Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 25 Jul 1962

Vol. 196 No. 18

Committee on Finance. - Vote 44—Industry and Commerce.

Minister for Industry and Commerce (Mr. J. Lynch)

I move:

That a supplementary sum not exceeding £250,000 be granted to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1963, for the Salaries and Expenses of the Office of the Minister for Industry and Commerce, including certain services administered by that Office, and for payment of sundry Grants-in-Aid.

When bringing in a Supplementary Estimate on 21st February last, I gave the House a fairly full account of the history of the Avoca Copper Mines over the past 15 years or so. I think it will suffice now if I indicate the principal points in that history.

Following a favourable report on the Avoca deposits by a leading British consulting engineer, Mianrai Teoranta commenced the exploration of the deposits in the area in 1947. The exploration continued until 1955 at a cost to the State of about £540,000. As a result of the explorations, the mines were advertised as having reserves of some 13½ million tons of ore, with a copper content of over 1 per cent.

A number of approaches were received from mining concerns, and negotiations were commenced in 1955 with Consolidated Mogul Mines of Toronto. A mining lease was granted to a subsidiary of that company—St. Patrick's Copper Mines Ltd.—in January, 1956. The lease provided for the repayment to the State out of the profits of the Company of the £540,000 spent by Mianrai Teoranta and for the payment of royalties on the minerals extracted in the form of a percentage of the operating profit realised.

During the following two years, St. Patrick's Copper Mines Limited were actively engaged in the development of deposits and spent somewhere in the region of £2,000,000 in that operation. At that stage there were certain credit restrictions in Canada and they found difficulty in attracting moneys beyond this £2,000,000 for further development. In March, 1958, they asked the Government for certain assistance as a result of which a Supplementary Estimate providing for the guaranteeing of £1,368,000 loan was approved.

Commercial production commenced in October, 1958. As a result of difficulty experienced in the operations, largely as a result of the caving in of old workings, further assistance was sought and a second State guaranteed loan of £550,000 was approved in December, 1959.

The two loans, which were made by the Irish Life Assurance Company Limited on the State's guarantee, were protected by a mortgage on the assets of St. Patrick's Copper Mines Limited and there was a further provision that, in the event of a default in payment leading to the guarantee being called upon, virtually all the Canadian owned shares in St. Patrick's would become State owned. Subsequently, St. Patrick's Copper Mines Limited raised a number of different loans from private sources in Canada. As a result of unsatisfactory operational results and exploration findings, however, they found difficulty in raising further capital and, accordingly, they approached the Government again.

In February of this year, the Dáil approved a Supplementary Estimate authorising the making of payments to the company which, together with certain further payments which received approval in principle at the time but which did not fall due for payment until the financial year now current, amounted to £240,000. I explained that the purpose of the Estimate was to provide money to assist St. Patrick's Copper Mines Ltd. over the ensuing few months when their resources would be unequal to their commitments. I made it clear that, even with the further injection of money then proposed, the position at Avoca was serious. In particular, I said that the whole future of the enterprise might be jeopardised if further testing of the mineral resources did not produce results nearer to the findings of Mianrai Teoranta on which the decision to develop the area was largely based, or if copper prices declined or if the further development work to be undertaken by the company encountered new difficulties.

I am sorry to have to say that, while the price of copper has been maintained, although at the rather low level of slightly more than £230 per ton, the reasonable hopes entertained in regard to the other two factors have not been realised. Check drilling carried out by the company has continued to show results at variance with, and for the most part worse than, the results obtained by Mianraí Teoranta in regard to both tonnage and grade, that is, both the quantity and quality of the ore available. In addition the practical difficulties met by the company in regard to both development and production have continued, and resulted in a reduction in the rate of output to a level at which it was seriously uneconomic.

In these circumstances, the company came to me some time ago and told me that a further investment of some £600,000 would be necessary to keep the company in production to the end of 1962 and to bring it to a position where they estimated it could pay interest on the loans made to it and thereafter break even on its operations, but without being able to repay capital. The company said it was unable to procure any part of this additional capital privately, and proposed that it be provided by the Government. After discussions with the company, they were informed that the Government would not make further State funds available to them.

An offer from the Canadian interests concerned was then received to the effect that they would put up 20 per cent of the additional capital required, provided that the loans totalling about £1,918,000 made to the company by the Irish Life Assurance Co. Ltd. were capitalised and that the Canadians were given a 50 per cent. interest in the reconstructed equity of the company. Capitalisation of the loans advanced by the Irish Life Assurance Co. Ltd. under guarantee would require the payment of the amount of the loans by the Government to the Assurance Company in return for a corresponding share-holding in St. Patrick's. This offer was unacceptable to the Government not only because of the conditions attached to it but because it offered no reasonable assurance that it would provide any lasting solution of the difficulties, and the proposers were informed that it was not acceptable.

The position now is that St. Patrick's Copper Mines Ltd. are already in default, since 1st July, with the payment of interest of approximately £56,000 due to the Irish Life Assurance Co. Last week, I was informed orally by the company that they do not propose because of lack of funds to pay this interest, and they have now confirmed this in writing. In these circumstances, a Receiver has been put in, in accordance with the terms of the mortgage deed. The assurance company has already claimed from the Minister for Finance payment not only of the interest due but of the capital of the loan by virtue of the guarantee given to them under the State Guarantees Act, 1954. With the payment to the assurance company of interest and capital by the State, not only their interest in the mortgage but a large preponderance of the shares of St. Patrick's Copper Mines Ltd. will revert to the State, which will thus find itself virtually the owner of the mine and the mining operation.

Throughout the course of recent developments, the Government have kept the position under review. Its primary policy was to ensure that, as long as there was a reasonable expectation that the mine could be worked economically, everything possible would be done to ensure that this objective would be achieved. It is clear from the debate on the Supplementary Estimate here last February that all Deputies would endorse this policy. It is motivated first by the necessity of securing the livelihood of the several hundred men employed at the mine, with all that that means to their dependants and to the life of the whole district. Secondly it is important, that the amount of State money, approximately £2¼ million which has been committed in one way or another in the mine should be protected. I may say too, and I am sure Deputies will agree with me in this, that we would be sorry to see the Canadian interests which had promoted St. Patrick's at the loss of the £2 million or so which they had invested in Avoca, and while we would not be justified in expending the taxpayers' money in rescuing private capital adventured on a commercial risk, at the same time we wished to give the promoters every opportunity of rendering their enterprise successful.

These considerations, and principally as I have said the protection of employment, were no doubt present to the minds of Deputies when advances of £240,000 were agreed to earlier this year. They were in the minds of the Government in examining the request for a further £600,000. I may say that, had there been any assurance that this £600,000 would have achieved its stated objective of putting St. Patrick's in a break-even position, there would have been no hesitation about seeking Dáil authority to pay it. As it was, however, there could be no such assurance. The failure of successive infusions of capital from different sources to bring the company to the stage of profitable operation, and the receipt in recent months of mining results and geological forecasts less favourable than had been hoped even as late as last February, forced the Government to the conclusion that further injections of capital into the present operation should not be made until an independent technical assessment had been made of the whole situation. As I have said the company was accordingly informed recently that no further State funds would be made available to them.

As I have already explained, the situation now is that the Government in effect find themselves in command, through the medium of a Receiver, of the operations at the mine and of the fortunes of Avoca. The Government have decided that an independent assessment of the geological and engineering factors should be obtained as rapidly as possible. It is estimated that a preliminary report should be obtainable within three or four months. On the basis of this new assessment, decisions as to the future of Avoca will have to be taken. Were we merely concerned with the economics of the case, it would probably be best to put the mine on a care and maintenance basis while this review of the situation was being carried out. We cannot ignore the human aspects of the matter, however, and what the Government propose is that in order to protect employment in the interim period, production should meanwhile be continued, though the intention is that production should be conducted on as economical a basis as possible and that purchase of equipment should be confined to the minimum necessary to maintain production.

This will involve loss in operation but I believe that there is not likely to be a significant difference between such loss and the cost that would be incurred by further exploration and development, without production, which I am advised will be necessary in order to fully determine the future prospects of the mine. Efforts will also be made to explore the possibility of having the mine taken over as a going concern by private enterprise.

I would like here to remove certain misconceptions as to the life of the mine. Statements have been publicised that only five years' reserves of ore remain. This is not correct. The position is that subject to the problems I have referred to being overcome proved reserves of ore are sufficient to maintain full production for five years, but that there are reasonable expectations that economically exploitable deposits, of which there are strong indications but which have not so far been proved, exist in quantities sufficient to extend the life of the mine by a further 10 or even 15 years. Indeed, I am advised that it may well turn out to be the case, in view of what is known of the geology of the area, that still further reserves may be revealed as exploration proceeds.

It will, of course, be necessary to provide the funds necessary to carry out the Government's policy. It is not yet possible to say how much will be required for this purpose. Commitments to date amount to approximately £230,000 subject to what I will say about one item in a moment. These commitments arise as follows. In the first place, in order to enable the discussions with St. Patrick's to be completed and a re-examination of the whole position to be carried out, sums have been issued to St. Patrick's over the past number of weeks to enable them to keep in production meanwhile. A total of £70,000 has been approved for payment in this way.

It is also proposed that State funds should be provided to meet debts due to trade creditors of St. Patrick's. The Irish directors of the company represented to me some time ago that the mine was being kept in production largely because this was the wish of the Government, and that this involved the incurring of debt for equipment, etc., which they would not feel morally justified in incurring if they did not feel there was a reasonable expectation that the debts could be discharged with the help of State funds made available, whether by way of capital investment or temporary assistance, to the company. They contend that the State should help to discharge these debts and I feel there is force in their contention. Even from the most practical, commercial point of view it is desirable, as long as the possibility of continuing the production exists, that the mine should not have acquired a bad commercial reputation by reason of St. Patrick's being obliged to default on their trade debts. It is proposed, therefore, to provide for the paying off of trade creditors, at a cost which is expected to approach £100,000.

Finally, a claim may be made for paying off a Canadian loan amounting to about £60,000. This loan was made to St. Patrick's expressly for the purchase of certain equipment which is essential to the operation of the mine. This equipment is actually in situ.

These commitments, as I have said, may amount to about £230,000. It is not possible to say what future expenditure may be, but I am proposing to put in what can only be regarded as a token figure of £20,000 for this purpose. That is providing that the £60,000 will be proved as a debt. The total amount of this Supplementary Estimate is thus £250,000.

I want to make it clear that it is virtually certain that when the Dáil reassembles it will be necessary to ask for a supplementary sum to keep the mine in production until the reassessment of which I have spoken has been completed. When that reassessment has been made, it will be possible to see our way clearer for the future. It would be useless to attempt as yet to predict whether that future will see an abandonment of the Avoca workings or a restart on new and conceivably even extended lines.

It is regrettable to have to bring a Supplementary Estimate of this sort before the Dáil, arising as it does out of the failure of an important undertaking which made a significant economic contribution to a large area. It also made an important contribution to our balance of international payments amounting to almost £1 million annually from the export of copper ore and pyrites. Two principles must guide us for its future. First, if the operation cannot be made at least self-supporting, it cannot be maintained by continual shots in the arm of new capital even in the interests of employment. Second, it must not be abandoned unless and until we are satisfied beyond yea or nay that it cannot be made self-supporting. This is the question to which we hope we shall obtain an answer within the next few months.

Meanwhile, I ask the approval of the House for this Supplementary Estimate.

Mr. Cosgrave

The account which the Minister has given will undoubtedly come as a disappointment to Deputies and, indeed, to all who have been concerned with the progress of events at Avoca over a number of years. On the other hand, some of the information he has conveyed has answered certain queries that naturally come to the mind of anyone who has considered this matter. Where there is such a large-scale public investment as the investment which has been made by the State in Avoca, it is important that a full and careful examination of the manner in which public money has been expended should be undertaken. For that reason, the decision to get the opinion of experts is a sensible one and in fact the only obvious decision that could be taken.

I hope it will be possible to get competent technical assessment, geological or otherwise and that that assessment will be made in as short a time as possible. It ought to be possible to get persons properly qualified to examine and report on the quality of the ore at Avoca and, if possible, give an estimate of the quantity of workable ore available. I notice from the Minister's remarks that originally when Mianraí Teoranta reported on the availability of the ore there, they estimated there were supplies of copper ore available exceeding one per cent. I gather from what the Minister now says that since the St. Patrick's Copper Mines have found that the actual workings did not prove that earlier survey and that in fact some of the workings proved that the original estimate has not measured up in the actual production results.

Later, the Minister remarked there was some misconception about the life of the mine. I must say I find it somewhat difficult to reconcile these two statements. If it is possible to assess the quantity of ore available, there ought to be some indication of the quality. It may not be possible to assess accurately the quantity of ore at a particular copper content, or ore at a lower or higher content, as the case may be. On the other hand, before it was possible to give an indication of the life of the mine, some assessment must have been made of the quantity of ore available and I should be interested to hear if any assessment has been made of that quantity and what indication there is of the quality, on the basis of that assessment.

It is many years now since I had something to do with this matter in the Department of Industry and Commerce. At that time, Mianraí Teoranta, who had been carrying on work there for a number of years, as a result of their surveys stated that there was available at Avoca copper, lead, zinc and pyrites, and one of the problems at that time was that though much of this ore was not regarded as of sufficiently high grade, the problem of segregation was a real technical difficulty, that while there was ore available, the difficulty was to segregate the different ores, one from another. What the House and the country would be interested to hear is whether unforeseen production and technical difficulties arose which caused this financial problem.

