I move:—
"That the Dáil takes note of the Report and Accounts of Coras Iompair Éireann for the year 1959/60."
There are many satisfactory developments to note in the Report and Accounts of C.I.E. for the year 1959/60 which I will mention in the course of my speech. The immediate reason for arranging this Debate at this time is, however, the anxiety of many Deputies for a discussion on the subject of the closing of branch lines. The question of closing any particular branch line cannot usefully, or even intelligently, be considered in isolation from the overall position of public transport. It is not yet even three years since the Oireachtas passed the Transport Act, 1958, which gave to C.I.E. carefully expressed powers to close uneconomic branch lines.
There was then no opposition from any side of the House to delegating these powers to C.I.E. and the only point of difference which arose on the relevant Section was whether C.I.E. should have an absolute obligation in all circumstances to provide a substitute road service whenever they terminated a rail service. As C.I.E. have in all cases provided such substitute services, this question has never become a practical issue.
To consider why the Dáil unanimously voted these powers to C.I.E. it is necessary to cast one's mind back to the circumstances which led up to the enactment of the Transport Act, 1958. In June, 1956, the Chairman of C.I.E. submitted to the then Minister for Industry and Commerce a report which indicated that despite Exchequer assistance to the amount of £12 million over the seven years 1949-50 to 1955-56 and the raising of £7 million by means of stock issues guaranteed by the Minister for Finance to meet the cost of dieselising the undertaking and providing new rolling stock, losses nevertheless continued to grow and the railways continued to lose both freight and passenger traffic. Annual losses, which had then reached £1.6 million—representing £2 million for the railway alone—had to be borne by the Exchequer. The only remedy which C.I.E. could suggest was drastic and entirely unacceptable restriction of private transport.
The precarious condition of public transport in this country revealed by the C.I.E. report raised as a practical and urgent issue the question of whether public transport, or at any rate the railway undertaking of C.I.E. should or could be maintained at all. The then Government decided to refer the matter for urgent examination to a special Committee of Inquiry—the Committee of Inquiry into Internal Transport, known popularly as the Beddy Committee after its Chairman, Dr. J.P. Beddy.
The Committee's report, which was published in May, 1957, was a most comprehensive and informative one which subjected our transport problems to the most rigorous examination and analysis and which arrived at some challenging, but in all the circumstances, heartening conclusions. The Government decided that in the main the recommendations in the Report were soundly based and, with some important modifications, should be implemented. The Minister for Industry and Commerce when introducing the Supplementary Estimate for Transport and Marine Services on 27th November, 1957, indicated that the necessary legislation to implement that decision would be prepared and the Transport Bill, 1958, was subsequently introduced in May, 1958.
The Committee of Inquiry had reported that they could see no reasonable justification for the continuation of the railway undertaking of C.I.E. as then constituted and operated, but they considered that the railways should be given a limited period of years under conditions wholly different from those then prevailing to show whether their continuance could be justified in the national interest.
The Committee rejected decisively and categorically the proposals made by C.I.E. for limitation of private transport. They also considered that subsidies for the railways could not be justified save for the transitional period during which the railway undertaking could be reorganised on the lines proposed by them.
In regard to the reorganisation of the railways, the Committee recommended reduction of the length of line and number of stations while still providing that as many as possible of the areas served by C.I.E. should be within convenient reach of a railway station by short motor transport.
The Committee made it clear that they did not possess the necessary information to make firm recommendations as to the precise lines and stations which should be closed, but, as shown on the map at page 186 of the Report, they suggested relatively drastic pruning of the railway system which would reduce the mileage of line from 1,918 to 850.
The Committee also recommended the closest co-ordination of rail and road transport, and urged that C.I.E. should operate with strict impartiality as between road and rail, using to the fullest extent the advantages of each type of transport.
In other words, the Committee looked unsentimentally on the railway as a means of transport, and not as an end in itself They could see justification in retaining railway services only in so far as they contributed to an economic and efficient public transport system and they believed that a large part of the railway could usefully and profitably be retained for that purpose, if the hopelessly uneconomic parts were pruned and if the "railway-first-at-any-price" system of operation were abandoned.
On the second stage of the Transport Bill, 1958, the Minister for Industry and Commerce made it clear that the Government did not accept the specific suggestions in the Report relating to the reduction of the mileage of railway lines or the number of stations, which in any case the Committee had put forward only as an illustration.
