When this debate was adjourned, I was dealing with the question of the usefulness of the Defence Forces in rendering assistance to civil defence in the event of this country being subjected to nuclear attack. In that respect, I can assure the movers of the motion that I fully appreciate the importance of having the Army trained in the technique of civil defence. I cannot, however, agree with one of the movers when he says that the money at present being spent on the Defence Forces should be diverted to this other purpose of civil defence. Even if the Army were converted completely to the civil defence notion, it would not lessen the urgent need at the moment for a widespread civil defence organisation, and it is on such a voluntary organisation that our plans must be based.
I am fully in agreement with Deputy McQuillan when he speaks about the desirability of training our people as a whole in civil defence, but, unfortunately, we cannot train the people, if they will not volunteer for the civil defence services. I must admit that so far we have not succeeded in getting the people genuinely interested in that matter of civil defence. That is a problem which will have to be tackled. The only satisfactory way in which civil defence organisations can be got going is through the local authorities and, with one or two exceptions, the local authorities have been very apathetic in regard to civil defence. I hope that Deputies will do all they can to encourage greater enrolment in the voluntary civil defence organisations. I feel sure that if a catastrophe, such as would result from a nuclear attack took place, everybody would want to help, but if people were untrained, they would be practically useless in such an emergency.
I was dealing with some of the ways in which the Army could help in such an emergency, in the event of the country being attacked with nuclear weapons. I had mentioned that light aircraft and mobile units of the Army would be suitable for the reconnaissance of damaged radio-active centres. The infantry units of the Army and the engineers could be usefully employed in rescue operations and in the restoration of damaged communications. The Army medical units would be useful in rendering first aid and in assisting in the evacuation of the injured. The Army signal units would be useful when ordinary telephonic communications had been destroyed. I think these considerations, coupled with the undoubted fact that, in future, the conditions of warfare are unlikely to allow us any appreciable time for expanding our Defence Forces, only serve to lay emphasis on the necessity for maintaining the maximum force in peacetime, rather than on a reduction of our strength, as the movers of the motion seem to want. It should be realised that the existing force here is very far from excessive.
With regard to the question of economy, when I moved the Estimate here last year I expressed the view that it was necessary to achieve the utmost economy compatible with maintaining the efficiency of the Defence Forces but at the same time I did draw attention to the fact that there was a substantial reduction in comparison with the net Estimate for the previous year. I said that economy could be achieved only as a result of a determined effort to bring about the maximum saving on every service and activity covered by the Estimate. I can assure the House that in the meantime everything possible has been done, and is still being done, to achieve every possible economy.
With regard to the proportion of officers and N.C.O.s to the other ranks in the Army, to which Deputy McQuillan referred and has been accustomed to refer on every possible occasion in this House, it is not fair criticism merely to quote the numbers of officers and N.C.O.s and then quote the number of private soldiers in the Army and say this proportion is too high. It is not fair to forget the fact that there is also the Fórsa Cosanta Áitiúil and the First Line Reserve to be trained and that there must be available a sufficient number of regular officers and N.C.O.s to assist in the training and organisation of these reserve forces.
In addition, it should be remembered that the present Army is organised merely as a nucleus, capable of being expanded in the event of an emergency. While it is not necessary to have the full complement of officers and N.C.O.s that would be required for the ultimate Army we would hope to have in the event of an emergency, still it is necessary to have a sufficient number of trained officers and N.C.O.s to allow of expansion in such circumstances.
I can also assure the House that the general staff is keeping abreast, as far as possible, with modern developments in warfare and that our defence organisation and planning is under constant review in the light of these developments. I cannot, then, subscribe to the idea, as stated in this motion, that defence expenditure is wasteful in large measure. So far from that being so, I am convinced that the amount being spent on defence is the bare minimum if we are to make any pretence at all at defending ourselves. If the movers feel we should abandon all pretence at defending ourselves and let somebody else undertake our defence, I should be glad if they would say so and if they would indicate who they would wish to undertake our defence for us. The proportion of our Budget devoted to this essential form of insurance is very much smaller than in the case of almost any other country that could be mentioned.
The motion goes on to propose that:
"A Select Committee consisting of 14 members to be nominated by the Committee of Selection, of whom six shall be a quorum, should be appointed, with power to send for persons, papers and records to inquire into, consider and report upon the whole question of national defence expenditure."
On that proposal I can only repeat that the Defence Forces are the State's insurance policy against internal disorder and external aggression. It is the responsibility of the Government to decide to what extent they should hold this insurance, and, in my opinion, no Government worthy of the name would be prepared to hand over that responsibility to a committee, as suggested in this motion. No Government would be prepared to allow themselves to be circumscribed by such a committee in such important matters. I find it hard to believe that the proposers of the motion expected that suggestion to be taken seriously.
The only effect that the setting up of such a committee would have would be to obscure the real functions of the Government, the Minister and the general staff. The effect of that would be to render more difficult the proper fulfilment of these different responsibilities. If these were to be done in the case of the Department of Defence, I cannot see why there should not also be a demand for it to be done in the case of other Departments. If a system like that were to develop, the result would be chaos.
In concluding, it might be no harm to quote some remarks of Deputy McQuillan when dealing with the Defence Estimate in 1955. At that time, as reported in column 105 of the Dáil Debates of the 5th July, 1955, Deputy McQuillan said:—
"There is little, perhaps, that we can do in the line of defence against atomic or nuclear warfare."
He went on:—
"It is, therefore, essential that we scrutinise the policy of the present Government in connection with the defence of the country and, in connection with it, the amount of money it is proposed to expend on an army and the type of army on which this money will be expended. My personal belief is that we should have a small army composed of personnel on a permanent basis and that this small army should consist of the cream of our soldiers, officers, N.C.O.s and men; that it would be highly trained and mobile and at the same time capable of very rapid expansion and able to take in, in times of emergencies, larger groups who would be trained on a basis of three or six months a year. The actual size of this standing army is something on which we can agree to differ—there may be differences of opinion as to whether it should be 12,000 or 8,000, and I do not propose to enter into the lists to discuss that particular aspect of the matter- I think it should be left to people who are more expert on that than we are to make recommendations as to what the actual size of that small, but well trained, force should be."
I think that that is, to a certain extent, a description of the type of Army we have at the moment. I note that at that time, just two years ago, Deputy McQuillan was prepared to leave to people more expert the responsibility of making recommendations as to the type of Army we should have. I do not know if in the meantime Deputy McQuillan thinks he has become an expert on the subject——