Each member of the civil defence organisation will require a knowledge of first aid.

Our big difficulty, of course, in respect to the equipping of the civil defence units for the general protection of the public is that it is almost impossible at the present time to secure equipment of that particular type anywhere. We are watching the trend of events everywhere and we have made inquiries both in England and America as to the likelihood or possibility of securing a particular type of equipment.

Would it not be preferable to get the equipment before you get the men?

If the Deputy can tell me where we can get the equipment I will be very glad to go with him to get it.

Why bother about the recruits?

The purpose in getting the men is to have them trained. It would be futile to have the equipment and not have the men trained to handle it.

Supposing there is no prospect of getting it?

Then we shall have to make do with what we have.

I have nothing but sympathy for the Minister in the position in which he is.

I am aware of that and no doubt the Deputy is aware that in the last emergency we got through reasonably well and were adequately protected. Had we not had the men trained to meet the acts of war that were inflicted on us, especially here in Dublin and to a smaller extent down in Wexford, there might have been many more casualties. People were civil defence minded as a result of the organisation we had built up at that time.

It must be the object of any Government, even in the absence of the type of modern equipment for which we are looking, to have men trained in defence as far as it is humanly possible so to train them. I have already mentioned the fact that we are constructing buildings in the Phoenix Park. These buildings will be used for actual demonstrations of fire and the demolition of buildings and so on. Real people will be concerned in these rehearsals, and the personnel engaged will have to act under a considerable amount of risk in the completion of the task set before them. That is as far as we can go at the present moment. I think it is going quite a considerable distance. If the Deputy or anyone else can tell me where we can get the equipment I will be very grateful.

Did you consult Deputy Captain Cowan?

Procuring the equipment is our biggest obstacle at the moment. Having said that, I want the House and the public to understand what is being done in relation to civil defence in order to make the people aware that we are as actively minded in relation to civil defence as we are in regard to military defence. Deputies will understand that the prola tection of the public is the first duty of any Government.

The next subject which loomed very largely in this debate was that of the F.C.A. I find it difficult to approach this particular subject because I am very far from being satisfied with the present position with regard to the F.C.A. The position is not as it should be. Amongst the numerous responsibilities I undertook when I reassumed office as Minister for Defence was the responsibility of endeavouring to instil new life into the F.C.A. When I was in opposition I heard statements of the kind that have been made here recently. I was told that the Army was antagonistic to the F.C.A. I did not believe these stories because, knowing the Army as I did, and knowing what the Army had done in the building up of that force initially, I could hardly credit that the outlook in relation to An Forsa Cosanta Áitiúil had changed in such a very short time. If anything, the desire of the Army would be to build up that force as one which could be relied upon at any time during a period of emergency.

I regret that statements were made here which had a political flavour, statements which should not have been introduced into this debate. Deputy O'Higgins stated "that the former Government undoubtedly did considerable work in building up the local defence force." He continued:

"I know in doing that they did experience a certain apathy from the regular Army personnel towards the F.C.A. The feeling of suspicion had been experienced for a number of years back by people associated with the F.C.A., but I think that is dying. I think that even the most conservative regular Army officers in recent years came to recognise the need for a force such as the F.C.A. It is a pity that in the last 12 months the F.C.A. seems to have been put into a back seat again. The changed outlook has undoubtedly been responsible to a certain extent for the very marked decreases in the available strength for the force ... It is a pity that the Minister should be neglecting the F.C.A. I can see no sense in anyone suggesting that because our standing army is some 2,000 or 3,000 more than it was 12 months ago, therefore we are better able to defend ourselves."