It was the Government's view that the actual implementation of a reorganisation policy on the lines suggested by the Committee could be undertaken only by the Board of C.I.E., who alone had day-to-day administrative responsibilities and access to all the relevant facts and who alone, therefore, were able to judge the value of any particular section of a line or any particular station to the community and the prospects of operating it economically within the foreseeable future.
The Bill, therefore, empowered the Board to close down any line or station for which there was clearly no future and to do so on their own decision. They were, however, given a statutory direction not to terminate any rail service unless they first satisfied themselves that there were no prospects of its continued operation being economic within a reasonable period.
The Board were also placed under a general obligation so to conduct the undertaking as to eliminate losses on its working by 31st March, 1964. These provisions meant that the fate of any branch line or any station depended on whether sufficient business was generated to justify its retention and, in effect, therefore, that the future of these lines and stations fell to be determined primarily by the amount of local support given to them.
When this Bill was introduced, almost two years after the submission of the C.I.E. report to which I have referred, the financial position of the undertaking and particularly the railway had deteriorated still further. The losses, which had amounted to £1.6 million in 1956, had grown to £1.7 million in 1956/57 and for the year 1957/58 had swollen to £2.3 million.
It was clear to every Deputy that the powers proposed for C.I.E. were essential and if public transport were to be preserved, that C.I.E. might well have to use them drastically and the probable measure of the pruning which would be required was inevitably estimated in the light of the suggestions made by the Committee of Inquiry. These powers were, nevertheless, voted unanimously. The only point of difference arose on whether C.I.E. should have an absolute obligation to provide a substitute road service.
The extent to which the Government and the House believed that relatively drastic pruning of the railway system and the general reorganisation of C.I.E. might be necessary was further evidenced by the provision made in the Bill whereby the heavy cost of compensation of redundant employees would be met by the Exchequer in the case of redundancy occurring within the five-year period of reorganisation provided for.
The capital was drastically written down to relieve the Board of the load of deadweight debt and provision was made for the payment of a subsidy to the Board at a fixed rate over the five-year period of reorganisation, after which it would be expected to continue entirely without State assistance.
The Bill was accepted by the House as a measure to enable a once-and-for-all, realistic and rational reorganisation of our public transport system to be undertaken which would necessarily involve the pruning of hopelessly uneconomic railway services and the rational co-ordination of road and rail traffic.
The decision to give sole statutory responsibility to C.I.E. for deciding whether any particular rail service should be terminated was a new departure, carefully considered and deliberately implemented by the Oireachtas. It was obvious to every Deputy that C.I.E. would use these powers subject to the limitations provided and that public opposition and agitation could be expected to greet every proposal to close a branch line no matter how uneconomic it might be.
Against this background, it is difficult to see why the closing of a few branch lines by C.I.E. should now cause consternation or should be regarded as a matter of urgent public importance. C.I.E. have, in fact, closed lines and stations to a far more moderate degree than was envisaged in 1958 and the reorganisation planned by them, which will be completed with the closing of the West Cork line, will leave in existence many services not featured in the railway pattern envisaged by the Committee of Inquiry. They will have closed only 420 miles of railway as compared with over 1,000 miles suggested by the Beddy Committee.
It is still more difficult to understand these protests when regard is had to the progress made by the new Board of C.I.E. in improving services and restoring the finances of the organisation in the short time since they took over. The losses, which amounted to £2.3 million in 1957/58, fell to £1.9 million in the year 1958/59, but in the year ended 31st March, 1960, the first year of the 5-year period during which the Board was required to reach solvency, the loss fell to £709,000, a reduction of £1.2 million over 1958/59 and of £1.6 million over 1957/58.
In this connection, it should be remembered that the loss of £2.3 million in 1957-58 was for C.I.E. alone; the loss of £709,000 in 1959/60 covered losses on the portion of the G.N.R. taken over in 1958, the losses on which in the year ended 30/9/58 amounted to £238,000. On the other hand, it does not take account of the liabilities written off in the 1958 Act, representing £632,000 per annum. If these adjustments are taken into account, the net improvement in 1959/60 over 1957/58 due to the Board's own efforts is £1.2 million.
This most astonishing improvement in so short a time was not secured merely by reducing uneconomic services. The Board's report shows that there were substantial increases in railway receipts for both goods and passengers and improvements in every department of the undertaking. This result was achieved notwithstanding that the full effect of the closing of certain uneconomic branch lines during the year will not be apparent until the accounts for the year ending 31st March, 1961, are available.
