Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 29 Jan 1964

Vol. 207 No. 1

Private Members' Business. - Extradition Bill, 1963—Second Stage (Resumed).

Question again proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time".

Mr. M.J. O'Higgins

Before the debate was adjourned, I was about to refer to section 38 and the difficulties which may exist in relation to this section. This is the section which provides that when a person has been extradited, he shall not be proceeded against, sentenced or imprisoned or otherwise restricted in his personal freedom for any offence committed prior to his surrender other than that for which he was surrendered, with two exceptions which are set out in the section. The first exception is, except it is with the consent of the requested country, that is, the country which has complied with the request for extradition made to it. Secondly, it is where the person who has been extradited, having had an opportunity to leave the State, has not done so within 45 days of his final discharge in respect of the offence.

It may be that the only remedy is to accept it on faith, which seems to be what the Minister felt was the position but the difficulty I see about this is that, no matter what the intentions are, it does not seem to me that this Bill or any other Bill we can introduce can give any guarantee that that section will be implemented. After all, the section in effect is laying down in our legislation what is to be done in another country. I am prepared to accept that other countries who have signed or have accepted the European Convention on extradition will have a reciprocal arrangement with this country in relation to this matter because it is laid down in Article 14 of the Convention and section 38 of the Bill follows very closely the wording laid down in Article 14.

The final matter I want to mention is in relation to the backing of Northern Ireland and British warrants. In this case also it is provided in section 45 that a warrant will not be endorsed for execution if the Minister, or the High Court if the question has been referred to the court, directs that it should not be endorsed and this subsection (2) of that section lays down the particular cases in which the Minister or the court, as the case may be, will direct that the warrant should not be endorsed, and those, briefly, are, first of all, a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence.

Here again the point I raised earlier on the general question of extradition applies, as to who should decide whether an offence is a political offence or an offence related to a political offence. I feel, as I have already mentioned, that that decision is one of sufficient importance to warrant its being taken by the Government rather than by an individual Minister.

The second category of warrants which will not be endorsed for execution are in respect of offences under the military law which are not offences under the ordinary criminal law. That, again, is on a par with the similar provision in relation to extradition.

Thirdly, there are revenue offences which, again, is on a par with the position for extradition. Then the subsection finishes up:

or that there are substantial reasons for believing that the person to whom the warrant relates will be prosecuted for a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence against military law which is not an offence under ordinary criminal law.

What I am a little puzzled about in connection with this section—I should like the Minister to explain it further —is that in relation to political offences and the backing of Northern Ireland warrants, this section does not seem to me to go anything like as far as section 11 which deals with the question of extradition for political offences. I mean, taking political offences or offences connected with political offences simpliciter, the two provisions are the same but in section 11 there is added the subsection which says that the same rule, that is, that there will not be extradition, shall apply if there are substantial grounds for believing that a request for extradition for an ordinary criminal offence has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons.

I do not want to say anything which would in any way be regarded as casting a slur on the administration of affairs in the North or questioning their bona fides but I think the Minister might take into account the fact that his Leader only today answered a Parliamentary Question on the general question of discrimination and, as I understood the Taoiseach's reply, it was to the effect that he accepted that there was discrimination and that representations had from time to time been made to the British Government with regard to it.

If that is the Taoiseach's belief and the belief of the Government it would seem to me to warrant the inclusion of a provision such as is in subsection (2) of section 11, or some similar provision, with section 45, dealing with the backing of warrants. In other words, to include it on the question of backing of warrants as well as including it on the question of extradition. The Minister might, at any rate, have a look at that.

Mr. Sherwin

This is a Bill for lawyers. Nevertheless, we can have a few opinions. An attempt on the life of a head of State will not be looked upon as a political offence. If we have any extradition treaty with other countries and someone who is here attempts to take the life of the head of one of the States with which we have such a treaty, he will not be handed over. Does the question not arise that the head of State might be a dictator, that he might have usurped authority? Surely you must qualify this mention of "head of State"? Is it the head of a duly elected Government? There can be all sorts of heads of State. Take, for example, what is happening in Africa at the moment. Such events might happen elsewhere. Do we still hand over any person?

Mr. Haughey

We would have the arrangement only with countries about which we are satisfied.

Mr. Sherwin

You cannot always guarantee that those things will not happen in countries with which you have a treaty. It is stated in a morning newspaper that the passing of this Bill could mean that a lot of people in the south might now be involved. The Bill actually is not retrospective.

Mr. Haughey

It is.