The Minister did mention in the course of his speech that the copper content was below the trial borings or the estimate originally made by Mianraí Teoranta. On the other hand, he did not say to what extent the copper mined there fell short of the estimate, or what quantity of the copper already mined was short of one per cent. copper, or gave a yield of over one per cent. I wonder whether the segregation problem is still a technical difficulty there.

The other matter that, of course, affected the financial operation there was the steep drop in the world price of copper. When the Mogul Mining Corporation came here originally, the price of copper was about £450 a ton. The price today is something around £230 or £232 per ton. For part of the time since, it has remained at £234 a ton. During earlier discussions here, the Canadian interests expressed the opinion that if copper prices did not fall below £232 a ton, it would be possible to work the mine on an economic basis.

Whether it is because technical or other difficulties have arisen, or the fact that the price of copper has for the greater portion of the past few years been substantially below the price prevailing in 1956, or whether both have contributed to the present difficulties and problems, I am not clear. This matter has been the subject of anxious consideration by Deputies and by those closely affected by it. I think the views expressed here in February could be reasserted at present—that the general approach to this problem is similar to that expressed then: that the contribution which this undertaking made to the economy of the area was a most valuable one, that originally it held out high hopes of a worthwhile productive undertaking, that it had economic and social possibilities which revolutionised the prospects for Avoca and indeed for the surrounding area.

It is vital in the interests of those employed in it, as well as the economic interest of the Avoca area, that a most careful technical assessment should be made. It is equally true, as the Minister remarked, and as was stated here previously, that an undertaking of this magnitude depends for its continuance on its economic possibilities and on the possibility of working it on an economic basis. For that reason, it is essential in the public interest that a first-class technical assessment should be procured as early as possible.

It is also important that we should try to get a fuller picture of the position as it exists. I gather it is proposed to provide a sum of £100,000 to meet certain trade creditors and £60,000 for a Canadian loan and then a token sum of £20,000. The Minister referred to the fact that certain loans had been secured from Canadian sources. He did not specify the amount so secured and while there is a general overall picture of the position, I should be interested to hear what sum was secured from these sources.

At present the total State investment in this amounts to over £2,000,000. I should like to say that from the national point of view it is important that a State investment of this magnitude should, if at all possible, be salvaged and rendered productive. Similarly, the fact that it was possible to secure technical advisers and experts from Canada and financial investment from Canadian sources is a very strong argument why every effort should be made to bring this mine into economic production. No effort that can be undertaken by the Minister's Department or by whatever technical advisers he gets should be spared to ensure the continuance of productive possibilities there.

Another aspect of the matter to which the Minister refers, which is of economic significance, is the contribution which this undertaking made to our external trading position. Exports of copper and pyrites amount to over £1,000,000, a very considerable contribution by any standard. I should like to know what proportion of that was due to copper exports and what proportion to pyrites.

This Supplementary Estimate also raises the question of the proposed fertiliser factory at Arklow. According to the official announcement, the factory depended for the production of nitrogenous fertilisers on a supply of pyrites from Avoca as an essential raw material. The prospect of establishing an industry with such a large public investment on the basis of the availability of a supply of pyrites must inevitably require most careful thought and assessment, especially in the circumstances which have now arisen. Quite apart from any technical opinions which may be expressed on the technicalities of establishing a fertiliser factory on the basis of pyrites or on the other bases which have recently been referred to and which are highly technical matters about which it is probably difficult for the layman to express an opinion and on which there may well be ground or reason for divergent views, the economics of a proposal based on a supply of pyrites, particularly in present circumstances, will obviously require to be considered further. I have no doubt that before any decision is taken on that matter, the Minister will give the House and the country a full report.

This Supplementary Estimate raises an even wider question. The circumstances in which it is required, in my view, raise the whole question of the activities of State companies and the extent to which their activities are open to review by the Dáil. The Dáil has a duty and responsibility to see that public money is wisely spent on the purposes and for the objects for which it is appropriated. As regards ordinary Government Departments, this examination is undertaken annually with the presentation of the respective Estimates to the Dáil and the subsequent examination of the annual appropriation accounts by the Committee of Public Accounts to ensure that the money is spent exactly in accordance with the directions of the Dáil as appropriated when the Estimates are passed.

State companies or State bodies are not subject to the same investigation or review. Generally, this is reasonable enough because of the nature of the undertakings. It is necessary to have freedom of action in running commercial undertakings. It is also essential to preserve as confidential certain trade and business matters from possible rival trading concerns. No one expects an undertaking engaged in trade or commerce to be subject to scrutiny in its day-to-day activities. Having said that and having allowed a proper measure of freedom of action and control, the Dáil and the Government have a duty to keep the financial and other operations of State companies or bodies under review. This matter has been adverted to here on previous occasions and has been the subject of considerable discussion from time to time in Britain and other countries. The fact that it has not been possible to devise a satisfactory system in Britain is no reason why we should not try to devise a system here.

In considering this matter, or in considering State companies and bodies, we generally tend to think of the successful undertakings such as those that readily come to mind, the ESB, the Sugar Company and many others. Except for questions of policy and financial operations, they are rarely the subject of discussion. There are, however, many other State undertakings, involving considerable sums of public money, where periodic reviews of activities would be justified —in fact, in certain cases for no other reason than to prove that the system of trading in operation is the correct one. I believe this problem must be faced. Taxpayers are entitled to know how public money is being spent and to see at regular intervals an account of the operation of State companies other than that disclosed in the annual accounts.

It is true that all State companies present accounts in one form or another to the Dáil or to the appropriate Minister and subsequently they are laid on the Table of the House. It is equally true that, with few exceptions, these accounts are rarely the subject of a discussion here. On occasions, accounts have been discussed by means of motion made and certain aspects adverted to and considered in conjunction with the Estimate for the appropriate Department or in cases where some Bill is introduced to increase the statutory limit under which the particular company is operating. On the other hand, most of the information given in these accounts is comparatively meagre. I suppose invariably they comply with the requirements of the Companies Acts but at least they comply with what the accountants require in order to furnish their certificates when these accounts are presented. The information generally given is meagre but that does not alter the reasons why, in the main, these accounts are accepted.

We are now concerned with a company in which considerable sums of public money are involved, where over a period of time recurrent difficulties appear to present themselves. These difficulties are invariably unforeseen and unexpected when the operations are originally undertaken, but in world-wide experience, mining is a highly speculative business. In many cases, after most exhaustive efforts have produced negligible results, mining operations strike a lucky break. In other cases where operations were being undertaken, it happened that some chance investigation or some strike produced unexpected results. However, that is inherent in mining operations.

What I believe we want to consider here this evening, as well as the matters undoubtedly of uppermost concern in the immediate future so far as Saint Patrick's Copper Mines are concerned, is the desirability and indeed the necessity for considering and establishing some machinery, either a Select Committee of the House or an ad hoc committee, to investigate periodically the investments and operations of State companies. If necessary, certain information could be kept confidential to that committee in order not to jeopardise or in any way interfere with the commercial or trading operations of the concern. But nevertheless the committee would reassure and guarantee to the public that public expenditure was justified and that every effort was made to see that the utmost value was secured for the public confidence which had been reposed, both financially and otherwise, in the undertakings concerned.

Subject to these remarks, we approve of the proposal the Minister has introduced this evening, not merely for the purpose of keeping the operations going, which is necessary, but also, I hope, with the objective of getting a competent technical and geological assessment of the position. Even on the basis of the information we have been given, it is obvious that further financial assistance will be necessary in a comparatively short time to keep this company going. It would be possible to review then the results of whatever technical examination is to be undertaken. We all can only express the hope that the technical opinions which will be secured will make it possible to exploit the resources there on an economic basis, not merely in the interests of all concerned in Avoca but in the national interest as well.

Mr. Norton

The Minister's statement here this evening has answered quite a number of questions that one was tempted to ask in connection with the Avoca mines and to a substantial extent the Minister has pulled back the curtain and given us a picture of the situation at Avoca. I am sorry to say that, in general, it is a pretty regrettable picture. I am sure the whole House will be disappointed to learn that a situation of this kind has been reached. It is obviously a far cry to-night from the days we were told we were selling Ireland when we induced the Canadians to invest £2,250,000 in the development of the Avoca deposits. When you remember that at that time there were people now in the Government benches who said that the Canadians would make £13 million out of Avoca and leave it a dustbin afterwards, quite clearly, one occupation which these people should not take up is the occupation of metallurgist, and they should not try to pass themselves off in the role of prophets.

What we succeeded in doing in 1956 was to persuade the Canadians, the only group in the world really interested in Avoca, to invest £2,250,000 there for the development of the deposits. It is true that in or about that time the price of copper was £450 per ton. But copper, of course, is a mercurial commodity, as far as price is concerned. One has only to look at the stock markets over the past 50 years to see the way in which copper goes up and goes down in price. Very largely, its price is determined by the decision of certain countries to stockpile, in which case the price of copper goes high. When the circumstances against which they have stockpiled have passed and they throw the copper on the market for sale, then the price falls.

Since 1955, the price of copper has moved between £167 per ton and £450 a ton. It is now at the price of £232 a ton. It was at that price that the Canadians said they believed Avoca would be an economic proposition. While they would have been glad to have seen the price continue at £450 per ton, or as near as possible to that amount, nevertheless, they were satisfied they could have done extremely well if the price were even much shorter than that amount. Of course, they realised that a small mine in Avoca, the output of which does not even justify a smelting plant— and would not justify a smelting plant if it were even three times bigger—could not hope to influence the price of copper throughout the world. This is especially true when you remember that the Rhodesian and Chilean copper ores contain a much heavier percentage of lead and other complex metals than is to be found at Avoca. I hope we can rule off now from the days of these daft prophecies that the Canadians would make £13 million. Anybody who would like to engage in light reading for the weekend ought to look up——

Mr. Sweetman

Volume 154.

Mr. Norton

——Volume 154, preferably starting at Column 83 where the present Taoiseach delivers himself learnedly on the subject of copper and other minerals and, after two or three minutes says the Canadians will get away with £13 million of this. He is assisted later in these lunatic prognostications by such well-known mining experts as the then Deputies Aiken, Childers, MacEntee—the whole bundle were thrown in. You never came across such a bevy of mining talent in your life as precipitated themselves into the discussion of the Avoca mines. If Avoca did not make the source of a first-class copper mine, it certainly very nearly made the source of a first-class play. The number of engineering quacks who sought to bring their empty heads to bear on the deposits in Avoca was simply immeasurable.

We have ruled off all that now. That has gone into the insanity period, as far as mining prophecy is concerned. We have to face up to the cold realities disclosed by the balance sheet. Whatever differences of opinion there were about the content of the mines and the profits to be made in 1956, whatever difference of outlook there was as to whether it was desirable to allow a foreign firm to come in here and spend £2,250,000 on the development of Avoca, we are all at least in the same boat now. We have got a common interest in trying to save whatever can be saved of the Avoca mines. But let us not overlook the fact that the Canadians brought in £2,250,000 and they backed their faith in Avoca by sinking that £2,250,000 there, in the belief that they could make a go of it. They were encouraged to do that by the price of copper prevailing at the time, and even allowing for a substantial fall in the price.

We made a lease of the mines to the Canadians for 21 years, but we could not guarantee the price of copper, for that is not fixed by us or by any one country. It is very largely fixed not only by the producers in the countries where rich veins of copper ore are to be found, but it is also determined in large measure by the large countries which may decide to stockpile. These countries might stockpile for commercial purposes or for military purposes and there is no substitute for copper. Any lease we made to the Canadians did not, of course, contain any assurance that the price of copper would remain at any particular level but the Canadians asserted that if the figure was, I think over £220 they believed they could make a go of the mine at Avoca.

They were told, of course, by Mianraí Teoranta at the time that there were two main deposits in Avoca, one was the pond lode and the other was the Tigroney lode. In one there was about 2,700,000 tons of mineralised ore and in the other there was supposed to be 9,000,000 tons of mineralised ore. It was said that the 9,000,000 tons ore had been assayed as grading 1 per cent. copper; that is what is known as the south lode. In the pond lode the copper was assayed as containing 1.35 per cent. copper.

This report was made by Mianraí Teoranta. It was prepared by their own personnel. It was confirmed by what were then stated to be first-class consultants so that, so far as the Canadians were concerned, they got mineralised ore, 2,700,000 tons of 1.35 per cent. copper and 9,000,000 tons of 1 per cent. copper. They knew all that. They did not expect any better. They knew it was low grade ore but they said there was a new method of processing low grade ores and they thought the flotation plant they subsequently installed was the answer to the low grade ore. Finding it so convenient in Avoca, with labour available on the spot at a rate that did not worry them, they believed they would be able to make a commercial proposition of Avoca.

I should like the Minister now to answer one simple question. Mianraí Teoranta said 9,000,000 tons, 1 per cent. copper and 2.7 million tons with 1.35 per cent. copper ore in these two lodes at Avoca. Do the Canadians now say that these reports were not, in fact, borne out by the evidence they found in their own exploration of the deposits in the area?

Mr. J. Lynch

That is the position.

Mr. Norton

The position is, therefore, that the Canadians took the mine on an assurance resting very largely on the references as to the mineral content of the ores as revealed by Mianraí Teoranta. Now the Canadians say, and the Minister confirms it, that they could not find any ore in Avoca with a copper content of the percentages which were said to be there in the report submitted in 1954. That is, of course, a very grave disappointment to the Canadians and I can only assume now, from what the Minister says, that there are not 9,000,000 tons of one per cent. ore and there are not 2.7 million tons of 1.35 per cent. ore in Avoca. There is mineral ore there. Anybody can see it but apparently it does not contain the quantity of copper Mianraí Teoranta said it contained when they made their report in 1954, a report prepared by their own staff and underwritten by a firm of consultants. That is pretty tough.