C.I.E. have since reported further successes in their drive for new business, particularly in the form of package deals which enable them to give competitive comprehensive services which were not possible until the Board was relieved by the 1958 Act of a number of obsolete legislative restrictions on their commercial adaptability.
The Board are confident that provided their costs are not increased by new wage increases not related to increased productivity, they will be able to break even well before the expiry of the five year period.
This extraordinary change, which was undreamt of two short years ago and which marks the virtual resurrection of an almost moribund undertaking, is not attributable merely to the closing of some uneconomic lines, though this necessary surgical pruning of the unhealthy extremities of the railway system is essential to the reinvigoration of the whole undertaking.
The results reflect even more the energy and drive which is now evident in the organisation. There is a new wind blowing through C.I.E. There has been a remarkable improvement in the morale of the employees, who are now conscious of being members of what is becoming an efficient and successful undertaking and who feel that their efforts are worthwhile to themselves and to the community.
The company are exploiting the commercial freedom given the C.I.E. for the first time in the 1958 Transport Act with aggressive salesmanship and improved services. In the past year C.I.E. have carried more freight than ever in their history and their freight carryings are increasing.
In the year ended 31st March, 1960, C.I.E. concluded some 400 package deals with an annual revenue potential of £235,000. A further 240 package deals concluded since then are worth £365,000 per annum of new business. Both rail and road freight revenue are sharing in new business.
The most modern management methods and new equipment are bringing about increased efficiency and economy in the organisation. The opportunity for these developments was provided by the 1958 Transport Acts and by the supplementary Government measures, including the reconstitution of the C.I.E. Board. It is only right that I should pay tribute in this connection to the Board and, above all, to the remarkable impact on the organisation of its chairman, Dr. C.S. Andrews. Dr. Andrews has brought to his new post in C.I.E. the practical idealism and sense of purpose, the same concern for the development of the country, particularly of rural Ireland, which distinguished his pioneering career in turf development. He has already infused C.I.E. with something of his own adventurous spirit.
These advances have been secured in consultation and co-operation with the trade unions. There has been inevitable redundancy and there may be more, but the redundant workers are protected by the generous compensation provided for in the 1958 Act. It is evident, of course, that only the achievement of a self-supporting and efficient public transport service can guarantee permanent stability of employment in C.I.E. It has been argued by critics of C.I.E. that the improvements in the finances of the undertaking have been secured only by reducing standards of service to the community and that the Board have become more concerned with their statutory obligation to achieve solvency than with their equally important statutory obligation to provide reasonable, efficient and economical transport services. This accusation has become a chorus among those who have been opposing the closing of hopelessly uneconomic branch lines. The critics do not appear to have bothered to find out whether the evidence supported their views. I have already pointed out that the improvement in C.I.E. finances reflects not merely a reduction in uneconomic expenditure but a substantial increase in business.
The remarkable growing increase in freight traffic to which I have already referred is, as anyone acquainted with the history of C.I.E. will know, a most significant index of improvement. As any businessman knows, increased business is the first and acid test, not only of the efficiency of his organisation but particularly of the services it offers to his customers.
The agitation against the closing of branch lines has been carried on on the basis of another assumption, for which there is, equally, no evidence— that the existing rail services in the areas concerned are necessarily superior to any substitute road services that can be provided. C.I.E. who are the national transport authority and the only body in possession of all the necessary experience and know-how, are satisfied that they can provide substitute road services which will be at least as efficient and probably more satisfactory than the rail services which are being terminated. It is, I think, in any case, obvious that for many purposes road transport is superior to rail transport, especially in rural areas. In the case of passenger services, the existing rail service may be more convenient for a limited number of people who live and work adjacent to the stations, but the substitute road services will give a door-to-door service to a great many more people.
In many rural areas, the provision of road services is a step forward and advances the prestige and amenities of the district. There are thousands of industries, hotels and places of interest throughout the world which do not depend at all on rail services. In the case of freight services, it is equally evident that for shorter runs the door-to-door service which cuts out double handling offers many advantages to customers.
It has been argued, particularly in the case of the Waterford-Tramore line, that road services could not deal adequately with heavy summer excursion traffic such as from Waterford to Tramore. C.I.E. are fully satisfied that they can supply adequate services and, as every Deputy knows, C.I.E. are already meeting such needs by road in many parts of the country. The buses to be used on the Waterford-Tramore summer services will be specially adapted to carry prams.