Mr. Sherwin

I am no authority, but my reading of the Constitution is that no Act may be passed here that is retrospective in its effect.

Mr. McGilligan

No. The section says that nothing shall be made a criminal offence that was not so at the date of its commission.

Mr. Sherwin

The only point I want to make is how you will define "head of State".

Mr. McGilligan

In so far as we have a piece of legislation proposing to put extradition on a different basis, nobody can disagree. International society has got to the point that there is general agreement that we should not allow each other's criminals to hide in our territory. If it were merely a matter of the ordinary criminal, the position would be clear. Take a person who is charged with an offence against, say, the statutes regarding larceny, burglary, housebreaking, and so on. That is all right. But there is a certain amount of deep water and rather turbulent water into which one might get in this matter.

The general principle accepted since 1870 and tied into a piece of statutory legislation which applied to us when we were part of the United Kingdom, was the Extradition Act, 1870. A couple of principles were observed in that. The first was that no country will send back people who are alleged to have broken the revenue laws of another country. Criminality is one thing but a breach of the revenue laws is another. The courts have been quite clear about that.

Take the person who owes money, say, for income tax, estate duty, and so on, and who does not pay but leaves and goes to another country. Many efforts have been made in all such countries to get such people sent back so that they could be subjected to the ordinary pressure of imprisonment, and so on, in order to make them pay their debts of a revenue or estate type. That has always been resisted.

In the second case, people will not hand back those who are sought because they are alleged to have committed offences political in their character. Those are the two big exceptions. The ordinary up-to-date procedure has been quite effective.

The Minister has circulated a memorandum. There is a certain amount of comment as to whether Orders made under the 1870 Act would be regarded as binding. In 1931, I was fairly conversant with the names of people for whom we were looking who had gone to the United States. I know of no case in which a State refused to accept an extradition arrangement on the ground that the arrangement had been made with England and not with us. In other words, the 1870 Act and all the Orders made under it were tacitly accepted as applying between ourselves when we emerged as a State and the other countries in respect of which these Orders had been made.

There were occasions when we asked to have certain people, whom we alleged to be criminals and whom we knew to be in the United States, sent back. They were not, but it was not the case that the United States said the Orders under which we asked them to send back these people were invalid. It was simply that they could not get their hands on the people. We tried to get certain people sent back. They were not sent back. But the answer is that there was no difficulty with regard to operating the old arrangements as between ourselves and, say, America— those arrangements having originated between the United Kingdom and America.

I know of no occasion except under the Petty Sessions Act, 1851, where the arrangements for handing back what I call ordinary criminals had broken down. It is probably better to tidy up the situation. Are we breaking new ground? We are, in certain things, and some of them I do not like.

The old arrangement about extradition was that there was the extraditing country and the country by which the request was made—the requesting country and the requested country. There had to be two points of view before there was any Order. If an effort were made for an extradition or any sending back of a person guilty of a criminal offence, the requesting country gave evidence which convinced the requested country that there was a prima facie case that an offence had been committed. We are wiping that out.

The solid test now is: have proceedings of a criminal type been instituted? That is a very easy matter to write down in legislation and it becomes binding. It is well known that in England in the past four or five years the Revenue Commissioners —I suppose, frustrated and annoyed by the number of people found to be evading the tax laws there—have decided to bring prosecutions against individuals in relation to tax offences. They allege they have made false declarations for the purpose of depriving the Revenue of what it should get. Those are taken in the criminal courts. There is no doubt that in relation to what we would call an ordinary Revenue matter to be fought out in our Chancery Courts, under the present English administration, they parade such a person before their criminal courts.

Take a person who, 25 years ago would have been asked in the courts to give reasons why he had defaulted on the Revenue, on just debts to the State. If that person came across here under such conditions that those who investigated the matter felt a prima facie case had been made, and if the background were a revenue matter, we would not send back that person. I do not know how that will fit into the new scheme because, for Revenue matters, prosecutions may be instituted. Take a person who is prosecuted for a revenue matter, clearly and distinctly for non-payment of income tax or estate duty. Supposing it is clear that it is just for that reason that a prosecution has been instituted, will we let that override the ordinary prohibition that existed that we did not surrender people if the charge against them was really a revenue matter or was what they called “political”?

The situation may change somewhat because of the English procedure. I hope we shall still hold fast to that principle that we shall not surrender people if the charge in the background, no matter how framed, is for Revenue defalcation; in other words, that we will let that be the basis of our decision. For those reasons I would prefer to have a prima facie case made instead of merely the Minister being faced with proceedings being started, by saying there is a summons, there is a warrant for that man's arrest, which seems to be the deciding point here.