Mr. J. Lynch

I should like to say, if I might intervene for a moment, that all the Canadian company exploration was done by boring and the ordinary exploration methods and, therefore, the findings of the Canadian company are not at this stage conclusive.

Mr. Norton

But they cannot yet find the one per cent. and the 1.35 per cent.

Mr. J. Lynch

That is true.

Mr. Sweetman

They have failed so far to find them.

Mr. J. Lynch

That is so, and the processing has failed to live up to the ore content envisaged.

Mr. Norton

That is very regrettable. One puts in £2,250,000 on the basis of a certificate from an Irish mining company, and a State-sponsored one at that, and one gets the report of the Irish company "okayed" by a firm of consultants, and then one gets £2,250,000 buried in the ground. We discover now that the report was a bit glossier than was justified by the cold contents of the earth in Avoca.

The Minister is, I think, wise in one approach to this problem. The Canadians ought to get a chance, so far as we need give it to them, to redeem themselves, if it is possible for them to redeem themselves on the situation in Avoca. The Minister says it has been established now that the Canadians cannot find the 9,000,000 tons of one per cent. ore and the 2.7 million tons of 1.35 per cent. ore. Naturally, that is a considerable disappointment to them.

When the Minister spoke on this matter on the last occasion, I think he said the Canadians were boring into the 2.7 millions area. That is what is called the "pond lode". It was there the 1.35 per cent. copper was supposed to be found; but the Canadians were disappointed with their discoveries there, and the Minister indicated, I think, that they were going to move over to the 9,000,000 tons area to see if there was anything better there. I gather now that, having searched both areas, they are disappointed in both areas and in the quality of the copper.

Mr. J. Lynch

The Deputy may be confusing the south lode with the Tigroney area. I think they are separate.

Mr. Norton

I made a mistake. I mean the south lode is the 9,000,000 ton area.

Mr. J. Lynch

That is the big area anyway.

Mr. Norton

Tigroney is a separate area.

Mr. Sweetman

It is very small.

Mr. J. Lynch

It is.

Notice taken that 20 Members were not present; House counted and 20 Members being present,

Mr. Norton

In view of the situation which has been reached, therefore, that the mine has not lived up, apparently, so far, to the certificate given to it by Mianraí Teoranta, there is only one course open to the Minister, that is, the one he has wisely decided to take, namely, to seek an independent survey of the mine from the most competent authority that can be found so as to enable us, on the one hand, to resolve this difference of opinion between the Canadians and Mianraí Teoranta, and, on the other, to decide whether or not further commercial development of the mine is possible or, at least, is possible on an economic basis.

I do not know how long the Minister thinks it will take to get that independent survey. I do not know whether he thinks he can easily get a competent firm to undertake the work but I gather from him that it is the intention to try immediately to get this independent test of the mine and that we should have as early as practicable a report from the consultants for further consideration by the House.

The Minister mentioned that the Canadian company had contributed substantially to our balance of payments by the export of copper ore during the past four years. It is interesting to note the figures given by the Minister on a previous occasion when he said that, in 1959, copper ore and concentrates to the value of £836 were exported; that, in 1960, copper ore and concentrates to the value of £1,100,000 were exported; that, in 1961, £809,000 worth of copper ore and concentrates were exported. I do not know what the 1962 figure is to date. Perhaps the Minister could give us some information on the 1962 exports when he is replying? These figures take no notice of the value of pyrites which are not the subject of any separate index or tabulation here.

Deputy Cosgrave has raised a matter which I intended to deal with also, that is, the effect, if any, on the nitrogenous fertiliser factory at Arklow, if for any reason the mine at Avoca is compelled to close down. I have no doubt that the Minister could bring in pyrites from other places, including other parts of Ireland, and use it at Arklow or he could bring in sulphuric acid and bring it to Arklow for the purpose of production at the nitrogenous fertiliser plant, but I want to know from the Minister whether, independent of the future of the Avoca copper mines, he intends to continue with the location of the nitrogenous fertiliser factory at Arklow. Perhaps he could say something on that when he is replying?

In general, I agree with the viewpoint expressed by the Minister in his introductory speech. As I have said, he has taken the only course open to him, that is, to try to get an independent evaluation of the mine and then let us make up our minds in the light of that report what its future is to be.

Having spent £2¼ million, perhaps £2½ million, the Canadians are entitled to some sympathetic consideration and I am sure the Minister will give it to them. The development of Avoca was a magnificent effort, so far as they were concerned. I had hoped that success in Avoca would light a fire never previously lighted on a commercial basis in this country and would lead to the merchandising of minerals in other parts of the country. But, if Avoca dies now, it may very well mean that we are not far from the end of mineral development in this country.

I would hope, therefore, that as long as there is a glimmer of hope that we can make any kind of reasonable success of Avoca, we should endeavour to do so, even if it means the State itself must, through a public corporation or public utility, continue to operate the mines.

I do not know whether it is possible to do that. Nobody can say definitely until the report of the consultants on the contents of the mine is received but it would be a great tragedy if at this stage every possible effort were not made, not only to save the mine in Avoca but all that it means in the way of employment, the development of Irish resources, its possibilities and its export capabilities.

The Minister said he hoped later in the year to be able to give us a report so that we could review the whole situation. I would ask him to give the House an assurance that the mine will continue in operation while the Dáil is in recess, that it will not be closed in the meantime and that when the House reassembles, the Minister will find an occasion to make a statement on the situation to date so that the House can debate the new situation and see in what way it can make any contribution towards keeping the Avoca mine in production as an economic unit and as something showing great prospects, if it can be operated on an economic basis.

Mr. P. Brennan

It was a matter of great regret to me and, I am sure, to other members of the House that the Minister found it necessary to come in here with another Supplementary Estimate in connection with St. Patrick's Copper Mines. This occasion is somewhat different from the Minister's past efforts here in so far as it appears as if the Supplementary Estimate he is seeking is to wind up the business of St. Patrick's Copper Mines pending a survey as to the future prospects for Avoca. The figure the Minister mentioned is about £2½ million. He has given us a breakdown of the figures. I was very happy to hear that there is a sum there that will provide for the continued employment of the men in Avoca while the survey is being carried out.

I was particularly gratified by the manner in which this Supplementary Estimate has been received by the two previous speakers. Even if Deputy Norton did bring us back to 1955 and what was said on that occasion, I think, generally speaking, he agreed that the action taken by the Government on this occasion was the only course open to them. I do not want to go back to 1956.

Mr. Norton

Would the Deputy speak a little louder? We want to hear what he has to say.

Mr. P. Brennan

I am not too anxious to go back to 1956.

Mr. M.P. Murphy

He is not too anxious to be heard.

Mr. P. Brennan

There were some prophecies made in 1956 in this regard. I do not think Deputy Norton can be completely excused because he himself painted a fairly rosy picture of what he was doing. It was unfortunate that it did not work out and I am personally very sorry the Canadian people were not able to make a go of Avoca. I, possibly more than any other Deputy, realise what that project has meant to the locality. I know Deputy Norton and Deputy Sweetman who were concerned with it at the time, and Deputy M.J. O'Higgins who has since come to represent County Wicklow, also realise the important part Avoca played in the economy of South Wicklow. However, I know a great many of these people personally. I know what their pay packets have meant to them and to their wives and families and even though the prospects do not look bright, I am glad to see a sum of money is being made available to continue these people in employment while the survey is being carried out.

With Deputy Cosgrave and Deputy Norton, I wish to join in expressing the hope that the best possible technical advice will be obtained in connection with this survey. From discussions I have had with people from time to time, I believe it is possible to work Avoca, maybe not to show a profit but at least to continue operations there without State assistance and to keep in employment the number of men who have been employed there in recent years.

In 1955, when discussions on Avoca were taking place in this House, I think 1.2 per cent. copper was the figure that was generally used. Now we are told the figure is something like .8 per cent. copper. Further surveys are the only means of finding out which figure is right. Recently, I had occasion to meet somebody who has some experience of mining. This person maintained that it was possible to work a mine economically with .8 per cent. copper. I do not know whether that is true or not but that is one view I have had. I have also been told that the mining technique in Avoca was the most up-to-date in the world and that it could be a very economically run mine. This person also bore that out. If that is so, there must be some future for Avoca.

It is regrettable that the Canadian people have lost such a substantial sum of money on this project and I am glad the Minister stated that an opportunity would be given to the Canadian people of getting back some of the money they have invested there. The only way in which they can recapture some of their money is by the continued working of Avoca. I should not like to see the Canadian people stuck for such a large amount of money and I am glad the Government are anxious to help them out in this regard.

Reference has been made to the nitrogenous fertiliser factory, which has been coupled with Avoca. When the Minister was replying to the debate on the Supplementary Estimate in February last, he informed the House that it was possible for this nitrogenous fertiliser factory to go ahead independently of Avoca. Accordingly, I should like to ask the Minister on this occasion to make the position clear in this regard. There is no point in having this matter ballyragged around the country, with people saying it could go here, there or elsewhere or that the project should not be proceeded with at all. I should like the Minister to make an announcement, if he can, as to the prospects for this factory in Arklow.

The Minister has taken the only course open to him as regards Avoca and I sincerely hope that the advice he gets will be the best technical advice available and that as a result of the survey, we can look forward to a continuance of operations in Avoca as they have proceeded over the past four or five years.

Mr. M.J. O'Higgins

I can certainly bear out fully what Deputy Brennan says with regard to the importance of the Avoca mines, as far as employment in the area is concerned. Deputy Brennan can, I think, speak with greater and longer knowledge than I can on the subject and he can speak with personal knowledge because his own home of Carnew is very much within the sphere which was affected in respect of employment in Avoca.

While everyone regrets the picture at Avoca the Minister had to present to the House and probably most people regard it as a very gloomy one, it is right to point out that there are some bright spots and that one of the matters which is very much on the credit side is the fact that for a number of years employment has been given, as the Minister himself mentioned, to several hundreds of people. That is a matter which has had no small impact on the area. I do not pretend to know—I am sure the Minister knows—what the average weekly wage bill is in Avoca. I imagine it is some thousands of pounds. When one considers that, at the end of a year, that means something in the region of £70,000 being paid out to workers in the area and spent locally, one can appreciate the importance of the employment given to the people of the locality.

While I say that the question of the employment given is very much a matter on the credit side and one that cannot be written off as of no importance, also on the credit side is the fact that the balance of payments position has been assisted to the extent of approximately £1,000,000 a year by the exports from the Avoca mines. A considerable quantity of material has been exported over the years and the Minister has estimated that that assisted the balance of payments position to the extent of £1,000,000 a year. That cannot be lightly disregarded.

On the debit side is the fact that about £2¼ million of State money was put into the concern. As against that, you had the advantage of the exports and the very definite advantage of the large scale employment that was given. I think the Minister is probably doing the only thing he can do. I was glad to know that in his final remarks he mentioned that the approach of the Government to this matter was that the mines would not be abandoned, unless and until they were satisfied beyond yea or nay that they could not be made self-supporting. That is my own feeling on the matter and may I, as one of the Deputies for the constituency, urge on the Minister that there should be no question of closing down the mines, if there is any chance at all that, with certain assistance, they can be made self-supporting and continue the employment that they have given?

The Minister has announced that the Government intend having an independent technical assessment of the position made both as regards the geographical and engineering factors. He mentioned that he hopes to have a preliminary report in three or four months' time. I think we would all agree that it is a pity that as far as the workers are concerned, they will be left in this position of uncertainty and insecurity but I appreciate the Minister's position and that as things stand, that cannot be helped. At least there is a hope held out in the Minister's approach and the approach of other Deputies who have spoken that if there are any reasonable prospects from the independent assessment the mines will continue in operation.

I would like to urge the Minister also, as Deputy Norton did, that, one way or the other, even if the report comes in earlier than he expects there should not be any question of closing down the mines, without first coming back to the House and having the matter fully considered here. I am sure that would be the Minister's own desire and approach to it. I hope that the independent assessment when it is made, will be of such a nature as to warrant the Government deciding to continue the mines in operation.

There are some questions on which I was not entirely clear from the Minister's statement and I am sure that he will clarify them for me when he is concluding. I am not clear as to who is going to operate the mines for the moment. I appreciate that from he is going to operate the mines for our own point of view the receiver will be in control but so far as the active operation of the mines is concerned is it the position that the Canadian people will continue to assist there? If that is not so, is the Minister in a position to say what alternative arrangements he has in mind for their running?

I should like to join with Deputy Norton and Deputy Brennan in asking the Minister to give the House some assurance with regard to the fertiliser factory which it is proposed to build near Arklow. There seems to be some confusion with regard to that matter. It is assumed by a number of people that the fertiliser factory project is dependent entirely on the Avoca mines and on their continued operation. I understand that that is not so and that the fertiliser project can proceed as an independent project. If I am right in that, I would like the Minister to make the position quite clear to the House so that the misunderstanding which has arisen may be avoided in the future.

Finally, might I just say that if the question of the closing down of the Avoca mines should come about as a result of the assessment which the Minister proposes to have made, I would like to urge on him that, now that the mines have become a Government responsibility by reason of the fact that the Government have become their virtual owners by the appointment of the receiver, there is a definite responsibility on the Government to take whatever steps may be open to them to give opportunities for alternative employment in the area? It will have a grave effect on the whole area surrounding Avoca, if the weekly wage bill of people working in the mines is suddenly cut off. If that situation should arise, I strongly urge on the Minister to see that some alternative employment in the area is given and that every encouragement is given to the provision of alternative employment.