In some cases, the change to road transport has meant some small increase in fares, but this was inevitable sooner or later, even if the railways remained open. As part of the old policy of directing all traffic to rail, fares on many of these uneconomic lines were kept below the corresponding road rates. This was a practice which was criticised by the Beddy Committee. There is, in any case, no good reason why the relatively limited number of persons in a few areas who enjoyed subsidised fares under these conditions should expect to retain them indefinitely at the expense of the rest of the community. Recently the weekly charges for provincial buses have been substantially reduced to bring them into line with rail charges. This should eliminate the principal source of complaint about substitute road passenger services—that they were more expensive than rail, particularly for children.
So far as freight transport is concerned, C.I.E. have decided to retain the railway rates and through rates in order to facilitate the change-over for all concerned. Much play has been made with problems of beet haulage in West Cork and I have examined the statements made in this connection very closely. I find that in the West Cork area there has already been a gradual shift from rail to road haulage of beet. In the year 1959/60, only half of the West Cork crop was carried by rail to Mallow. C.I.E. will carry beet by road on the same terms as it was formerly carried by rail. Those who previously engaged C.I.E. road services to deliver beet to railhead will even secure a small saving of 9d. per ton. Those who formerly delivered their own beet to railhead will have to pay an extra charge in respect of the distance from roadside pick-up to former railhead, but they will, of course, be saved the cost of supplying their own transport.
It was claimed, particularly in relation to the West Cork area, that the closing of the railway will prevent the establishment of new industries which were hoped for. Before the decision was taken to close the West Cork line, C.I.E. were fully informed of the possibilities of industrial development in the area and they assured themselves that any new industry in the area could be just as well served by road as by rail. The position was subsequently examined by the Industrial Development Authority and the Department of Industry and Commerce and it is a fact confirmed with the promoters that the closing of this railway service will not affect in the slightest degree the prospects for industrial development in West Cork.
Grossly exaggerated claims have been made about the heavy expenditure on the roads which would be necessary to cater for substitute road services. Examination of the facts in each case has shown that there is little to fear. The increase in traffic on the existing roads which will be brought about by the substitute road services will be only marginal. C.I.E. have indicated that the following numbers of vehicles will cater for the additional traffic to be carried by the Board's substitute road services following the closing of these branch lines:—
Buses Lorries |
|||
Waterford/Tramore |
3 |
1 |
Plus appropriate trailers, containers |
West Clare |
4 |
5 |
and special bodies required for various |
West Cork |
3 |
11 |
Kinds of traffic. |
Some additional vehicles will, of course, be required for peak traffic. For example, two additional buses will be required for the Waterford-Tramore service during the holiday season.
In the case of West Cork, 40 additional lorries and some trailers will be used for the transport of beet to Mallow during the beet season. C.I.E. intend to meet this requirement by better utilisation of the existing road transport fleet and no new vehicles will be acquired for the purpose. Of a total of 83,000 tons of beet carried from West Cork to Mallow in the 1959/60 season, 41,000 tons, or almost 50 per cent., was carried by road by C.I.E. and the licensed hauliers.
The estimates of additional vehicles required to replace regular passenger and freight traffic made by C.I.E. in the case of previous closings have been fully borne out. The significance of the numbers of additional vehicles required for the substitute services can be appreciated by reference to the total numbers of vehicles registered in Counties Waterford, Clare and Cork. Those figures are:
NUMBER OF VEHICLES REGISTERED IN AUGUST 1960.
Commercial vehicles |
Other vehicles |
Total |
|
Waterford (including County Borough) |
1,274 |
6,998 |
8,272 |
Clare |
1,167 |
4,507 |
5,674 |
Cork (including County Borough) |
7,146 |
32,330 |
39,476 |
TOTALS |
9,587 |
43,835 |
53,422 |
In the light of these figures it is clear that the volume of additional traffic on the roads in these counties arising from the additional numbers of vehicles due to closure of lines will be marginal. Recent reports of the county engineers suggest that certain portions of roads on which the substitute services will operate may be already substandard, even for existing traffic. While there may be a need for improving these roads, the necessity for such improvement in relation to the substitute road services can only be very slight.
All the roads concerned are already used by buses, having been licensed for that purpose by the Minister for Local Government and there is no limitation on their use by privately owned lorries, which are much more numerous than those of C.I.E. C.I.E. are as much entitled as any private firm or individual to the use of the roads, for which they pay heavy taxation on their vehicles.