Secondly, there is this political matter. I see on the first page of the Minister's statement that we are to provide on a reciprocal basis for the enforcement of warrants for ordinary criminal offences emanating from Northern Ireland. Then the exceptions are made, about revenue matters, political matters and things attached to political matters, and then there is the peculiar phrase "purely military matters". I would put the test question at once. If this had been the law five years ago and there was an IRA foray across the Border and in that foray a member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary was killed and if there was identification of the person who killed that Royal Ulster Constabulary man, would that be a political offence or would it be a purely military offence? I do not know what the word "purely" means. We talk about offences which are subject to military law. If that is all——

Mr. Haughey

It does not matter. They are both out.

Mr. McGilligan

A military man is not entitled to kill except under certain conditions.

Mr. Haughey

Both categories are excluded.

Mr. McGilligan

Is an IRA foray across the Border a military matter?

Mr. Haughey

It does not matter.

Mr. McGilligan

Or is it a political matter?

Mr. Haughey

It is a question of fact.

Mr. McGilligan

I am taking what we know happened in the past five or six years—a raid by the IRA across the Border in which a Royal Ulster Constabulary man is killed. We did not ever know who fired the fatal shot but supposing he was known and the North of Ireland Government made a request for his extradition, then is it to be refused on the grounds that this is a political offence? I am sure the Minister must have considered this matter because it jumped at once to the eyes of everyone who read this. We ought be clear on it. I am quite clear. Any such killing is murder and could not be excluded on the ground that it is a political offence. Will the Minister agree? The Minister does not answer. This matter must have been considered. How are the exceptions to be ruled? The Minister is going to rule on them for a period but there may be a question of habeas corpus in the High Court or under some other conditions but could we not get rid of this matter? Surely any such foray that ends in murder is not a political offence?

Mr. Haughey

Deputy McGilligan would be the first to complain if I interrupted him as he is speaking. We are not going to conduct this on the basis of question and answer.

Mr. McGilligan

The Minister can answer later. I am not putting a question in a rhetorical way. I want to know the answer. Have we at least got standards by which that is to be charged on the ordinary standards of taking human life unlawfully? I am told this is all to be done on a reciprocal basis and a lot of it will depend on whether other States with which we try to enter into reciprocal arrangements accept our conditions. On the second page of the Minister's statement, he says that it is proposed to negotiate formal extradition agreements in due course. I want to find out what is proposed.

There were two cases which agitated constitutional lawyers in England in recent years. One was the case of Dr. Soblen. Dr. Soblen was a man who was found guilty of what amounted to treason in the United States of America and he was convicted. He escaped on a passport of his brother and first of all got as far as Israel. From Israel, he was sent in an aircraft to England and then here but he would not be allowed to land and eventually he went back to England. I understand that his complaint to his counsel was that he was told here that nothing would happen to him when he went back to England. His case, I think, went to the highest court in England. He had landed there but there was an aliens order against him. He could have been prevented from landing but he had committed certain depredations on his own body which meant that he was an ambulance case when he arrived and they let him land. The question was, having a footing in England, even though by a subterfuge, whether he was entitled to seek the courts on a habeas corpus application. In the habeas corpus application, it was agreed the offence was a non-extraditable offence. They took refuge under their Aliens Act. We have an Aliens Act but whether we have the same order, I do not know. I do not know the details of it. In the end, he was sent back but I think he never got to the United States because he committed suicide on the way to the plane. It was held that he had no resort to habeas corpus.

Can that situation arise here? If somebody like the Minister for Justice makes an order, he is not a judicial person. He has no right, particularly in a criminal matter, to decide something against an alleged criminal. I know that in England this was held to be non-extraditable; he had landed under a subterfuge, and the order of the Home Secretary was that he be sent back to his own country. Can that happen here? It is an involved question, but I should like to know the answer.

The other question in England raised a different controversy. A Chief of one of the new States in Africa got as far as England and an application was made either to have him extradited or, in any event, sent out of the country. There was considerable delay and a great deal of confusion of thought and the Parliamentary discussion about his case was postponed two or three times. There was a delay of a few months but in the end he was sent back.