Mr. M.P. Murphy

It is apparent from the opening statement of the Minister that he and his Department have a patient on their hands that is seriously ill. The first we heard of the Avoca mines was in 1947 and from 1947 to 1955, public funds were invested in the Avoca mines to the tune of £540,000. We anticipated that by giving that subvention to the mines, they would be taken over by an independent company, give employment in the adjacent area and that they would not be a liability on public funds in the future. That has been borne out by the statements referred to by Deputy Norton. He mentioned how the then Opposition, the Minister's Party, were very worried about the concessions given to the mines, that they felt big profits would be made from the mines and that instead of handing these profits on a plate, so to speak, to the Canadians we should hold them ourselves, that if Fianna Fáil were in power they would work the mines and keep the profits at home.

We have a completely different picture painted here this evening. The figure for 1955 was £540,000. In the meantime the patient got ill but the first we heard of that illness was in 1958 when the Minister came to the Dáil pleading that the Avoca mines needed money from the State if they were to continue in operation. He said that the transfusion he required for the mines was £1,300,000. That, to my mind, was an exceptionally big injection for the patient but this House, having addressed itself to the question at length, decided to give this £1,300,000. The main concern of the House at that time was the maintenance of continuity in employment of the workers in the Avoca district. It was also felt it would be a big loss to the trading public in Avoca if the mines were to close and the wages of the men were to be withdrawn.

The Minister told us at that time he was quite satisfied that once the Avoca mines got this big injection of £1,300,000 they would be able to stand on their own feet for the future—and we passed the money. The next we, the taxpayers' representatives, heard of the mines was that they were again not feeling too well before Christmas, 1959, when the Minister came along again asking for another £550,000 and making a somewhat similar plea to the one he made in 1958.

Mr. J. Lynch

I was minding a different patient in 1958.

Mr. M.P. Murphy

It was the Minister's predecessor who came here in 1958. However, the Minister came along in 1959 and repeated the assertions of the former Minister and this House, for the very same reasons as before, gave its unanimous approval to the Minister's proposal for a guarantee of £550,000. All went well as far as encroachment on public funds was concerned until some months ago, in February 1962, when the Minister came before us again and said he required a further sum of £240,000. He required £170,000 to carry the mine over the 1961-62 year and, in order to give them a start for the new financial year so that he would not be coming back again looking for more money, he said he was reserving £70,000 for the mines. That money has been paid and we are back again six months afterwards seeking a further £250,000.

Apart from the preliminary expenditure by the State of £540,000 this is the fourth time in four years the Minister has come before the House seeking for guarantees for the continuance in production of the Avoca mines and I believe it is incumbent on the Minister to give the House and the country some details of the working of those mines. What was the turnover of the mines this year? Where are the balance sheets? What was the capital expenditure? How many men were employed and what wages were paid? Who is directing the mines and what are the salaries paid? Are they big or small? Are the salaries paid to Irish people or to foreigners? Who is the managing director? Coming before the House for the fourth time in as many years, the Minister cannot hope to get the guarantee he requires without answering these pertinent questions.

Another big question is whether we are satisfied the mines are being efficiently managed. Surely any company or any board of directors who said in 1958 that if they got a certain amount of money, they would be able to stand on their own feet afterwards, who repeated the request in 1959 and repeated it again twice in 1962, would be knocked overboard immediately? It was mentioned that a State-sponsored body, Mianraí Teoranta, blundered in their assessment of the ore content of the mines. We were told here this evening that five or six years ago they assessed the ore content at one per cent.—that there would be in the region of 9,000,000 tons of ore containing one per cent. copper and some 2,500,000 tons containing 1.4 per cent. copper. I am sure the mining experts who gave those figures went to great pains and difficulty to make sure the figure was correct since there was such a big amount of money involved.

Usually in making an assessment of that kind, one is more likely to err on the conservative side. Deputy Brennan told the House tonight, and I am sure reliably, that the average ore content was .8 per cent. Surely it is quite evident that if the ore content is much less than set out in the original assessment—it is in fact between 65 per cent. and 70 per cent. of what was estimated—the experts have a question to answer there? Has the Minister taken any action against Mianraí Teoranta for blundering in this manner in a matter of vital concern since it involves so much State money? Did the experts who made this assessment get any reprimand? Did the Minister call them into his office and say: "Look here, boys, you have blundered badly, you have embarrassed me very much by giving me an assessment six years ago which has proved utterly wrong and as a result I have made statements in the Dáil that the mines were a sure bet?"

On page 3 of the Minister's statement, he says that the Irish Assurance Company has lent £1,918,000 to the Avoca Mines. Am I to assume that this sum is apart from the money we have given——

Mr. J. Lynch

No. The State is guaranteeing the loan.

Mr. M.P. Murphy

Further on in the statement, I see that the State is asking for the current interest of, I think, £60,000 which is due to the Irish Assurance Company. Am I right in assuming that if Avoca goes down, in addition to the money the House is guaranteeing, we shall have to pay the £1,918,000?

Mr. J. Lynch

It is all the one sum.

Mr. M.P. Murphy

This House has looked after the Avoca mine with fatherly interest. We have watched and nourished it from the day it started in 1947. We have cared for it as well as we could and, if I may repeat the Minister's terms, we have given it frequent injections to try to keep it alive. Now we find the prospects are not too bright. The demand made by the mining authorities is for a sum of £600,000 and not for £250,000, the amount of this Estimate. If I interpret the Minister's statement correctly, the £250,000 will only meet current liabilities. I think that £230,000 is required to meet the liabilities of the company up to the present and that there will be a carry over of only £20,000, according to the Minister's statement. Is that correct?

Mr. J. Lynch

It is quite clear in the statement.

Mr. M.P. Murphy

Is it quite clear also that we shall be asked in the not too distant future for a further grant or loan? I think grant would be a better term in the circumstances; I hope I am wrong, but we must go on hard facts. It is reasonable to assume that before the year ends— and we are now in the second half of it—a further Supplementary Estimate will be required to keep the mines going.

In the Minister's statement some sympathy was expressed for the Canadians who put £2¼ millions into the mines. Could we get more information on the Canadian investment? Are we satisfied they have lost the £2¼ million? Did we make any inquiries to ascertain if they have got some of that money back through stock exchange dealings? Has it all gone down the drain? Have they got no return for it? That is an important question. This State, we know, has got no return for its money. Everybody agrees that is the position but we should be told, on the other side of the picture, whether the Canadians have lost their money in full. I do not know if it is right, but it is alleged that they may not have lost the money, that they may have recouped what they invested in this scheme through exchange dealings. If that is so, they must have been helped in their recoupment by the misleading assessment made by Mianraí Teo.

A peculiar point about this transaction is that we did not give the money ourselves; we farmed that job out to the Irish Assurance Company so that they would get their whack out of it. I understood from previous debates that when this money was voted by the Dáil, it would be paid by ourselves with no middleman and that the money would be paid directly to the mines from the Exchequer. I now understand the Irish Assurance Company have a "cut" on it, that we did this job through them. I do not like that. I do not think in the Minister's statement previously he mentioned that the money would be lent by the Irish Assurance Company, with a guarantee of repayment by the State.

I appreciate that this is a national question and I appreciate the anxiety of the Deputies who have contributed to the discussion that we should approve of this Estimate and take no action here that would hinder the development of Avoca. Bearing all that in mind, can we, as a State, continue to guarantee money to such a company, without getting the information I have sought? In fairness, I think we cannot, that we must get detailed information. This is the fourth time the Minister has come to the House and we must have more information particularly regarding the efficiency of the management. Are we satisfied they know their job; that they have the qualifications to control this firm which requires a good deal of ability? Are we satisfied they are making the best use of the money we vote them; that they are employing it in the most advantageous way in the company's and the nation's interest?

It was unfair on the Minister's part not to have included some reference to the management of the firm in his opening remarks. I expect to get that information in his reply. If that information is forthcoming, I shall support the granting of money sought in the Estimate, but it is quite evident that support is contingent on the Minister making a more detailed inspection of the company and satisfying himself on the many points mentioned in the discussion. We want that information for the House and the country that may eventually have to pay this money. We all hope that somebody in the company will some day be able to repay it. I do not want to be too gloomy in the picture I paint but I am afraid it will be some time before that day dawns.

The Deputy from the constituency, Deputy O'Higgins, sounded a very pessimistic note. I know he has interested himself very much in this mine and has a good idea of whether or not it is likely to survive. But I was rather struck by the pessimistic note he sounded in his concluding remarks. He pleaded with the Minister to try to get alternative employment, if the mine were closed. I thought that was very pessimistic on the part of a Deputy for the area. It strikes me, to put it mildly, that all is not going well there at present.

The Minister is responsible for mining generally and we should not confine our attentions solely to Avoca. The State has no right to discriminate. Every place is entitled to equal consideration from the State.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

On this Estimate, the debate is confined to Saint Patrick's Copper Mines.

Mr. M.P. Murphy

One is incidental to the other. I have not departed from the Estimate before me.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

I was simply reminding the Deputy.

Mr. M.P. Murphy

You will bear with me, Sir, when I say I believe we are giving preferential treatment, that this sick patient is being very well doctored. We are giving him injections whenever he requires them, but are we doing it with others that have cost the State nothing? Did we do that in regard to Allihies?

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The question of Allihies or other mines does not arise. The Deputy will have to confine his remarks to the Supplementary Estimate before the House, which is very specific.

Mr. M.P. Murphy

It is quite relevant to the discussion to make comparisons. Is it not relevant to say we are giving preferential treatment to the Avoca mines and that others who have made applications for assistance have not got the same sympathetic consideration? I believe it is quite in order to make that comment. However, I have reasonably good faith in the Minister. I always hoped he would make a success of his job and that, perhaps, he would climb a little higher later on.

Mr. Norton

After that, he deserves ten minutes on Allihies, Sir.

Mr. M.P. Murphy

I am asking the Minister not to confine his activities to Avoca. There are other places in the country as well. They may not be as nice as the Vale of Avoca but there are people there, too, who could do with a pay packet just as well as the people in Avoca. I hope that the pessimistic note sounded here by Deputies—what other line could they take in view of the facts?—Will not be justified and that the Avoca mines will overcome their difficulties. Even though I expressed the fear that the Minister or his successor will have to come back to the House in the not-too-distant future, I hope my prophecy is wrong. I am asking the Minister to give consideration to Allihies because I believe the ore content there is far in excess of what it is in Avoca.

Mr. Sweetman

It would be very easy indeed for anyone speaking from this side of the House to go back to the debates of 1956 and to quote extensively from the idiotic statements made at that time by the Taoiseach, the Tánaiste and, most of all, the Minister for External Affairs. But the problem we have before us today is a national problem, and much though it would amuse me and make for the discomfiture of Fianna Fáil to go back on that debate, I do not propose to do so.

However, I want to say one thing about it in an entirely objective way. When Deputy Norton and I started off to deal with the negotiations in relation to Avoca with the Canadians, we did so in the sure and certain knowledge that no one else had shown the slightest interest in this mine, that no one else was willing to come forward and to risk putting any of his money into the development of the mines there. Knowing that, we approached these negotiations in the frame of mind that, if we could produce something of the minerals that were in the ground there, assisting us in our balance of payments and giving reasonable employment, whether the State did or did not make much profit out of the transaction was not of primary importance. All the advice I got at the time—I think it was borne out by the advice Deputy Norton got, too—and which is on the files of the Department, was clearly to the effect that we could not possibly under any circumstances see in the future for any considerable time the continuation of the then high price for copper. We were quite satisfied when going into those negotiations that the price of copper at that time was a scarcity price certain to tumble and that, unless we took advantage of the price then existing to clinch the negotiations at that time, there was perhaps no possibility ever of ascertaining the potentialities of the minerals in Avoca.

We knew that not merely was that true then but also that there was a very strong possibility that we had seen the best of the surveys in relation to the properties in question. It was most unlikely, according to the advice tendered to me at the time, that the actual working of the grades and the ores would be in excess of the survey results put forward to us by Mianraí Teoranta and confirmed by the consultants. In fact, the position has proved to be exactly in accordance with the views we were given on those lines.

We were faced with this situation in 1956. Deputy Norton was abroad on one of those trips that produced very substantial industries and additional employment for the country, although they were decried at the time by Fianna Fáil. When we came to this House in February, 1956, I was in this position: if I criticised at all the exaggerated—to put it kindly—statements that were being made then by Fianna Fáil, though I was reasonably satisfied at the time that the then price of copper would not hold, the only effect of any criticism by me as Minister for Finance would have been to injure and to harm the prospects of the Canadian company successfully developing the mines at Avoca.

For that reason, therefore, and quite deliberately, though I was absolutely certain that when Fianna Fáil on that occasion were advocating and urging that we would not take Canadian money into this mine, but that we would go out with the imprimatur of the Government and push—I use the word “push” deliberately—Irish investors into taking an investment in St. Patrick's Copper Mines, I decided, in the interests of the development of the mine, that it was better to keep quiet altogether. For that reason, you will find that, throughout these debates, I did not at any time suggest that the price of copper was likely to fall or the possibility that the ore would not stand up to survey. It was better that it should be that way. Deputies know that I am rather a person who very often finds it very difficult to keep quiet when I am being taunted, but, if I had not then behaved as I did, if the Government at the time had not taken the view they did, and if the Government had not succeeded in prevailing on the Canadians to come in and put over £2,000,000 of their own money into this mine, we would never know, regardless of what the next survey might show, whether Avoca did hold out any prospects or any potentialities at all for us.