The argument is that the increased C.I.E. road services, relatively small though they may be, will, so to speak, provide the last straw to break the camel's back. This may be a good argument for undertaking any improvements and repairs to the roads which may be necessary; it does not support the contention that C.I.E. should continue to run grossly uneconomic railway services in order to postpone any necessary expenditure on the roads.
The appropriate course for the local authorities and other interested parties to take is to pursue with the Minister for Local Government as a separate matter the question of whatever improvements are required in these roads. The Minister for Local Government has already indicated in the Dáil in relation to the Waterford/ Tramore road that he would be prepared to consider carefully any submissions made to his Department as to the condition of the road.
A striking fact in the history of rail closings has been the contrast between the public outcry before the closing of a line and the almost complete absence of complaints about the substitute services thereafter. A remarkable example is that of Bundoran, which had feared complete extinction as a holiday resort with the closing of the railway service in 1957 but had a better tourist season than ever in the following year.
It is, I fear, the case that much of the public agitation is carried on by people who do not themselves use the particular rail services or who will not be affected adversely by the closing, but who are motivated by misguided sentimentality or, in some cases, perhaps, by political considerations.
The only genuine interest a farmer, merchant or anyone else can have in the public transport services is that they should be speedy, safe, economic and convenient. Where substitute road transport services compare favourably in these respects with the rail services they displace there can be no reasonable grounds for grievance. It can hardly be expected that C.I.E. should continue to subsidise the operation of these services merely to gratify the sentimentality of railway lovers.
In the particular cases of the Waterford-Tramore, West Clare and West Cork branch lines, receipts failed to cover the direct expenses of the lines by £82,000 per annum, without taking into account the cost of providing for workshop administration and other overheads. C.I.E. are satisfied that efficient transport services can be provided by road in these areas at a saving of £79,000 per annum, compared with by railway.
The branch lines are being closed for one fundamental reason and one only; they have not received the measure of local support necessary for reasonably economic operation. Nor is there any prospect that they would receive such support in the future. Of all the letters of protest and appeal received by C.I.E. and by myself and other Ministers not a single one contained any specific offer of new business for the lines.
I hope I have said sufficient to put the whole question of the closure of a limited number of hopelessly uneconomic branch lines into proper perspective against the background of general transport policy. It is true, but yet difficult to realise, that we have now before us, for the first time, I think, since the State was founded, a real and imminent prospect of having an efficient and economical public transport system which will give good service without subsidy from the Exchequer. The pruning of the most inefficient and uneconomic parts of the railway system and the substitution therefor of efficient road transport is an essential prerequisite to the realisation of this prospect.
The really important issues in the field of public transport now are to consolidate the financial stability of C.I.E. and on this solid foundation to build up a highly efficient transport system which will give a first-class service to the community comparable with that of any public transport system in Europe. The Oireachtas has willed these ends and has also, thereto, willed the means, which include the termination of hopelessly uneconomic rail services.
Public agitation about the relatively moderate reduction in the railway system can only distract the attention of all concerned from the really important tasks before them. Sentimentality and misguided optimism about the railways have been a millstone about the neck of public transport for far too long. In future we must concern ourselves with securing an efficient public transport service and any such service will inevitably include, on its own merits, a substantial railway system which, when fully rehabilitated, will play an invaluable part in catering for the types of passenger and goods traffic for which railways are specially suited and inherently superior to other means of transport. The experience of the past two years and the rapid improvement in the finances and efficiency of the C.I.E. undertaking give us a reasonable assurance that public transport is now on the right lines. The soundness of the main conclusions of the Beddy Committee have been vindicated and the wisdom of the Government and the Oireachtas in implementing them, with appropriate modifications, fully justified.
One last word. The terms of the 1958 Act made it clear to every Deputy that C.I.E. would drastically alter the character of services. In giving C.I.E. executive power to close uneconomic lines every Deputy knew that this could only be done in the public interest by rejecting the shortlived universal protests prevalent here and elsewhere against railway closings at the time that such intentions are made public. They are responsible and they alone for making this decision; they ordained and wrote the new policy into the Statute Book.
Finally, may I point out once again that the 1958 Transport Act is based on the general principle that there is no special merit in a rail service as such and that the objective is to establish the most efficient widely used type of public transport in each area.
The Act eliminated completely the attributes of special privilege and importance to any particular type of transport. The Act was based on the fundamental assumption of the Beddy Committee that the investment in private transport in this country is of record dimensions in relation to national income. Any public transport service would have to compete with this huge volume of private transport and there was no justification for any element of subsidy when capital was required for other projects for which private capital was inadequate.