I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time. The purpose of this Bill is to bring about a much-needed amendment and reform of our civil law. Far too little time has been devoted in our discussions here to bringing about amendment of the law which deals with the ordinary everyday life of the people. We spend a great deal of time in passing Bills which do not affect in the slightest many of the real problems which face the people. It is for that reason that we, on these benches, have introduced this Bill to bring about in one particular a much-needed reform of the law.
The Bill is styled the Civil Liability Bill and, as its title would indicate, it is intended to deal with the common law affecting liability for wrongs done between one citizen and another. I do not think it is necessary to weary the House by a discussion on our common law with regard to civil wrongs. Suffice to say that all Deputies will appreciate that if one citizen is careless and negligent in the way he conducts himself and, as a result, causes harm and injury to another citizen, he commits a civil wrong or tort entitling the person injured to sue him and recover such monetary compensation as a court may decide to give him. That is a very simple right which the law gives to all citizens and a sanction which it imposes against a wrong-doing of a civil kind.
If a person does something wrong, short of a crime, injures another person, that person is entitled to sue him and get compensation. Needless to say, it is that rule which ensures that each one of us in our everyday life tries to be careful and tries to have due regard to the ordinary rights of others, knowing that otherwise we might find ourselves sued and damages for injury recovered against us.
That rule of common law is as oldas the law itself, but after it was first recognised a rule grew up to the effect that if the injured party, the person who suffered the wrong, the person who was hurt, had been a little bit careless and if his carelessness contributed to the injury he suffered, then he was not entitled to sue anyone. If two people were driving—it may have been chariots in those days—and both were going a little carelessly, one more so than the other and one was seriously injured, neither could sue the other because the fault of each one had contributed to the injury. It was in that way that this defence of "contributory negligence" grew up.
I want to impress on Deputies the real harm and hardship that has been done and that is being done by this rule of the ordinary common law. Right throughout the years it defeated the claims of a person who was seriously and gravely injured as a result of an accident to which he had contributed in some very slight degree. That person for all time lost any right to get any compensation from anyone.
On account of the real hardship of the rule of contributory negligence, which prevented an injured person from suing, our courts here and in England tried to get out of the effect of that rule. They created a new rule of law which was called "the rule of the last or final opportunity". It arose in this way, that if two motorcars were being driven up to a corner, say one of them being driven too fast and the other on its incorrect side of the road, and they collided at or around the corner, and if before the collision took place the person who was sued later had an opportunity of avoiding the negligence of the person who was suing, then the person suing would be entitled to recover.
It was and is an artificial method, whereby the courts have endeavoured for some time past to defeat the hardship of the defence of contributory negligence. Unfortunately, even that way out is being closed now. To-day the tendency has been more and more to get away from what is called "the third question" and to leave to a jury only two questions—was the defendantnegligent, and was the plaintiff negligent? If the answers to both questions are in the affirmative, the action fails. Every day in the courts seriously injured persons are being deprived of all compensation. For that reason, we on these benches have suggested that some step to reform the law should be taken.
The proposal contained in this Bill is not a novel one, it is nothing very new or startling or strange. It is a proposal that has been tried in relation to collisions between ships at sea, over a great number of years. It is a proposal entitling a court investigating an accident or a collision to say that, by the amount that the person injured was at fault, but by no more, that person's damages will be reduced. If the person was equally at fault with the person sued, instead of getting the full amount, say, £100, which a judge might decide his injuries entitle him to, he will get only £50. That is what is called the Admiralty rule in relation to contributory negligence. It has been in operation, as I say, in relation to collisions at sea for a great number of years and is, in that connection, part of our existing statute law, being incorporated in the Maritime Conventions Act of 1911; but in any event, it is already recognised by one branch of our law, a branch of the law which does not often arise and is not frequently discussed in the courts.
It is a strange thing that that particular rule has never been applied to the ordinary accident that occurs every day in circumstances in which people seriously injured are unable to get any redress. It was this very hardship in relation to the rule of contributory negligence that caused members of the British House of Commons some years ago to get down to discuss and to see in what way the common law, which then in England was the same as it is now in Ireland, could be modified to give some relief and some redress. I think it is a tribute to that law reform committee of the British House of Commons under the chairmanship of the present Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell-Fyffe, that, even in the middle of the turmoil and destruction of the last war, they nevertheless found timeto consider the common law as it affected and applied to ordinary British subjects.
That law reform committee was responsible for the introduction of a great number of very worthwhile law reform statutes. I will refer to only one of them which was passed in 1945. It was entitled "an Act to amend the law relating to contributory negligence and for purposes connected therewith." That Act, styled as the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, a British statute, introduced into the law of civil liability in England, into road accident cases and ordinary negligence actions, the Admiralty rule with regard to damage and contributory negligence.
I know that, since that Act was passed in Britain in 1945, a very great social wrong has been remedied. To-day the person who walks along a British road or footpath, possibly without keeping his eyes open and having due regard to everything that is taking place, who might be a little careless and who is severely injured by a negligent, drunken or careless motorist, knows that he can go to a court of law, that he can sue that motorist for damages, that he can say to a judge or jury: "I know that I was not as careful as I should have been—I was a little to blame myself —but that does not disentitle me to relief," and can get, under the Law Reform Act of 1945, a judge or a jury to assess what damages his injuries entitle him to, be it £1,000 or whatever other sum it may be. He can then get the judge or jury to consider whether or not he himself was at fault and, if so, whether he was 5 per cent., 10 per cent., 25 or 50 per cent. at fault and by the amount to which he was at fault the damages the jury have already found will be reduced.