The deal was made; the start was made. As the Minister has indicated, the Canadians commenced by putting some £2,000,000 of their money into the working of the mine. The Minister has not given us any indication, either now, or on the last occasion, of the manner in which that development money was used, nor of the manner in which the remaining funds were utilised after they had been granted by the authority of the State Guarantees Act and by Estimates introduced into this House. At a later stage, I want to come back to that.

The facts are that that £2,000,000, having been put into the operation, and the remaining moneys having been put up by the State with a guarantee indirectly, we have a situation today in which the results have not been satisfactory. What are the causes of these results? I suggest one can divide up the possible causes of the failure under three headings. First, one would take, I suppose, in magnitude the fall in the price of copper. While the price of copper was as high as £400 at the beginning of the negotiations, there was at that time in every financial journal a clear indication that that price was likely to tumble at an early date. The Canadians themselves said at the time that if a price of £240 was standardised, they would be able to succeed. I have my doubts whether it could have been successful at that price. In fact, as we know, at the time when Avoca started working, the price had fallen to £186. It recovered later and it is now somewhere round about the £230 mark. If anybody at that time—in this I include the Canadians—believed that the price of copper would remain at £400, equally it was expected, at the same time, and it certainly was hoped, that the price would not fall below the £200 level.

We must remember that when the price of £240 was publicised at that time by the Canadian promoting corporation in Toronto, costs and expenses were not anything like as high as they are today and the equivalent of £240 in 1956, as a balancing operation, unless there had been a very substantial increase in mining productivity and very substantial increase in the estimated efficiency of the extraction of the ore, would probably mean that today we would require, on the same basis, a price of £280 or thereabouts to equate with the £240 of which we spoke in 1956. Be that as it may, I am certainly not sufficient of an expert on mining to know whether there has been any such increase in productivity or any such increase in efficiency in new engineering techniques. The fact remains that the price is even now below the figure at which the Canadians at that time, in their most optimistic mood, said they could make a profit.

The second cause to which one might attribute the failure is bad working. I was glad to hear Deputy Brennan, as one who lives near, pay tribute to the method of working the mine and to hear him say that mining experts had paid such tribute. When a thing is going badly, everyone always appears to hear all sorts of wild rumours and stories. Some of us have heard some wild rumours and stories about the system of working in Avoca and about the complete lack of discipline in certain of its operations. While that may have been the case at one time, I think it is significant that no one I have heard has produced any such story since the present manager went down to Avoca to take over. It seems a coincidence that the stories about the lack of discipline and lack of efficient working terminated at the same time as the former manager left.

The third cause with which one might be concerned is that working had become more expensive. The increases in wage rates that have taken place, not merely in Avoca but throughout the country, since 1956 were bound to have their effects on the economic operation of the mine, unless new and improved methods were constantly being brought into operation to increase output in order to overcome these increases. I do not know enough of mining throughout the world to know whether there has been in the past six years any such increase in productivity. Perhaps the Minister may be able to tell us something about it.

The fourth cause to which I would attribute the failure is that the mine in its operation did not stand up to the survey that was there before us. That survey was a survey made by Mianraí Teoranta. It was confirmed by someone who was believed to be the best consultant that could be got at the time. The assessment of the results of the drillings necessary for a survey is by no means an exact science. While it is possible, I understand, without much difficulty, to assess the individual results that come up in each individual drill, the working out of the pattern that the ore takes so far below the surface from these individual drills must be a matter to some extent of estimate, to some extent of conjecture. It is always extremely difficult to know whether it so happens that the drill that is being put down so many feet below the ground has hit a rich pocket or a bad pocket and it can only be on the basis of an average all round that an estimate can be made as to what the content of the ore body bebeath the ground may be.

I do not know, for example, that the fact that the ore that was worked did not stand up to that survey arose because the Canadians, for their economic working, decided to approach the extraction of that ore in a manner different from the way in which Mianraí Teoranta felt it should be approached for the purpose of getting the results at which they had estimated the extractions.

Quite honestly, I do not think that in a science, if I may call it that, an estimate of geological samples which are so far underground and, therefore, virtually impossible accurately to determine the results, it is fair to criticise the opinions given in the rather tough way that Deputy Murphy did criticise them. The fact is that they were made according to the best of the ability in this country and confirmed by the consultants from outside.

We have not got, unfortunately, much mining experience here. We have not got here the practical experience over a large number of years of assessing different geological samples taken out from the bowels of the earth. Perhaps we have the practical experience of assessing geological samples taken from the surface of the earth. That has been done for a considerable period but the practical results of taking the samples from the bowels of the earth, as had to be done in the diamond drilling, is something of which we had not got, in the nature of things, the practice or the know-how that would justify us taking what was stated as being gospel truth. It was, without question, the best estimate that was available to us and, as Deputy Norton has said, the estimate not having been good enough and the Canadians having accepted it, we do have at least the responsibility of hoping that things will turn the right way to ensure that they will get back some of their investment in the mine. But, while we may with simplicity determine that the cause of the failure must have arisen under one or more of these heads, the course of conduct we should adopt now is one which it is not so easy to assess.

If I might start at the last one, first of all, I should like the Minister to give us clearly in his concluding speech what was the best percentage extraction that was taken at any time since the mine started work in 1958. When I say the best extraction, I do not mean the extraction of an infinitesimal amount for the purpose, naturally enough, of putting on a good show the day people might be down there, but I mean over a reasonable period of time.

Will the Minister also give to the House the figures of the ore taken out month by month since the operations began? I assume, of course—the Minister will correct me if I am wrong —that apart from the actual basic returns, the operators were bound to provide under the lease, because we provided certain basic returns under the lease, they have made available to the Minister any and every other information that he required. But, what was the best percentage taken; what was the average percentage taken out and how did that percentage vary between the several lodes?

There was a rumour going around at one time that the area that was believed originally to be the most likely for profitable working was in fact not as profitable as another lode in the area and that, in consequence, some of the initial funds had been lost in developing the wrong lode in preference.

Will the Minister also tell us what was the amount of the total sales of copper, on the one hand, pyrites, on the other, and any other subsidiary sales as a third factor since the operation began—since 1958 up to any last convenient date?

I cannot remember whether the company is a public company or a private company, but, having regard to the amount of State injection of funds, whether it is public or private, it would be highly desirable that the Minister should place in the Library of the House the accounts of the company over the period since initial operation so that we may have some opportunity of studying the manner in which public funds have been used.

There was, as far as I can understand also, a suggestion at other times here that we were very wrong at the time in not providing that the Canadians were bound to install a smelter in Avoca or Arklow, as well as extracting the copper ore. Of course, as Deputy Norton correctly said, the volume in the mine was obviously far too small to justify the provision of a smelter and, in fact, the non-existence of the smelter probably made it easier to sell the ore in recent years than it would have been otherwise. The sale price of ore included a scarcity value following the developments in the Philippines where, instead of smelting, it was ascertained that it was a more economic proposition to break down their ore by chemical means rather than by the ordinary smelting. In consequence of that, there was a very great over-capacity in the world of smelting appliances and, in consequence, there was an anxiety on the part of those countries which had over-smelting capacity to get ore, which would not have applied at all from a price point of view if the Avoca mine was big enough, which it was not, to justify doing our own smelting here. I do not know whether the Minister has taken that factor into account at all in his consideration of the problem.

I should like to have some indication from the Minister of the amount of pyrites that has been sold since the mine started and some indication not merely of the amount sold but of the period during which it was sold because even if Avoca were a success, it seems to me it would be entirely too short a life on which solely to base the setting up of the nitrogenous fertiliser factory. From the somewhat pessimistic speech of the Minister, no one can say that the Avoca mine at the present time will be a success. Even if it were a success for a short period of time on the basis of providing employment and providing some assistance towards our balance of payments without considering the repayment of the capital which has gone and which I am afraid most of us must consider has now been lost, that would be far too uncertain a supply upon which to base an investment of the type and of the size concerned in the fertiliser factory. I trust therefore that the statistics and the estimates for that have been based not entirely on the provision of pyrites from just up the way in Avoca but allow for the fact that an entirely alternative supply must be provided.

When Deputy Norton was speaking and when the Minister was answering certain questions put to him, there was some discussion about percentages in relation to the four lodes. I think I am right in saying there were four different lodes or veins. The Minister is probably in the same condition as I was six years ago trying to learn the jargon of mining. I cannot remember the difference between a lode and a vein in the technical sense in the four areas of mining, the "South" lode, the "Pond", the "Tigroney" and—I forget what the fourth one was.

Mr. J. Lynch

There were two "ponds", one high and one low.

Mr. Sweetman

I thought there were two "Souths". That is my recollection.

Mr. J. Lynch

That is right, two "Souths".

Mr. Sweetman

That is not bad after six years. The reason I remember it is that I asked how could there be two ponds, one underneath another. In addition to the two "Souths", the "Pond", the "Tigroney", there was another one, an outcrop——

Mr. J. Lynch

Cronebane.

Mr. Sweetman

Whether it was an outcrop or part of the main vein is one of the things I remember being considered, but that is not the name that rings a bell. However, in relation to this exploratory survey that is now to be undertaken, is it intended that it will cover all five, as the Minister indicates there now are, of these areas, or will it be restricted to any one? If it is to cover all five, is it to cover all five simultaneously or is it considered that any one of these areas has the best chance of success and is therefore the primary area to be surveyed?

I should like the Minister also to give us some indication of the type of export he proposes to get. Let me be quite frank and say to him that he will find it extremely hard to get an expert who will give him an unbiased report because almost all the people who are expert in this type of operation have a tie-up in one way or another with different companies or with the prospects of different areas. It seems to me the only way he could get an expert to advise him adequately and successfully is to get someone who would perhaps be in the employment of some person who had a special reason to be on more than friendly terms with our country.

I appreciate the great difficulty in that respect but, at the same time, I am not clear how production will be carried on while that exploratory survey is taking place. I do not want the Minister to understand for one moment that I am casting any aspersions on the ability of the Receiver as an accountant but I do not think it is entirely an accountant who is needed to deal with a problem like this. It must be someone who also has mining experience. If a proposition is put up to an accountant by people engaged in the practical work of mining, he will not be able to say whether the facts, figures and reports they are putting to him are realistic. In my view, the Receiver should have very considerable mining experience. I do not know whether it would be possible to appoint as Receiver a person with mining experience and for him to get an accountant to assist him in the book end of the work or whether the reverse way is the better——

Mr. J. Lynch

It does not matter one way or the other.

Mr. Sweetman

That is what I was about to say but certainly the two are required. An accountant who is put in as a Receiver to work the mine in the manner the Minister indicated has an impossible task. In saying that I am not passing any comment whatever on the gentleman's ability as a Receiver.

Incidentally, from a purely legal angle, I was rather curious about the phrase the Minister uses in his speech: "In these circumstances a Receiver has been put in". I should have thought that as the initial mortgage was made to the Irish Assurance Company a Receiver would have been installed by the Irish Assurance Company. Yet from the wording there, it would appear that the Minister has already, so to speak, accepted default and stood into the shoes of the assurance company under the guarantee. It is not a matter of any consequence except that I am interested in it from a legal point of view and perhaps the Minister can give us some help on that.

Apart from the difficulty of an accountant doing this job, great difficulty is bound to arise from the feeling of insecurity which occurs among the various key workers in the area. While nobody who has been happy in his job would be anxious to leave if there were any real prospect for the future, at the same time, one must assume that when they see the difficulties all round, certain key workers might think of moving. I hope that if that does happen, the Minister will be able to provide some means by which it can be overcome and avoid a situation which can only result in appalling losses, if these keymen are not available.

The Minister also referred to the company having obtained a number of different loans from private sources in Canada. I would be glad if he would indicate whether those are the same loans as the loans of £60,000 for machinery to which he has already referred. If they are separate loans, I should like to know whether they went in with the other £2½ million in the total capital that has been sunk, and I am afraid "sunk" is the operative word in relation to any mine because it all goes under ground, whether it comes back in the form of returns or not.

The Minister also said that the State was the owner of the large preponderance of shares. Whether the insurance company or the State put in the Receiver, the position is that the Receiver has to recoup the loan moneys, first of all, and, if there is anything after that, it is for the benefit of all the shareholders. I do not understand how the State could have come into the ownership of the large preponderance of the shares. It seems to me that the State is the owner of the mine and that the only money the Receiver will be able to pay out of profits or the proceeds of sale will be those to pay off the loan moneys and give everything else back to the equity capital. Therefore, I should be glad if that particular wording was explained.

I am also in considerable difficulty in ascertaining the money already spent on the mine. Perhaps the Minister will bear with me if I repeat that matter in some detail. As far as I understand it, the Canadians put in an actual £2,000,000. I thought the amount was to be £2¼ million but in the figures given in relation to the Supplementary Estimate last February, the amount was given as £2 million. I should like to know what is the correct figure. Under the first guarantee by us, there was to be put up a sum of £1,368,000. That was followed by sums of £550,000, £170,000, £70,000 and £240,000, making a total of £2,328,000. Are those figures correct or have I duplicated some of them?

Mr. J. Lynch

You have, to some extent. The £170,000 should be added to the £70,000 making a total of £240,000.

Mr. Sweetman

If I take out the £170,000, I arrive at the same figure. That means that the Irish investments by loan capital and by Supplementary Estimate here come to £2,158,000. In addition to that, Mianraí Teoranta spent £540,000 on development. That brings the Irish investment up to £2,700,000 before this Estimate is given to them and with this Estimate, the Irish investment is £3 million. Add that to the Canadian investment of some £2 million and it appears that the total amount invested in the Avoca mines to date, when this Estimate is passed, will be in the region of £5 million. That seems to be a pretty large sum and in giving that large sum we have not got anything like the details we should have got tonight.