Of course nobody made such a statement and that statement is purely a figment of the Deputy's imagination. Far from neglecting the F.C.A, I have done as much as any Minister ever did for the F.C.A. Deputy O'Higgins also had something to say about the F.C.A.:

"Here by way of criticism might I say that the F.C.A. is not getting the attention from the Army it got heretofore. Heretofore, half the officers of G.H.Q. above the rank of Commandant were out every week-end with the F.C.A., surprise visits, inspections and paying the unit the compliment of a very high G.H.Q. officer moving amongst them... What was done in my time had to be done by drive, drive, drive, by continuous prodding, by always asking what was done last month. Otherwise the F.C.A. would be allowed to fade away. That drive is not there at the moment and the F.C.A. feel it ... I would implore the Minister to look at what attention has been given to the F.C.A. in the last 12 months and compare that with the previous 12 months!"

His imploring was not in vain because, in response to it, I decided to look up and find out what the position was generally in regard to the F.C.A. I was very far from being satisfied with the situation which I found in regard to the F.C.A.

These figures, I think, will show the reasons for my fears, and why I had to give expression to that opinion. On the 31st December, 1947—that was the last year of the Fianna Fáil Government before it was superseded by the Coalition Government—the total number of officers, N.C.O.s and men was 47,880. At the end of 12 months, that is, on the 31st December, 1948, the force was reduced from 47,880 to 39,560, a decrease of 8,320. On the 31st of December, 1949, it had still further decreased from 39,560 to 34,636. That represented a further decrease of 4,924, almost 5,000 men. On the 31st December, 1950, the figures again showed a decrease from 34,636 to 30,311, a decrease of 4,325. On the 30th June, 1951, that was up to the time of the change of Government, the year to which Deputy O'Higgins implored me to look to see what was done in respect of the F.C.A., it had decreased in the six months by no less than 7,941, bringing the total strength down to 22,370.

Would the Minister not agree that there was a weeding out process in regard to its effective strength during that particular period?

The Deputy can make any excuse he likes. We can all hold our own opinions as to what was the cause of the decrease. My own opinion is that there was a lack of activity and excitement. We know that in the old days of the Irish Volunteers if there was anything actively being done you had people coming in in thousands. I am only pointing out the fact, when Deputy O'Higgins tries to imply that whatever is happening at the present time is due to the ineptitude and to the inactivity of the present Minister or the present Government or whatever you like to assign it to, that that is not correct. Here we have a continual bleeding, hæmorrhage from the forces. On the 31st of December, 1951, the figure was 22,436, and while we are discussing this Estimate here the figure is now down to 18,115.

These are rather depressing figures. I do not think myself that they mean anything other than what I have suggested, that, if to-morrow there was a call to arms for some emergency purpose, we would not only have the 47,800 that existed in December, 1947, but would probably have every man that was trained in the F.C.A. during all the intervening years, men who had come in and had gone out again. The astonishing thing that I find, in connection with the F.C.A., is that men are coming in and are going out at the rate of 4,000 or 5,000 a year. We have a continuous influx into the ranks and an exodus following that.

I was only a couple of months in the Department of Defence—after I had dealt with the other matters to which I have been referring in the course of my statement—when I took up the matter of the F.C.A. and the general situation in regard to it. I wrote a long minute to the Chief of Staff. pointing out my fears with regard to the whole situation. I asked him for suggestions as to ways and means by which this depletion could be brought to an end, for any suggestions as to better conditions, or ways and means, by which we could find equipment to interest them. The general report which I received led me to believe that the Army authorities, while doing everything possible to interest the F.C.A., were having little success.

I visited every command in the country, and everywhere I went my first anxiety, naturally, was to find out what was the actual position in regard to the F.C.A. It was almost the same everywhere I went. Here is an example. In the Southern Command the officer there, who is very alert, very efficient and very sympathetic, designed a series of lectures to cover, I think, a period of six weeks, a lecture per week. The series of lectures was very well advertised amongst the members of the F.C.A. all over the area. Appeals were made to the individuals concerned to come forward and to participate in the lectures. They were told that they would be very informative, very instructive and very beneficial to both rank and file. What happened? On the first night the lecturer, the officer concerned, appeared at the hall and found an audience of six men. Naturally, he was very depressed, after all the trouble he had gone to, and after all the trouble the authorities had gone to, to publicise the lecture, to find six individuals sitting facing him. Nevertheless, he decided to deliver his lecture. He did so, and he appealed to the six who were there to inform their comrades that the second lecture would be delivered on that night week.