That brings me to the next point. There was a great controversy in the English Parliament about this man, Chief Enahoro. The contention raised on his behalf was that he was extradited for a particular offence and could not be tried for other offences. The point made was that it was all very well to extradite a man for something that could mean a term of imprisonment but it was quite a different thing to extradite a man on a subterfuge and have him tried for something which might mean the loss of his life. It was solemnly stated in the House of Commons by persons like the Home Secretary and possibly the Attorney General, that he could not be tried on a capital offence and that a promise had been got. At the same time, when that man arrived back, although he had been promised legal aid, the people whom he regarded as proper to defend him were refused permission to enter the country. The result was that he got what was from his point of view an unsatisfactory trial.

All that turns on a point that was clearly met in the old extradition arrangement. When we were part of the United Kingdom, the arrangement was that, if a man was extradited on a particular offence, he could not be charged, when he arrived back in the country to which he was extradited, with another offence. That was a matter for reciprocal arrangement. There is a section here which is intended presumably to meet the situation. It applies to a person who has been surrendered to the State by a requested country. Subsection (2) states: "He shall not be proceeded against, sentenced or imprisoned or otherwise restricted in his personal freedom for any offence committed prior to his surrender...." Certain exceptions follow, but they are not of any great consequence. That was an effort to close the door on what was alleged in Chief Enahoro's case, that he was asked back on offence "A" and was then going to be charged on a much more serious offence which entailed capital punishment. Here, as far as our law is concerned, he shall not be proceeded against, sentenced or imprisoned for any offence prior to his surrender other than that for which he was surrendered. How can we impose that on a country that asks for surrender except by reciprocal arrangement? Is it intended that arrangement will encompass all that field?

Mr. Haughey

It must.

Mr. McGilligan

Do not tell me it must. Is it intended that it will? We will not enter into a reciprocal arrangement unless this is involved. Very good. That means, therefore, that we make the case that if Britain wants to get back under her control a man who has been summoned for what is a criminal offence, the offence of not paying his just debts to the Revenue, and we surrender him because a prosecution has been instituted, can he be charged criminally with what we consider is only a civil offence in this country? Are we going to make it clear, if we enter into a reciprocal arrangement with Britain, that we will not accept their ruling as to whether a matter is or is not criminal? The matter will have to be criminal under our law before we will agree to any such arrangement.

The second step—it might mean the full closing of the door—is that we will not enter into any arrangement with Britain, irrespective of whether or not they institute a prosecution, if the offence for which they ask us to surrender a man is, in our opinion, a civil offence. Take a revenue matter. The British start a prosecution. It looks to them to be good from the point of view of their legislation. Proceedings have been instituted. The first hurdle has been cleared. We then find that they are going to charge a man with something that is criminal in their jurisdiction but only a civil matter in ours. That closes the door at that point. We will have nothing to do with it.

These are the two main points I want to have cleared up. I note there are over 40 countries with which the United Kingdom made treaties and arrangements. My best advice informs me that that still obtains. I know of no action—I can be contradicted—as a result of which those reciprocal arrangements with the United Kingdom do not apply to us. That would mean that there are 40 countries with which there are reciprocal arrangements.

I notice at page 3 of the Minister's statement there are six members of the Council of Europe which have ratified the Convention on Extradition and I presume that, with regard to these countries, there would be a clause corresponding to our Clause 38 providing a person shall not be proceeded against for any offence prior to his surrender or other than the offence on which he is surrendered. On page 3 it is also stated by the Minister that "This requirement"—that is, of a prima facie case—“is a feature of the Anglo-American tradition.” That is our tradition. “In the Continental civil law countries generally, extradition may be allowed on evidence that a person is wanted for prosecution or punishment under an order of a competent authority” and the Minister then says we would recognise or subscribe to the view that these people would not move except in a proper way. He goes on to say that, if a warrant for the arrest of a person on a criminal charge has been issued, we would take it that the warrant was not improperly issued. Will that be our test? A warrant issues for the arrest of a person, a summons for something, which may be criminal in the requesting country and civil in ours and will we say: “Very good; the conditions are fulfilled”? Will we say to Mr. So-and-So: “Back you go”? I do not think that is right.

The Minister disturbs me when he speaks on page 4 of a "conviction emanating from that country". I cannot understand that. Mr. A a citizen of Great Britain has come here. I can understand the situation in which the British can issue a warrant for his arrest or a summons issues against him with details of a conviction. Does that mean a conviction in the person's absence? They have tried to get hold of a person and, in his absence, they have proceeded to conviction. That is contrary to all the rules of jurisprudence to which this country adheres: a person must be present when he is tried. That holds good in England. This may apply in the case of a man who is arrested, brought before a court, and then escapes. But that is very unlikely and I do not think we should make any provision for it.

Mr. Haughey

It happened only the other day.