The Minister indicated that he would have to come back to the Dáil for a further Supplementary Estimate after the House reassembles. He must have made up his mind as to what will be the amount he will have to ask us for then. I think it only fair to the House and to the country that the Minister should give us some idea of the additional money with which the taxpayer is to be saddled by reason of the fact that this Estimate is required to keep the entire project from being written off.

Let me make sure that I am not misrepresented in relation to this matter. I am not advocating that the money should be cut off but I do think that there should be fuller information and a full picture put to the House as to what will be the additional amount we will have to meet at the end of four or five months when we come back after the recess. It would not be unfair to say that no matter what happens, whether it would be success or failure, before the Minister comes to the House again, detailed figures should be put before the House and the country so that we can see where we have travelled and where we hope to travel in this respect.

I may sound pessimistic in regard to this but I am afraid that I am not optimistic. I read from the phrase the Minister uses here in page 3, where he says that the company came to him some time ago, that the examination of the situation by him and his Department took a very considerable time and perhaps that is the reason that the Government are anxious to give the company this money because it is to meet expenses incurred while the Government were making up their mind.

I am not going to be as unkind about the matter as some of the Minister's colleagues would be, if they were on these benches and we were over there. The charge would then be made straight away that the Government were dithering. I am not going to say that. This is a matter which required full, thorough and lengthy examination and if the case the Minister is making is that one of the reasons he feels he must meet these payments is that he required that length of time to make that examination, and that the debts arose some time ago, that is understandable, if one approaches the matter equitably but I am afraid his colleagues would not see it that way if the situation were reversed.

No matter what reserves there may be at Avoca, they are nothing by comparison with the reserves in other parts of the world. The richer veins of copper are somewhere in the two per cent., three per cent. approximation and there is in those veins some 400,000,000 tons reserve. The amount of reserves we have are of so trifling a nature that they cannot affect prices, but equally when those richer veins are able to produce copper at £175 per ton and when the people concerned have those enormous reserves available, if there were an increase in future in the price of copper, they would be able to draw on their reserves and in that way create cash reserves to meet falls in prices at a later stage.

We must remember this is the law of averages to some extent. When the good Lord was creating an arid desert in Saudi Arabia, He did not give them much to look at on the top but He gave them enormous wealth underneath. When He created this country of ours, He gave us a very rich and fertile land and I think that in this case the law of averages is working in reverse against us.

Mr. J. Lynch

That is the Jake Day theory.

Mr. Sweetman

I was going to liken it to something else. What we have in Avoca in the way of mineral wealth will never make a great meal. It may be pulled out now and again like a child pulling a raisin out of a pudding but that never makes a great meal. That is what happened in relation to the original survey. Whatever the theory is in relation to a rich surface and a poor underneath, we can at least fall back on something they cannot fall back on in the arid desert, if they cannot find oil.

May I say in relation to the general picture of mining, in an entirely objective way, that we were violently and viciously attacked in 1956 for having got the Canadians in to do this particular mining job. I said earlier, and I repeat now, it was far better to get the Canadians in than to have nobody do it. Of course, it would have been much better to have had our own people do it, if they had the technical ability. Equally, in relation to the prospecting going on at present, it is much better foreigners were brought in to do the job rather than that it should not be done at all, and the Minister will pardon me if I refer to the reply he gave me here on 19th July last which showed that of the prospecting licences granted here in respect of 600 square miles, 75 per cent. have gone to Canadians or other foreigners.

If the Minister were on this side of the House, he and his colleagues, I have no doubt, would say the mineral wealth of the country was being sold to foreigners. I do not make that charge because I realise if we cannot get our own people to do it, it is much better that we get the Canadians to do it, just as I believe it is better to have Ambassador Oil Corporation and others doing the oil survey rather than that it should not be done at all, that there should be no attempt made to find out whether we have any oil or mineral wealth beneath our land. If we have, anybody who comes in to find it is welcome to the profits they make because the profits will be negligible in comparison with the benefits to the nation as a whole.

Mr. McQuillan

I speak here as a layman. I confess to no greater knowledge of mining than the experts in this House who have been speaking for the past three hours on mining. The picture has changed considerably in connection with the Avoca mines over the past few years. I recall that some six years ago the two major Parties in this House were vying with each other on the issue of the Avoca mines. The Fianna Fáil group took up the attitude that there was a fortune to be made by the Canadians as a result of the activity of the inter-Party Government in handing the mines over to these people, and Deputies Sweetman, Norton and company were clapping themselves on the back for having achieved a wonderful success for this country in persuading a group of Canadians to come in and operate the Avoca mines.

But the picture has changed. It is no longer a matter of one or the other side taking credit. Now we have them speaking with restraint, each side of the House saying: "I would say a lot more only I do not want to be drawn. If I were on the other side of the House, I know what the other people would say at the present time." Of course, they are showing a sense of restraint because they are all in the pot, all equally to blame for what has happened so far. Only a few months ago, the Minister for Industry and Commerce came in here with a Supplementary Estimate to keep the mines going for a period and he got quite insulted and hurt at the criticisms levelled then.

He said: "This is not my doing; I am not responsible for that." He showed his tender feelings in this respect. If it had been successful, I have not the slightest doubt the natural reaction of the Minister or anyone in his place would be to claim credit. This is a sad situation at the moment from the point of view of the workers. It is sad that there is at the present time an air of uncertainty about the future of their employment and I think we should be more concerned with the workers involved and with the Irish taxpayers than we should be with the Canadians. Since this debate began, all I have heard from all sides of the House is talk of the wonderful work of the Canadians, the sad situation that has presented itself in the loss sustained by the group from Canada who put their money into this venture—cheers for the Canadians and contempt for the Irish taxpayers. Deputy Cosgrave spoke at length on the situation that has developed as regards the power exercised by the House over State and semi-State bodies. For a while, I did not know whether he was in order or not but the Ceann Comhairle was the decider in that matter. It was quite evident from the Deputy's remarks on State bodies and the necessity for more control by this House, that he sought to suggest that this company, St. Patrick's Copper Mines Limited, was some sort of State company. In that suggestion alone there was an indication to the public that State companies could not be trusted to do anything, that State companies were not fit to run certain ventures, that certain ventures should be for private interests.

Let us be quite clear. This company was founded by the Canadians and run by the Canadians and paid for, to a great extent, by the Irish taxpayer. What was the history of the company prior to 1956? From a certain amount of research I have done, I am satisfied that the private enterprise group, small though it may have been, which some years ago operated in portion of Arigna showed just as great an enterprise in its development as the Canadian mining company which afterwards took over from Mianraí Teoranta.

I understand that a company called Avoca Mines Limited functioned in a not very extensive way in the Avoca area in the mining business and that they came to the then Government some years ago and asked for assistance to the tune of £25,000 in order to carry out mining operations at a place called Connory, where according to the experts—I think the Minister is aware of the experts concerned; one in particular was afterwards employed by Mianraí Teo.—the extract in this locality was as high as 3 per cent. When this private company asked for State aid they were refused but not very long afterwards that company was approached by Mianraí Teoranta and informed that the State was going to take over their private mining rights in Avoca.

I understand that after much discussion, negotiating and bargaining, a certain figure of compensation was paid to the private company and from that day on Mianraí Teoranta were responsible. We know that perhaps £500,000 was spent by Mianraí Teoranta on the exploration, examination and investigation of the possibilities of the Avoca area. They satisfied themselves so far as possible that it was a reasonable proposition and at that stage, we had the position arising as Deputy Norton suggested—this was his view and Deputy Sweetman's— that in all the world they could find nobody to take over and exploit these mines except the Canadian group. According to the inter-Party Government, nobody except the Canadian group was prepared to develop the mining potential of Avoca.

I know, and other people in this House know, that a well-known Canadian speculator arrived in Dublin and, shall I say, floated down to Wicklow and had a look around Avoca. He was familiar with the job of looking over potential areas where companies could be floated. After having examined Avoca and getting information from Government circles on the report of Mianraí Teoranta, he got the bright idea that this would be a first-class venture on which to base a company. It was through this gentleman that what is known today as St. Patrick's Copper Mines Limited was born.

The gentleman to whom I refer was connected with the Mogul company in Canada and he was, and is, known in Canada to be a manipulator of the stock exchange. Having got the bright idea that this area in Avoca would be suitable to attract the money of people who utilised the stock exchange he went to London and it is common knowledge that he hawked shares on the stock exchange in London. He pointed out in London, especially among sections of the community favourably disposed towards Ireland, that this was a wonderful opportunity for them to help the home country. He then went to Canada and these same shares were given plenty of publicity there. Here is where the Canadian money came in. A large number of Irish-Canadians and Irish people living in Canada were attracted to the idea put forward by this individual and his associates to buy shares in this company on patriotic grounds.

They were told of the wonderful prospects it held for Ireland and of the amount of money they would make and to clinch the matter, the mining venture was described under the name of a saint. Wherever you have a shamrock and a saint, it is a fair bet to attract some poor suckers into putting their money into it. That has been the position in this country over the years—exploitation of something that should be sacred within the State. St. Patrick's Copper Mines Limited was a wonderful name to use in Canada. How reliable it would look! The gentleman to whom I have referred got out, having made his money on the stock exchange and the shares. I do not know what he made but he lives in retirement in Canada at present and is very well off through manipulation on the stock exchange of St. Patrick's Copper Mines.

He was not the only one. I am personally aware of a man in Dublin who was shrewd enough, when this company was formed, to buy £1,000 worth of shares. Inside two months, he sold them and got £3,000. How many other people made money on manipulation of the stock exchange on this venture on Avoca, I do not know. Have we not the same situation arising at present in Tynagh where there has been a rush to purchase shares in the hope that people will make fortunes overnight? I have not the slightest doubt that many people in Canada made fortunes on this idea of the Wicklow mining venture without the slightest work being done and without the slightest danger of their investment being lost.

It is a ridiculous situation to have Deputies weeping for the Canadians who lost the £2 million they invested. Many of those people were like the people who put money into Shanahan's Stamp Auctions. They put the money in to take a gamble. They were not like the ordinary taxpayer who was mulcted in the Budget and who has to pay up now for the losses. Because certain people look on mining as a form of gambling and are satisfied to lose on mining, there is no use saying the Irish people will have to do the same thing with their money in order to pay up for the losses these outside people have suffered.

I should like the Minister to answer a few questions when replying. He went part of the way when replying to Deputy Sweetman. I should like him to say how much Irish money has been involved in St. Patrick's Copper Mines to date. How much money has been advanced to the company from sources outside this House through the Department of Industry and Commerce in the form of loans and otherwise?

Mr. J. Lynch

Is the Deputy suggesting we did something not authorised?

Mr. McQuillan

I am asking the Minister to answer these questions because I am not satisfied with the information given so far. We are given no information. All we have is rumour. Is it a fact that the amount of Irish money spent so far on this is nearer to £5 million instead of £3 million?

Mr. J. Lynch

The Deputy should not make wild statements in order to get headlines. He should not be playing to the gallery.

Mr. McQuillan

The Minister will have an opportunity of replying later.

Mr. J. Lynch

The Deputy should not make wild, exaggerated statements.

Mr. McQuillan

The Minister should hold his tongue.

Mr. J. Lynch

I will not. I will not allow the Deputy to get away with that sort of stuff.

Mr. McQuillan

If you do not, I will make you hold it before I am finished.

Mr. J. Lynch

You will, indeed!

Mr. McQuillan

Were any moneys repaid which were given to this company in the form of loans? Is the Minister aware that it is common talk in Avoca that things have not been right in this mine for the past two years? I want the Minister to know it is common belief in the mining areas that there has been misappropriation of funds in this venture. It has been publicly stated in the villages throughout Wicklow that at least £30,000 has been missing over the past 12 months and that there is no account of it.

Mr. J. Lynch

The Deputy should put on an old shawl and go down with the gossips.

Mr. McQuillan

I want to know how many executives and parasites are drawing fat salaries of between £50 and £80 a week from this venture. I want to know why there has been an air of "eat, drink and be merry for to-morrow we die" in this place. Now the House is being asked to extend its life. I want to make it quite clear I am as anxious as any Deputy, and probably more anxious than some, to see the livelihood of the workers there safeguarded.

Mr. J. Lynch

The Deputy is going the right way about establishing confidence in the place.

Mr. McQuillan

I shall come to that. The Minister will have his say. This is the fourth occasion the Minister has come into this House and asked for aid, and every time he has come he has had a pessimistic approach. He has had no plans whatever to recover the losses, which are mounting, and to make this a paying and stable proposition. Now he is asking the Irish taxpayer to subsidise inefficient private enterprise. We had him stating in his opening statements that he hopes private enterprise will take over this venture later on. Let me tell the Minister that that is the rock he will perish on. If the Minister thinks that, after the public have paid for the mistakes, the losses, the inefficiency and incompetence, when everything is fixed up, he can appoint his own pets to another private company and allow private enterprise to endeavour to run it successfully for another five years, he will find he will not get away with that. The people have paid enough for the mistakes of private enterprise in this venture.

Mr. J. Lynch

Why not make a constructive suggestion?

Mr. McQuillan

I want the Minister at this stage to have a full-scale inquiry into the affairs of this company from the date of its formation up to the Minister's coming to this House. I want the Minister to have this inquiry carried out by a completely independent and competent group. That is apart altogether from having an independent geological report made of the potentialities of the mine itself. The Minister has stated that the affairs of the company have been put in the hands of a Receiver. I have nothing to say against the individual who has been appointed Receiver, but the firm to which this gentleman belongs is far too closely associated with the Cabinet to be described as independent.