That statute rule in England is fair both to the person sued and to the person injured, because the person sued knows that the unfortunate person who is injured, who loses an arm or a leg, has been punished by that loss in respect of whatever fault he may have been responsible for and the person who is injured gets fromthe wrongdoer some contribution for the injury he has suffered. This Bill proposes to introduce, with certain differences which are necessary, the same rule as now exists in Britain under the British Act of 1945. The material section is Section 2 which provides—I think I should read the first paragraph, because it sets out what is proposed to be done:
"Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own negligence and partly of the negligence of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the negligence of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage."
This epitomises the purpose of the Bill, to visit as a punishment for contributory negligence, not the entire defeat of the claim, but the reduction in the damages that may be recovered. Section 2 of the Bill proposes to do that.
There is also in sub-section (2) of the section a consequential provision in relation to negligence causing death. In Britain, by another of the law reform statutes, the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, provision was made whereby in respect of action brought arising out of carelessness which caused death, actions brought by the dependents of a deceased person, the fault or carelessness of the deceased person does not defeat a claim, but again, there is a reduction in the amount of damages.
Sub-section (2) provides that where the action is in respect of the death of a person, the damages to be recovered by the dependents shall be reduced by the degree to which the deceased person was at fault, if the court finds that he was at fault.
Under Section 3 it is necessary to provide for consequential provisions in relation to the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1934. As the House is no doubt aware, under the Workmen'sCompensation Act, 1934, a workman who is injured in the course of his employment has alternative remedies, in the first instance, open to him. He may proceed under the Act against his employer or he may proceed at common law to sue for damages. The Workmen's Compensation Act provides that if his claim for damages is dismissed—possibly on the ground that, voluntarily, he undertook the risk or that partly he was at fault himself— the same court is entitled to award him the compensation under the Act— subject, of course, to the costs of the action. When drafting this Bill, I had in mind the possibility that a workman who sued at common law under his right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and who ordinarily might be entitled, say, to £300 or £400 damages but who was, perhaps, 75 per cent. at fault and accordingly found his damages reduced to £100, might like to say: "I will not take those damages. I prefer now to go back to what I would have had under the Workmen's Compensation Act." Provision is made under Section 3 whereby he is entitled to do that if the damages he is likely to recover or has recovered in the common law action are not high enough.
That would apply, in particular, to fatal cases. If a workman is killed in the course of his employment his widow and family together are entitled to £600 compensation. The dependents of the workman who is killed may still have a right to bring an action under the Fatal Accidents Act. By reason of the abolition, as proposed in this Bill, of the defence of contributory negligence and the reduction of the damages in such an action they might find that they were getting, say, £500 from a court whereas they would be entitled to £600 under the Workmen's Compensation Acts. In those circumstances, the Bill entitles them to say that they would prefer to retain their rights under the Workmen's Compensation Acts.
Section 4 provides that nothing in the Bill will interfere with or concern the present rule in relation to Admiralty cases—to collisions at sea. That is already dealt with under the MaritimeOffences Act, 1911. It also provided under Section 4 that the Act will not apply to any acts or omissions before the passing of the Bill into law.
It is proposed in Section 5 to bring about a slight amendment of the Tortfeasors Act, 1951. As the House is aware, the Tortfeasors Act, 1951, introduces the right of two people who were injury to another to halve contributions between them as to the damages they might have to pay to the injured party. That right of contribution and apportionment of damages is set out in Section 4 of the Tortfeasors Act of 1951. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of that Act provides that no apportionment shall be made in any case under sub-section (1) unless the judge is satisfied that all persons liable as tortfeasors in respect of the injury are before the court. In practice, that particular sub-section has meant that the entire section has not been workable. The House will appreciate the position that would arise if, for example, there was a collision in this city between a C.I.E. omnibus and an ordinary motor vehicle, which might be driven by a chauffeur or some employee of the owner, and if a person travelling in the bus was injured and sued C.I.E. and the owner of the car that collided with the bus. Both of these vehicles would have been driven by employees of the owners. The C.I.E. bus would have been driven by a bus-driver and the motor car by some person other than the owner.
Nobody in his senses would bother about suing the two drivers but the two drivers are tortfeasors: they, in fact, brought about the injury. Under the Tortfeasors Act the court could not apportion in those circumstances unless all the persons liable as tortfeasors were before the court. In effect, that has meant that no apportionment has been possible. Section 5 of this Bill proposes to remedy that situation by providing that the court can, in those circumstances, apportion if it thinks fit or, if it prefers, may adjourn the question of apportionment.
I appreciate that certain opposition may be expressed to this Bill. Insurance companies may possibly, suggestthat this Bill will put them out of business. There will be that type of opposition but, in fact, there is nothing in it. Undoubtedly, more decrees will be given and more actions will be fought. More persons will recover compensation but the amounts of compensation will in many cases be far less. To-day where a person is injured in circumstances which might suggest a sharing of the fault, and the injuries are serious, it often means that the injured person is entitled to £10,000 or nothing. There is no in-between. The insurance company or the defendant face an award from a jury of £10,000 or, if they are lucky, they get away with nothing. Under this Bill it might mean in those circumstances that an award would be given but it would be substantially less. There may be more awards but I have no doubt that even the indemnifying companies will find that the decrees given will in the long run be far less.
It is always a good thing, in proposing a matter of this kind, to be able to point to experience elsewhere. Anybody who has any knowledge of the law courts in the Six Counties and in Britain will appreciate that the Contributory Negligence Act of 1945 has worked extremely well and has brought about a very beneficial result to this branch of the law. I have no doubt that the same result is desirable here and it can be achieved only by a method of law reform of this kind.