Mr. McGilligan

It happens occasionally. Is that meant to relieve my doubts about this whole matter? Halfway down page 4 the Minister says that what he has said so far does not apply to an offence of a political, revenue or purely military character. That "military character" is a peculiar phrase. What does the word "military" mean? I know a military offence is one contrary to our Defence Forces Act or to the corresponding Act in Britain. "Purely military character" seems to me to confuse the whole issue. It could be claimed that action by the IRA is of a military character. It could even be claimed to be of a "purely military character". It would have a political objective. But, even if it had, that is not of course any ground for escape. This should be a reason for refusing a request for extradition. I have my doubts that it will be regarded in that way and I want to reiterate my view that this ought not to be regarded as an offence of a purely military character just as I think it should not be regarded as political.

Towards the end of page 4, the Minister again speaks of:

... reasonable grounds for thinking that an offence against that country's laws has been committed by the person whose surrender is requested.

We are now back to the reasonable grounds. This seems to be coming back to the prima facie case. The reasonable grounds are surely grounds that appear to us to be reasonable and not simply because they are regarded by people in the requesting country as reasonable grounds? Surely we have a right to pass our own judgment on those matters? That is where I feel that the old standard of requiring a prima facie case to be made meant that a case had to be considered by the Government authorities here, the Minister, the High Court or the Supreme Court on habeas corpus. They would have to decide there were reasonable grounds to suspect an offence had been committed. No matter about this Convention, there are ways of writing in your own law into these international conventions. This international convention has not yet been accepted as part of our domestic law in this country and it does not rule here, although it looks from another statement by the Minister as if we intend to make it part of our domestic law. However, we have not done so yet.

There is also the case of a man who has gone through a period of trial, gone through a length of sentence and who has then, somehow, got here. When we come to our nationals, it is stated in the Minister's speech:

It is the intention that extradition of citizens will be allowed only on a basis of reciprocity. As a consequence of making provision for non-extradition of citizens, Section 37 provides that an Irish citizen who has been accused of committing an offence in a country with which we have an extradition arrangement may be prosecuted for the offence in our courts where that country has requested that such proceedings be taken and the Attorney General so directs.

I want again to come back to the case —there is no question about it—of nationals of this country crossing the Border in a raid. They commit the offence of murder. Say one person is identified. He comes back here. The situation is that he is a national of our country. We do not like extraditing our nationals for other Governments to try. Take a national of our country who has committed what was clearly an extraditable offence, if it was not for this difficulty about his being a citizen of this country. We may prosecute that person here for the offence in a country with which we have an extradition arrangement where that country requests that such proceedings be taken and the Attorney General so directs. Say some of these people engage in a foray across the Border, commit a crime and come back here. I must say that if I were the person whose fate was in issue and I was faced with the alternative of being tried here in the Twenty-Six Counties or of being handed over to the Six County judges for trial, I think I know what my choice would be. But the situation is apparently that we cannot try such a person here unless the country where the offence was committed has requested it.

I do not mind the Attorney General's consent. That would probably follow if the other country consented. In the case I am speaking about, it would mean that unless the Six County Government requested us to try such a man here, we could not do it. Then you travel back to the other situation. This is an extraditable offence. Do we hand the person over or excuse him on the grounds of an operation of a purely military character or of a political matter? These are the rather deep and somewhat muddy waters into which we get in dealing with this matter of extradition.

The Minister says in page 7 of his speech:

May I say before leaving Part II that an endeavour has been made to follow the text of the European Convention as far as practicable. This procedure has considerable advantages from the point of view of establishing uniformity of interpretation. Our courts will be able to have regard to decisions of foreign courts on the provision of this Convention when interpreting the provisions of Part II and of extradition agreements to which we become party.

How will we, unless it will be that it is intended to make this international convention part of our domestic law? Until that is done our courts will not merely turn a blind eye; they will say they cannot see and they will not listen. Take the Lawless case. There they decided the Convention on Human Rights had been agreed to by this country, but it was not part of our domestic law and they could not judge on it. Is it intended that this European Convention will be made part of our domestic law? If so, I can see the courts turning to their own interpretation of what the conditions are and probably getting help from their colleagues in other countries who joined with us in agreeing to this international convention. But until this convention is made part of our domestic law, the courts would pay no attention to decisions made by foreign courts in the interpretation of an international agreement not part of our domestic law. But they would have a different attitude and would be inclined to listen to other interpretations, if we adhered to the international convention and made it part of our domestic law. But only in those circumstances.