The officer went away and reported what had happened. He returned again in the following week. To his amazement he found six more men facing him to hear the second of a series of lectures. The astonishing thing about the situation was that they were six different men. They were not the six men who had had the benefit of the first of the series of lectures. Then, having again made his appeal to these men and having reported the unsatisfactory situation, he returned and on his third visit, he found two or three men from the first group and the same from the second group. His lectures were a complete waste of time. The first group heard the first lecture but did not hear the second. The second group heard the second lecture but did not hear the first, and some of each group heard the third lecture. There is another side to the case. It is the sort of thing that depresses the Army authorities who are held responsible for the success of this particular service.

Again, this situation occurred. The officer in a particular command organised a field day. A field day is one of the most valuable forms of training for the F.C.A. that the Army authorities can devise. They planned it several weeks ahead. All arrangements were made for it. The Army authorities themselves had everything prepared in the way of rations and other requirements for the men for the day. When the staff of Army officers turned up for this long-arranged and well-advertised field day they found just a few men— not sufficient to entitle them to go out and hold what they could describe as a field day. Therefore, they had to abandon the project. An inquiry was then made as to why, after all the trouble and difficulty, this particular field day failed in the manner in which it did.

The reason was that there was a replay of a football match—a thing which could not have been foreseen. The Army authorities arranged the field day for a certain day after having gone to the trouble of ensuring that this day would be open as far as sport was concerned. They could not foresee that two somewhat prominent football teams would draw in a game, and that a replay would be fixed for this particular day. That is what happened. I very respectfully suggest to the F.C.A. that if they are serious about making the F.C.A. a force on which the nation can depend, they will have to choose between amusements of that kind and their duty to the nation. If the members of the F.C.A. are not prepared to make that sacrifice, I cannot see what more the Army authorities can do than they are doing at the present time. I have brought to their notice the statements which have been made that they are, to some extent, not interested in the F.C.A. Their reply was to show me the number of schemes which they had prepared and the results of the schemes —examples not quite as outstanding as those I have given, but examples which, to some extent, would prevent any body of men continuing to have that active interest that the Army authorities should have.

When Deputy Dr. O'Higgins spoke on this Estimate he said something which I am sure a lot of Deputies will agree with. I would be prepared to agree with him myself. I quote from Volume 132, No. 3, column 349, of the Official Report:—

"It is unreasonable to expect men to lose money as a result of turning up for annual training. I hold very, very strongly that, when the F.C.A. personnel turn up for such training with the Regular Army, they should receive marriage allowance, children's allowances and every other allowance in the way of pay in addition to the ordinary training bonus that is given. I maintain that they should be equated with the conditions existing for soldiers."

Deputy Dr. O'Higgins has put that on record as his belief. He was the Minister for Defence for three years, and I have no doubt that he made an effort to bring about that position. If he did make an effort in that respect, he failed. He is putting it up to me now to succeed where he failed. I do not mind telling the House that I will have a try. If, as Deputy Dr. O'Higgins believed—and I, too, share his belief to some extent—we can succeed, it will improve, perhaps to some extent anyhow, attendances at the annual camps and perhaps at the courses which the Army authorities are continually imploring the officers of the F.C.A. to attend, but with very little success.

I should mention also that the standard of the officers of the F.C.A. could be much higher than it is if they would only attend the courses. I quite realise that this is a voluntary force and that the full course would cover a period of three months. Even in three months it would not be possible to impart to them all the knowledge that would be necessary but it is the shortest possible period that the Army can suggest. It is short when one considers that the cadets—that is, officers-to-be—have to do two years in the training college before they can begin their career as officers. It is only when they begin their career as officers that, in fact, they begin their education. I realise that the three months' period is a difficult period for civilians in employment because of the question of securing release from their employment. If it is possible that the extensions of marriage allowance, children's allowances and all these allowances to which the Regular Army officer is entitled will encourage them to go into annual camps to do the courses which the Army are so anxious they should do, then certainly I shall make every possible effort to secure that these allowances will be granted.