Mr. J. Lynch

That is a dirty remark. The Deputy should be ashamed of himself.

Mr. McQuillan

I am not saying anything against the individual. I am saying that the company to which he belongs is far too closely associated with the Fianna Fáil Cabinet to convince the public that this is an independent——

Mr. J. Lynch

There is no association whatever.

Mr. McQuillan

Of course, there is. The Minister knows the association of the company with the Taoiseach.

Mr. J. Lynch

The name of the company is Griffin, Lynch and Co. The Lynch has nothing to do with me, if that is what the Deputy is thinking.

Mr. McQuillan

I am thinking of the association between Griffin and the Taoiseach.

Mr. J. Lynch

This is more of your dirt.

Mr. McQuillan

I will take you down to the Glass Bottle Company, if you like.

Mr. Colley

What connection has Mr. Griffin with that firm?

Mr. McQuillan

I am surprised the Deputy does not know. He should ask the Taoiseach.

Mr. J. Lynch

There is no Griffin in the company, if that is any information for the Deputy.

Mr. McQuillan

The Minister knows who is in it behind the scenes. The Minister is not going to cod the House that, just because the front of the house looks innocent, the back garden is not very dirty.

Mr. Colley

The dirt is coming from the Deputy.

Mr. J. Lynch

The Deputy is the greatest bluffer.

Mr. McQuillan

When the assessment has taken place, the fact that the Government have put in this independent Receiver will not give them the opportunity of saying: "The affairs of the company are now in good shape and we will hand it over to private enterprise." That is what is in the Government's mind. I would not be at all surprised if they have picked out in their own minds the individuals who will run this company when it has been put on its feet again at the expense of the Irish taxpayers.

In my opinion, the Government should have courage. They should say at this stage: "This is the property of the Irish people. There has been enough tinkering and monkeying with it. We are going to set up a State company and run it on behalf of the Irish people. It has been running at a loss up to the present and those losses have had to be met by the Irish people." If there is any prospect of money in it, then let that money accrue to the Irish nation. This would not be the first time that a State company ran things successfully here, and it is nearly time we gave an opportunity to a properly constituted State company to step in and salvage what can be salvaged from this project. It may be possible that the project can be run without making any great profits; it may be possible that it can be run without incurring loss. If it can be run without incurring loss, and since it provides employment, it will be good for the locality and good for the country, from the point of view of the balance of payments position. We are not interested in big profits being made. Particularly we do not want big profits made to be taken outside the country by those who, up to the present, have been lucky enough to make money out of this venture.

Deputy Sweetman, and others, have pointed out that there are regions in the world where there are vast reserves of copper. Here was yet another example of cold water being thrown on a venture for which these very self-same speakers were taking credit six years ago. It is said that there is only a small amount of minerals in Ireland. I do not dispute that, but if that argument holds good in relation to copper, then the same argument should hold good in relation to coal, and everything else. We should not exploit any of our resources. We should meekly accept the view that coal should be imported from Britain. On that basis, it is ridiculous to produce our own wheat. We could buy it abroad at half the price.

No—if there is any possibility in this, let us keep the mine going. Let it be operated in the right way. I do not think the Government are going the right way about it at the moment. I do not want to hark back to the way the Irish people were gulled about this project at the beginning. There can be no denial of the fact that the Irish people were led to believe that the raw material would be processed here and that a smelting works for that purpose would be set up. But after a while the sad news was conveyed, bit by bit, to the public. The amount of ore was too small; one would want five or six times the amount of deposits before it would be an economic proposition to set up a smelting works here to process the raw material. But the public were not told that at the beginning. They were told that so much work would be provided on the processing and smelting and so forth.

We are told now that was ridiculous —it just could not be done. It was never envisaged. All that was envisaged was these huge machines tearing into the sides of the hill, the raw material taken down and loaded on a ship in Arklow to be taken away and processed elsewhere. There was no real advantage in that except that we got a certain amount of money to offset our balance of payments. The real benefits accrued to the people who did the smelting and processing outside this country altogether.

I want the Minister now to let us know whether he is prepared to set up a State company or board to run this mine. I want him to know that I strongly object, and will continue to object, to the idea of handing this back to private enterprise after the losses have been made good, and it is put on a running basis. I have nothing against the individual appointed as Receiver, but I think the unfortunate man is merely a front. The Government will have to get an independent Receiver, with no connection of any kind with the Government, because we all know what this present Cabinet can do behind the scenes. In this particular venture, I think their hands should be securely tied by having a neutral independent group put in charge of any investigations that take place.

Mr. J. Lynch

This is a shabby reflection on the man appointed and most unwarranted.

Sir Anthony Esmonde

Three or four days ago, I asked the Minister whether he had sufficient advisers to deal with mineral matters in this country and suggested that he might increase the number of expert advisers he has. The Minister replied that he had very good advisers available, that he had the geological section of his Department, and so on. I quite agree he has a geological section in his Department but the fact that we are faced with this issue this evening leads me to think, at any rate, that the Minister needs something more than he has got at present. In effect, the Minister is asking us here for more money to carry on this project. He has given us a financial survey more or less of what has happened over the years and he has intimated that he will have to come back again in the near future for still more money. He has not really told the House why the mine has failed. He has not told us why, when the prospects were so good, when the ore was proved, and when the experts estimated that there were 20 years of copper in the mine, and the money was made available, the mine should have failed.

Mr. J. Lynch

I do not know why the Deputy should make assumptions he cannot stand over; if he had been here when I was making my opening statement, he would appreciate that I made it quite clear why the mine has failed.

Sir Anthony Esmonde

I am coming to that.

Mr. J. Lynch

Why does the Deputy make these other statements first then?

Sir Anthony Esmonde

Let me make my argument. The Minister indicated why the mine failed. He said it was because the price of copper had fallen. Am I right in that?

Mr. J. Lynch

Possibly, yes.

Sir Anthony Esmonde

That appears to be the main reason for the failure. The Minister gave us no other reasons.

Mr. Sweetman

I did.

Mr. J. Lynch

So did I.

Sir Anthony Esmonde

The Minister gave us one reason. Now, Deputy Norton has some information on this matter and he stated that when the Canadian company was founded and took over the working of the mine, the price of copper was approximately what it is to-day; they were satisfied that with the then price of copper they could make the mine pay. That is what I understood Deputy Norton to say. He was Minister for Industry and Commerce when the venture started.

Mr. P. Brennan

It was £450 a ton when they took over.

Sir Anthony Esmonde

Deputy Norton said it was £230 per ton. Copper was £450 a ton at one time, but when this mine was first taken over, it was not £450 per ton.

Mr. P. Brennan

It was, when the deal was made.

Sir Anthony Esmonde

Deputy Norton stated here this evening that when he opened this mine, the price of copper was £232 per ton and the Canadian company were satisfied they could make the mine pay at that price. If I am misquoting Deputy Norton, I will withdraw, but that is certainly what I understood him to say, and I was sitting quite close to him. Whether he is right in that, I do not know, but he must know something about it.

Now that could be one reason. The principal reason given by the Minister as to why the mine failed was that the price of copper had fallen. Deputy Sweetman went further. He gave four reasons as to why the mine failed. He said, in the first instance, he agreed with the Minister that it was due to the fall in the price of copper. The price of copper is something no one can control. I attribute no blame to the Minister for failure in that respect.

The second reason Deputy Sweetman related to the management. I am not qualified to say whether there is good or bad management in the mine and I do not suppose anybody else in this House is qualified, either, to express an opinion on that. That brings me back now to the question of expert advice and expert advisers. By the time this Supplementary Estimate is finished, the Government will have invested over £3 million in this mine. Have they had any expert advice at any time from anybody who is a mining expert to the effect that the mine was properly run according to the methods by which a mine should be run? Have they had anybody to advise them in order to protect the State investment? I do not think they have. They have geological experts who could tell them what was likely to be found in the mine. They had a State company, Mianraí Teoranta, that was responsible for getting reports as to whether the deposits of ore could be proved or not. Down through the years the mine was worked there was no mining engineer or representative of the Government, to my knowledge, whose duty it was to protect the State interest. That is where the mistake is.

If we are to expend money on mining, if we are going to expend in that direction on the Tynagh Mine or the other mines, there could be considerable expansion of mining. I am not against expansion of mining. If we can prove the existence of minerals, we ought to go ahead with mining but if we invest State money the taxpayers should be protected. For that purpose I suggest to the Minister that he should set up experts in his Department on that matter. He could, if necessary, repatriate Irishmen, experienced miners, working all over the world, and set them up as advisers in his Department.

I fully and absolutely concur in what Deputy Sweetman said just now. There is a question of appointing an official receiver. An official receiver can deal with financial matters but to a certain extent the official receiver in this case will have to deal with the ultimate management of the mine. He will have to be for the time being overall director of the mine, no matter who is to run it. I am personally not very clear as to who is running the mine at the moment. In those circumstances the official receiver will require expert advice, unbiased expert advice.

I take it from the Minister's speech —perhaps I am wrong; I am not criticising in any way—that he has accepted absolutely in toto anything the Canadian company have told him. They have told him that it is not possible to get the produce of the ore out of this mine that was anticipated, that the prognostications with regard to that were entirely wrong. That may be. That very often is the case, I understand, in mining. Mining, in all circumstances, is a complete gamble from beginning to end. Where a mine is successful it is quite usual for people to invest money and to lose their investment in other mines. In this case there does not appear to have been any other opinion taken as to whether the Canadians, who were the experts running the mine, were right or not. If I am wrong in that, will the Minister say so? If I am right in it, will the Minister accept my suggestion that he should get experts so that the State may be safeguarded in future because as sure as I am standing here—the Minister said so himself—in order to maintain this mine in existence, unless we cut our losses altogether which so far as the taxpayer is concerned are in the neighbourhood of £3,000,000, he will have to come back to the House to look for more money in the near future.

I want to tell the Minister what I have been told about this mine by a mining expert. My information may be wrong. My informant may be incorrect in what he told me. I was told that the mine was estimated to have a production of copper ore for a period of 10 to 15 and possibly 20 years. I am told that the people who were running the mine installed very heavy machinery, too heavy machinery under the particular circumstances of this mine in that the shafts were narrow in it, as most shafts are, I understand, in the mineral deposits we have under the soil in Ireland, that this very strong, big machinery was far too strong and effective for the type of mining that was to be undertaken and that as a result there was a very heavy dilution of the ore, that the machinery was not suitable to the mine, and that in his opinion this firm, the Canadians, were trying to get out of the mine in a period of about four years what they should have taken ten or 15 years to take, that it would have been far better if there had been, say, 250 men employed as against 500, if there had been a much lighter type of machinery used, that they would have got the results and would have been able to remain solvent and keep the mine open, without having to look for public funds all the time.

Whether that is correct or not, I do not know and I do not suppose the Minister is in a position to know either. He probably knows no more about mining than I do. He has no expert advice at his disposal. I suggest that is the root and kernel of the whole trouble.

As far as the continuation of the mine goes, my point of view is that we will have to give this money to the Minister. It is necessary that the mine should be continued in existence. But, if we are going to vote the money and if the Minister has to come back again to the House, as undoubtedly he will have to do, it will be up to him to find out in the meantime how the mine is being worked, who will work it in future, what the potential of the mine is, what the labour potential of the mine is, whether it has, as I have been advised, a lesser labour potential, whether there is a certain future for the mine. There is no use in our continuing in the present ambiguous position. I hope the mine will be able to continue. I hope it will be able to continue to give the employment it is giving. I am directly concerned in it as far as my constituency is concerned because quite a few of the labour content are drawn from the area in which I live.

I do not really attribute blame to the Minister in this matter. I would not like him to think so. I am only expressing a point of view that was expressed to me, and I think I am quite justified, now that it is said, in saying the Minister gave us very limited information as to why the mine has failed. The reason he gave us such limited information was that he had not got the expert advice at his disposal which he should have had.

Mr. J. Lynch

It is true that the price of copper at the time this deal was made, or this lease was given to the Canadians, was £450 a ton, or thereabouts, and it was obvious to everybody that that price was unlikely to be maintained, certainly not for very long. Deputy Norton also suggested that the Canadians at the time would have liked that price to be maintained but I doubt if they would because, from the little I know about it, it was obvious that if copper continued at that price per ton the likelihood would be that substitutes would replace copper in a short time.

Mr. Norton

There is no substitute for copper.

Mr. J. Lynch

That is my advice from expert sources so far as I could get it in that respect. Nevertheless, whether it was desirable or otherwise, it was obvious, as I have said, that the price would come down and, unfortunately for Avoca, it came down much lower than the present price which I described as being comparatively low. It went down as far as £170 a ton at one period for a short time and rose gradually from that a little higher than what it is now but has been maintained at roughly between £232 and £234 a ton for some time past.

The suggestion was made that the Mianraí exploration results were wrong as found in practice by the Canadians. I should like to point out that, as Deputy Sweetman observed, the deposits in the Avoca area are like a fruitcake. You have currants, raisins and——

Mr. A. Barry

Plain dough.

Mr. J. Lynch

You have something else as well—peel.

Mr. Dillon

Too much dough they have. Should there be more of the currants, raisins and peel, we would not be the way we are.

Mr. J. Lynch

There was a certain amount of drilling done by the Canadians after they started operations but, unfortunately, some of those drillings did not bear out the drillings by Mianraí. I am told, and I have no reason to doubt it, that the methods employed by Mianraí Teoranta at the time were the very best available and the results attained were checked by experts, as has been mentioned in the House. Some of these results are still capable of being checked because the manner in which some of those bores were taken was that the core, having been extracted, was cut in two down the centre and the half that was being checked by the expert consultants was sent abroad and the other half was retained by Mianraí Teoranta. There may be a divergence of expert opinion as to the volume but I think the divergence of opinion here was not so much as to the volume itself as to the volume bearing a certain percentage of copper ore. The Canadians apparently found that the volume that was reported as bearing one per cent. or more than one per cent. did not bear such a high proportion.