As far back as the Petty Sessions Act of 1851 is concerned and the backing of warrants from the North, I am glad we are trying to bring an end to the confusion that has arisen. That confusion has arisen only in the last three years. The provisions of Section 29 of that Act and the backing of warrants went fairly smoothly up to about three years ago. There was a certain amount of messing around—I must say this by way of criticism—with what was required under the Petty Sessions Act, 1851. I have no doubt the result of that has been to draw down judgments from the courts in very special cases casting doubts as to whether the Petty Sessions Act applies to the whole country or only to the Dublin Metropolitan Police Area. That has occurred because of what, I must say on reading the case, we must decide to be irregularities in the operation of the Petty Sessions Act of 1851. However, we are going to get rid of that.

The Minister said in his speech:

... provision has been made for prohibiting the surrender of persons who are accused of political offences, offences connected with such offences, purely military offences or revenue offences and in cases where there are substantial reasons for believing that the persons concerned will be prosecuted for political offences or offences connected with them or for purely military offences.

Deputy O'Higgins drew attention to the fact that in the general extradition proposal, not the one for Northern Ireland, those precautions are not specifically stated. I hope they will be retained in regard to general extradition and reciprocal arrangements and that we will not surrender persons accused of political offences, offences connected with such offences, purely military offences or revenue offences or in cases where there are substantial reasons for believing that the persons concerned will be prosecuted for political offences or offences connected with them or for purely military offences. It comes back to what I mentioned already. We will be tied down hard and fast if we surrender a person for a specific criminal matter No other offence can possibly be brought against that man when he goes into the jurisdiction of another country. While we want to uphold this principle of getting rid of each other's criminals we do not want to have any breach in the old-time law in regard to political offences so that by a subterfuge a man is brought back on an alleged criminal offence and tried on something which is not connected with a criminal matter at all.

I see that on page 8 there is reference to a safeguard of the individual's rights in the provision that a person arrested on a British or a Northern Ireland warrant must be given a reasonable opportunity of consulting a solicitor. I have not read the extradition proposals in detail but I presume that that would be part of the ordinary extradition proposals. In this phrase, it is related to arrests on Northern Ireland or British warrants. If a person is arrested on a United States warrant or a French warrant, surely he ought to be given the right to consult a solicitor? I hope that is covered in the proposals.

In regard to the Minister for Justice, this is not a matter to put into the hands of an individual Minister. Without meaning any criticism of an individual Minister, I say this is a Government matter and I imagine in every case it would be a matter for a Government decision. However, it should be clearly stated that it is not a ministerial point of view but a Government decision.

I am glad to see—and I want to see what the machinery is—an effort to retain the right to habeas corpus and the right to apply to the High Court for a direction for release on various grounds; in other words, that a person is not entirely tied either to a ministerial or a Government decision. I want to pursue the details of that procedure before Committee Stage in order to ensure that the machinery of access to the High Court and to the Supreme Court by way of habeas corpus is not blocked by a ministerial or Government decision. We do not want such a change in the law that, because there is a ministerial decision saying some offence is not a political offence, it will not be possible to ventilate that matter still further before the final court in this country.

I object to the law which says "the Act will apply in relation to an offence whether committed or alleged to have been committed before or after the passing of this Act." Supposing this measure goes through by Eastertime, I would prefer that we would start from then. I am not forgetting the countries with which we have extradition treaties and they can still be honoured, but in so far as we are making new law, I do suggest that, even though some people would benefit by it, it would be better to have that than have all this inquisition going back 20 or 25 years investigating the records and the activities of people in respect of offences or alleged offences committed years before the passing of this measure.

The Minister's memorandum is quite clear on that. It says:

As regards Northern Ireland warrants, which will be coming here for the first time, the section will permit the endorsement and enforcement of warrants for crimes alleged to have been committed at any time in the past.

There is no limitation but we should write it in in this matter. I do not want statistics in this connection promulgated to the House, but the Department must know how many cases there are of applications not being effectively made to our courts because of some technical defect in the warrant. I should imagine there are not many. It is wrong anyway to have a person sent back no matter when he committed the crime. After all if a person had been sentenced years ago he would have gained remission of sentence. The Minister says on page 10:

.... It can be fairly claimed that the enforcement of the criminal law in these islands has been brought to a commendable degree of efficiency while preserving fully the rights of the individual.