It is difficult to know what to say about the attendance of Regular Army officers at the F.C.A. parades—that is, the nightly parades. When the F.C.A. was established, regular officers and regular N.C.O.s were attached to these units to develop the units from the military point of view and to put them under expert guidance initially. It was hoped that, perhaps, in the course of a year or 18 months, the officers of the F.C.A. itself would develop the self-confidence necessary to enable them to undertake the complete and entire handling of the F.C.A. unit themselves. It was formed in 1946 and this is the year 1952 and, with some honourable exceptions, the position is practically as it was at the beginning. Officers are not prepared to undertake the control and full responsibility of these units and, until they undergo these courses of training which the Army are so strongly advocating, I am afraid that that self-confidence which would make them capable of taking that control will be absent.

The position is that there is no use in this House, or Deputies in this House condemning, more or less wholeheartedly, the Army authorities for whatever defects there may be in the F.C.A. As far as I am concerned, I am satisfied that the Army authorities will do everything and anything that is possible to make this force a success. They realise only too well, just as well as any reasonable Deputy, that to have a force of that kind behind the Army, consisting of 30,000 or 40,000 partly-trained soldiers, would be an asset that should not, and could not, be ignored. Naturally, having that viewpoint, why should they be antagonistic to the F.C.A. or take up the attitude that has been suggested in this House of neglecting the F.C.A.? I am satisfied that that is not the position, that that is not so.

I go on from that to the more or less general situation which was discussed in a manner similar to the manner in which the other points which I have dealt with were discussed. However much we may hope and pray that this country will not be invaded, it is our duty, and it would be the duty of any Government, to ensure that, as far as lies within the power of that Government, every effort will be made to prevent an attack upon the freedom of this country. We heard Deputy Dillon on this subject. He was very vocal. He gave us his views in general, on heavy artillery and light artillery, on the value of the orthodox method and the value of the guerrilla method, and all that sort of thing. In the course of his speech he used these words:—

"The danger against which we must provide is airborne invasion by the Russians. There is not any other danger. The Americans are not going to invade this country and they will not let the British invade it. The Russians may."

When Deputy Dillon made that statement I began to ask myself if Deputy Dillon had a private Department of External Affairs of his own, because I am conscious of the fact that in the last emergency the then Taoiseach made every possible effort to get a guarantee from our neighbours and the associates of our neighbours that this country would not be invaded and he failed to get that guarantee. He did not get it although he made a very strong plea for it. Yet Deputy Dillon can stand up in this House and he can, apparently, unequivocally tell us——

He can express an opinion. It is an expression of opinion. What else could it be?

It is an expression of opinion that should not be given if he has not got these guarantees.

How would he get any such guarantees?

He is a responsible member of the Opposition and as a responsible member of the Opposition we expect him to make responsible statements.

He is not responsible.

What irresponsible statement did he make?

He expressed an opinion.

I regard him as a responsible member of the Opposition when he stands up to speak on a subject of this kind. The reason why I am dealing with this statement is that Deputy Dillon is regarded as being a responsible member of this House by the people outside.

That is right; not within the House.

You would be a good judge.

If he makes a statement that the Americans are not going to invade this country it is to be assumed that he is making a statement of fact, and we ought to know where he got his guarantees because there is this about that statement, that, if it was a fact, people might say that there is no reason in the wide world why we should be expending money on defence if the great American nation is not contemplating invasion of this country or the British nation is not contemplating invasion of this country. As I said just a few minutes ago, in the last emergency our Government failed completely to get that guarantee. When Deputy Dillon makes a statement of that kind he seems to forget that one of these nations has its foot firmly planted in the heart of one of our most historic provinces. He ignores that fact completely. If the Russians had their foot in our province we would be sitting up and taking a lot of notice of it, and Deputy Dillon would too, I am sure, but that is not the position. The position is that any military staff that would attempt to ignore that situation would not be doing their duty.