In introducing the Supplementary Estimate I mentioned that one of the main difficulties was that the Canadians, in starting operations in this mine, found old workings which were quite convenient to the surface. When I say quite convenient, I am not suggesting they were just under the subsoil but they were at a much higher level than the deposits which had been explored and reported upon by Mianraí Teoranta. These higher-lying deposits were not reported upon at all by Mianraí Teoranta. However, even though the ore content was much lower than would normally be worked by a mining company, by reason of the proximity of the deposits to the surface, the Canadians started to work on them. They worked them reasonably well at the beginning but by reason of these cavings-in that occurred, their production was halted and losses were incurred.

In regard to the manner in which the mine was worked, it has been suggested to me that the Canadian company did not drill sufficiently in advance or develop sufficiently. It may not be necessary to explain but I shall do so in any case: there is a difference between development and production. Development is the work of tunnelling, getting at the ore body in order to extract the ore that is of value. It was suggested to me, subsequent to these troubles having been conveyed to me, that sufficient development and sufficient drilling were not done in advance. To that extent, there may be some criticism of the company in regard to the manner in which they worked the mine. Beyond that, I have not heard any criticism of the manner in which they set about the job. It is true there was a change of management of the mine some time ago but I do not know to what extent that change was caused by reason of any defects in the previous operation of the mine, as has been suggested by Deputy Sweetman. The fact remains that there is a mine manager who was brought in some months ago and I understand his capacity is beyond question. Fortunately for the Receiver, I understand also that he proposes to remain at the mine at least for some time.

It was suggested that the Receiver being an accountant—and being a first-class accountant—would not be competent to manage the mine, even in the interim period while the independent experts are being sought. I have no hesitation whatever in agreeing with those sentiments. The Receiver will have the advantage of having a group of three or four people with the best mining experience I can find in the country to help him to operate the mine on the production basis on which it is proposed to operate it.

In that connection, I might say that when I sought the £240,000 Supplementary Estimate in the spring of this year, the company made a suggestion to me that it might be necessary to cease production and concentrate on drilling and development. I asked for comparative figures between the cost of drilling and development as such and the cost of doing that work together with production. I discovered the difference in cost was relatively low and therefore I asked the company at the time to use this £240,000 to the best advantage and to maintain employment as long as they considered it reasonably possible. In the event, they retained employment to the full; at least no volume of men was deliber ately laid off. By reason of this experience, I thought it well to advise the Receiver that production might be maintained while drilling and other development work would be going on which drilling and development work would be necessary in any event to establish what the real future prospects of the mine were.

In regard to Deputy McQuillan's remarks, I deprecate his coming into the House and casting any aspersions on the capacity or the independence of the Receiver who has been appointed. I want to deny categorically that there is any connection as far as I know between that Receiver, his company and the Government collectively or individually. It is a pity that men like the Deputy should make these wild statements here and then leave the House without bothering to hear a reply to them. I said in my intervention that Deputy McQuillan was playing to the gallery. The gentlemen of the Press are here and they have to report objectively all the statements made in the House. Unfortunately, many of these wild statements get into the Press and take the headlines and somebody perhaps believes what has been said. Deputy McQuillan is coming back and I want to deny categorically——

Mr. McQuillan

I knew he would not say anything while I was out.

Mr. J. Lynch

Now that he has come back, I shall repeat every word of it. I deprecate the unjust—in fact, I shall go further and say "the mean and shabby attack"—the Deputy made on the Receiver who was appointed over the affairs of this company.

Mr. McQuillan

I did not attack the Receiver. I attacked the Government for using this unfortunate man as a cover-up.

Mr. J. Lynch

Not alone has he described him as a cover-up but he challenged his independence. He said he had a connection with the Government and that because of this connection he secured the appointment. Again I want to deny categorically that that is the position. I said that the name of the company happened to be Griffin, Lynch and Company and that no more than if there were never a Griffin or a Lynch connected with the company, I did not know who they were. There is no connection——

Mr. McQuillan

Indeed there was and the Minister knows the connection between Griffin and Lemass.

Mr. J. Lynch

There is a man named Griffin who is friendly with the Taoiseach but no more than there is a Griffin in that company associated with the Government is there a Lynch associated with me in that company.

Mr. McQuillan

I did not say the Minister at all; I said the Taoiseach. The Minister is only a messenger boy to the Taoiseach.

Mr. J. Lynch

I mention my name merely to show how shallow are the charges the Deputy makes here.

Mr. McQuillan

The Minister does not count. He is only a messenger boy for the Taoiseach.

Mr. J. Lynch

As usual, the Deputy gets up on the fence, shouts "a plague on both sides of the House" and never gets off it to come down on either side.

Mr. McQuillan

I would not come down on either side here. You are both in the ditch in this matter.

Mr. J. Lynch

The only thing I am sorry for in making these remarks is being goaded into doing so. Deputy Cosgrave asked me a number of questions and I hope I can answer them. He asked what was the value of the copper ore produced as compared with the pyrites. I understand that the value, pound for pound, is about five to one. I may be able to answer Deputy Norton's question when he quotes the value of exports for the years 1959, 1960 and 1961 as being something less than £1,000,000 by telling him that these figures include both copper and pyrites. I used the words "copper concentrates" but I have inquired and I understand that includes both copper and pyrites.

Mr. Norton

On 21st February, the Minister said that the exports for the three years of copper ore and concentrates were so much. He gave the figures but he did not mention pyrites.

Mr. J. Lynch

I have made inquiries and I have told the Deputy that the figures for pyrites are included in those figures.

Mr. McQuillan

You do not know what you are doing.

Mr. J. Lynch

Deputy Sweetman asked me what the monthly figures were and what was the best average ore content over a period. The best average ore content in any one month was .92 per cent. and the average monthly figures show a great variation starting in 1958 with 15,000 tons in the month of September but rising gradually from 15,000 to 94,000 in the month of April of 1959. There was a steady falling off then down to 61,000 tons in December of 1959 and all through 1960. The lowest figure was 56,000 tons in February of that year and the highest was 78,000 tons in December. There was again a slight upward trend from December, 1960, to January, 1961, when it was 80,000 tons. Generally speaking, there has been a steady drop in the tonnage since then. The lowest monthly figure was in 1962 at 41,000 and for May, 1962, the latest date available, it was 64,000 tons.

Mr. Sweetman

I was not able to be here for the earlier part of the Minister's reply as I was trying to arrange the business for to-morrow, but the Minister will remember that the original estimate was one million tons a year. Apparently we never reached the average that would produce that.

Mr. J. Lynch

I was coming to that.

Mr. Norton

Has the Minister got any record of the average copper content for a year?

Mr. J. Lynch

I have not got it in this document but the Deputy may have missed what I said in reply to a question, that the best average for a month was .92 per cent.

Mr. Norton

Then the average must have been substantially less than that?

Mr. J. Lynch

Yes.

Mr. Cosgrave

It never reached one per cent?

Mr. J. Lynch

No. The extractions were not all made from the one place. The extractions would be made from where the largest body of ore would be but with comparatively lower copper content. I understand that the best method of production is where the largest body of ore with the lower content is married to the smaller body of ore with the higher content.

Mr. Norton

If the Mianraí report showed one per cent. of ore and if there was 2.7 per cent. in 9 million tons, the average should have been well over one per cent.?

Mr. J. Lynch

There is another consideration which is that the copper content as established by borings may not necessarily be maintained when the flotation plant has worked on it. There may have been some lightening of part of the borings generally and the tailings might have been taking away too much of the ore. The assays of the copper when it is worked may not be as good as the assay when it is first extracted. In taking it out and mixing it around in whatever way they do it, there could be some loss and that might account for some of the lower copper contents which they found in practice.

To come back to the monthly output, having regard to the copper content of the ore extracted, I was informed that to reach a break-even figure, the mines would have to produce 80,000 tons a month. As a result of the cavings-in to which I referred already, they were driven back from that 80,000 which they reached in early 1961 and in several months in 1959 and, by reason of a shortage of money at times, they were unable to maintain their equipment at the level that would make it as efficient as it should be.

Apparently mining equipment deteriorates very quickly and needs a steady inflow of capital to maintain it properly. The company did not find it possible to get the necessary money for this in their own country and had to depend for these injections, as they have been called, on this country from time to time. The lack of capital has hit them particularly hard in the past six months or so when production fell to 60,000 roughly in October and November of last year, to 50,000 tons in January-February and to 41,000 tons in April of this year. There has been a slight improvement recently by reason of the fact that they have been able to buy some equipment on the understanding that the Government would pay for it. It was 54,000 tons in May and that is the last figure we have. The total tonnage extracted to date is 2,750,000.

As far as the capital structure is concerned, the actual equity investment of the Canadians is £1.6 million. I think I allowed Deputy Sweetman to go slightly astray earlier on because I was unable to get a sufficiently quick grasp of the figures he quoted, but this is the true picture. The Irish Life Assurance Company loans secured by the two mortgages amounted to £1.918 million; the advances by the State are £240,000 plus £70,000 which has been paid since, a total of £310,000 to date. Then there are loans from Canadian sources. I do not know whether I am authorised to give details of these at this stage but I think if I say that they were £269,000, £89,300, £59,200 and £69,200, I might be helping the Deputy who asked the question. The last mentioned figure was in respect of a certain piece of equipment. There is some doubt as to whether that should have been paid for out of sums we are now voting.

Mr. Norton

Are these the liabilities of the Canadian group? These borrowings carry no guarantee of repayment by the State or the Irish Assurance Company?

Mr. J. Lynch

I mentioned a figure of £1.918 millions, plus £310,000 advanced by the State——

Mr. Norton

The figures now mentioned are borrowings by the Canadian group from their Canadian friends?

Mr. J. Lynch

The equity investment was £1.6 million.

Mr. Sweetman

That, of course, is not in accordance with the arrangement made. The arrangement was that their equity investment would be in excess of £2,000,000. Is there not a repayment of £350,000?

Mr. J. Lynch

The repayment of the £540,000 still is outstanding.

Mr. Sweetman

Were they not to pay that at a specific time?

Mr. J. Lynch

The total Canadian investment is £2,000,000.

Mr. Norton

Does that include plant?

Mr. Sweetman

It includes the £62,000.

Mr. J. Lynch

That was for a conveyor and crusher.

Mr. Sweetman

Those are different figures from those the Minister gave last February. There was an item of £550,000.

Mr. J. Lynch

It was £1.918 million.

Mr. Sweetman

How does the Minister reconcile £1.918 million——

Mr. J. Lynch

Their commitment was to provide an equity equivalent to £2,250,000. I cannot account for the figure in respect of equity investment but they got by other means almost as much as they were obliged to spend.

Mr. Norton

So they backed it to the extent of £2,250,000 either by equity or borrowings?

Mr. J. Lynch

Not quite £2,250,000. I shall have to make it up again now. I shall not finish tonight and will have more details on these figures tomorrow. I shall have something to say on another matter to which I had not intended to refer.

Mr. Sweetman

I know it is rather difficult to follow these figures without having them on a table in front of one.

Mr. J. Lynch

The local Deputies asked me for certain details about keeping the mine open until such time at least as the Dáil has a chance of discussing their future. It will take three or four months to have this independent survey carried out. It was impossible for me on any advice I could get to estimate what this survey would cost or what it would cost to maintain production on the scale envisaged. It was for that reason I wanted the £250,000, including a balance between the commitments that would be required to be met and that £250,000 as a token Estimate. I may return to the Dáil in the autumn when we will have, I hope, the survey completed. If not, I may come back to the House anyway to look for authorisation for whatever money in excess of what we are now voting will have been spent.

Mr. Norton

I take it that the mines will be still operating when the Dáil reassembles—that we will get an opportunity of reconsidering the matter before there is any decision to close the mines?

Mr. J. Lynch

Three months is the minimum period in which this survey could be completed. Time will be in favour of honouring an undertaking.

Mr. Sweetman

Was there ever a mining survey completed within the stipulated time?

Mr. J. Lynch

There is an obvious difficulty in getting this independent survey going. One must establish two things—the expert and his independence. I have taken steps along the lines Deputy Sweetman envisaged to secure somebody who is well-known in the mining world and who is a particularly good friend of this country.

Mr. Norton

There is such a gentleman in Dublin at the moment.

Mr. J. Lynch

There could be.

Mr. McQuillan

They are all friendly to this country on St. Patrick's Day.

Mr. J. Lynch

It is a matter of getting somebody who will have expertise.

Mr. M.P. Murphy

So the Minister anticipates he will require a further amount in the autumn. That will be the third time in the course of the present year that he will have come to the House looking for money for those mines.

Mr. Norton

And none for Allihies.

Mr. J. Lynch

Since the Deputy mentioned it, Avoca is in production; Allihies is not. In so far as I may have omitted some points mentioned in the debate or have failed to give certain figures, I shall try to give them in the morning. In the meantime, I would point out now that I was asked during the course of the debate how these mines were related to the nitrogenous fertiliser factory. It had not been my intention to refer to that matter at all at this stage. Now, however, it is my intention to deal with that relationship very fully in the morning.

Mr. Norton

Could the Minister tell us whether he will be continuing with his reply at the opening of Business in the morning?

Mr. J. Lynch

Yes, I hope so.

Progress reported; Committee to sit again.