That is what I am questioning. I am not sure that has been done. While it is accepted that we do not want to have other people's criminals here and that it is desirable to have criminals who are nationals of ours sent back to wherever the crime has been committed, if we start from the date of the passing of this Act, it will be a good and commendable situation. I do not like this idea of digging back into the past and raking up all sorts of things. Furthermore, it is not right to go the length of making things criminal in this country which were not so at the date of their commission. Unless they were clearly criminal at the date of their commission, it is unconstitutional to accept them as criminal under these provisions.

Mr. Coogan

I am not quite clear in regard to the reciprocal arrangements under this legislation. I should like the Minister to define them at a later stage. We have seen the form of justice meted out to Irish people in Great Britain, very savage sentences being imposed on them because they were Irish. Irish people over there are not all carrying haloes but an Irishman who goes up before a magistrate in Britain is looked down upon. This magistrate is one of the old school tie type brought up in an atmosphere which despises everything Irish and an Irishman is condemned before sentence is pronounced at all.

There is ample evidence of what is happening to many of our citizens. It may be said we are soft here but some of our young men have been given anything up to six months there for a crime for which we in this country might think two months would be a harsh sentence.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

That does not seem to arise on the Extradition Bill. The Deputy is dealing with sentences, a matter which has no relation to the Bill before the House.

Mr. Coogan

We are asked to accept British justice and for that reason I want to know what the position is. We should be chary about co-operation when it comes to punishing Irish citizens. That is what happened in the past when they came before magistrates in Great Britain and I must ask the Minister if he intends to co-operate in the dispensing of that type of justice. I only ask the Minister to let us know what his views are on this matter.

Mr. Haughey

So far, the discussion on this measure has consisted mainly of questions of one sort or another which have been addressed to me, questions dealing, in the main, with matters of interpretation. As Deputies realise, this is a very important measure and, to a large extent, a very technical one, so I feel that for a number of reasons it would be preferable if we left over discussions on these specific technical questions until Committee Stage. I feel that is desirable for two reasons: first, because it is certain that they will come up again on Committee Stage and, to that extent, we will be duplicating our work; and, in addition, because of their technical and somewhat complicated nature, it is only with the freedom of discussion we have on Committee Stage that we can deal with them as fully and adequately as we should.

Deputy McGilligan posed one question, at least, of considerable and fundamental importance with which I should like to deal at this stage. I do not think he had full regard to section 45 of the Bill when he spoke of our proposed arrangements with Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I should have thought section 45 clearly spelled out the situation with regard to political, military and revenue offences. First of all, let me deal with the question of purely military offences. I should have thought it was clear from the wording of section 45 that purely military offences in that category mean offences against military law which are not offences under criminal law.

Deputy McGilligan also posed a question to me about IRA forays across the Border. I think the simple answer to that question is that the Bill lays down clear and precise machinery for dealing with any situation which may arise. The Bill indicates that, when a warrant comes to us for endorsement, we have to decide whether it comes within any of these exempted categories. The decision in the first place as to whether or not it is a political offence will be taken by me, as Minister for Justice. Here in passing let me assure Deputies that this would be a Government matter. The Bill speaks exclusively of the Minister for Justice, but in this regard the Minister for Justice would act only on the advice and instructions of the Government. When the Minister for Justice would decide that it either was or was not a political offence, or that he was going to refer the matter to the High Court, that decision by the Minister for Justice would be taken on the facts of any particular case coming before him and, of course, the same would apply if the case were referred by him to the High Court. In the case of any warrant coming for decision as to whether or not it should be endorsed for execution, it would be taken on the facts of the case and in accordance with the procedures laid down in the Bill.

Mr. M.J. O'Higgins

I do not want to interrupt the Minister, but the point is that the Bill is retrospective in the sense that it can apply to what happened in the past. Deputy McGilligan referred to matters which everyone knows are matters of fact and I think he was trying to ascertain whether the Minister regarded them as in the category of political offences or military offences or offences for which warrants would be backed.

Mr. Haughey

I can only say that that is a purely hypothetical question. We have had a number of incidents of one sort or another, out of any one of which we could have been presented with a warrant if this Bill were law——

Mr. M.J. O'Higgins

Or may be.

Mr. Haughey

On that aspect of the matter, I should like to say it would not be my intention that this Bill would operate, as Deputy McGilligan suggested, retrospectively for anything like 25 years. I should imagine that three or four years, or something like that, would be the maximum extent to which it would operate in practice. As I said, as we all know, there have been incidents arising out of which we could, at any time if this Bill were law, have been presented with warrants for execution and we may indeed be in the future, but I think it is not for us here dealing with this measure to deal with that sort of hypothetical situation.