On the question of whether we should have heavy artillery or light, artillery or rifles or machine-guns, that, again, is a matter of opinion. As far as I am concerned, I want to say that I am not wedded to heavy artillery at all because I know that, in certain circumstances, it might be impossible to get away heavy artillery and we might have groups of men dying beside their guns rather than surrender them. We can secure for this country weapons like the Brandt mortar, of which we have a number, machine-guns, anti-tank weapons, weapons that are ideally suited for a country of this kind where the country is so close. I think it would be agreed that our terrain is anti-tank terrain. With the exception of the main roads, I do not think progress by the tank method could be achieved with much success. Therefore, except for attacking definite posts such as cities or fortified positions, I doubt if heavy artillery is desirable at all in our present situation. I think we must concentrate on a lighter type of an equally destructive weapon.

When we talk of guerrilla warfare, as opposed to orthodox military action, so long as the situation in the North is as it is, any military staff worth its salt in this country will have to rely on the orthodox method. It may be that, in due course, they will have to resort to the other method, the method to which, I would say, our people are temperamentally suited and in which we have, perhaps, given a lead to the world. If we ever have to resort to it again, it is possible that we shall be resorting to it with a tradition behind us which will be of considerable value. There will also be the fact that we shall have weapons in our possession that we did not have in the last struggle which we undertook.

Before I leave that subject, I should say that, as far as this Government is concerned, we are carrying out the policy which we carried out in the last emergency and we shall continue to carry out that policy until such time as conditions make it necessary to bring about a change. If any changes are necessary, this House will be made fully aware of the position in that respect.

Some Deputy raised a question as to the amount of money that is being expended on new vehicles—£88,000 is, I think, the sum involved. I want to inform the House that that sum is provided merely for replacements, and these replacements will be made over the course of a number of years.

Then it will not be spent this year.

If we can get the vehicles it will be spent this year and in the years to follow. Replacements will follow year by year. The sum is being allotted for that particular purpose, to replace vehicles which have been used over a considerable number of years, and which are to all intents and purposes now beyond service.

It would be an economy to replace them.

It would be. The question of married quarters has been referred to. A committee has been set up to ascertain to what extent married quarters can be improved. The whole problem is bound up with the housing problem generally. The matter of certain barracks and forts was mentioned by Deputy Desmond, but these places are not at present occupied.

Reference was also made to the number of civilians in the Army. Last year we provided for 2,042 civilians, and this year we are providing for 2,117, an increase of 75 men. The increase is due to the necessity of providing more tradesmen for maintenance work and the extension of the branch dealing with civil defence. The whole trend in our Army, as in all others, is to employ civilians on non-military work, and to leave the soldiers to deal with purely military matters.

I shall conclude on this note. Deputy MacEoin raised the question of the demonstration of the new weapons. If Deputy MacEoin or any other Deputy in this House is anxious to have a demonstration, I should be very pleased to make arrangements to have Deputies who indicate that they would like to see this demonstration, conveyed to wherever the demonstration will take place, but the demonstration would have to take place on a given day. If Deputies are anxious to see these weapons in action, I shall be only too pleased to make the necessary arrangements.

I gladly accept that invitation from the Minister. My complaint was that when a demonstration was being given, you could invite army officers from the two nations which Deputy Dillon said would not invade us and that when you were giving a demonstration to them, it did not strike somebody that some Deputies on this side of the House would like to be there on that occasion. It means that you have to make further arrangements now and incur further expenditure for another demonstration. That expenditure should have been avoided. There is no question about it; I should like to see them. I cannot speak for any body else but I am sure that there are other Deputies who would be glad to have the opportunity.

I should certainly like to see them too.

I was not in for all of the Minister's speech but I should like to know if he dealt with the question of compensation for the relatives of Army personnel who may be killed in the course of military practice or when engaged on military duties.

That does not arise on this Vote. That would come under the Pensions Vote.

Vote put and agreed to.
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