When the Bill becomes law, the decision whether or not to endorse any warrant is one which will have to be taken in the light of the surrounding circumstances and of our knowledge of the particular case concerned. The Bill provides that if the Minister for Justice does not wish himself to decide whether or not the offence is political, he can refer the matter to the High Court for decision. That procedure is enshrined in the Bill. It also makes quite clear the type of offence for which surrender will not be granted and that is, I think, as far as it is necessary for us to deal with the matter at this stage.

With regard to the general question of extradition arrangements with countries apart from Northern Ireland and Britain, the important thing is, I think, the reciprocity aspect of the matter. This is also the answer to the question posed by Deputy Sherwin. We will, of course, of necessity, automatically have extradition arrangements with any of the 16 members of the Council of Europe who ratify the Convention. We must take it that all these 16 countries which are associated with us in the Council of Europe are countries with whose judicial and legal systems we are quite satisfied.

Outside those 16 countries, we would make extradition and reciprocal arrangements only with countries about whose legal processes and political set-ups, and so on, we were perfectly satisfied. We would not enter into extradition arrangements with any country unless we were assured from our knowledge of the situation that anyone we would send back would be guaranteed a fair trial. I think that is the answer to the question which Deputy McGilligan has posed about the Soblen case in Britain.

As I remember that case, the British Home Secretary was criticised because he exercised his powers under the Aliens Act and a similar situation could, of course, arise here. We could deport any alien whom we regarded as undesirable for a number of reasons. That procedure would still obtain and it would be ridiculous to suggest that the Government here or the Minister for Justice could not deport an undesirable alien simply because he could not be extradited. These are two entirely separate matters, two entirely different territories. We might well be deporting aliens to all sorts of places with which we had no extradition arrangements of any sort.

I want to repeat that the fundamental principle in Part II of the Bill is this question of our not being prepared to enter into any sort of reciprocal arrangement unless we are satisfied that the country concerned is a proper country with which to make such arrangements and that its legal and judicial system is such that it satisfies our notions of justice and fair play.

Deputy M.J. O'Higgins mentioned the question of religious discrimination in the North of Ireland. I want to say that a question of that kind is not relevant to this measure.

Mr. M.J. O'Higgins

On a point of correction, I simply raised the question of discrimination as raised in the Parliamentary Question replied to by the Taoiseach today.

Mr. Haughey

Deputy O'Higgins seems to suggest that we should incorporate in Part III of the Bill some sort of reference, as we have in Part II, to race, creed or nationality. It would be entirely inappropriate for us to suggest that in Northern Ireland or Britain such a qualification or prohibition is necessary. We must look at it this way: extradition—or in the case of Part III, not extradition but this special arrangement—can only come into operation where an offence has been committed or where there has been a prosecution for an offence. It is not an offence under Northern or British law to be a member of a particular religion or of any particular race or to have a particular nationality: it is impossible to envisage a situation where a person would be prosecuted there simply on the ground of being of a particular race, religion or nationality.

Therefore, I do not think it is really relevant and it would be quite inappropriate for us to insist on any such qualification in the case of either Britain or Northern Ireland.

I am glad that both Deputies McGilligan and O'Higgins have accepted as desirable that we should not permit our country to be a refuge for fugitives from justice from other countries and that we should be able to get back from other countries our citizens who have committed offences here. That is the basis of this legislation. What we are trying to do here is to ensure that and at the same time, as I said in my opening remarks, to build into the Bill and the system safeguards for the individuals concerned, to make sure that the machinery will only operate to bring to justice those who are guilty of criminal offences.

That is the general principle which we adopt in regard to the world at large. In the case of Britain and Northern Ireland, we have to keep in mind that we have complete freedom of movement and travel inside these islands and we should therefore in framing our arrangements keep that freedom of travel in mind. If justice is to be effectively administered inside these islands and at the same time we are to preserve this freedom of movement, then we must have some system in operation between us which is more immediate and effective than the rather cumbersome semi-diplomatic process of extradition itself.

It is for that reason we are establishing this arrangement with Britain and Northern Ireland—it can be regarded as a concomitant of freedom of travel in the three areas. It is a satisfactory arrangement, particularly since we have spelled out in the Bill all the offences which are excluded and the safeguards which are built in to protect the rights of individuals who may be concerned. I have nothing more to say at this stage except to hope that in principle the Bill is acceptable to the House, however we may argue afterwards on particular details or on the safeguards Deputies may feel should be inserted. All that we can do much more satisfactorily and much more comprehensively when we come to the Committee Stage.

Question put and agreed to.

Committee Stage ordered for Wednesday, 12th February, 1964.